19/12/15: Another Un-glamour Moment for Economics

Much of the current fascination with behavioural economics is well deserved - the field is a tremendously important merger of psychology and economics, bringing economic research and analysis down to the granular level of human behaviour. However, much of it is also a fad - behavioural economics provide a convenient avenue for advertising companies, digital marketing agencies, digital platforms providers and aggregators, as well as congestion-pricing and Gig-Economy firms to milk strategies for revenue raising that are anchored in common sense. In other words, much of behavioural economics use in real business (and in Government) is about convenient plucking out of strategy-confirming results. It is marketing, not analysis.

A lot of this plucking relies on empirically-derived insights from behavioural economics, which, in turn, often rely on experimental evidence. Now, experimental evidence in economics is very often dodgy by design: you can’t compel people to act, so you have to incentivise them; you can quite select a representative group, so you assemble a ‘proximate’ group, and so on. Imagine you want to study intervention effects on a group of C-level executives. Good luck getting actual executives to participate in your study and good luck getting selection biases sorted out in analysing the results. Still, experimental economics continues to gain prominence, as a backing for behavioural economics. A still, companies and governments spend millions on funding such research.

Now, not all experiments are poorly structured and not all evidence derived from is dodgy. So to alleviate nagging suspicion as to how much error is carried in experiments, a recent paper by Alwyn Young of London School of Economics, titled “Channelling Fisher: Randomization Tests and the Statistical Insignificance of Seemingly Significant Experimental Results” (http://personal.lse.ac.uk/YoungA/ChannellingFisher.pdf) used  “randomization statistical inference to test the null hypothesis of no treatment effect in a comprehensive sample of 2003 regressions in 53 experimental papers drawn from the journals of the American Economic Association.”

The attempt is pretty darn good. The study uses robust methodology to test a statistically valid hypothesis: has there been a statically significant result derived in the studies arising from experimental treatment or not? The paper tests a large sample of studies published (having gone through peer and editorial reviews) in perhaps the most reputable economics journals. This is creme-de-la-creme of economics studies.

The findings, to put this scientifically: “Randomization tests reduce the number of regression specifications with statistically significant treatment effects by 30 to 40 percent. An omnibus randomization test of overall experimental significance that incorporates all of the regressions in each paper finds that only 25 to 50 percent of experimental papers, depending upon the significance level and test, are able to reject the null of no treatment effect whatsoever. Bootstrap methods support and confirm these results. “

In other words, in majority of studies claiming to have achieved statistically significant results from experimental evidence, such results were not really statistically significantly attributable to experiments.

Now, the author is cautious in his conclusions. “Notwithstanding its results, this paper confirms the value of randomized experiments. The methods used by authors of experimental papers are standard in the profession and present throughout its journals. Randomized statistical inference provides a solution to the problems and biases identified in this paper. While, to date, it rarely appears in experimental papers, which generally rely upon traditional econometric methods, it can easily be incorporated into their analysis. Thus, randomized experiments can solve both the problem of identification and the problem of accurate statistical inference, making them doubly reliable as an investigative tool. “

But this is hogwash. The results of the study effectively tell us that large (huge) proportion of papers on experimental economics published in the most reputable journals have claimed significant results attributable to experiments where no such significance really was present. Worse, the methods that delivered these false significance results “are standard in the profession”. 

Now, consider the even more obvious: these are academic papers, written by highly skilled (in econometrics, data collection and experiment design) authors. Imagine what drivel passes for experimental analysis coming out of marketing and surveying companies? Imagine what passes for policy analysis coming out of public sector outfits? Without peer reviews and without cross-checks like those performed by Young?

18/12/15: Ukraine Inches Even Closer to a Default

So, we have this:

Which means that Ukraine and Russia - so far - have failed to agree terms of debt restructuring. As a reminder, over the last few days, Ukraine and Russia were involved in a 'last minute' dialogue (via Germany) to resolve the issue.

Does this mean that Ukraine is now in a sovereign debt default? Technically - no. Ukraine will only be in a default after 10 days grace period expires, which means the parties to the talks still have 12 days to reach an agreement and avoid default.

Does this mean that Ukraine is now in breach of IMF lending criteria? Technically - no. IMF amended its own rules allowing lending to continue for countries in official sector default, as long as these countries continue to engage in debt restructuring negotiations with the lenders.

Can the two countries reach a deal in time to avoid official default? Unlikely: any deal between Russia and Ukraine (except for a deal that treats Russia under the same terms extended to private lenders - a deal that is simply unacceptable to Russia) will require approval of other (commercial) lenders under the agreement between commercial lenders and Ukraine struck earlier. There is simply not enough time to achieve such an approval, even assuming, there is a deal and the deal can be approved (both assumptions are quite a stretch).

Do both parties show will to negotiate in good faith? So far - no. Russian offer (see here) has been to restructure debt by extending repayment period (a real haircut absent nominal haircut, as far as I read this). The offer shifted Russian position in negotiations in the direction of Ukraine's position: from the opening position that the debt is official sector debt and thus should be repaid in full and in time. Ukraine's position has been to treat Russian debt equivalent to private sector debt and Ukraine (as far as public record goes) did not alter its position to move closer to Russian offer. Ukraine also deployed consistent rhetoric of "Our way or the highway" variety. In other words (I am willing to be corrected on this), Russia made insufficient step toward Ukraine, while Ukraine made no step toward Russian position whatsoever.

Note: my view has been (consistently over time) that Russia should restructure loans to Ukraine to a longer term, say 10-year, bond extended at original interest rate and allow for 2-3 years interest payments moratorium. Financially optimal solution would have been to impose a haircut on principal and extend maturity of the remaining balance. But, given Ukraine's failure to secure stronger restructuring with private sector lenders, this option is not available and is politically infeasible.

17/12/15: Re-aligning Ruble with Oil: Fed Hiccup...

Two casualties of the Fed's rate jitter: Oil & Ruble

Source: @Schuldensuehner 

Ruble is now nearing August 2015 lows on a continued trend that realigned with oil prices.

And while we are at it, another pairing:

Source: @Schuldensuehner 

Note: as of yesterday's closing Russian CDS 5 year spread was at 308.91 with implied probability of default of 19.15%. A week ago, same stood at 291.64 with implied probability of default at 18.26% and at the end of Tuesday, at 305.91 with implied probability of default at 18.99%.

But as a reminder, watch not only Brent, but also Urals-Brent spread. Hawkish dove of the Fed has less to say on that than Russian energy substitution ongoing in Europe and Turkey via Saudi's and Iranian contracts.

16/12/15: 36 years of interest rates across major advanced economies

As we inch closer to the U.S. Fed rates decision today, here is a useful chart summing up evolution of interest rates in key advanced economies over the last 36 years:

Happy lifting... 

16/12/15: Only 2/5 Global Ranking Methodologies Show an Irish Uni in Top 100

Universities rankings are a hazardous undertaking. Too many moving metrics, too many subjective inputs, too many egos fighting each other and too many euros and dollars and rupees and pounds etc at stake from funding sources. So one really should take them with a grain of salt and in comparatives look at a number of rankings across the board.

So here's a set of simple facts:

• By ARWU methodology, there are no Irish Universities in top 100 world wide: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/08/15815-irish-universities-none-in-top.html;
• By Times Higher Education methodology, there are no Irish Universities in top 100 world wide: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/11/51115-times-higher-education-rankings.html
• By US News & World Report (NWR) methodology, there are no Irish Universities in top 100 world wide: http://www.usnews.com/education/best-global-universities/search?region=&country=ireland&subject=&name= and see chart below;
• By QS rankings methodology there is only one Irish university in top 100 world wide http://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings/world-university-rankings/2015#sorting=rank+region=140+country=+faculty=+stars=false+search= (see second snapshot below)
• By Wikipedia rankings, there is only one Irish university in top 100: https://www.timeshighereducation.com/carousels/wikipedia-ranking-world-universities-top-100 (see third snapshot below)

US NWR rankings:

QS rankings:

Wikipedia rankings:

Note: although QS and Wikipedia rankings for Trinity are relatively close, two methodologies are quite different. In terms of perceived robustness, ARWU and THE, are seen as top quality rankings, with QS and USNWR methodologies being usually seen as 'intermediate' quality and Wikipedia rankings being, err... a bit off-the-wall. 

Still, net effect is: 3/5 global universities rankings give Ireland zero places in top 100. No matter how you spin this, it ain't great...

15/12/15: There will be more blood: Global commodities markets

My Article for Sunday Business Post on commodities markets outlook: http://www.businesspost.ie/constantin-gurdgiev-there-will-be-blood/.

15/12/15: Europe’s Refugees Crisis: Some Economic Perspectives

In recent months, we have observed an ever-increasing cost estimates for Germany (and by a corollary Europe) of absorbing the 2015 inflows of refugees.

Central to these estimates have been numbers released by the Ifo Institute. These estimates started with the assumed inflows of 800,000 refugees in 2015 and were first pegged at EUR10 billion, “just to cover accommodation and food”. I covered these estimates earlier here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/09/22915-germanys-ifo-refugees-to-cost-ten.html.

Subsequent estimates raised both the number of refugees (to 1,100,000) and the cost per refugee, raising the estimate to EUR21.1 billion (covered here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/11/111115-new-cost-estimates-of-european.html) and per Ifo including “accommodation, food, creches, schools, German courses, training and administration” over 12 months.

In part, very high costs estimates are premised on the assumed ability of refugees to integrate into German labour markets (http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/presse/Pressemitteilungen/Pressemitteilungen-Archiv/2015/Q4/pm-20151204_Bildung_Fluechtlinge.html) due to lack of language skills, work skills and education. These assumptions - based on population averages and aggregate scores for key countries of origin for refugees - appear to be in line with German employers’ perception of refugees as generally lacking in key basic skills as noted here: http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/presse/Pressemitteilungen/Pressemitteilungen-Archiv/2015/Q4/press_20151126_sd22_fluechtlinge.html.

Taking Ifo Institute’s estimate of EUR19,000 in annual costs per refugee, and based on the EU Commission estimate that some 4 million Syrian refugees currently are in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, with some also in Egypt, Iraq and Libya, what are the chances that EU’s latest ‘aid’ to Turkey of a miserly EUR3 billion is going to be enough to address the problem?

If research also attempts to quantify cost/benefit assessment of the refugees inflows. In a more recent note (http://www.cesifo-group.de/cesifo/newsletter/1115/From_the_Editor_November_2015.html) the Institute states that “…Europe, with its ageing societies, needs new workers. Germany alone theoretically needs more than 30 million young immigrants until 2035 to keep the old-age dependency ratio constant at the current pensionable age, and maintain both the pension and contribution rates in its pay-as-you-go system unchanged. So, could the newcomers be the solution?”

The answer depends on which model one uses to estimate costs/benefits of inflows. “There have been different calculations about the benefit that refugees bring to the recipient countries. While a Keynesian model using a multiplier analysis until 2035 (!) comes to the conclusion that there are positive net benefits for the incumbent population, generational accounting models come up with frighteningly large loss estimates for the state, reaching between 79,000 and 450,000 euros per person in present value terms. This burden might well prove unsustainable if the number of immigrants continues unabated.” In other words, if you believe in a world where Government spending on anything (be it digging of ditches or building refugees shelter or hospitals) is a positive contributor to growth in the long run, things are just fine. If you believe that there can be misallocation of resources in investment and there can be inefficient transfers across generations as a result of multi annual policy commitments, things are pretty costly.

As usual, there is no agreement amongst the economists on the subject of economic impact of refugees. Which is not to warrant any statement about ethical and human dimension of how Europe should be addressing the crisis (economics, of course, is by far not the only consideration on this matter). But it is a good starting point (albeit a bit late for the current crisis) to have a debate as to the merits of different models for selecting refugees based on specific characteristics, such as prior work experiences, basic skills and education. It is also a good point to start thinking about how the balance between humanitarian assistance and development supports (in countries of origin) as well as social supports and workplace integration incentives in the host countries should/could be structured.

Ifo Institute position on the subject of host countries labour market and social supports structures is to stress the need for reducing minimum wage (Hartz IV) barriers to labour market entry. Without endorsing this view, here is an interesting link to a study that covered impacts of social welfare nets on entrepreneurship amongst migrants in the US, Canada and the UK (with Canadian experience being very interesting as Canadian model of highly selective migration filters is being advocated for Europe): http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2010/02/economics-07022010-human-capital.html.

The refugees crisis of 2015 (and possibly 2016 and on) is testing European systems (labour markets, social welfare, capital structures etc) along the economic dimension. The debates and policy responses so badly needed today should have taken place years ago. Absent these, we are now staring at the possibility that this crisis will alter our political systems, while stressing our economic and social systems. A right response would, in my opinion, involve recognising first and foremost the humanitarian dimension of the crisis, while accelerating the process for developing long term economic responses.


Note: this post is a follow up on my appearance on Bloomberg Radio last morning discussing the topic of economic impact of the refugees crisis.

15/12/15: Russian Outlook for 2016: Slon & Rain

My first column for Russian current affairs magazine Slon is out covering outlook for Russian economy for 2016: https://slon.ru/posts/61120.

I spoke about the topic on Russian TV Channel Dozhd' (Rain): https://tvrain.ru/teleshow/slon_na_dozhde/dollar_71-400099/.

14/12/15: ECB Rates & Policy Room

My comment on monetary policy space remaining for ECB post-December decision: Expresso (December 12, 2015, page 09):

14/12/15: U.S. Rates Impact on Euro: Expresso, December 12

My comments on potential impact on Euro and Euro area economy from the Fed rate hike for Portuguese Expresso (December, 12 page 03):

13/12/15: Strelka Institute: Interview

Recently, I gave an interview (in Russian) to Strelka Institute in Moscow. The interview covered the importance of linking economic development and urban design to sustain a C.A.R.E system of supports for human capital-intensive economy. Here is the interview link: http://www.strelka.com/ru/magazine/2015/12/01/gurgiev.

13/12/15: Irish National Accounts 3Q: Post 6: Exports and MNCs

In the previous 6 posts, I covered:

1. Irish National Accounts 3Q: Sectoral Growth results;
2. Irish year-on-year growth rates in GDP and GNP;
3. Quarterly growth rates in Irish GDP and GNP; 
4. Irish Domestic Demand (Household Consumption, Government Spending and Public and Private Investment)
5. Irish external trade; and
6. Evolution of per-capita metrics and the dynamics of the crisis.

So let’s get down to the last post on the matter of Irish National Accounts for 3Q 2015: the subject of Irish economy’s dependency on MNCs… err… exports that is.

Real Exports as a share of Irish real GDP stood at 120.1% in 3Q 2015, the second highest proportion on record, down from 123.0% in 2Q 2015 which was record-breaking level. Similarly, Nominal Exports as a share of nominal GDP fell from 127.2% in 2Q 2015 (highest on record) to 122.7% (second highest).

This is a remarkable set of numbers, driven predominantly by the activities of MNCs in Irish economy, and a number that is a signifier of all that is wrong with our National Accounts. Unlike countries that serve as a basis for production, Ireland serves as a basis for both some production of goods and services, but also as a platform for large scale tax optimisation. Vast majority of our exports are accounted for by MNCs trading from here, with large share of activity not taking place here, but being booked into Ireland from abroad. This distorts actual levels and value of production, but it also distorts the metrics of this economy’s openness to trade.

As the result on much of the MNCs activities, profits derived in Ireland by MNCs can go four ways:

1. They can be booked into tax havens (in which case they register as outflows from Ireland or Irish imports);
2. They can be booked in Ireland as profits and retained here (in which case they accrue to our National Accounts);
3. They can be registered here and then repatriated abroad (in which case they register as outflows of factor income); and
4. They can be booked into here and then expatriated, but remain on our books, as long as the MNCs is domiciled here (e.g. company created as an Irish entity via inversion).

We have zero ability to tell how much exactly do MNCs derive in profit from activities here and tax optimisation through here. But we do have a number that partially captures (3) above. This is provided by Net Factor Income Outflows to the Rest of the World and here is the chart showing how it evolved over time relative to Exports:

Do note that over 2011 - present period, average net outflow of factor payments abroad has fallen as a share of Exports from 17.5% in the period of 1Q 2002 - 4Q 2010 to 15.1%, the lowest period average on record. In other words, during the last 4 and 3/4 years MNCs operating from Ireland have been expatriating fewer profits abroad than in other periods in history. Question is: what happens to these retained profits over time? Obviously, these MNCs have absolutely no interest in re-investing these profits in Ireland (there is neither the scale for such reinvestment, nor the need). This suggests that either these profits are being parked until such a time as when they can be expatriated for the purpose of funding MNCs investments around the world, or the MNCs overall switched to declaring lower profits as a share of their exports.

Truth is - we do not know what is going on, though we do know that something is afoot.

Overall, however, Irish economic miracle’s dependence on MNCs-driven exports growth is growing, whilst transparency of MNCs operations here (at least as far as the National Accounts go) is declining. Happy FDI days are upon us… as long as the U.S., OECD, EU, and the rest of the host of states and organisations hell-bent on ending the free for all tax optimisation by corporates aren’t looking…

12/12/15: Irish National Accounts 3Q: Post 6: Measuring Recovery

In previous posts, I have covered:

1. Irish National Accounts 3Q: Sectoral Growth results 
2. Year-on-year growth rates in GDP and GNP in 3Q 2015 
3. Quarterly growth rates in GDP and GNP 
4. Domestic Demand and
5. External trade side of the National Accounts 

Now, as usual, let’s take a look at the evolution of 3 per-capita metrics and trace out the dynamics of the crisis.

In 3Q 2015, Personal Expenditure per capita for the last four quarters totalled EUR 19,343, which represents an increase of 2.78% on four quarters total through 3Q 2014. Relative to peak 4 quarters total (attained in 4Q 2007), current levels of Personal Expenditure on Goods & Services on a per capita is 7.14% below the peak levels. In other words, 7 and 3/4 of the years down, Personal Expenditure on a per capita basis is yet to recover (in real terms) pre-crisis peak.

Per capita Final Domestic Demand (combining Personal Expenditure, Government Expenditure and Fixed Capital Formation) based on the total for four quarters through 3Q 2015 stood at EUR 34,616, which represents an increase of 7.75% y/y. This level of per capita Demand is 11.19% lower than pre-crisis peak attained in 4Q 2007. As with Personal Expenditure per capita, Final Demand per capita is yet to complete crisis period recovery, 7 and 3/4 of the years down.

On the other hand, GDP per capita stood at EUR 42,870 on a cumulative 4 quarters basis, which is 6.2% above the same period for 2014 and is 0.98% above the pre-crisis peak (4Q 2007). Hence, GDP per capita has now fully recovered from the pre-crisis peak and it ‘only’ took it 7.5 years to do so.

GNP per capita has recovered from the crisis back in 2Q 2015, so at of Q3 2015, 4-quarters aggregate GNP per capita stood at EUR 36,508 which is 5.85% ahead of the same period through Q3 2014 and is 2.39% above pre-crisis peak. In other words, it took 7 and 1/4 years for GNP per capita to regain its pre-crisis peak.

It is also worth looking at the potential levels of output per capita ex-crisis.

To do so, let’s take average growth rates for 4 quarters moving aggregate GDP. GNP and Domestic Demand, for the period 1Q 2002 through 4Q 2007. Note 1: this period represents slower rates of growth than years prior to 1Q 2002. Note 2: I further removed all growth rates observations within the period that were above 5 percentage points for GDP and GNP and above 4% for Final Demand, thus significantly reducing impact of a number of very high growth observations on resulting trend.

Here is the chart, also showing by how much (% terms) would GDP, GNP and Domestic Demand per capita have been were pre-crisis trends (moderated by my estimation) to persist from 4Q 2007:

I’ll let everyone draw their own conclusions as to the recovery attained.

12/12/15: Irish National Accounts 3Q: Post 5: External Trade

In the first post of the series, I covered Irish National Accounts 3Q: Sectoral Growth results. The second post covered year-on-year growth rates in GDP and GNP, while the third post covered quarterly growth rates in GDP and GNP. The fourth post covered Domestic Demand.

Now, consider external trade side of the National Accounts.

Irish Exports of Goods & Services stood at EUR62.52 billion in 3Q 2015, a rise of 12.4% y/y, after posting growth of 13.5% y/y in 2Q 2015 and 15.5% growth in 3Q 2014. Over the last four quarters, Irish Exports of Goods & Services grew, on average, at a rate of 13.4%, implying doubling of exports by value roughly every 5.5 years. If you believe this value to be reflective of a volume of real economic activity taking place in a country with roughly 1.983 million people in employment, you have to be on Amsterdam brownies. Over the 12 months through 3Q 2015, Irish economy has managed to export EUR235.67 billion worth of stuff, or a whooping EUR27.828 billion more than over the same period a year before. That’s EUR118,845 per person working at home or at work in Ireland.

Now, moving beyond the total, Exports of Goods stood at EUR34.062 billion in 3Q 2015, up 16.07% y/y - a doubling rate of 4.5 years. Exports of goods were up 16.03% y/y in 2Q 2015 and 16.9% in 3Q 2014, so over the last 12 months, average rate of growth in Exports of Goods was 18.01%. In other words, Irish Exports of Goods (physical stuff apparently manufactured here) are running at a rate of increase consistent with doubling of exports every 4 years.

Exports of Services are still ‘lagging’ behind, standing at EUR28.458 billion in 3Q 2015, up 8.2% y/y in 3Q 2015, having previously risen 10.5% in 2Q 2015. Both rates of growth are below 13.9% heroic rate of expansion achieved in 3Q 2014. Over the last four quarters, average rate of growth in Irish Exports of Services was 8.6%, to EUR107.29 billion.

However, in order to produce all these marvels of exports (and indeed to sustain living and consumption), Ireland does import truck loads of stuff and services. Thus, Imports of Goods and Services overall rose to EUR52.788 billion in 3Q 2015, up 18.9% y/y and beating 16.5% growth in 2Q 2015 and even 18.75% growth in 3Q 2014. Over the last four quarters average rate of growth in Imports of Goods and Services was impressive 17.6%.

Some of this growth was down to increased consumer demand. Imports of Goods alone rose 5.1% y/y in Q3 2015, compared to 8.1% in 2Q 2015 and 16.7% in 3Q 2014 (over the last four quarters, average growth rate was 10.1%). Imports of Services, however, jumped big time: up 27.9% y/y in 3Q 2015, having previously grown 21.8% in 2Q 2015 and 20.2% in 3Q 2014 (average for the last four quarters is 22.6%). Of course, imports of services include imports of IP by the web-based and ICT and IFSC firms, while imports of goods include pharma inputs, transport inputs (e.g. aircraft leased by another strand of MNCs and domestic tax optimisers) and so on.

Both, exports and imports changes are also partially driven by changes in the exchange rates, which are virtually impossible to track, since contracts for shipments within MNCs are neither transparent, more disclosed to us, mere mortals, and can have virtually no connection to real world exchange rates.

All of which means that just as in the case of our GDP and GNP and even Domestic Demand, Irish figures for external trade are pretty much meaningless: we really have no idea how much of all this activity sustains in wages & salaries, business income and employment and even taxes that is anchored to this country.

But, given everyone’s obsession with official accounts, we shall plough on and look at trade balance next.

Ireland’s Trade Balance in Goods hit the absolute historical record high in 3Q 2015 at EUR15.602 billion, up 32.4% y/y and exceeding growth rate in 2Q 2015 (+27.5%) and 3Q 2014 (+17.2%). Meanwhile, Trade Balance in Services posted the largest deficit in history at EUR5.87 billion, up almost ten-fold on same period in 2014, having previously grown by 154% in 2Q 2015.

Thus, overall Trade Balance for Goods and Services fell 13.4% y/y in 3Q 2015 to EUR9.732 billion, having posted second consecutive quarter of y/y growth (it shrunk 0.51% y/y in 2Q 2015).

As chart above shows, overall Trade Balance dynamics have been poor for Ireland despite the record-busting exports and all the headlines about huge contribution of external trade to the economy. On average basis, period average for 1Q 2013-present shows growth rate averaging not-too-shabby 5.1% y/y. However, this corresponds to the lowest average growth rate for any other period on record, including the disaster years of 1Q 2008 - 4Q 2012 (average growth rate of 24.3% y/y).

11/12/15: Irish National Accounts 3Q: Post 4: Domestic Demand

In the previous posts of the series, I covered Irish National Accounts 3Q: Sectoral Growth results;  year-on-year growth rates in GDP and GNP; and quarterly growth rates in GDP and GNP.

Now, let’s look at the Domestic Demand.

Personal Expenditure on Goods & Services rose 3.63% y/y in 3Q 2015 in real terms, posting a stronger growth than in 2Q 2015 (+2.91%) and in 3Q 2014 (+1.11%). Over the last four consecutive quarters, growth in Personal Expenditure on Goods & Services averaged 3.36%. All of this is strong and encouraging, as Personal Expenditure on Goods & Services is one of the few figures still remaining in the National Accounts that are unpolluted by the MNCs activities and as such is a significant reflection of the strength of the real economy.

Despite the rise in 3Q 2015, current level of Personal Expenditure on Goods & Services remains 7.85% below pre-crisis peak levels.

Still, in 3Q 2015, Personal Expenditure on Goods & Services contributed EUR779 million to y/y growth in GDP and GNP, which is up on EUR616 million growth contribution in 2Q 2015 and on EUR236 million growth in 3Q 2014.

Expenditure by Government on Current Goods & Services fell in 3Q 2015 (down -1.38% y/y or -EUR94 million). This compares to growth of 1.82% y/y in 2Q 2015 and 3.23% growth in 3Q 2014. Over the last four quarters, Expenditure by Government on Current Goods & Services growth averaged strong 3.95% - faster than growth in Persona Consumption.

As with Personal Consumption, Government Expenditure is still down on pre-crisis peak levels, in fact, it is down more than Personal Consumption at -13.1%.

Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation continued to post literally unbelievable readings in 3Q 2015, rising 35.8% y/y, compared to 34.2% increase recorded in 2Q 2015 and to 10.1% rise in 3Q 2014. 3Q 2015 y/y growth figure was the highest on record and there is a clear pattern of dramatic increases over 4Q 2014, 2Q 2015 and 3Q 2015, with last four quarters average growth rate at 24.9% implying that Irish economy’s capital stock should be doubling in size every 3 years. This is plain bonkers and is a clear signifier of distortions induced into the Irish economy by the likes of Nama, vulture funds and MNCs.

Based on our official accounts, whilst building and construction (including civil engineering etc) added only EUR44 million to GDP in 3Q 2015, Fixed Capital Formation jumped by EUR3.1 billion over the same period of time.

Still, even with this patently questionable accounting, Irish Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation remains 11.8% below pre-crisis peak levels.

With all three components of Final Domestic Demand still under pre-crisis peak levels performance, Final Domestic Demand ended 3Q 2015 some 7.0% below pre-crisis peak. However, Final Domestic Demand did post strong growth, rising 10.2% in 3Q 2015 compared to 3Q 2014, with rate of growth in 3Q basically consistent with 10.1% expansion recorded in 2Q 2015, and up strongly on 3.1% y/y growth recorded in 3Q 2014. Over the last four quarters, Final Domestic Demand growth rate averaged 8.35%.

However, virtually all of growth in Final Domestic Demand was accounted for by Fixed Capital Formation - the only component of the Domestic Demand that is impacted by the MNCs. In 3Q 2015, growth in Final Domestic Demand stood at EUR3.782 billion, of which EUR3.098 billion came from Fixed Capital Formation side.

One additional point is worth making with respect to the expenditure side of Irish National Accounts in 3Q 2015. In last quarter, EUR497 million (or 37.6% of total GNP growth y/y) came from the expansion in the Value of Physical Changes in Stocks. This is not insignificant. In 3Q 2015, compared to 3Q 2014, Personal Expenditure in Ireland contributed EUR779 million, while Changes in the Value of Stocks contributed EUR497 million. Absent this level of growth in stocks, Irish GNP would have been up only 3.43% y/y instead of 5.5% and taking into the account last four quarters average changes in Stocks, the GNP would have been up just 2.8%. In other words, quite a bit of Irish GDP and GNP growth in 3Q 2015 was down to companies accumulating Physical Stocks of goods and services, sitting unsold.

A key observation, therefore, from the entire National Accounts series is that one cannot talk about Irish economy ‘overheating’ or ‘running at its potential output’ anymore: all three headline growth figures of GDP growth (+6.84% y/y in 3Q 2015), GNP growth (+5.50% y/y) and Domestic Demand growth (+10.23% y/y) are influenced significantly by MNCs and post-crisis financial and property markets re-pricing. In the surreal world of Irish economics, the thermometer that could have told us about economy’s health is simply badly broken.


Stay tuned for analysis of Irish External Trade figures next.

10/12/15: Irish National Accounts 3Q: Post 3: Quarterly GDP and GNP Growth

In the first post of the series, I covered Irish National Accounts 3Q: Sectoral Growth results (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/12/101215-irish-national-accounts-3q-part.html).

The second post covered year-on-year growth rates in GDP and GNP (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/12/101215-irish-national-accounts-3q-post.html)

Now, consider quarterly growth rates analysis.

While things were bustlingly rosy for GDP and GNP based on year-on-year growth figures, the picture is much more mixed when it comes to quarterly growth rates.

Firstly, GDP at constant factor costs rose 1.43% q/q in 3Q 2015, down from 2.4% growth recorded in 2Q 2015 and on 2.54% growth recorded in 3Q 2014. In so far as this reflects sectoral activity, this slower 3Q 2015 growth is hard to interpret.

Taxes at constant factor costs actually fell 1.49% q/q in 3Q 2015, having risen just 0.37% q/q in 2Q 2015. 2014 3Q contraction was much sharper at 6.65%.

GDP at constant market prices rose 1.37% q/q in 3Q 2015, once again posting slower rates of growth than in 2Q 2015 (+1.89%) and in 3Q 2014 (+2.06%). The current rate of q/q growth in GDP was the slowest in 3 quarters, but remains significant (above 1.33% average for the period of 1Q 2013 - 3Q 2015.

GNP surprised to a downside, falling 0.81% q/q in 3Q 2015, having previously posted growth of 1.35% in 2Q 2015 and having expanded 2.71% in 3Q 2014. In fact, 3Q 2015 is the worst quarter-on-quarter growth result for GNP since 4Q 2013 and the second quarter of negative growth over the last 4 quarters (previous one was in 1Q 2015 at -0.24%).

Over the first three quarters of 2015, GNP growth averaged 0.1%, which compares poorly to 1.97% average for the first three quarters of 2014 and 3.21% average growth posted for the first 3 quarters of 2013, and ditto for 2012.

The key takeaways here are:

1. Q/Q GDP growth remains robust, but is now the lowest in 3 consecutive quarters;
2. Q/Q GNP growth has turned negative once again in 3Q 2015, posting the worst reading for any quarter since 4Q 2013.
3. Meanwhile, net factor income outflows to the rest of the world are booming, hitting (on seasonally adjusted basis) the highest level since 4Q 2011 and the second highest level on record. 

In other words, MNCs extraction of profits from the economy is ramping out, which is helping the Exchequer and pushes up GDP, but also is leading to GNP growth lagging that of GDP.


Stay tuned for more analysis coming up.

10/12/15: Irish National Accounts 3Q: Post 2: Annual GDP and GNP Growth

In the first post of the series, I covered Irish National Accounts 3Q: Sectoral Growth results (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/12/101215-irish-national-accounts-3q-part.html).

Now, consider data for GDP and GNP aggregates. Starting with seasonally unadjusted data (real variables) to allow for y/y comparatives.

Taxes at Constant Factor Costs:

• In 3Q 2015, Taxes at Constant Factor Costs rose at 6.95% y/y, having previously posted an increase of 6.04% in 2Q 2015 and a rise of 1.67% y/y in 3Q 2014. Taxes at Constant Factor Costs added EUR403 million to official GDP in 3Q 2015, a rise on the increase of EUR279 million in 2Q 2015 and a massive jump compared to the y/y uplift of EUR95 million in 3Q 2014. This clearly correlates with the data from the Exchequer and most likely is dominated by unexpected (and unexplained) growth in corporation tax receipts. 
• Over nine months through September 2015, Taxes at Constant Factor Costs rose EUR1.129 billion (+7.05%) compared to the same period of 2014. This rise now accounts for 16.9% of the increase in GNP over the same period. 

GDP at Constant Market Prices:

• GDP rose incredible 6.95% y/y in 3Q 2015, having previously posted growth of 6.84% y/y in 2Q 2015, both up on 3.75% growth in 3Q 2014. Year on year, 3Q 2015 rose EUR3.384 billion, which was up on 2Q 2015 growth of 3.234 billion, with both quarters posting massive uplift compared to 3Q 2014 growth of EUR1.757 billion.
• In 3 quarters of 2015, GDP rose by EUR9.943 billion which corresponds to annual growth of 7.04% and amounts to 148% uplift compared to the rise in GNP.

GNP at Constant Market Prices:

• -GNP rose 3.18% y/y in 3Q 2015, less than half the rate of increase in GDP. This comes on foot of the 5.5% y/y growth in 2Q 2015 and lower than 3Q 2014 growth of 3.68%. 
• Over the 9 months through September 2015, Irish GNP grew cumulative EUR6.694 billion (+5.58%) compared to the same period of 2014. This is appreciable growth, but it is far short of the GDP expansion over the same period. 

Per chart above, both GDP and GNP continue on the upward trend, albeit at different rates of growth. This divergence is now translating into widening (once again) GDP/GNP gap. In 2Q 2015, the GDP/GNP gap stood at 18.9%. In 3Q 2015 the gap widened to 21.65% - the largest since 1Q 2012 and well above the average of 17.8% for the period from 1Q 2013 through 3Q 2015. This gap used to reflect most of the over-statement of actual economic activity due to the MNCs trading in the Irish economy, but it no longer does, as new accounting standards now push up (superficially) or investment (via R&D reclassification in recent years, and through the upcoming ‘Knowledge Development Box’) and as MNCs continue to alter their pattern of profit flows through Ireland.

The latter aspect is reflected in rising volatility of Net Factor Income Flows which rose to 17.8% as a share of GDP in 3Q 2015, the highest level since 1Q 2012.

Incidentally, Net Factor Income for Rest of the World stood at a whooping EUR9.264 billion in 3Q 2015 - the highest level on record. Over nine months through September, MNCs-driven outflows of payments from Ireland exceeded inflows of payments into Ireland by a massive EUR24.67 billion which is 15.2 percent higher than for the same period of 2014.

Here is a comparative to ponder: in the first three quarters of 2015, GNP rose EUR6.69 billion on the same period of 2014, while net outflows of factor payments out of Ireland rose EUR3.25 billion, almost 1/3 of the increase in GDP and 1/5 of the increase in GNP.

Still, it is worth noting that for all of the above caveats, based on 4 quarters rolling cumulative measure, Irish GDP is now 6.97% above pre-crisis peak and is 6.78% ahead of where it was a year ago. For GNP, current 4 quarters cumulative reading is 8% ahead of pre-crisis peak and 6.45 above last year’s reading.


Stay tuned for quarterly growth rates analysis coming up next.

10/12/15: Irish National Accounts 3Q: Part 1: Sectoral Growth

CSO released data for national accounts for Ireland, so in the next few posts I will be covering headline results. As usual, starting with sectoral accounts, showing decomposition of growth by sector. All data is based on seasonally unadjusted figures, allowing for y/y comparatives and expressed in real terms.

Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing sector contribution to GDP:

• Real activity in Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing sector rose strong 16.0% y/y in 3Q 2015 a rate of growth that was more robust than 9.97% expansion recorded in the sector in 3Q 2014. This is the fastest pace of y/y growth in 3 quarters, and especially welcoming given that 2Q 2015 growth came in at negative -2.87% y/y. Overall, Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing sector contributed EUR210 million to GDP growth in 3Q 2015, which amounts to 7% of total 3Q 2015 expansion in GDP y/y. On a cumulative 3 quarters basis, Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing sector expanded its activity by EUR200 million or +5.67% y/y, which is well below same period 2014 growth that stood at EUR502 million and +16.58%. 
• One key conclusion from the above figures is that Agriculture Forestry and Fishing has expanded robustly over both 3Q 2015 and on the cumulative basis over the first nine months of 2015. Which is good news.

Industry sector contribution to GDP:

• Overall Industry, including construction posted expansion of 16.08% y/y in 3Q 2015, which compares favourably to 5.15% growth in 2Q 2015 and to 4.23% growth y/y in 3Q 2014. Industry contribution to GDP growth over the first nine months of 2015 stood at EUR3.519 billion up 10.17% y/y. This is an improvement on the sector contribution over the first nine months of 2014 which stood at EUR2.25 billion (+6.95% y/y).
• Within Industry sector, Transportable Goods Industries and Utilities sub-sector activity rose 17.83% y/y in 3Q 2015 - a pace of growth well ahead of 5.51% growth in 2Q 2015 and 3.70% in 3Q 2014. Over the first nine months of 2015, Transportable Goods Industries and Utilities sub-sector added EUR3.412 billion to our GDP (+10.97% y/y), which vastly outstrips EUR1.913 billion added by the sub-sector to the economy over the first nine months of 2014. 
• So, our second core conclusion from these data is that Transportable Goods Industries and Utilities sub-sector - dominated strongly by MNCs - has been growing at unbelievably high rates of 10.97% y/y over the first 3 months of 2015. This is consistent with sector activity more than doubling in less than 7 years - a rate of expansion that consistent with a rapidly growing emerging economy, rather than with a mature economy. The Transportable Goods Industries and Utilities sub-sector was responsible for 54.3% of total growth in GDP over 3Q 2015 and 39% of total growth in Irish GDP over the period of 1Q-3Q 2015. Again, these are simply incredible figures, suggesting high degree of distortions from MNCs accounting practices and, potentially, exchange rates changes.
• Building and Construction sub-sector of Industry showed much more modest rates of growth, with 3Q 2015 y/y expansion at 3.49%, better than 1.52% growth recorded in 2Q 2015, but less than 7.8% growth in 3Q 2014. Construction sector contributed 1.47% to the overall gains in Irish GDP over 3Q period. For the first nine months of 2015, cumulative y/y growth in Building and Construction sub-sector output amounted to just EUR108 million (+3.09% y/y) which is three times slower in terms of the rates of growth recorded in the sub-sector over the same period of 2014.
• Our third core conclusion, therefore, is that traditional activity - proxied by Building and Construction sub-sector is growing in Ireland at rates probably closer to 3.5-4 percent - appreciable and positive, but not as massive as 6.8% growth recorded by the sectoral GDP (GDP at factor cost).

Distribution Transport Software and Communication (DTSC) sector activity:

• Distribution Transport Software and Communication sector activity grew at 8.28% y/y in 3Q 2015, which is slower than 11.2% growth recorded in 2Q 2015, but faster than 7.52% growth penned in 3Q 2014. The sector contributed EUR1.05 billion to GDP expansion in 3Q 2015 which amounts to 35.1% of the total growth in the GDP at factor cost. On the 9 months cumulative basis, Distribution Transport Software and Communication sector activity grew by EUR3.38 billion (+9.7% y/y) in 2015 compared to 2014.
• Once again, robust rates of growth in the sector are most likely reflective of the shifting MNCs strategies relating to tax optimisation, plus, potentially, the effects of exchange rates changes.

Public Administration and Defence sector contribution to GDP at factor cost:

• Public Administration and Defence sector activity shrunk 0.97% y/y in 3Q 2015, which is shallower contraction that -4.37% decline y/y in 2Q 2015 and -2.58% drop y/y in 3Q 2014. On a 9 months basis, Public Administration and Defence sector activity reduced our GDP at factor cost by EUR167 million (-3.59%). 
• 3Q 2015 contraction in sector activity was the shallowest in 5 quarters.

Other Services (including Rent) sector activity:

• Other Services (including Rent) activity rose 3.84% y/y in 3Q 2015, having previously posted 4.35% expansion in 2Q 2015 and 5.23% growth in 3Q 2014. 
• The sector contributed 22.9% of total growth in GDP at factor cost in 3Q 2015. 

As chart above shows, GDP at factor cost posted rates of growth above 2012 - 3Q 2015 average in every quarter since Q1 2014. Also, since 1Q 2015, rates of growth have been running above pre-crisis period average (Q4 2002-Q4 2007).

All of this is good, with positive dynamics in trends:

However, growth by sources remains unbalanced and most likely reflects skew in favour of MNCs-led sub-sectors:

Key conclusions are:

• Irish sectoral growth shows strong aggregate figures, with GDP at factor cost expansion over the first nine months of 2015 amounting to EUR8.831 billion (+6.91%) year on year, which is stronger than growth recorded over the same period of 2014 (EUR5.852 billion or +4.80% y/y).
• Sectoral contribution to growth show continued evolution of unbalanced economy skewed in favour of MNCs-led sectors, with Transportable Goods Industries and Utilities sector accounting for 38% of total growth recorded over the first nine months of 2015 compared to the same period of 2014, followed by Distribution Transport Software and Communication (38% share of total growth) and Other Services (including Rent) (+24% share). (Note: these shares add up to more than actual GDP at factor cost due to the ways in which CSO computes GDP at factor cost totals)
• All indications are that despite the MNCs bias in the figures, domestic activity did improve and is currently running at higher rates than in 2Q 2015 and over the first nine months of 2014.

Stay tuned for more analysis. 

10/12/15: Europe's M&A activity lowest in 17 years

While the U.S. companies are gorging themselves on M&As (see post here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/12/71215-another-nothing-to-see-here-chart.html), while shying real organic investment (see post here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/11/141115-more-evidence-us-capex-cycle-is.html), Europe's 'repaired' economy is shying away from both.

Europe's M&A cycle is weak - second weakest for the period of 1998-2015:

Which makes for some interesting reading, especially when one realises that most recent quarterly growth in Europe was underpinned by domestic demand and inventories build up... Time for ECB to start buying companies outright...

10/12/15: U.S. Corporate Debt: It's Getting Boomier

U.S. Non-financial Corporations debt - the other 'third' of the real economic debt equation - is on the rise, again. Deleveraging is not only over, but has been pushed aside. The new cycle of debt boom is well under way, and with it, the next cycle of a bust is getting closer...

10/12/15: Europe's Negative Yields Ship of Fools

Those of you who follow my work would know that I hold little compassion for the 'investors' who are willing to give money away to the governments whilst whingeing about high rates of taxation they endure on their incomes. Well, Europe is full of this sort of investors:

And it is getting more full by the minute at EUR2.7 trillion and counting. So, happy waisting your money...

10/12/15: R v G and all the Pikettian Theory Malarky

You know the Pikettian Thesis that if return on capital exceeds in the long run economic growth, then capital income appreciation relative to wages income growth will lead to rising wealth inequality. Except, err...

Source: @MaxCRoser 

Which says, really, that since the start of the 20th century, wages income of the richest 1% became more important in the determination of their full income, whilst entrepreneurial income remained roughly the same, and capital income shrunk. R > G and all that malarky...

8/12/15: Irish Rents: A Longer Term View

Much has been written about the plight of renters in Ireland. Much of it is correct - there have been some atrocious rises in rents, primarily private rents, in recent years. Year on year, in the last 3 months (though October 2015), private rents rose 10.35% against local authority rents falling 1.11% and mortgage interest declining 8.88%. A year ago - over 3mo through October 2014, private rents inflation was running at 8.95% against local authorities rents rising 1.06% and mortgage interest falling 10.26%.

Which makes for a depressing reading for the renters. Actual rents paid by tenants were up 8.83% in 3mo period through October 2015 and they rose 7.93% y/y in the 3mo period through October 2014. So inflation rate in rents is going up.

However, rents inflation has to be taken over the longer period of time. And here, things are not as clear cut as in the short run. Comparable CSO data goes only back to January 2003. So we have no reliable benchmark for earlier periods, albeit some bootstrapped comparatives are possible. As the result, let’s consider 1Q 2003 as the starting point for inflation - with a host of caveats attached.

Setting 1Q 2003 average level of price indices at 100, inflation in overall Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels category that includes rents, mortgages and other housing costs stood at 55.94% in October 2015. Actual rentals paid by tenants over the same period of time were up 26.93%. Private rents rose over 1Q 2003 to October 2015 by 18.62% while local authority rents rose 73.36% and mortgages rose 24.33%.

In other words, cumulated inflation since 1Q 2003 was higher in Local authority rents and mortgage interest than in private rents. Chart below illustrates:

Pretty much the same picture emerges if we take the entire 2003 average (not just 1Q 2003) as a benchmark. In fact, compared to 2003 levels, mortgage interest inflation is just above actual rents paid and is still higher than private rents inflation.

Setting levels aside, let’s take a look at inflation rates (y/y changes in indices). Historical average y/y inflation in Housing, Water, Electricity, Gas & Other fuels category is 4.50% against historical mortgages interest costs inflation of 5.29%, historical private rents inflation of 1.56%, historical local authorities rents inflation of 4.56% and historical inflation in actual rentals paid by tenants of 2.00%.

Once again, timing is everything: given low level of transactions in the purchasing markets for property over the current crisis, majority of mortgage payees today have lived through the period of pre-crisis spike in mortgage costs. Their current savings (reduced cost of mortgages interest) are simply lagged off-sets to this high cost reality of the past. On the other hand, renters faced far lower volatility in rents than mortgagees in mortgage interest. Their current pain is a delayed cost uplift on past moderation in inflation.

Which is, of course, not to say there is less pain because of this or that Irish rental markets are somehow functioning well in terms of pricing. Just to point out that timing of comparatives is important and that one should be careful pitching the (real) pain of Irish renters against the allegedly easy-times for other participants in the markets.

8/12/15: Commodities Rot Runs Ahead

Commodities rot continues unabated, as Bloomberg Commodities Index fell to its lowest reading since June 1999:

Source: @Schuldensuehner

Which, of course prompted another repricing of the commodities-linked currencies:

 Source: @Schuldensuehner

As I noted few days ago (post here) for the Russian Ruble, there is some room to the downside from here on.

Here is an interesting discussion of the historical trend/cycles in commodities busts via Carmen Reinhart: https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/commodity-price-decline-will-continue-by-carmen-reinhart-2015-11. And long-view chart of same:

Trend-wise, that is 160 years of deflation...

7/12/15: A new study on psychology of crisis response & the role of the media

This is a new study developed by an excellent young Irish psychologist - Seamus Power - at the University of Chicago. 

All Irish people, over the age of 18, are eligible to take part in this survey and all walks of life, ages, demographics etc are really needed. The survey should take under 15 minutes to complete.

Seamus is interested in your responses to a range of questions and your reactions to a randomly assigned media article covering the topics relating to policy responses to the recent crisis.

I can't really stress enough how important this topic is for Ireland and for social sciences, so please, take a few minutes to complete it. We need data-based evidence and Seamus will be sharing his findings with all of us.

Study link here: http://ssd.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_bKESEHr6IXjkXGt .

7/12/15: CX Future of Work Summit: Dublin

Another excellent video from the CXC Corporate's "Future of Work" summit on the Gig Economy: https://vimeo.com/148042205.

You can see more on the event, including my slides here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/11/111115-gig-economy-challenge.html

7/12/15: Of Monetary Activism and Growth: CB Balancesheets vs Economies Balancesheets

There is much talk around two matters relating to the monetary policy expectations:

1. The 'normalisation' course allegedly pursued by the Fed (rates rises); and
2. The justification for (1) by references to the monetary policy-repaired economy, made wholesome once again thanks to the Central Banks' activism (see recent Janet Yellen speech on the subject here)

Except, of course, the second point is... err... questionable. For all the estimates of percentage points of growth uplifts and unemployment reductions delivered by the Fed-linked economics analysts, there are two simple facts stubbornly persisting out there:

Fact 1: U.S. (and European, and Japanese, and global) growth since the end of the Great Recession has been much slower than historical records for recoveries suggest; and

Fact 2: Fact 1 comes on foot of a historically unprecedented monetary expansions, that are, by far, not over yet.

Here are two charts on the second fact:

Now, observe: as of today, Big 4 CB balancesheets expanded almost 4-fold. By the end of 2017 (per BAML), projected balancesheets are expected to rise even further, by more than 4.5-fold. Both BOJ and ECB will be leading this latter stage of monetary easing - the two economies that are by far fairing the worst throughout the crisis, despite the fact that whilst the ECB adopted a more conservative stand in the earlier stages of the crisis, BOJ raced ahead of everyone else with Abenomics arrival.

In other words, since 2012 through 2015, CB balancesheets grew by more than 50 percent. Meanwhile, what happened to growth rates and growth expectations?

Which, sort of, suggests that all this 'normalisation' of growth under the monetary policies activism is... well... imaginary?..

7/12/15: Another "Nothing to See Here" Chart for M&As

I have written over the recent months about the over-heating present in the global (and especially N. American) M&A markets (see posts here,  here and here) so it is only reasonable from continuity perspective to post some more data on the subject. Here it is :

Source: @Jim_Edwards

Looking at the volumes of M&A deals since around the start of 2Q 2014 through today, one cannot escape a simple conclusion: absent organic growth in revenues, and with shares buy-backs now being discounted in the markets (belatedly awakening to the reality of unsustainable valuations in the equity markets), current levels of M&A (over at least 18-21 months period) are simply, certifiably, clearly bonkers.

5/12/15: Ruble converging to Urals... at last

After some strengthening in the second half of November, Russian Ruble continues to re-align with oil prices:

With current levels of Urals-Brent spread, Ruble has room to the downside still, at about 2-3 percent, taking it into 69.8-69.9 range. Which means the CBR has some room for raising foreign exchange reserves, but not much room...

3/12/15: Heard of Number26, yet?..

An interesting 'break-in' into Irish banking market via Number26 which uses:

• Fintech platform; and
• German license

to break the Central Bank of Ireland-led freeze on new entrants into the banking market here.

Details are here: http://techcrunch.com/2015/12/02/number26-launches-its-bank-of-the-future-in-6-new-countries/. Surprisingly low margin operation based on fees from transactions, rather than on direct customer charges. Presumably, accounts are insured by German system and are free from the Irish Government indirect tax extraction schemes, such as card duties etc... One, of course, will have to be compliant on Irish DIRT.

Of course, Fintech offers plenty of disruption potential in the sector that is inhabited by technology dinosaurs. Still, for all its promise, Fintech is yet to:

1. Achieve a significant breakthrough into traditional banking and insurance services (beyond aggregators and price optimising platforms) and
2. Deliver a viable (financially) margins model.

These two points mean that to achieve scale, Fintech offers today need deep pockets and customer bases of more traditional services providers, as I describe during this discussion: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/10/161015-financegoogle-2015.html.

3/12/15: Of Debt, Central Banks and History Repeats

Couple of facts via Goldman Sachs' recent research note:

1. Since the start of 2008, U.S. corporate debt has doubled and the interest burden rose 40 percent. Even as a share of EBITDA, debt servicing costs are up 30 percent, so U.S. corporations’ ability to service debt has declined despite the average interest rate paid by the U.S. corporate currently stands at around 4 percent, as opposed to 6 percent in 2008.
2. Much of this debt mountain has gone not to productive activities, but into shares buybacks and M&As. Per Goldman’s note: “…the changing nature of corporate balance sheets does raise the question, again, about the lack of organic growth and reinvestment post the crisis.”

And the net conclusion? “…the spectre of rising rates, potential global disinflation, declining operating profits and wider credit spreads continues to create near-term consternation for weak balance sheet stocks.”

Source: Business Insider

Oh dear… paging the Fed…

• Meanwhile, per IMF September 2015 Fiscal Monitor, Emerging Markets’ corporate debt rose from USD4 trillion in 2004 to USD18 trillion in 2014. Much of this debt is directly or indirectly linked to the U.S. dollar and, thus, Fed policy.

Oh dear… paging the Fed again…

And just in case you think these risks don’t matter, a quick reminder of what Jaime Caruana, head of the Bank for International Settlements, said back in July 2014 (emphasis mine):

• "Markets seem to be considering only a very narrow spectrum of potential outcomes. They have become convinced that monetary conditions will remain easy for a very long time, and may be taking more assurance than central banks wish to give… If we were concerned by excessive leverage in 2007, we cannot be more relaxed today… It may be the case that the debt is better distributed because some highly-indebted countries have deleveraged, like the private sector in the US or Spain, and banks are better capitalized. But there is also now more sensitivity to interest rate movements."

All of which translates, in his own words into

• "Overall, it is hard to avoid the sense of a puzzling disconnect between the markets’ buoyancy and underlying economic developments globally."

And as per current QE policies?

• "There is something strange about fighting debt by incentivizing more debt."

Which, of course, is the entire point of all QE and, thus, brings us to yet another ‘paging Fed moment’:

• "Policy does not lean against the booms but eases aggressively and persistently during busts. This induces a downward bias in interest rates and an upward bias in debt levels, which in turn makes it hard to raise rates without damaging the economy – a debt trap. …Systemic financial crises do not become less frequent or intense, private and public debts continue to grow, the economy fails to climb onto a stronger sustainable path, and monetary and fiscal policies run out of ammunition. Over time, policies lose their effectiveness and may end up fostering the very conditions they seek to prevent."

Now, take a look at the lengths to which ECB has played the Russian roulette with monetary policy so far: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/12/31215-85-v-52-of-duration-of-risk.html