24/08/2011: Few thoughts on today's Gold price correction

Following a dramatic rise over the recent weeks, gold registered a correction today. At this moment in time, gold for December 2011 delivery is down 5.76% on the day and is priced at USD 1,754.00 / oz. Here's a snapshot:
Of course, one day movement can be many things:

• A sustained correction (with market settling at lower levels and running along a flat trend)
• A short-term correction (with a return to, perhaps more sustainable, upward trend)
• A bear trap (with relatively prolonged period of downward corrections followed by a return to positive trend) and so on

While it is extremely hazardous to profess any explanations for specific daily (and generally high frequency) changes, here are some of the reasons that are being advanced by various analysts as to the possible drivers of today's correction:

1. The margins theory (see zerohedge comment here): CME raised margins on gold for the second time in the month, having hiked them first 22% and now raising them 27% again (new account margins are now at USD9,450 and maintenance accounts at USD5,500). This second rise follows 26% hike on margins by the Shanghai Gold Exchange (+26%) on Monday to 12%. In theory, margins increases should symmetrically rise costs for short and long positions on gold futures. Which can lead to closing of some positions. In practice, however, two things occur. Firstly, short positions face lower margin exposures than long positions - the difference being small, alas. Secondly, margins increases themselves might be dramatic, but on absolute terms they are still small, unless you are opening highly levered new accounts. The margins theory, in my view, helps explain the physical move in prices, but not the behavioral drivers for investors' reaction. More likely, in my view, is the possibility that two consecutive, short-spread margin hikes signal to the investors that CME is actively trying to prevent gold going parabolic, to contain speculative momentum. If so, current correction is welcome, as it triggers retrenchment of speculative leveraged investors.
2. The talk about Euro area demands for the collateral on Greek (and Portuguese and Irish... and may be Italian and Sapnish...) loans from EFSF/ESM/alphabet soup. FtAlphaville speculates on this (here). There can be indeed a push for such a move, though I doubt it will result in actual sales of gold reserves. Even if the sales were to take place, European peripheral gold will most likely be placed 'discretely' to other central banks and treasuries, plus the IMF in fear of destabilizing official reserves elsewhere. The last thing Europe will want to do is to dent its own (German, French & UK) wealth and anger a bunch of governments in Asia, plus the US & IMF - all of which are deeply into gold holdings.

Incidentally, couple of days ago I commented on twitter that CME margins increases are long-term positive for gold, if they are successful in cooling off speculative leveraged investors.

My guess - and I stress that this is a guess - is that the current correction can turn out to be relatively deep, but it will not alter long term (9-12 months) upward trend for gold. The reason is simple: US, UK, Japan and Europe are poised to print money. In part, this is already factored into previous highs for gold. In part, the uncertainty about the quantities of QE to be deployed, are offering both the upside and the downside scenarios for the gold price relative to peak.

If, however, the global QE does not materialize, stock markets and corporate debt markets will likely to slip into serious bear sentiment. Which will push gold back onto near-parabolic trend up.

As far as today's short-term correction goes, my view is that it was 'helped' by the shifts of liquidity into equities with markets posting another day of strong upsides.

For a longer-term lesson to be learned: today's correction shows clearly the perils (for ordinary investors) of rushing into an asset with a single large-scale purchase. Instead, gold should be treated as a long-term allocation aimed at real wealth preservation and hedging. Such allocation should be built over time, with sustained - volatility-reducing - strategic long positions. Not with attempts to 'time' the market or based on impulsive buy-ins based on expected capital gains.

And, of course, the volatility shown by today's gold price movement, as well as an even more dramatic volatility in equities and fixed income shown over recent months, highlight the need for conservative, long-term investment strategy based on proper risk management and diversification.

23/08/2011: Trade Figures for June - an awesome performance by the sector

Latest trade stats are out for June 2011 for Ireland and the results are, overall, excellent:

• The seasonally adjusted trade surplus increased by 7.54% mom (a whooping 22.45% yoy) to €4,079m. This is the highest monthly surplus ever recorded in nominal seasonally-adjusted terms.
• Compared to June 2009, trade surplus increased 7.48% (+€283.8 million) and compared to June 2010 trade surplus is up 22.45% (+€747.9 million).
• The non-seasonally adjusted trade surplus in June 2011 was €4,473m comprising exports of €8,343m and imports of €3,870m. Per CSO: "This is the highest trade surplus since June 2001.
• Imports came in at a weak €3,821 million in seasonally-adjusted terms in June 2011, down 7.48% on June 2010 and up 2.83% on June 2009.
  
• Exports posted the best seasonally-adjusted performance since February 2011, reaching €7,900 million in June 2011, up 5% (+374.6 million) mom. Exports rose 5.89% yoy (+€439.1 million) and 5.18% (+€388.90 million) on June 2009.

As chart above shows, trade surplus has broken through short-term flat trend that run from roughly speaking January 2009. Which, of course is the good news. Build-up of inputs imports in April 2011 is now exhausted, as indicated by the fact that we have moved to a much more intensive position in exports as determined by imports volumes (chart below). This suggests that trade surplus can shrink in months to come as rebuilding of inputs inventories set in. Regardless, however, June figures are truly spectacular.
For H1 2011:

• Imports stood at €24,934.4 million, up 8.47% (+€1,946.4 million) year on year
  
• Exports were at €46,244.9 million, up 5.43% (+€2,423 million) yoy and
• Trade surplus stood at €21,310.3 million, up 2.29% (+€476.4 million)

The above, of course, provides a backdrop for the claims that our exports-led recovery (which is roaring ahead) is going to underwrite overall economic recovery (which is not happening). Just think, the entire trade surplus increase for 6 months this year would be barely enough to cover 2.6% of our fiscal deficit through June 2011.

Per CSO (using final figures through May) for the first five months of 2011 compared with those for 2010:

• Exports increased by 6% to €38,565m:
• Exports of Medical and pharmaceutical products increased by 14% or €1,362m,
  
• Exports of Organic chemicals rose by 7% or €582m and
  
• Exports of Dairy products increased by 47% or €217m.
• Imports increased by 12% to €21,123m
• Imports of Other transport equipment (including aircraft) increased by 34% or €497m
  
• Medical and pharmaceutical products by 22% or €318m and
  
• Imports of Petroleum rose by 17% or €305m.
  

These figures were achieved against improving terms of trade (lower TT readings) through May (the TT data is lagged 1 month behind the Trade data), as shown in the chart below:
As the result of this, long-term relationship between terms of trade and exports implies that June performance was actually below exports levels consistent with current reading of terms of trade. This suggests that in July and August there is some room for exports increases despite the slight deterioration in the terms of trade month-on-month in June.
On the net, therefore, very positive set of figures on trade from Irish exporters! something truly worth cheering.

23/08/2011: July Banks Survey - Euro area credit supply - Expectations

3 months forward expectations for lending conditions in Euro area, based on July 2011 data from the Banks Lending Survey run by ECB indicate that:

• Overall lending standards by Euro area banks are expected to tighten in 3 months following July 2011 by 9% of survey respondents - a number that has been rising now consecutively for 3 quarters.
  
• Overall lending standards are expected to ease by just 2% of survey respondents, down from 5% reporting back in April 2011.
• The respondents expect virtually no change in lending conditions for SMEs
• Lending to large enterprises is expected to tighten over the next 3 months by 10% of the banks surveyed, while only 3% are expecting lending to ease.

23/08/2011: July Banks Survey - Euro area credit supply - costs & controls

In the previous two posts I looked at the supply of credit to enterprises and the core drivers for changes in banks lending within the Euro area over the 3 months through July 2011. Here is a quick snapshot of what these changes mean on the ground.

The survey question this relates to is: Over the past three months, how have your bank's conditions and terms for approving loans or credit lines to enterprises changed?

• Bank margins on average loans to enterprises have tightened across 19% of the banks in 3 months through July 2011, while 18% of the banks reported easing of the average margins. Thus, overall margins remained largely unchanged across 57% of the banks - same as in 3 months to April 2011. However, in 3 months to April 2011, the percentage of the banks reporting easing of conditions on margins exceeded the percentage of the banks reporting tightening by 3 percentage points. This compares against zero percentage points differential in 3 months through July 2011 (note - these are adjusted percentages, compensating for respondents' errors).
• Number of the banks reporting tightening of margins on riskier loans exceeded numbers reporting easing by 23 percentage points in 3 months to July 2011.
• Non-interest rates charges have tightened in 2 percentage points more banks than eased
• Size of the loans granted tightened in 7% of the banks and eased in 3%, with 84% reporting no change in 3 months through July 2011.
• Collateral requirements have become tighter in 6% of the banks, while the requirements eased in 4%, suggesting de-accelerating rate of collateral requirements barriers growth.
  
• There was tightening of loans covenants reported by 9% of the banks and 6% reported easing. In previous quarter, the comparable numbers were 5% and 4%, implying tighter covenants are getting tougher.

While margins and non-interest rate charges are running at virtually no change since early 2010, there is a slight uptick in pressures in these credit costs. Collateral requirements remain on moderating tighter path, while riskier loans are posting second consecutive quarter of tightening of the margins.

Overall, these responses paint a mixed picture of costs of the bank lending to enterprises and suggests that market funding and capital and liquidity concerns drive banks lending dynamics in the Euro area, rather than costs and conditions structures.

22/08/2011: July Banks Survey - Euro area credit supply - drivers

In the previous post I highlighted some new developments in Euro area banks lending to the SMEs and larger enterprises (post link here). In this post, let us consider the data (through July) from the ECB's Banks Lending Survey for the core drivers of the structural stagnation and renewed weaknesses that have emerged in the Euro area credit supply.

The survey question we are considering here is: "Over the past 3 months, how have the following factors affected your bank's credit standards as applied to the approval of loans on credit lines to enterprises?"

• When it comes to the cost related to the bank's capital position, the percentage of banks reporting tighter (higher) costs was 6%, while the percentage of banks reporting easing of capital cost conditions was zero.
• There were zero banks reporting easing in capital costs conditions in April 2011 and January 2011.
• 2010 average for the percentage of banks reporting tighter cost conditions in excess of those reporting easing of conditions at the end of July (6%) was identical to the 2010 annual average.
• As shown in the chart below, bank's ability to access market funding remains on downward trend for second quarter in a row. At the end of July, the percentage of banks reporting tightening of access to market financing was 9%, same as for the three months through April 2011 and up on 4% in H2 2010.
• At the same time, percentage of banks reporting easing of access to market funding dropped from 2% in 3 months to October 2010, to 1% through January 2011, to 0% in 6 months since January 2011.

And a summary plot of banks access to funding markets, showing new tightening trend:

When it comes to the banks' liquidity positions, the story is also that of continued and deepening deterioration:

• 10% of banks in the survey stated that their liquidity conditions tightened in 3 months through July 2011, up from 8% in 3mo through April 2011 and 6% in 6 months before that.
• Only 1% of banks stated that their liquidity positions have eased (improved) in 3 mos through April 2011, the same percentage as in 3 mos through April 2011 and down from 3% in 3 months through January 2011.
  

Meanwhile, banks competition is now running along a flat trend:

• In 3 months through July 2011, 82% of the banks in the Euro area reported no change in competitive pressures from other banks, up from 79% in 3 months to April 2011, while 1% reported tightening and 8% reported easing of competition.
• The same story, but less dramatic, holds for competition from non-banks and for competition from market (non-banks) financing.
• The percentage of banks that observed tighter expectations of general economic activity in the end of July 2011 was 15%, as contrasted by just 4% that reported easing expectations.

So in summary, despite (or perhaps because of) the regulatory and recapitalization measures deployed, in 3 months to July 2011, Euro area banks continued to shrink supply of credit to Euro area enterprises because their funding conditions, liquidity positions, capital costs and expectations for economic activity were getting tighter. In the meantime, competition in European banking sector, having eased significantly from the peak crisis period, is running at generally depressed levels and along relatively flat trend.

Surely these are not the signs consistent with stable improvement or the end of the crisis?

22/08/2011: July Banks Survey - Euro area credit supply to enterprises

There are rumors circling euro area banks about the impeding liquidity crunch and rising risk profiles. In this light, it is illustrative to take a look at the latest Banks Lending Survey data from ECB to see if there are new trends emerging in terms of credit supply.

This post will look at some data from the Surveys covering lending to enterprises, while the follow up posts will deal with the core drivers of changes and with banks' lending to the households.

First, consider the aggregates (all data through July 2011) - with Chart below illustrating:

• Overall in terms of lending to the euro area enterprises, 8% of banking survey respondents indicated that lending conditions have tightened or considerably tightened over 3 months through July 2011, while 5% indicated that their lending conditions eased or eased considerably.
  
• The percentage of respondents who indicated tightening of conditions remained unchanged in July compared to June, but is up from 5% reported in May. Year on year, percentage of respondents reporting tighter lending conditions dropped by 4 percentage points, while percentage of those reporting easing of conditions rose 4 percentage points.
  
• 87% of respondents indicated that their lending conditions were unchanged in 3 months through July 2011, down from 89%.
• Over 3 months through July 2011, percentage of the banks reporting tighter lending conditions (8%) was below 9.25% 2010 average and significantly below 35% and 49.5% averages for 2009 and 2008.
• The percentage of banks reporting easing of lending conditions in 3 months through July 2011 (5%) was above 2010 average of 3.75% and above 2008 and 2009 averages of 0.75% each.

For SMEs (Chart below illustrates):

• Percentage of the banks reporting easing of considerable easing of lending conditions in 3 months through July 2011 was 3%, which is 3 percentage points above same period last year, but is unchanged from June and down from 4% in both April and May.
• Percentage of the banks reporting tighter or considerably tighter lending conditions was 7% in 3 months through July 2011, up on 6% in May and June, but down from 15% in April. The percentage of banks reporting tighter lending to SMEs in 3 months through July 2011 was 7 percentage points lower than a years ago and at 7% compares favorably against 11.75% average for 2010 and 35.5% and 39% averages for 2009 and 2008 respectively.

For larger corporate loans (Chart below):

• 9% of the banks reported tightening of lending conditions to large enterprises in 3 months through July 2011, which is 6 percentage points below the level of responses recorded in July 2010. However, the current percentage remains relatively close to 2010 average of 10.5%, although it is substantially down from 37.75% and 52.5% averages for 2009 and 2008.
• Month-on-month, tighter conditions in July 2011 (9%) were less prevalent than in June (11%), but more prevalent than in May (7%).
• Easing or considerable easing of lending to large enterprises was reported by 7% of the banks, up from 5% a month ago and 4 percentage points above the same level in July 2010.
• Easing of conditions in 3 months through July 2011 (7%) is now ahead of the same figure for 2010 average (4.25%) and well ahead of both 2008 and 2009 averages of 0.5% and 0.75%.
  

On the net, data shows some stabilizing momentum in credit supply, but this momentum is extremely anemic. Overall, more lenders continue to tighten lending conditions for large enterprises and SMEs.

20/08/2011: Yielding to Fear or Managing Wealth

Here's a copy of my presentation from August 18th in the Science Gallery covering some of my views on gold (announcement here). All disclosures were made in the announcement and at the beginning of my presentation - do not accept this as either an advice to take any investment action - as usual. You can click on individual slides to enlarge.

18/08/2011: VIX signals crunch time for the crisis

Summary:


Few charts on VIX - hitting historic, second highest ever, 1-day dynamic semi-variance range:
VIX itself above and intraday range below:

3mo dynamic STDEV showing emerging and reinforced trend up on semi-variance side:
And same for straight volatility (symmetric)
This, folks is a crunch time.

The reasons I bothered with this are here.

16/08/2011: Euro area and German growth Q2 2011

Two quick updates on some economic data released today.

Germany posted virtually zero rate of growth with GDP in Q2 2011 adjusted for seasonal effects up just 0.1 percent on Q1 2011. Q1 2011 quarterly growth rate was revised to 1.3 percent. German GDP growth was 2.6% yoy in Q2 2011, down from 4.6% in Q1 2011.

France data released last week showed economy stagnated in the three months through June with zero growth rate qoq and 1.6% growth rate yoy in Q2 2011, down from 2.1% expansion in Q1 2011. Italy reported data on August 5th showing its GDP growing 0.3% qoq in Q2 2011, 0.8% yoy, down from 1.0% yoy growth in Q1 2011. Spain’s economy expanded by just 0.2 percent in Q2 2011 (qoq) and 0.7% yoy, against 0.8% expansion in Q1.

And so on... until eurostat posted euro area-wide growth rate of 0.2% qoq in Q2 2011, down from 0.8% qoq in Q1 2011. Year on year growth rate fell to 1.7% in Q2 2011 from 2.5% in Q1 2011. Exactly the same growth rates were recorded in EU27, showing that the ongoing slowdown is now spreading across non-euro area member states as well. The EU27 and the euro area growth rates are now below those in the US (+0.3% qoq).

Summary table courtesy of the eurostat:

The overall disappointing growth in the euro area was entirely predictable, given that the leading indicators were pointing to it for some time now (see here), the industrial output data (here), etc.

However, here's an interesting chart suggesting that months ahead are not going to be easy for German economy:
Pay especially close attention to the yellow line showing business expectations for economic activity in months ahead. The data above is through July 2011, the latest we have and it firmly shows that business expectations have now dropped to the lowest level since January 2010, marking as fifth month of consecutive declines. The index stood at 105.0 in July 2011, down from the Q1 2011 average of 110.1 and Q2 2011 average of 107.1.

Euroarea leading economic indicator is now slipping since the beginning of July and this confirms continued weakness in the growth series.

16/08/2011: EU's pearls of wisdom

As far as the cartoonish characters go, European leadership provides fertile ground for rich pickings. And as the crisis continues to spread from one Euro area country to the next, there is hardly any respite from their brilliant pearls of wisdom being showered on unsuspecting European public and the markets.

On August 9th, Olli Rehn, European Monetary Affairs Commissioner, issued letter to the European parliament in which he objected to the experts opinion of the ECB as the 'bad bank' on the back of the ECB purchases of distressed Government bonds from Italy and Spain. Apart from making up the claim that the ECB bonds purchases programme is compatible with the EU Lisbon Treaty – the fabrication to which he managed himself to admit in his interview with Bild newspaper today – Olli really struck the golden vein of wisdom in his comments on the ECB programme. As brilliantly put by the zerohedge blog (link here):

"Where you should prepare to have your frontal lobe turn to jelly is the following: in defending why the expanded SMP program, which may soon hit hundreds of billions in onboarded toxic bonds, Rehn said the central bank's investments are safe because "the bonds are purchased in the secondary market at market price -- i.e. the credit risk is already factored in," according to a response dated yesterday to a query by an EU lawmaker. We will repeat this.... because it bears repeating: there is no risk of loss to the ECB's loan portfolio because they are purchased in the open market. In other words, if you, or a central bank, or an alien from Uranus, buys something in the open market, it is a risk free transaction."

What can one add to that? Not much, unless you are Olli – the inexhaustible fountain of wisdom on the markets, finance, macroeconomics and all things concerned. Yesterday, in the interview published by German Bild newspaper, Olli told the world that Spain, Italy and France won't need a rescue.

Of course, Olli managed to put his foot into his mouth so many times with respect to the EU rescues that one begins to wonder if he ever actually takes the said foot out of the said mouth at all. Rehn assured investors that Greece won't need a rescue package 1 and then rescue package 2 just weeks before the country was sent into the EFS/ESM/IMF/ECB 'safe' house. He did the same with Ireland – a week before the IMF/EU/ECB troika arrived into Dublin. Olli was also bullish on Portugal not requiring assistance shortly before it went to the wall. Olli also consistently denied any plans for the EU bailouts in all of the above cases, even while the Commission ardently labored behind the scenes to push them through.

And, as the above instance with his deep grasp of risk considerations in financial investment clearly indicates, he is also deeply confused as to whether subsidized purchases of Italian and Spanish bonds by the ECB last week (and before that) constitutes a rescue measure. According to the ECB and Olli's own bosses in the Ecofin, it does. According to Olli, it does not. Go figure how this man made it to be a Monetary Affairs Commissioner when his grasp of both finance and macroeconomics (the two core components of the monetary policy) is so bizarre, he couldn't probably even get a job as a junior bank loans administrator.

But Olli 'La-La" Rehn is hardly the only serial gaffer in the top circles of Brussels elites. Close to him in these dubious accomplishments it the President of the European Council, Herman "Frompy" Van Rompuy.

Usually busy with his war against Europe's 'other' President – the Commission chief Jose Manuel "Grabosso" Barosso for the title of the Presidency (please, keep in mind that Europe has three (!) Presidents, including Frompy, Grabosso and Jean-Claude "Junky" Juncker who is the President of the Euro Group of Finance Ministers), Frompy took some time back in July to share with us, the mere mortals, his wisdom on the global value of Europe (aka, the EU, for apparently non-EU members of Europe do not warrant to be called European).

"Europe is still sexy," declared President Frompy. "As long as a club attracts new members," he added, "it is in good shape."

That, of course, is exactly what the Ottomans were saying to themselves in the 18th century before switching to congratulating their rulers for keeping the empire going in the 19th century. Never mind they were presiding over the 'Sick Man of Europe' all along.

15/08/2011: Italian "reforms" 2011

So Mr Berlusconi's plan for Italy is now clearly outlined, but as usual with Italian government, it remains to be seen if:

1. There will be effective government push to implement it, and
   
2. There will be a government to implement it.

Italy's new austerity budget is the country only political and macroeconomic response to the increase in bond spreads and its reliance on ECB purchases of the Government paper. In a clear concession to the emergency of the situation, the new budgetary measure were passed by decree, and are now subject to a 2 months-long debate and amendments by the Parliament. Which, of course, is risk number one – the Parliament amendments can significantly reduce the bill effectiveness.

Overall, the bill plans for budgetary savings of €20bn in 2012, and €25.5bn in 2013.

Majority of the reductions will be driven by higher taxes, which means:

• They will have a longer-lasting adverse impact on growth, and
• Cannot be seen as permanent or even long-term, as point (1) above implies that for an already heavily taxed economy (with General Government total revenue accounting for 45.5-46% of the country GDP in 2010-2011 against G7 average of 35.2-35.4%), Italy will have to come off higher tax path sometime in the near future.
  

Given that the country already runs low rates of economic growth (with IMF latest projections for the average growth of under 1.3% per annum in 2011-2016), low personal income base (with GDP per capita adjusted for price differentials expected to return to pre-crisis levels some time in 2013 – the latest of all Big-4 Euro area economies), high unemployment (8.6% in 2011 against G7 average of 7.6%), the gross government debt of 119% this year, and the worst current account deficit of 3.4% this year amongst the Euro area Big-4 economies, it is hard to imagine that the country can actually master these tax increases.

Overall, based on IMF data, the estimated impact of the budgetary plan announced yesterday will take out roughly €1,980 per working person in new taxes and spending cuts, which amounts to 9.3% reduction in the per capita income, adjusted for price differentials. Accounting for this, IMF projections for Italy suggest that Italian real disposable incomes will not return to their pre-crisis peak anytime before 2016. And this is based on IMF's rather rosy assumptions for growth in 2011-2013, which were compiled prior to the onset of the recent economic slowdown.

Of course, in a typical Italian fashion, the new plan is virtually devoid of the structural spending cuts and reforms on the spending side. Overall spending cuts include:

• Central government ministries cuts of €6bn in 2012 and €2.5bn in 2013.
• Savings on the funds allocated to town councils, regions and provinces of €6bn in 2012 and €3.5bn euros in 2013.
• State pension system savings of €1bn in 2012 alongside the increase in retirement for women in the private sector by 5 years to 65. In addition, there will be restrictions on retirement funds for public sector workers who retire early.
• Burden sharing with senior politicos was achieved by restricting MP's reimbursements for flights only to the economy class costs.
• All public bodies with fewer than 70 employees will be abolished (excluding economics and finance functions).
• Provincial governments with less than 300,000 inhabitants and covering less than 3,000 square kilometres will be abolished. Town councils with less than 1,000 inhabitants will be merged. It is estimated this will mean the abolition of up to 29 of Italy's 110 provincial governments.

In terms of revenue increases:

• There is a new "solidarity tax" on high earners, to be levied for three years from this year, as an additional 5% on income above €90,000 per year and 10% on income above €150,000
• Increase in taxation of income from financial investments from 12.5% to 20% - which is a regressive measure for Italy, where investment is running at 19.9% of GDP this year, down from the average of 21.6% of GDP in pre-crisis years
• Increases on a so-called "Robin Hood" tax on energy companies
• Increase in the base rate for corporation tax
• Higher tax on lotteries and betting and higher excise duties on tobacco – the latter being a personal blow to the devotees of the Italian MS (aka Morto Sicuro) cigarettes, like myself
• Further curbs in tax evasion – a set of policies that has been promised more often than the Italian Governments' went to elections, and yet to be delivered in any meaningful measure. Of course, the tax increases above are only going to add incentives to evade taxes in the future, and
• Finally, in a silly season way, all non-religious public holidays will be celebrated on Sundays, to reduce their disruptive effects on national output (note to Berlusconi - outlawing Italian siesta hours in services would do some marvels to output too).
  

According to the IFC Paying Taxes 2011 report, Italy's total tax rate stands at 68.6%, compared to the EU rate of 44.2% and the world-wide average rate of 47.8%. The country ranks 128 in the world in Ease of paying taxes, 49th in the world in terms of Tax payments, 123rd in the world in terms of the time cost of complying with the tax codes and 167th in the world in total tax rate burden. (www.pwc.com/payingtaxes)

The only structural reform promised by Berlusconi emergency measures is, as of yet completely unspecified liberalisation of national labour contracts.

Good luck to all who would go long Italy on the back of these 'measures'. In my opinion, there is about 25% chance of the Italian Government actually delivering on revenue raising targets from this package and about 10% chance we will see noticeable reductions in the costs of the state sector in Italy, with one slight exception – the local and regional reforms. However, there is a good 75-90% chance that Italy will slide into a recession in Q3-Q4 2011 and its 2011-2016 average growth rate will likely slide from 1.31% projected by the IMF back in April 2011, to ca 1.02%. Which, of course, will mean that its debt will top 120% of GDP mark in 2012 and is
unlikely to alter the path set out for it in the IMF projections.

Here are few charts:

14/08/2011: A warning on synthetic ETFs class

An interesting, much overlooked working paper from the Bank for International Settlements, shines some light on recent innovations in financial engineering. It also contains a warning of the rising probability of the next asset class meltdown.

BIS Working Paper Number 343 (available here) “Market structures and systemic risks of exchange-traded funds” by Srichander Ramaswarmy starts from some historical stylized fact from finance.

“Crisis experience has shown that as the financial intermediation chain lengthens, it becomes complicated to assess the risks of financial products due to a lack of transparency …at different levels of the intermediation chain.”

Despite the crisis, however, the appetite for structured credit products is now growing, especially amongst the institutional investors with access to low cost funding (courtesy of the lax monetary policies). The problem, according to Ramaswarmy, is finding higher risk and higher returns products to beef up institutional portfolia returns – the very same problem identified back in 2002-2003 when, following the collapse of ICT bubble, tech stocks (high risk, high return products of the late 1990s) were wiped out.

“This time, financial intermediaries have responded by adding some innovative features to existing plain vanilla …exchange-traded funds (ETFs)... The structuring of these funds initially shared common characteristics with that of mutual funds. In particular, the underlying index exposure that the ETF replicated was gained by buying the physical stocks or securities in the index.”

As a result, of investors appetite for higher returns while simultaneously desiring high liquidity, “ETFs have moved away from being a plain vanilla cost- and tax-efficient alternative to mutual funds to being a much more complex and diverse array of products and replication schemes…” using derivative products. “As the volume of such products grows, such replication strategies can lead to a build-up of systemic risks in the financial system.”

Here are some interesting facts – all from Ramaswarmy:

• As of end-2010, there were close to 2,500 ETFs offered by around 130 sponsors and traded on more than 40 exchanges around the world.
• Global ETF assets under management rose from $410 billion in 2005 to $1,310 billion in 2010 (Chart left hand side panel) roughly 5.7% of the global mutual fund industry.
• “Almost all of the ETFs that are benchmarked against fixed income or equity indices in the United States are plain vanilla structures that involve” physical holding of securities that comprise the underlying index. “In Europe, roughly 50% of the ETFs are plain vanilla types, and the rest are replicated using synthetic structures (Chart, centre panel).”
• “Regulatory rules …encourage the adoption of plain vanilla structures in the United States [including notification, stress-testing and control over derivatives held, especially over-the counter derivatives]… The UCITS regulations that apply in Europe, on the other hand, permit exchange-traded as well as over-the-counter derivatives to be held in the fund…”
• As the result of more lax regulation in Europe, a significant share of more risky ETFs benchmarked to emerging market assets is “domiciled in Luxembourg or Dublin… ETFs benchmarked to emerging market assets now total $230 billion (Chart, right-hand panel).”
  

Synthetic ETFs replicate the index using derivatives such as unfunded total return swaps or the funded swaps as opposed to owning the physical assets.

The former type of a swap is a transaction between two counterparties to exchange the return arising from an asset for periodic cash flows. Under this swap system:

• ETF can end up holding physical securities / assets that are completely different from the benchmark index that the ETF is supposedly replicating.
• Underlying securities can incorporate potential conflicts of interest between the funding counterparty and the securities it pledges.
• “The composition of the assets in the collateral basket can change daily... Under UCITS regulations, the daily NAV of the collateral basket, …should cover at least 90% of the ETF’s NAV...”
  

An alternative is the funded swap under which, “the ETF sponsor transfers cash to the swap counterparty, who then provides the total return of the ETF index replicated. This transaction is collateralized… [usually to 110-120% of the NAV, using a system that] can potentially lead to delays in realising the value of collateral assets if the swap counterparty fails…”

These synthetic ETFs, per Ramaswarmy “transfer the risk of any deviation in the ETF’s return from its benchmark [the tracking error risk] to the swap provider... However, there is a trade-off: the lower tracking error risk comes at the cost of increased counterparty risk to the swap provider.”

In addition, many synthetic ETFs are at a risk of non-transparent “possible synergies that might exist between the investment banking activities of the parent bank and its asset management subsidiary or the unit within the parent bank that acts as the ETF sponsor. These synergies arise from the market-making activities of investment banking, which usually require maintaining a large inventory of stocks and bonds that has to be funded. When these stocks and bonds are less liquid, they will have to be funded either in the unsecured markets or in repo markets with deep haircuts. By transferring these stocks and bonds as collateral assets to the ETF provider sponsored by the parent bank, the investment banking activities may benefit from reduced warehousing costs for these assets…”

In other words, if ETF sponsor is cross-linked to the funding bank, the cost savings to the investment bank from synthetic ETF collateral are directly and inversely linked to the quality of the collateral held by the ETF – the lower the quality, the higher the savings. As Ramaswarmy puts it, “for example, there could be incentives to post illiquid securities as collateral assets.”

Furthermore, liquidity regulation, “such as the standards now proposed under Basel III, may also create incentives to use synthetic replication schemes” to artificially reduce the run-off rate on short maturity assets. This can be used to allow banks “to effectively keep the maturity of the funding short” and inflate bank’s liquidity positions.

All of the above benefits can yield short-term gains to ETF investors, but they come at a cost of:

1. increased risk to financial markets stability
2. lack of transparency in the quality of collateral held and liquidity positions
3. decreased transparency on ETF leverage and composition,
4. decreased liquidity of the ETF collateral can be further compounded by securities lending, and etc
   

Ramaswarmy summarizes these as follows: “Drawing on [the 2000-2008] experience, there are a number of channels through which risks to financial stability could materialise from ETFs, especially when product complexity and synthetic replication schemes grow in usage. They include:

1. co-mingling tracking error risk with the trading book risk by the swap counterparty could compromise risk management;
2. collateral risk triggering a run on ETFs in periods of heightened counterparty risk;
   
3. materialisation of funding liquidity risk when there are sudden and large investor withdrawals; and
4. increased product complexity and options on ETFs undermining risk monitoring capacity.”

Core ETFs’ risk minimisation mechanism – overcollateralisation – “might provide little comfort, as crisis experience has shown that collateral quality tests and collateral coverage tests designed by rating agencies for structured products did not protect senior tranche holders from losses.”

And there is a warning note to the investors: “by employing a variety of markets and players to replicate their benchmark indices, ETFs complicate risk assessment of the end product sold to investors. There is little transparency and no investor monitoring of the index replication process when this function is taken over by the swap counterparty. Financial innovation has added further layers of complexity through leveraged products and options on ETFs.”