Monday, July 16, 2012

17/6/2012: Services Value Index for Ireland - May 2012

Some good news for a change:


Per CSO: "The seasonally adjusted monthly services value index increased by 5.5% in May 2012 when compared with April 2012 and there was an annual increase of 8.0%." Some notable mom changes were:

  • Information and Communication (+12.1%), 
  • Business Services (+6.3%), 
  • Wholesale and Retail Trade (+4.5%), 
  • Other Services (+2.3%) 
  • Accommodation and Food Service Activities (+0.3%) 
  • Transportation and Storage showed a monthly decrease of 1.4%.

Some larger yoy moves were:

  • Information and Communication (+20.0%), 
  • Transportation and Storage (+8.7%),
  • Wholesale and Retail Trade (+8.3%), 
  • Other Services (+0.8%) 
  • Business Services (+0.2%) 
  • Accommodation and Food Service Activities showed an annual decrease of 2.5%.



16/7/2012: GFSR July 2012 - more alarm bells for European banks


IMF published Global Financial Stability Report update for June 2012, titled “Intense Financial Risks: Time for Action”

Per report: “Risks to financial stability have increased since the April 2012 Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR).
  • Sovereign yields in southern Europe have risen sharply amid further erosion of the investor base.
  • Elevated funding and market pressures pose risks of further cuts in peripheral euro area credit.
  • The measures agreed at the recent European Union (EU) leaders’ summit provide significant steps to address the immediate crisis. Aside from supportive monetary and liquidity policies, the timely implementation of the recently agreed measures, together with further progress on banking and fiscal unions, must be a priority.
  • Uncertainties about the asset quality of banks’ balance sheets must be resolved quickly, with capital injections and restructurings where needed.
  •  Growth prospects in other advanced countries and emerging markets have also weakened, leaving them less able to deal with spillovers from the euro area crisis or to address their own home-grown fiscal and financial vulnerabilities. 
  •  Uncertainties on the fiscal outlook and federal debt ceiling in the United States present a latent risk to financial stability."


Aside from the headlines, some interesting points from the report are:


  • Market conditions worsened significantly in May and June, with measures of financial market stress reverting to, and in some cases surpassing, the levels seen during the worst period in November last year.  (see Figure 1)
  •   The 3-year LTROs helped support demand for peripheral sovereign debt but that positive effect has waned. Private capital outflows continued to erode the foreign investor base in Italy and Spain (see Figures 3 and 4)



An interesting point on Euro area banking sector [emphasis mine]: “Notwithstanding the ample liquidity provided by the ECB’s refinancing operations, funding conditions for many peripheral banks and firms have deteriorated. Interbank conditions remain strained, with very limited activity in unsecured term markets, and liquidity hoarding by core euro area banks. Bank bond issuance has dropped off precipitously, with little investor demand even at higher interest rates.

“Banks in the euro area periphery have had to turn to the ECB to replace lost funding support, as cross-border wholesale funding dried up, and deposit outflows continue. The April 2012 GFSR noted that EU banks are under pressure to cut back assets, due to funding strains and market pressures, as well as to longer-term structural and regulatory drivers. The sharp reduction in bank balance sheets in the fourth quarter of 2011 continued, albeit at a slower pace, in the first quarter of 2012.

Growth in euro area private sector credit diverged significantly. While credit has contracted in Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland, it has remained more stable in some core countries.

Survey data on bank lending conditions show that credit supply remains tight, albeit less so than at the end of 2011, but that demand has also weakened more recently.

Deleveraging is also a concern for many peripheral corporations, given their historic dependence on bank funding and the risk that credit downgrades and diminished investor appetite could drive borrowing costs higher, even for high credit quality issuers.”


Now, here’s an interesting point not raised in the GFSR, but linked to the above observations: equities issuance accounts for roughly 55% of total corporate capital in US and EU. However, because the US corporates issue more bonds-backed debt than their EU counterparts, banks lending accounts for 40% of the European corporate funds raised, against 20% in the US. Which means that banks credit is about twice more important in Europe than in the US in terms of funding corporate capex. In fact, recent research from BCA clearly links US corporates ability to raise direct market funding by-passing banks to faster economic recovery in the US than in EU or Japan.

Add to this equation that European banks are worse capitalized than their US counterparts and that they are more leveraged than their US counterparts and you have a bleak prospect for the EU economy. BCA recently estimated that to bring Euro zone banks’ capital ratios to the levels comparable with the US average, the largest EU banks will have to raise some USD900 billion worth of new capital or cut their assets base by a whooping USD 9 trillion.

But wait, there’s more – you’ve heard about the latest report in the WSJ that Mario Draghi proposed to bail-in senior bondhodlers in Spanish banks? Much of the Irish commentary on this was positive, suggesting that Ireland is now in line for a retrospective deal from the ECB to recover some of the funds we paid to senior bondholders in Anglo and INBS. Setting aside the ‘wishful thinking’ nature of such comments – look at Draghi’s idea implications for EU economic activity. If bail-in does make it to the policy tool of European authorities, funding for the EA17 banks will only become more expensive in the medium and long term (risk premium on ‘bail-in probability’), which, in turn will mean even less credit for corporates, which will mean even less capex, and thus even lower prospect of recovery.

You know the story – pull one end of the carriage out of the quicksand pit, the other end sinks deeper… Let me quote BCA: “In Japan, credit contraction lasted well over nine years in the aftermath of the asset bubble bust. During that time, deflation prevailed and economic growth averaged a measly 0.5% annual pace.” Much of hope for Europe then? Not really. Recall that Japan had aggressive fiscal and monetary policies at its disposal plus booming global markets when it was undergoing credit bust. We, however, have psychotic monetary policy, no fiscal policy room and are running debt deflation cycle amidst global economic slowdown.

IMF is also on the note here: “Policymakers must resolve the uncertainty about bank asset quality and support the strengthening of banks’ balance sheets. Bank capital or funding structures in many institutions remain weak and insufficient to restore market confidence. In some cases, bank recapitalizations and restructurings need to be pursued, including through direct equity injections from the ESM into weak but viable banks…”

16/7/2012: IMF downgrades growth prospects for 2012-2013


A notably interesting, if worrying, World Economic Outlook update from the IMF today. Titled “New Setbacks, Further Policy Action Needed” the document sounds several key warnings:
  • In the past three months, the global recovery, which was not strong to start with, has shown signs of further weakness.
  • Financial market and sovereign stress in the euro area periphery have ratcheted up, close to end-2011 levels.
  • Growth in a number of major emerging market economies has been lower than forecast. …these developments will only result in a minor setback to the global outlook, with global growth at 3.5 percent in 2012 and 3.9 percent in 2013, marginally lower than in the April 2012 World Economic Outlook.
  • These forecasts, however, are predicated on two important assumptions: that there will be sufficient policy action to allow financial conditions in the euro area periphery to ease gradually and that recent policy easing in emerging market economies will gain traction.
  • Clearly, downside risks continue to loom large, importantly reflecting risks of delayed or insufficient policy action. In Europe, the measures announced at the European Union (EU) leaders’ summit in June are steps in the right direction.
  •  The very recent, renewed deterioration of sovereign debt markets underscores that timely implementation of these measures, together with further progress on banking and fiscal union, must be a priority.
  •  In the United States, avoiding the fiscal cliff, promptly raising the debt ceiling, and developing a medium-term fiscal plan are of the essence. In emerging market economies, policymakers should be ready to cope with trade declines and the high volatility of capital flows.

Some growth forecasts snapshots of the IMF update for 2012 and 2013:

  • US gets downgraded on growth for both years by 0.1% from 2.1% in April 2012 to 2.0 in July 2012, and for 2013 from 2.4% to 2.3%.
  • Meanwhile, Euro zone gets no change in 2012 forecast (at -0.3%) and a downgrade by -0.2% to 0.7% for 2013 forecast.
  •  Let’s recall that Eurozone is Ireland’s ‘hope’ and ‘engine for growth’ according to our Government. And it is expected to perform markedly worse than any other advanced region in both 2012 and 2013. 
  •  Note that the most ‘dynamic’ large euro zone economy – Germany – is now expected to grow by a ridiculously low 1.4% in 2013 on top of an absurdly low 1.0% in 2012.
  • Elsewhere, China and India both got seriously downgraded in terms of growth prospects for 2012 and 2013 compared to IMF forecasts 3 months ago.

Chart below shows some monetary and banking sides of the euro crisis.


“Overall, global growth is projected to moderate to 3.5 percent in 2012 and 3.9 percent in 2013, some 0.1 and 0.2 percentage point, respectively, lower than forecast in the April 2012 WEO…

Growth in advanced economies is projected to expand by 1.4 percent in 2012 and 1.9 percent in 2013, a downward revision of 0.2 percentage point for 2013 relative to the April 2012 WEO. The downward revision mostly reflects weaker activity in the euro area, especially in the periphery economies, where the dampening effects from uncertainty and tighter financial conditions will be strongest.”

“Growth in emerging and developing economies will moderate to 5.6 percent in 2012 before picking up to 5.9 percent in 2013, a downward revision of 0.1 and 0.2 percentage point in 2012 and 2013, respectively, relative to the April 2012 WEO… Growth is projected to remain relatively weaker than in 2011 in regions connected more closely with the euro area (Central and Eastern Europe in particular).”

16/7/2012: IMF Fiscal Monitor Update - Ireland

IMF just published its Fiscal Monitor Update for July 2012 with some interesting data. I will focus here on forecast changes and updates to Advanced Economies, including Ireland.

 Chart above shows changes in the cyclically adjusted fiscal balances (structural deficits) which clearly highlight Ireland as a relative laggard in the fiscal adjustment process. Despite this, IMF concludes in the case of Ireland that:

Not exactly time to grab champagne yet... In its Table 1 IMF supplies Fiscal Indicators for the countries for 2008-2013 period, inclusive of revisions from April 2012 report to July 2012 report. And I plotted these in the charts below:

First chart covers Overall Fiscal Deficits for 2011, 2012 and 2013 per latest (July 2012 forecasts):


Clearly, Ireland had the worst fiscal deficit in 2011 of all EA17 states covered by the IMF update.  But we are also expected to post the worst deficit in 2012 and 2013.

Adding insult to injury, chart below shows that IMF downgraded our deficit cutting prospect for 2013 by 0.2 ppt, which is the worst case (on par with Spain) of a downgrade for an EA17 state covered. Note: we did get an upgrade from April to July forecasts for 2012 results.


Let's take a look at Cyclically-Adjusted Deficits measured as % of potential GDP (aka structural deficits):


Again, per chart above, Ireland had the worst EA (covered states) cyclically-adjusted deficit in 2011, followed by the expected worst deficits in 2012 and 2013. We posted the second worst downgrade for 2013 forecast (Spain was first). As before, we got an upgrade on cyclically-adjusted deficit forecast for 2012 - which is good news.


Now, what about that fabled Irish leadership in austerity? Chart below shows the depth of structural deficits reductions from 2009 through 2012 (forecast consistent with July update):


It turns out, per chart above, that our championship in austerity is really behind that of Greece (-14%),  Portugal (-6.7%) and Spain (-4.7%).

And the really worrisome update is reserved for Government debt levels. Back two years ago I predicted that Irish debt/GDP ratio will top over 120% marker. Back then, I was criticized for this because an army of our 'green jersey' economists and commentators decided that 120% is a magic number we will never reach. The reason for their ardent defense of this imaginary line in the sand is that they bought into the ECB and EU line that 120% is 'sustainability bound' for public debt. Of course, I never aligned with the idea that 120% debt/GDP ratio is a magic 'sustainability bound'. But, now, take a look at chart below:


Per IMF latest forecast, Ireland's 2012 Government debt will reach 117.6% of GDP (up on 113.2% forecast for 2012 back in April) and in 2013 it will peak at 121.1% of GDP (up on 117.7% forecast for 2013 back in April).


Note that for all our efforts, our Government debt/GDP ratio will be relatively close in 2013 to that of Italy (126.4% of GDP) and above Portugal (118.6% of GDP).

Pretty ugly.

Friday, July 13, 2012

13/7/2012: CERN and Other 'Alternatives'

There is an interesting debate going on right now in Ireland about our membership in CERN project.

The debate is exemplified by some claiming that Ireland funds 'other' programmes of similar expenditure magnitude and therefore, we can fund CERN membership as well. Here is one example, just for illustrative purposes (not to pick on the specifics, but to illustrate):


This type of an argument is doubtful at lest on 3 fronts: 

  1. It assumes that €20mln on methadone support (other programme) yields lower value 4 money than CERN membership. Which is unproven. I am yet to see a feasibility study for:
    • CERN membership 
    • Methadone support withdrawal
    • Comparative between two actions
  2. It assumes that CERN membership will return 'jobs & science' for Ireland. Which is unproven & not supported by any assessment, as far as I know. I place tremendous value on science, especially on primary science. Primary science is supported by CERN with some promises (note - promises) of applications. However, Ireland has many other, and arguably potentially more pressing needs for financing in science. Perhaps, to support physics and other primary fields relating to CERN, an alternative to CERN membership can be developed via collaborative research or 'partial' (per-project) membership? If we have brilliant ideas to be tested at CERN, surely German or French or UK etc researchers would love to co-author with our physicists on these? If no, something is deeply amiss in the field.
  3. It assumes that we have a choice between supporting methadone dispensing (other spending lines) and supporting CERN. This is only true if the two spending alternatives presented are comparable ones in terms of social and public safety goods and economic returns. I doubt there is any evidence to support this either.
In short, yes, there is plenty of spending waste in Government programmes, including in sciences and public health. No, this does not mean we should simply swap one programme for another because they 'spend similar' amounts. But, yes, we need serious assessments of potential membership in CERN.

Thursday, July 12, 2012

12/7/2012: Wealth taxes - coming up next to Europe near you...

And so wealth taxes (on those who are not all that wealthy, in fact) is a matter of EU-wide policy now, thanks to Schauble: link here and here. Note, the idea is to tax property assets in excess of €250,000 - with an additional one-off levy of 10% on top of other taxes and presumably, as per talk in one of the links about 'capital taxes' other assets can be included. And the original source for the grand idea is here.

Thus, the logic goes, you've saved for the retirement (which requires at least as much in provisions as the tax bound) and you are not a drag on social pensions system. Off you go, pay up...

One question - what happens if two years from now property values drop and your property 'wealth' declines to below €250K... do you get a refund?.. Question two - what happens when tax is levied and as the result, property markets go into further contractions, forcing question one above to the forefront?.. Question three - what happens in the long run when taxes have depleted not only disposable (investable) incomes, but also investable (and largely illiquid) wealth - do pensions provisions go up?.. do Governments step in to provide cheap capital for investment?.. does Schauble and his friends drop their own pensions demands to compensate economy for €230 billion they've sucked out of investment pool?..

Idiots squad has never been so much enforced in Europe as today.

Saturday, July 7, 2012

7/7/2012: Banking union - a bit of a folly

Daniel Gros makes a cogent argument on banking union at vox.eu : http://bit.ly/L0tmUR

However... his argument is partially self-defeating.

Unified banking operations for an Italian bank with german subsidiary he uses as an example, by allowing transfer of liquidity (funds / deposits) from German subsidiary to cover Italian parent's liquidity demand that arises from Italian bank's overall elevated riskiness would be, in effect, a case of mis-pricing risk for German customers of the Italian bank. Should these customers re-price risk post-banking union, the customers will walk out of the subsidiary and the Italian parent bank will still be short of liquidity.

Thus, unless Italian bank is made a German bank (or until), the problem will remain. The only way for the supervisory authority to avoid the problem arising in the short run is by deceiving German customers of the Italian bank.

In addition, in order to make an Italian bank into a German bank, common supervision will require full convergence of all banking models to a common denominator. Whether such a convergence yields a better Italian bank (by the standards of the day) and / or a less safe German bank is a matter of more than supervision, but of a full regulatory convergence.

Tuesday, July 3, 2012

3/7/2012: Curb your enthusiasms?

So, the NTMA have issued a (welcome) note that Ireland is to resume auctions of T-bills. The note states that "on Thursday 5 July 2012. The NTMA will offer €500 million of Treasury Bills with a three-month maturity in its first such auction since September 2010." 



The details of the auction on 5 July are as follows: 
• Auction size: €500 million. 
• Maturity: 15 October 2012. 
• Auction opens: 9:30 a.m. 
• Auction closes: 10:30 a.m. 
• Settlement date: 9 July 2012. 

This is potentially (pending results of sale, namely yield, volume and percentage allocation to non-captive banks and funds) a minor positive for Ireland. Minor, because:
  1. Bills are NOT bonds - bills are short-term instruments, traditionally under 12 months maturity (bonds are over 1 year maturity).
  2. Bills issued currently fall to mature within the period of existent EFSF funding programme, so in effect there will always be funds to cover these, short of a catastrophic collapse of the euro during the duration of the bills.
  3. Issuance of bills has nothing to do in terms of signaling the state of public finances health or economic conditions health of the issuer, as both Greece (see here) and Portugal (here) have issued these during their tenure in the rescue programmes.
  4. Portugal issuance (linked above) covered 18-mos bills, which would constitute a stronger positive signal than that of planned Irish sale, if there was any whatsoever informational content to these auctions.
  5. Ireland has issued T-bills back in September 2010, and then it was NOT a signal of any confidence in Ireland's financial health.
The media statements that this sale shows that 'Ireland is back to bond markets' is fully incorrect. T-bills market is not the same as bond market. And T-bill instruments are distinct from the bonds. For example, T-bills were not covered by PSI default in Greece, unlike bonds.

Funding public spending via T-Bills is a (marginally?) riskier undertaking for the Exchequer because it implies transfer of any potential maturity mismatch risk onto the Exchequer. Maturity mismatch risk arises when the Government uses short-term debt to finance longer-term spending commitments.

So what is the 'positive' then in NTMA news? For now - just a hope we do not get a complete rejection (which is highly unlikely, as NTMA has primed the market already). We need to see results of the auction to tell if things are positive or not - e.g. how high is the demand from outside Ireland? how expensive is the funding obtained compared to secondary bonds markets on shorter maturity end? etc.

H/T for some of the above to: Prof Karl Whelan, Prof Brian M Lucey, Owen Callan (Danske Markets)

Update:  There is a nagging question begs asking - why does Ireland need T-bill? Portugal and Greece might have used T-Bills to manage expenditure in the interim of disbursals of EFSF funds, which, especially for Greece this year, have been uncertain. Ireland is fully compliant with Troika requirements and is getting its money on schedule, with no uncertainty. In effect, therefore, either we are facing a shortfall on funding within the programme (unlikely in my view) or we are using T-bills (more expensive money raising) to finance that which we can finance at cheaper rates via Troika funds. The latter option is double-daft as the repayment of T-bills will be done out of the same Troika money. In this latter case, of course, the motivation can be to simply 'generate feel-good news' by the Government that 'Ireland is back to the (bond) markets'...

Monday, July 2, 2012

2/7/2012: Sunday Times 24/06/2012: Pharma Cliff is Here

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article from June 24th.


Since the beginning of this crisis back in 2008, Irish Governments have been quick to point to our exceptional and exemplary trade performance as the sole hope for the recovery. As we know, five years into the crisis, that recovery is still wanting. However, our exports have expanded significantly.

The latest Irish trade in goods statistics, released this week by the CSO and covering the period through April 2012 come on foot of the last week’s release of the more detailed trade statistics for Q1 2012. Both are presenting an alarming picture.

April 2011 Stability Programme Update (SPU), the official Government report card to the Troika, envisioned exports growth of 6.8% in 2011 and 5.7% in 2012. Budget 2012 revised 2011 exports growth estimate to 4.6%. By April 2012 – the latest SPU publication – actual 2011 growth outrun was 4.1%, down a massive 2.7 percentage points on a 9 months-ahead forecast from April 2011. April 2012 SPU also revised 2012 projected exports growth to 3.3%. More realistic IMF is now projecting exports growth of 3.0% this year as per its latest Article IV report on Ireland released last week.

As poor as the above prospects might be, the reality is even more alarming. For trade in goods only, January-April 2012 period total volume of imports was down 7.2% on the same period of 2011, while the volume of exports was down 0.9%, not up 3.3% as forecast in the Budget and the latest SPU. So far, average rate of growth in exports in the first four months of 2012 is -0.6%, down from the same period 2011 average growth rate of 7.4%.

Our trade surplus in goods is up 7.7%, but that is due to the fall-off in imports, especially in Machinery and Transport Equipment and in Chemicals and Related Products categories. The decline in imports, while boosting temporarily our trade balance, can mean only two possible things: either imports will accelerate much faster than exports in months ahead as MNCs rebuild their diminishing stocks of inputs, or MNCs will cut back their exports output even further. Either way, there will be new pressure coming from the external trade side.

The latest decreases in exports are driven by the rapid shrinking of two sub-sectors.

In the first four months of 2012, Medical and Pharmaceutical Products exports have fallen to €7.93 billion from €9.01 billion a year ago – a decline of almost 12%. And this trend is accelerating with 21% drop in April 2012 compare to 12 months ago. The patent cliff, or in common terms, production cuts as drugs go off patent, is now biting hard with blockbuster drugs, such as Lipitor and Viagra either going or scheduled to go soon into competition with generics.

Organic Chemicals have also shrunk in April compare to a year ago, although the first four months of the year exports are still up on 2011.

These two sectors are the giants of Irish exports. In 2010, exports of Medical and Pharmaceutical Products and Organic Chemicals accounted for 49% of our total shipments of goods abroad. By 2011 this number rose to 50%. At the same time, in 2010 and 2011 the two sectors trade surplus (the difference between the value of exports and imports) was close to 88% of our total trade surplus in goods. So far, in the first 4 months of 2012, the same holds, with two sectors contribution to trade surplus now reaching above 95%.

Given the on-going contraction in the sectors activity revealed in April data, and given steady, even rising, share of their contribution to our overall trade in goods, one has to ask a question as to why other sectors of exporting activity are not taking up the slack created by declining pharma sales?

The answer is, unfortunately, as worrying as the stats above.

Since about 2007, when the effects of the upcoming patent cliff started to feed into the decision makers’ diaries, Irish trade development and FDI policy has shifted in the direction of promoting bio-pharmaceutical and biotechnology investment and trade. Much hope was placed on these two sectors stepping up to the plate to replace revenues that were expected to be lost in the pharma sector.

These are yet to bear fruit and, given the accelerating competition worldwide for biotech business and investment, our time maybe running out. The main obstacles to the bio-pharma and biotech sectors development here in Ireland are regulatory, policy and institutional.

One key focus of biotechnology sector research pipeline worldwide is on stem-cell research – the area restricted in Ireland by the lack international (rather than national) standards. The same applies to a number of other areas of R&D intensive sector. Analysis by Pfizer, published two years ago, spelled exactly why Ireland is not at the races when it comes to clinical research, an area that covers huge R&D related spends of major pharmaceutical and biotech companies. We lack competitiveness in terms of providing unified and transparent research infrastructure, absence of a systemic ‘knowledge-sourcing’ opportunities, protracted and unpredictable research approval and trial processes, high cost of sourcing patients for trials, cost and bureaucratic burden relating to regulatory inspections and compliance, and lack of PR and communications platforms that can be used outside Ireland.

Back in 2010, the Research Prioritization Steering Group was set up to review priorities for Ireland’s research funding. Published this March, the Group report marks a significant departure from the previous funding approach for bio-medical sciences, re-focusing funding toward commercialization and jobs creation, away from ‘pure’ science and early stage research. This shift in the approach is both radical and reflective of the realities in the biotechnology and other core high technology sectors to-date. During the previous decade, the state spent €7.3 billion on R&D supports under Government Budget Appropriations or Outlays on R&D, helping to employ some 340 PhDs and 171 non-PhD researchers in the state sector alone in 2010 (down from 431 and 197, respectively in 2008). Yet there is preciously little in terms of exports generation that came from these programmes, and today Ireland has no serious indigenous or FDI-supported start-ups culture in bio-pharma or modern medicine and healthcare.


As competition for the sector investment heats up, and as MNCs-led pharma exports continue to shrink, Ireland needs to move fast to create institutional and regulatory systems that can make us attractive to biotech firms. One simple step would be to reinstate a national bioethics council and integrate organizational systems relating to biotech R&D. The role of the Government’s Science Advisor should become more assertive, outputs-focused and linked directly to providing better information to the Government and policymakers on both the strategic aspects of R&D policies and actual outcomes. Alongside, we need to put in place systems for better assessment of returns on investment in R&D as well as processes that would allow us to act on such evaluations. If entrepreneurship and jobs creation were to become core objectives for R&D backing, we should consider merging commercialization functions of the Science Foundation Ireland with exports development capabilities of the Enterprise Ireland. This should leave SFI dealing solely with pure research, reducing duplication in the system of commercialization supports.

The latest trade figures, taken on their own, should sound an alarm bell in the corridors of power.





Box-out:

In an economy that is importing pretty much everything it uses for capital investment, having an investment ‘stimulus’ is equivalent to taking each euro of Government spending and sending over a half of it abroad – in aid of imports manufacturers in Germany, France, the UK and further afield. The end result of such a transaction would be a gross gain to the economy from employing lower-skilled domestic workers installing imported capital, minus the value of imports, plus the returns to the installed capital. Given the low value-added of low skilled labour, the net result would most likely be a loss to the economy due to close-to-zero returns on the above transaction and high cost of financing such a stimulus in the current funding conditions. In Ireland, the above negative return is likely to be increased further by the politicized nature of our public ‘investments’. Thus, in my view, the ESRI is correct in its assessment, published this week, of the undesirability of a fiscal stimulus in the current conditions. Minister Howlin, in his response to the ESRI arguments claimed that “…the social imperative of getting people back to work is … a far more important [priority] in the current climate.” His statement betrays disdain for evidence and economic illiteracy of frightening proportions. The Government should not and can not be in the business of wasting people’s resources, including the resources of the unemployed taxpayers, on feel-good ‘policies’. Yet Minister Howlin disagrees, even when the wastefulness of his own belief is factually evidenced by research. The Government should have economically sensible programmes for dealing with the curse of long-term unemployment. These, however, should not come at the expense of creating apparent waste.

2/7/2012: One brutal Monday

Brutal beginning to the week in terms of economics data:


(via ZeroHedge) and

(via Reuters)