13/4/2012: Short-selling - more evidence that restriction hurt, not help financial stability

Keeping up with some old topics of interest, here is another paper studying markets efficiency within the context of short-selling bans of 2007-present. The study, titled “Price Efficiency and Short Selling” by Pedro A. C. Saffi and Kari Sigurdsson, forthcoming in Review of Financial Studies covers a unique, large set of stocks across a number of countries for the period of January 2005 - December 2008. Data is daily, covering lending and borrowing transactions in 12,621 stocks in 26 countries. The study covers more than 90% of global stocks in terms of market capitalization.

The core questions the authors attempted to answer are:

• What is the impact of short-selling constraints on financial markets?
• Do they make markets more or less efficient?

After Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy in September 2008, in the US, SEC and the UK FSA restricted the short selling of particular stocks. The emergency order enacting the short-selling restrictions in 2008 by the SEC recognized the usefulness of short-selling for market liquidity and price efficiency, but it also claimed that: “In these unusual and extraordinary circumstances, we have concluded that, to prevent substantial disruption in the securities markets, temporarily prohibiting any person from effecting a short-sale in the publicly traded securities of certain financial firms, (...), is in the public interest and for the protection of investors to maintain or restore fair and orderly securities markets. This emergency action should prevent short selling from being used to drive down the share prices of issuers even where there is no fundamental basis for a price decline other than general market conditions.” Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-58952 (September 18th, 2008). Following the US and UK, Germany banned short-selling in June 2010 for eurozone sovereign bonds and credit default swaps, claiming that short-selling “had led to excessive price shifts, which could have led to significant disadvantages for financial markets and have threatened the stability of the entire financial system.”

The study considers whether short-sale constraints affect price efficiency and characteristics of the distribution of stock returns of firms around the world. The study defines price efficiency “as the degree to which prices reflect all the available information, both in terms of speed and accuracy.”

The study finds that:

• Lending supply influences price efficiency so that “stocks with limited lending supply are associated with lower efficiency.”
• Higher level of lending supply is “associated with a greater degree of negative skewness and fewer occurrences of extreme price increases, but is not linked with extreme price decreases.” In other words, absence of restrictions on short-selling is not associated with significant presence of extreme downward pressures on stocks – something the bans on short-selling were designed to reduce.
• In the presence of short-selling restrictions, the decrease in skewness is “due to less frequent extreme positive returns, in line with the view that arbitrageurs cannot correct overvaluation as easily when short selling constraints are tighter.” Or put differently, presence of a short-selling ban reduces volatility – if at all – via reducing upward movements in the stocks, not the downward ones.
• Limited lending supply – consistent with short-selling restrictions – “does not affect downside risk and total volatility. We actually find that less lending supply and higher loan fees are associated with greater downside risk and total volatility.” In other words, the short-selling restrictions act in exactly the opposite direction to their intended objectives.

“These findings do not support the view expressed by regulators that unrestricted shorting can destabilize prices, while simultaneously supporting the academic findings that short-sale restrictions generally make market less efficient.”   

“The negative relationship between short-sale constraints and stock price efficiency is found at a stock level all over the world, and equity lending supply is an important driver of differences in price efficiency.”

Interestingly, the findings are robust to membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, and to endogeneity concerns.

13/4/2012: Ireland's Green Economy

Wading through some old (relatively) papers, I came across the Cleantech innovation study: “Coming Clean: The Cleantech Global Innovation Index 2012”. The study ranked 38 countries across 15 indicators that relate “to the creation and commercialisation of cleantech start-ups, …measuring each [country] relative potential to produce entrepreneurial start-up companies and commercialise technology innovations over the next 10 years.”

Overall, expectedly, North America and northern Europe “emerge as the primary contributors to the development of innovative cleantech companies, though the Asia Pacific region is following closely behind.”

Top-line results:

• Denmark leads the global rankings, “with its unique combination of a supportive environment for innovative cleantech start-ups, evidence of those start-ups gaining momentum, as well as a strong track-record of companies commercialising their cleantech innovations and scaling them up to widespread market adoption, particularly in wind.”
• Scandinavian (or Nordic countries more broadly) “performed notably well, as Sweden and Finland also placed third and fourth respectively. These countries … are behind [Denmark and Israel] on their ability to scale-up entrepreneurial cleantech companies to wider commercial success. (A pattern shared by fifth place country the United States.)”
• “China and India placed 13th and 12th respectively, but stand out as having a strong potential to rise through the ranks in the coming years. While not currently creating innovative cleantech companies in great numbers relative to the size of their economies, they are already strong centres for cleantech production, and have increasingly supportive governments, large sums of private money ready to be invested, and massive domestic markets.”

 

I am not going to pass a judgment on the viability or sustainability of the cleantech activities, but it is clear that the Irish Government continued the rhetoric of prioritizing the ‘Green economy’ ideals it inherited from its predecessor. In this light, how did Ireland score in the cleantech rankings for 2012? It turns out not too bad for a Small Open Economy and that our strong performance is driven by what we are actually good at: selling stuff. Which, in my opinion, risks making this a strong positive in terms of sustainability of cleantech activity.

Per study: ‘Ireland scores especially well on general innovation drivers [e.g. policy and legacy enterprises in innovation-intensive sectors, such as services MNCs and some domestic exporters, but not specific to cleantech] and commercialised cleantech innovation [e.g. MNCs activities], but falls below average on cleantech-specific innovation drivers [e.g. policies supporting innovation in energy and green-IT and IT-for-Green]. Ireland has very strong general innovation inputs, yet lacks public R&D spending, and has only average scores for supportive government policies and access to private finance [which is surprising, given significant VC funds and incubation centres we have deployed via EI and universities system]. Ireland stands out less for emerging cleantech innovation due to its low output of environmental patents and lack of high impact cleantech start-ups. In contrast, the country scores well for commercialised cleantech innovation, with a large percentage of the population working in cleantech, and good numbers for private equity and M&A deals. Ireland falls just ahead of the neighbouring UK.”

Ireland ranks 9th in the world in the global cleantech tables and its scores, compared against peer economies, per categories, are shown below.


What is revealing, perhaps, is that globally there is only a weak positive relationship between cleantech-specific innovation and commercialized cleantech innovation and in Ireland this relationship is stronger than average. This is most likely due to the more advanced MNCs and exporting base in the Irish economy in general, whereby domestic innovation activities, including those booked by the MNCs into Ireland for tax purposes, is aligned with commercialization via exports. Worldwide, the weak relationship suggests continued non-commercial nature of much of cleantech – serving as a proxy for subsidies dependence of the industry. In which case, Ireland overall is a good stand-out again.

11/4/2012: Irish Construction Sector PMI for March

Irish construction PMI for March 2012 (published by Ulster Bank) posted a 58th consecutive monthly contraction with a reading of 46.7 against 45.8 in February 2012. In other words, construction sector activity has now been below 50.0 reading every month since June 2007.

Commercial sector activity showed accelerating decline at 47.4 in march 2012 against 49.1 in February 2012. This puts to a test some of the assertions made in recent months by sector analysts and in the media that commercial construction activity is showing a rise on the foot of robust FDI investments.


Engineering sector activity - primarily driven by public projects - was showing decline at 37.0 in march, slower rate of decrease than consistent with 35.6 reading in February. Housing sector activity remained on a relatively constant rate of decline at 42.3 in March compared to 42.4 in February.


Desperate reports of some analysts have decided to focus "positive" attention on allegedly broadly unchnaged new orders sub'index and improved business sentiment. However, actual data release stated that (emphasis and commentary mine):

• New orders were broadly unchanged in March, having declined solidly in the preceding month (thus unchanged in March means unchanged from the losses sustained previously). Some firms indicated that small contracts had been secured during the month, but others indicated that a reluctance among clients to commit to projects had prevented a rise in new orders. (If this is a net positive, I should be probably joining the Russian Ballet)
• Business sentiment was at its highest since January 2007 in March and, as such, was the strongest since the current downturn in activity began (in June 2007). Exactly 46% of respondents  predict that activity will increase over the next 12 months, with signs of improving economic conditions and a forecast rise in new orders supporting optimism. (Alas, the Ulster Bank release fails to give us any data on business sentiment sub-index. In fact, this is the only indicator missing in the charts supplied by the Markit note).

What no report that I have seen so far mentions is that, per Ulster Bank-Markit note: Construction sector "workloads remained insufficient to generate a rise in employment in the sector during March. That said, staffing levels decreased at a rate that was much weaker than seen throughout much of the current downturn." So employment continues to drop. And profit margins are also continuing to fall: "The rate of input cost inflation accelerated for the third consecutive month in March, and was the fastest since April 2011. Higher prices for fuel and other oil-related products were reported by panellists."

On the foot of this information, and presumably with an aid of some tealeafs floating in a cuppa, one respectable analyst concluded (emphasis and commentary mine): unchanged new orders and unverifiable "spike" in business sentiment "...may tentatively signal that the Irish market is approaching stabilisation, albeit at a very depressed level." Ok, then, Bolshoi School is recruiting for Junior Infants... I am off for an audition.

Live Register for March 2012 - additional trends

In the previous post on live Register headline figures, I suggested that March 2012 data paints a mixed picture of some changes that might be consistent with early improvements in the trends (although it is too early to tell) and the continuation of the overall high level of unemployment and Live Register supports demands.

In this post, let's take a look at couple sub-trends.

First, consider LR by age - all seasonally adjusted figures:

• At the end of Q1 2012 there were 360,400 individuals 25 years and older on the Live Register, down from 361,900 (-1,500 or -0.4%) mom and up marginally on 360,200 at the end of Q1 2011. This represents an improvement on February 2012 when yoy there were 3,300 more LR signees age 25+. Q1 2012 average is now 1.07% below Q4 2011 average, however, Q1 2012 average is 0.74% ahead of Q1 2011 average.
•  At the end of Q1 2012 there were 74,400 individuals age less than 25 on LR, representing a decline of 1,500 (-2.0%) on February 2012 and a drop of 8,400 on March 2011 (-10.1%). This too represents an acceleration in annual decline rate in march, compared to February when yoy decline was 8.4%. Quarter on quarter, average LR participation by under-25 year olds has fallen 4.6% and year on year it is down 9%. Much of this is, most  likely, accounted for by the younger workers' participation in various State training programmes and emigration.

Next trend to consider is for Casual and Part-time workers LR participation:

• In March 2012, there were 87,716 part-time and casual workers on LR, up 502 (+0.6%) mom and 2,561 (+3%) yoy. This is down from the February 2012 annual growth rate of 3.7%. Quarter on quarter, March 2012 numbers are up 2.1% and year on year average Q1 2012 LR participation by this group is up 3.7%.

Live Register breakdown by nationality:

• Number of non-Irish nationals on the Live Register fell 675 mom in March 2012 (-0.9%) and it is now down 514 (-0.7%) yoy. However, monthly results conceal the reality of return of the upward (albeit relatively weak) trend in LR participation by non-nationals since September 2011 local trough.
• Number of Irish nationals on the Live Register is down 4,693 in March 2012 (to 355,974) relative to February and it is down 6,625 year on year (-1.8%)

As the result of the above changes, relative share of non-Irish nationals on the LR has risen for the third moth in a row, reaching 18% in march 2012. This is the highest reading since April 2009.

5/4/2012: Live Register for March 2012 - headline figures

Live Register figures released yesterday provide the evidence for continued flat trend in unemployment with mild volatility to the downside. There are some mixed news coming out of data, worth highlighting - both positives and negatives.

On the neutral side: Live Register implied unemployment rate slipped to 14.3% in March from 14.4% in January and February. This marks a decline from the peak of 14.6% in November 2011. There has been little volatility in the series along the trend since the beginning of the crisis (in part due to subsequent revisions of LR to closer align with QNHS) and this means that 0.1 percentage point move mom is statistically significant. However, given future revision of the data, there is little economic significance to the change. Overall level of unemployment remains elevated. Adding to the Liver Register those who are excluded because they participate in State-sponsored training programmes (see more on this below) would have seen implied unemployment rate closer to 16.6%, instead of 14.3%.

Total number of Live Register signees, seasonally adjusted, stood at 434,800 in March 2012 against 437,800 in February 2012 and 443,100 in March 2011. As I noted before, seasonal adjustment is starting to look slightly off to me - perhaps due to changes in methodology and partially, most likely, due to change in the longer-term trend - the establishment of the relatively flat trend within a narrow band at around 430K-450K since H2 2010 that replaced robust upward trend late 2007 through H1 2009. Nonetheless, if we are to have some goods, here it is:

• Year on year March 2012 decline in LR is now at 8,300 or -1.87% and this is an improvement on February year on year decline of 3,700 or -0.84%
• Month on month March Live Register numbers declined 3,000 - the fastest pace of declines since 3,700 drop in December 2011.
• Q1 2012 average LR is 1.08% below that for Q1 2011.

The CSO also published numbers for February 2012 participation in the Government-run training programmes. Participants in these are not included in Live Register, despite the fact they clearly are in receipt of state benefits. Here, the story is not great - in terms of what I would call 'hidden' unemployment, or perhaps the things are wonderful, given at least some of those in training are getting marketable skills and might be able to transition into jobs. Let's be neutral. 

In February 2012 there were 71,393 individuals engaged in Live Register Activation Programmes of various types. This represents an increase on 62,346 in same programmes in February 2011. The CSO supplied data for similar participants from February 2008. Using rather crude means of taking average increases in 2008-2010 and reversing the data from 2008 back into 2006, chart above plots the 'estimated' (inverted commas are to highlight the fact that for 2006-2007 this data is just purely illustrative, although from 2008 it is reflective of CSO actual figures) Live Register inclusive of those in Activation Programmes.

Here's the unpleasant bit:

• While seasonally adjusted Live Register fell 8,300 in a year through March 2012, the Live Register with Activation Programme Participants rose over the same period of time by 747. In other words, more people went off the Live Register into Activation Programmes (+9,047) than went off the Live Register (-8,300) in the twelve months to March 2012.
• The above dynamic, however, is an improvement on February 2012 when Live Register declined 3,700 year on year, while Live Register with Activation Programme Participants rose 5,347.
• Same is evident in rates of change. Q1 2012 Live Register fell 1.08% yoy, while Live Register with Activation Programme Participants rose 0.85% yoy.
• Overall, Live Register with Activation Programmes Participants stood at 506,193 in March 2012 against Live Register of 434,800.

On a positive note, monthly decline in the Live Register in march was 6th largest since the beginning of the crisis:

So, as I usually say, some things to cheer about, but let's keep it real - unemployment problem is not going away. One has to keep in mind that LR benefits do run out and people drop off the LR. In addition, rampant emigration is clearly playing a factor here. Unfortunately, CSO does not provide reliable and timely data on jobs creation and destruction to make any determination as to whether the small changes in the Live Register are signifying improved labour markets trends or not.

Next post - some details on nationalities on the LR, part-time employment and other sub-trends.

3/4/2012: Sunday Times 1/4/2012 - Deep Reforms, not Exports-led Recovery, are needed

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article from 1/4/2012.

After four years of the crisis, there are four empirical regularities to be learned from Ireland’s economic performance. The first one is that the idea of internal devaluation, aka prices and wages deflation, as the only mechanism to attain debt deleveraging, is not working. The second is that the conventional hypothesis of a V-shaped recovery from the structural crisis, manifested in economic growth collapse, debt overhang and assets bust, is a false one. The third fact is that Troika confidence in our ability to meet ‘targets’ has little to do with the real economic performance. And the fourth is that exports-led recovery is a pipe dream for an economy in which exports growth is driven by FDI.

Restoring growth requires structural change that can facilitate private companies and entrepreneurs search for new catalysts for investment and consumption, jobs creation and exports.

For anyone with any capacity to comprehend economic reality, Quarterly National Accounts (QNA) results for Q4 2011, showing the second consecutive quarterly contraction in GDP and GNP, should have come as no surprise. In these very pages, months ago I stated that all real indicators – Purchasing Managers indices, retail sales, consumer and producer prices, property prices, industrial turnover figures, banking sector activity, and even our external trade statistics – point South. Yet, the Government continues to believe in Troika reports and statistical aberrations produced by superficial policy and methodological changes.

The longer-range facts about Ireland’s ‘successes’ in managing the crisis, revealed by the QNA, are outright horrifying. In real (inflation-adjusted) terms, in 2011, every sector of Irish economy remains below the pre-crisis peak levels. Agriculture, forestry and fishing is down almost 22%, Industry is down 3%, Distribution, Transport and Communications down 17%, Public Administration and Defence down 6%, Other Services (accounting for over half of our GDP) are down 8%. In Q4 2011, Personal Consumption was 12% below Q4 2007 levels, Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation was 57% down on 2007. The only positive side to Irish economic performance compared to pre-crisis levels was Exports of goods and services, which were just 1.2% ahead of Q4 2007 level.

Meanwhile, factor income outflows out of Ireland – profits transfers by the MNCs – were up 19% relative to pre-crisis levels. Despite a rise of 0.7% year on year, Irish GDP expressed in constant prices is still 9.5% below 2007 levels. Our GNP, having contracted 2.53% year on year in 2011, is down an incredible 14.3% on the peak. All in, Irish economy has already lost nine years of growth in this crisis, once inflation is controlled for.

We are now three years into an exports boom and the recovery remains wanting. Here’s why. Between 2007 and 2011 exports of goods rose €2.5 billion or just 3%, while imports of goods fell 31.3% - a decline of €19.6 billion. Over the same period, exports of services rose €5 billion, while imports of services increased €5.5 billion. All in, rising exports of goods and services accounted for just 35% of the increase in Ireland’s trade surplus. Almost two thirds of our trade surplus gains since 2007 are accounted for by collapse in imports. Taken on its own, the dramatic fall-off in imports of goods amounts to 91% of the total change in trade surplus in Ireland.

Both the Government and the Troika should be seriously concerned. Taken in combination with accelerating profits transfers out of Ireland by the MNCs, these numbers mean that Irish economy is struggling with mountains of private and public debts that exports cannot deflate.

Remember all the noises made by the external and domestic experts about Ireland’s current account surpluses being the driver of our debt sustainability? Last week, the CSO also published our balance of payments statistics for 2011. In 2010, Irish current account surplus stood at a relatively minor €761 million. In 2011, current account surplus fell to €127 million. If the entire current account surplus were to be diverted to Government debt repayments, it will take Ireland 579 years to bring our debt to GDP ratio to the Fiscal Pact bound of 60%.

The immediate lesson for Ireland is that we need serious changes in the economic fundamentals and we need them fast.

First, Ireland needs debt restructuring. We must shed banks-related debts off the households and the Exchequer. In doing this, we need drastic restructuring of the banking sector. Simultaneously, an equally dramatic reform of taxation and spending systems is required to put more incentives and resources into human capital formation and investment. Income tax hikes must be reversed, replaced by a tax on fixed and less productive capital – particularly land. All land, including agricultural. Entrepreneurship-retarding USC system must be altered into a functional unemployment insurance system.

Policy supports should shift on breaking the systemic barriers to domestic firms exporting and restructuring dysfunctional internal services markets that are holding companies back. Public procurement changes and markets reforms in core services – energy, water, transport, public administration, etc – must focus on prioritising facilitation of inward and domestic investment, entrepreneurship and jobs creation.

Delivery of health services must be separated from payment for these services, with Government providing the latter for those who cannot afford their own insurance. Private for-profit and non-profit sector should take over delivery of services. Exports-focused private innovation, such as for example International Health Services Centre proposal for remote medicine and ICT-related R&D, should be prioritized.

In education, we need a system of competing universities, colleges and secondary education providers. A combination of open tuition fees plus merit and needs-based grants for domestic students will help. We should incentivise US universities to locate their European campuses here, and shift more of the revenue generation in the third level onto exports. In the secondary education, we need vouchers that will encourage schools competition for students. In post-tertiary education we need to incentivise MNCs to develop their own corporate training programmes and services here.

This will simultaneously expand our skills-intensive exports and provide for better linkages between formal education and, sectoral and business training – something the current system is incapable of delivering.

One core metric we have been sliding on is sector-specific skills. This fact is best illustrated by what is defined as internationally traded services sector, but more broadly incorporates ICT services, creative industries and associated support services.

Eurostat survey of computer skills in the EU27 published this week, ranked Ireland tenth in the EU in terms of the percentage of computing graduates amongst all tertiary graduates. Both, amongst the 16-24 years olds and across the entire adult population we score below the average for the old Euro Area member states in all sub-categories of computer literacy. Only 13% of Irish 16-24 year olds have ever written a computer programme – against 21% Euro area average. Over all survey criteria, taking in the data for 16-24 year old age group, Ireland ranks fourth from the bottom just ahead of Romania, Bulgaria and Italy in terms of our ICT-related skills.

Not surprisingly, at last week’s Digital Ireland Forum 2012 the two core complaints of the new media and ICT services sector leaders were: lack of skills training domestically and draconian restrictions placed on companies ability to import key skills from abroad.

The Irish economy and our society are screaming for real change, not compliance with Troika targets and ego-stoking back-slapping ministerial foreign trips.

Box-out:

On the foot of my last week’s questions concerning the role of securitizations and covered bonds issuance by the Irish banks in restricting banks’ ability to control the loans assets they hold on their balancesheets, this week’s move by Moody’s Investors Services to downgrade the ratings of RMBS (Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities) notes issued by two of the largest securities pools in the country come as an additional warning. On March 26^th, Moody’s reduced ratings on RMBS notes issued by Emerald Mortgages and Kildare Securities on the back of “continued rapid deterioration of the transactions, Moody’s outlook for Irish RMBS sector; and credit quality of key parties to the transactions [re: Irish banks] as well as structural features in place such as amount of available credit enhancement.” The last bit of this statement directly references the concerns with over-collateralization raised in my last week’s note. Although Moody’s do not highlight explicitly the issue of declining pools of collateral further available to shore up security of the asset pools used to back RMBS notes, the language of the note is crystal clear – Irish banks are at risk of running out of assets that can be pledged as collateral. This, of course, perfectly correlates with the lack of suitable collateral for LTRO-2 borrowings from the ECB by the Irish banks, other than the Bank of Ireland last month. As rated by Moody’s, half of the covered RMBS notes were downgraded to ‘very high credit risk’ or below and all the rest, excluding just one, were deemed to deteriorate to ‘high credit risk’ status. Surprisingly, the Central Bank’s Macro-Financial Review published this week makes no mention of either the RMBS, covered bonds or the impact of securitization vehicles on banks’ balance sheets. See no evil, hear no evil?

2/4/2012: Q1 2012 US Mint Gold coins sales

Time to update the data for Q1 2012 US Mint gold coins sales - something I have been doing as a sort of an ongoing project.

As before, there is much volatility sloshing around, and as before, there is less drama when one takes a closer look at the data.

Q1 2012 volume of sales (oz) of US Mint coins fell 29.7% year on year, and 22.3% on 2010. The demand is also down 38.5% on 2009. Total volume of sales stood at 210,500 oz in Q1 2012, 17% below the average demand for Q1 over 2008-2011 period, but much stronger (+89%) on pre-crisis average for 2000-2007.

Much of the downside to the demand was driven by February sales, which run 21,000 oz against March sales of 62,500 oz.

Chart below illustrates:

Note that stabilization of the price trend along the flat line above US$1,660/oz since H2 2011 is not associated with establishment of a similarly flat trend for volume of US Mint sales. More on this below, but in basic terms this confirms that the demand for gold coins has little to do with the price in general. In other words, no hysteria and no bubble here. Something other than price movements drives demand for coins. 

It is worth noting, that, as consistent with the above observations 6mo MA for volume demand is now at 95,083 oz which is below the March demand of 99,500. Again, no drama - rather mean reversion in the short run.

On the side of coinage sold, demand for coins fell 20.6% in Q1 2012 compared to Q1 2011, but it up 41.3% on Q1 2010 and 12.0% on Q1 2009. Total demand was 383,000 coins in Q1 2012 of which 256,500 came in January. Compared to this, 2000-2007 Q1 average is 216,929 and 2008-present Q1 average is 313,000. So current first quarter is well ahead of the historical averages, but on a moderate side compared to 2011.

 Looking at the two charts above, it is clear that while volume demand is following a pronounced down-sloping trend, coinage demand is relatively flat. Which is consistent with a decrease in average gold content per coin sold. In Q1 2012, average oz/coin sold fell to 0.63 from 0.82 average for Q1 2008-2011. Average weight per coin is down 0.1% in Q1 2012 year on year, and down 37% on Q1 2010 and Q1 2009 (in both of these years, average oz/coin content of US Mint coins sold was 1.0). However, this decline has itself been mean-reverting as the chart below clearly shows.

One point to be made in addition to the above is the increased volatility in the series since the mid-2007 through 2010 that is now abating since the beginning of 2011. This reinforces the general historical trend established since 1987.

As mentioned above, correlations between price and volume of gold demanded (via US Mint coinage sales) are now running consistently below the historical trend for some time - primarily since H2 2010. This continues today. The 12mo rolling correlation is negative on-average since July 2010 and this remains the case for Q1 2012. However, Q1 2012 negative correlation is moderate - averaging just -0.05, which is statistically indistinguishable from the Q1 2011 (+0.1) and more moderate than -0.4 correlation for Q1 2010. The average for 12mo rolling correlations for Q1 period over 2000-2007 was +0.18 and during the crisis period it fell to +0.03. With standard deviation of 0.36 none of these correlations suggest any dramatic departures in price-demand relationship from a stable long-term zero correlation trend. Chart below illustrates:

The point that the above adata suggests is best glimpsed by directly relating the levels and the rates of change in gold price and the overall demand for gold via US Mint coins. Both exercises are illustrated below:

And guess what: historically - that is since 1987 - gold price has virtually nothing to do with demand for US Mint coins (in terms of volume of gold sold via coins) neither in terms of levels of price effect on levels of demand for gold, nor in terms of rate of change in price effect on rates of change in demand.

Which means that at least in the case of the US Mint sales, there is no hype, and no madness. What there is instead, is a rather volatile demand with gentle upward slope imposed against a robustly positive exponential relationship in gold price:

The fact that in recent months demand for gold has been oscillating around the historic trend (as opposed to resting above that trend in August 2008-August 2011 period) is the good news - the current levels of demand are historically sustainable, trend reversion-consistent and show neither hype, nor panic buying.

As I have noted in January post (here): "Welcome back to ‘normalcy’ in US Mint sales." Yep, still holds.




Disclaimer:

1) I am a non-executive member of the GoldCore Investment Committee
2) I am a Director and Head of Research with St.Columbanus AG, where we do not invest in any specific individual commodity
3) I am long gold in fixed amount over at least the last 5 years with my allocation being extremely moderate. I hold no assets linked to gold mining or processing companies.
4) I have done and am continuing doing academic work on gold as an asset class, but also on other asset classes. You can see my research on my ssrn page the link to which is provided on this blog front page.

5) Yes, you can find points (1)-(3) disclosed properly and permanently on my public profiles. 

6) I receive no compensation for anything that appears on this blog. Never did and not planning to start now either. Everything your read here is my own personal opinion and not the opinion of any of my employers, current, past or future.

2/4/2012: Impact of the middle class on economic, social and political institutions

A fascinatingly interesting study of the effects the middle class has on economic, social and political institutions.

The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 6015: "Do Middle Classes Bring Institutional Reforms?" by Norman Loayza Jamele Rigolini Gonzalo Llorente (link here - emphasis mine) "examines the link between poverty, the middle class and institutional outcomes using a new cross-country panel dataset on the distribution of income and expenditure." The data "spans 672 yearly observations across 128 countries" allowing the authors "...to gauge whether a larger middle class has a causal effect on policy and institutional outcomes in three areas:

• social policy in health and education 
• market- oriented economic structure and 
• quality of governance." 

The study finds that "when the middle class becomes larger (measured as the proportion of people earning more than US$10 a day),

• social policy on health and education becomes more progressive [expansion of share of these expenditures to GDP], and 
• the quality of governance (democratic participation and official corruption) also improves. 
• This trend does not occur at the expense of economic freedom, as a larger middle class also leads to more market-oriented economic policy on trade and finance." 

From data (econometrics) perspective: "These beneficial effects of a larger middle class appear to be more robust than the impact of lower poverty, lower inequality or higher gross domestic product per capita."

The causality of the latter effect is itself an interesting point: "That may be linked to the evolution of the middle class: they are more enlightened, more likely to take political actions and have a stronger voice. They also share preferences and values for policy and institutional reforms, as well as higher stakes in property rights and wealth accumulation."

The authors note that their results show that "the indicators of poverty and inequality are also relevant determinants for social policies, economic structure, and governance quality, but not always in the expected way or with the consistency shown by the middle class measure. For instance, a decrease in income inequality seems to produce a decline in official corruption (as possibly expected) but also a reduction in democratic participation (which may be harder to explain). Similarly, a decrease in the poverty headcount appears to induce a liberalization of international trade but also, surprisingly, a constriction of credit markets."

Fascinating stuff, in my view.

2/4/2012: Two studies on Global Financial Crisis

An interesting analysis of the International Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 from Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick, both Yale and NBER just out - see link here. Worth a read and contrasting with Taleb's excellent paper on same (earlier work than that of Gordon and Metrick) here.

2/4/2012: Banks bailouts and bonds eligibility

Two important documents relating to banks bonds, Sovereign Guarantees and the bondholders' haircuts.

First, the ECB decision of March 21 that was rumored to have been implemented by the Bundesbank last week - allowing the NCBs not to accept as collateral Government-guaranteed bank bonds from the countries currently in the EU-IMF financial assistance programmes (aka Greece, Ireland and Portugal). Here's the link. Key quote (emphasis mine):
"Acceptance of certain government-guaranteed bank bonds: On 21 March 2012 the Governing Council adopted Decision ECB/2012/4 amending Decision ECB/2011/25 on additional temporary measures relating to Eurosystem refinancing operations and eligibility of collateral. According to that Decision, National Central Banks (NCBs) are not obliged to accept as collateral for Eurosystem credit operations eligible bank bonds guaranteed by a Member State under an EU-IMF financial assistance programme, or by a Member State whose credit assessment does not comply with the Eurosystem’s benchmark for establishing its minimum requirement for high credit standards. The Decision is available on the ECB’s website."

Hat tip for the link to @OwenCallan of Danske Markets.

However, the latest information is that Bundesbank clarified that it will continue accepting all EA17 Government bonds. See link here. Confusion continues as to what Bundesbank will and will not accept.

Second, today's release by the EU Commission of the consultation paper on dealing with future banks crises and bailouts. Titled "Discussion paper on the debt write-down tool – bail-in". The paper clearly states (emphasis is mine, again):

"Rather than relying on taxpayers, a mechanism is needed to stop the contagion to other banks

and cut the possible domino effect. It should allow public authorities to spread unmanageable

losses on banks' shareholders and creditors."

The proposals advanced by the EU are not new: "In most countries, bank and non-bank companies

in financial difficulties are subject to "insolvency" proceedings. These proceedings allow either

for the reorganization of the company (which implies a reduction, agreed with the creditors, of its

debt burden) or its liquidation and allocation of the losses to the creditors, or both. In all the

cases creditors and shareholders do not get paid in full."

Per EU: "An effective resolution regime should:

• Achieve, for banks, similar results to those of normal insolvency proceedings, in terms of allocation of losses to shareholders and creditors
• Shield as much as possible any negative effect on financial stability and limit the recourse to taxpayers' money
• Ensure legal certainty, transparency and predictability as to the treatment that shareholders and creditors will receive, so as to provide clarity to investors to enable them to assess the risk associated with their investments and make informed investment decisions prior to insolvency."

There is no point at this stage to explain that in Ireland's case, NONE of the above points were delivered in the crisis resolution measures supported by the EU and actively imposed onto Ireland by the ECB.

It is, however, worth noting that the Option 1 advanced by the EU includes imposing losses on senior bondholders and that the tool kit for doing this includes debt-equity swaps. Readers of this blog would be well familiar with the fact that I supported exactly these measures.

2/4/2012: Improved Manufacturing PMI - March 2012

Manufacturing PMI for March is out and there are some nicely positive surprises.

First off - we bucked the trend on euro area manufacturing PMIs which signal contraction. Second headline - we bucked the trend within recent months for our own PMI. Third, PMIs are volatile, manufacturing PMI is even more volatile and we have to be careful reading the 'trend'.

Details, then:

• March PMI headline reading is 51.5 - in an expansion territory, but statistically within 1/2 Standard Deviation of 50.0. This marks the first increase above 50.0 reading since October 2011 and the highest reading in headline PMI since May 2011. Per NCB/Markit statement: "Although only slight, the improvement in operating conditions was the first in five months".
• 12mo MA of headline PMI is now at 50.0 - meaning that on average, manufacturing activity stood still over 12 months. 3mo MA is very close to that at 49.8, which is an improvement of sorts of previous 3mo MA of 49.1. 2011 3mo to March average is 56.1 - that was reflective of robust growth reading back then. In 2010, 3mo average to March was 49.9.
• Volatility of the series remains above pre-crisis levels - standard deviation for the series rose from 4.54 for full sample (1998-present) and 4.46 for pre-2008 period to 5.60 since 2008.

More details on the data:

• Output sub0index posted stronger reading than core PMI index, rising to 52.8 in March from 50.4 in February and marking second month of above-50 readings. March level was statistically significant relative to 50.0. 12mo MA is now at 51.1 and 3mo MA at 50.2 against previous 3mo MA of 49.9. These series generally run above the core PMI index, with 3mo through March averages in 2010 of 51.2 and in 2011 at 59.2. The sub-index also has higher volatility than core PMIs with crisis-period stdev at 6.35.
• New orders sub-index also hit statistically significant expansion reading at 52.7 in March up on 50.1 in February. 12mo MA is now at 49.8 and 3mo average at 49.9 against previous 3mo average of 49.0. 
• New Export orders sub-index rose robustly to 55.1 in march from a weak contraction level of 49.7. This is a massive gain, although the sub-index is volatile. NCB analysis suggests that the reason for the rise is due to Irish economy exposure to stronger US economy, offsetting the negative forces from the euro area recession. 12mo MA is now at solid 52.5, 3mo average through March at 51.9 a small rise on 50.2 for 3mo period average through December 2011. These readings, however, are still far behind the reading of 60.4 in 3mo through March 2011 and 57.4 for 3mo through March 2010. Volatility of new exports orders sub-index is one of the highest amongst core sub-indices at 6.97 for crisis period, up on 4.99 in pre-crisis period.

Some other sub-indices:

On the net, majority of other subcomponents continue to show weakness, but all are improving in rates of signalled contraction. Backlogs of work are down again, but at a slower rate. Post-production inventories of finished goods continue to fall, but the rate of fall is moderating. Inputs purchases expanded robustly from 48.7 in February to 53.8 in March in line with growth in orders and exports.

On tow core points of employment and profitability (both will be covered in individual posts once we have Services PMI data as well):

• Profit margins continued to shrink in Manufacturing - compounding months of deterioration, which is bad news for the sector
• Employment sub-index reached back into growth territory at 51.2, for the first time since December 2011. 12mo MA is now at 49.6 and 3mo average is 50.0. Both are an improvement, but overall employment sub-index is not exactly a great predictor of actual jobs creation. In particular, in 2011 3mo average through March stood at 53.2 and there was no jobs creation of any appreciable quantity.

So core conclusion: cautiously, this is good news. But I must stress the point that it is only 'cautiously' so because:

• Core index and sub-indices are volatile, and
• The oerall trend since around June 2011 remains relatively flat and close to statistically identical to flat-line economy at 50.0

1/4/2012: Flightless dodo - the Hunt of Chief Noonan

I am not usually prone on updating my past posts, but the Promissory Notes 'deal' announced last week by Minister Noonan just keeps on giving more and more backlash and analysis. So:

• My original post here.
• Note the updates in the above
• FT Alphaville view here which is broadly in agreement with my view and with links I posted in the original post updates.
• Interesting information coming out of ECB on Minister Noonan's claims that the 'deal' is a part of some 'broader plan' - via the Irish Times, here.

Reiterating my view:

• Promo Notes have been paid, not deferred
• Payment of Promo Notes was originally to be based on Government borrowing cash from the Troika. Under the 'deal' it has been replaced by the Government borrowing cash from BofI
• Payment of Notes under the 'deal' cost us more in new debt and increased deficit in 2012, but will decrease interest payment in 2013 compared to original arrangement. Net effect on interest cost - nearly a wash.
• The 'deal' is NOT (see ECB official statement) a part of any 'broader deal'.
• The ECB are now clearly on a defensive - which means they will be unlikely to support any further 'deals'.

Having gone out with a brave claim to spot a bald eagle soaring in the sky and get a feather for his war bonnet, Chief Noonan came back with a smudgy mud-print of a dodo, a bill for €400mln+, and a promise to go hunting again. Next stop, trading gold for glass beads... oh, they sparkle so nice.

(Obviously - an allegorical analogy. For those rare readers lacking in humor department.)

On a serious note - I find it discomforting and sad that an excellent seasoned politician and a very promising Minister for Finance has been forced into this position of defending the failure. Let's hope his luck (and progress) change in the nearest future.