Wednesday, February 11, 2015

11/2/15: Baltic Dry Index: Another low...


Readers of this blog would be familiar with the Baltic Dry Index and with its importance in flagging up trends in global trade and, especially, in European trade.

Well, today, BDI has hit a historical low...


Source: @MktOutPerform

Good luck digging up any good news in that one...

Monday, February 9, 2015

9/2/15: Sanctions: "poisoning the public water supply in the hope of killing some enemies"


An excellent article on the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a tool in geopolitical conflicts: http://www.capx.co/sanctions-against-russia-are-dangerously-defeating-in-a-globalised-economy/

Quick quotes:

"Research by the Peterson Institute for International Economics in 1997 showed that, in instances where the United States imposed economic sanctions in partnership with other nations, between 1945 and 1970 they were successful in 16 cases and failed in 14 – a success rate of 53 per cent. Between 1970 and 1990, when sanctions were applied more prolifically, they succeeded in 10 instances and failed in 38, reducing the success rate to 21 per cent. ...Unilateral US sanctions had a high success rate of 69 per cent between 1945 and 1970, tumbling to 13 per cent in the period 1970-90."

Meanwhile, "in economic terms they carry a cost. …the reality is that Russia is the European Union’s third largest commercial partner and the EU, reciprocally, is Russia’s chief trade partner. Who thought it was a good idea to subvert this arrangement?"

"Economic sanctions have the same credibility as poisoning the public water supply in the hope of killing some enemies. Sanctions are not a weapon that can responsibly be used in a globalised economy."

Yep. On the money. Though I am not so sure that "killing some enemies" is even an attainable goal here: so far, sanctions have been hitting predominantly smaller enterprises (via cut off of credit supply) and ordinary people (via supporting currency devaluations). As per oligarchs and Government-connected elites, for every instance where their property abroad has suffered, there are tens of thousands of instances where devalued ruble has made their forex holdings and forex-denominated portfolios of investments increase in purchasing power. So be prepared to see more concentration of economic power in Russia in their hands over the next 12 months.

Sunday, February 8, 2015

8/2/2015: Composite Activity Signals Weakening of Growth in BRIC


Having covered Manufacturing PMIs and Services PMIs for BRIC economies, let's take a look at the Composite measure of PMIs.

First, combined Composite Measure for all BRIC economies. The measure is based on a sum of Services and Manufacturing PMIs for each country, weighted by the relative size of each economy (as a share of the global GDP, based on IMF data).


As the chart above shows, Composite measure of PMI-captured activity has fallen for the BRIC group from 102.3 in December 2014 to 101.1 in January 2015. 3mo average through January stood at 101.9 against 102.5 in 3mo period through October 2014 and 100.8 in 3 months through January 2014. Since July 2013, the recovery in BRIC PMIs was weak and volatile, with downward trend setting in from June 2014.

Next, consider disaggregated PMIs for Russia as opposed to BRIC-ex-Russia:


The chart above shows the divergence between Russian PMIs and those of the rest of the BRIC group. This divergence set in in October 2013, well before the start of the Ukrainian crisis in December 2013-January 2014. Nonetheless, even removing Russia out of the equation, BRIC PMIs have slipped in January 2015 compared to December 2014.

Conclusions: Overall trends in BRIC PMIs show weakening of the economic activity in January 2015 compared to December 2014. This weakening does not remove the positive trend established following April 2014 local low in the series, but it does suggest that the recovery trend in PMIs is likely to be much weaker this time around than post September 2011 local low. Meanwhile, Russia is continuing to diverge from the BRIC trend and is showing significant deterioration in activity in January, consistent with expectations of major economic growth pressures in Q1-Q2 2015.

8/2/15: BRIC Services PMIs: Poor Performance in January


BRIC PMIs for January are continuing to show divergence in growth across the four economies. I have covered manufacturing sector trends here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/02/8215-bric-manufacturing-pmis-one-cold.html.

Now, let's take a look at Services PMIs:





  • Brazil Services PMI fell to 48.4 in January from 49.1 in December signalling deeper contraction and marking fourth consecutive month of sub-50 readings. Current 3mo average is at 48.7 and this compares poorly to the already contractionary 49.7 3mo average through October 2014. January 2014 3mo average was 51.2. 
  • Russian Services PMI dropped significantly from already poor reading of 45.8 in December to strongly contractionary 43.9 in January. 3mo average through January 2015 is at 44.7 and this compares unfavourably to 3mo average through October 2014 at 49.5. We now have 4 consecutive months of sub-50 readings in the series. 3mo average through January 2014 was 52.2. Overall, substantial decline in Services activity as signalled by the PMI reading.
  • China Services PMI stayed declined from 53.4 in December 2014 to 51.8 in January 2015. This is the weakest performance since July 2014. 3mo average through January is at 52.7, virtually unchanged on 52.6 average 3 mo reading through October 2014 and an improvement on 51.4 3mo average through January 2014.
  • India Services PMI improved from 51.1 in December to 52.4 in January, with 3mo average through January reading at 52.0 - ahead of 3mo average through October 2014 (51.1), and ahead of 3mo average through January 2014 (47.4).
  • Overall, Russia (-1.9 points), China (-1.3 points) and Brazil (-0.7 points) posted declines in Services PMIs in January compared to December 2014, while India (+1.3 points) posted an increase. 
  • Conclusion: BRIC Services sectors are still suffering from weak growth conditions, similar to those observed in December, with Russia being the weakest, followed by Brazil, and with very weak and weakening growth in China, set against improving growth in India.
Chart and summary table below:



8/2/15: BRIC Manufacturing PMIs: one cold January for growth


BRIC PMIs for January are continuing to show divergence in growth dynamics across the four economies, across the two key sectors, and a broad slowdown in growth across majority of the BRIC parameters. Here are some details:

Starting with Manufacturing PMIs:

  • Brazil Manufacturing PMI improved marginally to 50.7 from 50.2 in December. Current 3mo average is at 49.9 and this compares as a weak improvement on 49.4 3mo average through October 2014. January 2014 3mo average was 50.3. Across the board - weak growth returned to Brazil's manufacturing, but both m/m and 3mo on 3mo growth improvements were poor.
  • Russian Manufacturing PMI dropped significantly from already contractionary 48.9 in December to strongly contractionary 47.6 in January. 3mo average through January 2015 is at 49.4 and this compares unfavourably to 3mo average through October 2014 at 50.7. However, 3mo average through January 2014 was even worse - at 48.7. Overall, substantial decline in Manufacturing activity as signalled by the PMI reading and second consecutive month of sub-50 readings.
  • China Manufacturing PMI stayed virtually flat at 49.7 in January as compared to 49.6 in December. 3mo average through January is at 49.8, down on 50.6 3mo average reading through October 2014 and on 50.3 3mo average through January 2014. Just as in the case of Russia, Chinese Manufacturing activity posted second consecutive month of sub-50 readings.
  • India Manufacturing PMI slipped from 54.5 in December to 52.9 in January, with 3mo average through January still reading at 53.6 - ahead of 3mo average through October 2014 (52.0), and ahead of 3mo average through January 2014 (51.1).
  • Overall, India (-1.6 points), and Russia (-1.3 points) posted declines in Manufacturing PMIs in January compared to December 2014, while Brazil (+0.5 points) and China (+0.1 points) posted increases. Declines outstripped increases by a wide margin and two economies (China and Russia) posted sub-50 readings. 
  • Conclusion: BRIC manufacturing sectors are still suffering from weak growth conditions, with Russia being the weakest, followed by China, and with very anaemic growth in Brazil and slowing growth in India.
Chart and summary table below:



Services PMIs covered in the next post.

8/2/15: Carry Trades Returns: More Pressure for Ruble & CBR


Carry trades involve borrowing in one currency at lower interest rates (say in Euro or Japanese Yen) and 'carrying' borrowed funds into investment or lending in another currency, bearing higher interest rates (e.g. into Australia or New Zealand, or Russia or Brazil). The risk involved in such trades is that while you hold carry asset (loan to, say, an Australian company), the currency underlying this asset (in this case AUD) devalues against the currency you borrowed in (e.g. Yen). In this case, your returns in AUD converted into Yen (funds available for the repayment of the loan) become smaller.

With this in mind, carry trades represent significant risks for the recipient economies: if exchange rates move in the direction of devaluing host economy currency, there can be fast unwinding of the carry trades and capital outflow from the host economy.

Now, let's define, per BIS, the Carry-to-Risk Ratio as "the attractiveness of carry trades" measured by "the ...risk-adjusted profitability of a carry trade position [e.g. the one-month interest rate differential]... divided by the implied volatility of one-month at-the-money exchange rate options".  In simple terms, this ratio measures risk-adjusted returns to carry trades - the higher the ratio, the higher the implied risk-adjusted returns.

Here is a BIS chart mapping the risk-adjusted ratios for carry trades for six major carry trade targets:


Massive devaluation of the Russian Ruble means that carry trades into Russia (borrowing, say in low interest rate euros and buying Russian assets) have fallen off the cliff in terms of expected risk-adjusted returns. There are couple of things this chart suggests:

  1. Dramatically higher interest rates in Russia under the CBR policy are not enough to compensate for the decline in Ruble valuations;
  2. Forward expectations are consistent with two things: Ruble devaluing further and Russian interest rates declining from their current levels.
Still, three countries with massive asset bubbles: New Zealand, Australia and Mexico are all suffering from far worse risk-adjusted carry trade performance expectations than Russia.

The Russian performance above pretty much confirms my expectations for continued weakness in Ruble and more accommodative gradual re-positioning of the CBR.

8/2/15: Reformed Euro Area Banks... Getting Worse Than 2007 Vintage?..


For all the ECB and EU talk about the need to increase deposits share of banks funding and strengthening the banks balance sheets, the reality is that Euro area banks are

  1. Still more reliant on non-deposits finding than their US counterparts; 
  2. This reliance on non-deposits funding in Euro area is actually getting bigger, not smaller compared to the pre-crisis levels; and
  3. This reliance is facilitated by two factors: slower deleveraging in the banking system in the Euro area, and ECB policy on funding the banks, despite the fact that Euro area banks are operating in demographic environment of older population (with higher share of deposits in their portfolios) than the US system. Note that Japanese system reflects this demographic difference in the 'correct' direction, implying older demographic consistent with lower loans/deposits ratio.
Here's the BIS chart on Banking sector loan-to-deposit and non-core liabilities ratios  showing loan-deposit ratios:


Note: 1)  Weighted average by deposits. 2)  Bank liabilities (excluding equity) minus customer deposits divided by total liabilities. 3) The United States, Japan and Europe (the euro area, the United Kingdom and Switzerland). This ratio measures the degree to which banks finance their assets using non-deposit funding sources.



Saturday, February 7, 2015

7/2/15: Euro Area's Debt Addiction


Europe's debt addiction in one chart: the following chart plots total domestic and cross-border credit to non-banks, at constant end-Q2 2014 exchange rates, in per cent of GDP:
Source: BIS: http://www.bis.org/statistics/gli/gli_feb15.pdf

In the above:

  • The solid lines are actual outcomes, 
  • The vertical lines indicate the 2007 beginning of the global financial crisis and the 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers. 
  • Figures include government. 
  • The dashed lines reflect long term trend, calculated as for the countercyclical capital buffer in Basel III using a one-sided HP-filter.
Two obvious conclusions emerge from the above:
  1. Since the start of the Global Financial Crisis, debt addiction expanded both in the US and the Euro area, with US addiction rising faster than the Euro area's.
  2. The gap between Euro area and US dependency on debt at the end of 2014 stood at a similar level as at the start of the Global Financial Crisis and above the pre-crisis level. That is despite the fact that in the US, most recent manifestation of the debt addiction has been associated with much higher economic growth and jobs recovery than in Europe.

Friday, February 6, 2015

6/2/15: Two Tax Inversions Islands


Remember Tax Inversions Islands? Ireland ≠ Bermuda?

Bloomberg have a neat reminder:


Source: http://www.bloomberg.com/infographics/2014-09-18/tax-runaways-tracking-inversions.html

6/2/15: Cyprus AWOL on Troika 'Reforms'


Yes, at some point, Troika won't be able to handle all the bad news flying its way... for now, however, a new alarm at the barbwire fence of European Reformism: Cyprus is heading off the Troika Reservation:


Whatever might have made Cyprus rush for the AWOL, I'll let you discover, but judging by the foreclosure and insolvency framework reforms approved by the Troika in Ireland, one can't be too much surprised if any country would have much of faith in Troika expectations on that front. Then again, Cypriots would probably remember how EU regulators first encouraged accumulation of Greek sovereign debt in Cypriot banks, then haircut that debt, causing instant insolvency crisis across the Cypriot banks. Why would anyone listen to the same people giving advice on 'structural' reforms next, puzzles me.

Thursday, February 5, 2015

5/2/15: IMF and Ukraine: 'Scaling Back' Risk Is Real


Generally, I rarely comment directly on Ukrainian economy as was explained before on this blog. But the latest set of news is certainly falling into the category of 'big time news'.

As I noted before, IMF were in Kiev since mid-January and were going over the Ukrainian Government request for switching lending to Ukraine into a different facility (see http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/01/2112015-ukraine-requests-extended-fund.html). In January, IMF head, Christine Lagarde gave an interview to Le Monde, saying that no partner of the IMF can participate in a funding programme when some 20% of the Ukrainian economy remains impacted by the conflict in the East.

So far, under stand by arrangements, IMF committed USD17 billion in funding for Ukraine, of which Kiev already received disbursements of USD3.2 billion in May 2014 and USD1.4 billion in September. Under stand-by arrangements, funding is provided for up to two years, so in 2015, Ukraine must redeem USD1.42 billion in IMF funding and some USD9.6 billion more in maturing government debt. Of this, more than USD4 billion is due in Q1 2015. Meanwhile, currency and gold reserves of Ukraine are down to USD7.5 billion - below debt maturity levels for 2015.

Now, IMF is reportedly (see here: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-05/ukraine-allows-hryvnia-free-float-raises-key-rate-to-19-5-) "is seeking to limit its share of the aid burden in discussions on an expanded bailout for Ukraine, according to two people with knowledge of the institution’s stance, as a military conflict pushes the sovereign closer to default."

Note: IMF limiting new funding share to 2/3rds will mean that of USD15 billion that Ukraine wants to get over the next 2 years, USD5 billion will have to come from 'other' sources. If IMF were to restrict its total share to 2/3rds of all bailout money, then in the new funding, the non-IMF share will be USD4 billion. One might think that the funds can be provided by the EU - keen on partnership with Kiev. But EU talks a lot, yet delivers little. In 2014, EU Commission President, Barroso stated that the EU is willing to commit EUR11 billion to fund Ukraine over 2 years. So far, EU delivered only EUR1.4 billion in 2014 and committed to provide EUR1.8 billion in 2015. EBRD and EIB promised Ukraine EUR6.5-8 billion in funding, but delivered only EUR2.2 billion so far. Germany promised and delivered EUR1.6 billion to Ukraine in 2014 and in January this year committed to provide further EUR500 million.

The point is that absent IMF funding an entirely new programme, it is impossible to see how Ukraine can continue servicing and redeeming existent debts and cover current deficit that is expected to hit double digits in 2015. On the other hand, IMF is aware of this reality as well as of the lack of will in Europe and the US to fund Ukraine. Worse, stung by the 'partnership' with EU in funding euro area crisis-hit countries, the IMF is itching to cut back its engagements with difficult partners. Meanwhile, Ukraine has - completely understandable - difficulties pushing through IMF-mandated reforms. And to add to the complexity of the situation, the EU and US are nursing major differences in their respective objectives when it comes to what the two players want to see emerging from the current crisis.

In my view, Ukraine is now being played in the game of geopolitical chess by all sides, with the IMF struggling to remain independent (even pro-forma). The tragedy of all of this is that Ukraine is being prevented, by a combination of poor funders cooperation and ongoing conflict in the East, from actually engaging in reforming its economy, politics and society. My sympathies on this mess are with Ukraine and President Poroshenko - they got the short ends of all sticks.

Note: In my opinion, Ukraine needs a much more structured package of supports, including larger loans, on more benign terms, and grants, and over a longer horizon. In effect, it needs a Marshall Plan.

5/2/15: Maan... it's like... Structural Reforms, like... maaan!


You know that slightly odd person who sits on a park bench repeating to anyone who bothers to ask him the same story over and over again? Well, now try imagining one that is doing so unburdened by a request.

And you have ECB...


At least Frankfurt did not mention its (and IMF's) favourite made up dream: the labour market reforms... presumably because in China, labour markets are already 'efficient' enough, why with all the factory dorms and campuses and the rest.

H/T for the ECB blurb to @LorcanRK.

5/2/15: Where the Models Are Wanting: Banks Networks, Risks & Modern Investment Theory


My post for Learn Signal blog: "Where the Models Are Wanting Part 2: Banks Networks, Risks and Modern Investment Theory" covering networks effects on risk propagation in the financial services sector and the impact of these networks on equity pricing models is now available here: http://blog.learnsignal.com/?p=153.

5/2/15: Gazprom's Nord and South Streams: Lessons Learned, Strategy Changed


I just published a long note on the trials and tribulations of the ill-fated South Stream gas pipeline project that was designed to deliver Russian gas to Bulgaria and Southern Europe. Here is the link: http://trueeconomicslr.blogspot.ie/2015/02/5215-gazproms-nord-and-south-streams.html

Wednesday, February 4, 2015

4/2/15: Debt Overhang and Sluggish Growth


Debt overhang and its impact on growth has been a rather controversial topic over the recent years. One of the key contributors to the debate is Kenneth Rogoff. Rogoff has a new paper out on the topic, together with Stephanie Lo, titled "Secular stagnation, debt overhang and other rationales for sluggish growth, six years on" published by the Bank for International Settlements (http://www.bis.org/publ/work482.pdf).

In the paper, Rogoff and Lo state that "there is considerable controversy over why sluggish economic growth persists across many advanced economies six years after the onset of the financial crisis. Theories include a secular deficiency in aggregate demand, slowing innovation, adverse demographics, lingering policy uncertainty, post-crisis political fractionalisation, debt overhang, insufficient fiscal stimulus, excessive financial regulation, and some mix of all of the above." Rogoff and Lo survey "the alternative viewpoints" on the causes of slow growth. The authors argue that "until significant pockets of private, external and public debt overhang further abate, the potential role of other headwinds to economic growth will be difficult to quantify."

Rogoff and Lo focus strongly on the effects of debt overhang on growth. "In our view, the leading candidate as an explanation for why growth has taken so long to normalise is that pockets of the global economy are still experiencing the typical sluggish aftermath of a financial crisis… The experience in advanced countries is certainly consistent with a great deal of evidence on leverage cycles, for example the empirical work of Schularick and Taylor (2012), who examine data for a cross-section of advanced countries going back to the late 1800s and find that the last half-century has brought an unprecedented era of financial vulnerability and potentially destabilising leverage cycles. Moreover, focusing on more recent events, Mian and Sufi’s (2014) estimates suggest that the effects of US household leverage might be large enough to explain the entire decline in both house prices and durable consumption."

Still, their conclusion is very cautious. Instead of assigning direct causality from debt to growth, they suggest increased indeterminacy of the relationship between other variables and growth in the presence of high debt overhangs. They do reinforce the point that the argument about debt overhang relates to the total real economic debt (governments, households and non-financial corporations), not solely to government debt alone.

4/2/15: Russian Services & Composite PMIs: January


Russian manufacturing PMI slipped deeper into contractionary territory posting 47.6 in January compared to 48.9 in December, as covered here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/02/2215-irish-manufacturing-pmi-january.html

Today's release of the Services PMI adds to the gloom. Services PMI posted its fourth consecutive monthly reading below 50.0, coming in at abysmal 43.9 in January, down from an already disastrous 45.8 in December. 3mo MA through January is now at 44.7 - a deep contraction, deepest since 2009 recession. This compares to the already contractionary 49.4 3mo MA through October 2014. 3mo average through January 2014 was benign 52.2. So we have a full swing of 7.5 points year on year on a 3mo MA basis.

Things are bad over both sectors of the economy, implying that the Composite PMI should be performing poorly as well. No surprise there, hence, with Composite PMI falling to 45.6 the lowest monthly reading since May 2009 and the fourth consecutive monthly reading sub-50. 3mo average through January 2015 is at 46.8, marking significant contraction that accelerated from October 2014 through January 2015. This compares to 3mo average of 50.4 for the 3 months period through October 2014 and with 51.5 3mo average through January 2014. Year on year, 3mo average reading is now down 4.7 points.



In summary, January m/m decline in PMIs was second steepest over 12 months period for Manufacturing, fourth steepest for Services and third steepest for Composite PMI.

The downward trend across all series is being reinforced since Q3 2014.

Tuesday, February 3, 2015

3/2/2015: Japanification of Europe?


One of the main narratives for understanding European economy's longer term growth outlook has been the risk of Japanification: a long-term stagnation punctuated by recessionary periods and accompanied by low inflation and or deflationary episodes and pressures. I posted on the topic before (see for example here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/10/19102014-chart-of-week-japanising-europe.html) and generally think we are witnessing some worrying similarities with Japan, driven primarily by longer-term trends: debt overhangs across real economy, nature of debt allocations (concentrated in less productive legacy assets, such as property in some countries, physical capital in others) and, crucially, demographics-impacted political and institutional paralysis.

One recent paper, titled "The Macroeconomic Policy Challenges of Balance Sheet Recession: Lessons from Japan for the European Crisis" by Gunther Schnabl (CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 4249 CATEGORY 7:MONETARY POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, MAY 2013) sets out the stage for looking into the direct comparatives between Japan's experience and that of the EU.

Per Schnabl, "Japan has not only moved through a boom-and-bust cycle …almost 20 years earlier than Europe but has also made important experiences with a crisis management in form of monetary expansion, unconventional monetary policy making, fiscal expansion and recapitalization of banks. Although Japan has reached the (close to) zero interest rate environment more than a decade earlier than Europe and gross general government debt (in terms of GDP) has gone far beyond the levels, which are today prevalent in Europe, growth continues to stagger."

In other words, as we know all too well, Japan presents a 'curious' case of an economy where neither monetary, nor fiscal policies appear to work, even when applied on truly epic scale.

What Schnabl finds is very intriguing. "The comparison between the boom-and-bust cycles in Japan and Europe with respect to the origins of exuberant booms, the crisis patterns, the crisis therapies, and the (possible) effects of the crisis therapies shows that despite significant differences important similarities exist. With the growing socialisation of risk Europe follows the Japanese economic policy decision making pattern, with – possibly – a similar outcome for European growth and welfare perspectives. The gradual decline in real income in Japan should be incentive enough for a turnaround in economic policy making in both Europe and Japan."

The key to the above is in the phrase "With the growing socialisation of risk Europe follows the Japanese economic policy decision making pattern" which of course has several implications:

  • Mutualisation / Socialisation of risk is actually mutualisation and, thus, socialisation of debt - clearly suggesting that the path toward debt deleveraging is not the one we should be taking. The alternative path to debt deleveraging via mutualisation / socialisation is debt restructuring.
  • To date, no European leader or organisation has come up with a viable alternative to the non-viable idea of 'internal devaluation'. In other words, to-date we face with a false dichotomous choice: either mutualise debt or deflate debt. Neither is promising when one looks at the Japanese experience. And neither is promising when it comes to European experience either. See more on this here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/08/1082014-can-eu-rely-on-large-primary.html and http://trueeconomics.blogspot.it/2014/08/1082014-inflating-away-public-debt-not.html.
  • ECB policies activism - the alphabet soup of various programmes launched by Frankfurt - is still treating the symptom (liquidity or credit supply to the real economy) instead of the disease (debt overhang). And the outcome of this activism is likely to be no different from Japan: debt overhang growing, economy stagnating, asset prices and valuations actively concealing the problem, data detaching from reality.


Here are some slides from Schnabl's November 2014 presentation on the topic:




So here's the infamous monetary bubble / illusion:

And the associated public sector balloon (do ignore some of the peaks that were down to banks rescue measures and you still have an upward trend):


And an interesting perspective on the Japanification scenario for Europe:

Happy demanding more Government involvement in the economy, folks... for this time, all the monetary, fiscal, regulatory, institutional, propagandistic etc 'easing' will be, surely, different... very different... radically different...

3/2/15: Global Trade Growth: More Compression, Whatever About Hope...


As I noted just a couple of days ago, global trade growth is falling off the cliff (see: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/02/1215-world-trade-growthnow-scariest.html). And euro area's trade growth is leading to the downside:


So no surprise there that the Baltic Dry Index is tumbling. As noted by @moved_average, the index is now down 577 - the level below the crisis peak lows and consistent with those observed back in 1985-1986 lows.


Ugly gets uglier... but you won't spot this in PMIs...

As an aside, in the chart above, perhaps a telling bit is the lack of any positive uplift in euro area trade growth from the introduction of the euro. 

Monday, February 2, 2015

2/2/15: Greek Primary Surplus: A Steep Hill to Climb


My comment for Expresso (January 31, 2015, pages 8-9) on Greece:

Greece has undertaken an unprecedented level of budgetary adjustments as reflected in the rate of debt accumulation on the Government balance sheet and the size of the primary surplus. Stripping out the banking resolution measures, Greek Governments have managed to deliver general government deficit consolidation of some 13.8 percentage points based on forecast for 2015, compared to the peak crisis, with Irish Government coming in a distant second with roughly 9 percentage points and Portuguese authorities in the third place with 7.7 percentage points. These figures are confirmed by the reference to the structural deficits and primary deficits. 

Given the level of austerity carried by the Greek economy over the recent years, and taking into the account a significant (Euro16 billion) call on debt redemptions due this year, it is hard to see how the Greek Government can deliver doubling of a primary surplus from IMF-estimated 1.5% of GDP in 2014 to forecast 3% of GDP in 2015 and 4.5% in 2016. Even assuming no adverse shocks to the Greek economy, these levels of surpluses appear to be inconsistent with the structural position of the Greek economy and I would have very severe doubts as to whether even the 2-2.5% range of surpluses can be sustained over the medium term (2015-2020) horizon.


2/2/15: Russian External Debt: Falling & So Far Sustainable


BOFIT published an update on Russian external debt as of the end of December 2014. The update shows the extent of debt deleveraging forced onto Russian banks and companies by the sanctions.

In H2 2014, repayments of external debt accelerated.

Banks cut their external debt by USD43 billion to USD171 billion over the year, with much of the reduction coming on foot of two factors: repayment of maturing debt and ruble devaluations. Ruble devaluations - yes, the ones that supposed to topple Kremlin regime - actually contribute to reducing Russian external debt. Some 15% of banks' external debts are denominated in Rubles.

Corproate external debt fell by USD60 billion to USD376 billion, with Ruble devaluation accounting for the largest share of debt decline, as about 25% of all external corporate debt is denominated in Rubles.

So do the maths: Ruble devaluations accounted for some USD16 billion drop in banks debts, and some USD54 billion in corporate debt in 2014 (rough figures as these ignore maturity of debt composition and timing).

Additional point, raised on a number of occasions on this blog, is that about 1/3 of corporate debt consists of debt cross-held within corporate groups (loans from foreign-registered parent companies to their subsidiaries and vice versa).

All in, end-2014 external debt of Russian Government, banks and corporates stood at USD548 billion, or just below 30% of GDP - a number that, under normal circumstances would make Russian economy one of the least indebted economies in the world. Accounting for cross-firm holdings of debt, actual Russian external debt is around USD420 billion, or closer to 23% of GDP.


CBR latest data (October 2014) puts debt maturity schedule at USD108 billion in principal and USD20 billion in interest over 2015 for banks and corporates alone. Of this, USD37 billion in principal is due from the banks, and USD71 billion due from the corporates. Taking into the account corporates cross-holdings of debt within the enterprise groups, corporate external debt maturing in 2015 will amount to around USD48 billion. Against this, short-term banks' and corporate deposits in foreign currency stand at around USD120 billion (figures from October 2014).

In other words, Russian banks and companies have sufficient cover to offset maturing liabilities in 2015, once we take into the account the large share of external debts that are cross-held by enterprise groups (these debts can be easily rolled over). Of course, the composition of deposits holdings is not identical to composition of liabilities, so this is an aggregate case, with some enterprises and banks likely to face the need for borrowing from the CBR / State to cover this year's liabilities.

BOFIT chart summarising:


2/2/15: Irish Manufacturing PMI: January 2015


Markit/Investec Irish Manufacturing PMI is out for January, posting 55.1, down on 56.9 in December and the lowest reading in any month since May 2014. Still, 55.1 is a strong performance.

3mo MA is now at 56.1 which is slightly worse than 56.5 3mo reading through October 2014, but is ahead of 55.7 average for 12 months through January 2015.

The growth rate is slowing down, but the activity remains robust:



2/2/15: Russian Manufacturing PMI slips in January


Russian Manufacturing PMI (Markit and HSBC) for January came in at 47.6, below 50.0 (statistically significant sub-50 reading), down from 48.9 in December. This is the second consecutive month of below 50 readings.

3mo MA through January is at 49.4, which is well down on 3mo MA through October 2014 which stands at 50.6, but ahead of 3mo MA through January 2014 which was 47.6.

The trend remains negative and has been reinforced in January.


Sunday, February 1, 2015

1/2/15: Oh, those largely repaired Irish banks...


What do foreign 'experts' like BofE Mark Carney forget to tell you when they say that Ireland's banking system has been [largely] repaired?

Oh a lot. But here are just two most important things:



Both, in level terms and in growth terms, Irish banks remain zombified. 'Repaired' into continuously shrinking credit supply and stagnant household deposits base, the banks have been flatlining ever since the beginning of the crisis. In the last 6 consecutive quarters, household deposits posted negative rates of growth - a run of 'improvement' that is twice longer than the 'recovery period' of Q3 2012 - Q1 2013 when the deposits rose (albeit barely perceptibly).  Meanwhile, credit continues to shrink in the system with not a single quarter of positive growth (y/y) since Q4 2009. In four quarters through Q3 2014, credit for house purchases shrunk at just around 3.05% on average - the steepest rate of decline since the start of the crisis.

"Yep, [largely] repaired, Mr. Carney", said undertaker firming up the dirt on top of the grave...

1/2/15: World Trade Growth:Now a Scariest Chart Candidate


The scary chart of the month: post-Great Recession, World Trade volumes are growing at the slowest average pace in 35 years (even if we are to 1) exclude recession effects, and 2) accept IMF's rosy projection for 2015 and ignore latest Baltic Dry Index tumbling):


Thursday, January 29, 2015

29/1/15: Where the Models Are Wanting: Banking Sector & Modern Investment Theory


My new post for Learn Signal blog covering the shortcomings of some core equity valuation models when it comes to banking sector stocks analysis is now available here: http://blog.learnsignal.com/?p=152.

Tune in next week to read the second part, covering networks impact on core valuation models validity.

Tuesday, January 27, 2015

27/1/15: Greek Debt: Non-Crisis Porkies Flying Around


There is an interesting sense of dramatic contradictions emerging when one considers on the one hand the outcome of the Greek elections, and on the other hand the statements from some EU finance ministers (for example see this: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2015-01-27/schaeuble-says-greece-needs-no-debt-cut-due-to-no-interest-phase.html). The basic contradiction is that one set of agents - the new Greek government and the Greek electorate - seem to be insisting on the urgency of a debt writedowns, while the other set of agents - majority of the European finance heads - seem to be insisting on the non-urgency of even discussing such.

What's going on?

Here is a neat summary of official (Government) debt redemptions coming up, by the holder of debt (source: @Schuldensuehner):


This clearly, as in daylight clear, shows 2015 as being a massive peak year for redemptions.

Note to the above: GLF debt reference covers GDP-linked bonds - see https://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.488644.de/diw_econ_bull_2014-09-5.pdf.

Alternative way of looking at the burden of debt is to compare debt dynamics and debt funding costs dynamics. Here these are for Greece, based on IMF data:


Take a look at the above blue line: in effect, this measures the cost of carrying Government debt. This cost did improve, significantly in 2012 and 2013, but has been once again rising in 2014. It is projected to continue to rise into 2019. So Greece can run all the primary surpluses the Troika can demand, the cost of servicing legacy debts is on the upward trend once again and Herr. Schaueble and his ilk are talking tripe.

Now, consider the red line in the chart above: in absolute terms, there is no reduction in Greek debt to-date compared to 2012. But do note the third argument advanced by Herr. Schaueble in the link above, the one that states that Greek debt reductions have exceeded those forecast under the programme. Did they? Chart below shows the reality to be quite different from that claim:


What the chart above shows is that 2015 projections for debt/GDP ratio (the latest being published in october 2014) range quite a bit across different years when forecast was made. Back in October 2010, the IMF predicted 2015 level of debt/GDP ratio to be 133.9%, this rocketed to 165.1% in October 2011 forecast, rose again to 174.0% forecast published in October 2012, declined to 168.6% in forecast published in October 2013 and rose once again in forecast published in October last year to 171% of GDP.  In other words, debt outlook for Greece for 2015 did not improve relative to 3 forecast years and improved only relative to one forecast year. Rather similar case applies to 016 projections and 2017 projections and 2018 projections. So where is that dramatic improvement in debt profile? Ah, nowhere to be seen.

And then again we keep hearing about the fabled end of contagion, 'thank God', that Herr. Schaeuble likes referencing. I wrote about this before, especially about the fact that risk liabilities have not gone away, but were shifted over the years from the shoulders of German banks to the shoulders of German taxpayers. But you don't have to take my word on this, here's a German view: http://www.cesifo-group.de/de/ifoHome/policy/Haftungspegel/Eurozone-countries-exposure.html#losses.

27/1/15: Bankruptcy & Capitalism Are Not the Same as Religion & Hell


I have recently seen some economists offer the following explanation of the role of bankruptcy in the market economy: "Capitalism without bankruptcy is like catholicism without a concept of hell".

That is a fallacious view at best, and a dangerous basis for policy formation to boot.

It is fallacious for a number of reasons, relating to both philosophy and economics.

Firstly: Capitalism, unlike religion is an ethical, but not a moralist (imperative) system. Hence, a concept of eternal damnation simply does not apply, nor should apply, to capitalism. Nothing eternal (imperative) is relevant to capitalism, including the principle of permanently enshrined law. In fact, capitalism is a system that is based on change, including change applying to its core principles. Example: transition in property rights definition as it evolved under capitalism. Change is something that is impossible in a moral imperative systems: the Hell is the Hell and it will always be the Hell. In contrast, even the most basic foundations of capitalism evolve over time. Humanity used to have markets for slaves. We no longer do, for a good of the system. Capitalism used to define capital as physical 'stuff', it now includes 'intangibles'. And so on. This ability of capitalism to change - both continuously (evolutionary) and discontinuously (revolutionary) - preempts any possibility of an 'eternal' value concept, such as 'Hell', applying to it.

Secondly: Capitalism is based on utilitarian ethics. It is ok to alter private property rights (even with partial only compensation) under certain circumstances. It is ok to restrict some markets and transactions, when Pareto efficiency allows us. And so on... There can be no Pareto efficiency justification for a fundamental sin. Hence, bankruptcy in capitalism is not a form of punishment (damnation) a priori, but a system for resolving dilemma of un-recoverable liabilities. It is instrumental - a resolution system and a restart system. Hell is a permanent state, inescapable once entered into. And Hell exists solely for the purpose of punishment. It is not instrumental - it is absolute.

Thirdly: Bankruptcy is a manifestation of the process of creative destruction. Which is a dynamic process and also value-additive process. Hell is a system of a final state of being. There is neither a desirability for finality, nor transformative imperative to alter a being through bankruptcy.

In short, a statement of "Bankruptcy ~ Hell", while sounding remotely plausible, commits a basic fallacy of moralism: over-extending an imperative moral consideration to something that requires none.

So why do I take this statement to task?

Precisely because our system of bankruptcy is erroneously designed to follow that fallacious principle. We use bankruptcy not to resolve the problem of un-repayable liabilities in the first action, but to punish the person / entity that caused the problem. We make bankruptcy painful beyond the reason of simply maximising the recovery of losses in order to 'teach others a lesson' in a way that the threat of Hell is supposed to do.

As long as we keep following such a moralist view of bankruptcy, we will continue to unncessarily penalise entrepreneurship and risk-taking; we will continue to force unnecessarily high costs of failure on enterprises and people that undertake enterprise. In other words, we will continue to subsidise returns and rewards to statism to a life of secured complacency.

Capitalism without bankruptcy is a prison without an exit. It imprisons, wrongly, the innocents to rescue bankrupt enterprises (as in the case of banks rescues), or it imprisons too harshly those who take a risk and experience a failure (as in the case of some entrepreneurs trapped in, say, Nama). In both cases, absence of a utilitarian (not absolutist or moralist) bankruptcy destroys value - economic, social and personal.

Hell is the concept of an ultimate judgement and eternal punishment for moral sins, best left to God to apply, than economists.

Monday, January 26, 2015

26/1/15: Markets v Greece: Too Cool for School... for now


There is much talk about the impact (or rather lack thereof) of Greek elections on the markets.

In fact, the euro continued to price in the effects of a much larger factor - the QE announcement by the ECB, the stock markets did the same. Only bonds and CDS markets reacted to the Greek elections, and even here the re-pricing of Greek risks was moderate so far (see chart below and the day summary for CDS - both courtesy of CMA).



The reason for this reaction is two-fold.

Firstly, Greece is a small blip on the overall radar map of Euro area's problems. Even in terms of Government debt. Here is the summary of the Government debt overhang levels (over and above 60% of debt/GDP benchmark) across the Euro area:


In simple terms, real problems for the euro, in terms of risk pricing, are in Italy, France and Spain.

Secondly, Greece is a political risk, not a financial risk to the Euro area. And it is a risk in so far, only, as yesterday's election increases the probability of a Grexit. But increasing probability of a Grexit does not mean that this increase is worth re-pricing. It is only worth worrying about if (1) increase in probability is significant enough, and (2) if elections changed the timing of the possible event, bringing it closer to today compared to previous markets expectations.

Now, here is the problem: neither (1) nor (2) have been materially changed by the Syriza victory last night. My comments to two publications yesterday and today, summarised below, explain.


Greek elections came as a watershed for both the markets analysts and the European elites, both of which expected a much weaker majority for the Syriza-led so-called 'extreme left' coalition. The final outcome of yesterday's vote, however, is far from certain, and this has been now fully realised by the markets participants.

The confrontation with the EU, ECB and the IMF, promised by Zyriza, is but one part of the dimension of the policy course that Greece will take from here on. Another part, less talked about today in the wake of the vote is accommodation.

Let me explain first why accommodation is a necessary condition for both sides in the conflict to proceed.

Greece is systemically important to the euro area, despite all claims by various European politicians to the contrary. Greece is carrying a huge burden of debt, accumulated, in part due to its own profligacy, in part due to the botched crisis resolution measures developed and deployed by the EU. It's debt is no longer held by the German, French and Italian banks, so much is true. German and French banks held some EUR27 billion worth of Greek Government debt at the end of 2010. This has now been reduced to less than EUR100 million. There is no direct contagion route from Greek official default to the euro area banking sector worth talking about. But Greek private sector debts still amount to roughly EUR10 billion in German and French banking systems (with more than EUR8 billion of this in German banks alone). Greek default will trigger defaults on these debts too, blowing pretty sizeable hole in the euro area banks.

However, lion's share of Greek public debt is now held in various European institutions. As the result, German taxpayers are on the hook for countless tens of billions in Greek liabilities via the likes of the EFSF and Eurosystem.

And then there is the reputational costs: letting Greece slip out into a default and out of the euro area will mark the beginning of an end for the euro, especially if, post-Grexit, Greece proves to be a success.

In short, one side of the equation - the Troika - has all the incentives to deal with Syriza.

One the other side, we can expect the fighting rhetoric of Syriza to be moderated as well. The reason for this is also simple: the EU-IMF-ECB Troika contains the Lender of Desperate Resort (the ECB) and the Lender of Last Resort (the IMF). Beyond these two, there is no funding available to Greece and Syriza elections promises make it painfully clear that it cannot entertain the possibility of a sharp exit from the euro, because such an exit would require the Government to run a full-blown budgetary surplus, not just a primary surplus. For anyone offering an end to austerity, this is a no-go territory.

So we can expect Syriza to present, in its first round of talks with the Troika, some proposals on dealing with the Greek debt overhang (currently this stands at around EUR 210 billion in excess debt over the 60% debt/GDP limit), backed by a list of reforms that the Syriza government can put forward in return for EU concessions on debt.

These reforms are the critical point to any future negotiations with the EU and the IMF. If Syriza can offer the EU deep institutional reforms, especially in the areas so far failed by the previous Government: improving the efficiency and accountability of the Greek public services, robust weeding out of political and financial corruption, and developing a functional system of tax collections, we are likely to see EU counter-offers on debt, including debt restructuring.

So far, Syriza has promised to respect the IMF loans and conditions. But its rhetoric about the end of Troika surveillance is not helping this cause of keeping the IMF calm - IMF too, like the ECB and the EU Commission, requires monitoring and surveillance of its programme countries. Syriza also promised to balance the budget, while simultaneously alleviating the negative effects of austerity. In simple, brutally financial terms, these sets of objectives are mutually exclusive.

With contradictory objectives in place, perhaps the only certainty coming on foot of the latest Greek elections is that political risks in Greece and the euro area have amplified once again and are unlikely to abate any time soon. Expect the Greek Crisis 4.0 to be rolling in any time in the next 6 months.

So in the nutshell, don't expect much of fireworks now - we all know two deadlines faced by Greece over the next month:

These are the markers for the markets to worry about and these are the timings that will start revealing to us more information about Syriza policy stance too. Until then, ride the wave of QE and sip that kool-aid lads... too cool to worry about that history lesson, for now...

26/1/15: If not Liquidity, then Debt: ECB's QE competitive limping


I have written before, in the context of QE announcement by the ECB last week (see here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/01/2312015-liquidity-fix-for-euro-what-for.html) that the real problem with the euro area monetary and economic aggregates has nothing to do with liquidity supply (the favourite excuse for doing all sorts of things that the ECB keeps throwing around), but rather with the debt overhang.

In plain, simple terms, there is too much debt on the books. Too much Government debt, too much private debt. The ECB cannot even begin directly addressing the unspoken crisis of the private debt. But it is certainly trying to 'extend-and-pretend' public and private debt away. This is what the fabled EUR1.14 trillion (or so) QE announcement is about: take debt surplus off the markets so more debt can be issued. More debt to add to already too much debt, therefore, is the only solution the ECB can devise.

While EUR1.14 trillion might sound impressive, in reality, once we abstract away from the fake problem of liquidity, is nothing to brag about. Take a look at the following chart:


Forget the question in red, for the moment, and take in the numbers. Remember that 60% debt/GDP ratio is the long-term 'sustainability' target set by the Fiscal Compact - in other words, the long-term debt overhang, in EU-own terminology, is the bit of debt above that bound. By latest IMF stats, there is, roughly EUR3.5 trillion of debt overhang across the euro area 18, just for Government debt alone. You can safely raise that figure by a factor of 3 to take into the account private sector debts.

Which puts the ECB QE into perspective: at the very best, when fully deployed, it will cover just 1/3rd of the public debt overhang alone (actually it won't do anything of the sorts, as it includes private and public debt purchases). Across the entire euro area economy (public and private debt combined) we are talking about the 'big bazooka' that aims to repackage and extend-and-pretend about 10-11% of the total debt overhang. Not write this off, not cancel, not burn... but shove into different holding cell and pretend it's gone, eased, resolved.

This realisation should thus bring us around to that red triangle and the existential question: What for? Between end of 2007 and start of 2015, the euro area has managed to hike its debt pile by some EUR3 trillion, after we control for GDP effects. Given that this debt expansion did not produce any real growth anywhere, one might ask a simple question: why would ECB QE produce the effect that is any different?

The answer, on a post card, to the EU Commission, please.

Sunday, January 25, 2015

25/1/15: Russian Current Account Improved in 2014

I have remarked on a number of occasions just how rapidly Russian current account can adjust to an external shock. This time around, the adjustment is via decreasing imports to compensate for both - the ruble devaluation effects and the sanctions/counter-sanctions effects, as well as the traditional economic recession pressures.


Based on the preliminary data from the Central Bank of Russia, Russian exports of goods and services fell 19% in dollar terms in Q4 2014 and were down 12% in euros. Russian imports of goods and services fell at the same rate.

Full year 2014 preliminary estimates show exports down 6% and imports down 9% in both dollar and euro terms. In 2013, exports of goods and services run USD593 billion or 28.3% of GDP. In 2014 exports of goods and services slipped to USD560 billion, but stood at 29.4% of GDP (these are dollar-denominated GDP figures). Trade balance in goods stood at USD182 billion (8.7% of GDP) in 2013 and this rose to USD186 billion (9.7% of GDP) in 2014. Trade balance in services also improved, from a deficit of USD55 billion in 2013 (-2.8% of GDP) to a deficit of USD55 billion (-2.9% of GDP) in 2014.

While goods imports contracted 10% over full year 2014, in Q4 2014, goods exports fell a whooping 19% in USD terms. Q4 2014 imports of tourism services (travel by Russian residents abroad) fell 20% compered to Q4 2013.


On the Financial Account side, State accounts excluding the Central Bank were in a healthy surplus of USD30 billion for the full year 2014, up on USD 5 billion in 2013.

Private sector accounts, however, were abysmal. Total Private Sector financial accounts finished 2014 with a deficit of USD150 billion (-7.9% of GDP) which is far worse than USD62 billion (-3.0% of GDP) in 2013. The USD150 billion figures is what we usually attribute to capital flight from Russia. This figure consisted of USD50 billion of financial deficit in the banking sector (against USD7 billion deficit in 2013) and USD 100 billion deficit on ex-banks private sector accounts (against USD55 billion in 2013).

Good news is: fictitious transactions (basically a shell-game with company money involving foreign offshore holding firms) shrunk dramatically in 2014: falling from the net outflow of capital via such transactions of USD27 billion in 2013 to net outflow USD 9 billion in 2014.

Another interesting note: as noted by me on numerous occasions, part of capital outflows was down to aggressive dollarisation of the economy at the end of 2014, which saw build up of private sector forex cash deposits held in Russia. Based on CBR data, in 2013 such deposits shrunk by USD0.3 billion, while in 2014 they rose by USD34 billion (USD18 billion of that increase took place in Q4 2014 alone).


Overall, Russian current account surplus improved significantly in 2014 despite all the cash outflows and decline in exports. In 2013, Russian current account surplus stood at USD34 billion (1.6% of GDP), and in 2014 this increased to USD57 billion (3.0% of GDP), with USD11 billion of that accruing in Q4 2014 alone.

We can expect more dramatic declines in both, oil and gas revenues on exports side and imports of goods and services in 2015. One key parameter to look at is exports and imports of services. The reasons for this are simple, albeit not easy to gauge or forecast.

Firstly, significant share of Russian exports of services (and also some associated imports) is down to effectively Russian companies producing services using (in accounting and also contracting sense) off-shore affiliates. We might see some of this activity being on-shored in Russia, with resulting decrease in imports and a rise in exports.

Secondly, Russian enterprises and investors are likely to cut back on imports of key financial, ICT and business consultancy services as the Russian economy suffers from downward pressures on investment and growth.

25/1/15: Swiss Out, Danes In: Pegs and Euro Mess


My comment from earlier this week on SNB and Denmark's Nationalbank pegs decisions (Expresso, January 24, 2015 page 09):

There are two truths about currency pegs.

The first one is that no Central Bank is an island. In other words, all pegs are temporary in their duration and costly in their nature, while held.

The second one is that exiting a peg with underlying conditions similar to those when the peg was set in the first place can never be a smooth and risk-free decision. Disruptive nature of such an exit is only highlighted by the necessity of the peg in the first place.


Swiss CHF to Euro peg is emblematic of the above two facts. The peg, de facto maintained from the summer 2011 (but officially launched on September 6, 2011) at the height of the euro area crisis, was designed to remove pressures on the Swiss Franc arising from the rapid acceleration of capital inflows from the euro area to Switzerland. The resulting inflows pushed values of CHF well beyond the sustainable bounds, threatening to derail the Swiss economy, heavily dependent (especially in 2011) on exports.

The cost of the SNB peg to the Swiss economy was manageable, but accelerating in recent months. As part of the peg, SNB printed CHF to purchase surplus euros. Bought euros were accumulated on the SNB balance sheet. recent devaluation of the euro against the US dollar, and expected future devalutations of the euro (on foot of upcoming ECB QE measures) pushes down the real value of these forex reserves accumulated by the SNB. Exiting the peg simply realigned these values to actual currency fundamentals and crystallised the loss in one go, de facto partially sterilising the inflows.

Chart below illustrates accumulation of Forex reserves by SNB from the peg introduction on September 6, 2011.



The disruption caused by the SNB exiting the peg has been significant. Some 46 percent of all Polish mortgages have been issued in CHF. Hundreds of thousands of loans in other Eastern European countries were tied to CHF as well. The cost of funding these loans rose by between 15 and 20 percent overnight, causing some panicked reactions from some Eastern European Central Banks. Beyond this, home-felt impact of SNB move has been less pronounced in the short run. However. in the longer term, stronger Swiss Franc is going to put severe pressure on Swiss exports and will likely result in deterioration in the overall balance of payments. Swiss economy is still heavily reliant on Forex valuations to support its global trade. Current world trade conditions - with the likes of Baltic Dry Index at 753,000 close to crisis period lows, and IMF projections for ever lower rates of global trade growth in 2015-2016 - all signalling serious pressures on Swiss exporters.


Denmark's decision to introduce a Krone/Euro peg this week is likely to fare about as well as that of the Swiss decision in 2011. Just as the Swiss, Danish regulators also set negative deposit rates to further reduce pressure on Krone from Euro inflows. However, the pressure on the Krone is rising not due to the crisis-related capital flight (as was the case with Switzerland in 2011-2013), but due to currency hedging in anticipation of the ECB quantitative easing move expected to be announced this week.

Danish peg is critically different from the SNB previous attempt to peg CHF. The reason for this is that Krone has a long-term link to the Euro and in effect current peg is simply a form of repricing this link. And, unlike CHF (which accounts for roughly 5.2 percent of global currency trading volumes), Krone is a relative minnow in the forex markets (its share of the global currency trade is only 0.8 percent).

The two factors make Krone peg more credible and less costly to defend over the medium term. But none of these factors help to alleviate the problem of currency valuations for Danish exporters, who will see their markets for exports more contested now that the Krone is appreciating against the Euro.



The reserves dynamics preceding the Denmark's peg introduction and the SNB peg announcement in September 2011 are similar: both currencies have sustained heavy 'buy' pressures and both pressures were driven by the crises in the euro area. SNB introduced the peg at relatively benign levels of forex reserves accumulation back in 2011 which, at the time, were nonetheless consistent with crisis-period peak levels. Denmark's Nationalbank's peg introduction also takes place close to crisis period peak of reserves accumulation and the question to be asked is: how much pain on DKK can Denmark take in this environment. 

Saturday, January 24, 2015

24/1/2015: CB of Russia Recent Interventions


In 2014, Central Bank of Russia spent USD83 billion on currency interventions, against total draw down of USD124 billion in foreign reserves held. At the end of 2014, CBR’s foreign currency reserves, including gold, were USD386 billion, down from USD510 billion at the beginning of 2014. As of December figures, Russian foreign exchange reserves rank 6th largest in the world, providing a cover for more than 15 months of imports at current running rate.

In first half of January, CBR spend some USD2.2 billion on currency markets interventions, issued foreign exchange repos for the amount of USD8.3 billion, with most of this (USD5.4 billion) in 28- and 365-day maturities.

24/1/2015: ECB v Fed: Why Frankfurt's QE is a Damp Squib


A neat chart from Pictet showing balancesheet comparatives for ECB and the Fed.


Setting timing issues aside (which are non-trivial), the quantum of ECB balancesheet expansion planned is still too weak and it is too weak relative to previous peak. The Fed balancesheet expansion followed three stages:

  • Stage 1 in 2008-2009 was sharp and more significant than for ECB.
  • Stage 2 covered Q1 2009-Q2 2011
  • Stage 3 covered Q1 2013 through Q3 2014.
  • There were no major policy reversals, only moderation, over the entire QE period.
In contrast, ECB balancesheet expansions were weaker throughout the period, and were subject to a major reversal in Q1 2013 - Q3 2014 period.

In effect, even with this week's boisterous announcement, the ECB remains a major laggard in therms of monetary policy activism, compared to all other major Central Banks that faced comparable risks.

Now, to timing. ECB is a de facto your family doctor who routinely forgets to apply medicine in time and under-medicates the patient after the fact. Frankfurt slept through the Q1 2009-H1 2011 and went into a delirious denial stage in Q1 2013-H1 2014. The inaction during two key periods meant that nascent recovery of 2010 was killed off and 2013-2014 can be written off as lost years. The lags in policy reaction by the ECB are monumental: as the Fed ramped up monetary expansion in Q4 2012, the ECB will be presiding over a de facto monetary (balancesheet) stagnation, if not contraction, until March 2015. Which means that during the critical years of deleveraging - of banks and the real economy - debt reductions in the European economy were neither supported by the institutions (bankruptcy and insolvency resolution regimes), nor facilitated by the monetary policy. Instead, monetary policy simple delayed deleveraging by lowering the interest rates, without providing funding necessary for the writedowns. This is diametrically different to the US, where deleveraging was supported by both monetary policy and institutional set ups.

Meanwhile, Germans are now at loggerheads with the rest of Europe, whinging about the 'abandoned prudence' of the ECB. Best summary of why they are dead wrong is here: http://www.forexlive.com/blog/2015/01/23/eight-reasons-german-complaints-about-qe-and-the-eurozone-are-laughable/

The circus of the euro area pretence at economic (and other) policymaking rolls on. Next stop, as always, Greece...

Friday, January 23, 2015

23/1/2015: Davos 2*&%: I am not a fan... Why?


Narcissistic, self-obsessed, publicity equivalent of the Maybach Exelero and about as useful for its stated purposes too, Davos World Economic Forum is an media fest ritual that probably costs the world more trees (chopped for all the glossy publications it generates) than anything else on the global events calendar every year.

Corporates and their media love it. Journalists are awe struck by its trappings - from hotel rooms prices, to cost of basic meals, to who they bump into in the corridors. Big wigs of global business have to have it, because, apparently, they have trouble (with all their private jets and first class travel seats) meeting each other in real life in New York or London or Singapore, where they live. A handful of select, usually consensus-circling economists and pundits provide a backdrop of 'intellectualism' to the gathering. You can't tell sell-side from buy-side because it is all sell-side - sell your own image.

Yes, I am not a fan. And to explain why, let me give you this link via @CapX by @DanHannanMEP which explains the entire Davos event in its headline: http://www.capx.co/davos-is-a-corporatist-racket/.

H/T to @msgbi for highlighting the article.