Saturday, June 28, 2014

28/6/2014: Irish Retail Sales: Q2 data to-date confirms fragile recovery


In the previous post I covered detailed analysis of Core Retail Sales data for May 2014: here. Now, a quick look at Q2 averages (for 2014 we have average over April and May) for the period from 2005 through latest.

Take a look at the chart plotting declines (as of April-May average) in retail sales activity compared to peak for Q2 data:


This data shows the following:

  1. The only two sub-categories of goods and services where retail sales indices in Value terms are in shallower decline than in Volume terms (in other words inflation is positive and feeding through to consumers) are: Automotive Fuel and Bars - in other words two sectors where prices for inputs are largely controlled/set by the state.
  2. No category has recovered pre-crisis levels of retail sales by both value and volume, while only one category (Food) recovered sales in volume, relative to pre-crisis activity.
This puts into perspective the extent to which the recovery we are experiencing so far is fragile. 

28/6/2014: Is S&P Behind the Curve on Portugal and Spain?


Euromoney Country Risk report is profiling S&P ratings on Portugal and Spain, with a comment from myself: here.

If you can't access the article, here is the article (click on each image to enlarge):






28/6/2014: Irish Retail Sales Activity: May 2014


There is a lot of hoopla about Irish retail sales stats released today by CSO. Irish and foreign media and even some analysts are quick to point to the headline numbers showing high rates of growth and some are going as far as describing Ireland's miraculous recovery. So what, really, is going on?

First of all, let's consider top level numbers: removing motor trades and fuel, Core Retail Sales:

  • In Value Index terms, things have improved, which is a positive - so far in the crisis, value of sales trended well flatter than volume of sales primarily due to deflation in the sector. This was good for consumers, but bad for businesses as profit margins shrunk and with them, employment declined too. In May 2014, value of retail sales index rose to 94.6, up 1.39% y/y. Good news for retailers. Even better news: 3mo MA through April 2014 is up 1.7% y/y and 6mo MA is up 1.4% y/y. All in, we are seeing some fragile gains here.
  • Also in Value index terms, this time around based on seasonally-adjusted data: month on month things are not so good: index is down 0.31% on April. So short-term, things are not better this time around. Not to panic, of course, as they are volatile and as trend remains up, albeit gently and unconvincingly so far (see first chart). We are bang-on on the trend now.


  • In Volume index terms, the index is under performing recent trend, but is still pointing up on average. Although m/m index is down 0.48%, year-on-year volume of sales is up 3.33%.
  • 3mo MA through May 2014 compared to 3mo MA through February 2014 is up 3.7%, stronger than Value index, implying potentially lower margins. Year on year 3mo MA is up 3.33% a notch slower than 3.36% 6mo MA on previous 6mo MA.



My Retail Sector Activity Index (RSAI) capturing simultaneously Value and Volume Indices, plus Consumer Confidence, reported by the ESRI has moderated from 111.0 in April 2014 to 110.6 in May 2014. Year on year, the RSAI is up strongly, from 101.4 back in May 2013, but on shorter-run horizon, the index is just about at the levels set in February-March 2014.



Top conclusions: All of the above are good readings, suggesting that while deflationary pressures remain a challenge, core retail sales have been improving. In previous months' posts, I noted that in my view, we are now on an upward trend in terms of Volume and at the start of a more cautious upward trend in Value terms. May data confirms this, as does the chart below showing current y/y growth compared to pre-crisis historical averages.


April 2014 reading for Volume touched just above the pre-crisis average growth rate (not the levels), this moderated back in May. Value index growth rates remain disappointingly below those recorded before the Great Recession.

In terms of levels, Value index (3mo average through May 2014) is currently 41% lower than historical peak levels and 13.8% below pre-crisis average. Volume index is 37.5% below its historical peak and 8.6% down on pre-crisis average.

Friday, June 27, 2014

27/6/2014: Eurocoin: Euro Area Growth in Q2 ahead of Q1


CEPR and Banca d'Italia released their latest Eurocoin forecast for the euro area economy today. Here are the details:

  • In May 2014, Eurocoin posted its first decline in 11 months, falling from 0.39 in April to 0.31. Still April-May 2014 forecast for GDP growth based on Eurocoin stood at 0.35% q/q, faster than any quarter since Q1 2011. 
  • The Eurocoin remained unchanged in June 2014, implying the overall average rate of growth of around 0.34%, a moderation on April-May forecast.
  • Error-adjusted forecast range for growth is between 0.17% and 0.5%.


Per Banca d'Italia: "The deterioration in business confidence was counterbalanced by the positive contribution from the improved conditions in the financial markets and the pick-up in industrial activity."

Couple of charts to illustrate:



Thursday, June 26, 2014

26/6/2014: Explaining the Gender Gap in Entrepreneurship


A new paper by Caliendo, Marco and Fossen, Frank M. and Kritikos, Alexander and Wetter, Miriam, titled "The Gender Gap in Entrepreneurship: Not Just a Matter of Personality" (May 23, 2014: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4803 http://ssrn.com/abstract=2457841) tackles a very important and highly sensitive issue of gender gap in entrepreneurship.

The authors ask "Why do entrepreneurship rates differ so markedly by gender?"

The paper uses data from a large, representative German household panel, covering 2000-2009 period, to "investigate to what extent personality traits, human capital, and the employment history influence the start-up decision and can explain the gender gap in entrepreneurship."

"In contrast to previous research the main advantage of our data set is that it contains not only information on the socio-demographic background of the respondents, but also on a broad set of personality constructs that elicit the Big Five traits and several specific personality characteristics."

Note: Big Five Factor Model of personality (McCrae and Costa, 2008) "describes the personality by the factors openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism (or, reversely, emotional stability)."

Per authors, "To the best of our knowledge information on the Big Five approach has not been used to assess the gender gap in entrepreneurship. We are the first to simultaneously analyse the effects of the Big Five factors, risk aversion, locus of control, and the ability to trust others ..., as well as of a variety of variables controlling for human capital, employment status, and other socio-demographic factors on the gender specific decision to enter self-employment."

The findings are very far-reaching and substantially in dispute with commonly held views:

  1. "Applying a decomposition analysis, we observe that the higher risk aversion among women explains a large share of the entrepreneurial gender gap."
  2. "We also find an education effect contributing to the gender difference." More specifically: "On average, working aged women in Germany are still less educated than men and are, therefore, less inclined to start a business."
  3. "Thirdly, the current employment state has a strong effect into the opposite direction: If the share of women in wage employment were as high as the male share, holding everything else constant, their entry rate into self-employment would be much smaller."
  4. "…we show that personality traits help explain the gender gap in nuanced ways. While specific characteristics, in particular risk attitudes, are able to explain a substantial amount of the gender gap, the overall influence of the Big Five personality constructs point to the opposite direction. This means that if women were endowed with the same scores in the Big Five as men, the gap would be even larger."


Overall: "the explained gap is therefore negative meaning that if women exhibited in all observable variables the same parameter values as men, the entry rate of women would be even smaller than actually observed."

26/6/2014: You Might Need a Hubble to Spot That Bubble


In my analysis yesterday (here) I argued that Dublin residential property prices are simply showing signs of reversion to trend, not 'bubble' dynamics. Since then, numerous reports in the media produced opposite conclusions, with headlines forcibly putting forward an argument for 'bubble' formation in Dublin property markets.

Over long run, sustainable property prices appreciation should track closely inflation in the economy. So far is pretty much clear. While arbitrary, starting points for trend estimation for Dublin property should start from pre-bubble period of 1999-2001. This is also pretty clear.

So let us apply Consumer Price Index-measured inflation to Dublin residential property price indices and see where the trend is against current reading. The following chart, based on annual series 2000-2013 and May 2014 for current reading illustrates this exercise:



Here's a pesky problem for 'bubble'-maniacs out there:

  1. If property prices expanded at the rate of inflation from 2000 on, current Dublin property prices index should read around 91.2.
  2. If property prices expanded at the ECB policy-consistent inflation target of 2%, the index should read around 89.4
  3. Current CSO index reading is 72.2
So we are somewhere 25-26% below 'sustainable' levels of house prices, if these are measured by inflation-linked price appreciation, or 24% below ECB-targeted rate of inflation.

You do need quite a powerful telescope to spot the bubble in Dublin markets from here. Which, of course, should not be read as 'there is no bubble', just as 'we can't yet tell anything about bubble being formed'.


26/6/2014: Ifo on Global Economic Conditions


Ifo Forecast 4 German economy: GDP +2.0% in 2014 (prev 1.9%); +2.2% in 2015. Unit labour costs 1.6% & 2.3%. Exports: 4.6% & 6.2%.

"As in 2013, the upturn is driven by domestic demand. Growth in equipment investment will accelerate due to high capacity utilisation rates, necessitating investments in replacements and expansion. Construction investment will also continue to rise significantly, driven by a reluctance to invest abroad and low interest rates. Private consumption is expected to increase at a similar pace as real disposable income levels. Export growth will accelerate thanks to an improvement in the world economy. Imports, however, will grow at an even faster rate due to the strong expansion of domestic demand."

On world economic situation:
"Thanks to developments in the advanced economies, growth in the world economy has picked up slightly since summer 2013. The economic recovery in the USA, Great Britain and Japan gained momentum, while the euro area emerged from a recession that lasted almost two years. Although the emerging economies continued to post higher growth rates than advanced countries, the economic expansion in the former remained relatively weak by historical standards, and has slowed down even further since summer 2013 in some areas."

"…The pace of global economic expansion will pick up moderately over the forecast horizon, primarily driven by the advanced economies.

  • The US economy will gain impetus, boosted by an improvement in the asset position of households and companies, further brightening in the labour and real-estate markets, and expansive monetary policy. 
  • Economic developments in the euro area will remain plagued by complex structural problems that are still present in several member states and will take some time to solve. The recovery in aggregate economic activity will temporarily stabilise, despite the continued existence of major differences between member states. 
  • Growth in the German economy, in particular, will far outstrip the euro area average for the forecasting period, while economic momentum in France and Italy will be relatively weak. 
  • The situation in the crisis-afflicted countries of Ireland, Portugal and Spain is expected to be somewhat more positive, although the economic situation remains fragile. 
  • Greece is still waiting for an economic recovery, but several years of recession may come to an end in 2015."


"All in all, aggregate world economic production will rise by 2.9% this year and 3.3% next year."

Emerging markets: 

  • "The pace of expansion in emerging economies will barely pick up in the forecasting period. Although they will benefit from the economic upturn in key advanced economies, the gradual rise in long term interest rates in the  US will, at the same time, result in a steady deterioration of financing conditions for emerging economies. Nevertheless, aggregate economic production in emerging economies will grow at over twice the rate as in their advanced counterparts." 
  • "Russia is the only country that is expected to experience an economic downturn this year."

Risks:
"One of the main risks for the world economy remains the fragile situation in the euro area. Despite the reform measures recently introduced by several member states, the adjustment process is far from complete. As a consequence, many of these countries remain far too expensive to be competitive. As in the past three years, crises could erupt at any time."

Wednesday, June 25, 2014

25/62014: IMF on Corporate Tax Spillovers: Ireland one of top names

IMF just published a watershed document on Corporate Taxation - relating to the tax avoidance and aggressive tax optimisation - and its effects on emerging and developed economies. Ireland features prominently in the report.

Here's what it is about.

A new IMF Policy Paper, titled "SPILLOVERS IN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE TAXATION" considers "the nature, significance and policy implications of spillovers in international corporate taxation—the effects of one country’s rules and practices on others."

Emphasis, throughout is mine (in italics and bold).

The paper develops further the concerns about potentially harmful spillovers from corporate tax regimes in countries with regimes permitting more aggressive tax optimisation onto other economies, in line with concerns expressed by G7, G20 and the OECD and developed under the OECD framework project on Base Erosion and Profit shifting (BEPS).

I wrote about this some time ago and covered it extensively on the blog and in the media. Here are couple of top-line links on the BEPS issues relating to Ireland and other EU countries:

  1. Link to my Cayman Financial Review paper on corporate taxation issues in Ireland: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/04/2242014-on-irish-taxes-quangos-trade.html
  2. My CNBC interview on Apple case: see third link here http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/06/2062014-some-recent-media-links-for.html
  3. My WallStreet Journal op-ed on Apple case: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/06/1762014-irelands-regulatory-resource.html


The IMF paper starts by arguing that tax spillovers can matter for macroeconomic performance, as "…there is considerable evidence that taxation powerfully affects the behavior of multinational enterprises. New results reported here confirm that spillover effects on corporate tax bases and rates are significant and sizable. They reflect not just tax impacts on real decisions but, and apparently no less strongly, tax avoidance."

Per IMF, globally, "The institutional framework for addressing international tax spillovers is weak. As the strength and pervasiveness of tax spillovers become increasingly apparent, the case for an inclusive and less piecemeal approach to international tax cooperation grows."

In other words, prepare for a greater push toward closing loopholes and harmful practices that so far have been the cornerstone of the Irish corporate tax policy conveniently obscured by the benign headline rate.


In fact, Ireland is at the forefront of the problems identified in the IMF paper and it is also at the forefront of the table of countries that will lose should aggressive tax optimisation be curbed.

In relation to problem countries, we feature prominently as an economy heavily dependent on FDI and tax optimisation (surprise, surprise):



Here's what the IMF have to say about the above evidence: "One set of questions concerns whether international corporate tax spillovers matter for macroeconomic performance. For capital movements, at least, it seems clear that they do. Table 1, showing characteristics of the ten countries with the highest FDI stocks relative to GDP, suggests that patterns of FDI are impossible to understand without reference to tax considerations (though these of course are not the only explanation). And the point is significant not only for some individual countries (accounting for a stock of FDI extremely high relative to their GDP) but globally (with relatively small countries accounting for a very large share of global FDI). The potential economic implications of international tax spillovers thus go well beyond tax revenue, with wider implications for the broader level and distribution of welfare across nations."


On pervasiveness of corporate income tax (CIT) optimisation in the overall host economy, IMF defines ‘CIT-efficiency’ in country A as the ratio of actual CIT revenue in this country to the reference level of CIT revenue, with the latter computed as the standard CIT rate multiplied by a reference tax base… To the extent that the reference CIT base is larger than the actual ‘implicit’ CIT base [CIT-efficiency measure] will be less than unity; and the further [CIT-efficiency measure] lies below unity, the less effective is the CIT in raising revenue relative to the benchmark."

Per IMF: "Variations in [‘CIT-efficiency’ metrics across countries and time] might reflect behavioral responses that affect GOS [gross operating surplus] and the implicit CIT base in different ways. One obvious candidate is profit shifting, the incentives for which are determined by differences in statutory CIT rates: if a country has a relatively high CIT rate, outward profit shifting will likely cause an erosion of the tax base, without a corresponding reduction in GOS. Conversely, for a country with a relatively low CIT rate, inward profit shifting will tend to expand the implicit base."

Key here is that "…profit shifting would be expected to induce a negative correlation between [‘CIT-efficiency’ metric] and [Corporate Tax Rate]." In other words, to spot profit shifting into the country from abroad, we need to have low corporate tax rate and very high CIT efficiency at the same time…

And guess who's at the top of the global bottom-feeding food chain here?

CHART: Mean CIT Efficiency, 2001–2012

Note: CIT efficiency for Cyprus is 213 percent.

Just look who is second in the world in terms of mean CIT efficiency (we know we are at the top of the world distribution when it comes to low corporation tax rate)… So remember: per IMF, high CIT efficiency combined with low tax rate = a signal that profit shifting is taking place into the economy.

IMF usefully decomposes tax shifting effects for the case of US MNCs as follows.

"The calculations begin with the net incomes of U.S. parents and Majority Owned Foreign Affiliates (MOFAs) by country of affiliate, taken from Bureau of Economic Affairs data… These are adjusted by the average effective corporate income tax rate in the respective country to obtain estimates of taxable income. The average effective tax rate for global taxable income is weighted according to countries’ GDP. Country shares of U.S. MNEs’ sales, assets, compensation of employees and number of employees are obtained from the same tables, adding totals for U.S. parents and MOFAs in all countries. Shares of each apportionment key are applied to global taxable income to derive changes in taxable income."

Here is the main kicker: "Appendix Table 8 shows the country-specific estimates… Broadly, a country gains from FA [global reforms in tax if tax were to accrue in the country where the company bases its activity that generates taxable income] on the basis of some factor if its share in the global total of that factor exceeds its share in the net income of US MNEs. That Italy, for instance, gains under all factors reflects the very low share of US MNEs net income reported there: about 0.16 percent. Whether that reflects inherently low profitability or particularly aggressive outward profit shifting cannot be determined from these data."

In other words, broadly speaking, positive values in the table below are when countries will benefit from tax shifting being shut down, and negative are where the countries will lose from such reforms. Alternatively - positive values show the effective losses incurred by the country from tax shifting. Negative values represent the gains to the country from acting as a tax shifting platform.

CHART: Appendix Table 8. Reallocation of Taxable Income from Alternative Factors, U.S. MNEs Percent of change


Ireland features prominently in this table as a country with:

  • the fourth highest benefit from tax shifting in terms of sales activity booked
  • first highest in terms of assets booked, 
  • third highest in terms of compensation and employment. 

Crucially, we are in line with such tax-transparent jurisdictions as Bermuda and Luxembourg, ahead of the Netherlands and well ahead of Singapore and Switzerland.

But keep repeating to yourselves, we are not a tax haven… not a tax haven…

25/6/2014: Irish Residential Property Prices: May 2014


CSO published Residential Property Price Index today for May 2014. Lots of various headlines reporting double digit gains in property prices and lauding general recovery in the market, as usual.

Let make some sense of the data as we have it:

Point 1: National house prices: Index was at 70.1 in April 2014 and this rose to 71.7 in May 2014. April reading was just a notch above 70.0 in December 2013. In other words, for all annual gains, we were just about back to the level prices were in December last year. In May, this rose above December 2013 levels, and closer to September-October 2011 average.

I would not call this a 'recovery', yet, especially since we have drawn another 'u' around December 2013-April 2014.

That said, relative to peak prices are down 45.1% and are up 11.9% on crisis period low. Cumulated gain over last 24 months is only 9.47% which equates to annual average growth in the 'recovery' period of just 4.63%. Again, given the depth of decline from the peak, this is not a 'bubble'-type recovery.

3mo moving average was down through April 2014 at -0.23% compared to 3mo period through January 2014, but in May this moved into positive territory of +0.86% compared to 3mo average through February 2014.

Current national prices are 26.9% below Nama valuations (inclusive of LTEV and risk cushion) so for Nama to return profit on average acquired loan it will need ca 27.4% rise from here on. At current running 24 months growth rate, that will require roughly 6 years.



Point 2: National property prices ex-Dublin: the index reading is at 68.2 barely up on 68 in March 2014. Compared to crisis trough, the index is now only 3.2% up. Cumulated rate of growth over 24 moths through April 2014 is negative at -1.02%. 3mo MA through May 2014 is 1.02% below 3mo MA through February 2014. In other words, nationally (excluding Dublin) things are not getting better.





Point 3: Dublin properties, despite all the talk about 'new bubble' and 'boom' are only now in line with those nationally (chart above shows this much). In other words, Dublin 'boom' is a correction for much steeper decline in Dublin properties relative to the rest of the country.



Point 4: Dublin all properties index is now at 72.2 in May, which is up on 69.3 in April 2014, and is the highest reading since February 2011.

Relative to peak, Dublin properties are still down 46.3% although they are now 26% above the crisis trough. Cumulated gain in Dublin over 24 months through May 2014 is 23.6% which equates to roughly 11.2% annual rise - robust and clearly signalling recovery, in contrast to ex-Dublin markets.

But, 3mo MA through April 2014 was % below 3mo MA through January 2014, while 3mo AM through May 2014 is 2.66% up on 3mo MA through February 2014, which shows some volatility in the index and can be a sign of the rally regaining some momentum or seasonal effects combining with some improved economic news or simply volatility taking hold of the recent data. Simple answer - we have no idea what is going on.

Crucially, as chart above shows, apartments segment of Dublin market is showing weaker growth over the last 6 months than houses segment. This is surprising, given rapid rises in rents and reported shortages of accommodation.

So here you have it: for all the hoopla about 'mini-bubble' etc, things are still very much shaky:
  • Growth in Dublin is strong, but so far consistent with the market catch up with more conservative price declines to trough in the rest of the country. 
  • Meanwhile, outside Dublin, things are solidly dead.


Tuesday, June 24, 2014

24/6/2014: Planning Permissions in Ireland: the 'Recovery' is Still Worse than the 1980s Crisis


There are many drivers for planning permissions applications in Ireland, including traditional ones (economic fundamentals, demand, credit supply availability etc) and idiosyncratic (changes in planning regime etc). Not to comment on either of these, here are the latest stats (through Q1 2014) on the subject.

Q1 2014 registered an uplift in total number of planning permissions granted, which rose y/y by 17.0%. This sounds like a large number, except the problem is - it comes off such a low base that Q1 2013 actually was an absolute historical low for planning permissions for any quarter since Q1 1975. In real terms, as the chart below clearly shows, since Q1 2011 through Q1 2014, maximum number of planning permissions granted barely reaches previous historical low in Q1 1988. That's right: the worst of the 1970s-1980s is the best of 2011-present range. In fact, Q1 2014 'improved' activity in terms of planning permissions is 11.7% lower (that's right - lower) than 1975-1999 lowest point.



Dwellings permissions are currently sitting 38.9% below their absolute low of 1975-1999 period, although these did rise 3.36% year on year.



In terms of total square meters relating to permissions granted, things are no better. Year-on-year volume of permission granted by square meters is down 20% for all applications. From Q1 2011 through Q1 2014, total square meters of permissions granted have been trending basically in line with the lowest levels reached in the 1980s.



I am not sure if anyone can tell with any degree of confidence as to what the effect of new regulatory regimes is on these numbers, but one thing is very clear - the recovery is not to be seen anywhere in the above numbers, yet. Despite some reports in the media and from the industry suggesting that things are getting better and better.


24/6/2014: US Productivity Slowdown: It's Structural & Nasty


"Productivity and Potential Output Before, During, and After the Great Recession" a new paper by John Fernald (NBER Working Paper No. 20248, June 2014) looks at the U.S. labor and total-factor productivity growth slowdown prior to the Great Recession in the context of the slowdown "located in industries that produce information technology (IT) or that use IT intensively, consistent with a return to normal productivity growth after nearly a decade of exceptional IT-fueled gains". In a sense, the paper reinforces the point of view that I postulated in my TEDx talk last year dealing with the 'end' of the Age of Tech (here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/11/14112013-human-capital-age-of-change.html).

Fernald opens the paper with a set of two quotes. One brilliantly describes the core question we face:
"When we look back at the 1990s, from the perspective of say 2010,…[w]e may conceivably conclude…that, at the turn of the millennium, the American economy was experiencing a once-in-a-century acceleration of innovation….Alternatively, that 2010 retrospective might well conclude that a good deal of what we are currently experiencing was just one of the many euphoric speculative bubbles that have dotted human history." Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan (2000)

Fernald argues that "The past two decades have seen the rise and fall of exceptional U.S. productivity growth. This paper argues that labor and total-factor-productivity (TFP) growth slowed prior to the Great Recession. It marked a retreat from the exceptional, but temporary, information-technology (IT)-fueled pace from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s. This retreat implies slower output growth going forward as well as a narrower output gap than recently estimated by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO, 2014a)."

Figure 1 from the paper illustrates how the mid-1990s surge in productivity growth indeed ended prior to the Great Recession. The rise in labor-productivity growth, shown by the height of the bars, came after several decades of slower growth. But, notes Fernald, "in the decade ending in 2013:Q4, growth has returned close to its 1973-95 pace. The figure shows that the slower pace of growth in both labor productivity and TFP was similar in the four years prior to the onset of the Great Recession as in the six years since."



And things have been bad since. Labour productivity growth (slope of liner trend below) is now on par with what we have been witnessing in 1973-1995, and shallower than in 1995-2003. But the trend is still close to actual performance, which signals little potential for any appreciable acceleration:


Beyond labour productivity, things are even messier. Charts below plot the Great Recession against other recessions in terms of productivity, output and labour utilisation:







Notes: For each plot, quarter 0 is the NBER business-cycle peak which, for the Great Recession,
corresponds to 2007:Q4. The shaded regions show the range of previous recessions since 1953. Local
means are removed from all growth rates prior to cumulating, using a biweight kernel with bandwidth of 48 quarters. Source is Fernald (2014).

All of the above show the cyclical disaster that is the current Great Recession, but crucially, they show poor recent performance in Labour Productivity, exceptionally poor performance in Hours of Labour used, disastrous performance in Total Factor Productivity… in other words - historically problematic trends relating to productivity, labour utilisation and tech-related productivity in the current recession compared to all previous recessions.

But more worrying is that, as Fernald notes: "That the slowdown predated the Great Recession rules out causal stories from the recession itself. …The evidence here complements Kahn and Rich’s (2013) finding in a regime-switching model that, by early 2005—i.e., well before the Great Recession—the probability reached nearly unity that the economy was in a low-growth regime."

So what's behind all of this slowing productivity growth? "A natural hypothesis is that the slowdown was the flip side of the mid-1990s speedup. Considerable evidence… links the TFP speedup to the exceptional contribution of IT—computers, communications equipment, software, and the Internet. IT has had a broad-based and pervasive effect through its role as a general purpose technology (GPT) that fosters complementary innovations, such as business reorganization. Industry TFP data provide evidence in favor of the IT hypothesis versus alternatives. Notably, the euphoric, “bubble” sectors of housing, finance, and natural resources do not explain the slowdown. Rather, the slowdown is in the remaining ¾ of the economy, and is concentrated in industries that produce IT or that use IT intensively. IT users saw a sizeable bulge in TFP growth in the early 2000s, even as IT spending itself slowed. That pattern is consistent with the view that benefiting from IT takes substantial intangible organizational investments that, with a lag, raise measured productivity. By the mid-2000s, the low-hanging fruit of IT had been plucked."

This a hugely far-reaching paper with two related implied conclusions:

  1. Prepare for structurally slower growth period in the US (and global) economy as the last catalyst for growth - tech - appears to have been exhausted; and
  2. The Age of Tech is now in the part of the cycle where returns to innovation and technology are falling, while returns to financial assets overlaying tech sector are still going strong. The classic bubble scenario is being formed once again, as always on foot of disconnection between the real economic returns to the assets and asset valuations. This bubble will have to deflate.

24/6/2014: ECR Ukraine Risk Assessment


Ukraine keeps diving deeper and deeper into the economic crisis territory (via ECR):

So per above, the country is now in the lowest ranking tier in terms of risks. And it is significantly underperforming its peers:

Risks scores composition is abysmal on Political and Economic Assessments (none have much to do directly with the external threats and all are already pricing in any positives from the latest Presidential elections):