15/9/2014: OECD Economic Outlook: It's Worse than the Cover Says...

Keeping in mind that the OECD is a cooperative international body (aka not known for taking strong positions on anything, save lunch menu), here's Paris-based boffins' latest outlook for the global economy in 2014:

Everyone is downgraded, save India. Poor Italy got blasted - forecast for 2014 growth is now 0.9 percentage points lower than back in May and the 'powerhouse' of the euro area, Germany, is expected to grow by just 1.5% this year despite booming current account.

2015 is not going to be much better either:

OECD expects euro area to grow at 1.1% in 2015, which is slower than its forecast for the common currency area for 2014 produced back in May 2014. In other words, the expected 'new' recovery is worse than expected 'old' current outlook.

And world trade slowdown is now pretty much structural:

Domestic demand is likely to stagnate just as external demand, especially in the euro area as jobs creation remains anaemic and wages growth is nowhere to be seen, even at low inflation rates:

What the OECD has to say on the euro area reads like a description of a full-blow Japanization:
"The recovery in the euro area has remained disappointing, notably in the largest countries:  Germany, France and Italy. Confidence is again weakening, and the anaemic state of demand is reflected in the decline in inflation, which is near zero in the zone as a whole and negative in several countries. While the resumption in growth in some periphery economies is encouraging, a number of these countries still face significant structural and fiscal challenges, together with a legacy of high debt. "

Meanwhile, door knobs of European policymaking are calling for raising domestic demand to combat debt overhang. Now, definition of Domestic Demand is: Personal Consumption of Goods & Services + Net Expenditure by Local & Central Government on Current Goods & Services + Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation = Final Demand. Add to Final Demand Value of Physical Changes in Stocks and you have Total Domestic Demand.

Take a look at the above components:

• Personal Consumption of Goods & Services is subject to significant downward pressures due to tax increases, cost of government-supplied / controlled goods & services increases and household debt overhang. To increase this without increasing debt overhang for households requires shifting some of the Government burden off shoulders of the households. Which will only add to Government debt pile.
• Net Expenditure by Local & Central Government on Current Goods & Services is held back by Government debt overhang and large deficits. To stimulate this will require heavier debt overhang or more taxation of households, which will only increase their debt overhang and depress their demand. 
• Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation is held back by corporate debt overhang and broken credit system (down to banks debt overhang). Stimulating investment - aka fixed capital formation - will either require companies to increase their debt overhang (more credit issuance) or increase Government spending (see above) or dilute equity in companies.

In short, there is not such thing as a debt-neutral 'stimulus' when debt overhang is present across all sectors of the economy, as in euro area periphery, and in a number of other euro area states.

Boffins from the OECD have this to say on euro area's alleged malaise Numero Uno: low inflation. "Inflation has been falling steadily in the euro area for nearly three years. As demand strengthens, inflation is expected to turn back up and gradually converge on the EBC’s target range. But the succession of downward surprises has increased the risk that inflation remains far below the ECB’s target for a more extended period or declines further. Excessively low inflation makes it more difficult to achieve the relative price adjustments that remain necessary to rebalance euro area demand without having to endure a prolonged period of slow growth and high unemployment. Inflation near zero also clearly raises the risk of slipping into deflation, which could perpetuate stagnation and aggravate debt burdens."

In my view, this is just plain bollocks, pardon my language. Why? 

Because low inflation only exacerbates debt burden in ratios to GDP, not in real terms and even then  only for the Governments. Low inflation means low interest rates, which reduce cost of debt servicing for all actors in the economy: households, governments and corporates. Higher inflation equals higher interest rates, which means that you are killing households and companies in order to drive that debt/GDP ratio down for the Government. Meanwhile, economy's cost of servicing the debt levels, not ratios, is rising. This is why deflation with low growth are unpleasant but bearable in debt overhang scenarios (see Japan) while stagflation (low growth and high inflation) is a disaster. 

Need more convincing? Suppose inflation reaches ECB target of 2%. Suppose we post real growth of 3% pa. Which makes our nominal growth in the economy around 5% (simplifying things, but only marginally). What happens to interest rates? Why, they go toward historical averages. Say benign 2.5%. What happens to legacy mortgages rates? They more than double for trackers and rise by at least 2.5 percentage points for ARMs. What happens to mortgages arrears? What happens to household consumption? What happens to household investment? If growth of 5% is driven, as currently, predominantly by external sectors (exports and foreign investment, including in property markets), what happens to earnings and wages that are supposed to pay for the household debts and purchase domestic companies' goods and services? And what happens to Government yields and with them debt-servicing costs?.. 

OECD rather cheerfully presents the following outlook for inflation:

Which suggests we are heading for mean reversion (increases) in interest rates on 5-10 year horizon. Fingers crossed by then foreign investors will be snapping homes in Ireland at prices close to 2005-2006 peak so we can at least foreclose on them without much of negative equity overhang...

4/7/2013: Ifo Forecast for euro Area Growth Q2-Q4 2013

Ifo Institute latest forecast for Eurozone:

-- "Activity contracted by 0.3% in Q1 2013, falling for the sixth consecutive quarter."
-- "GDP growth is expected to turn slightly positive in Q2 2013 (+0.1%), with a mild acceleration over the following quarters (+0.2% in Q3 and +0.3% in Q4)."
Core drivers:
-- "...progressive improvement in exports and a marginal recovery of domestic demand in the second half of the year."
-- "…fiscal consolidation and ongoing deleveraging in corporate and banking sectors of several Eurozone economies will continue to weigh on economic growth."
-- "Labor market conditions will remain unfavorable, placing an additional burden on disposable income and private consumption."
-- "Due to tight credit conditions and weak prospects for internal demand, gross fixed investment is also expected to remain weak."
-- "Exports growth and the need to replace an ageing capital stock will lead to a modest investment recovery in Q3 and Q4 2013 (+0.1% and +0.4% respectively)."
-- "Under the assumption that Brent oil price remains stable at USD 103 per barrel in Q3 and Q4 and the euro/dollar exchange rate fluctuates around 1.30, inflation is projected to 1,3% in Q4."

Core caveat: "This forecast assumes that financial tensions in Europe do not escalate and a gradual unwinding of the monetary policy stimulus in the United States."

Full note: http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/facts/Forecasts/Euro-zone-Economic-Outlook/Archive/2013/eeo-20130704.html

My view: optimistic assumption on inflation and EURUSD rate, but generally, agree with Q2-Q3 outlook as a central scenario. Risks are rising, however, by the day.

Core charts:

30/1/2013: German Economy: Returning to zero growth in January 2013

Germany's CESIfo published the latests (January 2013) assessment of the state of the German economy in Manufacturing and these are slightly more upbeat than at the end of Q4 2012, albeit with some clear seasonal supports.

"In manufacturing the business climate indicator continued to rise. Manufacturers are more satisfied with their current business situation than last month. The improvement in expectations with regard to future business developments continued into the New Year. Optimism is returning. After three successive declines, capacity utilisation rates also rose."

As per data below, in manufacturing 'optimism' is not exactly 'returning', but rather 'pessimism is receding', as business expectations remain below 0 on balances:

"In wholesaling, on the other hand, the business climate clouded over. Wholesalers are less satisfied with their current business situation and slightly more pessimistic about future business developments. In retailing the business climate indicator rose somewhat. This was due to a slightly more positive assessment of the business situation, while retailers’ business expectations remained unchanged.

In construction the business climate index rose sharply. This was primarily due to far more optimistic expectations, which last reached such a high level in March 2012. Assessments of the current business situation also improved."

It is worth noting that in Construction sector, it was business expectations that drove overall index up sharply and these are exceptionally seasonally-driven:

 However, as balances data below shows clearly, three of five sub-sectors continue showing weaknesses:

Overall, the three core aggregate series are above 100 for the first time since May 2012 (good news), but at levels that are signalling stagnant or very weak growth.

• Climate indicator reading is at 104.2 - only sixth highest reading in last 12 months, and substantially below 108.2 reading in January 2012;
• Situation indicator is at 108.0, which is only 10th highest reading in last 12 months, and well below 116.3 recorded a year ago.
• Expectations are at 100.5, marking 5th highest reading in 12 months, down marginally on 100.7 in January 2012.

In terms of overall impact on the euro area, the above figures suggest that the January 2013 eurocoin indicator-based forecast (see details here) of -0.4% growth in January 2013 should be more moderate. Not enough data yet to recompute the actual forecast figure from -0.4%, but I believe it can be closer to -0.2-0.1%.

29/9/2012: Eurocoin for September 2012

In the previous post I promised the update for the leading economic indicator, eurocoin, results for September.

In September, eurocoin remained at broadly-speaking the same level as in August, singaling contraction of -0.32 (August reading was -0.33). The indicator was on the positive side in equity markets and sovereign debt components, but came in with deterioration on firms and households surveys side.

This marks twelve consecutive months of sib-zero readings.

3mo MA for the indicator is now at -0.297, 6mo MA is at -0.195 and y/y the swing in the eurocoin is -0.35 points. Current reading is slightly worse than -0.31 average reading for 2008-2009.

Growth forecast based on eurocoin suggests -0.4-0.5% economic contraction in Q3 2012.

Monetary policy is now consistent with accommodative stance:

However, monetary policy remains outside the inflation targeting range:

Economic deterioration continues in y/y terms, while moderating inflation is also on track, suggesting that some further easing in the policy is still feasible in months ahead. My expectation would be for an ECB rate cut in October-November of 25bps.

3/9/2012: Euro Area PMIs for August

I will be blogging on Irish Manufacturing PMI for August 2012 later today (the headline numbers are encouragingly positive, albeit growth rate has slowed down markedly on July), but here's the summary of Euro area PMIs and growth dynamics from Pictet:

The two charts are confirming the dynamics presented here on the foot of eurocoin leading indicator for growth.

31/8/2012: Eurocoin for August 2012

Euro area leading growth indicator from Banca d'Italia and CEPR has posted eleventh consecutive monthly contraction in August, reaching -0.33 from -0.24 in July. This marks the worst reading for eurocoin since July 2009. 2008-2009 average was -0.31, so the current reading is worse than average for the first wave of the crisis.

A year ago, the indicator stood at +0.22, implying a growth swing of 2.1-2.3% annual.

3moMA indicator is now at -0.25, annual expected rate of decline is at -1.3%.

Charts to illustrate:

1/8/2012: Global Manufacturing PMIs for July

The summary of July 2012 Manufacturing PMI readings to-date:

Two things worth highlighting:

• Overall the readings are exceptionally poor across the board.
• Of all advanced economies so far reporting, Ireland shows by far the most positive indicator reading at 53.9. This is some huge achievement and the credit here goes primarily to the MNCs trading out of Ireland.

More detailed analysis of Irish PMI is to follow, so stay tuned.

16/7/2012: GFSR July 2012 - more alarm bells for European banks

IMF published Global Financial Stability Report update for June 2012, titled “Intense Financial Risks: Time for Action”

Per report: “Risks to financial stability have increased since the April 2012 Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR).

• Sovereign yields in southern Europe have risen sharply amid further erosion of the investor base.
• Elevated funding and market pressures pose risks of further cuts in peripheral euro area credit.
• The measures agreed at the recent European Union (EU) leaders’ summit provide significant steps to address the immediate crisis. Aside from supportive monetary and liquidity policies, the timely implementation of the recently agreed measures, together with further progress on banking and fiscal unions, must be a priority.
• Uncertainties about the asset quality of banks’ balance sheets must be resolved quickly, with capital injections and restructurings where needed.
•  Growth prospects in other advanced countries and emerging markets have also weakened, leaving them less able to deal with spillovers from the euro area crisis or to address their own home-grown fiscal and financial vulnerabilities. 
•  Uncertainties on the fiscal outlook and federal debt ceiling in the United States present a latent risk to financial stability."

Aside from the headlines, some interesting points from the report are:

• Market conditions worsened significantly in May and June, with measures of financial market stress reverting to, and in some cases surpassing, the levels seen during the worst period in November last year.  (see Figure 1)

•   The 3-year LTROs helped support demand for peripheral sovereign debt but that positive effect has waned. Private capital outflows continued to erode the foreign investor base in Italy and Spain (see Figures 3 and 4)

An interesting point on Euro area banking sector [emphasis mine]: “Notwithstanding the ample liquidity provided by the ECB’s refinancing operations, funding conditions for many peripheral banks and firms have deteriorated. Interbank conditions remain strained, with very limited activity in unsecured term markets, and liquidity hoarding by core euro area banks. Bank bond issuance has dropped off precipitously, with little investor demand even at higher interest rates.

“Banks in the euro area periphery have had to turn to the ECB to replace lost funding support, as cross-border wholesale funding dried up, and deposit outflows continue. The April 2012 GFSR noted that EU banks are under pressure to cut back assets, due to funding strains and market pressures, as well as to longer-term structural and regulatory drivers. The sharp reduction in bank balance sheets in the fourth quarter of 2011 continued, albeit at a slower pace, in the first quarter of 2012.

Growth in euro area private sector credit diverged significantly. While credit has contracted in Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland, it has remained more stable in some core countries.

Survey data on bank lending conditions show that credit supply remains tight, albeit less so than at the end of 2011, but that demand has also weakened more recently.

Deleveraging is also a concern for many peripheral corporations, given their historic dependence on bank funding and the risk that credit downgrades and diminished investor appetite could drive borrowing costs higher, even for high credit quality issuers.”

Now, here’s an interesting point not raised in the GFSR, but linked to the above observations: equities issuance accounts for roughly 55% of total corporate capital in US and EU. However, because the US corporates issue more bonds-backed debt than their EU counterparts, banks lending accounts for 40% of the European corporate funds raised, against 20% in the US. Which means that banks credit is about twice more important in Europe than in the US in terms of funding corporate capex. In fact, recent research from BCA clearly links US corporates ability to raise direct market funding by-passing banks to faster economic recovery in the US than in EU or Japan.

Add to this equation that European banks are worse capitalized than their US counterparts and that they are more leveraged than their US counterparts and you have a bleak prospect for the EU economy. BCA recently estimated that to bring Euro zone banks’ capital ratios to the levels comparable with the US average, the largest EU banks will have to raise some USD900 billion worth of new capital or cut their assets base by a whooping USD 9 trillion.

But wait, there’s more – you’ve heard about the latest report in the WSJ that Mario Draghi proposed to bail-in senior bondhodlers in Spanish banks? Much of the Irish commentary on this was positive, suggesting that Ireland is now in line for a retrospective deal from the ECB to recover some of the funds we paid to senior bondholders in Anglo and INBS. Setting aside the ‘wishful thinking’ nature of such comments – look at Draghi’s idea implications for EU economic activity. If bail-in does make it to the policy tool of European authorities, funding for the EA17 banks will only become more expensive in the medium and long term (risk premium on ‘bail-in probability’), which, in turn will mean even less credit for corporates, which will mean even less capex, and thus even lower prospect of recovery.

You know the story – pull one end of the carriage out of the quicksand pit, the other end sinks deeper… Let me quote BCA: “In Japan, credit contraction lasted well over nine years in the aftermath of the asset bubble bust. During that time, deflation prevailed and economic growth averaged a measly 0.5% annual pace.” Much of hope for Europe then? Not really. Recall that Japan had aggressive fiscal and monetary policies at its disposal plus booming global markets when it was undergoing credit bust. We, however, have psychotic monetary policy, no fiscal policy room and are running debt deflation cycle amidst global economic slowdown.

IMF is also on the note here: “Policymakers must resolve the uncertainty about bank asset quality and support the strengthening of banks’ balance sheets. Bank capital or funding structures in many institutions remain weak and insufficient to restore market confidence. In some cases, bank recapitalizations and restructurings need to be pursued, including through direct equity injections from the ESM into weak but viable banks…”

16/7/2012: IMF downgrades growth prospects for 2012-2013

A notably interesting, if worrying, World Economic Outlook update from the IMF today. Titled “New Setbacks, Further Policy Action Needed” the document sounds several key warnings:

• In the past three months, the global recovery, which was not strong to start with, has shown signs of further weakness.
• Financial market and sovereign stress in the euro area periphery have ratcheted up, close to end-2011 levels.
• Growth in a number of major emerging market economies has been lower than forecast. …these developments will only result in a minor setback to the global outlook, with global growth at 3.5 percent in 2012 and 3.9 percent in 2013, marginally lower than in the April 2012 World Economic Outlook.
• These forecasts, however, are predicated on two important assumptions: that there will be sufficient policy action to allow financial conditions in the euro area periphery to ease gradually and that recent policy easing in emerging market economies will gain traction.
• Clearly, downside risks continue to loom large, importantly reflecting risks of delayed or insufficient policy action. In Europe, the measures announced at the European Union (EU) leaders’ summit in June are steps in the right direction.
•  The very recent, renewed deterioration of sovereign debt markets underscores that timely implementation of these measures, together with further progress on banking and fiscal union, must be a priority.
•  In the United States, avoiding the fiscal cliff, promptly raising the debt ceiling, and developing a medium-term fiscal plan are of the essence. In emerging market economies, policymakers should be ready to cope with trade declines and the high volatility of capital flows.

Some growth forecasts snapshots of the IMF update for 2012 and 2013:

• US gets downgraded on growth for both years by 0.1% from 2.1% in April 2012 to 2.0 in July 2012, and for 2013 from 2.4% to 2.3%.
• Meanwhile, Euro zone gets no change in 2012 forecast (at -0.3%) and a downgrade by -0.2% to 0.7% for 2013 forecast.
•  Let’s recall that Eurozone is Ireland’s ‘hope’ and ‘engine for growth’ according to our Government. And it is expected to perform markedly worse than any other advanced region in both 2012 and 2013. 
•  Note that the most ‘dynamic’ large euro zone economy – Germany – is now expected to grow by a ridiculously low 1.4% in 2013 on top of an absurdly low 1.0% in 2012.
• Elsewhere, China and India both got seriously downgraded in terms of growth prospects for 2012 and 2013 compared to IMF forecasts 3 months ago.

Chart below shows some monetary and banking sides of the euro crisis.

“Overall, global growth is projected to moderate to 3.5 percent in 2012 and 3.9 percent in 2013, some 0.1 and 0.2 percentage point, respectively, lower than forecast in the April 2012 WEO…

Growth in advanced economies is projected to expand by 1.4 percent in 2012 and 1.9 percent in 2013, a downward revision of 0.2 percentage point for 2013 relative to the April 2012 WEO. The downward revision mostly reflects weaker activity in the euro area, especially in the periphery economies, where the dampening effects from uncertainty and tighter financial conditions will be strongest.”

“Growth in emerging and developing economies will moderate to 5.6 percent in 2012 before picking up to 5.9 percent in 2013, a downward revision of 0.1 and 0.2 percentage point in 2012 and 2013, respectively, relative to the April 2012 WEO… Growth is projected to remain relatively weaker than in 2011 in regions connected more closely with the euro area (Central and Eastern Europe in particular).”

2/1/2012: Sunday Times January 1 - 2012 Economy Forecast

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article for January 1, 2012.

Happy New Year and the best wishes to all of you fond of reading up on economics this morning.

Having just closed the book on the fourth year of the crisis, one can only hope that 2012 will be the year of the return of the global and Irish economic fortunes.

I wish I could tell you that this will be so with some sort of certainty. That ‘exports-led growth’ will open the way for reduced unemployment and that ‘real reforms’ will take place to the benefit of those of us living here and restore the confidence of the proverbial international investors. Alas, the only reality we can glimpse from the road we travelled since 2008 is that this year will be marked by the same fiscal uncertainty, growth volatility and markets psychosis that were the hallmarks of the years past.

So in line with the New Year’s Day tradition for forecasts, lets take a look at the crystal ball and ask two questions.

Question number one: Where are we today on the road of the global economic and financial crises resolution?

At the macroeconomy level, the US has completed some two-thirds of the required private sector deleveraging. This means that by the very end of 2012 we might see some signs of life in the US consumer demand and household investment, assuming the credit system globally does not experience another seizure. Until this takes place, corporate balance sheets will remain focused on hoarding cash and capex is unlikely to re-start. The US economy is likely to bounce around the growth rates just above zero, with moderate risk of a recession in the first half of 2012.

The three black swans for the global economy are: the risk of the deficit blowout and the lack of Congressional consensus on dealing with the US debt mountain that can destabilize the Treasury market; China’s economy teetering on the brink of an asset crisis and growth slowdown; and the euro area hurtling toward a disorderly collapse. Should any one of these materialising, there will be an unprecedented shift in global investment portfolia with gold and a handful of international blue chip corporates becoming the only stores of value. Unlikely as it might seem, such a scenario will cause a new Great Depression worldwide.

Barring the catastrophe identified above, global demand will most likely remain subdued in 2012, with previous pockets of growth – e.g. the emerging markets, the beneficiaries of exceptionally low cost of carry-trade finance from QE funds in the US in 2009-2010 – becoming mired in a significant growth slowdown.

Europe is likely to be on the receiving end of the poor global growth newsflows.

Germany was the driver of European growth in 2011 and its exports performance (up 13.4% in 2010 and 8.5% in 2011) looks set for a severe test in 2012. In months ahead, the ECB will drive down key interest rates to 0.5-0.25 percent from the current 1.0 percent to accommodate the default-bound euro area sovereigns. However, in the climate of deleveraging banking sector, this move will fail to stimulate private demand. Government spending in Germany is also set to fall in 2012, by 0.4-0.5 percent. As the result, we can expect German GDP to contract in Q4 2011 and Q1 2012. Annual rate of growth is likely to fall from 2.9% in 2011 to 0.2-0.4% in 2012.

France is now forecast to enter a shallow recession between Q4 2011 and Q1 2012 with annual growth falling from 1.6% in 2011 to zero percent in 2012. The downside risk for the second largest euro area economy is that fiscal adjustments planned to-date can be derailed by lower growth. In this case, France can remain in a shallow recession through 2012.

Overall, euro area growth looks set for some negative downgrades in months ahead. We can expect GDP to remain flat in 2012, having shown expansion of 1.5 percent in 2011. Personal consumption will be static, investment will shrink by 1.2 percent and Government spending will contract 0.3 percent. Exports growth will fall 10-fold, from 2011 annual rate of 6.3 percent.

This provides the backdrop to the second question of the day: What will 2012 bring to Ireland?

We are all familiar with the fact that Irish economy is highly volatile and subject to a number of push and pull factors ranging from global demand for Irish exports, to foreign conditions for debt crisis resolution in the common currency area.

Assuming no major disruptions to the current global environment, we can look at two possible scenarios.

Scenario 1 involves benign assumptions of continued growth in agricultural output, modest resilience in exports, moderating contraction in construction sector, and only slightly deeper reduction in public spending compared to 2011. Crucially, this scenario assumes virtually no nominal change in the services sector activity, a moderate rise in net taxes and a slight decrease in profits by the multinational enterprises expatriated abroad. All in, Scenario 1 yields estimated rate of growth in real GDP of 0.8% and GNP growth of 0.7%.

Less benign Scenario 2 with shallower growth in agricultural and exporting sectors activity, as well as services sectors contraction, yields growth forecast of -0.6% for real GDP and -0.9% for GNP. In this adverse scenario, Irish economy is likely to end 2012 with real GNP 13% below the peak 2007 levels.

These small differences in forecasts are, however, compounded year on year, as illustrated by the historical divergences between previous Department of Finance forecasts and realised rates of growth in the chart.

The range of risks we face is a daunting one, but there is also a narrow range of potential outcomes that present an upside for the battered economy.

In terms of the sovereign risk, recent discontent with the Budget 2012 has translated into dramatically reduced approval ratings for both Fine Gael and Labor. These are likely to persist on the back of higher taxes and a potential increases in unemployment in the retail sector and other services, post-January sales. By mid-2012, lower growth and overly optimistic projections on tax revenues and expenditure reductions will mean that the Coalition will face a stark choice of either further reducing capital expenditure, or levying some sort of a new revenue raising measure. Discontent of the backbenchers will only increase as time moves closer to the Budget 2013, possibly forcing the Government to adopt some structural reforms on the expenditure side and rethink its policy on future tax increases.

The latest projections by the Economist Intelligence Unit put peak Government debt/GDP ratio at 120-125% in 2013. At this stage, there will be a belated restructuring deal struck with EU that will see debt/GDP ratio falling to below 100%. The pressure for such a deal will be building up throughout 2012 and we might see some positive moves during the year.

Banks will be nursing continued losses, with mortgages showing a more visible trend toward deterioration, while business insolvencies will continue driving significant losses behind the façade. Again, pressure of these losses will become more apparent in late 2012, just around the time banks capital buffers begin to dwindle once again.

With economy bouncing up and down along the generally stagnant growth trend, the Government will continue its search for excuses for avoiding deep reforms. Thus, 2012 will be the year of silent risks build up in Irish economy, culminating in a major blow-out in late 2012 or early 2013. Welcome to the Groundhog Year Number Five.

Box-out:

Most recent data for Ireland’s external accounts shows that in Q3 2011 our balance of payments stood at a surplus of €838 million, comprising a current account surplus of €850 million and a capital account deficit of €12 million. For the nine months of 2011, the current account has registered a deficit of €669 million, an improvement of just €125 million on the deficit in the same period of 2010. Over the same time, balance of payments deficit fell from €771 million in the nine months through September 2010 to €675 million for the first nine months of 2011. Which raises the following question: given that we continue running current account and balance of payments deficits, what external surpluses does the Government foresee for the near future that can possibly make a dent in our public debt overhang? Since the onset of the current exports boom in the beginning of 2010, Ireland’s average quarterly current account surplus has been a meagre €13 million. At this rate, it will take Ireland Inc some 190 years to pay down just €10 billion of debts, even if these debts were costing us nothing to finance.

24/10/2011: New Orders for Industry: August data

Cheerful update today from the Eurostat on New Orders in Industrial Production series:

"In August 2011 compared with July 2011, the  euro area (EA17) industrial new orders index rose by 1.9%. In July the index dropped by 1.6%. In the EU27 new orders increased by 0.4% in August 2011, after a fall of 0.6% in July. Excluding ships, railway & aerospace equipment, for which changes tend to be more volatile, industrial new orders rose by 0.7% in the euro area and by 0.5% in the EU27. In August 2011 compared with August 2010, industrial new orders increased by 6.2% in the  euro area and by 6.5% in the  EU27. Total industry excluding ships, railway & aerospace equipment rose by 5.0% and 5.2% respectively."

Here are the details:

Start at the top: EU17 new orders index is now at 115.11 for August, up on 112.93 in July, down on 115.54 in May. The index is now back into the comfortable expansion territory, where it has been since April 2010. 

2008 average reading was 110.09, 2009 average was 86.99 and 2010 annual average was 102.2. So far - through August - 2011 average is 112.93 - not a bad result. But miracle it is not - reading of 100 is consistent with activity back in H1 2005, so in effect, through August 2011 we have achieved growth of 2.05% annualized in terms of volumes of output. Given that since then we had pretty hefty doses of inputs inflation and moderate gate prices inflation, the margins on the current activity have to be much lower than for pre-crisis years. Which means relatively robust improvements in volumes of industrial new orders are not necessarily implying robust value added growth in the sector.

Meanwhile, German new orders have shrunk in August 2011 from 122.4 in July to 120.9 in August. Month on month German new orders are down 8.04% and year on year activity is down 13.34%. This marks the lowest reading since April 2011.

 Of the big players:

• France posted an increase in new orders index to 102.90 in August from 100.1 in July. France's 2011 average to-date is 100.43, well ahead of 2010 average of 90.93 and 2009 average of 84.31. France's new orders index averaged 100.06 in 2008.
• Spain posted a surprising improvement in August to 96.43 from 93.85 in July and yoy rise of 2.0%. Spain's 2008 average was 102.93, 2009 average of 81.57 and 2010 average of 89.61. For 8 moths through August 2011, Spain's new orders index averaged 94.27.
• Italy;s new orders index hit 117.21 - very robust increase of 6.14% mom from 110.56 in July. Italy's new orders index is now averaging 113.58 for eight months of 2011, up on 2010 annual average of 103.09, 2009 average of 89.75 and 2008 average of 104.59. It's worth noting that Italy exemplifies the fallacy of 'exports-led growth' argument - the country has posted very robust recovery in its significant and highly exports-oriented industrial sector, and yet it also posted virtually no growth over the last 2 years.

Other countries are illustrated below.

 So on the net, industrial production new orders signal some bounce back from the troughs of the slowdown in early summer 2011, but this can be immaterial for the wider Euro area economic growth and a temporary improvement. September and October data will be more crucial, signaling into early 2012.

12/10/2011: Euro area industrial production for August

This morning, release of Industrial Production (volume) indices across the EU was interpreted as a positive surprise on the otherwise bleak economic news horizon. To be honest, there is a good reason for this. August 2011 data, compared with July 2011, shows seasonally adjusted industrial production rising by 1.2% in the euro area 17 and by 0.9% in the EU27. In July, adjusted figures show that production grew by 1.1% and 0.9% respectively. Year on year, August 2011 compared with August 2010, industrial production increased by 5.3% in the euro area and by 4.3% in the EU27.

But some details are omitted in the release and become more visible once you look at the updated eurostat database. Here are the breakdowns of numbers:

For All Industries (Mining and quarrying; manufacturing; electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply; construction) as opposed to eurostat release-focus of All Industries, less construction, the data we have covers only the period through July 2011. Here we have:

• Euro area production rose 1.8% monthly and 3.96% yoy in July, 
• Belgium posting an increase of 0.1% mom and 3.13% yoy, 
• Denmark +1.15% mom and +0.34% yoy
• Germany -1.04% mom and +7.91% yoy (German data is for August)
• Ireland -6.73% yoy (latest data is for June)
• Greece -14.0% yoy (latest data is for June)
• Spain 1.01% mom and -1.52% yoy
• France +0.69% mom and +4.98% yoy
• Italy -1.12%mom and -2.39% yoy
• Netherlands +2.34% mom and +2.26% yoy
• Austria -1.3%mom and +4.58% yoy
• Poland +0.99% mom and +6.10% yoy (latest data is for August)
• Portugal +1.21% mom and -4.04% yoy (latest data is for August)
• Finland +0.94% mom and +2.88% yoy (latest data for August)
• Sweden +0.32% mom and +4.49% yoy (latest data is for August)
• UK -0.64% mom and -1.30% yoy

Charts illustrate:

Note that euro area average index for 2008 stood at 105.05, declining to 90.73 in 2009 and rising to 94.57 in 2010. 2011-to-date average index is 97.12, still miles below the 2008 levels.

Looking closer at overall index subcomponents. Let's take Manufacturing first.

• Euro area 17 manufacturing index is up 1.6% mom and 6.44% yoy - strong showing. The index averaged 102.91 in 2011-to-date, against 107.27 average in 2008 and 97.53 average in 2010. Again, it appears we are still way off the 2008 levels of activity.
• Denmark -4.33%mom and +1.87% yoy
• Germany -1.01%mom and +9.42% yoy
• Ireland +3.69% mom and +11.52% yoy
• Greece -2.63% mom and -11.62% yoy
• Spain +2.84% mom and +1.03% yoy
• France +0.74% mom and +5.06% yoy
• Italy +4.03% mom and +3.56% yoy
• Poland +2.15% mom and 6.06% yoy
• Portugal +6.56% mom and +0.10% yoy
• Finland +3.05% mom and +3.25% yoy
• Sweden -2.57% mom and +7.65% yoy
• UK -0.33% mom and +1.52% yoy

Strong showing on manufacturing side is also replicated by robust growth in New Orders sub-index:

• Euro area up 2.38% mom and +8.47% yoy in August, with 2011-to-date average index at 105.8 against 110.09% 2008 average and 98.84 2010 average. The gap is both narrower and is closing more robustly.
• Denmark (-4.78%mom), Germany (-0.43%mom), Greece (-0.36%mom), Portugal (-0.17%mom), Sweden (-2.33%mom) and the UK (-0.88%mom) posted monthly declines in the index in August
• Ireland (+1.4%mom), Spain (+2.44%mom), France (+1.08%mom), Italy (+4.87%mom), the Netherlands (+0.13%mom), Poland (+2.05%mom) and Finland (+2.16%mom) have posted monthly increases.

06/10/2011: Has ECB done a sensible thing, at last?

Like a heavily Photoshopped version of Bill Gates can be expected to last, oh about a nanosecond in convincing the generation i-Apple of the need to buy Microsoft products, so did the interest rate’s junkies expectation that the ECB is about to drop rates to where Ben “The Helicopter” Bernanke has them proved to be short-lived.

Today’s decision  by the ECB not to alter the existent rates was both a shock to all those incapable of making a living in the real economy stagnated of cheap liquidity and to those who were expecting the ECB to miraculously discover some latent propensity to fuel inflation.

Yet, the decision was perfectly in line with ECB’s policies to-date. Worse, it was in-line with rational ECB policies to-date – the type of policies that should be predictable from the long-run perspective. ECB has held its nerve this time around. Here’s why.

Chart below shows the historical path relating ECB rates to the leading indicator for real growth in the euro area, eurocoin.

At the depth of the crisis back in 2009, rates consistent with the current eurocoin reading were justifiably lower than they are today because they were coming on the foot of severe contractions in economic activity from the tail end of 2008 and into 2009. In addition, monetary policy at the time was accommodative of growth recession, rather than of the banking and financial services crisis or the sovereign crisis. Today, the picture is different. While eurocoin has entered the period of signalling potential for renewed recessionary dynamics, the looming growth crisis is not underpinned by the change in economic fortunes for the euro area, but by a set of structural weaknesses (fiscal, banking and credit supply-related, depending on the specific country). Easy monetary policy can help, but it cannot restore the euro area economies to structural health. Instead, alleviating the pressure on growth through monetary tools can only delay the necessary adjustments in structural parameters. ECB is not about to do this and, perhaps, for a very good reason.

This means that the current leading indicators scenario should be compared not against 2008-2009 period, but against pre-crisis periods where eurocoin had also fallen to the current levels around zero. This is the period of December 2002-June 2003 and the underlying ECB repo rate at that time was around 2.5%. Get it? The policy-consistent move for ECB today would be from around 3% down to 2.5%, not from 1.5% to 1%. Given we are at 1.5%, the most consistent move would be to stay put. And this is what the ECB chose today.

By the way, in the long run, since eurocoin is the leading indicator of activity, there is a negative relationship between inflation and the growth projections it provides: higher growth signal into the future tends to coincide with lower inflationary pressures today. Or put differently, falling eurcocoin now is not necessarily a signal for well-anchored short-term inflationary expectations, something that coincides with the stated ECB concern expressed in today's statement.

Of course, ECB targets are set based on inflation, not leading growth indicators, although the two are strongly correlated with lags. Here, the same picture applies:

And the same logic holds. So based on inflationary dynamics, the ECB repo rate should be around 2.0% to 3.0% and falling from above 2% levels, but not below 1.75%. Given the starting position at 1.5%, a rational move would be to stay put. 

No surprise, then in today's decision. It could have gone like 25:75 - with lower chance for an irrational knee-jerk rates lowering reaction on the foot of the immediate crisis, and higher chance of what has been delivered.

Perhaps the only disappointing bit to today's ECB call is that the central bank will continue supplying unlimited liquidity to the insolvent banking sector under unlimited 1mo lending extended through July 2012. Perhaps the ECB had no choice, but to do that. Or may be a better option would have been to start properly assessing the quality of collateral pledged by the banks at the discount window. That would have achieved two things - simultaneously - both being good in the long run for the euro area banking sector:

1. It would have continued provision of supports to the banks with better quality assets (aka solvent but stressed banks), and
2. It would have put pressure on member states to purge their sick banks and drastically restructure the banking markets (getting rid of Dexia-esque zombies).

On top of that, ECB announced renewal of LTROs (12-mo and 13-mo) with delayed interest cover - in effect a heavy duty support for really stressed banks. Last time ECB did this was back in December 2009 and those operations were designed to shore up banks in the wake of the Lehman Bros bust.

Instead of applying some pressure on euro area's clownish 'leadership' in the banking sector, the ECB choose to call for some unspecified efforts by the banks to voluntarily shore up their balance sheets and retain earnings to provide cover for losses on their sovereign bonds exposures to weaker euro area countries. In the current climate, and with ECB providing unlimited liquidity, this is equivalent to suggesting that zombies should get out into the yard and work-off some of their rigor mortis. Good luck.