17/12/2012: Don't write manufacturing off

Here is an amazing (yep, amazing) report from McKinsey on the future of Manufacturing: http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/mgi/research/productivity_competitiveness_and_growth/the_future_of_manufacturing

And here is a really fascinating eye-opening chart from it:

What are the interesting bits in the above?

1. The US retained its position as number 1 manufacturing source in the world (note - with recent emergence of on-shoring trend for US manufacturing, this is likely to stay)
2. China moved - predictably - quite fast in the league table
3. India's performance has been relatively weaker than that of China - not surprising 
4. Russia - in 2000 only 21st in the world is now 11th
5. Brazil moved from 15th in 2000 to 6th
6. Indonesia moved from 20th in 2000 to 13th
7. Germany dropped from the 2nd in 1980 to the 4th
8. Italy rose from the 6th in 1980 to the 5th
9. France dropped from the 5th to the 8th
10. In 1980 and 1990, EU had 5 countries in the top 10, in 2000 - 4 countries and the same number in 2010 - a rate of relative decline
11. Big loser is Canada, rising from 10th in 1980 to 9th in 2000 and falling to 15th in 2010.

Here is another revealing chart, mapping 5 broad categories of manufacturing sectors based on specific inputs intensities:

Let's give it a thought. Ireland is a location most suited for R&D intensive and labour (skilled) intensive sectors, as we have neither sufficient capital, nor access to cheap energy (sorry, the renewables bugs - these are not cheap and not abundant). We also want to aim for high trade intensity and high value density. Which means priority sectors for us should be:

• Motor vehicles, trailers, parts
• Other transport equipment
• Electrical machinery
• Machinery, equipment, appliances

Tier 2 priorities (mostly driven by imported capital due to their high capital intensities) should be:

• Chemicals
• Computers and office machinery
• Semiconductors and electronics
• Medical, precision, and optical

Interestingly, and rather counter contrary to the perceived effects of the web-based economy, R&D intensive areas of the economy remain manufacturing:

These are just some of the fascinating insights. I will try blogging on the report some more in later posts.

17/12/2012: More spin on Promo Notes 2012

Here's the latest saga on Anglo Promo Notes 'non-payment' in March 2012:

This relates to the past here on the topic.

The point raised, allegedly, by the Department of Finance is as follows: Promo Note was 'settled' not in cash, but by issuance of a bond, so that

1. Irish Government issued a bond (which is to say borrowed money) to the IBRC
2. IBRC took the bond to the 'market' to obtain cash in exchange for it
3. Absent a 'market' for this bond, Bank of Ireland took the bond on for one year and paid the IBRC €3.06 billion (presumably, Bank of Ireland borrowed the funds to do so from the ECB using the bond as the collateral)
4. The IBRC paid down the ELA with the money.
5. ELA was written down by the required amount in 2012.

Let's re-narrate this in more simple terms:

1. Irish Government official went to a restaurant for a working lunch without having any money
2. The official, upon consuming lunch, wrote an IOU for €100 covering the bill to her lunch companion who had a credit card with him.
3. The credit card was maxed-out, so the second official called his bank and arranged for a 1-day overdraft facility from the bank to cover the bill, using as security the IOU from his lunch companion.
4. The credit card owner then used the credit card new facility and paid €100 bill.
5. The restaurant recorded payment of €100 bill.

Now, two questions:

Question 1: was the bill paid? Answer: yes. Proof: if no, then the restaurant could claim that no payment was received, so no tax is due on the proceeds from this payment. I doubt the Revenue will be so keen to allow this.

Question 2: did the original official pay the bill? Answer: it depends on which scenario will take place in 1 day: Scenario A: Original official does not intend to settle the debt (IOU) - in which case she defaults on loan from the second official and no payment by her was made under the IOU agreement. Scenario B: Original official honors her commitment, and the original IOU was a form payment.

However, Question 2 is purely academic from the standpoint of whether the lunch was paid for or not - it was paid. Full stop.

Substitute 'Promo Note' for 'lunch' and you have it. Promo note 2012 was paid. QED

16/12/2012: Europe's Social Welfare State gets German Warning

"If Europe today accounts for just over 7 per cent of the world’s population, produces around 25 per cent of global GDP and has to finance 50 per cent of global social spending, then it’s obvious that it will have to work very hard to maintain its prosperity and way of life."

Wonder what 'extremist' right-wing 'demagogue' said this? Why, Angela Merkel...

Read the full story here.

But here is some data from the OECD


Estimates of real public social spending and real GDP (Index 2007=100) and public social spending in percentage of GDP (right scale), 2007-2012

Source:

Projected public social spending as a % GDP and as a % “trend GDP” and real GDP, 1980-2012  (select countries):

Source for above: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/is-the-european-welfare-state-really-more-expensive_5kg2d2d4pbf0-en

And here is the latest OECD data (2009, published 2012):

Back in 2009, Ireland ranked 18th in the OECD in terms of private spending on Social Expenditures as % of GDP and 14th in the OECD in terms of public spending. We ranked 15th in terms of overall Social Expenditures. In comparison, Swiss spent 19.4% of their GDP, against Ireland spending 25.8%.

Setting aside Irish case, Ms Merkel has a point. EA12 average public spending is 26.8% of GDP against the OECD average of 22.1%, while private spending average is 2.4% against the OECD 2.5%. In other words, EA12 spend more publicly, less privately, on social expenditure.

16/12/2012: A Bucket of the Bad with a Pinch of the Ugly

I wanted to post this chart for some time now, but kept forgetting about it. The chart comes from RBS research on banks from November 2012 and is based on data through Q3 2012.

The interesting bits - beyond the overall apparent weakness of the European banks, as highlighted in the headline, is which banks are the weakest. Basically: Mediobanca leads, with Danske and Banco Popolare in second. Which brings us to the irony of Danske's latest marketing push for becoming a bank for the 'New Normal' (see here). Oh, the irony...

16/12/2012: Stop the nonsense on 'non-payment' of Promo Notes 2012

In recent weeks, the Irish Government has engaged in a willful and undeniable distortion of fact. Here is one example of a senior Minister on the record saying that : ""[The Government] didn't pay the promissory note this year…"
http://www.herald.ie/news/rabbitte-rules-out-31bn-payment-for-anglo-debt-3321386.html

The same was repeated today on RTE programme.

The Ministers must know that according to the official exchequer accounts, the Promissory Note due 2012 was paid in full.

In the Budget 2013 Economic and Fiscal Outlook (official document released by the Department of Finance: http://budget.gov.ie/budgets/2013/Documents/Budget%202013%20-%20Economic%20and%20Fiscal%20Outlook.pdf) contains the following references to repayment of the Promissory Note 2012:

Page C.19, explanatory note to Table 10 (reproduced above): "The 2012 IBRC Promissory Note payment was settled with a Government bond…"

In Table 10 above, 2012 item for "Promissory Note Repayment of Principal" enters -€3.1 billion, fully confirming the repayment was made.

Page C.22 Table 13 clearly identifies 2012 Promissory Notes repayment as being "Non-cash payment in 2012 of IBRC promissory note" and states in the explanatory note below the table that "In 2012 the annual promissory note payment to IBRC was made with a Government bond". The same is entered on page C.5 under the Table 1.

The details of the bond settlement scheme are here:
http://www.finance.gov.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=7195

ECB position on what transpired vis the Promo Notes in March 2012 is outlined here: http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2012/html/is120404.en.html quoting from Mario Draghi's responses to press query regarding the note payment (emphasis mine):
"we take note of the scheduled end-March redemption of the promissory notes and a subsequent reduction in Emergency Liquidity Assistance provided by the Central Bank of Ireland. We expect that the future redemptions will be met according to the schedule to which the government has committed itself."

The above was confirmed less than a week later: Few days after repayment of the March 2012 note, Joerg Asmussen, a member of the ECB's executive board, was speaking in Dublin where he "reiterated the ECB's view that Ireland must continue to repay the Anglo Irish Bank promissory note". Asmussen clearly did not believe that Ireland did not pay 2012 installment on the notes.
Soruce: http://www.rte.ie/news/2012/0411/ecb-official-warns-irish-banks-on-debt.html


The transaction of 'non-payment of cash payment' involved Irish State issuing a €3.06bn bond that was funded by Nama for the period of time it took Bank of Ireland to deliver approval by shareholders. Thereafter, the bond was transferred to the Bank of Ireland for 1 year. Which means that comes April 2013, Irish Government must have some sort of an agreement in place as to what to do with this bond. Either the Bank of Ireland agrees to hold it longer, or the bond has to be sold to another holder.

Here is NTMA Issuance Circular for that bond: http://www.ntma.ie/erratum-2015-bond-offering-circular/

Now, note: the coupon on that bond is 4.5%, far less than 5.5% issued in August 2012, after significant improvements in Irish secondary markets bond yields, so 4.5% Promo Notes Bond is a 'better' deal than ordinary bonds. Which means that Bank of Ireland was buying a dodo. Of course, Nama effectively backstopped Bank of Ireland, which simply borrowed money from the ECB to fund the bond.

All of this stuff I explained back in April 2012. But here's a bit worth repeating: in 2012 Promo Notes carried no interest (the last year of a two years holiday), while in 2012 the state paid 4.5% on 3,629.92 million bond. Thus, the cost to the taxpayers of Minister Noonan's 'non-payment' was €163.35 million annualized.

Which means that were Minister Noonan to repeat the exercise comes March 2013, he will be increasing the interest bill on Promo Notes by the above amount on top of the already hefty €1.9 billion one scheduled for 2013.

14/12/2012: Irish external trade in goods: October 2012

Irish trade in goods stats are out for October 2012 and here are the core highlights (aal seasonally adjusted):

• Imports of goods in value have fallen from €4.482bn in September to €4.188 billion in October, a m/m decline of €294mln (-6.56%) and y/y increase of €327mln (+8.47%). Compared to October 2010, imports are up 16.43%
• Imports were running close to historical average of €4.404bn in October, but below pre-crisis average of €4.673bn and ahead of crisis-period average of €4.126bn. Year-to-date average through October was €4.109, so October imports were relatively average.
• Exports increased from €7.349bn in September to €7.468bn in October (up €119mln or +1.62%). Year on year, however, exports are up only €7 million or +0.09% and compared to October 2010 Irish exports of goods are down 1.48%.
• Year-to-date average exports are at monthly €7.687bn which means October exports were below this, although October exports were very close to the crisis period average of €7.433bn.

• Overall, the rise of €423mln in trade surplus can be attributed as follows: 71.2% of trade surplus increase came from shrinking imports, while 28.8% came from rising exports. Not exactly robust performance, especially given exports are up only 0.09% y/y.
• Trade surplus expanded by 14.4% m/m after a rather significant drop off in September. However, october trade surplus at €3.28bn was still the second lowest reading in 7 months.
• Year on year, trade surplus in October actually fell €321 million or -8.91% and compared to October 2010 trade suplus is down 17.65%. These are massive declines and worrying.
• Trade surplus in October 2012 stood ahead of the historical average of €2.903bn and ahead of pre-crisis average of €2.513bn - both heavily influenced by much more robust domestic consumption in years before the crisis. Crisis period average of €3.307 is slightly ahead of October 2012 reading. However, average monthly trade surplus for 12 months through October was more robust (€3.578bn) than that for October 2012.

Here are some charts on the relationship between exports, imports and trade balance:

Accordingly with the above, imports intensity of exports rose slightly in October on foot of a steep fall-off in imports, rising 8.75% m/m. However, the metric of 'productivity' of irish exporting sectors is now down 7.72% y/y and down 15.38% on October 2010. During crisis period, Exports/Imports ratio averages 182.4%, while YTD the ratio averages 188.0%. In October 2012 it stood at 178.3% well behind both longer term trend metrics.

Lastly, the above relatively poor performance of exporting sector came amidst two forces, both representing adverse headwinds for Irish exporters:

1. Global trade slowdown
2. Term of trade deterioration.

October 2012 on October 2011, saw decreases in the value of exports of Chemicals and related
products - down -€253 million (or -6%), and a decrease of €513 million in Organic chemicals, "partially offset by an increase of €208 million in Medical and pharmaceutical products" per CSO. Further per CSO: "The value of exports increased for Miscellaneous manufactured articles (up €91 million), Mineral fuels (up €54 million), Machinery and transport equipment (up €47 million) and Food and live animals (up €39 million)... The larger increases were for imports of Food and live
animals (up €116 million), Mineral fuels (up €96 million) and Machinery and transport equipment (up €92 million)."

So to summarize: headline rise in tarde surplus is driven more than 3/4 by drop off in imports, with exports performing poorly on y/y basis and m/m basis. However, we have to be cognizant of the adverse headwinds experienced by irish exporters in global markets and by the continued effect of pharma patent cliff.

13/12/2012: Some thoughts on gold

Tonight's Prime Time program covering gold is undoubtedly one of the rare occurrences that this asset class got some hearing in the Irish mainstream media. Which is the good news.

Not to dispute the issues as raised in the program, here are some of my own thoughts on the question of whether or not gold prices today represent a bubble.

A simple answer to this question, in my opinion, is that we do not know.

Short-term and even medium-term pricing of gold (in any currency) is driven by a number of factors (fundamentals), all of which are hard to capture, model and value.

For example, currency valuations forward suggest that gold is unlikely to experience a sharp and protracted correction in the US dollar terms, if you believe the Fed QE4 is likely to persist over time. In euro terms, potential for devaluation of the euro implies pressure to the upside to the gold price. Yen price is also likely to play longer-term continued devaluation scenario. Things are less certain when it comes to Pound Sterling price… and so on. Here's just one discussion on one of the above effects: http://soberlook.com/2012/12/precious-metals-hit-by-evans-rule.html?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter

Another example: drivers for prices on demand side that include rather volatile regulatory conditions in the major gold demand growth markets, such as China and India.

In short, things are much more brutally complex than the PrimeTime programme allowed for.

The reason for this complexity is that gold acts simultaneously (as an asset) in several structural ways:
1) as a simple bi-lateral long term hedge for inflation, equities and currency valuations
2) as a medium term (albeit not entirely persistent) hedge for some asset classes (e.g. equities)
3) as a short term speculative instrument to some investors
4) as a backing for numerous and large volume ETFs
5) as a benchmark backing for numerous and relatively large volume synthetic ETFs
6) as a store of value
7) as a risk management tool for complex structured portfolios
8) as a bilateral safe haven against equities and bonds, political and economic risks, systemic financial markets risks, etc.

These relationships can be unstable over time, can require long time horizon for materialization and are 'paid for' by assuming higher short term volatility in the price of gold. That's right - while PrimeTime contributors spoke about gold price 'correcting' or 'bubble bursting' none seemed to be aware of the fact that if you want to get something you want (hedging and safe have properties being desirable to investors), you should be prepared to pay for it (price volatility seems to be a good candidate for such cost of purchase).

No matter what happens in the short- to medium- term, gold is likely to remain the sole vehicle for the store of value and risk hedging over the long-term. It did so over the last 5,000 years or so and it will most likely continue doing so in years ahead. This property of gold is well established in the literature and is hardly controversial.

There is one caveat to it - due to instrumentation via ETFs, there are some early (and for now econometrically fragile) signs emerging that some of gold's hedging properties might be changing. More research on this is needed, however and only time will tell, so in line with PrimeTime, let's stay on the RTE side of Complexity Avoidance Bias on that one.

There is an excellent summary on what we know and what we don't know about gold by Brian M. Lucey available here:  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1908650 .

Last year I gave a presentation at the Science Gallery on some properties of gold, which is posted here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2011/08/20082011-yielding-to-fear-or-managing.html .

Not to make this post a lengthy one, let me summarize my own view of gold as an asset class:

1. In my view, gold can be a long-term asset protection from the risk of expropriation, inflation, devaluations, and tail risks on political and economic newsflow side etc.
2. To me, gold is not a speculative (capital gains) instrument for the short-term and it should not be acquired in a concentrated fashion - buying in one go large allocations. Gold should be bought over longer period to allow for price-averaging to reduce exposure to gold price volatility.
3. Gold allocation should be relatively stable as a proportion of invested wealth - different rules apply, but 5-10% is a reasonable one in my view.
4. Of course, any investment portfolio (with or without gold) should strive to deliver maximum diversification across asset classes, assets geographies etc.

Disclosure: I have no financial interest in or any commercial engagement with any organization engaged in selling gold. Until December 1, 2012 I used to be a non-executive member of the investment committee of GoldCore Ltd and was never engaged on their behalf in any marketing or provision of advice to any of their current or potential clients.

13/12/2012: Italy & Spain escape bond markets scrutiny... for now

Two bond auctions for the largest peripheral euro area countries showed the sign of markets still believing the ECB promises of OMT 'some time soon' and at significant support levels.

Spain aimed to sell up to €2 billion worth of above-OMT dated paper and in the end managed to sell slightly ahead of target: €2.02 billion in 3-, 5- and 28-year bonds. Recalling that OMT is promising to purchase bonds with maturities up to 3 years, the result was pretty strong.

Average yields were 3.358% for 3-year paper (compared to 3.39% back on December 5th), 4-year yield was 4.2% down on 4.766% back at October 4, and 28-year bond yield was 5.893%.

Bid-cover ratios were 4.81 for 3-year (vs 2 on December 5), 3.13 for 5-year (vs 2.47 on October 4) and 2.09 for the 2040 bonds. This was the first time near-30-year bonds were offered since May 2011.

Spain is now out of the woods in terms of funding for 2012 - it has raised this year's requirement back a month ago - but the country will need to raise some €90.4 billion in 2013.


Italy also went to the well today, placing €4.22 billion worth of bonds - below the maximum target €4.25 billion. The bonds placed were: €3.5 billion of 3-year paper at 2.5% (down on 2.64% in November 14 auction, marking the lowest yield since October 28, 2010 auction) and €729 million of 14-year paper at 4.75% yield. Bid-cover ratios were much weaker than those for Spain: 3-year paper attracted ratio of 1.36 down on 1.5 in last month's auction.

Italy's 2013 funding requirement is expected at over €400 billion.

Thus, both Italy and Spain seemed to have benefited once again from the ECB's OMT promises. The problem is out to 2013 - with both Italy and Spain having to raise just over 1/2 of the LTROs 1&2 worth of bonds, the promise of OMT better translate into actual scaled OMT purchases, and the threat of political mess in Italy better stay out of headlines.

13/12/2012: Mortgages at Risk: Acceleration in the Trend

In the previous post (here) I detailed the trends in mortgages arrears in Ireland based on Q3 2012 data released today. Since then, I have seen some comments on the 'dynamics' of the mortgages arrears, suggesting that things are 'getting worse more slowly'.

This is simply incorrect. Here's a chart graphically showing acceleration of overall crisis since Q2 2012:

Note that data through Q3 2010 is imputed by estimating back trend from Q4 2010-Q2 2012 data reported by CBofI. Hence, the jump in orange line at Q3-Q4 2010.

13/12/2012: Irish Mortgages Arrears - Q3 2012

Q3 2012 data for Irish residential mortgages in arrears is out and here is the first summary of horrific details:

• Total number of residential mortgages in arrears more than 90 days rose from 47,627 to 49,482 between Q3 2011 and Q3 2012 - a rise of 3.89% y/y. This marks acceleration in the rate of increase in arrears 90 days + from 1.13% in Q2 2012.
• Total number of mortgages in arrears less than 90 days rose to 86,146 in Q3 2012 from 62,970 in Q3 2011 - an increase of 36.8% y/y, compared to a rise of 45.3% in Q2 2012.
• Total number of accounts in arrears (90 days and over, and under 90 days) rose from 110,597 in Q3 2011 to 135,628 in Q3 2012 - an annual rate of growth of 22.63%. In Q2 2012 the rate of increase was 25.20%.
• Total number of accounts at risk of default (currently in arrears, plus restructured and not in arrears, plus repossessed) rose to 180,314 in Q3 2012, up 6.5% q/q and up 21.95% y/y. In Q2 2012 the rate of annual increase was 20.92%.
• Overal value of mortgages at risk now stands at €31,835,683,000 up 6.0% q/q and 19.8% y/y

Charts to illustrate:

Let's make it simple:

1. Between Q3 2011 and Q3 2012, the % of loan accounts in arrears for more than 90 days rose from 8.1% or all accounts (10.8% of outstanding mortgages values) to 11.3% (15.1% of outstanding mortgages values).
2. A a year to Q3 2012, the number of mortgages at risk of default or defaulted (including mortgages in arrears, restructured and current not in arreas and repossessions) rose from 147,857 to 180,314
3. In Q3 2012, mortgages at risk accounted for 24% of all mortgages outstanding accounts and 29% of the total value of outstanding mortgages, up from 19% and 23%, respectively, in Q3 2011.

That's right - almost 1/4 of all mortgages accounts are now at risk or have defaulted, and almost 30% of the total value of outstanding mortgages is at risk.

Updated: here's the Irish Mortgage Holders Organization response to today's Arrears figures.

11/12/2012: Ireland and EU27 Construction sector activity Q3 2012

On foot of the previous post looking at Q3 2012 data for Construction and Building Sector activity in Ireland, here are some international comparatives.

Keep in mind the mental key to decoding these: per Irish Government and a host of its 'analysts', Ireland has delivered an economic turnaround sometime back in early 2012 and our economy has stabilized. We are not Greece. In fact, per claims, we are the best performing economy in the Euro area periphery.

With the above in mind, chart below shows Ireland's Building & Construction Sector performance with index normalized at 100=2005, set against the backdrop of the 'Peripheral' Euro area states:

Pretty clearly, we are 'unique' in the periphery as being so far the worst performing economy in terms of Building & Construction. Now, let's recall that in Ireland, Building & Construction are about the only conduits for household investment. Also, let's recall that household investment is usually seen as the leading indicator of cyclical turnarounds.

Now, to the full EU27 comparative:

And again, by far, Ireland is the worst performer in the above. In fact, based on 2012 data through Q3:

• Ireland's index of construction activity is currently at 20.85, down on 2011 index of 23.4 and down on pre-crisis peak of 103.6. 
• Which means that Irish activity index is now down to the absolute lowest in the EU27. Worse, our index reading is worse than Greece's (37.7 or 81% ahead of Ireland's). 
• We are 44.7% below Greece, 53.2% below Spain, 62.7% below Portugal and 73.2% below Italy.

So that 'turnaround' or in Hillary Clinton's words 'rebound', then... certainly not to be seen in Building & Construction sector.

11/12/2012: Construction Sector Activity in Ireland - Q3 2012

Horrible numbers out today for the Irish Building & Construction sector.

Per CSO: "The volume of output in building and construction was 4.2% lower in the third quarter of 2012 when compared with the preceding period. This reflects decreases of 5.3%, 2.4% and 1.9% respectively in the volume of residential building, civil engineering and non-residential building. The change in the value of production for all building and construction was -2.1%. On an annual basis, the volume of output in building and construction decreased by 10.8% in the third quarter of 2011. The value of production decreased by 8.5% in the same period."

Now some details:

• Value Index for ex-Civil Engineering work stood at 17.5 in Q3 2012 (100=2005 activity levels), down 15.5% y/y, marking 23rd consecutive quarter of declines (! give that number a thought).
• Worse, ex-Civil Engineering Value index is down 2.23% q/q, down 10.15% for Q2-Q3 2012 compared to Q4 2011-Q1 2012 6mo periods and down 14.5% for the 6 months through Q3 2012 compared to same period in 2011.
• The rate of annual decline in the index has accelerated since Q4 2011.
• Volume Index for ex-Civil engineering work fell to 15.5 in Q3 2012 from 15.9 in Q2 2012. The Index is now also down consecutive 23 quarters. The annual rate of decline continued to accelerate for the fourth quarter in a row.
• In 6 months through Q3 2012 index fell 15.82% compared to same period of 2011. Quarterly index change is -2.52%.
• Relative to peak, Value Index in ex-Civil Engineering sector is now at 15.39% and Volume Index is at 14.57%.

In Civil engineering sector things are bouncing at the bottom - a pattern that is now running solidly from Q3 2010:

• Value Index for Civil engineering slipped to 63.0 from 64.6 in Q3 2012 compared to Q2 2012, marking a decline of 2.48% q/q. However, due to massive jump in Q2 (+16.2% y/y), index is still 9.2% ahead of Q3 2011 reading. This side of the Index is likely to suffer in 2013 due to Budget measures on capital spending.
• Volume Index of Civil Engineering also fell from 57.5 in Q2 2012 to 56.1 in Q3 2012 (-2.43% q/q), although the index is up 7.9% y/y in Q3 2012 (due to a one-off substantial rise of 14.8% in Q2 2012).

Overall, based on simple averages, activity in Civil engineering remained broadly unchanged - at absolute lows - since Q3 2010, averaging between 63.3 for the Value Index and 56.3 for the Volume Index. This dynamic is simply inconsistent with any talk about economic turnaround.

Misery comparatives for the sector are self-evident when looking at residential and non-residential indices:

• Value of Residential Construction reached another historical low in Q3 2012 - hitting 8.2, down from 8.5 in Q2 2012. This means that activity by value in this sub-sector is now down 91.8% on 2005 levels or 92.8% on pre-crisis peak. The Index has been posting annual rates of decline in every quarter since Q1 2007, or 23 quarters in a row. The rate of decline (y/y) also accelerated since Q1 2012.
• Volume of Residential Construction is down from 7.6 in Q2 2012 to 7.2 in Q3 2012. Again, this implies that volume index is now down 92.8% on 2005 level and 93.0% down on pre-crisis peak. Annual rate of decline accelerate to 20% in Q3 2012, the highest rate in 4 quarters. The index has now posted 26 consecutive quarters of annual declines.
• Non-residential Construction Value Index fell from 53.5 in Q2 2012 to 52.5 in Q3 2102, with annual rate of decline accelerating to 15.5% in Q3 2012, marking third consecutive quarter of annual declines. The index is now 57.4% down on pre-crisis peak.
• Non-residential Construction Volume Index is down from 47.5 in Q2 2012 to 46.6 in Q3 2012, marking an accelerated annual rate of decrease of 16.3% in Q3. The Index is now down 58.4% on pre-crisis peak.

If anything the above dynamics clearly show that the rates of activity collapse are accelerating through Q3 2012, nto ameliorating or turning to positive growth. Both series dynamics, therefore, are consistent with worsening of economic conditions, not stabilization or a turnaround.

I will blog on European countries comparatives in the next post.