Showing posts with label Irish banks. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Irish banks. Show all posts

Tuesday, June 10, 2014

10/6/2014: Credit to Irish Households: Q1 2014

Having recently posted miraculous recovery in terms of yet another quarter of declines in lending to Irish private sector enterprise (see: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/06/662014-credit-to-irish-resident.html) repaired/restored/reformed Irish banking system coughed out another set of 'encouraging' data points… today's one coming on the side of credit advanced to Irish private [assuming this excludes Irish public - aka celebrity economists et al] households. And guess what… the aforementioned repaired/restored/reformed Irish banking system is shrinking in terms of household credit too, still…

Chart to start with:

And the above shows:

  • Total credit extended to Irish households falling 2.62% in Q1 2014 compared to Q1 2014 and down 0.54% q/q
  • Credit advanced for house purchases is down 1.21% y/y and basically flat (-0.03%) q/q.
  • SVR mortgages volumes are up (arrears restructuring and new mortgages extended adding to the pile of soon-to-be even more expensive loans, as the banks re-engage in margins rebuilding post-ECB rate cut); Trackers are down; Up to one year fixed rates mortgages are up, Fixed rate mortgages are down;
  • Other personal loans are down whooping 9.98% y/y and are down 5.82% q/q (with both Finance for investment and Finance for other purposes sub-categories down by more than 5% q/q).


Meanwhile, deposits (remember our 'gargantuan' savings rates that worry everyone from ESRI to DofF) well… deposits are down 1.78% y/y and down 0.14% q/q.

Remember our Government's talk about repairing the banking system? One of the core metrics for this was loans/deposit ratio. Chart below shows evolution of this:


Observe one interesting regularity: since Q4 2011, loans-deposit ration in terms of Irish households' balance sheets averaged 114.7% and in Q1 2014 this ratio was… err… 114.2%. In other words, things have not been improving when it comes to loans/deposit ratio for some 10 consecutive quarters now…

Since we are onto the topic of 2011, recall that in H1 2011 we have recapitalized Irish banks, which, ever since that time, been on a steady path of recovery. Even Wilbur Ross says as much, let alone our Ministers and Senior Officials. Numbers confirm… the opposite story: compared to H1 2011, q1 2014 levels of households' credit in the economy was down massive 18.2%, credit for house purchase down massive 15.5%, credit for other purposes down gargantuan [truly] 30.9%, while deposits are down 1.82%.

Clearly things have to be looking sunnier some day soon... of Wilbur will have to come back to help us repair the banking system once again...

10/6/2014: In Irish Press: Wilbur and Electricity Taxes


In Irish news today, one dominant story is that of BofI investor, Wilbur Ross moving on off 'Ireland Corp' team and into the not-too-shallow Government's Christmas Cards list. The US billionaire is cashing in his chip at the Irish Banks Casino and there is no end to glowing reviews of his legacy.

Per RTE report: "Mr Ross said he believes the bank is "on the right track". This is "definitely not a negative comment on BoI or Ireland. Both are clearly on the right track," Mr Ross said in an emailed message after Deutsche Bank announced it was to sell his stake." Naively, RTE could not fathom an idea that Mr Ross might be speaking in marketing mode - he is selling the stake in a bank, so hardly can be expected to make any comments adverse to his own interest of talking up the said bank.

But never mind, the really grotesque bit of the story is at the bottom, where our Government and State officials pour praise all over Mr Ross. Now, Mr Ross made a nice profit having taken some risk. No problem there. A slight blemish on his investment strategy in Ireland is the fact that much of this return was down to taxpayers taking on the bank recapitalisation burden. Slightly more of a blemish is the fact that during his tenure as a major shareholder and board member, the Bank became synonymous with playing the hardest ball with those borrowers who fell onto hard times. Still, let us not begrudge him in his success.

But the glowing and even slavish praise being heaped onto him makes one wonder if there is still a gas station somewhere on, say, N3 or N7 left unnamed? Is it time for a 'Wilbur Ross Plaza' replete with convenient Centra and washing facilities?

In a related bit of the story, we have projected valuations of the stake. Updating the above report from RTE, latest information we have is that he is selling the stake for EUR0.26-0.27 per share, a discount of up to 8.5% on yesterday's price. This is an impressively shallow discount (my expectation was closer to 10-12%), but still a discount. Some years ago, when Mr Ross just bought into BofI, I suggested that any exit will require a discount. A couple of Ireland's illustrious Stockbrokers came out of the hedges to bite me, claiming that actually Mr Ross can sell at a premium, as there can be a great demand around the world for BofI shares in a strategic package volume. Ooops...

Never, mind, however, the illustrious Stockbrokers are back at it, now lauding the virtues of 'increased free-float' of BofI shares in the wake of Mr Ross' exit as a major support for the stock. By said logic, BofI should just quadruple numbers of shares in the market, to gain even more 'support'.

On a related side, Reuters reported that "Ireland's Finance Minister Michael Noonan in December said that while the government had no interest in running banks long term, it was under no financial or political pressure to sell." (link here). Of course, this is the same Minister Noonan who's standard answer to virtually all questions about Irish Government involvement in managing strategic or operational aspects of individual banks it owns is: 'We have no control over what they do' and who's voting record as shareholder is about as 'activist' as that of the Anglo shareholders back in 2005.



A far less-dominant story also in the news today is that Irish Government is raising by a whooping 50% tax on domestic electricity. This is covered here. Per report: "Householders will be charged €66.55 a year in the PSO levy, up 47pc. When valued added tax (VAT) is added the annual cost on each household bills will go to €75.42." 

Irish Independent politely calls this a 'sneaky tax'... sneaky, presumably, because it is dressed up as a 'Public Service Obligation' - a levy designed to subsidise renewables energy companies and peat-burning stations. Which makes it more subtle than just bludgeoning taxpayers in dark alleys for their spare change.

At the end of 2013, Ireland had the fourth highest levels of electricity taxes and electricity prices in the EU27 and posted between the fourth and the fifth highest rate of increases in taxes and levies for electricity in EU27 (depending on annual consumption levels for households). Here is some additional background on how Irish Government has been extracting cash out of financially strained households via electricity supply systems.

Friday, June 6, 2014

6/6/2014: Credit to Irish Resident Enterprises: Q1 2014


Since time immemorial (ok, since around 2009) Irish Government after Irish Government has been promising the restoration of functioning credit markets. Targets were set for the banks to lend out to non-financial (aka real economy) enterprises. Targets were repeatedly met. Banks have talked miles and miles about being open for lending, approving loans etc etc etc. And credit continued to fall and fall and fall...

And so the story repeats once again in Q1 2014. Central Bank latest data on credit advanced to Irish resident private sector enterprises attests to the lifeless, deleveraging-bound, zombified banking sector.



  • Credit advanced to financial intermediation companies is down 3.63% in Q1 2014 compared to Q4 2014. This marks 9th consecutive quarter of declines. Since Q4 2008, credit has fallen in 11 quarters, and actually it has fallen in 12, since Q4 2011 rise was down to reclassifications being factored into the equation for the first time. Worse than that, majority of declines came since the current Government took office, not before. 
  • Credit advanced to financial intermediation and property sectors fell 4.05% q/q in Q1 2014. The fall was steeper than in Q4 2013 compared to Q3 2013 and also marks ninth consecutive quarterly decline in the series or 11th if we are to control for 2011 reclassifications.
  • Excluding financial intermediation and property, credit advanced to Irish resident non-financial companies ex-property sector has fallen 1.31% q/q in Q1 2014. This marks fourth consecutive quarterly fall. Credit to the real economy is now down in 20 quarters since Q4 2008. Since the current Government came into office, credit to these companies is down in 10 quarters out of 12.
  • Total credit advanced to Irish resident enterprises was down 3.49% q/q in Q1 2014 - steeper than the decline of 3.07% recorded in Q4 2013, and marking ninth consecutive quarter of declines (11th, if reclassifications are ignored).
So keep that hope alive... one day, some day... things will be better. Do not forget to give credit to the Government and the Central Bank - they predicted this 'betterment' years ago and like a stopped clock, one day they will be proven right...

Saturday, May 17, 2014

17/5/2014: Central Bank Annual Report 2013: Not Much to Report, Much to Promote


This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article from May 4, 2014.


This week, the Irish Central Bank published its annual report for 2013.

In the opening statement, Governor Patrick Honohan said: "The Bank’s key priorities included the ongoing repair of the banking system and achieving progress in the delivery of sustainable solutions for distressed borrowers. Significant progress was achieved on these fronts, though many tasks still remain to be completed."

This was not a great moment to stake such a claim.

In recent days, the state-controlled Ptsb, announced a substantial hike in variable rate charges on mortgages. Bank of Ireland, faced criticism for using a 'blunt force approach' with distressed borrowers.

Central Bank data, highlighted in the annual report, shows that in 2013 lending to non-financial corporations in Ireland posted its steepest year on year decline since the start of the crisis, down 6 percent. Credit to households fell at the second fastest annual rate, down 4.1 percent on 2012. Mortgages arrears, including the IBRC mortgages sold to the external investment funds, as percentage of all house loans outstanding, were virtually unchanged year on year at the end of 2013.

Reading through the Central Bank own financial accounts also reveals some significant insights into the inner workings of our financial system and its watchdog.

In the last three years, Irish Exchequer reliance on income from the Dame Street has gone up exponentially. In 2009-2013, the Central Bank paid EUR4.73 billion in total dividends to the State. Of this, 50 percent came from its operations in 2012-2013. This makes the CBI the largest net contributor to the State coffers of all public and semi-state organisations.

The bulk of the Central Bank earnings come from interest on assets it holds. Last year marked the second year of declines in this income. Back in 2010, the Central Bank collected EUR3.67 billion worth of interest. As the scope of the emergency lending to Irish banks fell, the interest income also declined, reaching EUR2.6 billion in 2012 and EUR2.02 billion in 2013.

Central Bank’s highest-paying assets today cover Irish Government Floating Rate Notes, NAMA bonds, and a Irish 2025 bond. All in, the money paid by the Government and NAMA to the Central Bank is being recycled back to the Exchequer at a hefty cost margin.

In a sign of continued improvement in the Irish banks funding situation, marginal refinancing operations and long-term refinancing operations (MROs and LTROs), representing lending to credit institutions from the Eurosystem fell to EUR39.1 billion in 2013, down from EUR70.9 billion in 2012. At their peak in 2010, these lines of credit amounted to EUR132 billion.

Central Bank’s staff-related expenses rose from EUR106.3mln in 2012 to over EUR121.4mln in 2013. These increases were down primarily to salaries, allowances and pensions, as staff numbers employed stayed relatively unchanged between 2011 and 2013. Per employee staff expenses are now up 15 percent on 2012 levels.

Other operating expenses were up from EUR57.5 million to EUR70.3 million. The largest hikes incurred were in Professional fees, which rose by a quarter to EUR27.1 million. Only in 2011, at the height of banks’ recapitalisation, did the Central Bank manage to spend more on external consultants. So far, the banking crisis has been a bonanza for the Central Bank advisers who were paid EUR98.3 million in fees since 2009.

In return for the rise in expenses, the Bank marginally expanded some of its enforcement and supervisory functions. There was a rise in prudential supervision activity, but a decline in authorisations and revocations of regulated entities. The number of investigations also fell, from 216 in 2012 to 184 in 2013. However, the Central Bank oversaw 1,004 regulatory actions taken in 2013, up on 2012, but down on 2011.

Overall, the Annual Report paints a picture of the Central Bank continuing to engage in active enforcement and supervision, amidst overall declining need for banking sector supports.



17/5/2014: The Banking Inquiry Shopping List...


This is an unedited version from my Sunday Times article from May 4, 2014.


This week, the Government announced the establishment of a banking inquiry.
The idea is to take a definitive, conclusive and final shot at identifying the events and the actions that have led to the historically and internationally unprecedented financial crisis that has ravaged our economy, society and the lives of millions of our citizens.

Some would say this was long in coming. But, in reality, we have been here before.


Between 2010 and 2011 we had the Nyberg Report, the Honohan Report and the Regling-Watson Report. All were full of generalist discourse about technical and systemic failures, but contained few specifics. In July 2012 we had the PAC report into the crisis. This set out the framework for the current inquiry, but also fell far short of bringing the matter to a closure.

All of these reports and inquiries suffered from similar problems. They were limited in scope, restricted in terms, covered only sub sets of the crisis history and virtually nothing in terms of the crisis fallout, and were disempowered to deliver conclusions in excess of anodyne academism. None of the reports to-date delivered final definitive answers, named names and specific actions by actual players.

This nation, told to pay for the banks and other domestic and foreign actors’ reckless practices, was never given a chance at establishing impartially and substantively the truth about the causes and the drivers of the crisis.

The Anglo Three trial, concluded this week, served as a logical denouement of the aforementioned processes of obfuscation of the causes of the crisis. It loomed large in public minds as a possible source of closure. Excessively technical in nature, restricted in scope and legalistic in terms of discovery, it naturally fell short of achieving that closure. With this failure, public trust in core institutions of this state has been stretched too thin. Even our public representatives now see the urgent need for some sort of a broadly based, non-partisan and open inquiry.


To be effective, the inquiry must mark a clear-cut departure from the past.

It has to be open and broad. Its remit must cover years prior to the crisis, preferably starting from the regulatory, monetary and market foundations laid out in the late 1990s, reaching beyond the night of the 2008 Guarantee, all the way to today.

The inquiry must cover not only the actions of the banks, but also those of our regulators, supervisors, the Department of Finance, the Department of Taoiseach, the roles played by the IFSC-based institutions and the Social Partners. It must deal with technical issues, such as, amongst others, liquidity rules breaches, macro prudential risks build-up and transmission of risks from Government policies to the banking sector and property lending, investment practices violations, and funding risks.

The inquiry must dig deep into the underlying culture, strategic choices and decision-making in our banking system, broader financial services, and economy and policymaking at large.

It must name key names. It must place responsibility on the shoulders of individuals involved - those still serving and since retired. The inquiry must distinguish and allocate legal, regulatory, professional and ethical responsibilities, identifying not just potential violations of the law and regulations, but also systemic weaknesses in competencies, incentives and performance.

The inquiry must achieve clarity as to the role played by banks auditors, consultants, advisory committees and boards, as well as by banks executives, including mid-ranked professionals, such as economists, risk analysts, and lending managers.

We need to know and understand the roles played by European and potentially US policymakers, organisations and investors in fuelling the credit bubble here in Ireland and in structuring the disastrous fallout from the credit bust.

Ireland paid some 40 percent of the overall cost of the euro area financial crisis. The inquiry at least should tell us, who benefited from these payments and who owes us a refund.

Above all, the inquiry must be robust, open, and reflective of the public appetite for closure. It must leave behind evidential record of errors made, strategies adopted, actions taken, regulatory breaches unaddressed and expert opinions supplied. In other words, it will have to break an entirely new ground in terms of all past inquiries ever conducted in the history of this state.

Tuesday, May 13, 2014

13/5/2014: No, Johnny the Foreigner didn't do it... our own Government did...


Ah and so it rolls, Irish national media obsession with who (from abroad) pushed (presumably unwilling) Irish Government (so deeply concerned with national wellbeing) to guarantee bondholders (presumably the elderly investors from pension funds and teachers, nurses and fire(wo)men) back in September 2008 (because, you know, the Government did not beat the 'Great Irish banks Inviolable drum for the good part of 2008).

The latests instalment is on the role of Timothy Geihtner (based on his book) and it is available here: http://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/timothy-geithner-keeps-it-short-when-it-comes-to-haircuts-1.1792498.

So we know the drill:

  1. IMF called for haircuts. Well, I am not so sure. IMF does include haircuts in some of its 'rescues' and it is a part of the tool kit. But IMF never played an active part in Ireland or for that matter in the euro area. Just compare and contrast the Fund manhandling of Hungary against its waffling on in Greece. My internal IMF sources told me that staff was surprised Ireland did not burn the bondholders the way Iceland did. But then again, one's dismay is not Fund's advice, and Fund's advice is not Fund's order (oh, and IMF does issue 'orders').
  2. ECB barked at the idea of haircuts. Again I am not so sure. We do know ECB opposed them, but that is not a reason not to try them, is it? The argument goes that if Ireland were to go against ECB's will, the skye would fall onto us and the moon will no longer exert its tidal push and pull force on the Irish sea, making the entire island uninhabitable. Truth is, we have no idea what ECB would/could have done. Stop funding of Irish banks? Lots of good that funding did to us, I'd say - apparently even with ECB lending we had to bankrupt the nation to mummify the zombies (you wouldn't call this a rescue operation, since our banks are still zombies five and a half years into the mess).
  3. EU balked at the idea. Which means what? Olli Rehn had hiccups for breakfast? Both EU and ECB were, allegedly, powerless midgets incapable of stopping the spread of contagion from the inter-galactically important Irish banks (if they were just simple banks, why all the huff about their systemic importance) and thus needed Irish people to bite the missile (you would hardly call a guarantee the size of 2.5 times the nation's GDP a bullet) for them. So who exactly held the trump cards? 
  4. US and UK went apoplectic (although as we now know, Geithner did not oppose haircuts in principle, though he was against their timing). I must confess, I noticed no such reaction from Treasury and BofE officials I encountered in briefings around the time of the Guarantee and there after.
  5. Irish Government reluctantly, tragically, with tears in their eyes, was forced to introduce a guarantee of all liabilities. 


Now, just for nanosecond give this a thought: the Irish Government, that spent a good part of 9 months prior to the Guarantee staunchly defending the banks and since around July of 2008 - covering up their repeated violations of regulatory requirements (liquidity ratios etc), the same Government that apparently had no desire to know what was going on in the banks shares support schemes and didn't give a damn about abuse of derivative instruments to prop up the banks valuations, the said Government that had lost no sleep over the silencing of whistleblowers pointing to systemic problems in the banks… that Government today is being painted as having been 'bounced' into the Guarantee and subsequently the Troika bailout?..

Are we serious? Let's take a hard look into the mirror. The Guarantee was an act of the Irish Government to protect and secure Irish banks connected to the Irish elite's interests. Full stop. That it rescued a bunch of unsavoury bond holders and investment funds was a cherry on the proverbial cake, not the main spoiler of the 'benevolent Government' intentions.

That we did not exercise a sovereign right to, in a national emergency, impose losses on whoever we wish to impose them is not a corollary - it is a direct evidence of intent to rescue the banks at any cost to the nation. This is further collaborated by the fact that following the guarantee, the Irish Government (not the ECB or US Treasury or the EU Commission) sat back and did absolutely nothing to impose any terms and conditions onto the banks. It is evidence by the fact when our Government at the time was forced to start doing something about reforming the banks, it went about it in the following order:

  • First, losses were imposed on borrowers. Borrowers who are still (after numerous 'powder over the gaping wound' reforms of insolvency and bankruptcy codes) being milked by the banks to the loud approval from the Central Bank for every penny they might have or will have in the future.
  • Second, banks were given token targets on governance reforms (changes of boards, senior executive ranks, salaries caps etc). The banks blew past these like a boy racer blows past the '30 km/h' speed sign.
  • Third, the State created Nama which underpaid for the banks assets in order to secure brighter future for itself and its consultants and vulture funds (the latter now expect returns of 20% per annum and more on the assets they are buying from Nama, which Nama claims to be selling at a profit).
  • Fourth, more cash was injected into the banks to cover the hole blown in them by Nama. Cash was taken off the same taxpayers, many of who are the said borrowers being pursued by the banks with the blessing of the State.
  • Fifth, the banks were subsidised and protected from any competition - and still remain such: we have a massive penned up demand for credit (allegedly from top-quality SMEs and corporates and households with healthy balancesheets that everyone - from IBEC to myhome.ie claims exist all over Ireland) and we have rising lending margins, and yet we have not a single foreign bank coming into the country or expanding its operations (beyond PR releases) here. Why?


Do tell me that anything in the above suggests that the past Government shed a single non-crocodile tear in guaranteeing the banks? I simply can't believe that. It does not correspond to the facts at hand.

So to tidy things up: let's continue digging for the evidence that some Johnny the Foreigner 'bounced' Ireland into the Guarantee and the bailout and the rest of the mess we are in. Let's even keep digging for the evidence that the Martians are responsible for the original mishap of two Luas lines not being connected to each other.

But let's also remember - as a sovereign State, Irish State had choices. It made them. It made them to suit all of the objectives of supporting the banks that were consistently and persistently pursued by the State prior to the Guarantee. Subsequent to the Guarantee, Irish Government officially and repeatedly stated that it will provide all and any support needed by the banks, unconditionally, unreservedly and unceremoniously. Whatever Johnny the Foreigner did or did not do in such circumstances is secondary - interesting, important, intriguing, but still secondary. Primary is the fact that we were flushed down the proverbial banks sewer by our own.

Friday, May 9, 2014

9/5/2014: Cost of Credit in Ireland Kept Rising in Q1 2014


Latest data from the Central Bank shows continued increases in cost of credit in Ireland in Q1 2014:
- Overdrafts rates for households are up 0.46 percentage points in Q1 2014 compared to Q1 2013;
- Loans for house purchases with original maturity up to 1 year: up 0.29 percentage points
- Loans for house purchases with original maturity of over 1 year and up to 5 years: up 0.08 percentage points
- Loans for house purchases with original maturity over 5 years: down 0.2 percentage points

- Consumer loans with original maturity up to 1 year: up 0.82 percentage points
- Consumer loans with original maturity of over 1 year and up to 5 years: up 0.3 percentage points
- Consumer loans with original maturity over 5 years: down 0.02 percentage points

- Non-financial corporations loans with original maturity up to 1 year: up 0.1 percentage points
- NFC loans with original maturity of over 1 year and up to 5 years: up 0.16 percentage points
- NFC loans with original maturity over 5 years: up 0.01 percentage points
- NFC overdrafts rates down 0.36 percentage points.

Thus, Irish 'repaired' banking system continues to extract higher costs out of households and businesses already strained by debt burdens.

Thursday, April 3, 2014

3/4/2014: Learning from the Irish Experience – A Clinical Case Study in Banking Failure


Our new paper on the future of banking based on Irish experience and lessons from the crisis:

Lucey, Brian M. and Larkin, Charles James and Gurdgiev, Constantin,

Learning from the Irish Experience – A Clinical Case Study in Banking Failure (September 23, 2013).

Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2329815

Abstract:  
 
We present a review of the Irish banking collapse, detailing its origins in a confluence of events. We suggest that the very concentrated nature of the Irish banking sector which will emerge from the policy decisions taken as a consequence of the collapse runs a risk of a second crisis. We survey the literature on size and efficiency and suggest some alternative policy approaches.

Saturday, February 8, 2014

8/2/2014: Irish Mortgages Crisis: More of a crisis, less of a solution


This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times column from January 19, 2014.



With Dublin property prices and rental rates on the rise optimism about bricks and mortar is gradually re-infecting our living rooms and feeding through to the government and banks' expectations concerning the mortgages arrears.

The good news is that, per latest data, there has been a decline in the arrears reported by the Department of Finance. Across the six main lenders tracked by the department, mortgages in arrears were down by 1,903 in November 2013, compared to September.

The bad news, however, is that the very same figures show that the banks continue to focus on largely cosmetic debt relief measures. In many cases such restructuring tools are potentially pushing distressed borrowers deeper into debt. The fact that Official Ireland lauds such measures as 'permanent' also indicates a lack of serious consideration of the risks faced by the distressed borrowers in the future.


Let's take a look at the latest mortgages numbers, reported by the Department of Finance. To caveat the discussion below, these numbers exclude smaller, predominantly sub-prime lenders, whose borrowers are currently nearly all in arrears.

As of November 2013, there were 116,481 principal residences mortgages accounts in arrears, comprising 17 percent of all principal residences accounts. Counting in buy-to-lets, 148,727 accounts were behind on their contractual repayments, which represents 18 percent of all mortgages. The Department does not report the amounts of mortgages or actual cumulated arrears involved, but based on the data from the Central Bank of Ireland, at the end of Q3 2013, mortgages in arrears amounted to 26 percent of all housing loans.

Of the above, 20,325 principal residences mortgages in arrears over 90 days have been restructured representing just over a quarter of all arrears in this category of mortgages. This number is only 1,812 higher than in September 2013, and is down 89 on August 2013.

We do not know what exactly happened to the mortgages that were reclassified as no longer in arrears nor restructured. The omens are not great, however. Based on the Central Bank data, around half of all previously restructured mortgages relapse into arrears. Some properties have probably gone into repossessions or were voluntarily surrendered.

This lack of clarity signals a deep state of denial by our policymakers and civil servants of the true causes and extent of the crisis. Overall, figures supplied by the Department of Finance classify mortgages into ‘permanently restructured’ and ‘temporarily restructured’. There is no methodological clarity as to what these designations mean. The data reported is not audited and the process of restructuring to-date is not being independently tested by anyone. A systematic registry of various solutions applied by the banks simply does not exist and no one can see the models used in structuring these solutions and their underlying assumptions. The fog of secrecy surrounding mortgages arrears resolution process is thick.

Everyone involved in the process of mortgages arrears resolution knows that the real problem faced by distressed borrowers is the level of debt they carry. But restructuring data reported by the Department of Finance tells us nothing about total debt levels of the households before and after restructuring. Adding insult to the injury, our data excludes unsecured debt – a major barrier to mortgages sustainability and a huge obstacle to banks offering borrowers forbearance. No secured lender can be expected to agree a debt reduction plan for a mortgage, when unsecured lenders are expecting to be made whole.

The official data also separates principal residences from buy-to-lets, despite the fact that a large number of households with arrears on the latter also face difficulties funding the former. Are risks being shifted from one side of the household balancesheet to another?

We are living through a debt crisis of historically unprecedented proportions and yet we are still refusing to threat household debt in a holistic approach. Instead, the overarching belief in the system is that once a mortgage account is restructured, the borrower is no longer at risk. To achieve such an outcome, the bank can offer a household anything between extending temporary interest-only arrangement to offering a split mortgage.  A term extension, or arrears capitalisation, or a fixed repayments scheme in excess of interest-only repayments, or a hybrid of all of the above, is all that is officially available.

The strategy for dealing with distressed borrowers, therefore, is to roll the arrears into either a top-up to the existent mortgage or set up a future claim against the property, and forget the problem ever existed. In medical terms, the analogy is to removing a person off the hospital patients’ list, once she is transferred out of the emergency.

This treatment is problematic because it assumes that the distressed borrowers who went into the arrears will be able to service their new mortgages until full repayment. It further assumes that any future shocks to household finances and to the economy can be covered under the new arrangements.

None of these assumptions have been tested by the independent analysts. All of these assumptions can raise significant questions, when one considers what sort of arrears resolution deals are being offered by the banks.

Suppose a bank makes a mistake in its risk assessment of the proposed solution and, after years of making due payments, the household slips into financial difficulties once again. There is nothing in the system to address such a risk. The household will face the cost of the new crisis, plus the residual cost of the current one, plus the loss on all payments made between now and the moment the new crisis materialises.  In contrast, the bank faces lower cost. The officials responsible for the present system face, of course, no risks at all.

How likely is the above scenario? Per official data, 60 percent of all 'permanent' restructurings involved rolling up accrued arrears and/or stretching out repayments over longer time horizon. In other words, including interest payable, the debt levels associated with such restructurings are greater than those incurred under the original mortgage. This begs a question – how will these households deal with higher future interest rates that are likely to materialise given the longer horizons and larger life-cycle debts of their restructured mortgages? Another question worth asking is how can capitalisation of arrears address the original causes of the financial distress that has led to arrears accumulation?

At most, less than one in six of all mortgages in arrears have been ‘permanently’ restructured without risking an increase in the overall life-time debt levels. Only one in twenty five of all defaulting mortgages were modified on the basis of some risk sharing between the banks and the borrowers. The vast majority of Ireland’s distressed borrowers are expected to pay the full price of their own and bank’s errors. Instead of restoring debt sustainability to Irish households’ finances, the system appears to be aiming to provide only a temporary cash-flow relief.


The key stumbling blocks to the successful resolution of mortgages arrears are, unfortunately, the cornerstones of the personal insolvency regime reforms and of policies aimed at dealing with distressed borrowers.

These include the fact that Irish homeowners are facing the full cost of dealing with the banks without any support from the state. This stands in contrast to the UK model where these costs are usually in part or fully covered by the banks. High costs and cumbersome bureaucracy deter many homeowners from engaging with the banks and from seeking professional and independent advice in restructuring their debts. So far, only one bank, the AIB Group, has voluntarily committed to helping its distressed borrowers to access independent support. The rest of the Irish banking system, including the regulators, are happy to make borrowers pay.

The pilot scheme designed by the Central Bank to deal with the problem of unsecured debt has now run its course. There is a complete silence across the official channels about its successes or failures, or about its potential renewal. Which suggests that the scheme was a flop. Meanwhile, the banks are refusing debt reductions to mortgages arrears, often citing lack of cooperation from unsecured lenders. We will never know how many of the 59,620 ‘permanently’ restructured borrowers could have availed of some debt relief but were failed by the dysfunctional system.

More ominously, we have effectively no regulation over the resolution schemes advanced by various banks. For example, through November 2013, there were 6,090 split mortgages solutions extended. Vast majority of these involve lower cost of borrowing offset by a delay in debt claim realisation. In contrast, one of the major banks currently is in the process of developing a split mortgage product that will offer borrowers an option of converting the capitalised portion of the split back into normal mortgage at some point in the future. In exchange, the borrowers will be offered a sizeable debt write-off for a portion of their mortgage.  Such a product is vastly superior to all other split mortgage arrangements in place, but it will be treated as identical to them in future reports.

The latest data on mortgage arrears resolutions clearly shows that the Irish State is unwilling to forgive those who fell into debt distress under the hardship of the Great Recession.  Instead of helping families to overcome the debt problem, our system is designed to help the debt problem to gain control over the debtor.



Box-out:

With the first issue of post-Troika Irish bonds safely away, it is time to reflect on the NTMA's opening gambit in the markets. Whatever one might say about the agency, its timing of this month's sale was impeccable. In the global markets, investment funds have been migrating out of fixed income (bond markets) and into equity markets pretty much throughout most of 2013. This trend is now accelerating. Usual bulk buyers of sovereign bonds are also starting to slow their appetite. Sovereign Wealth Funds, especially those located in Asia and the BRICS, are facing slowing domestic economic activity, reduced funding inflows from their exchequers and increased political pressures to reinvest domestically. Euro area banks, other large buyers of government bonds, are continuing to repay ECB-borrowed funds. They too are unlikely to demand significant amounts of Government bonds. And, looming on the horizon, large euro area issuers are about to swamp the market with fresh supply. Spain and Italy alone are planning to sell some EUR712 billion worth of new bonds to fund maturing debt and new deficits. All of this suggests that both supply and demand pressures later in 2014 can make it tougher for smaller euro area countries to tap the markets. Which makes NTMA's this month's timing so much wiser.

Saturday, January 4, 2014

4/1/2013: Irish Private Sector Deposits: November 2013


Central Bank of Ireland published series of data today covering deposits and credit in Irish banking system through November 2013. Here are the highlights on deposits. Credit side was covered in the previous post here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/01/312013-irish-private-sector-credit.html

Here, we cover deposits and loan/deposit ratios:

  • Private sector total deposits fell in November 2013 to EUR180.2 billion from EUR180.417 billion in October, but deposits are up EUR13.696 billion (+8.23%) y/y. 3mo average through November 2013 is up EUR13.259 billion on a year ago.
  • However, private sector non-financial deposits (deposits by households and non-financial corporations) show much weaker performance than total deposits, rising only EUR1.357 billion (+1.11%) y/y in November and up just EUR969 million (+0.79%) year on year on 3mo average basis.
  • The main reason total deposits are up is down to Insurance corporations, pension funds and other financial intermediaries booking a rise of EUR12.339 billion in deposits in November 2013 compared to November 2012.
  • Households' deposits are down EUR1.013 billion (-1.1%) y/y in November and down EUR567 million compared to October 2013. 3mo average through November 2013 is down EUR975 million (-1.06%) y/y.
  • Non-financial Corporations' deposits are up EUR2.37 billion y/y in November (up EUR1.944 billion on 3mo average basis) and are up EUR99 million on a monthly basis.



With private non-financial sector (households and NFCs) loans at EUR188.892 billion (down 0.59% y/y and down 0.79% m/m) and private non-financial sector deposits at EUR123.731 billion (up 1.11% y/y and down 0.38% m/m):

  • Loans to deposits ratio in November 2013 stood at 153%, basically unchanged since August 2013 and marking the lowest level since October 2003.


Note: The data for both deposits and loans is  severely distorted by changing composition of banking institutions (exits by a number of banks from the market) and by regulatory changes (inclusion of new institutions, e.g. credit unions).

Friday, January 3, 2014

3/1/2013: Irish Private Sector Credit: November 2013


Central Bank of Ireland published series of data today covering deposits and credit in Irish banking system through November 2013. Here are the highlights.

Overall, household credit outstanding at the end of November 2013 stood at EUR107.763 billion, down EUR1.354 billion on October 2013 and up EUR2.547 billion on November 2012. Compared to November 2011, outstanding credit to Irish households is down EUR3.069 billion (-2.77%). On a more stable, 3mo average basis, Q4 2013 average credit outstanding was EUR2.886 billion ahead of the same period in 2012.

Monthly decline in overall credit supplied to Irish households can be broken down into a decline of EUR1.226 billion in loans for house purchase, EUR119 million decline in consumer credit and EUR9 million decline in other loans. In other words, monthly decline was broad across all three categories of household credit.

Year on year, credit to households fell EUR1.336 billion for consumer credit, and is down EUR110 million for credit extended via other loans. There was a rise of EUR4.680 million for loans for house purchase. However, this increase itself is fully accounted for by a massive EUR6.233 billion jump in credit for house purchase extended in just one month: December 2012. Since December 2012, however, credit remained slightly lower, averaging EUR 83.978 billion over 11 months of 2013 as compared to EUR84.973 billion back in December 2012.

In summary: house purchase loans are slightly down over the 12 months from December 2012 through November 2013, Consumer credit loans are down over the same period, and other loans are also down. In all three cases, declines were moderate, implying that over December 2012-November 2013, overall credit to Irish households declined from EUR111.076 billion to EUR107.763 billion.

Compared to H1 2008:

  • Household credit overall was more than 30% down in November 2013 compared to H1 2008 average;
  • Credit for house purchases was more than 32% down in November 2013 compared to H1 2008 average;
  • Consumer credit was more than 39% down in November 2013 compared to H1 2008 average;
  • Other loans were 139% up in November 2013 compared to H1 2008 average.


Non-financial corporations total credit outstanding in November 2013 stood at EUR81.129 billion, down EUR143 million on October 2013 and down EUR3.676 billion on November 2012. Q4 average stock of credit to non-financial companies in Ireland declined in Q4 2013 y/y by some EUR3.734 billion (-4.38%). Compared to November 2011, credit to NFCs in Ireland is down EUR7.225 billion (-8.18%). More than half of this drop took place over the last 12 months.

In summary: credit to NFCs extended in the Irish system is down y/y in November and over Q4 2013 overall and the rate of decline did not decline over the last 12 months, compared to previous 12 months.

Compared to H1 2008:

  • Credit to NFCs overall was more than 50% down in November 2013 compared to H1 2008 average.




Next post will cover deposits and loan/deposit ratios.

Thursday, December 26, 2013

26/12/2013: Don't Bank on the Banking Union: Sunday Times, December 15


This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times column from December 15, 2013.


Over the last week, domestic news horizon was flooded by the warm sunshine of Ireland's exit from the Bailout. And, given the rest of the Euro area periphery performance to-date, the kindness of strangers was deserved.
Spain is also exiting a bailout, and the country is out of the recession, officially, like us. But it took a much smaller, banks-only, assistance package. And, being a ‘bad boy’ in the proverbial classroom, it talked back at the Troika and played some populist tunes of defiance. Portugal is out of the official recession, but the country is scheduled to exit its bailout only in mid-2014, having gone into it after Ireland. No glory for those coming second. Greece and Cyprus are at the bottom of the Depression canyon, with little change to their misery.

In short, Ireland deserves a pat on the back for not being the worst basket case of the already rotten lot. And for not rocking the boat. Irish Government talks tough at home, but it is largely clawless vis-à-vis the Troika. Our only moments of defiance in dealing with the bailout came whenever we were asked to implement reforms threatening powerful domestic interests, such as protected sectors and professions.

However, with all the celebratory speeches and toasts around, two matters are worth considering within the broader context of this week's events. The first one is the road travelled. The second is the road that awaits us ahead. Both will shape the risks we are likely to face in the medium-term future.


The road that led us to this week's events was an arduous one. Pressured by the twin and interconnected crises - the implosion of our banking sector and the collapse of our domestic economy - we fell into the bailout having burnt through tens of billions of State reserves and having exhausted our borrowing capacity. The crater left behind by the collapsing economy was deep: from 2008 through today, Irish GDP per capita shrunk 16.7 percent, making our recession second deepest in the euro area after Greece. This collapse would have been more benign were it not for the banking crisis. In the context of us exiting the bailout, the lesson to be learned is that the twin banking and growth crises require more resources than even a fiscally healthy state can afford. Today, unlike in 2008, we have no spare resources left to deal with the risk of the adverse twin growth and banking shocks.

Yet, forward outlook for Ireland suggests that such shocks are receding, but remain material.

Our economic recovery is still fragile and subject to adverse risks present domestically and abroad. On domestic side, growth in consumer demand and private investment is lacking. Deleveraging of households and businesses is still ongoing. Constrained credit supply is yet to be addressed. This process can take years, as the banks face shallower demand for loans from lower risk borrowers and sharply higher demand for loans from risky businesses. On top of this, banks are deleveraging their own balance sheets. In general, Irish companies are more dependent on banks credit than their euro area competitors. Absent credit growth, there will be no sustained growth in this economy. Meanwhile, structural reforms are years away from yielding tangible benefits. This is primarily due to the fact that we are yet to adopt such reforms, having spent the last five years in continued avoidance of the problems in the state-controlled and protected domestic sectors.

On the Government side, Budgets 2015 and 2016 will likely require additional, new revenue and cost containment measures. Post 2016, we will face the dilemma of compensating for the unwinding of the Haddington Road Agreement on wages inflation moderation in the public sector and hiring freezes.
To-date, Irish economy was kept afloat by the externally trading services exporters, or put in more simple terms - web-based multinationals. Manufacturing exports are now shrinking, although much of this shrinkage is driven by one sector: pharmaceuticals.

Meanwhile, the banking sector is still carrying big risks. Heavy problems of non-performing loans on legacy mortgages side, unsecured household credit and non-financial corporates are not about to disappear overnight. Even if banks comply with the Central Bank targets on mortgages arrears resolution, it will take at least 18-24 months for the full extent of losses to become visible. Working these losses off the balance sheets will take even longer.
Overall, even modest growth rates, set out in the budget and Troika projections for 2014-2018, cannot be taken for granted.


This week, the ongoing saga of the emerging European Banking Union made the twin risks to banks and growth ever-more important. The ECOFIN meetings are tasked with shaping the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, or BRRD. These made it clear that Europe is heading for a banking crisis resolution system based on a well-defined sequencing of measures. First, national resources will be used in the case of any banks' failures, including in systemic crises. These resources include: wiping out equity holders, and imposing partial losses on lenders and depositors. Thereafter, national funds can be used to cover the capital shortfalls and liquidity shortages. Only after these resources are exhausted will the EU funds kick in to cover the residual capital shortfalls. This insurance cover will not be in the form of debt-free cash. Instead, the funding is likely to involve lending to the Government and to the banks under a State guarantee.

When you run through the benchmark levels of capital shocks that could qualify a banking system for the euro-wide resolution funding under the BRRD, it becomes pretty clear that the mechanism is toothless. For example, in the case of our own crisis, haircuts on bondholders under the proposed rules could have saved us around EUR15-17 billion. In exchange, these savings would have required bailing in depositors with funds in excess of the state guarantee. It is unlikely that we could have secured any joint EU funding outside the Troika deal. Our debt levels would have been lower, but not because of the help from Europe.

This last point was made very clear to us by this week’s events. After all, our historically unprecedented crisis has now been 'successfully resolved' according to the EFSF statement, and as confirmed by the European and Irish officials. The 2008-2010 meltdown of the Irish financial system was dealt with without the need for the Banking Union or its Single Resolution Mechanism.

With a Banking Union or without, given the current state of the Exchequer balance sheet, the buck in the next crisis or in the next iteration of the current crisis will have to stop at the depositors bail-ins. In other words, banking union rhetoric aside, the only hope any banking system in Europe has at avoiding the fate of Cyprus is that the next crisis will not happen.


Second issue relates to the continued reliance across the euro area banks on government bonds as core asset underpinning the financial system. In brief, during the crisis, euro area banks have accumulated huge exposures to sovereign bonds. This allowed the Governments to dramatically reduce the cost of borrowing: the ECB pushed up bonds prices with lower interest rates and unlimited lending against these bonds as risk-free collateral.

The problem is that, unless the ECB is willing to run these liquidity supply schemes permanently, the free lunch is going to end one day. When this happens, the interest rates will rise. Two things will happen in response: value of the bonds will fall and yields on Government debt will rise. The banks will face declines in their assets values, while simultaneously struggling to replace cheap ECB funding with more expensive market funds.

Given that European Governments must roll over significant amounts of bonds over the next 10 years, these risks can pressure Government interest costs. Simple arithmetic says that a country with 122 percent debt/GDP ratio (call it Ireland) and debt financing cost of 4.1 percent per annum spends around 5 percent of its GDP every year on interest bills, inclusive of rolling over costs. If yield rises by a third, the cost of interest rises to closer to 6.6 percent of GDP. Now, suppose that the Government in this economy collects taxes and other receipts amounting to around 40 percent of GDP. This means that just to cover the increase in its interest bill without raising taxes or cutting spending, the Government will need nominal GDP growth of 3.9 percent per annum. That is the exact rate projected by the IMF for Ireland for 2014-2018. Should we fail to deliver on it, our debts will rise. Should interest rates rise by more than one-third from the current crisis-period lows, our debts will rise.


The point is that the dilemmas of our dysfunctional monetary policy and insufficient banking crisis resolution systems are not academic. Instead they are real. And so are the risks we face at the economy level and in the banking sector. Currently, European financial systems have been redrawn to contain financial exposures within national borders. The key signs of this are diverged bond yields across Europe, and wide interest rates differentials for loans to the real economy. In more simple terms, courtesy of dysfunctional policymaking during the crisis, Irish SMEs today pay higher interest rates on loans compared to, say, German SMEs of similar quality.

Banking Union should be a solution to this problem – re-launching credit flowing across the borders once again. It will not deliver on this as long as there are no fully-funded, secure and transparent plans for debt mutualisation across the European banking sector.



Box-out:

Recent data from the EU Commission shows that in 2011-2012, European institutions enacted 3,861 new business-related laws. Meanwhile, according to the World Bank, average cost of starting a business in Europe runs at EUR 2,285, against EUR 158 in Canada and EUR 664 in the US. Not surprisingly, under the burden of growing regulations and high costs, European rates of entrepreneurship, as measured by the proportion of start up firms in total number of registered companies, is falling year on year. This trend is present in the crisis-hit economies of the periphery and in the likes of Austria, Germany and Finland, who weathered the economic recession relatively well. The density of start-ups is rising in Australia, Canada, the US and across Asia-Pacific and Latin America. In 2014 rankings by the World Bank, the highest ranked euro area country, Finland, occupies 12th place in the world in terms of ease of doing business. Second highest ranked euro area economy is Ireland (15th). This completes the list of advanced euro area economies ranked in top 20 worldwide. Start ups and smaller enterprises play a pivotal role in creating jobs and developing skills base within a modern economy. The EU can do more good in combatting unemployment by addressing the problem of regulatory and cost burdens we impose on entrepreneurs and businesses than by pumping out more subsidies for jobs creation and training schemes.

Tuesday, December 24, 2013

24/12/2013: Should Government Do More on Credit Supply? Or Do Better?


We commonly hear about the need for the Government to do something about 'credit supply' to the real economy and 'fixing the bad loans' problem in the banks. Alas, as per the IMF assessment shown in the chart below, Ireland is already well ahead of the majority of its euro area counterparts (save Spain and Slovenia) in terms of policies aimed at supporting supply of credit. And we are way ahead of everyone else in terms of policies that are designed to address the issue of bad loans.


Given having policies ≠ having effective policies or allowing policies on the books to be implemented in the real world. So may be the Government shouldn't be 'doing more' to fix credit supply and demand, but instead 'do better'?

Note: Policies aimed at enhancing credit supply include: fiscal programmes on credit (e.g. credit support schemes, etc), supportive financial regulation, capital markets measures (e.g. funding via state agencies etc), and bank restructuring (that the IMF and the Irish Government often confuse for repairing). Supporting credit demand policies include policies aimed at facilitating corporate debt restructuring and household debt restructuring.

Friday, December 20, 2013

20/12/2013: Are the bondholders' bailouts off the table now?


From late 2008 on through today, myself (including on this blog) and a small number of other economists and analysts have maintained a very clear line that burning of Anglo and INBS bondholders would have been a preferred option for Ireland.

Not to speak for others, I still maintain that writing off the Government bonds held by the ECB is the only course of action open to us today and that it should be pursued.

The ex-IMF's official statements yesterday concerning the preference for burning senior unsecured bondholders in Anglo and INBS, and the claim that this option is no longer viable for Ireland,  are neither new, nor material. For three reasons:

  1. Anglo and INBS bondholders should have been bailed-in in full regardless of their status. Those who held secured bonds should have been bailed-in via equity swaps after the full bailing-in of unsecured bondholders. The action would have saved Irish taxpayers tens of billions, not just billions as the ex-IMF-er claims.
  2. Other banks: AIB and ptsb bondholders should have bailed-in as well.
  3. ECB objections to such a course of action were exceptionally robust, but Ireland should have pursued more aggressive stance with respect to the ECB. Not quite a full exit, but possibly a combination of a threat, plus a concerted push alongside other 'peripheral' countries in the European structures to force ECB engagement.
  4. It is never too late to do the right thing: the debts are still there, only in a different form. Anglo-INBS debts are now held by the Central Bank in the form of sovereign bonds, converted into the latter by the acts of the current Government. These bonds should not be repaid. There are many ways in which such non-repayment can be structured, including with cooperation of the ECB and European officials. One example would be converting the bonds into perpetual zero coupon bonds.

In other words, late admission by the ex-IMF employee of the wrongs, backed by the claim that 'nothing more can be done' are not good enough. We need real corrective action from the EU.

Report on actual statement is here: http://www.breakingnews.ie/ireland/imf-ireland-could-have-saved-billions-by-burning-anglo-bondholders-617688.html

Update: H/T to @aidanodr for the following:
http://www.independent.ie/irish-news/politics/eu-chief-barroso-no-backdated-bank-debt-deal-for-ireland-29854504.html

This pretty much sums up the EU Commission's stance on the 'seismic' banks deal 'negotiated' by the Irish Government in June 2012. It is also wrong, offensive and belligerent. Mr Barroso's comments are simply economically illiterate. Assume Ireland did cause the euro area crisis. Can anyone (Mr Barroso?) explain how the euro can be deemed sustainable if it can be destabilised by a crisis in one of the smallest nations members of the union? Alternatively, imagine the US Dollar being as vulnerable to a banking crisis in New Hampshire in a way that euro (per Mr Barroso's claims) was allegedly vulnerable to the Irish crisis?

Thursday, December 12, 2013

12/12/2013: Measuring the Mortgages Crisis in Ireland


As the readers of this blog would know, I rarely comment on articles in Irish press, and rarer yet on articles in the Irish Times. So here is a rare occasion, not because of the article itself, but because of what it suggests about our national treatment of statistics.

Let's start from the top. The New York Times published an article on Irish crisis today. Here's the link: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/12/business/international/as-bailout-chapter-closes-hardships-linger-for-irish.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1&rref=business&hpw&pagewanted=all

Irish Times - in some ways correctly took the New York Times article to task: http://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/are-we-really-reduced-to-shooting-pigeons-for-food-1.1625588

Let me take up one point in the two articles. Original version of the NYT article cited - quoting from the IT response - that "most startling is the assertion that two-thirds of homeowners have not paid their mortgage “on time for the last two years”".

IT correctly points that this is not true, saying that "The bank’s most recent arrears figures suggest 18.5 per cent of mortgage holders are in arrears of some sort or other.
They also indicate that 22 per cent of those currently in arrears are behind in their payments for at least two years or more."

The NYT published correction to their original claim. Story ends there.

But from the point of view of reality, it does not. This is pivotal to our narrative about the crisis.

Mortgages arrears have many meanings in the economy. But in the social context and in relation to mapping out the extent of the crisis here's what matters: Mortgages arrears are a signifier of the extent of the crisis. In this, they are neither the only indictor, nor are they a relative indicator. Let me explain.
  1. Assume we want to identify the extent of the crisis as it impacted the households holdings of property.
  2. Assume we have official data to do so only.
From (1) and (2), identifying the crisis extent is simple and yet hard. 

Take an analogy of identifying the crisis in the macroeconomy. That would be GDP. Or rather, the size of the crisis = the gap between the GDP at pre-crisis peak to GDP at crisis-period trough. One thing that does not matter to this analysis is where the GDP is today (post-trough). Should in the future the GDP hit a new trough and should the drivers for this be consistent with the drivers for the original crisis, then that new trough becomes the crisis metric. Should GDP recover to pre-crisis highs (as it will one day), the magnitude of the crisis will not be zero, it will still be GDP pre-crisis less GDP at trough.

Variants on the above are possible by looking at various GDP metrics and/or pre-crisis and trough metrics (trend, potential etc). But the essence of analysis is the same: GDP pre-crisis - GDP at trough = Crisis Impact.

Now, back to the original issue: How shall be measure the impact of the crisis when it comes to mortgages?

The IT comments can suggest (and usually the media obliges to take this as given) that Arrears Current = Crisis Impact. But are they?

My view is that they are not. Let's compute the total impact:
  1. Peak of arrears (we are yet to reach that) = part of impact
  2. Restructured mortgages that are not in arrears = part of impact for two reasons: (a) they face high probability of going back into arrears (just under 50:50 chance currently and declining slowly); and (b) restructured mortgages are no longer the original pre-crisis mortgages, so the mere fact of restructuring them is a sign of the crisis impact
  3. Repossessed homes = direct impact; and
  4. Voluntary surrenders = direct impact.
What do we know from official sources: Total mortgages outstanding: 915,746 per CBofI (composed of 768,136 principal residences-linked mortgages and 147,610 BTLs), of these:
  1. Total mortgages in arrears: 181,946 per CBofI (composed of 141,520 principle residences and 40,426 BTLs)
  2. Restructured, not in arrears: 56,186 (composed of 43,034 principal residences and 13,152 BTLs)
  3. Repossessed homes - we have no numbers for aggregates repossessed - neither the CBofI, nor Department of Finance report these on any regular basis. But in Q3 2013 we had 1,566 properties in repossession (1,050 residences and 516 BTLs). These are properties held in possession by the banks. We do not know how many they have sold since the beginning of the crisis.
  4. Voluntary surrenders - we have no data on these from any official source, but the properties that are surrendered and are still in the possession of the banks are aggregated into (3) above.
So, with incomplete information on (3) and (4), to-date, the extent of the crisis is for all types of properties:

181,946 in arrears + 56,186 restructured, not in arrears + 1,566 repossessed and surrendered = 239,698 accounts or, ca 26% of all accounts outstanding.

And the number is growing...

This is not 2/3rds as claimed originally in the NYT, not even 1/3rd, and it is certainly not the percentage of mortgages in trouble over 2 years... and the above 26% include BTLs too... But the true extent of the crisis is that 26 out of 100 mortgages in the country have been directly impacted by it. And the crisis has not peaked, yet.

But here's what this tells us about our psychology when it comes to measuring the extent of the crisis: we commonly interpret arrears alone (and often only arrears in excess of 90 days) as the metric of the crisis. This is an error - an error based on the implicit anchoring of the idea of the crisis to the news and thus, to relative position in time. This is simply wrong. The crisis of WW2 is measured by the absolute level of destruction wrecked at the peak, cumulatively, not by where the losses were in 1955 or in 1948.


Actually, should you be interested, I track the evolution of the above metric (I call it mortgages in default, defaulted or at risk of default) in my regular posts on CBofI quarterly data. The latest was provided here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/11/28112013-irish-mortgages-arrears-q3-2013.html.

And for the conclusion: I recall in 2007 CEO of AIB at the time stating in a meeting with analysts that "Irish people do not default on mortgages. They never do." I replied: "Never is a very precise term. Is there any uncertainty around this claim?" and he retorted: "None." Back to that 26% figure, then?..

Friday, November 29, 2013

29/11/2013: Central Bank: Failure of Own Sustainability Criteria on Mortgages Arrears Resolutions?

So things are getting better with mortgages arrears crisis… practically easing the worries of the nation, according to the Irish media and officialdom… And the Central Bank is delighted that the banks are so actively meeting targets etc… (Note: my coverage of the arrears figures is here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/11/28112013-irish-mortgages-arrears-q3-2013.html)

Except…

Per Central Bank: “We expect that lenders will continue to progress and develop their approaches to ensure that future sustainability targets will be achieved.  With indications the banks are now offering long term sustainable solutions to customers, the Central Bank continues to encourage meaningful engagement between lenders and borrowers.”

And what these 'sustainable solutions' might be, you should ask?

Per CB: "As at end of September 2013 the lenders in total reported they had issued proposals to 43% of mortgage accounts in arrears against a target of 30%."


Now, let me be forthright here on my views:
1) Repossessions and voluntary surrenders are a part of the solutions tool kit and are unavoidable (and indeed optimal) in a number of cases.
2) However, the above can only be deemed sustainable if and only if they take place in the context of first (ex-ante repossession or surrender) concluding arrangements between borrower and lender on what is to be done with the residual balance on mortgage remaining at the end of the property sale.

Since we do not know what percentage of all repossessions and surrenders were accompanied by such an agreement, we do not know if there is ANY (repeat - any) sustainability of debt has been achieved in the process of such a resolution. In other words, the Central Bank cannot make a factual claim that 55% of the resolution measures proposed were sustainable (aka meet the CB own criteria for them satisfying the target requirement).

Worse, the massive number - 55% - is itself an indication that the entire Central Bank-led process is a complete failure. In fairness to the Central Bank, the language of the release (http://www.centralbank.ie/press-area/press-releases/Pages/CentralBankpublishesoutcomeofMortgageArrears.aspx) suggests that the bank is not entirely happy with the status quo distribution:

"There has been a change in the trend of proposed solutions from Quarter 2 to Quarter 3. In Quarter 2 62% of the proposals were in the Surrender/Repossession category, which decreased to 55% in Quarter 3."

But there are problems even with this claim. Firstly, there is no trend. There is not enough time series data to show ANY (repeat - any) trend up or down in the data. What we have is one quarter against another. Should the 'trend' of 7 percentage points per quarter continue, we will end 2014 with over 40% 'resolutions' leading to foreclosures or surrenders of properties. Given the bank wants to deliver 75% resolutions target by the end of 2014, this would imply that more than 40% of the mortgages accounts in arrears will be in liquidation. That is a trend to a national disaster.

Thursday, November 28, 2013

28/11/2013: Irish Mortgages Arrears: Q3 2013


Numbers are out for Residential Mortgages Arrears in Q3 2013 and the data shows that the chronic problem of mortgages distress is still with us with little change after months of tough talks from the authorities, 'resolute' actions from the banks and a barrage of legislative, regulatory and rhetorical changes.

Top of the line numbers are still frightening, albeit things have largely faltered out on most fronts.


  • Total number of PDH accounts at risk or defaulted (defined as all accounts currently in arrears, restructured and not in arrears, and in repossessions) at the end of Q3 2013 stood at 185,604, down 329 accounts or 0.2% from Q3 2012. 
  • Over the 12 months through September 2013, number of BTL accounts at risk or in default rose 3,022 (+5.9%) to 54,094. 
  • Thus, total number of mortgages accounts currently at risk or defaulted at the end of Q3 2013 stood at 239,698, which is 1.1% higher than in Q3 2012. 
  • Total outstanding volume of mortgages at risk or defaulted for both BTL and PDH mortgages at the end of Q3 2013 was EUR46.77 billion, up EUR1.75 billion on year ago.
  • As of the end of Q3 2013, 20.3% of all PDH mortgages accounts and 36.65% of all BTL mortgages accounts were either in arrears, restructured due to previous arrears or in repossession. 
  • Across the entire system, 26.18% of all mortgages accounts and 33.6% of all mortgages volumes outstanding in Ireland were at risk or defaulted at the end of September 2013.

Deleveraging process is not working either:

  • Total outstanding volume of mortgages debt in the country was EUR138.88 billion in Q3 2013, only 2.4% lower than a year ago.
  • Total number of mortgages accounts fell to 915,746 in Q3 2013, down 3.08% y/y.
  • Residential mortgages in arrears rose to 141,520 accounts (+0.1% y/y) and BTLs accounts in arrears numbered 40,426 (+10.35% y/y). Thus total number of accounts in arrears was up 2.2% y/y.
  • Total outstanding volumes of mortgages in arrears stood at EUR36.56 billion in Q3 2013, up 5.8% y/y (comprising EUR25.56bn in residential mortgages volumes +4.75% y/y and EUR11.0bn of BTLs +8.32% y/y).
  • Total amounts of actual arrears rose to EUR3.479bn in Q3 2013, up 28.2% y/y.
  • Repossessions rose to 1,566 in Q3 2013 from 1,503 in Q2 2013 and 1,358 in Q3 2012. Residential repossessions rose to 1,050 from 1,001 a quarter ago and 944 a year ago. The process of repossessions remains very slow and is likely to accelerate in the near future.


These figures clearly show that banks-driven approach to the process of resolving the mortgages arrears crisis, adopted by the Government and the financial sector regulatory authorities is not delivering. To-date, the speed of mortgages arrears restructuring and resolution is disappointingly slow.

Some charts to illustrate the trends:





Saturday, November 9, 2013

9/11/2013: Stress testing zombie banks: Sunday Times, November 3


This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article from November 3, 2013.


In the marble and mahogany halls of European high finance HQs, the next few months will be filled with the suspense of the preparation for the banks audits.

Much of this excitement will be focused on matters distant to the real economy. Truth is, saddled with zombie banks, and public and private sectors’ debt overhangs, euro area is incapable of generating the growth momentum sufficient to wrestle itself free from the structural crisis it faced since 2008. The latest ECB forecasts for the Euro area economy, released this week, predicted real GDP contraction of 0.4 percent for 2013 and growth of 1 percent in 2014. With these numbers, the end game is the same today as it was two years ago, when previous stress tests were carried out. The system can only be repaired when banks absorb huge losses on unsustainable loans.

New stress tests are unlikely change this. However, the tests are important within the context of the weaker banking systems, such as the Irish one. The reason for this is that the ECB needs to contain the sector risks as it goes about building the European Banking Union, or EBU.

The good news is – there are low- and high-cost options for achieving this containment in Ireland’s case. The bad news is – neither involves any relief on the legacy banks debts necessary to aid our stalled economy. The worse news is – the Government appears to be pushing for exiting the bailout without securing the low cost option, leaving us exposed to the risk of being saddled with the costlier one.


The IMF data suggests that Euro area-wide banks’ losses can be as high as EUR350-400 billion - or just under one third of the total deleveraging that still has to take place in the banks. The ECB needs to have an accurate picture of how much of the above can arise in the countries where banks and Government finances are already strained beyond their ability to cover such losses. The ECB also needs to deliver such estimates without raising public alarms as to the levels of losses still forthcoming.

Taken together, the above two points strongly suggest that in the case of Ireland, the banks will come out of the stress tests with a relatively clean bill of health shaded somewhat by risk-related warnings. Pointing to the latter, the ECB will implicitly or explicitly ask the Irish Government to secure funding sources for dealing with any realization of such risks. Such precautionary funding can only come from either a stand-by credit line with the IMF and/or European stabilization funds, or a commitment to set aside some of the NTMA cash. An NTMA set-aside will cost us the price of issuing new Government debt. This is potentially more than ten times the price of IMF credit line.

In short, Ireland should be using ECB’s concerns over our banking system health to secure a cheaper precautionary line of credit. Judging by this week’s comments from the Government, we are not. One way or the other, it is hard to see how continued uncertainty build up within Irish banks can help our cause in obtaining both a precautionary line of credit and a relief on legacy banks debts.


The ECB concerns about Irish banks are not purely academic. Our banking crisis is far from over.

Consider the latest data on three Pillar Banks: AIB, Bank of Ireland and Permanent tsb, covering the period through H1 2013 courtesy of the IMF and the EU Commission reviews published over recent weeks. On the surface, the three banks are relatively well capitalised with Core Tier 1 capital ratio of 14.1 percent, down on 16.3 percent a year ago. Meanwhile, the deleveraging of the system is proceeding at a reasonable pace, with total average assets declining EUR30.5 billion year on year.

The problem is that little of this deleveraging is down to writedowns of bad loans. This means that high levels of capital on banks balance sheets are primarily due to the extend-and-pretend approach to dealing with nonperforming loans adopted by the banks to-date. All members of the Troika have repeatedly pointed out that Irish banks continue to avoid putting forward long-term sustainable solutions to mortgages arrears and that this approach can eventually lead to amplification of risks over time.

Loans loss provisions are up 11 percent to EUR28.2 billion and non-performing loans are up to EUR56.8 billion. Still, while in H1 2012 non-performing loans accounted for 22.2 percent of all loans held by the banks, at the end of June this year, the figure was 26.6 percent. Non-performing loans are now 35.5 percent in excess of banks’ equity, up from just 4.7 percent a year ago. As a reminder, Irish Exchequer holds 99.8 percent stake in AIB, 99.2 percent share in Ptsb and 15.1 percent stake in Bank of Ireland. This means that should capital buffers fall to regulatory-set limits, further writedowns of loans will mean nullifying the Exchequer stakes in the banks and crystalising full losses carried by the taxpayers.

Continued weaknesses in the solvency positions of the banks are driven primarily by three factors. Firstly, as banks sell or collateralise their better loans their future returns on assets are diminished. The second factor is poor operational performance of the banks. Net losses in the system fell between H1 2012 and H1 2013. However, this still leaves banks reliant on capital drawdowns to fund their non-performing assets. The third factor is the weak performance of banks’ non-core financial assets. Over the last 12 months, Irish banks holdings of securities grew in value at a rate that was about 12-15 times slower than the growth rate in valuations of assets in the international financial markets.

In short, the IMF review presented the picture of the banking sector here that retains all the signs of remaining comatose. This was further confirmed by the EU Commission report this week, and spells trouble for the Irish banks stress tests.

In 2011 recapitalisation of Irish banks, the Central Bank assumed that banks operating profits will total EUR3.9 billion over the 2011-2013. So far the banks are some EUR4.5 billion shy of matching the Central Bank’s rosy projection.

This shortfall comes despite dramatic hikes in interest margins on existent and new loans, decreases in deposit rates, and reductions in operating costs. Compared to H1 2011 when the PCARs were completed, lending rates margins over the ECB base rate have shot up by up to 138 basis points for households and 59 basis points for non-financial companies. Rates paid out on termed deposit have fallen some 103 basis points. As the result, banks net interest margins rose.

On top of that, the funding side of the banks remains problematic. The NTMA is now holding almost half of its cash in the Pillar Banks, superficially boosting their deposits. Private sector deposits continue to trend flat and are declining in some categories. This is before the adverse impacts of Budget 2014 measures, including the Banks levy and higher DIRT rates start to bite.

Behind these balance sheet considerations, the economy and the Government are continuing to put strains on households' ability to repay their loans. This week, AA published analysis of the cost of mortgages carry (the annual cost of financing average family home and associated expenses). According to the report, the direct cost of maintaining an average Irish home purchased prior to the crisis is now running at around EUR 21,940 per annum. Under Budget 2014 provisions, a married couple with two children and combined income of EUR 100,000 will spend one third of their after-tax earnings on funding an average house. In such a setting, any major financial shock, such as birth of another child, loss of employment, extended illness etc., can send the average Celtic Tiger household into arrears.


All of this, means that any honest capital adequacy assessment of the Irish banking system will be an exercise in measuring a litany of risks and uncertainties that define our banks’ operating conditions today and into the foreseeable future. Disclosing such weaknesses in the system will risk exposing Irish banks to renewed markets pressures, including possible failures to roll over maturing debts coming due. It can also impair their ability to continue deleveraging, and fund assets writedowns. On the other hand, leaving these stresses undisclosed risks delaying recognition of losses and exposing us to pressure from the ECB down the line.

Not surprisingly, as the ECB goes into stress tests exercise, it is exerting pressure on Ireland to arrange a stand-alone precautionary line of credit. While it is being presented as a prudential exercise in light of our exit from the bailout, in reality the credit will be there to cushion against any potential losses in the banking system over 2014-2018, before the actual EBU comes into force. Should such losses materialise, the Exchequer will be faced with an unpalatable choice: hit depositors with a bail-in or pony up some more cash for the banks. Having a stand by loans facility arranged prior to exiting the Bailout will help avoid the latter and possibly the former. The cost, however, will be an increase in overall interest charges paid by the State, plus continued strict oversight of our fiscal position by the Troika.

A rock of interest charges and Troika supervision, a hard place of zombiefied banking, and a rising tide of risks are still beckoning Ireland from the other side of the stress tests.




Box-out: 

The latest data from the retail sector released by the CSO this week painted a rather mixed picture of the domestic economy’s fortunes. Controlling for some volatility in the monthly series, Q3 2013 data shows that despite very favourable weather conditions over the July-September 2013, Irish core retail sales (excluding motors sales) fell in volume by some 0.3 percent compared to Q3 2012. On the other hand, there was a 0.6 percent increase in the value of sales over the same period. Currently, the volume of total core retail sales in Ireland sits 4.3 percent below 2005 levels. Non-food sales, excluding motor trades, fuel and bars sales, fell 2.1 percent on 2012 in volume and is up 1.2 percent in value. The inflation effects imply that when it comes to core non-food sales, the volumes of retail trade are now down 22 percent on 2005 levels, while the value of sales is up almost 2 percent. Consumers are still on strike, while retailers are getting only a slight prices relief in the unrelenting crisis.

Friday, October 11, 2013

11/10/2013: What's 'new' in German Coalition talks... what's Ireland...


So today's report in the Irish Times on German Government coalition talks and demands by the Social Democrats (SPD) on Germany blocking use of ESM to cover Irish Exchequer debt exposures arising from the banking crisis and for Germany to adopt a tougher stance on irish corporate tax regime are news... Read them here: http://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/irish-debt-linked-to-angela-merkel-talks-on-coalition-1.1556845

Now, recall this: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/10/8102013-german-voters-go-for-status-quo.html where all of this fall-out from the German elections was foretold...