Wednesday, August 21, 2013

21/8/2013: Ireland's Potemkin Village (Knowledge) Economy

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article for August 18, 2013.


This week two news items offered significant implications for the framing of the budgetary policy direction for 2014-2015 and beyond.

First there was the revelation that the Revenue Commissioners are setting up a specialist unit to monitor the use of R&D tax credits by Irish and international firms. The second item was the publication of the Times Higher Education league tables ranking universities on their ability to attract corporate research funding. Both items are linked to the flagship of Irish economic policy that aims to establish R&D and innovation as the drivers of our future economic growth. Both touch upon our sacrosanct Potemkin village: the knowledge economy.


Since the Finance Act 2004, and throughout the crisis, governments have been keen on expanding Irish R&D activities amongst the indigenous enterprises and within the MNCs-dominated sectors. Over the last ten years, the main mechanism for doing so has been through the tax credits that allow the firms to claim R&D related spending. In Budgets 2012 and 2013, the current government significantly broadened the scope and the size of the scheme, and allowed new tax relief for key employees engaged in R&D activities.

Major consultancy firms providing supports for inward FDI, our state development agencies and business lobbyists – all have heralded these tax credits as visionary and imperative to making Ireland an attractive location for R&D.  Such framing of the policy debate makes this week’s news from the Revenue Commissioners significant. In truth, R&D tax credits are long overdue some serious scrutiny. The little evidence we do have suggests that the policy has failed to foster a pro-innovation culture in Irish economy after a decade long application of the scheme.

Firstly, tax credits-supported R&D activities remain too small to make any significant difference at the economy level. In 2004-2010 use of credits rose from EUR80 million to EUR225 million and at their peak, the credits amounted to less than one sixth of one percent of the Irish economy.

This is hardly a result of the scheme being too restrictive. In Ireland, firms are allowed to claim up to 25 percent of their R&D expenditure in credit. In the UK, the maximum is set at just 10 percent for the SMEs. The UK scheme is even more restrictive for larger enterprises. Furthermore, the UK applies strict criteria for SMEs that can qualify for such credits. Yet, UK R&D tax credits cover five times the share of GDP compared to Ireland.

Secondly, our tax credits scheme, along with the rest of the existent R&D and innovation support systems have failed to deliver any serious uplift in the R&D and innovation activities. Instead, these support systems have become a magnet for tax arbitrage by the multinationals and business cost optimization by Irish SMEs.

Take a look at the latest data on private sector R&D spend. Total R&D Expenditure by all enterprises in Ireland in 2012 stood at just EUR1.96 billion or 1.5 percent of our GNP. Between 2009 and 2012 this share of GNP has barely increased, rising only one percentage point, despite the large-scale increases in tax credits and other supports. The miracle of our 'knowledge economy' is, put frankly, quite feeble.

The achievements of 'Innovation Ireland' programmes are even less impressive when we consider what types of activities the R&D investments are being backed by tax credits. In 2007-2012 labour costs and current expenditures associated with R&D activities went up 29-31 percent, just as the economy was undergoing the alleged 'internal devaluation' normally associated with declines in these costs. In 2009-2012, costs associated with Payments for Licenses on Intellectual Property rose 357%. Total capital spending on R&D activities has fallen 30 percent over the same period. All in, CSO data shows that there might be significant cost shifting taking place via R&D tax credits being used to fund companies labour expenditures, as well as to optimise transfer pricing.


From economy's point of view, tax credits are one of the least efficient tools for stimulating investment in R&D and innovation. Research from the EU, published in February this year, examined the effectiveness of special tax allowances, tax credits and reduced income tax rates on R&D output. In assessing the quality of R&D projects, the authors looked at the R&D innovativeness and revenue potential. Using data on corporate patent applications to the European patent office, the authors found that a low tax rate on patent income is instrumental in attracting high quality innovative projects. In contrast, R&D tax credits and tax allowances were not found to have a significant impact on project quality.

International evidence shows that in general, all three forms of incentives are effective in raising the R&D activity. Ireland is one exception. Here, spending on R&D did not increase significantly in 2009-2012 period, rising in nominal terms by just EUR93 million for all companies and in real terms by 1.5 percent. The share of indigenous enterprises in total spending remained relatively stagnant at under 29 percent of total R&D spending. Total increase over 2009-2012 period in R&D spending by Irish-owned firms was only EUR14.5 million.

Tax credits are also reducing the overall transparency in the Irish economy when it comes to our firms performance and Government policies. Irish Government routinely references R&D tax credits as an example of pro-growth enterprise-focused policies. Yet there is no evidence directly linking economic growth, employment and enterprise outcomes to the tax credits.

In a welcome departure from our usual group-think, New Morning IP, the intellectual capital consultancy firm, recently published a report that argued that data shows no link between the introduction of the R&D tax credit and increased patenting activity by indigenous Irish companies. New Morning IP went on to state that “in our experience this tax credit has been used as a way of getting 'free money'…" It was a rare moment of truth in Ireland’s policy Byzantium, where interest groups routinely game the system for quick fixes, subsidies and protection, while ritualistically claiming unverified successes for such policies.

More distortions to the assessment of R&D tax credits effectiveness are induced by the fact that more than three quarters of R&D spend in Ireland is carried out by the MNCs. In some international studies, world-wide R&D investments by MNCs-based in Ireland are counted as if they take place here. One good example is the EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard which ranked Ireland in top 10 EU countries for R&D investment in 2012. Per report, Ireland was host to 14 of the top-spending companies for R&D, but 11 of these were foreign companies and these accounted for 88.5 percent of all R&D spending attributed to Ireland.

In contrast to such reports, the European Patent Office data for 2012 put Ireland in 26th place in terms of total number of patent applications and in per-capita indigenous innovation terms, right between New Zealand and Cyprus. Not quite the achievement one finds promoted in Irish Government speeches and promotional brochures extoling the virtues of ‘Innovation Ireland’.


The above data on R&D investments and patenting activities in Ireland, correlates with the poor performance by the country academic institutions in attracting private sector research funding. The two problems are conjoined twins, born out of the lack of real innovation culture in Irish business.

This week's study by the Times Higher Education, ranked Ireland at the bottom of global league table in terms of private sector funding per academic researcher. Irish academics get an average of just over €6,000 from business research grants and general funds, or 12.5 times less than the world leader, South Korea. These numbers, of course, should be taken with a grain of salt. Lower rankings for Ireland, as well as for a number of other countries, can be in part explained by much broader academic research taking place in our universities, as well as in the bias in funding volumes in favour of specific technical disciplines. They are also reflective of the anti-innovation ethos of Ireland’s domestic enterprises. However, it also highlights the simple fact that Irish academics are often lacking policy and regulatory supports necessary to attract larger research grants.

The main point of all the data is that Irish policy supports for these high value-added activities are excessively focused on targeted tax incentives and are insufficiently aligned with the needs of the innovation-intensive sectors, businesses and entrepreneurs. Over-stimulation with targeted tax credits and exemptions is no substitute for the creation of a real culture of entrepreneurship and innovation.

To develop such culture, Ireland needs more flexible, more responsive public policy formation capable of supporting knowledge-intensive and rapidly evolving sectors, such as biotech, stem cells research, content-based ICT, remote medicine, human interface technology, customizable design and development technologies and so on. While we do have a benign corporate taxation regime, we also need a benign income tax regime to attract and anchor professional researchers and investors in innovation. Equally important are active state policies promoting start-ups and early stage enterprises. These require agile state systems for helping enterprises with issues relating to access to markets, IP, legal and regulatory matters and so on. Last, but not least, Ireland requires more streamlined and investor-friendly equity funding systems, tax laws and regulations and more open systems of IP and business ownership.



Box-out:

The latest report on the European construction industry, published this week by the German Ifo Institute shows that the residential construction sector in Europe will remain on course for further cutbacks with activity expected to hit a 20-years low in 2013-2014. The Institute forecasts show no pick up in residential building sector in Europe until 2015 and the market for new construction bottoming out at 45% below the level in 2006. The proverbial silver lining in the report comes in the Ifo forecasts for Ireland. Ifo experts see residential construction sector here switching to a 5.5% growth in 2014, followed by a 10% expansion in 2015. According to the report, “…it is encouraging that Ireland, which also had to overcome a major crisis in residential construction, is no longer a problem child.” Lets put these seemingly rosy forecasts into perspective. Currently, residential construction in Ireland is down 93 percent on peak year activity, marking the largest drop of any country in the EU. If the Ifo projections hold, by the end of 2015 Irish residential construction sector will be returned to the activity last seen in 2011. Not exactly encouraging, is it?

Monday, August 19, 2013

19/8/2013: 'Tax Haven' Ireland in the (2009) news again

I've been tracking articles relevant to the debate on the tax haven status of Ireland in relation to corporation tax for some time now.

Here's the last link which sets the chain of previous links on the topic:
http://trueeconomics.blogspot.it/2013/06/1062013-corporate-tax-haven-ireland.html

And since the above, I had couple of posts relevant to the subject:
http://trueeconomics.blogspot.it/2013/06/1662013-minister-in-northern-ireland-is.html
and
http://trueeconomics.blogspot.it/2013/07/2272013-g20-spells-out-squeeze-on-tax.html

Here are couple of most recent ones:

The Guardian covers 2009 case of Vodafone in two stories:
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/aug/18/vodafone-tax-deal-irish-office
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/aug/18/tax-vodafone-dublin
while the Tax Justice Network responds to the OECD Action Plan on corporate tax avoidance, explicitly identifying Ireland as a 'tax haven'
http://blogs.euobserver.com/shaxson/2013/07/19/press-release-response-to-oecd-action-plan-on-corporate-tax-avoidance/
and lastly the editorial in the EUObserver that also labels Ireland a 'tax haven':
http://blogs.euobserver.com/shaxson/2013/05/02/the-capture-of-tax-haven-ireland-the-bankers-hedge-funds-got-virtually-everything-they-wanted/

Note 1: The Guardian article references EUR67 million rebate on EUR1.04 billion in Vodafone dividends booked into Luxembourg. The dividends were paid on underlying revenues that were booked into Irish GDP and, thus, into our GNI (netting out transfers of royalties etc).These, in turn, required a payment of 0.59% of GNI-impacting activities to the EU Budget. While is is hard to exactly assess how much Irish Exchequer unnecessarily paid into the EU budget due to Vodafone activities, the amount is probably in excess of EUR 5 million and this compounds the transfers of EUR67 million referenced by the Guardian.


Note 2: I am not as much interested in the legal definitions of a tax haven (there are none and, thus, technically-speaking no country can be definitively labeled a tax haven) or in specific groups' definitions of the tax haven (the OECD definition is so convoluted, it virtually makes it impossible for any country with any global political clout - including that acquired via membership in the EU - to be labeled one, while the Tax Justice Network definition is broad enough to potentially include a large number of countries). I am concerned with the spirit of the concept - rent-seeking via tax arbitrage, and with the potential fallout from this in terms of distortions to economic development models and risks arising from same.

Note 3: A 'thank you' is due to a number of people who reminded me - in the context of the Guardian articles linked above - that Ireland charges a 25% corporate income tax on non-trading income. TY to    

Sunday, August 18, 2013

18/8/2013: A Baby Recession for Europe?

An interesting and forward looking study from the Eurostat on the demographic fallout from the current crisis predicting a so-called 'baby recession' in Europe. The paper is downloadable here: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-13-013/EN/KS-SF-13-013-EN.PDF

The main thesis is that "Fertility is commonly assumed to follow the economic cycle, falling in periods of recession and vice-versa, though scientific evidence is still not unanimous on this. This report looks at fertility trends in 31 European countries against selected indicators of economic recession… in 31 European countries, the economic crisis spread in 2009, while decreases in fertility became a common feature in Europe with a time lag. … In 2008, there were no falls in the rate compared to the previous year, but by 2011, the TFR had declined in 24 countries."

TFR refers to the total fertility rate.


All of this sounds reasonable, and there are some signs that fertility rates might be signaling a crisis-related decline and that such a decline might be coming. However, there is a slight hick up in the data on a number of fronts:

  1. The average TFR is running at 1.595% for the 31 countries sample in 2010-2011 against 2000-2009 average of 1.527%. In other words, the decline is not evident so far, except in one year of 2011.
  2. On country-average for 2000-2009 period, 11 out of 31 countries have been running ahead of average. In 2010-2011 period, same 11 countries run ahead of 31 countries-average. So there is no compositional change on under-performance relative to average.
  3. Over 2010-2011, TFR average for countries was ahead of 2000-2009 average for 24 out of 31 countries. 
  4. Countries that saw TFR decline from average for 2000-2009 to lower average for 2010-2011 were: Cyprus (not in crisis in 2008-2011), Luxembourg (not in crisis in 2008-2011), Hungary (in a crisis), Malta (not in crisis), Portugal (in crisis), Romania (in crisis), Latvia (in crisis), suggesting a very mixed evidence on the links between TFR and crisis to-date.
  5. The weak link is further reinforced by the fact that other crisis-hit countries have fared much better in terms of TFR: Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Italy, Slovenia, UK, Iceland all posted increases in terms of 2010-2011 average compared to 2000-2009 average.


Charts below illustrate (data from Eurostat report, charted and computed by myself):




Note: in the case of Ireland, weather events had potentially significant impact on 2008 and 2010 birth rates. Adjusting for these effects, 2011 reading of TFR for Ireland is hardly a significant decline.

Saturday, August 17, 2013

17/8/2013: Long-Term Great Unwinding for ECB?..


On foot of David Rosenberg's pressie on Long-Term Inflation strategy switch (link here), here's the ECB Monetary Policy dilemma illustrated.

First, the steep hill 'walking':


Per chart above, the wind-in-your-face breezing down the interest rates slopes for ECB is more severe than the Fed trip so far. And the duration of this episode is longer in the ECB-own historical context:


In fact, we are into 55th month now of staying away from the mean and that is for the euro era (already too-low by historical metrics) mean. Last two episodes of deviations lasted 30 and 33 months respectively. In severity terms: average overshooting post-revision in previous downward episode (June 2003 - June 2006) was -46 bps and in this period (since March 2009) it is currently running at -146 bps or 317% of the previous episode.

Good luck to anyone believing that ECB policy (repo) rate is not going to head for 3.75-4.0%...

Friday, August 16, 2013

16/8/2013: David Rosenberg Breaks Consensus on Long-Term Inflation

The most important note on the market written in the last 12 months, if not longer (and for those forward looking - the most important note written about the next 5 years plus):

http://www.gluskinsheff.com/Assets/Documents/Musings%20and%20Special%20Reports/Special%20Report%20-%20From%20Inflation%20to%20Deflation%20And%20Back%20-%20August%2014-2013.pdf

And 11 core snapshots from the ppt:














A must-read stuff!

16/8/2013: US Mint gold sales: H1 2013

In the previous post I covered July 2013 monthly sales figures for US Mint Gold Coins. As promised, here is a more stable trends analysis using H1 aggregates from 1987 through June 2013.

In H1 2013, US Mint sold 629,000 oz of coinage gold, marking the 5th highest ranked H1 in sales terms since H1 1987. Year on year, H1 2013 sales were up 86.1% and relative to crisis period average, sales were up 22.0%, while relative to the pre-crisis period (2001-2007) H1 2013 coinage gold sales were up 261.5%. For comparison, historical H1 average sales are currently at 336,520 oz.

In H1 2013, US Mint sold 1,088,500 coins, marking the third busiest H1 sales period since 1987. For comparison, historical average sales for H1 are at 592,615 coins.

In terms of average gold volume per coin sold, H1 2013 came it at 0.578 oz/coin, which is relatively moderate, given the historical average of 0.577 oz/coin.

Chart below to illustrate the above:

Chart above shows that both coins sales and oz sales of coinage gold remained in H1 2013 on the upward trend established since 2007 and the overall 2009-2013 activity for H1 period remains at post-1999 highs. There is little indication of any serious long-term slowdown in demand for US Mint coins in the data and H1 2013 strengthened the trend away from such moderation. The correction sustained over 2011-2012 has now been more than reversed and H1 2013 numbers in terms of coins sold is sitting comfortably above previous post-1999 maximum attained in 2010.

At the same time, demand for coinage gold (oz sold), while partially correcting upward in H1 2013 remains below the local maxima set in 2009-2010.

The above is consistent with restricted buying-on-the-dip behaviour, with some upward momentum being sustained by considerations other than price movements. This is further supported by changes in correlations between sales and the spot price of gold (average of closing monthly prices in USD):

  • For price vs oz correlation, correlation between H1 1987 - H1 2012 stood at +0.22 and this rose to +0.29 for the period H1 1987 - H1 2013, implying (recall that price fell for H1 2013 to USD1,484.50/oz compared to H1 2012 at USD1,664.00) some limited buying-on-the-dip behaviour.
  • For coins sold vs price, correlation H1 1987 - H1 2012 stood at +0.04 and this rose to +0.11 for the period H1 1987 - H1 2013, also implying limited buying-on-the-dip behaviour.
It is worth noting that H1 2013 figures were driven largely by January )month 1 of Q1) and April (month 1 of Q2) sales. This dynamic did not replicate in July (month 1 of Q3), so we should tread cautiously in expecting robust continuation of the H1 sales in H2.

16/8/2013: US Mint gold sales: July 2013

It has been some time since I updated the data on sales of US Mint Gold Coins, so let's take a quick run through the data for July 2013.

  • US Mint gold coins sales in July 2013 stood at 50,500 oz, dow 11.4% m/m (though there is little point looking at monthly figures which can be volatile) and up 65.6% y/y. The sales were close to historical average at 57,239 oz and below the crisis period average (since January 2008) of 88,694 oz.
  • US mint sales of coins in July 2013 stood at 90,000 coins, down 20.4% m/m and up 97.8% y/y. This compares agains 100,286 coins sold on average per month over historical period and 124,731 coins sold on average per month over the crisis period.
  • Average volume of gold sold per coin in July 2013 stood at 0.561 oz/coin, which is 11.2% ahead of June 2013 and 16.3% behind July 2012. In historical comparatives, July sales were behind 0.59 oz/coin monthly average over the historical period and well behind 0.77 oz/coin average for the crisis period.
  • 24mo rolling correlation between volume sold (oz) and gold price (end of month spot price) stood at 0.009 in July 2013, up on -0.045 in June 2013 and ahead of -0.09 average rolling correlation for the historical period covered by data, but virtually identical to the 0.01 average rolling correlation for the crisis period. In basic terms, the zero correlation between gold coins sales and gold spot price remained intact in July 2013.
Charts to illustrate:




Overall, analysis above confirms a short-term trend toward increased demand for gold coins, driven by changes in prices. This trend is more directly evident in 6mo sales data (next post). In total coins sales, there is a nice reversion to the up-sloping trend (first chart above), while oz/coin sold remains below the longer-term up-sloping trend line, potentially reflective of speculative purchasing running at more subdued volumes (second chart). Per third chart, there is a clear negative correlation between demand for coinage gold and the price of gold, suggesting some 'buying-on-the-dips', although this correlation is weak (last chart above) and is getting weaker (in absolute terms). There is a long-term trend toward positive (or at least much less-negative) correlation between the price of gold and coins sales.


Tune in for the H1 2013 cumulative data analysis next.

Thursday, August 15, 2013

16/8/2013: H1 2013 Trade in Goods & Balance Dynamics for Ireland

On foot of my post detailing Irish cumulated figures for trade in goods for H1 2013, some asked me to post on the relationship between exports and trade balance. Here are few charts, taking snapshot from H12000 through H1 2013:

First, two charts showing levels of exports and trade balance for trade in goods:



Note that in the first chart, there is barely any difference between the 2000-2013 average level of exports (at EUR44.145bn) and 2009-2013 period average (at EUR45.077bn). The gap is only 2.1% of EUR932mln. At the same time, the second chart shows that there is a massive gap between the average trade balance over the period of 2000-2013 (EUR17.184bn) and for the period of 2009-2013 (EUR20.728bn) -  a gap of 20.6% or EUR3,544 mln. The core reason for this is that much of the 2009-2013 'stellar' performance in our trade surplus was driven by collapse in imports, rather than a rise in exports. 

To see this, let us plot exports against trade balance:


The last chart clearly shows that in 2009-2013, on average, exports were tracking changes in trade balance, but they were not doing so 1:1.

More interestingly, the chart shows that trade in goods in Ireland is in trouble. In 2009-2013 period, Irish Government policy has been to rely solely on exports (of goods and services) in driving the economy toward recovery and debt sustainability. This hope rests on growth in exports and simultaneously positive trade balance and growing trade balance as the key parameters for consideration when it comes to both economic growth and debt sustainability.

Alas, in years 2010, 2012 and 2013 (in other words in 3 out of 5 years), measured by H1 figures alone, Irish goods traded operated in the 'pain spot' region - the region of shrinking exports and shrinking trade surpluses.

In other words, in terms of levels our merchandise trade is performing well. But in terms of growth it is performing poorly. And this is despite a huge drop-off in imports, something that is not likely to last when the economy goes back to capital investment (imports of capital goods will rise) and/or consumption recovery (imports of consumption goods will rise).

15/8/2013: H1 2013 Trade in Goods data for Ireland


Latest data for Merchandise trade for June 2013 allows us to make some comparatives for the first half of the year. Here are some stats, all covering only merchandise trade:

  • Total Imports rose in H1 2013 by 3.12% on H2 2012 and were down 2.39% on H1 2012. Imports were up 3.11% in H1 2013 compared to the 6 months cumulative averages over the three years from H1 2010 through H2 2012. H1 2013 levels of imports were 23.2 below their peak for any 6 months period since H1 2000.
  • Total Exports fell in H1 2013 by 4.35% on H2 2012 and were down 6.55% on H1 2012. Exports declined, in absolute terms by EUR3.045 billion year-on-year. This marked the largest 6-mo cumulative drop in exports since H1 2003, marking the H1 2013 the worst year-on-year 6 months period since then.
  • Exports were down 4.48% in H1 2013 compared to the 6 months cumulative averages over the three years from H1 2010 through H2 2012. H1 2013 levels of exports were 12.43% below their peak for any 6 months period since H1 2000.
  • Trade Surplus fell 12.62% on H2 2012 and was down 11.47% in H1 2013 compared to H1 2012. In level terms, trade surplus was down EUR2.442 billion in H1 2013 compared to H1 2012, marking the worst 6 months period since H1 2005.
Charts below illustrate the trends:


Good news, per chart above, Trade Surplus is still running above 2000-present average, although Exports are now running below their 2000-present average. Bad news, the above chart does not adjust for inflation.

Not-too-good news is, exports are now in the negative territory in terms of y/y changes. Remember, we need positive growth in total (merchandise and services) exports of ca 5% per annum to maintain any semblance of sustainability. Here's the tricky bit:


As chart above shows, we really need rapid, very rapid growth in services exports to return our total exports and trade balance to where we need them to be to maintain economic activity at the levels that will be consistent with long-term gradual reduction of public debt.  Over the last 5 years, merchandise exports in Ireland grew on average at 0.59% y/y and over the last 10 years this growth was 0.94%. Owing to the recent collapse in our imports, our trade balance grew on average at 11.73% in the last 5 years. However, over the last 10 years the growth in our trade balance was much less dramatic 3.18%.

Tuesday, August 13, 2013

8/13/2013: Sunday Times, August 11: Wither Middle Ireland


This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article from August 11, 2013.


Recent data from Irish retailers, aggregate services indices as well as household surveys paints a picture of an economy divided in misery and fortunes. Following an already unprecedented five years of straight declines, domestic demand, stripping out one-off effects, such as weather, continues to shrink. This is the paralysed core of our economy. At the opposite side of the spectrum, pockets of strength remain within some demographic groups – namely the young and mobile professionals and debt-free older households. These form a de facto sub-economy only marginally attached to Ireland’s long-term future. With personal consumption still accounting for over half of the total annual GDP, a society torn between these two divergent drivers of domestic demand, savings and investment, is an economy at risk.


On the surface, CSO data through H1 2013 shows that Irish retail sales (excluding cars) grew modestly in June 2013 when compared to the same period a year ago. Much of this growth was due to weather effects and these are likely to strengthen even further in the third quarter. However, removing food, fuel and bars sales, core retail sales were down 1.7 percent in value and were up 0.8% percent in volume in April-June 2013, year-on-year. In other words, core sales are still being driven primarily by price declines rather than by organic growth in demand.

Meanwhile, aggregate data released this week, covering services (as opposed to sales of goods alone) showed annual declines in June 2013 in accommodation, and food and beverage services activities.

The bad news is that five years into the process of reducing household expenditures, Irish consumers are still tightening their belts. Not only discretionary spending is dropping, but demand for staples is contracting as well. At the end of H1 2013, retail sales were down on 2007 levels for both durable and non-durable household consumption items, as well as food.

This data is largely consistent with the analysis of the household budget surveys released earlier this month.  These surveys showed that compared to 2009, Irish households have cut deeper into their bills in twelve months through Q3 2012. Demand for groceries, clothing and footware, recreation, health Insurance and education saw continued cutbacks. For example, in the 24 months prior to June 2011, 56 percent of Irish households cut down on food purchases. Further 51 percent cut spending in the 12 months through September 2012. Despite these already severe cutbacks, industry surveys show that Irish households are still concerned with high cost of basic consumables.

Households’ propensity to cut costs has risen in the twelve months through September 2012 compared to the 24 months period to June 2011 as those still holding onto their jobs are now shifting into deeper cost savings mode. This busts the myth that the only people forced to severely cut their spending are the unemployed and the poor. The largest proportion of severe cuts in the earlier part of the recession fell onto the shoulders of the households where at least one person was jobless, followed by students. Back then households in employment were the category second least impacted by household budgets cuts. Last year, households still in employment were the second most likely to reduce spending. Significantly - households with some members on home duties, retired or not at work due to illness or disability posted the shallowest average cuts of all demographic groups.

The above explains why the data from multiples retailers in Ireland has been showing a V-shaped pattern of changes in consumer demand, with higher demand witnessed in lower-priced categories of own-brand goods supplied by discount retailers, such as Aldi and Lidl, and the premium own-brands of traditional multiples, such as Tesco. Demand for mid-range priced goods usually purchased by the middle class continued to fall.

Ditto for the luxury end of the market, with exception of Dublin, as sales of food and drink in specialist stores have fallen almost 20 percent on pre-crisis peak. Exactly the same pattern of shift away from the middle of price range sales emerged in the demand for electrical goods.


The drivers for the above trends are crystal clear. Middle Ireland is under severe pressures financially, while Happily-Retired and Yappy Irelands are having a relatively easy recession or living through the good times. The main force working through the Irish domestic demand is that of polarization of households not along the lines of employed v unemployed, but along the more complex and fragmented demographic lines.

The average number of spending cutbacks in 12 months through September 2012 for households with no person at work stood at 2.6 categories of spending. The same numbers for households with one and two persons working were 3.3 and 3.2 categories, respectively.

This pattern of cutbacks and income distribution changes across the households is also strengthening over time. In effect, due to Government policies, Ireland is becoming a country with severely polarised distribution of financial well-being. This polarisation is contrary to the one witnessed in normal economies and is different from the one that majority of out policymakers and analysts have been decrying to-date.

The Great Recession has finally exhausted ordinary savings of both working and unemployed households, while lack of income growth has meant that even those in employment are now sinking under the weight of debt and tax and cost inflation driven by the State budgetary policies to-date.

Last week, CSO reported distribution of the households by their ability to manage bills and debts over 12 months prior to July-September 2012. Of households with at least one adult aged 65 and over, up to 28 percent were experiencing difficulties in managing their debts and bills. For households with all adults under the age of 65 the corresponding number was up to 46 percent. Up to 69 percent of the families with children were in the same boat. The older the respondent was, the less pressure on paying their bills their reported.

In normal economies it is the older families that face tighter budget constraints. In today's Ireland it is the younger and the middle-age families with children that are being pressured the hardest by the crisis. This bedrock of financial health in the normal times has been pulled from underneath the economy by the Great Recession.

At the same time, the crisis has generated a new class of the relatively well-off. Based on employment levels and quality, earnings, as well as regular and irregular bonuses data, three sectors in the Irish economy stand out as the winners during the crisis: the ICT services, specialist exports-focused services and international financial services. All three sectors are dominated by younger workers with high percentage of employees coming from abroad and working on a temporary assignment basis here. The demographic they represent is primarily from mid-20s through mid-30s, with smaller size families. These groups of employees are also heavily concentrated geographically, with exporting services sectors workers primarily living in Dublin, followed by a handful of other core urban areas.

Even as early as 2006-2007, market research has shown that these types of households favour premium consumption of convenience food, spend more of their income on going out and travel abroad, and less on purchases of durable goods, household goods, education and health insurance. They do not invest in this economy and hold off-shore most of their long-term savings. Their financial investments are also held and managed abroad and often include mostly shares and options in their own employers. Their children are not going to continue growing up in Ireland and will not be a part of our future workforce. The skills they accumulate while working here are transitory to the overall stock of Irish human capital. On a social level, their demand for entertainment is currently best exemplified by the booming restaurants and bars across the D2-D4-D6 areas of Dublin and stands in stark contrast to Middle Ireland’s hollowed out town centres and neighborhoods with empty storefronts and vacant building sites.


Today’s Ireland is a society where the middle class and large swaths of the upper-middle class have been dragged under water by the combination of the unprecedented crisis, compounded by rampant state-sanctioned cost inflation and legacy debt.

The data on domestic demand suggests that we might be entering a classic ‘Bull trap’. Here, tight rental markets in the leafy South Dublin neighborhoods fuels sales of rentable properties to service the needs of the Yappy Ireland. These pockets of activity are at a risk of generating inflated expectations of incoming prosperity. Don’t be fooled by this – the risks to the real Irish economy are still there, in plain view, in the streets of real Ireland.

Recognising this reality requires the Government to reconsider the tax increases that are impacting adversely the middle and the upper-middle classes. It also means that the State must reform, rapidly and thoroughly the semi-state sector to reduce the cost drag exerted by the Irish utilities, transportation, health and education services providers on Middle Ireland families’ balancesheets.  Lastly, prudent risk management requires for us to manage very carefully the process of mortgages arrears restructuring and debt work-outs. While many economy have survived sovereign and banking sectors busts, no economy can emerge from a crisis having destroyed its middle classes.



Box-out:

In Ptolemaic cosmology, astronomers believed that the Earth was the centre of the Universe. To balance this Universe, Ptolemists used to draw complex sets of larger and smaller circles - known as epicycles - to describes their orbits around the Earth. The problem with epicycles spelled the demise of the Ptolemaic cosmology in the end: as the known number of planets and stars increased, the system of superficial orbits rapidly collapsed under its own complexity. The Ptolemaic absurdity, however, is still alive today in Irish economic policies. A year ago, the Government had a clear choice of policy options: a site-value tax (SVT) that can be levied on all forms of properties, including land, or a residential property tax that can be levied only on structures. In a study covering all known forms of policy mechanisms used to fund public infrastructure around the world,  submitted to the Department of Environment, I have argued that one of the major advantage of the SVT over a property tax was that it would have incentivised more efficient use land, reducing land hoarding and speculation. There were multiple other advantages of SVT over the property tax as well. Alas, the Government opted for a property tax favouring under-use of land over all other properties. This tax suits the major lobbies influencing the State: farmers and well-off rural landed families. Fast-forward eight months from last December: this week, Dublin City Council called for a levy on unused vacant sites. Hundreds of sites lay vacant across the city - blotching the cityscape and posing a threat to personal safety to many workers, as well as an unpleasant reminder of the property bust and economy's dysfunctionality to the would-be foreign investors. Dublin City has been trying to force this land back into development since 2009, although no one in the city has a slightest idea where the demand for such development might come from. Thus, our Ptolemaic system of economic policies is about to draw yet another contrived, complex and inefficient balancing circle on the map of our tax policies to compensate for the Government's rejection of the site value tax. After all, managing the superficial complexity of a political economy that attempts to appease the landed classes, while satisfying the needs and demands of foreign investors and urban authorities is an arduous task

13/8/2013: UK Great Recession

An interesting chart comparing the historical recessions in the UK to the current one:


The longest it took before the current recession for the output to return to pre-crisis peak was 47 months (1930-34 recession and 1979-1983 recession). In the current one, the UK is at 62 months and counting. I don't need to remind you that the UK has both fiscal and monetary policy at its disposal and was aggressive in deploying both during the current crisis. Ireland has neither fiscal nor monetary policy at its disposal. 

We can (and should) reference Government failures in dealing with the crisis, but we have to keep the simple fact in perspective: by joining the euro area, we have removed virtually all and any power from the hands of our politicians to even attempt to manage the economy. Instead of Dublin, Irish Great Recession can be almost solely blamed on Frankfurt & Brussels (Strasbourg et al can be included too, for completeness). Its causes are rooted in the systemic mispricing of economic and investment risks facilitated, incentivised and even directly driven by the euro and the underlying monetary policy of the ECB. Its regulatory and institutional frameworks were shaped and influenced and informed by the European (Brussels) ethos which put political considerations over political economy, and political economy over economy. Its inability to deal effectively and economically efficiently with the crisis is due to the lack of monetary policy tools, while its fiscal collapse is 50% driven by the social partnership model of the European social democracy, and 50% driven by the severe mismanagement of the banking crisis resolution by the EU/ECB/IMF. This is not to say that Irish society and Governments were not culpable in creating the conditions for the crisis or in failures of managing the crisis. Instead, it is to point to the joint liability that befalls not only us, but also the European systems and leadership.

This should be a reminder to European politicians, especially those claiming to have learned something from the crisis (e.g. http://trueeconomics.blogspot.it/2013/08/982013-political-waffle-passing-for.html)

Monday, August 12, 2013

12/8/2013: Sunday Times August 4, 2013: Troika Programme Exit vs Fiscal Reforms


This is an unedited version of my article for Sunday Times August 4, 2013.


Irish political leaders are not exactly known for making logically consistent policy pronouncements. The current budgetary debates are case-in-point. On the one hand, minister after minister from both sides of the coalition benches are repeating ad nausea the tired cliches about their successes in managing the economy. On the other hand, the very same ministers are talking tough about the need for more pain, more adjustments, and more 'reforms' to secure the said recovery and deliver us from the clutches of the Troika. Only to turn around and start praising Troika support as the source of our recovery.

In reality, there are good, if only rarely voiced, reasons for these exhortations: seven hard budgets down, we are not really close to shaking off past legacy of wasteful fiscal practices. The state is still insolvent. The structure of the state policies formation is still dysfunctional. The legacy of pork barrel party politics continues unreformed.

Nothing exemplifies this better than the stalled structural reforms of social welfare and the resulting temporary, risk-loaded nature of much of our fiscal adjustments to-date.


Take a look at the top-line data coming from the Merrion Street.

In the first six months of 2013 tax revenues collected by the Government were EUR3.17 billion ahead of the same period three years ago, while the total voted current expenditure by the Exchequer was up EUR391 million. In other words, the only difference between the current budgetary approach and that practiced by Bertie Ahearn is that today's tax collections are starting from the low levels. Aside from that, current spending continues to ride well ahead of our economy’s capacity to fund it. The 'boom is not getting “boomier”, but the two main current spending lines: social protection and health, are still running at 65.2 percent of the total voted current expenditure, up more than 4 percentage points on 2010.

Things have changed, over the years, to be fair. There have been reductions in current expenditure during the crisis, overshadowed by tax hikes and dramatic cuts to capital spending. Thanks to tax hikes, in H1 2013, Ireland marked the first half-year period when the current spending by the Super-3 Departments: Education and Skills, Health and Social Protection, combined, was below the total tax revenue collected by the State. A significant milestone, but hardly a salvation, as three departments' current expenditure in January-June 2013 still counted for 95 percent of total tax receipts. Thus, even with all the cuts to-date, shutting down all current voted expenditure, excluding the Super-3, will only half our Exchequer deficit from EUR6.59 billion to EUR3.31 billion.

Which exposes once again the five-years-old policy dilemma: to balance the books, Ireland will require at least a EUR2.7 billion worth of further cuts on the spending side on top of what is being planned for 2014-2015. Most, if not all of these will have to come from the Social Protection and Health

Sustainability of savings achieved to-date presents a further risk. So far, cuts to the Exchequer spending that dominated the last five years were heavily concentrated on the sides of capital expenditure and public payrolls. Both are at a risk of reversal in the future.

Any return to growth will require heavier capital investment in public infrastructure, schools, medical equipment and facilities and so on. In other words, capital savings are an illusion on the longer time scale.

Meanwhile, much of the current spending cuts fell onto the shoulders of temporary and contract staff, leaving permanent and more expensive staff protected. This protection came at a cost of increased demands on their productivity. With staff feeling the bite of higher taxes and pensions contributions, while being forced to work more and outside their comfort zone of life-long assignments, public sector unions are already itching to get a new wave of wages increases going.

Back in December 2012, the Troika has pointed out that the savings delivered in public sector pay bills under the Croke Park Agreement cannot be deemed sustainable in the long run. The Haddington Road Agreement for 2013-2016 further confirms this assessment. The insolvent state is now fully committed to more rounds of increments payments, no matter what happens to the economy or exchequer finances. Virtually all ‘savings’ to be delivered under the Haddington Road Agreement are to be automatically reversed at the end of the agreement term or earlier.

The risks of policies reversals on capital and public sector pay, relating to the above measures, are non-trivial. IMF forecasts through 2021 showed the current path of fiscal adjustments taking us to a debt to GDP ratio of just over 95 percent in 2021 from the peak of 2013. Using IMF assumptions, my own estimates suggests that reversing budgetary policies to 2013 levels after 2015 can result in our Government debt to GDP ratio stuck at 108 percent in 2021.


All of which points to a simple but uncomfortable fact: to achieve long-term sustainability of our fiscal policies, Ireland requires a longer term reduction in public spending well in excess of what can be delivered without significantly cutting into current health and social welfare expenditures. Given the fact that health spending is already stretched, the above cuts will have to happen on welfare side.

The reforms, to be undertaken across a period of, say 2015-2016 will have to be sweeping and permanent, building in part on some of the piecemeal changes already in place.

To reduce the risk of replay of the devastating 2008-2010 effects of unemployment shocks on exchequer and economy at large, we need to separate unemployment benefits from other welfare supports.

Unemployment Insurance (UI) should provide a temporary, but generous safety net, sufficient to sustain reasonable family commitments to mortgages and children- and health-related expenditures. Thus, UI should be paid as a percentage of the end-of-employment salary, starting with 2/3rds of the salary up to a maximum of the median wage, with payments declining with duration of unemployment. Payments should terminate after 9 months.

Social welfare payments (SWP) to able-bodied adults can kick in following the expiration of the UI scheme on a means-tested basis. A low monthly personal SWP rate should be supplemented with access to childcare and healthcare, as well as educational grants for children, but only in the cases where recipients engage in training and/or active job searching. A recipient cannot turn down a reasonable offer of a job without facing a financial penalty. All benefits should be subject to a life-time cap of 6-7 years to prevent formation of permanent welfare dependency, while providing a broadly sufficient safety net..

All benefits payments above the monthly personal SWP rate, benchmarked for provision under the scheme, such as health, public services and transport allowance, should be cashless to reduce potential misuse of funds. To encourage better health attitudes and more careful utilisation of public services, a share of unused allowances, say 10-20 percent, accumulated in the account at the end of each year can be paid out as an annual bonus.

We also need to reform our state pensions. Given the fallout from the property bust, large numbers of Irish families are facing the prospect of pension-less retirement. They will require significant state supports - something we cannot afford while carrying the burden of unfunded state pensions.

All statutory state pensions should be means-tested to generate immediate savings and remove absurd subsidisation of the better-off at the expense of those in genuine need. Ditto for age-linked medical cards.

Automatic benchmarking of legacy public sector pensions should end and all current public employees’ pensions should be converted into defined contribution schemes. This will require a legislative decision to alter employment contracts. It will also require recapitalization of the public pensions fund, which can be done gradually over the period of, say, 10 years.

Savings to be targeted in the above measures should apply gradually, over 2014-2017, to generate new substitutes for temporary measures adopted in previous budgets.

However, even with gradual improvements in the labour markets and economy from 2014 on, implementing the above reforms will be nearly impossible. Current political system, with policy decisions based on consensus of the interest groups, is subject to stalling on big reforms and the risk of future reversals by governments seeking popular mandates. This means that we need to take a National Unity approach to structuring and enacting the new legislation dealing with reforms of the social welfare and pensions. Such a consensus is feasible, once all political parties in the Dail realise that Ireland will continue to face subdued economic recovery, elevated unemployment and anemic asset markets well into 2020-2021. With these headwinds, the pressure to carry on with prudent fiscal policies will remain. Thus, the only way of avoiding the contagion from the current long-term economic crisis to the political and state balance of power is to enact irreversible, legislatively protected structural reforms of the social welfare on the basis of bi-partisan legislative engagement.






Box-out:

A note from Davy Research on Mortgages Arrears, published this week, represents a good summary of the current crisis and draws some sensible and well-argued policy conclusions on the subject. Alas, the report commits one common, unnecessary and unfortunate error. Strategic non-payment of mortgages debt is cited in the report eighteen times. Yet, there is no direct evidence presented in the report, or in any study cited in the report, as to the true extent of the problem in Ireland. Instead, like all other analysts, Davy team references unsubstantiated statements by the banks and banking authorities, and simplistic extrapolations of other countries’ studies to the case of Ireland as evidence that "mortgage delinquency has continued to grow despite better-than-expected labour market  conditions” and that “strategic default is now a problem." Like other researchers, Davy team cites increases in employment in Q1 2013 as the evidence of a 'growing problem' with strategic non-payments.  Alas, in Q1 2013, seasonally-adjusted full-time employment (jobs that can sustain payment of mortgages) dropped 4,500 year on year. Broader measures of unemployment reported by CSO also posted increases. This hardly constitutes a material improvement on households' ability to fund mortgages repayments and it certainly does not support the thesis of significant and growing strategic defaults. Of course, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence; the employment data cited above does not prove that there are no strategic defaults in Ireland. It simply shows that absent real, direct evidence, one should take care not to fall into the trap of convincing oneself that an oft-repeated conjecture must invariably be true.