Showing posts with label Global Economic Growth. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Global Economic Growth. Show all posts

Friday, June 21, 2013

21/6/2013: McKinsey Economic conditions Survey for H2 2013

Couple of interesting charts from the McKinsey Survey on global economic conditions (see full set of results here: http://www.mckinsey.com/Insights/Economic_Studies/Economic_Conditions_Snapshot_June_2013_McKinsey_Global_Survey_results?cid=other-eml-alt-mip-mck-oth-1306)


So the percentage of those who are saying the global economy is performing substantially better at the end of Q2 2013 is 36%, which is down on 43% in Q1 2013, signalling deterioration in the conditions. Percent of those who see any improvement in the global economy is down from 79% to 75% q/q. In terms of expectations forward:

Things are not going all too well in expectations 6mo forward either. 41% of all respondents are upbeat in expecting an improvement in global growth of H2 2013. Now, keep in mind, most of the official forecasts factor in significant uplifts in economic conditions in H2 2013 to deliver on annual targets set for 2013 at the end of 2012. Let's take a look at regions where H2 expectations were the most optimistic on the official side: 49% Eurozone executives expect things to improve, Asia-Pacific (especially China) 38% and North America 32%. Hmmm... nowhere over 50%. Sample biases are probably working toward reporting firms having more robust expectations, as the survey covers larger companies, with bigger investment pipelines, usually consistent with upside to expectations.

For their own countries:


Better vs Same/Worse percentages:

  • Asia-Pacific: 42% vs 59% in Q2 2012, against 38% vs 61% in Q1 2012. Own-country conditions confirm a 'no expansion' expectation in H2 2013
  • Developing markets: 35% vs 64% in Q2 against 47% vs 53% in Q1. Own-country conditions confirm a 'no expansion' expectation in H2 2013
  • Eurozone: 32% vs 68% in Q2 against 34% vs 66% in Q1. Own-country conditions confirm a 'no expansion' expectation in H2 2013
  • India: 45% vs 55% in Q2 against 60% vs 40% in Q1. Own-country conditions confirm a 'no expansion' expectation in H2 2013
  • North America: 54% vs 46% in Q2 against 43% vs 57% in Q1. Own-country conditions confirm a 'expansion' expectation in H2 2013
So of all regions, with exception of North America, own-executives signal no gains in growth in Q3-Q4 that is assumed ex ante in the official forecasts... time to go 'hmmmm...'

Monday, January 21, 2013

21/1/2013: Blackrock Institute Survey on Growth Conditions


Blackrock Investment Institute released latest summary of survey results for global growth outlook. Here are the charts by regions:

MENA:
 Western Europe & North America
 Latin America:
 Asia:

And summarising overall optimism levels for Western Europe and North America:

Good to see decent (not spectacular) performance for Ireland in the above (chart 2 and table above). Note: analysis is based on the surveys of professional economists.

Tuesday, January 15, 2013

15/1/2013: CFA Survey 2013: cautious optimism, equities exuberance?


CFA Institute annual survey of economic conditions was published yesterday and here are some core snapshots (full study available here):

Expectations change in favor of economic expansion:
 Interestingly, continued stronger optimism in EMEA as opposed to APAC, weaker optimism in APAC than in AMER, and EMEA as the core driver for growth expected. Another interesting point, although consistent with path dependency, is continued stronger growth expectations for Advanced economies as opposed to the Developing ones.

Euro area crisis continuation is the largest source of overall risk to global capital markets, at 37%, followed by concerns over economic conditions. CFA Members were divided on their expectations concerning the euro area crisis, with 23% expecting crisis easing, 35% expecting worsening and 42% expecting crisis conditions to remain at the levels of 2012. In other words, 77% expect no improvement in the euro area. An interesting snapshot into both path dependency of forecasts and anchoring of expectations is that most optimistic responses came from worst hit countries: Spain (53% expecting improvement) and Italy (46%), as well as from two countries least impacted: France (43%) and Germany (43%). Least optimistic countries are all outside the euro area: Russia (45%), UAE (41%), the US and Singapore (both at 39%) and S. Africa (38%).

Optimism about local economy expansion went up, slightly, from 42% in 2012 to 45% in 2013.
 The following chart plots the % of members indicating the biggest risk to their own local market in 2013.

And on Asset Class performance, equity seems to be king, as I predicted some time ago on foot of the long term decline in debt and liquidity over-supply globally:
Overall, 50% of respondents expect equities to provide highest total expected return, up on 41% in 2012. Asia Pacific region led in equities outperformance expectations (41% in 2012 on 30% in 2012). Cash saw a significant drop in expectations.

No major surprises then: the balance is between continued and ameliorating crisis, plus liquidity surplus sloshing into equities. The former is yet to play out, the latter has already begun.

Friday, November 23, 2012

23/11/2012: Global & Irish Outlook: few slides


My slides from today's presentation on the longer-range outlook for the Irish economy (and global) - you can click on each slide to open a larger image:

Friday, February 10, 2012

10/2/2012: Few thoughts on the global policy crisis

What makes me really concerned nowdays is not the ongoing crisis, but the logical and numeric impossibility of the mounting policy "solutions' to the crisis. Here's a quick synopsis. Take a look around the world:

  • Bank of England repeated QE rounds in the face of £1 trillion+ debt pile is a strategy for growth via debasement of the currency
  • Fed's continued unrelenting QE is much the same
  • ECB has been debasing any real connection between banks, real economy and banks profits via uninterrupted injection of cash into banks - giving a license to earn free profits on interest margins while monetizing already excessive Government debts. Real economy, of course, gets hammered by sterilization via reduced real credit flows. The end game - moral hazard of massive proportions in the financial sector across Europe
  • EU itself is hell-bent on debasing real incomes and wealth of its citizens by implementing the Fiscal Compact as the sole policy tool for dealing with the crisis
  • Obama Administration is debasing, in contrast with EU, the future generations' wealth and income by continuing to spend Federal dollars like a drunken sailor arriving in a casino
  • Ireland's Government is actively debasing the entire domestic economy, oblivious to the reality that households and businesses deleveraging is being prevented by banks and Government deleveraging - all for the sake of grand posturing of "We will pay all our debts" variety
  • Japan is engaged in an active pursuit of debasing Government balancesheet as the debt bubble spreads to Japanese Government bonds - now in negative yields
  • China is debasing its monetary and fiscal policies to deliver a 'soft landing' to the massive train wreck of its vastly bubble-like property and banking sectors
Close your eyes and think - how will the world be able to reverse out of these disastrous desperate policies in years ahead without completely shutting off growth via high interest rates, destabilized savings-investment links and in the presence of ever-rising public, private and corporate debts? What levels of inflation will be required to 'inflate' out of this mess? What degree of real wealth destruction has to be imposed on the ordinary people to sustain these gambles without a structured, orderly and coordinated restructuring of debts? What asset class and geography hedge can protect you from this avalanche of disastrous policy choices by the Western leaders?

Monday, April 12, 2010

Economics 12/04/2010: The next incoming train has left its first station

My current article on the longer term prospects for global economy, published in the current issue of Business & Finance magazine. This is an unedited version.

Forget the circus of the Euro zone Government’s bickering about Greece’s bailout package and the escapist idea of setting up the EU-own EMF. The real crisis in the Euroland is now quietly unfolding behind he scenes.

Finally, after nearly 15 years of denial, courtesy of the severe pain inflicted by the bonds markets, Brussels and the core member states are forced to face the music of their own making. The current crisis affecting Euro area economy is, in the end, the outcome of a severely unbalanced economic development model that rests on the assumption that exports-led economic expansions in some countries can be financed through a continued massive build up in financial liabilities by their importing partners.

Put more simply, the problem for the world going forward is that in order to sustain this economic Ponzi game, net importers must continue to finance their purchases of goods and services from net exporters by issuing new debt. The debt that eventually settles in the accounts of the net exporters.

One does not have to be versed in the fine arts of macroeconomics to see that something is wrong with this picture. And one does not have to be a forecasting genius to understand that after some 40 years of rising debts on the balance sheet of importing nations, the game is finally up. I wrote for years about the sick nature of the EU economy - aggregate and individual countries alike.

Last week, Lombard Street Research's Charles Dumas offered yet another clear x-ray of of the problem.

Lessons and Policy Implications from the Global Financial Crisis; <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_3">Stijn</span> <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_4">Claessens</span>, Giovanni Dell’<span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_5">Ariccia</span>, <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_6">Deniz</span> <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_7">Igan</span>, and <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_8">Luc</span> <span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_9">Laeven</span>; IMF Working Paper 10/44; February 1, 2010

Source: Lombard Street Research, March 2010

As Dumas' chart shows, core Euro area economies are sick. More importantly, this sickness is structural. With exception of the bubble-driven catch-up kids, like Spain, Ireland and Greece, the Euro area has managed to miss the growth boat since the beginning of the last expansion cycle.

The three global leaders in exports-led growth: Germany, Japan and Italy have been stuck in a quagmire of excessive savings and static growth. Forget about jobs creation – were these economies populations expanding, not shrinking, the last 10 years would have seen the overall wealth of these nations sinking in per capita terms. Only the Malthusian dream of childless households can allow these export engines of the world to stay afloat. And even then, the demographic decline will have to be sustained through disposal of accumulated national assets. So much for the great hope of the exports-led growth pulling us out of a recession. It couldn’t even get us through the last expansion!

Over the last decade, the Sick Man of Europe, Italy has managed to post no growth at all, crushed, as Dumas’ put it, by the weight of the overvalued and mismanaged common currency. The Sick Man of the World, Japan has managed to expand by less than 0.8% annually despite running up massive trade surpluses. Germany’s ‘pathetic advance over eight years’ adds up to a sickly 3½% in total, or just over 0.3% a year. France, and the UK, have managed roughly 0.98% annualized growth over the same time. Comparing this to the US at 1.27% puts the exports-led growth fallacy into a clear perspective.

I wrote in these pages before that the real global divergence over the last 10 years has been driven not by the emerging economies decoupling from the US, but by Europe and Japan decoupling from the rest of the world. The chart above shows this, as the gap between European 'social' economies wealth and income and the US is still growing. But the chart also shows that Europe is having, once again, a much more pronounced recession than the US.

Europe's failure to keep up with the US during the last cycle is made even more spectacular by the political realities of the block. Unlike any other developed democracy in the world, EU has manged to produce numerous centralized plans for growth. Since the late 1990s, aping Nikita Khruschev's 'We will bury you!' address to the US, Brussels has managed to publish weighty tomes of lofty programmes - all explicitly aimed at overtaking the US in economic performance.

These invariably promised some new 'alternative' ways to growth nirvana. The Lisbon Agenda hodge-podge of “exporting out of the long stagnation” ideas was followed by the Social Economy theory that pushed the view that somehow, if Europeans ‘invest’ money they did not have on things that make life nicer and more pleasant for their ageing populations growth will happen. Brussels folks forgot to notice that ageing population doesn’t want more work, it wants more ‘free’ stuff like healthcare, public transport, social benefits, clean streets, museums and theatres. All the nice things that actually work only when the real economy is working to pay for them.

As if driven by the idea that economic development can be totally divorced from real businesses, investors and entrepreneurs, the wise men of Europe replaced the unworkable idea of Social Economy with an artificial construct labelled ‘Knowledge Economy’. This promised an exports-led growth fuelled by sales of goods and services in which we, the Europeans, are supposedly still competitive compared to our younger counterparts elsewhere around the world. No one in Brussels has bothered to check: are we really that good at knowledge to compete globally? We simply assumed that Asians, Americans, Latin Americans and the rest of the world are inferior to us in generating, commercializing, and monetizing knowledge. Exactly where we got this idea, remains unclear to me and to the majority of economists around the world.

The latest instalment in this mad carousel of economic programmes is this year's Agenda 2020 – a mash of all three previous strategies that failed individually and are now being served as an economically noxious cocktail of policy confusion, apathy and sloganeering.

But numbers do not lie. The real source of Euro area's crisis is a deeply rooted structural collapse of growth in real human capital and Total Factor productivities. And this collapse was triggered by decades of high taxation of productive economy to pay for various follies that have left European growth engines nearly completely dependent on exports. No amount of waterboarding of the real economy with cheap ECB cash, state bailouts and public deficits financing will get us out of this corner.

The real problem, of course, is bigger than the Eurozone itself. Exports-led economies can sustain long-run expansions only on the back of a borrowing boom in their trading partners. It is that simple, folks. Every time a Mercedes leaves Germany, somewhere else around the world, someone who intends to buy it will either have to draw down their savings or get a loan against future savings. Up until now, the two were inexorably linked through the global debt markets: as American consumers took out loans to buy German-made goods, Chinese savers bought US debt to gain security of their savings.

This debt-for-imports game is now on the verge of collapse. Not because the credit crunch dried out the supply of debt, but because the global debt mountain has now reached unsustainably high levels. The demand for more debt is no longer holding up. Global economic imbalances remain at unsustainable levels even through this crisis and even with the aggressive deleveraging in the banking systems outside the EU.

Take a look at the global debt situation as highlighted by the latest data on global debt levels. The first chart below shows the ratio of net importing countries’ gross external debt liabilities (combining all debts accumulated in public and private sectors, including financial institutions and monetary authorities) to that of their net exporting counterparts. The sample covers 20 largest importers and the same number of largest exporters.

Source: IMF/BIS/World Bank joint data base and author own calculations

As this figure illustrates, since mid-point of the last bubble at the end of 2005, the total external debt burden carried by the world’s importing countries has remained remarkably stable. In fact, as of Q3 2009, this ratio is just 0.3 percentage points below where it stood in the end of 2005. Compared to the peak of the bubble, the entire process of global deleveraging has cut the relative debt burden of the importing states by just 9.8%.

To put this number into perspective, while assets base of the world’s leading economies has fallen by approximately 35% during the crisis, their liabilities side has declined by less than 10%. If 2007 marked the moment when the world finally caved in under the weight of unsustainable debt piled on during the last credit boom, then at the end of 2009 the global economy looked only sicker in terms of long-run sustainability.

The picture is more mixed for the world’s most indebted economies.
Plotting the same ratio for the US and UK clearly shows that Obamanomics is not working – the US economy, despite massive writedowns of financial assets and spectacular bankruptcies of the last two years remains leveraged to the breaking point. The UK is fairing only marginally better.

Of course, Ireland is in the league of its own, as the country has managed to actually increase its overall s
Lessons and Policy Implications from the Global Financial Crisis; Stijn Claessens, Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, Deniz Igan, and Luc Laeven; IMF Working Paper 10/44; February 1, 2010hare of global financial debt during this crisis courtesy of an out-of-control public expenditure and the lack of private sector deleveraging. Take an alternative look at the same data. Ireland’s gross external debt (liabilities) stood at a whooping USD 2.397 trillion in Q3 2009, up 10.8% on Q3 2007. Of these, roughly 45% accrue to the domestic economy (ex-IFSC), implying that Irish debt mountain stands at around USD 1.1 trillion or more than 6 times the amount of our annual national income.

Chart below shows gross external debt of a number of countries as a share of the world’s total debt mountain
.
Source: IMF/BIS/World Bank joint data base and author own calculations

And this brings us to the singularly most unfavourable forecast this column has ever made in its 7 years-long history. Far from showing the signs of abating, the global crisis is now appearing to be at or near a new acceleration point. Given the long-running and deepening imbalances between growth-less net exporting states, like Germany, Japan and Italy and the net importers, like the US, we are now facing a distinct possibility of a worldwide economic depression, triggered by massive debt build up worldwide. No amount of competitive devaluations and cost deflation will get us out of this quagmire. And neither a Social Economy, nor Knowledge Economics are of any help here.

Paraphraisng Cypher in the original Matrix
Lessons and Policy Implications from the Global Financial Crisis; Stijn Claessens, Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, Deniz Igan, and Luc Laeven; IMF Working Paper 10/44; February 1, 2010: “It means fasten your seat belt, Dorothy, ‘cause Kansas of debt-financed global trade flows is going bye-bye”.
Lessons and Policy Implications from the Global Financial Crisis; Stijn Claessens, Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, Deniz Igan, and Luc Laeven; IMF Working Paper 10/44; February 1, 2010

Wednesday, November 11, 2009

Economics 11/11/2009: Lagging indicators and leading signals

McKinsey have published their review of the global economic conditions survey for November. Good read as always (here). Few snapshots of main results first:

"For the first time in a year, a majority of respondents—51 percent—say economic conditions
in their countries are better now than they were in September 2008.... [but] only 19 percent say an upturn has begun. This figure rises to a remarkable 33 percent, however, among respondents in Asia’s developed countries."

Cool, but... 49% state that economy either did not improve or worsened relative to September 2008. 64% expect their economy to be better than in September 2008 by the end of Q1 2010 (up from 61% reading in September 2009). So almost 50% believe that their economy is no better now than at the beginning of this recession (full 4 quarters ago) and some 36% believe that it won't come out of the recession even after 6 quarters of straight contraction.

"A larger share of executives also expects the good news to continue, with 47 percent expecting GDP growth to return to pre–September 2008 levels in 2010 or 2011, compared with 40 percent
six weeks ago." Key point here is that this is an improvement in the indicator, not the actual growth signal (which would require a reading above 50%).

"Although the global news is good, there are marked regional differences; executives in the developed countries of Asia are generally the most optimistic, and those in Europe are the least." This tell us what we all knew - European companies are suffering still through the remnants of old pains, banks are yet to suffer most of their pains, and households - well, households in Europe are in a perpetual pain given sticky unemployment and slow consumption growth and household investment. Thus: "Everywhere except Europe, more executives describe the economy over the next several months as “battered but resilient” than say it is frozen, stalled, or regenerated." (see pic below)So much for the European Century story.

But what are the causes of this pessimism in Europe / optimism in Asia scenario? One can speculate:

For example, despite all the crises, all public spending and monetary easing, business leaders worldwide still see Government regulation as one of top three problems (chart below).
What this tells me is that structural issues that have precipitated the current recession have not been addressed. Can one be out of crisis when the causes of crisis in the first place remain intact?

Another interesting issue - future profitability.
I am not sure how you feel about this, but it makes me very uncomfortable for several reasons:
  1. Again, Europe acts as a global drag (just as it was before this crisis), and this is before the hefty tax increases necessary for underwriting recent profligate spending are factored in;
  2. US - think of this as the indicator of future equity values and you can see just how massively is overbought the US equity market;
  3. Overall, all countries which used large state reserves of liquidity to finance current crisis measures (India, China, Asia-Pacific) are on the tearing path for profitability relative to Europe and North America.
Now take the outlook for 12 months ahead:
Let's look at this closer:
  1. Low customer demand for our products or services: the main driver for all types of firms - with profits at risk (66%), static (46%) and expected to rise (41%). Just think what this means for countries that like Ireland are staring at higher taxes into foreseeable future and destroyed households' net worth;
  2. Loss of business to low cost competitors: do I need to say anything here in terms of threats to Ireland Inc? Well, let me put 5 cents in - think of wages path in this economy. While private sector did some cutting (and hardly enough to reach long run equilibrium wages) public sector did none and is unlikely to do much (the latest plan for 6.85% cuts is (a) insufficient, and (b) won't happen in real terms). So overall level of wages in Ireland is really stuck somewhere around 2006 levels.
  3. Competition from new entrants is the worry for leaders in profitability, but it will also impact the developed world economies. Why? Because to counter such entry you need new investment and to have new investment you need capital. Currently, capital is mopped up by Governments financing their deficits through Central Banks' issuance of new cash. Later it will be cleaned out by higher taxes. Not a good prospect going forward.
  4. Low levels of innovation - again go back to capital in (3) and the same investment cycle restart bottlenecks. Ditto for Inability to get funding - Number 7 on the list.
We can go on, but you can see where all this is leading us -
  • our current fiscal and monetary policies will be haunting us down the line into the so-called recovery,
  • while more frugal Governments in China, India (you get the irony here?), Asia and so on, having stayed pre-crisis off the path of unsustainable increases in public spending at rates much faster than growth in their real economies, were able to absorb the crisis with lesser burden of debts.
This is where optimism is now resting globally. We are, therefore, back to the paradigm of "Smaller Governments, Happier Economies"... and healthier households, one might add?