28/02/2012: Reforms in Ireland - at risk? (Sunday Times 26/02/2012)

My Sunday Times article from 26/02/2012 - unedited version.

So far, the explosive nature of Greece’s crisis has been a boon for Ireland, as international perceptions of our economic and fiscal fortunes have turned more optimistic in some analysts’ and investors’ circles. This shift in the sentiment, however, may be threatening to derail the already fragile momentum for economic reforms here.

Irish budgetary dynamics for 2011 were largely on target, although this achievement conceals significant pressures on the tax receipts side and the lack of real progress in tackling runaway spending in three core current expenditure areas – Social Welfare, Health and Education. In fact, much of the previous deficit adjustments have been based on the Governments picking the low hanging fruit of capital spending cuts, administrative savings, and substantial tax increases, soaking the middle and upper-middle classes. Budget 2012 was pretty much the firs attempt by the Irish Government to rebalance the overall budgetary dynamics that, since 2008, have penalized higher-skilled and entrepreneurs. It is hard to see how this approach of piecemeal changes targeting the path of political least resistance can continue delivering ever-rising levels of fiscal adjustments already pencilled in for 2012-2015, let alone maintain the budgetary discipline thereafter.

Accounting for the delayed December 2011 tax receipts that were incorporated in January 2012 figures, the Exchequer deficit in the first month of 2012 was €160 million ahead of that recorded in January 2011. This gap shows that the pressure on Ireland’s fiscal dynamics has not gone away.

There is a more fundamental problem looming on the horizon – the problem of growth. To deflate the public debt that is now well in excess of 107% of our GDP and climbing, we need some serious economic growth. On average, over the next 10 years, we will need growth of over 3% annually over and above inflation in order to bring our Government debt down to 90% of GDP. To sustain some private sector debts deleveraging will require even higher rate of growth. Compare the current situation with that in the 1980s and the maths required for budgetary and households’ deleveraging become dizzyingly high.

In Q3 2011, Ireland registered the twin contraction in GDP and GNP and majority of the analysts expect the same for Q4 figures. For the year as a whole, we are likely to post approximately 0.9% real GDP expansion. Forecasts revisions for Irish economic growth have been driving us beyond the bounds of the fiscal targets we set out for this year. The Budget 2012 assumed economic growth of 1.3% against the IMF, Central Bank, EU Commission, and ESRI forecasts of 0.9-1.1% growth. More recent February forecasts by the markets analysts and ESRI put the range for 2012 growth at -0.5% to 0.9%. Much the same is true for forecasts out to 2015, with Government growth prognoses coming in at a rather optimistic 2.43% annual average against IMF November 2011 projection of 2.25%. Taking the lower range of most current forecasts, the shortfall on Government current assumptions for growth can be as high at €5 billion – a sizeable chunk of change. Under the adverse shock scenario by the IMF, if average growth were to decline to 1% of GDP – a statistically plausible assumption – the shortfall will be close to €10 billion.

This means that the pressure is still very much on to deliver on 2012-2013 fiscal deficit targets of 8.6% and 7.5% respectively. More importantly, the entire recovery framework for Ireland is clearly misaligned. Instead of focusing on the simple short-term targets for fiscal deficits, Irish Government must focus on long-term growth environment. Putting the patient – the Irish economy – ahead of the disease – the fiscal and household debts overhang – is a must.

This puts into the context the events of the last two weeks. Specifically, it highlights the levels of unease with Irish Government plans being expressed, for now rather quietly, by some markets participants. It also underpins the subtle change in the Government own signals to the Troika. And, it is simultaneously contrasted by the Government public rhetoric that has been stressing the PR spin over sombre determination to act. Virtually all recent actions suggest that the Government is hoping that something will happen between now and 2013 to miraculously restore growth, thus alleviating the need for serious corrective measures on the current expenditure side.

First, take the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). Last week, the Government review of budgetary adjustments targets stated that 2013 fiscal savings will be “at least €3.5 billion” (page 14 of the MOU). The subtle change of language from the November 2011 version of the MOU which did not include the words ‘at least’ in relation to 2013 target might be a sign that the Government is being forced to accept the reality of its multiannual growth projections being overly optimistic in the current global and domestic growth environments.

Yet, when it comes to outlining reforms agenda, the MOU contains nothing new compared to its previous versions. The already inadequate set of measures on dealing with personal debt announced last night is presented as the end-all reform. Dysfunctional energy and utilities sectors are barely covered with exception for one specific measure – creation of the unified water management bureaucracy. Inefficiencies in the domestic services sectors, poor institutions relating to supporting competitive markets in these sectors and labour markets reforms are treated with generalities in place of tangible proposals. Vague promises of reforms of social welfare system and structural reforms in the state enterprises sector and financial services unveiled and partially actioned in the past are simply repeated once again in the current MOU.

In contrast, the Government has claimed this week that it has rather specific targets for yet another spending project – the ‘jobs creation’ efforts to be financed via privatizations returns. In other words, unlike Charlie McCreevy who spent the money he had, Minister Noonan is eager to spend what he hopes to have. To-date, Minister Noonan has managed to spend quite substantial funds on ‘jobs creation’ with various announcements taking potential total bill for these initiatives to well over €1 billion annually. Outcomes? Well, none, judging by the QNHS and Live Register data. The JobBridge programme is a resounding failure with the vast majority of ‘apprenticeships’ in effect displacing real jobs that would have been created through the normal course of business growth. The ‘Vat stimulus’ to tourism and hospitality sector is another failure. Fas restructuring is shambles.

The privatization plans, supported by the ESB and other state monopolies, are clearly designed to minimize any potential disruptions in the status quo of the semi-states-dominated sectors. Thus, privatization-induced changes in the energy and transport sectors will be purely cosmetic, the structure of the regulated markets will remain as anti-consumer as ever. Vast swathes of the domestic economy will remain protected from private investment and enterprises as ever.

Despite major risks present in the global and domestic economic environments, the Irish Government is slipping into the comfort zone of PR exercises, photo opps, and foreign ‘investment missions’.

By postponing the reforms necessary to boost our economic growth potential, the Government currently is putting an undue amount of risk onto the Irish economy. Its gamble is that sometime over the next 9-12 months Irish economy will be propelled to a miraculously higher growth plane and that this growth will be sustained through 2015 and thereafter. In the mean time, the Government will spend its way into jobs creation, while protecting its vested interests of the shielded sectors and avoiding any real structural reforms.

Chart:

Sources: IMF WEO database and country updates

Box-out:

Much of the latest attention paid to the external trade data has been devoted this month to the sudden and rapid slowdown in exports over the recent months. And this analysis is very much correct: in H1 2011, Irish goods exports and trade surplus grew by 6% and 2.5% respectively. In H2 2011, the same rates of growth were 1.9% and 1.5%. However, there are some very interesting trends emerging from the trade statistics by geographical distribution. Using eleven months data for 2011, annual rate of growth in Irish trade surplus vis-a-vis the EU is likely to come in at -1.7%, against the overall annual rate of growth of 1.5%. In contrast, Irish trade balance with Russia is likely to rise a massive 92% in 2011 compared to 2010. Our trade deficit with China is likely to decline by 9%. Although our trade deficit with India is expected to widen by almost 11%, our trade surplus with Brazil is on track to increase by almost 32%. Courtesy of Brazil and Russia, Irish trade surplus with BRICs in 2011 is likely to have reached close to €238 million, first year surplus on record.

2/2/2012: Exchequer non-returns from January

Exchequer returns pose no surprise - and none were expected, given this is just January - so no point of updating the detailed data sets.

Some top figures.

On tax receipts:

• Income tax revenues are up at €1,260mln in January 2012 over €987mln in January 2011 as USC kicks in full tilt this year.
• VAT is at +3% yoy to €1,725mln in part boosted by small gains in sales over Christmas period in terms of volumes.
• Corporation tax is up to €271mln from €72mln a year ago, but €250mln of this was due to delayed receipts from December 2011, so in reality, Corpo is down on 2011. 

None of the above are really significant as timing might have been a factor in all of these. It will take through March to see the real changes in the underlying numbers.

Exchequer deficit is at €393.7mln down from €483.2mln a year ago. So now, deduct that €250mln from the receipts side and you get Exchequer deficit at €643.7mln or some €160mln ahead of January 2011. Not pretty, eh?

Of course, as I said above, there is no point of doing any analysis on returns for just one month, so take the above comment with a huge grain of salt.

16/1/2012: Irish Bailout Redux - Sunday Times 15/01/2012

Several articles in the press yesterday on why Ireland will require / need a second 'bailout' - here's an excellent piece from Namawinelake and here's a piece from Colm McCarthy.

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times (January 15, 2012) article on the same topic.

In May 2011, as Greece was sliding toward the second bailout, I conjectured that within 24 months, Ireland and Portugal will both require additional bailout packages as well. This week, my prediction has been echoed by the Chief Economist of the Citi, William Buiter.

According to Buiter, the costs of borrowing in the markets are currently prohibitive and the expiration of the €67.5 billion loans deal with the Torika, scheduled for 2014 will see Ireland once again unable to borrow to cover remaining deficits and refinancing maturing bonds. Ireland should secure additional funding as a back up, to avoid seeking it later “in a state of near panic”.

Buiter’s suggestion represents nothing more than a prudent planning-ahead exercise. In addition to Buiter’s original rationale for securing new lending, Ireland is facing significant fiscal and economic challenges that will make it nearly impossible for the State to finance its fiscal adjustment path through private borrowing in 2014-2016.

Speaking to the RTE, Buiter said that although Ireland’s situation was different from that of Greece, the economy remains under severe stress from banking sector bailouts. Addressing this stress should involve restructuring of the promissory notes issued by the state to IBRC, as the Government was hoping to do in recent months. But it also requires anchoring our longer-term fiscal adjustment path to predictable and stable sources of funding at a cost that can be carried by the weakened economy.

The Government will do well to listen to these early warnings to avoid repeating mistakes of their predecessors.

On November 18, 2011, Carlo Cottarelli, IMF Director of Fiscal Affairs Department gave a presentation in the London School of Economics, titled Challenges of Budgetary and Financial Crises in Europe. In it, Mr Cottarelli provided three important insights into the expected dynamics for debt and deficits that have material impact on Ireland.

Firstly, he showed that to achieve the ‘golden rule’ debt to GDP ratio of 60% of GDP by 2030, Ireland will be required to run extremely high primary surpluses in years to come. Only Greece and Japan will have to shoulder greater pain than us over the next 19 years to get public debt overhang down to a safety level.

Secondly, amongst all PIIGS, Ireland has the highest proportion of outstanding public debt held by non-residents (84%), implying the highest cost of restructuring such debt. The runner up is Greece with 65%. In general, bond yields are positively correlated with the proportion of debt held by non-residents.

Thirdly, Cottarelli presented a model estimating the relationship between the observed bond yields and the underlying macroeconomic and fiscal fundamentals that looked at 31 countries. This model can be recalibrated to see what yields on Irish debt can be consistent with market funding under IMF growth projections for Ireland. Using headline IMF forecasts from December 2011, 2014-2016 yields for Ireland are expected to range between 4.7% and 6.5%. Incorporating some downside risks to growth and other macroeconomic parameters, Irish yields can be expected to range between 5.3% and 7.0%.

Even in 5.5-6% average yields range, financing Irish bonds rollovers in the market in 2014-2016 will be prohibitively costly as at the above yields, Ireland's debt dynamics will no longer be consistent with the rates of decline in debt/GDP ratio planned for under the Troika agreement. This, in turn, means that the markets will be unlikely to provide financing in volumes, sufficient to cover debt rollovers. Thus, Ireland will either require new bridging loans from the Troika or will have to extract even greater primary surpluses out of the economy, diverting more funds to cover debt repayments and risking derailing any recovery we might see by then.

What Butier statement this week does not consider, however, are the potential downside risks to the Irish fiscal stability projections. These risks are material and can be broadly divided into external and internal.

Per external risks, the latest CMA Global Sovereign Risk Report for Q4 2011, released this week, shows Ireland as the 6^th riskiest country in the world with estimated probability of sovereign default of 46.4% and credit ratings of ccc+. Despite stable performance of our bonds in Q4 2011, CMA credit ratings for Ireland have deteriorated, compared to Q3 2011. And, our 5 year mid-point CDS spreads are now at around 747 bps – more than seven times ahead of Germany. This highlights the effect of a moderate slowdown in euro zone growth on our bonds performance.

Even absent the above risks, Irish debt dynamics can be significantly improved by significantly extending preferential interest rates obtained under the Troika agreement to cover post-2014 rollovers and adjustments. Based on IMF projections from December 2011, such a move can secure savings of some €9 billion or almost 5% of our forecast 2016 GDP in years 2014-2016 alone (see chart).

CHART

Chart source: IMF Country Report 11/356, December 2011 and author own calculations

Looking into the next 5 years, there is a risk of significant increase in inflationary pressures once the growth momentum returns to the Euro area. A rise in the bund rates can also take place due to deterioration in the German fiscal position or due to Germany assuming greater role in the risk-sharing arrangements within the euro area. Lastly, German and all other bonds yields can also rise when risk-on switch takes place in post-recessionary period, drawing significant amounts of liquidity out of the global bond markets. All of these will adversely impact German bunds, but also Irish bonds.

On the domestic front, we should be providing a precautionary cover for the risk of a more protracted slowdown in the Irish economy especially if accompanied by sticky unemployment. The risk of deterioration in Irish primary balances due to structural slowdown in the rate of growth in Irish exports (potentially due to strengthening of the euro in 2013-2016 period or significant adverse effect of the patent cliff on pharma exports) is another one worth considering well before it materializes. Lastly, there is the ever-growing risk that the markets will simply refuse to fund the vast rollovers of debt which is currently being increasingly warehoused outside the normal markets in the vaults of the Central Banks and on the books of the Troika.

Overall, Ireland should form a multi-pronged strategic approach to fiscal debt adjustment. Recognizing future risks, the Government should aggressively pursue the agenda of restructuring the promissory notes issued to the IBRC with an aim of driving down notes yield down to ECB repo rate and push for ECB acceptance of burden sharing imposition on IBRC bondholders to reduce the principal amount of the promissory notes. Pursuit of longer-term objective of forcing the ECB to accept a writedown on the banks debts accumulated through the Emergency Liquidity Assistance lines at the Central Bank of Ireland is another key policy target. Lastly, Ireland needs to secure significant lines of credit with the EU at preferential rates for post-2014 period with longer-term maturity than currently envisaged under the Troika deal.

Given the general conditions across the Eurozone today, the last priority should be pursued as early as possible. In other words, there’s no better time to do the right things than now.

Box-out:

The latest EU-wide statistics for Retail sales for November 2011 released this week present an interesting reading. Retail sector turnover index, taking into account adjustments for working days, shows Irish retail activity has contracted by 0.4% in November 2011 year on year. Overall activity is now down 5.2% on same period 2008, but is up 7.9% on 2005. For all the Irish retail sector woes, here’s an interesting comparative. Euro area retail sales turnover is now down 2.5% year on year and 1.6% on 2005. In terms of overall contraction in turnover, Ireland is ranked 15^th in EU27 in terms of the rate of contraction relative to November 2010 and November 2008 and 12^th in terms of contraction relative to 2005. Not exactly a catastrophic decline. Once set against significant losses in retail sector employment since 2008, these numbers suggest that to a large extent jobs losses in the sector were driven by lack of efficiencies in the sector at the peak of the Celtic Tiger, as well as by declines in revenues.

7/1/2012: Irish Exchequer Results 2011 - Shifting Tax Burde

In the previous 3 posts we focused on Exchequer receipts, total expenditure by relevant department head, and the trends in capital v current spending. In this post, consider the relative incidence of taxation burden.

Over the years of the crisis, several trends became apparent when it comes to the shifting burden of taxes across various heads. These are summarized in the following table and chart:

To summarize these trends, over the years of this crisis,

• Income tax share of total tax revenue has risen from just under 29% in 2007 to almost 41% in 2011.
• VAT share of total tax revenue has fallen, but not as dramatically as one might have expected, declining from 30.7% in 2007 to 29.7% in 2011
• MNCs supply some 50% of the total corporation tax receipts in Ireland. And they are having, allegedly, an exports boom with expatriated profits up (see QNA analysis last month). Yet, despite this (the exports-led recovery thingy) corporation tax receipts are down (see earlier post on tax receipts, linked above) and they are not just down in absolute terms. In 2007-2011 period, share of total revenue accruing to the corporation tax receipts has fallen from 13.5% to 10.3%. So if there is an exports-led recovery underway somewhere, would, please, Minister Noonan show us the proverbial money?

 So on the tax side of equation, the 'austerity' we've been experiencing is a real one - full of pain for households (whose share of total tax payments now stands at around 58% - some 12 percentage points above it levels in 2007) and the real sweet times for the corporates (the ones that are still managing to make profits to pay taxes, that is). This, perhaps, explains why even those working in protected sectors are talking about their biggest losses coming from tax changes.

7/1/2012: Irish Exchequer Results 2011 - Expenditure

In the previous post I looked at the tax revenues side of the Exchequer figures for 2011. The core conclusions emerging from that analysis was that:

Irish Exchequer tax receipts did not perform well in 2011 compared to both 2010 and the target, with most of the improvement (some 80%) accounted for by reclassification of the Health Levy as tax revenue and addition of the temporary, extra-Budget 2011 Pensions Levy.

Irish Exchequer tax revenues for 2011 cannot be interpreted as being indicative of any serious improvement. Factoring in Pensions Levy and delayed receipts (Corporation Tax receipts for December carried over into 2012), overall Exchequer revenue fell 3.1% short of the target set in Budget 2011, not 2.5% claimed by the Department of Finance.

The above shortfall amounts to 0.66% of the expected 2011 GDP and 0.81% of our expected GNP and comes after significant increases in taxation burden passed in the Budget 2011, suggesting that the economy’s capacity to generate tax revenues based on the current structure of taxation is exhausted.

Subsequent posts on the topic of Exchequer balance will focus on overall balance, capital spending dynamics and relative distribution of tax burdens. This post focuses on the expenditure side of the Exchequer balance.

In general, there are good reasons as to why discussion of the expenditure side of the Exchequer balance is a largely useless exercise, rendered such by:

-       Constant re-alignment and renaming of departments, and

-        Changes in the departmental revenues (as in the case with the Health Levy reclassification) impacting the Net Voted Expenditure on Health

Here’s a good post on the above caveats from Dr Seamus Coffey which is worth a read.

So let’s consider some of the higher level figures.

Overall Net Voted Expenditure for 2011 came in at €45.711 billion, or €723 million (-1.56%) below 2010 levels and with a savings of €3.602 billion (-7.3%) on 2008. The target for 2011 expenditure was set at €46.022 billion and the end outrun implies that the Government has under-spent the target by €311 million. Note: I am referencing the original Budget 2011 target, as referenced, for example, in End-June 2011 - Analysis of Net Voted Expenditure. The Department for Finance reference figure for the annual 2011 target is €46.151 billion or €129 million ahead of the original estimate. This discrepancy is reflected in part in the capital carryover figures for 2010-2011 and 2011-2012.

Year on year, 2011 marks the third year of declining cuts. In 2009 yoy spending fell €2.150 billion, in 2010 it declined by €0.730 billion and in 2011 the drop was €0.723 billion. In proportional terms, expenditure declined 4.56% in 2009, 1.57% in 2010 and 1.58% in 2011. Cumulated net expenditure ‘savings’ since 2008 are now standing at a miserly €3.602 billion. Given that over the same period we accumulated €81.017 billion of deficits clearly shows the inadequate extent of cost reductions in the public services. Whichever way you spin it, to cover just ½ of already accumulated deficits out of cost savings achieved so far would take decades, and that before we factor in interest payments and the fact that much of the ‘savings’ delivered to-date comes out of temporary cuts to capital spending. More on this in the forthcoming analysis of capital and current spending.

Now, since we cannot clearly de-alienate actual spending, let us at the very least consider the spending priorities. These have changed over the years and changed in the direction that, while inevitable in the current crisis, is worrisome nonetheless.

Please keep in mind that although I did try to adjust as much as possible for changes in departments compositions, the data below is not fully reflective of these. Nonetheless, it does present some interesting changes in the overall spending dynamics.

As shown above,

-       Agriculture, Food and the Marine net voted spending constituted 3.36% of the total spending in 2008. This now has fallen to 2.28%.

-       Tourism, Culture and Sport accounted for 1.43% of the total spending in 2008 and is now down to 0.60%.

-       Communications, Energy and Natural Resources share actually rose from 0.54% in 2008 to 0.55% in 2011.

-       Defence saw a relatively shallow decline from 2.16% in 2008 to 1.93% in 2011.

-       Education and Skills – the third highest spending department in 2008 and 2011 – remained relatively static with 18.31% of total spending in 2008 and 18.07% in 2011.

-       Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation share of total spending fell from 2.94% in 2008 to 1.73% in 2011.

-       Environment, Community and Local Government spending fell from 6.41% in 2008 to 3.39% in 2011 – the drop that largely reflects changes in the departmental composition.

-       Finance share of spending declined from 2.83% in 2008 to 0.75% in 2011 – a dramatic fall.

-       Foreign affairs and Trade, despite gaining a new function of Trade have seen their share of spending decline from 1.99% in 2008 to 1.51% in 2011.

-       Health – the largest spender in 2008 at 27.45% dropped to the second place in spending distribution with 28.25% in 2011 despite having lost a number of functions. Adding back Children function to the DofH, the department spending share rose to 28.7% in 2011.

-       Justice and Equality accounted for 5.25% in 2008 and this dropped to 4.84% in 2011.

-       Social Protection rose from being the second highest spending department in 2008 with 19.06% (virtually identical share to that of Education) to the first highest spending department in 2011 with 29.16%.

-       Public Expenditure and Reform – a new department that, at least in my opinion is failing to show much value for money so far – has managed to rake in spending amounting to 1.71% of total net voted expenditure in 2011 – higher spending priority than Foreign Affairs and Trade, almost identical priority to Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation, more than double the spending priority of the Department of Finance. Let us presume - for a moment - that the Department has two important, related, but not fully coincident functions: bring down current spending (since bringing down capital spending is no-brainer) and produce longer-term reforms of public services (which is not all about cuts, of course). Given the numbers achieved to-date - see forthcoming post on capital and current expenditure reductions - one should have serious questions about the new department value for money.

-       Taoiseach group saw its spending priority virtually unchanged over the years, declining marginally from 0.38% in 2008 to 0.37% in 2011.

-       Transport – the department with significant compositional changes – has seen its spending share decline from 6.47% in 2008 to 4.18% in 2011.

So overall, top 3 departments accounted for 64.83% of total net voted spending in 2008 and this figure rose to 75.48% in 2011. The rate of increase in these expenditure shares has accelerated over the years. Year on year, share of the three top spending departments in overall expenditure rose 2.97 percentage points in 2008-2009, 3.80 percentage points in 2009-2010 and 3.89 percentage points in 2010-2011. Once Children function is added back to Health, the rate of increase in 2010-2011 jumps to 4.34 percentage points.

Top 4^th and 5^th ranked departments (Justice and Equality and Transport) saw their combined share of spending declining from 11.71% in 2008 to 9.02% in 2011. This largely reflects changes in composition of the Department of Transport.

Together, Social Protection, Health and Children accounted for 46.51% of the spending in 2008 and this now is up at 57.88% in 2011. In other words, almost €6 per every €10 spent by the state goes to finance the two functions that constitute in traditional nomenclature social welfare benefits and social benefits (note that private spending on health is netted out via departmental receipts in the net expenditure figures). Education accounts for roughly the same share – ca 18% of total spend – in 2011 as in 2008. Economic sectors departments (other than Transport) used to account for 6.84% of the total spend in 2008 and this is now down to 4.56% in 2011.

In short, the priority of the Government spending over the years of the crisis has shifted firmly away from supporting economy’s productive capacity and delivering structural subsidies to ‘social and environmental pillars’, to serving social welfare functions and preserving as much as possible public health spending. It is worth noting that the latter, of course, has been achieved by shifting more costs burden onto the shoulders of health insurance purchasers.

5/1/2012: Irish Exchequer Results 2011 - Tax Receipts

Irish Exchequer returns for 2011 are in and there has been much in the line of fireworks celebrating the 'strong' results. Alas, these celebrations are revealing more about the nature of the Exchequer figures analysis deployed by the Government spin doctors than about the real dynamics in tax revenues and spending reforms.

In this post, let's take a look at the tax performance over 2011.

Income tax receipts came in at the grand total of €13.798 billion this year, 22.4% up on 2010 and 16.6% up on 2009. Alas, the gross year on year gain of €2.522 billion achieved in 2011 is accounted for by re-labeling of the former health levy into income tax component. In 2010 the state collected €2.018 billion worth of health levies receipts which were not classified as a tax measure. This year, it was classed as such, and although we do not know just how much of the health levy has been collected, netting out 2010 receipts for this revenue head out of the 2011 tax receipts leaves us with an increase in income tax like-for-like of closer to €500 million year on year. And these net receipts would imply income tax still down on 2009 levels.

Overall, income tax was down €327 million on target set in Budget 2011 - a shortfall of 2.3% - not dramatic, but hardly confidence-instilling. 

The chart below illustrates trends over time, but one has to keep in mind that 2011 figures are gross of USC (and thus Health Levy receipts).

More revealing (as these compare like-for-like) are VAT receipts:

As the chart above illustrates, VAT receipts came in at €9.741 billion in 2011, down 3.57% on 2010 and 8.71% on 2009. Now, we are talking some real numbers here. While income tax 'improvements' were in reality very much marginal, VAT deterioration is very significant. VAT receipts are down 4.8% or €489 million on 2011 target and the receipts are off €360 million on 2010 and €929 million on 2009. VAT receipts are running €4.76 billion behind, compared to 2007 levels. 

Corporation tax is shrinking. Official numbers show Corpo receipts are at €3.52 billion in 2011, down €404 million on 2010. These include €261 million in delayed receipts, so year on year Corpo receipts are down really €143 million. This might look small, but for the economy that is allegedly 'recovering' the dynamic is poor. In percentage terms, Corporation tax receipts are off 10.29% yoy and 9.74% on 2009. Compared to 2007, corporate taxes are down €2.871 billion (disregarding the late receipts).

Relative to target, once December delayed payments are factored in, Corporation tax has fallen short of the projections by €239 million. In overall official terms, the tax is down €500 million on traget (-12.4%).

Another big tax head is the Excise. This came in exactly at the same level as 2010: €4.678 billion. Excise receipts are down just €25 million on 2009, but significantly lower - by €1.16 billion relative to 2007. Excise taxes are now basically in line with Department projections for Budget 2011. 

Stamps are up, but this is solely due to the pension levy introduction. Leve of Stamps receipts in 2011 reached €1.391 billion, which is €431 million ahead of 2010 and €461 million ahead of 2009. But once we factor out pension levy receipts, Stamps are actually down €26 million on 2010 and just €4 million ahead of 2009 levels. Compared to 2007 Stamps are down a massive €2.25 billion once pension levy is accounted for. And Stamps are down on target as well - by some €21 million.

When it comes to capital taxes, combined CAT and CGT receipts came in at €660 million or 12.9% ahead of 2010 receipts, although still 17.1% down on 2009 levels.

Both tax heads combined were bang-on on target.

So overall, of top 5 tax heads, 3 were behind the target despite the fact that Income tax included reclassification of tax revenues under USC, one was bang on target and one was ahead of target once temporary pensions levy is added, but behind target when this is netted out. In a summary, 4 out of 5 tax heads have underperformed the target and one came in at virtually identical levels to target. Where's, pardon me, the fabled 'improvements' and 'stabilization' in Exchequer revenues that Minister Noonan has been talking about?

Overall tax revenue stood at €34.027 billion in 2011, which is 7.16% ahead of 2010 and 2.97% ahead of 2009. However, if we are to correct for reclassified Health levy receipts and temporary pensions levy receipts, tax revenues for 2011 were at €31.552 billion, or 0.63% below those in 2010. tax rates went up, tax revenues went down, folks. Not what one would term an improvement in performance.

Even using dodgy apples-for-oranges accounting procedures deployed by the Government, tax revenues are down 2.5% on the Budget 2011 target. How on earth can anyone claim this to be 'stabilizing' performance or an 'improvement' defies any logic. 

Let's do the sums: 

• 2011 total tax revenues were €873 million behind Budget 2011 projections. These included non-tax revenue of at least €2 billion (Health levy) that was re-branded as tax revenues this time around, plus €457 million hit on pensions (not in the Budget 2011) and a delayed set of corporate returns of €261 million. So overall, tax revenues are down on target not €873 million, but €1.069 billion. 
• At the same time 2010-2011 outrun surplus claimed by the DofF at €2.522 billion in reality is a revenue gain of just €308 million.

That means that the Exchequer revenues side performance was really surprisingly unimpressive.

20/12/2011: IMF IV Review of Ireland Programme: part 3

In the previous two posts I covered the IMF analysis of mortgages arrears and budgetary dynamics. Here, let's focus on IMF forward-looking analysis for 2012.

"Given the strong growth in the first half, real GDP growth has been revised up to 1.1 percent
in 2011 from 0.4 percent in the most recent WEO projection. However, nominal GDP would
be essentially flat in 2011 given a projected 1 percent decline in the GDP deflator owing to a
deterioration in the terms of trade." [You can read this as follows: we repay debt out of nominal GDP. Which is flat. Thus our capacity to repay our debts in 2011 remains identical to that in 2010. Another year, and not any closer to the elusive - and utterly unattainable, of course - goal of paying down our total debts.]

"Further deceleration in external trade prevents any growth pick-up in the baseline in 2012. Growth projected for key trading partners—the euro area, the U.S. and the U.K. account for 80 percent of exports—has been revised down from 2 percent at the Third Review to 1½ percent currently (export-weighted). The non-cyclicality of pharmaceutical exports and recent improvements in competitiveness help mitigate the impact of lower demand, nonetheless, projected Irish export growth in 2012 has been revised down from 5¼ percent to 3¾ percent. Domestic demand will continue to contract, leaving GDP growth at 1 percent in 2012, down from 1.9 percent at the previous review. Low growth allows only a small reduction in unemployment in 2012. Inflation would remain low at about 1 percent in 2012, as higher indirect tax rates broadly offset the impact of weaker international price pressures." [So, in a summary: if pharma exports remain as they are - no patent cliff effects etc - we will grow at 1% in 2012, unemployment will decline slightly solely due to exits from the labor force and emigration, and high taxes will hammer domestic demand, thus driving down inflation. Did I hear 'stagnation' said anywhere?]

"Overall, growth is expected to average 2¾ percent over 2013–15, but the unemployment rate may remain in double-digits through 2016, risking the development of sizeable structural unemployment." [In other words, the growth rate IMF builds in assumes 2012 growth of 1.0%, 2013 growth of 2.3%, 2014 of 2.7% and 2015 of 3%. Department of Finance projects growth of 1.3-1.6% for 2012 (+0.3-0.6% on IMF), 2.4% in 2013 (+0.1% on IMF), and 3% in 2014 and 2015. Cumulative departure over 2012-2015 between IMF forecasts and DofF/Budget 2012 forecasts is, therefore, at 0.75-1.08 percent. If anything, were the IMF to be correct in their assumptions, Ireland will need some additional cuts of 0.02-0.03% of 2015 GDP - €172-204mln. If, however, the IMF itself is over-optimistic and Irish GDP growth were to come in at 2.5% average for the 2013-2015 period instead of 2.75%, the shortfall on targets will be as high as €293mln. And that's just the growth estimates effects.]

Importantly, the IMF revised its previous forecasts for 2015 deficit of 2.9% in line with the Government plans. However, debt/GDP ratio remains projected to peak at 118.1% in 2013 and this reflects adjustments for the €3.72bn 'Cardiff error'.

"Debt-to-GDP is projected to peak at 118 percent in 2013, in line with the previous review. The debt path is lowered by a correction to the end-2010 general government debt level and the reduced interest rate on EU loans, but this is offset by lower projections for nominal GDP. Potential privatization receipts could lower debt prospects, while outlays to restructure the credit union sector could raise debt prospects, but such outlays are expected to be manageable. External developments affecting growth and the prospective interest rates on market financing are the key sources of risk to debt sustainability."[The assumption is that projected cost of credit unions losses covers will be €500-1,000mln only.]

But don't worry - Government revenues are going to be very transparent. Per IMF analysis, in effect, the entire revenue adjustment forward will be carried through income taxes:

Perhaps a telling thing about the report is that the entire 'growth policies' section of the review is given less space than the reforms of the credit unions. What is given, however, is bizarrely thin on ideas and impact.

Most of the 'measures' referenced reflect focus on Employment Regulation Orders (EROs) or Registered Employment Agreements (REA) review - a measure that is likely to produce some labour cost reductions in the construction sector and perhaps some other labor intensive, lower-wage sectors. However, it is simply naive to believe that labor costs hold back jobs creation in retail, hospitality and construction. Instead, market structure, lack of consumer demand, Nama - for construction, banks credit availability and, above all, devastated personal incomes of those still working (via taxes hits and earnings declines) are the main drivers for lack of jobs creation in these sector. Review of wage setting mechanisms might be a high enough priority, but it is not the highest by any possible means.

Apart from that, IMF Megaminds have nothing else to say about jobs creation.

In the next post, I will focus on the IMF review of risks with respect to fiscal consolidation and growth.

20/12/2011: IMF IV Review of Ireland Programme: part 2

This continues my review of the IMF's 4th review of Ireland. The previous post (here) covered the findings concerning mortgages arrears and property markets.


"Budget execution remains on track despite weakness in revenues linked to domestic demand. ...Excluding net banking sector support costs, the January–October Exchequer primary deficit was €12.1 billion, 0.8 percentage points of GDP narrower than the authorities’ profile after allowing for the impact of the Jobs Initiative introduced in May 2011." [In other words, folks, allowing for pensions levy hit]

"The smaller deficit primarily reflects tight expenditure control; net current spending undershot budgetary allocation by 1.6 percent (0.4 percent of GDP), while capital spending was below profile by 17.2 percent (0.8 percent of GDP)." [This further shows that the smallest positive impact on deficit was derived from the largest area of expenditure - current spending, with capital spending cuts acting as the main driver, once again, of budgetary adjustment. This, of course, has been highlighted by me on numerous occasions.]

"Overall revenues remained on track, with shortfalls in taxes such as VAT due to weak domestic demand offset by higher than budgeted non-tax revenues, such as bank guarantee fees." [That's right, folks, one-off hits on income and wealth are 'compensating' for tax revenues fall-off in income tax, VAT and corporation tax. Again, keep in mind that IMF analysis is based on data that excludes the largest revenue generating month of November.]

But here's an interesting note: "The cumulative Exchequer primary balance through end-September 2011 was -€18.3 billion, above the adjusted target of -€20.2 billion. Central government net debt was €111.7 billion, below the adjusted indicative target of €115.9 billion" [One might ask the following question, is that target of €115.9bn - set in December 2010 - reflects the €3.6bn error found in Q3 2011? If not, then, of course, our 'outperformance of the target shrinks to a virtually irrelevant €500mln which, itself, can be fully covered by capital expenditure shortfall on the target mentioned above. In other words, when all is factored in, are we really outperforming the target set, or are we simply overestimating the target and ignoring expected spending?]

The IMF catches up to that:
"Program ceilings for fiscal indicators at end-2011 are expected to be observed. Although spending will pick up toward year-end, and a funding need of 0.2 percent of GDP is expected in relation to the failure of a private insurance company, the end-December performance criterion is projected to be achieved."
[In other words, the State will have to cover €300mln of Quinn Insurance losses in 2011 and then another €400mln of same in 2012. Alas, due to the accounting trick, since these losses will be recovered by the State through an insurance levy - to be paid by the completely innocent dopes (aka, us, consumers of insurance products in Ireland), the whole thing is not counted as Government debt, even though the State will be borrowing these funds.]

"Similarly, the general government deficit is projected at 10.3 percent of GDP, within the European Council’s ceiling of 10.6 percent of GDP. The 2011 consolidation package of €5.3 billion (3.4 percent of GDP) is expected to reduce the primary deficit to 6.7 percent of GDP, representing a €3.1 billion (2 percent of GDP) year-on-year reduction." [Now, note the maths - 6.7% primary deficit remains to be closed before we can begin net debt repayments. Last year, we've closed - and that is based on pre-November 2011 pretty disastrous numbers - 2%, so 2/9th down, 7/9th still to go, roughly-speaking]

Crucially: "The realized increase in the primary balance will thus likely amount to only about three-fifths of the consolidation effort, which reflects the adverse impact of the contraction in domestic demand and the rise in unemployment, highlighting the challenge of implementing large fiscal consolidations when growth is weak." [Here's what this means - due to the adverse effects of lower growth and higher unemployment, some 40% of this year's adjustment has gone on fighting the rising tide of economic crisis, not on structural rebalancing of fiscal deficit. In other words, if this situation of fiscal targets set against unrealistic expectations for growth were to continue in 2012 and through 2015, we will get a deficit to GDP ratio of closer to 5.5-6% not 2.9% as envisaged. Now, think about this in the following terms - Budget 2012 assumes growth of 1.3% next year - although I have some questions as to whether that is indeed the number, given that a day before the Budget 2012 was published, the Department of Finance quoted the figure of 1.6% - and the expectations of ESRI, OECD, the EU Commission and the IMF are now for 0.9-1%... hmmm... realistic expectations, targets and outcomes risks are now pretty clear...]

As is, the IMF report shows progress achieved. But it also raises a number of questions:

• Is this progress - 2% adjustment of which 2/5ths are simply gone to cover lost ground - sufficient?
• Is this progress sustainable (see next post)?
• Is this progress being achieved through structural reforms (current spending cuts and sustainable revenue raising) or through capital expenditure cuts and one-off tax measures?

The following post will cover the IMF analysis of the future outlook for the Irish economy.

08/12/2011: Budget 2012: Irish Daily Mail

Here is an unedited version of my article in the Irish Daily Mail covering Budget 2012.

Budget 2012 was billed as a path-breaking departure from the previous budgets. Quoting Minister Brendan Howlin, “Our budgetary process, …is about to change fundamentally.” The Government has been quick to stress the key concepts, that, in its view, were signaling a departure from previous 3 years of failed policy of capital cuts and tax increases, that yielded stillborn recovery we allegedly enjoy today.

Yet, in the end, Budget 2012 came down to a familiar hodgepodge of picking the proverbial low hanging fruit and covering up painful hit-and-run measures with platitudes. Once again, the nation is left with neither a long-term’, nor a ‘strategic’ model for fiscal sustainability.

We knew who were to be hit the hardest by this budget before our value-for-money busting duo of overpaid ministers set out to speak this week. The budget came down hard on the marginal groups across the less well-off: single parents, students, those reliant on public health. Old story by now. A well-tested strategy of Brian Cowen’s cowardly ‘leadership’: hit the smaller minorities as a token of ‘reforms’ and then decimate the silent majority of the middle class at will. At any cost, avoid taking on directly large vested interests.

And so, Budget 2012 cut into what effectively constitutes the largest tax rebate for the middle class – child benefit. And then it raised taxation on ordinary households. Healthcare costs – public and private went up - dressed up as 'savings' in the ministerial  speeches. Fuel taxes, VAT, DIRT, tobacco prices, household charge – you name it. Old story, once again: there is no change, no strategic approach, no long-term thinking.

Middle class that will see cuts to child benefits are ‘the new rich’, who also pay extortionary childcare costs and health insurance and after-school costs, all linked to having a real family. They finance mortgages that sustain the zombie zoo that is our banking sector. Although we did get some long overdue tax relief increases for mortgage interest for properties bought in 2004-2008, the measure is too little and too late to help the younger families pushed against the wall by the other budgetary measures.

Even adjustments in USC threshold came at a cost of applying cumulative basis to the levy on ordinary earners, implying higher tax clawback for the middle classes.

The new household charge, like the USC charge before it is not ring-fenced to cover any specific services the state might provide to the households. It is a pure tax, designed to finance pay increments to the public sector, pensions schemes rewarding early retirements in the civil service, dosh for advisers who help devise these policies of systematic impoverishment the middle class, the wasteful quangoes that the coalition is afraid to tackle.

The reductions of 6,000 via voluntary early retirement are both excessively costly and absurd from the point of view of improving public sector productivity. There are no reforms paths and no value-for-money benchmarks. The reduction target falls on those with more seniority on the job, not on those with lower ability or willingness to perform it. Good workers can be incentivised to leave their jobs, while bad workers can be encouraged to stay put.

And there is not change to the very source of our serial failures to reform Public Sector – the Croke Park agreement. Having delivered no change in the operations of the sector in two years of its existence, this deal has shown itself to be the core obstacle to reforms. But the Government continues to drone on about the inviolability of this compact with the largest vested interest group in the economy.

In the end, the only ‘fundamental change’ in the pages of the first FG/LP Budget is the clear departure from the numerous pre-election promises the coalition showered upon the gullible electorate.

08/12/2011: Budget 2012: Irish Examiner

This is an unedited version of my article for the Irish Examiner (December 8, 2011) covering Budget 2012.

As Peter Drucker once said  “Effective leadership is not about making speeches or being liked; leadership is defined by results not attributes.” By Drucker’s measure of leadership, Budget 2012 is a complete failure.

The Budget was launched with much pomp and circumstance. But in the end, the highly emotive language of ‘change’, ‘long-term thinking’ and ‘fundamental reforms’ served to cover up the return to the failed policies of the previous Government. No real change took place, and no real reforms were launched.

While much of the media attention is focused on the specific headline measures, especially those applying to the poor and the unemployed, very little analysis has been deployed to cover the budgetary dynamics – the very raison d’etre of the current austerity drive. Let’s take a closer look at what the Budget 2012 promises to deliver on the fiscal consolidation front and what it is likely to deliver in reality.

According to the Budget 2012 Ministerial Duet of Brendan Howlin and Michael Noonan, public expenditure reductions envisioned under the budget will amount to €1.4 billion in current spending and €755 million capital investment cut. These are gross savings, that will have second round effects of reduced associated tax revenues and thus their impact on deficit will be lower than envisaged.

Capital savings will come from mothballing a handful of white elephants carried over from the Bertie Ahearn’s era, but these will cost jobs and neglect in existent capital stock. Coupled with changes to CGT and CAT and Dirt, these measures will further depress investment in the economy that continues to experience collapse in this area. Yet, absent investment, there can be no jobs.

Perversely, the FG/Labor government thinks that the only capital investment worth supporting is that in property. The economy based on high value added services and knowledge and skills of its workforce is now fully incentivised for another property boom and fully disincentivised to invest in skills and entrepreneurship. The latter disincentives arising from the upper marginal income tax rate of 53% for all mortals and a special surcharge to 55% on self-employed. Never mind that self-employment is usually the first step toward enterpreneurship and business investment.

Short-termist reductions in one-parent family and jobseekers benefits are counterproductive to supporting large group of single parents in their transition to work. In the place where real reforms toward workforce activation should have been deployed, we now have a “all stick and no carrot” approach.

Health budget is one of the three mammoths of the fiscal ice age, with total spending this year projected to reach €12.83 billion this year, up 10.5% on 2010 levels. Instead of rationalising management systems at the HSE, the area where the bulk of waste resides, the Budget is achieving ‘savings’ by charging middle class insurance holders more for the very same services. A new tax, in effect, is now called ‘savings.

This Cardiffescue approach to accounting for sovereign funding and expenditure flows creates an illusion of something being done about the constantly rising current expenditure, while avoiding challenging operational and structural inefficiencies in public sector spending.

Budget 2012 is a mini-insight into a collapsed capability of a leadership system unable to cope with fiscal pressures and incapable of change.

Nothing else highlights this better than the host of new taxes that accompany the incessant drone of ‘jobs, jobs, jobs’ refrain from the Government.

Take the illogical hikes in VAT and fuel-related taxes. A 2% increase in the cost of shopping in Ireland, coupled with increase in the cost of petrol and diesel and a massive increase in tobacco taxes here will create tripple incentives for consumers to flee Irish retail sector in favour of Northern Ireland and to transact in the Black markets. None of these substitution effects are priced into Government budgetary projections, despite the fact that an error of omitting direct substitution effects of tax increases would have been a fatal one for an undergraduate student of economics.

The entire exercise looks like the repeat of Brian Cowen’s Grand Strategy of waiting until something turns up and rescues us. Thus, behold the rosy budgetary projections for 1.6% GDP growth in 2012, published just days after OECD confirmed its forecast for 1.0% growth and ESRI published its outlook with 0.9% growth projection.

These differences are material. Should the Budgetary assumptions on growth fail to materialize, the cuts and revenue measures envisioned by the Government will fall far short of what will be needed to keep the headline general government debt to GDP ratio at bay.

Karl Marx famously remarked that history repeats itself twice, first as tragedy, second as farce. Based on Irish Governments’ policies over the last 4 years, history ultimately blends into a farcical tragedy once leadership failures become a norm. Welcome to the farce of the long-term fundamental non-reforms of this new Government.

05/12/2011: Irish Exchequer Receipts: November 2011

Time to catch up with that data on Exchequer receipts for November - the critical month that makes or breaks Government budgets.

Income tax receipts: these are down to €12,709mln in 11 months of 2011, or -€272mln to target (-2.1%) but an impressive 22.5% above same period 2010 levels.

Sounds like tax policies of the past bearing fruit? Not really. Income tax rose €2,336 on 2010 in absolute terms, but at least €1,850mln of this is due to Health Levy reclassification as USC and aggregation into income tax receipts. Yes, folks, for all income tax increases in years past, the Exchequer netted less than €500mln in new revenues this year, or to be slightly more precise - an uplift not of claimed 22.5% (DofF maths), but of closer to just below 4.7%. The picture below looks good, but in reality, Income tax revenues are running below 2008 and 2009 levels, still, once Health Levy is factored in.

More ominously, the under-€500mln lead this year is based on the annual rate of Health Levy pay-in for 2010 spread evenly over all months. Of course, it probably was also peaking at around November, as usual seasonality in returns applied to it as well as to other income-related measures. Which means that it is quite possible that the annual rate of income tax increases will be even lower, once we see December figures than 4.7% figure suggests.

Let's recall that these figures come on top of shrinking workforce and rising unemployment and you get the picture - people at work are not getting anywhere, with their taxes rising dramatically in recent years, but Government revenue is not recovering either.

When it comes to VAT (second largest source of state revenues), the numbers are abysmal. November 2011 revenue is at €9,550mln or €464mln off target and 3.3% below 2010 figure (-€464mln). VAT receipts are 7.9% below those for the same period of 2009. Chart below shows what happens

Corporation tax receipts - the reflection of our booming exporting economy came in at €3,510mln or €236mln behind target and 4.3% or -€158mln down on 2010. Compared to 2009 these are now off 6.43% or -€241mln. Fourth straight year of decline.

Excise tax, the third largest category, is upo a whooping €15mln on target to €4,130mln, year on year the uplift is €39mln or 0.9%. And there was an even greater uplift in Stamps - up €442mln o  target to €1,297mln and up 51.6% year on year. Except, of course, that uplift is accounted for by the hit-and-run pension levy. Net of the pension levy, Stamps are actually down 1.75% yoy.

So total tax receipts are:

• Down €520mln on target (-1.6%) but officially up 7.9% (+€2,325mln) yoy
• Up just €18mln year on year once we net out Pension & Health Levies.
• Down on target in 3 out of top 4 tax headings and 
• Down on target in 5 out of 8 headings

Meanwhile, rosy forecasts continue to flow from the DofF which projects that 2012 total tax revenue will rise 4.13% (see here)... pass that funny gas mask, doc.

07/10/2011: Tax returns - truth and DofF-ised surreality

In his statement, following the publication of Exchequer returns for September (here), Minister for Finance, Michael Noonan stated (emphasis mine): "Tax receipts in the period to end-September were 8.7% above the same period in 2010 and slightly ahead of expectations. Although the minor surplus is due to some favourable timing factors and receipts from the Pension Levy introduced to fund the Jobs Initiative, it is encouraging that overall tax revenue is growing again. Individual tax-head performance has been mixed. VAT receipts are weaker than expected but income tax is performing well." The Minister further positioned improved tax and fiscal performance within the context of Irelands 'return to economic growth'.


Note: there is an excellent post on this topic available from Economic Incentives blog (here), although our numbers do differ slightly due to my numbers resting on explicit model for Health Levy revenues and some rounding differences. In addition, my post focuses on comparatives, including to pre-crisis dynamics and returns. I also attempt to cover slightly different questions as outlined below. Furthermore, Economic Incentives blog post also covers the issue of distorted timing on DIRT payments in April and July that I omit in the following consideration.


Another note: over the last 4 years we became accustomed to brutish spin from the previous Government when it comes to painting the tape on Ireland's 'progress' and 'recovery'. The current Government, however, is much more subtle in presenting the positive side of the 'recovery' and Minister Noonan's statement quoted above shows this. However, the real issue here is that in the name of transparency, DofF should be reporting actual figures that are comparable year on year. It's their job and they are failing to deliver on it.


The above statement, of course, raises the following three questions:

1. Did Ireland's tax revenue performance for 9mo through September deliver a significant enough change on 2010 and/or pre-crisis performance to warrant the above optimism?
2. Is Ireland's tax revenue performance attributable to 'return of growth'? and
3. Are the overall tax revenues really 'growing again' in any appreciable terms worthy of the Ministerial claim?

Table below summarizes the data on tax revenues through September 2011, including adjustments to tax heads that reflect:

• USC charge conversion from Health Levy to Income Tax measure: prior to 2011, health levy was collected within PRSI contributions, without being classified as Income Tax. In 2010, the levy collected amounted to €2.02bn for the year as a whole. Using distribution of income tax revenues across months for 2008-2010 average, I estimate that 65.9% of Health Levy would have been collected through September 2011 and account for this in the Income Tax ex-USC line. This is an imperfect estimate that errs on the downside of the overall USC impact as it disregards changes to the Health Levy rates & bands applied. In other words, my estimate assumes that USC incorporated into Income Tax today carries within it unchanged revenues from the Health Levy as per 2010.
• Pensions levy of €457mln is aggregated in the official figures into Stamp Duty returns and the table below provides for this in the line on Stamps ex Pensions levy. Note that the target for Pensions levy receipts was set at €470mln, so there is a shortfall on the target of €13mln which I do not account for in the relevant figures, making my ex-levy estimates erring on cautious side.
• Lastly, the total tax revenue ex-USC Health and Pension Levies incorporates the €122mln delayed payment

So let me run through the above:

• Income Tax revenues, once the Health Levy is factored out (revealing better comparatives to 2010 and before) are up 7.65%, not 25.7% in January-September 2011 compared to same period of 2010 that the DofF claims. Compared to 2009, Income tax revenues are up just 0.6%, not 17.5% implied by DofF numbers. See any significant uptick in the economy feeding through to significant rise in tax revenues? Well, stripping out tax rates increases and tax bands widening, I doubt there is anything but continued contraction in like-to-like revenues here.
• VAT is still tanking compared to 2010 (-2.0%) and to 2009 (-7.7%) as correctly reflected by DofF data. And VAT revenue gap is widening from H1 2011 to Q3 2011 as compared against 2010.
• Corporation tax revenue is falling - down 6.1% on 2010 and down 21% on 2009 and that is amidst historically record levels of exports! So if you know some evidence that 'exports-led recovery' is taking place, it is not showing up in the Exchequer receipts.
• Excise is down 1.4% on 2010 and 2.5% on 2009 and that dynamic is worsening from H1 2011 to Q3 2011.
• Stamps are down 1.4% once we factor out the hit-and-run on Pensions, not up 58.7% as DofF claims.
• CGT, CAT are down in double digits
• Customs are up as DofF shows.
• So total tax revenues are up 1.17% in comparable terms to 2010, not 8.7% as DofF claims and relative to 2009 total tax receipts are down 5.37%.

Relative to target figures are also severely skewed by USC reclassifications and Pension Levy receipts and show, in the end, that in comparable terms we are not delivering on targets. Of course, USC reclassification is reflected in the targets, so without netting out USC, total tax receipts are 0.69% behind the target as set in the Budget, not 0.7% ahead of it as DofF claims. And that is inclusive of timing error of €122mln and excluding USC reclassification change.

So what about our cumulative 'progress' since the crisis on-set in delivering on fiscal stability? Let's compare each year achievements to 2007 levels of total tax revenues:

Again, per table above, the entire set of draconian, growth-retarding tax hikes that have hit households since 2008 delivered virtually no improvement on the crisis dynamics. The shortfall on tax revenue for 9 months January-September period relative to same period pre-crisis (in 2007) in 2010 was €9,290mln and it currently stands at €9,030mln - an improvement of €260mln or less than €30mln per month!

Can anyone still claim that Ireland's public finances are on track to achieve some meaningful targets whatsoever? As Seamus Coffey (in the blog post linked above) points out: "I must say that I cannot see the justification for greeting the figures in such glowing terms" as those used by Minister Noonan and the DofF. I agree.