Two important documents relating to banks bonds, Sovereign Guarantees and the bondholders' haircuts.
First, the ECB decision of March 21 that was rumored to have been implemented by the Bundesbank last week - allowing the NCBs not to accept as collateral Government-guaranteed bank bonds from the countries currently in the EU-IMF financial assistance programmes (aka Greece, Ireland and Portugal). Here's the link. Key quote (emphasis mine):
"Acceptance of certain government-guaranteed bank bonds: On 21 March 2012 the Governing Council adopted Decision ECB/2012/4 amending Decision ECB/2011/25 on additional temporary measures relating to Eurosystem refinancing operations and eligibility of collateral. According to that Decision, National Central Banks (NCBs) are not obliged to accept as collateral for Eurosystem credit operations eligible bank bonds guaranteed by a Member State under an EU-IMF financial assistance programme, or by a Member State whose credit assessment does not comply with the Eurosystem’s benchmark for establishing its minimum requirement for high credit standards. The Decision is available on the ECB’s website."
Hat tip for the link to @OwenCallan of Danske Markets.
However, the latest information is that Bundesbank clarified that it will continue accepting all EA17 Government bonds. See link here. Confusion continues as to what Bundesbank will and will not accept.
Second, today's release by the EU Commission of the consultation paper on dealing with future banks crises and bailouts. Titled "Discussion paper on the debt write-down tool – bail-in". The paper clearly states (emphasis is mine, again):
"Rather than relying on taxpayers, a mechanism is needed to stop the contagion to other banks
The proposals advanced by the EU are not new: "In most countries, bank and non-bank companies
There is no point at this stage to explain that in Ireland's case, NONE of the above points were delivered in the crisis resolution measures supported by the EU and actively imposed onto Ireland by the ECB.
It is, however, worth noting that the Option 1 advanced by the EU includes imposing losses on senior bondholders and that the tool kit for doing this includes debt-equity swaps. Readers of this blog would be well familiar with the fact that I supported exactly these measures.
First, the ECB decision of March 21 that was rumored to have been implemented by the Bundesbank last week - allowing the NCBs not to accept as collateral Government-guaranteed bank bonds from the countries currently in the EU-IMF financial assistance programmes (aka Greece, Ireland and Portugal). Here's the link. Key quote (emphasis mine):
"Acceptance of certain government-guaranteed bank bonds: On 21 March 2012 the Governing Council adopted Decision ECB/2012/4 amending Decision ECB/2011/25 on additional temporary measures relating to Eurosystem refinancing operations and eligibility of collateral. According to that Decision, National Central Banks (NCBs) are not obliged to accept as collateral for Eurosystem credit operations eligible bank bonds guaranteed by a Member State under an EU-IMF financial assistance programme, or by a Member State whose credit assessment does not comply with the Eurosystem’s benchmark for establishing its minimum requirement for high credit standards. The Decision is available on the ECB’s website."
Hat tip for the link to @OwenCallan of Danske Markets.
However, the latest information is that Bundesbank clarified that it will continue accepting all EA17 Government bonds. See link here. Confusion continues as to what Bundesbank will and will not accept.
Second, today's release by the EU Commission of the consultation paper on dealing with future banks crises and bailouts. Titled "Discussion paper on the debt write-down tool – bail-in". The paper clearly states (emphasis is mine, again):
"Rather than relying on taxpayers, a mechanism is needed to stop the contagion to other banks
and cut the possible domino effect. It should allow public authorities to spread unmanageable
losses on banks' shareholders and creditors."
The proposals advanced by the EU are not new: "In most countries, bank and non-bank companies
in financial difficulties are subject to "insolvency" proceedings. These proceedings allow either
for the reorganization of the company (which implies a reduction, agreed with the creditors, of its
debt burden) or its liquidation and allocation of the losses to the creditors, or both. In all the
cases creditors and shareholders do not get paid in full."
Per EU: "An effective resolution regime should:
- Achieve, for banks, similar results to those of normal insolvency proceedings, in terms of allocation of losses to shareholders and creditors
- Shield as much as possible any negative effect on financial stability and limit the recourse to taxpayers' money
- Ensure legal certainty, transparency and predictability as to the treatment that shareholders and creditors will receive, so as to provide clarity to investors to enable them to assess the risk associated with their investments and make informed investment decisions prior to insolvency."
There is no point at this stage to explain that in Ireland's case, NONE of the above points were delivered in the crisis resolution measures supported by the EU and actively imposed onto Ireland by the ECB.
It is, however, worth noting that the Option 1 advanced by the EU includes imposing losses on senior bondholders and that the tool kit for doing this includes debt-equity swaps. Readers of this blog would be well familiar with the fact that I supported exactly these measures.
