5/1/2012: US Mint Gold Coins Sales: 1986-2012 data

The readers of this blog would be familiar with the exclusive time series on US Mint sales of Gold coins that I have maintained for some years now. With December 2012 sales finalised, it is time to update the annual and monthly data analysis on these.

Here is the analysis for January 2012 - to open the year - that predicted 'return to fundamentals' theme for coin sales. And here is my article for Globe & Mail on what fundamentals relate to gold coins sales.

I am happy to note that my prediction of moderating trend in speculative buying and restoration of stronger link to long-term behavioural demand and savings fundamentals has been confirmed through 2012.

Looking at annual data for 2012 (note: subsequent post will provide more shorter-term dynamics analysis for December data), first in weight terms:

• In 2012 the US Mint sold 747,500 oz of gold in form of coins, down 25.25% y/y, with demand for coinage gold declining below 2008 levels of 860,500, but well-ahead of the 2005-2009 average annual sales of 640,800 oz per annum.
• In terms of longer-term averages, 1990-1994 average was at 384,050 oz, 1995-1999 average at 1,047,800 oz, 2000-2004 average run at 386,550 oz, 2005-2009 average at 640,800 oz per annum and 2010-2012 average is currently at 989,333 oz per annum. 
• 2012 was the 10th highest demand year in history in terms of volume of gold coins sold in oz of gold, with series covering 1986-2012 period. In other words, 2012 was not a good year for Gold Bears and for Gold Speculators alike. This doesn't make it a great year for Gold Bulls, but, given that the average annual gold price in 2012 stood at $1,678/oz - ahead of any on the record and up  7.0% on 2011 - it does appear to have been another year when fundamentals seemed to triumph over shorter-term psychosis. 
• My annual forecast for sales in 2012 was 694,050, which means that simple dynamic trend of moderating sales expectations based on previous years' price effects was bearish.

In terms of number of coins sold:

• US Mint sold 1,123,500 coins in total in 2012, down 21.27% on 2011. The demand for actual coins was at the levels compatible with 2008 when the Mint sold 1,172,000 coins and well ahead of all annual sales in 2000-2007 period.
• In terms of longer-term averages, 1990-1994 average was at 637,620 coins, 1995-1999 average at 2,246,300 coins, 2000-2004 average run at 738,700 coins, 2005-2009 average at 955,800 coins per annum and 2010-2012 average is currently at 1,397,167 coins per annum. In other terms, current sales are annually bang on at the annual average for the last 8 years.
• 2012 ranks as the 10th most successful year for coins sales in terms of the number of coins sold, confirming my view in the third bullet point above regarding sales of coinage gold in oz.
• My forecast for 2012 sales was at 1,21,223 coins - a much closer call than on oz of gold sold via coinage, suggesting that the demand remains closely driven by long-term dynamics.

In terms of both - sales in coins numbers (1,123,500 coins) and oz (747,500 oz), 2012 results stand in close comparative to the historical averages. Historical average (1986-2012) for coins sold is 1,261,170 and for oz of gold sold through US Mint coins is at 717,343 oz.

In terms of average gold content of coins sold:

• 2012 average coin sold by the US Mint contained 0.665 oz of gold per coin, down slightly on 0.701 oz/coin in 2011 and well-ahead of the historical average of 0.574 oz/coin.
• 2012 ranks as the fifth highest year on record in terms of average oz/coin sales.

Charts:

Historical dynamics:

As charts above illustrate, all time series have shown convergence to the long-term upward trend:

• There is, so far, no overshooting of the trend to the downside - something that could have been expected if demand for gold coins was showing speculative bubble deflation dynamics or post-bubble correction, although, of course, we cannot say with 100% accuracy that this is not going to materialize with some lag.
• There is no acceleration in the convergence trend in 2012 or since convergence began in 2009.
• This episode of convergence is shallower (in terms of annual speed to target) than in 1997-2002 period and 1986-1991 period.

Historical correlations:

• In terms of historical correlations, the following matrix holds, showing overall zero to low level negative correlations between prices and demand for coins and coinage gold:

The above, of course, implies that given moderating price increases in gold (+7% for annual monthly average in 2012 compared to 22.21% rise in 2011, 25.61% in 2010, 11.44% in 2009 and so on), we can expect a slowdown in overall oz and coins volume demand, which can lag price changes. This is exactly what appears to have taken place in 2012.

As before, I remain comfortable with the 2012 trend and am looking forward toward more stabilised demand dynamics in 2013, with volume of sales declining in 2013 to ca 500,000 marker in oz terms and 850,000 in coins numbers terms, assuming no major volatility in gold price and in line with continued stabilisation in the world economy.

Disclaimer:
1) I am a non-executive member of the Heinz GAM Investment Committee, with no allocations to any specific individual commodities
2) I am long gold in fixed amount over at least the last 5 years with my allocation being extremely moderate. I hold no assets linked to gold mining or processing companies or gold ETFs.

3) I receive no compensation for anything that appears on this blog. Everything your read here is my own personal opinion and not the opinion of any of my employers, current, past or future.

4/1/2013: Major economies PMIs for December 2012

Global PMI snapshot:

Previously covered:

• Asia (ex-China) here
• Netherlands here
• Euro area here
• Ireland here

Some top line performance for the global economy:

Manufacturing:

• US Manufacturing: December 50.7 from November 49.5 - statistically not significant as above 50 reading, so a shallow positive, with a swing of 1.2 ppts being a good indicator of gradual strengthening. New orders static at 50.3 and employment gains at 52.7 in December against 48.4 (contraction) in November.
• Germany: 46.0 in December a deterioration on already abysmal 46.8 reading in November. Clear contraction territory. 
• France: 44.6 in December after 44.5 in November - an outright recession.
• Italy: 46.7 in December on 45.1 in November - falling off the cliff at a slightly reduced rate.
• UK: 51.4 in December on 49.2 in November - expansion, albeit moderate in December.
• Japan: 45.0 in December, worse than already recessionary November reading of 46.5.
• China: 50.6 in December, unchanged on November - both not statistically significantly different from 50.0. Employment continues to contract: 49.0 in December on 48.7 in November, while New Orders are growing at 51.2 in both months - modest growth rate.
• Brazil: 51.1 in December on 52.2 in November - signalling slowdown in already weak growth in November.

So Manufacturing sector is pretty ugly.

Services:

• US: to 56.1 in December from 54.7 in November, confirming strong growth trend. Employment at 56.3 in December - a robust uplift, on top of relatively static 50.3 in November. New Orders rising to blistering 59.3 in December from 58.1 in November.
• Euro area: to 47.8 in December from 46.7 in November - both signalling contraction
• Germany: bucking the trend for the euro area to 52.0 in December from 49.7 in November, with now moderate expansion
• In contrast to Germany, France went deeper into contraction territory: 45.2 in December against 45.8 in November.
• Italy matched France and raised: 44.6 in December (a depression-level reading) from 46.0 in November (a recession reading).
• UK stumbled: 48.9 in December (mild contraction) against 50.2 (effectively flat) in November.
• China: robust 56.1 in December on foot of strong 55.6 in November
• Brazil slightly less impressive, but stil positive: 53.5 in December relative to 52.5 in November.

So Services are all over the shop with the euro area remaining the Ugly of the Bad.

4/1/2013: Irish Manufacturing PMI: December 2012

The latest Manufacturing PMI for Ireland, released this week by the NCB, reflect a number of ongoing changes that can lead to a confirmation of the new trend toward slower expansion for Q4 2012 – Q1 2013. At the same time, the overall series continued to post expansion, in contrast with all euro area PMIs – a rather impressive performance.

Hence, my top conclusions – based on the detailed analysis below – are:

• Irish Manufacturing continued (albeit slowing in the rate) expansion reflects impressive robustness of the exports-driving MNCs, while
• The overall strong and persistent headwinds of slower global trade flows growth and the contractions in trade within the euro area are starting to feed through to Irish manufacturing sector – a trend that can prove to be a significant drag on growth in Q4 2012 – Q1 2013.

Now to the detailed analysis:

Top line reading for PMI came in at 51.4 in December, down from 52.4 in November. December reading printed exactly at 12mo MA and below 6mo MA (52.1) and 3mo MA (52.0). 3mo MA of 52.0 for October-December is down on 52.2 3mo MA for Q3 2012, but is above Q2 2012 average (51.5) and Q1 2012 (49.8). Q4 2012 average is bang on at Q4 2010 average and ahead of 49.1 average for Q4 2011. The December reading was the lowest in 4 months.

All of this implies a weakening growth momentum with output index peaking, for 2012 at 53.1 and 53.9 in June and July, afterward slipping toward 51.7 average reading. It is worth noting that a reading above 53 is statistically significantly different from 50.0, while a reading at or below 52.2 is not significantly different from 50.0.

Output PMI fell from 54.4 in October to 53.8 in November and to 51.2 in December 2012. December 2012 reading was the first statistically insignificantly different from zero-growth 50.0 in 3 months and marked seventh month in 2012 when growth was statistically at or below 50.0. At the same time, December reading was the 8^th consecutive month that output index printed above 50.0 level. All of which only makes sense when one recognizes that Output index is strongly volatile. For example, historical STDev for overall PMI is at 4.44, while STDev since January 2000 is at 4.36 and the crisis period STDev since January 2008 is at 5.43. In Contrast, Output PMI STDevs were 5.14, 4.94 and 6.04 respectively.

At 51.2, December output reading was below 12mo average of 51.7, and below 6mo average of 52.6. However, on a positive side, and statistically significantly, Q1 2012 index averaged 50.2, rising to 51.4 in Q2 2012, followed by 52.1 in Q3 and 53.1 in Q4.

While Output slowdown was marked only in December, fall off in the New Orders sub-index was much more pronounced and is signaling a longer term trend down. New Orders reading came at 50.9 (still above the 50.0 libne, but not statistically significantly different from 50.0) down from November reading of 52.1. New Orders activity peaked in 2012 in June-July and has fallen since. At the same time, in simple level terms, the index was for the tenth consecutive month above 50.0.

12mo MA for the New Orders sub-index is at 51.8, while 6mo MA is at 52.6. Q1 2012 average was at 49.9, Q2 at 52.0, Q3 at 53.3 and Q4 2012 came in at 51.9.

In contrast with sluggish bouncing along the zero growth line in the New Orders series, New Export Orders series posted surprising rise in December, reaching 53.6 (statistically significantly above 50.0) from 52.1 (not statistically significantly different from 50.0). This marked the highest reading in the series since July 2012 and allowed the sub-index to regain territory lost since August 2012. Per survey respondents, the core driver for new export orders was rising demand from the US.

New Export Orders have been steady on a gentle upward trend – based on averages and correcting for some shorter term volatility – Q1 2012 average was at 51.9, Q2 and Q3 2012 at 52.8, Q4 at 52.5. Thus, 12mo MA is at 52.5, very close to 6mo MA of 52.7.

Other subcomponents:

I will deal with employment and profit margins conditions once I complete analysis of the Services PMI in the next few days, so stay tuned.

3/1/2013: Irish Income Par Capita at 1998-1999 levels

On foot of the post on the US household incomes (see here), I took a look at CSO series for Ireland's per capita national income. Here's a chart:

As the chart shows, Ireland's current per capita national incomes stood at EUR27,105.6 in 2011, down 19.74% on peak and below 1999 level. Irish per capita national disposable income at EUR26,575.7 in 2011 was down 20.2% on peak levels and was below 1998-1999 average.

Using IMF projections for personal consumption and private investment for 2012, Ireland's 2012 per capita national income can be expected to remain below 1998-1999 averages in 2012.

Put in different terms, as the result of the current crisis, Ireland's real economy has already lost not a decade but over 14 years worth of growth. Assuming disposal incomes per capita grow at 2.5% per annum into perpetuity, Ireland will regain 2006 peak levels of real income per capita by 2022, at 2% by 2024 and at 1.75% - by 2026, implying that the 'lost decade' for Ireland's economy is likely to last not 10 years, but between 16 and 20 years.

2/1/2013: Euro area PMIs - dire state of economy persists through December

More on PMIs trail: euro area PMI for Manufacturing, per Markit, implies that "Eurozone manufacturing ends 2012 mired in recession, as demand from domestic and export markets remains weak".

Details:

• Final Eurozone Manufacturing PMI at 46.1 in December (flash estimate 46.3), down from 46.2 in November. Effectively, the rate of contraction continues unabated and we are in the seventh consecutive month of contracting output.
• Downturn remains widespread, with all nations bar Ireland reporting contractions (I will update Ireland database once I am back in Dublin).
• Cost caution leads to job losses and further scaling back of inventory holdings.
• Downturns accelerated in Germany, Spain, Austria and Greece, but eased in France, Italy and the Netherlands. 
• Greece remained bottom of the PMI league table, still well adrift of the next-weakest performing nations France and Spain.
• Eurozone manufacturing production declined for the tenth successive month in December, as companies were hit by reduced inflows of both total new orders and incoming new export business.
• However, over Q4 2012 as a whole, the average rates of decline in both output and new orders were the slowest since the opening quarter of the year.
• The latest decline in  new export orders took the current sequence of contraction to one-and-a-half years, despite the rate of reduction easing slightly to a nine-month low.
• Only Spain, the Netherlands and Ireland saw increases in new export orders during December, although the trend in Italy also moved closer to stabilising. In contrast, Germany, France and Greece all reported substantial declines in new export business.
• Employment in manufacturing is now in contraction for 11 consecutive months.
• Selling prices were unchanged, although this was nonetheless an improvement on the discounting reported in the prior six months. 
• Input cost inflation eased and was the weakest during the current four-month sequence. 
• Profit margins continued to shrink.

2/1/2013: Netherlands Manufacturing PMI for December: Not Pretty

Regular readers of this blog know that I like referencing the Netherlands as the 'leading' indicator for the Euro area growth for a number of reasons:

1. The Netherlands have a stable, even 'boring' economic make up, combining (despite a relatively small size) healthy drivers of domestic demand and investment with robust exporting economy;
2. The Netherlands supply side of the economy is also relatively well balanced with strong domestic and exports oriented manufacturing and services;
3. The Netherlands are a major entry port for the Euro area imports and the shipping and logistics hub for its exports;
4. The Netherlands are well-positioned to serve as lead indicators for household investment cycles changes.

With that in mind, yesterday's PMI for Manufacturing is disappointing:

Several things come to view:

• Dutch manufacturing posted a "broadly flat output in December. This reflected a combination of a slower fall in new orders and a further reduction of backlogs. Jobs were cut at a weaker rate, while input price inflation eased and output charges were raised at a faster pace. 
• NEVI  PMI rose to 49.6 in December from 48.2 in November, marking the highest reading in three months. Despite this, the index remained below 50.0, implying stagnation-to-reduction in activity. The index is compounding, which means that December decline came on top of declines in November and October.
• New orders fell for the third month running in December, although at slowest rate of decline.
• Export sales rose for the sixth consecutive month, although the increase was the slowest in 6 months period.
• Input prices eased, but remained in strong inflationary territory, while output prices rose modestly. This means profit margins shrunk.

Not quite ugly, but certainly not pretty.

2/1/2013: The Bitter ATRA Fudge

Some say never shall one let a good crisis go to waste... US Fiscal Cliff 'deal' of December 31st is an exact illustration. Here is the list of pork carriages attached to the Disney-styled 'train' of policies the US Congress enacted.

Have a laugh: http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2013/01/eight-corporate-subsidies-in-the-fiscal-cliff-bill-from-goldman-sachs-to-disney-to-nascar.html

And to summarise the farcical output of the Congressional effort:

• The American Taxpayers Relief Act (ATRA) has raised taxes on pretty much everyone. Taxes up means growth down. Now, recall that the US economy is not exactly in a sporting form to start with (link here).
• The payroll taxes cuts are not extended into 2013 so every American is getting whacked with some 2% reduction in the disposable income, taking out $115 billion per annum (the largest revenue raising measure in the ATRA) out of households savings, investment and consumption, or under 1% of annual personal consumption.
• The super-rich (or just filthy-rich, take your pick, but defined as those on joint incomes at or above $450K pa) will see income tax rising to 39.6% and will have to pay an additional 0.9% in Medicare tax to cover that which they will not be buying - the Obamacare. They (alongside anyone earning above $250K pa) will also pay 3.8% additional tax on 'passive' income - income from capital gains and dividends for same Obamacare.
• Dividends and CGT are raised from 15% to 20% (again for joint earners above $450K pa).

Meanwhile, the US has already breached the debt ceiling and the ATRA has done virtually nothing to address the deficit overhang. So in a summary, the 'deal' is a flightless dodo flopping in the mud of politics. There are no real cuts on the expenditure side, there are loads of tax hikes that are likely to damage demand and investment and lift up the cost of capex funding for the real economy. And there is simply more - not less - uncertainty about the future direction of policy, as the White House and the Congress are going to be at loggerheads in months to come dealing with the following list of unaddressed topics:

1. Spending cuts
2. Budget deficit
3. Further tax hikes
4. Debt
5. Reforms of the entitlements system
6. Growth-retarding effects of ATRA and Obamacare.

Obamanomics have delivered fudged recovery, fudged solutions to structural crises and real, tangible increases in taxation. The latter is the 'first' since 1993.

1/1/2013: Recovery in Asia? Well... not so fast, folks

The Year is only 1 day old (almost) and the trigger-happy Bulls' headlines are all around. Forget the 'Fiscal Cliff' non-solution in the US (it kicked the can of excessive deficits by about 1 month out, before uncertainty about the longer term outlook returns with renewed 'negotiations' and it failed completely and spectacularly in even approaching any workable solution to the US debt overhang). The chirpy sound of 'optimism at any cost' is now coming out of Asia.

Today, we saw Korean and Taiwanese PMIs released. Here are the facts:

• HSBC South Korea PMI for manufacturing sector rose from 48.2 in November (outright recessionary levels) to 50.1 in December. Now, 50.1 sounds like being above 50 (the 50 points mark identifying level of activity consistent with zero growth on previous month), statistically it is not significantly distinct from 50.0 or, for that matter, from 49.9. In other words, since May 2012, PMI registered continuous consecutive contractions in the manufacturing sector, compounded over time. In December, there was effectively zero growth from the bottom levels of November. And this some media heralded as the 'return' to growth. Worse, new export orders - the staple of Korean economy, continued to contract in December for the seventh consecutive monthly period.
• Taiwanese PMI did pretty much the same, rising from an outright contraction of 47.4 in November to 50.6 in December. Taiwanese level of activity (at 50.6) was probably statistically significantly above 50, but hardly anywhere near the levels consistent with a definitive growth trend. This was the first above-50 reading in 7 months and was underpinned (positively) by expansions in both new orders and exports orders. Importantly, input prices rose in Taiwanese manufacturing sector, while output prices shrunk - profit margins, therefore, have dropped - a trend established for at least 3 months now.

Meanwhile, unreported by the Bulls:

• Vietnam manufacturing PMI sunk to 49.3 in December from 50.5 in November, with 8 out of last 9 months posting contracting activity.
• Indonesia's manufacturing PMI remained above the 50.0 line at 50.7 in December, but growth fell from 51.5 in November.
• Earlier report from China showed December manufacturing PMI at 51.5 up from 50.5 in November, "signalling a modest improvement of operating conditions in the Chinese manufacturing sector. Moreover, it was the highest index reading since May 2011." But new export orders actually fell in December after a 'modest increase in November', which implies that China's manufacturing 'revival' is driven most likely by state spending boost, not by any 'resurgence in global economic activity'.
• And Australian manufacturing PMI was continuing to tank in December: "Manufacturing activity contracted for a 10th consecutive month in December, with the seasonally adjusted Australian Industry Group Australian Performance of Manufacturing Index recording a level of 44.3, unchanged from a slightly upwardly revised reading of 44.3 one month ago. The slump in manufacturing new orders also extended into the 10th month albeit at a slower rate, reflecting weak global demand and a softening Australian economy. The new orders sub-index rose 1.6 points to 45.7 in December."

So, pardon me, but what 'resurgence in Asia'?

1/1/2013: US Household Income: down 7.8% on January 2000

Sentier Research have published analysis new series on the US Household Income data (see report here).

Topline analysis, quoted directly from the report (emphasis mine):

• According to new data derived from the monthly Current Population Survey (CPS), real median annual household income in November 2012 was  $51,310, statistically unchanged from the October 2012 median of $51,134. 
• This is the second month in a row that real median annual household income has failed to show a statistically significant change. I
• With the exception of a 0.7 percent increase between April and May, all of the other month-to-month changes in real median annual household income since January 2012 have not been statistically significant. 

But wait, things are even worse:

• The November 2012 median annual household income of $51,310 was 4.4 percent lower than the median of $53,681 in June 2009, the end of the recent recession and beginning of the “economic recovery.” 
• The November 2012 median was 6.9 percent lower than the median of $55,093 in December 2007, the beginning month of the recession that occurred more than four years ago. 
• And the November 2012 median was 7.8 percent lower than the median of $55,650 in January 2000, the beginning of this statistical series. 
• These comparisons demonstrate how significantly real median annual household income has fallen over the past decade, and how much ground needs to be recovered to return to income levels that existed more than ten years ago.

And two charts to illustrate:

31/12/2012: Calling in the New Year

And calling in the New Year, an image via MacroMonitor:

May 2013 be somewhat different!

31/12/2012: Happy New Year!

A Very Happy 2013 to all readers of this blog!

Visit often, engage with comments, and don't forget to follow me on twitter: @GTCost

31/12/2012: Pimco Twitter-cast for 2013

Bill Gross of Pimco issued his 'twitter-cast' for 2013:

Gross: 2013 Fearless Forecasts: 

1. Stocks & bonds return less than 5% (so shallower returns for 2013 across both asset classes than in 2012, e.g. S&P500 YTD gain of 12.2%, US 10year Treasury yield index down from 1.880 to 1.7574 YTD)
2. Unemployment stays at 7.5% or higher 
3. Gold goes up (no indication by how much, but gold rose 6.3% in 2012 and is now on the longest price appreciation trend since 1920, having clocked 12th consecutive annual gain)
4. 5yr US Treasuries yield 0.70% by end of 2013 (5yr Ts started 2012 at 0.830 yield and closed off on 0.7229)
5. Dollar declines (see below)
6. Oil above USD100 at 'some point in year' (WTI is now down 8% for 2012 on foot of shale gas boom in the US, with WTI-Brent spread averaging at a discount USD17.44/barrel against a premium of USD0.95 for the 10 years period through 2010 (according to Bloomberg data). Brent was up 2.8% this year - a fourth consecutive annual gain. The significance of shale effect is hard to overestimate: US crude production is at 6/985 million barrels per day - the highest since 1993.)

And couple of precedent 'tweeter-casts':

Two charts for USD and Euro YTD changes:

Update: fresh closing data: Nasdaq Comp up almost 16% y/y, DJIA up 7.3% and S&P 500 up 13%.

23/12/2012: Q4 2012 Global Risk Analysis from BBVA - part 2

In the previous post I reproduced some interesting risk maps from BBVA Research report for Q4 2012. Here some more of the same:

And debt levels against risk thresholds (do keep an eye for Ireland's 'unique' position):

I am including the above primarily to re-enforce the fact that the issue of total economic debt I am continuing to raise in relation to Ireland and the rest of advanced economies is now becoming mainstream.

23/12/2012: Q4 2012 Global Risk Analysis from BBVA - part 1

Few interesting risk mappings for December 2012 from BBVA Research:

Per BBVA, through Q4 2012:

"The Western Central Banks “Put” drives financial tensions back to normal in both US and European
Markets. But some segments still “under pressure” (banks and interest rates). Emerging Markets among the most benefited markets during the quarter. The Central Banks actions leads EM Europe below the neutral area thanks to the diminishing Euro convertibility risk. Asian and to a lesser extent Latam financial pressure enter also in the very low tension area."

My view - don't be complacent on Latin America and some Asian markets - keep an eye out for Grey Swans (see my note here).

A nice chart showing easing of pressures in the sovereign CDS markets:

Nice performance for the Peripherals, but... caveat emptor - CDS markets might be singing a song of no content (see here).

Ratings agencies moves summary:

Note that Ireland is the longest running stressed ratings sovereign other than Hungary (shallower downgrades, albeit to below junk ratings). Which puts into perspective the irish Government claims to the success of Irish programme. In reality, we've been down for longer than anyone else, so everything else held equal, we should be expected to come of it earlier too. So far, however, there have been no upgrades (that's right, despite Irish Government claims - example here):

Here's an interesting risk radar map:

And same for Spain and Italy:

 and for Greece, Portugal and Ireland:

See the next post for more from BBVA Research...

23/12/2012: Not another cent?.. Irish banks state aid 2011

In the previous post, amidst the excitement of the aggregate figures reporting, I forgot one small, but revealing chart.

Now, recall the FG/LP election campaign promise of 'not another cent' for the banks?..

23/12/2012: State Aid in EU27 & Ireland

Yesterday, the EU Commission released updated analysis of state aid expenditures, covering 2012 data. The document, titled "State aid Scoreboard 2012 Update Report on State aid granted by the EU Member States - 2012 Update" is available here.

Here are some interesting bits:


"Between 1 October 2008 and 1 October 2012, the Commission approved aid to the financial sector totalling €5,058.9 billion (40.3% of EU GDP). The bulk of the aid was authorised in 2008 when €3,394 billion (27.7% of EU GDP) was approved, mainly comprising guarantees on banks’ bonds and deposits. After 2008, the aid approved focused more on recapitalisation of banks and impaired asset relief rather than on guarantees, while more recently a new wave of guarantee measures was approved mainly by those countries experiencing an increase in their sovereign spreads, such as Spain and Italy.

Between 2008 and 2011,  the overall amount of aid used  amounted to  €1,615.9 billion (12.8% of EU GDP).  Guarantees accounted for the largest part amounting to roughly €1,084.8 billion (8.6% of EU GDP), followed by recapitalisation €322.1 billion (2.5% of EU GDP), impaired assets €119.9 (0.9% of EU GDP) and liquidity measures €89 billion (0.7% of EU GDP)."


In other words, keeping up the pretense of solvency in the legacy banking system of the EU (primarily that of the EA17) has created a cumulated risk exposure of €5.06 trillion (over 40% of the entire EU27 GDP). With such level of supports, is it any wonder there basically no new competition emerging in the sector in Europe.


"In 2011, the Commission  approved aid to the financial sector  amounting to  €274.4 billion (2% of EU GDP). The new aid approved was concentrated in a few countries and involved guarantees for €179.7 billion, liquidity measures for € 50.2 billion, recapitalisations for €38.1 billion and impaired asset relief for € 6.4 billion.

The overall volume of aid used in 2011 amounted to € 714.7 billion, or 5.7% of EU GDP. Outstanding guarantees stood at € 521.8 billion and new guarantees issues amounted to €110.9 billion. Liquidity interventions amounted to € 43.7 billion and new liquidity provided in 2011 stood at €6.5 billion. Recapitalisation amounted to € 31.7 billion. No aid was granted through the authorised impaired assets measures."

Some illustrations of historical trends.

First non-crisis aid:

Amongst the euro area 12 states, Ireland has the fourth highest level of state aid over the period 1992-2011 and this is broken into 5th highest in the period of convergence with the EA12 (1992-1999), 5th highest for the period of the monetary bubble formation (2000-2007) and the second highest for the period of the crisis (2008-2011).

Relative to EU27, Irish state aid was above EU27 average in 1992-1994, 1998-2002, 2007-2011. In other words, Ireland's state aid was in excess of EU27 for 13 out of 20 years. And that despite the fact that our income convergence to the EU standards was completed somewhere around 1998-1999.

In terms of financial sector supports during the crisis, we are in a unique position:

The overall level of supports for financial sector in Ireland is so out of line with reality that our state aid to insolvent financial institutions stood at 365% of our GDP in 2011 or roughly 460% of our GNP. In other words, relative to the size of our economy, the moral hazard created by the Government (and Central Bank / FR) handling of the financial crisis in Ireland is now in excess of measures deployed by the second and third worst-off countries in EU27 (Denmark and Belgium) combined.

The chart above shows that Guarantees amounted to 246.7% of GDP in Ireland, almost identical to 245.7% of GDP in Denmark. Which means that our Guarantees were basically equivalent to those of seven worst-off Euro area countries combined.

However, stripping out the Guarantees, the picture becomes even less palatable for Ireland:

Ex-Guarantees, Irish State supports for the financial sector were more than 10 times the scale of EU27 supports and at 118.4% of GDP amounted to almost the combined supports extended by all EA12 states (123.2% of GDP).

21/12/2012: Slight upgrade for Ireland

Nice small present for the Day After (yep, that 'End of the World' thingy passed peacefully): Euromoney Credit Risk survey gave Ireland a small, but welcome upgrade:

Note that Ireland is just one of 3 countries receiving an upgrade.

Not a hugely significant development, but a nice step - 1 place up in the global rankings, now to 45th highest risk country (meaning there are 44 countries that rank less risky than Ireland). Do note, however, that our systemic risk scores in Structural Assessment has slipped, while Credit Ratings and Debt Indicators remained static.

20/12/2012: Pensions, health costs & education fees for 2014-2015

Staying with the IMF report on Ireland, and with the theme of 2014-2015 adjustments, here's again what the IMF had to say on what we should expect from the Government:

"The authorities should outline the remaining consolidation measures for 2014–15 around the time of Budget 2013 (MEFP ¶8). The program envisages additional consolidation of 3 percent of GDP over 2014–15. Taking into account the measures already specified for these years (such as on capital spending), and carryover savings from earlier measures, new measures of about 1½ to 2 percent of GDP remain to be identified for 2014-15."

I wrote about the above here. But there's more:

"To maximize the credibility of fiscal consolidation, and to reduce household and business uncertainties, the authorities should set out directions for some of the deeper reforms that will deliver this effort. These could include, for instance, on the revenue side, reforming tax reliefs on private pension contributions; and on the expenditure side, greater use of generic drugs and primary and community healthcare, and an affordable loan scheme for tertiary education to enable rising demand to be met at reasonable cost."

Further, per box-out on Health costs overrun: "there is scope for increased cost recovery in respect of private patients‘ use of public hospitals"

Hence, per IMF, the Government should hit even harder privately provided pensions (on top of the wealth tax already imposed), thus undermining even more private pensions pools and increasing dependency on state pensions. For those of us with kids, IMF - concerned with already unsustainably high personal debt levels - has in store more debt. This time to pay for our kids education. And for those of us with health insurance, there is more to pay too.

The above combination of measures is idiocy of the highest order. Per IMF, Irish economy is suffering from private debt overhang which leads to more deleveraging, less consumption and less investment. And these lead to lower growth. I agree. But what IMF is proposing is going to:

• Increase private debts and reduce the speed of deleveraging, and
• Raise the demand for already stretched public services.

This is the Willie Sutton moment for Ireland: the state (with the IMF blessing) is simply plundering through any source of money left in the country is a hope of finding a quick fix for Government insolvency. Now, with low hanging fruit already bagged, this process is starting to directly impact our ability to sustain private debts. But no one gives a damn! As Sutton, allegedly claimed, it makes sense to rob banks, because that is where the money are. Alas, with banks out of money, the Government, prompted by the IMF 'advice' is going to continue robbing us.

So a message to our Pensions industry, which hoped that going along with expropriation of customers' funds via pensions levy would allow the industry to avoid changes to tax incentives on pensions (the blood of the sector demand). Prepare for tax reliefs savaging. Once you fail to stand up to the bullies and protect the interests of your customers, you deserve what you are going to get. Every bit of it.

19/12/2012: Mr Grinch Travels in Threes

It hasn't been a good month or so for irish banks... Right, true, AIB & BofI sold some paper around, covered bonds that is. And this triggered a veritable drooling of happiness from some (mostly sell-side) analysts. But then the mortgages defaults figures for Q3 came in... Boom! The IMF started sounding alrams about risks in the stalled banking sector... Boom-Boom! And now, Moody's weighing in too...

"Announcement: Moody's: Irish Prime RMBS performance steadily worsened in October 2012

Global Credit Research - 19 Dec 2012
Irish Prime RMBS Indices -- October 2012
London, 19 December 2012 -- The performance of the Irish prime residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) market steadily worsened during the three-month period leading to October 2012, according to the latest indices published by Moody's Investors Service.

From July to October 2012, the 90+ day delinquency trend and 360+ day delinquent loans (which are used as a proxy for defaults) reached a new peak, rising steeply to 16.52% from 15.19% and to 7.91% from 6.58%, respectively, of the outstanding portfolios. Moody's annualised total redemption rate (TRR) trend was 2.95% in October 2012, down from 3.40% in October 2011.

Moody's outlook for Irish RMBS is negative (see "European ABS and RMBS: 2013 Outlook", 10 December 2012,http://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBS_SF309566). The steep decline in house prices since 2007 has placed the majority of borrowers deep into negative equity. Falling house prices will increase the severity of losses on defaulted mortgages (see "High negative equity levels in Irish RMBS will drive loan loss severities to 70%", 16 May 2012 http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PBS_SF285527). The rating agency expects that the Irish economy will only grow 1.1% in 2013 (see "Credit Opinion: Ireland, Government of", 07 November 2012 http://www.moodys.com/research/Ireland-Government-of-Credit-Opinion--COP_423933). In this weak economic recovery, it will be difficult for distressed borrowers to significantly increase their debt servicing capabilities and so arrears are likely to continue increasing.

On 15 November, Moody's downgraded nine senior notes and placed on review for downgrade one senior note out of five Irish RMBS transactions, following the rating agency's revision of key collateral assumptions. The downgrades reflect insufficient credit enhancement for notes rated at the country ceiling. All notes affected by this rating action remain on downgrade review pending re-assessment of required credit enhancement to address country risk exposure. Moody's also increased assumptions in eight other transactions, which did not result in any rating action due to sufficient credit enhancement. (See PR: http://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-takes-rating-actions-on-5-Irish-RMBS-transactions--PR_259945).

As of October 2012, the 19 Moody's-rated Irish prime RMBS transactions had an outstanding pool balance of EUR48.97 billion. This constitutes a year-on-year decrease of 7.1% compared with EUR52.69 billion for the same period in the previous year."

So, that's EUR48.97 billion of trash which are 7.91% fully destroyed and decomposing (EUR3.87bn) and is showing signs of severe rot at 16.52% (EUR7.96bn). With 70% expected loss, at EUR8.28bn expected writedown, swallowing all funds allocated under PCARs to mortgages arrears?

Who says there's just one Mr Grinch? Comes Christmas time, its IMF & Moody's & bad, bad, bad, moral-hazardous households that just can't pay their mortgages... Time to raise those AVR mortgages costs, then, to cover the losses on errm... mortgages...