Economics 03/05/2010: World Debt Wish 5

This is the fifth post in the series covering world debt issues. In the previous posts I provided analysis of the aggregate debt levels for 36 largest debtor nations (here) and for the Government debt (here), the banks debt (here) and the country level data (here). This post puts things into comparative perspective.

Before we begin, however, let me quote from today's Financial Times: "On my estimate, the total size of a liquidity backstop for Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland and possibly Italy could add up to somewhere between €500bn ($665bn, £435bn) and €1,000bn. All those countries are facing increases in interest rates at a time when they are either in recession or just limping out of one. The private sector in some of those countries is simply not viable at those higher rates."

Notice the numbers Wolfgang Munchau quotes above, and the countries he includes in the end-game rescue package. Ireland, figures in marginally - the last in line. Yet, what you are about to witness puts a different order on the potential default scenario within the PIIGS.

First the so-called 'good news' - per our Government's repeated boasting, Ireland is a country with sound public sector debt levels. Oh, really?
Chart above shows General Government Debt as percentage of GDP. Note, I decided to play 'fair' with Brian Lenihan here - he seemingly cannot understand the GDP/GNP gap, so let us not challenge him too much in his job and use GDP as a benchmark. Per chart above, as of Q4 2009 we had a 62% ratio of GGD to GDP. This puts us into a 'sound' fifth position in the group of world's most indebted 36 nations, behind such 'sound' public finance countries as

• Greece (93%)
• Belgium (74%)
• Italy (65% - getting dangerously close to Ireland)
• France (63% - virtually indistinguishable to Ireland)

Note, this is GGD nomenclature of the IMF/BIS/World Bank framework, which is slightly different from the Stability & Growth Pact methodology deployed by the EU, but unlike the EU's methodology, this one is comparative across the world.

Nothing to brag about here, folks. Fifth. And rising faster than France's or Italy's or Belgium's...
Chart above puts us into comparison in terms of banks' debt - need any explanation here? Oh, yes, we are the most indebted nation in the world by that metric. Worse than this. Suppose we chop off the IFSC (roughly 60% of the banks & 'other' credit institutions' debt). We end up being - the 3rd most indebted banking system in the world.

Of course, in the end it will be the real economy of Ireland - including our corporates and households - who will be paying for Brian Cowen's policies (GGD) and for the banks (Gross Banks Debt), so perhaps here Ireland is doing well? There has to be hope somewhere?
Oops, not really. In terms of private (non-banks and non-Exchequer) sectors debt Ireland Inc is actually in worse shape than it is in terms of banks and the Exchequer (which of course begs a questions - what are we doing rescuing banks while the real economy sinks?). Notice that we occupied this dubious first place in the world back in the days of 2003 as well, and part of this is IFSC as well - pension funds and investment funds. But the amount of debt we piled on since then is purely spectacular.

And so now, down to the main figure - the combined external debt liability of Ireland relative to other most indebted nations:
I bet the unions who are calling for more borrowing to finance more growth (the irony of ironies is, of course, that they were so loudly opposing 'growth for growth sake' during the Tiger years) want Mister Lenihan to pull out the state cheque book...

Now let me slightly digress from Ireland and focus on the US. Per above data:

• US public sector debt is only a notch above the 36 countries average;
• US Gross bank's debt is by leagues and bound lower than the 36 countries average;
• US private sector debt is just above the average for the 36 most indebted countries, which implies that
• US total economy debt is below the average for the 36 countries.
  

Now, for all Messrs Lenihan and Cowen talk about how the US caused Irish crisis, somehow the real data shows nothing of the sorts... Instead - the real data paints a picture of Ireland deeply sick by all fiscal and financial standards back in Q4 2003. If you go back to those days, really, there were only few economists who warned about some aspects of this problem - myself, Morgan Kelly inclusive. But there was only one economist who consistently argued back then that the entire picture of the Irish economy was wrong. It was David McWilliams. It turns out - he was right!

3/2/2013: Argentina v Chile: Government & External Balances

In the previous post I looked at the real economy comparatives between Latin America's best-in-class Chile and worst-in-class Argentina.

As promised, now a quick look at the Government and external balances.

If in terms of real economy comparatives, Argentina hardly significantly underperformed Chile since the mid 2000s, in terms of straight down the line General Government Deficits the country is a veritable basket case:

Just as in the case of the real economy, Chile moved dramatically away from Argentina in terms of gross deficits in 1996-2008, outperforming Argentina over that period of time in every year. After 2010, the same picture repeats. On a 5-year average basis, in 1996-2000, average General Deficit in Argentina stood at -3.0%, rising to 6.13% in 2001-2005, declining to -1.74% in 2006-2010 and rising again to -2.83% for 2011-2015 (based on IMF forecasts). Over the same periods of time, Chile recorded average surpluses in every 5 year period: +0.37% in 1996-2000, +0.90% in 2001-2005, +3.03% in 2006-2010 and forecast +0.02% in 2011-2015.

However, much of the headline deficit underperformance by Argentina relates directly to the burden of debt servicing. In this context, Primary Deficits are much more benign to Argentina's case, as illustrated in two charts below:

Again, consider 5-year periods in average annual terms. Due to lack of comprable data for Argentina for 1996-2000, let's omit this subperiod. In 2001-2005, Argentina's primary balance was on average in a surplus of 3.60%, with surplus declining to +2.26% in 2006-2010 and turning a deficit of -0.38% in 2011-2015 forecast period. Meanwhile, Chile enjoyed lower surplus of 1.38% in 2001-2005 epriod, higher surplus of 2.92% in 2006-2010 and a surplus of +0.17% in 2011-2015 period. So while overall Chile did show stronger performance, Argentina's primary deficits were hardly a substantial issue over the period of 2001-present.

Of course, Argentina's debt mountain is legendary... or should it be 'was legendary'?

Argentina's Government Debt/GDP ratio has peaked at 165% in the crisis year of 2002. So much is true. However, overall, the ramp up of debt (dynamics of debt accumulation) and the reduction in debt ratio to economy since the peak have been more than telling. In 1996-2000 Argentina's Government debt/GDP ratio averaged 40.6% - hardly a significant drag on either growth or public finances. In 2001-2005 the same stood at 114.44% of GDP - clearly well in excess of the known bounds for debt sustainability. With debt restructuring and return of economic growth, Argentina's Government debt/GDP ratio fell to 61.99% average for 2006-2010 period and is now on track to hit 43.42% average for 2011-2015. In other words, the country is expected to basically return to pre-crisis levels of Government debt burden by the end of 2015, some 13 years after the crisis.

Over the same period of time, Chile showed exemplary debt performance. Government debt/GDP ratio stood at 13.29% on average during 1996-2000 period, falling to 11.91% in 2001-2005 period and to 5.65% in 2006-2010. Since the devastating earthquake in 2010, debt/GDP ratio notched up to 12.09% for 2011-2015 period.

On external account side, Chile has been a recipient of the strong capital inflows from abroad over recent decades, the position that allowed the country to run significant deficits on trade side. Despite this, overall exports in both countries have been growing roughly-speaking in tandem, with slightly higher volatility for Argentina:

Thus, cumulated current account deficits in the case of Chile run at -104.2% of GDP over 1980-2017 period, against a cumulated deficit of just 24.54% for Argentina. Since 1990 through 2017, Argentina's current account deficits on a cumulated basis will amount to 4.43% of GDP against Chile's 36.62%. And over the period 2000-2017, the IMF is projecting cumulated current account deficit of 9.91% for Chile and a surplus of 20.62% for Argentina.

On the net, excluding fiscal performance and inflation, and keeping in mind that some of the official stats from Argentina are rather dodgy, there is little evidence to suggest that Argentine economy is a 'veritable basket case'. Instead, it is rather an economy struggling with Government debt overhang and fiscal situation whereby benign primary deficits are simply overwhelmed by debt servicing costs. In that sense, Argentina is closer to Italy (correcting for differences in growth rates) than to the 1990s crisis-stricken HIPCs.

16/12/16: The Root of the 2007-2010 Crises is Back, with a Vengeance

There are several fundamental problem in the global economy, legacies of the past 20 years - from the mid 1990s on - that continue to drive the trend toward secular stagnations (see explainer here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2015/07/7615-secular-stagnation-double-threat.html).

One key structural problem is that of excessive reliance on credit (or debt) to drive growth. We have seen the devastating effects of the rapidly rising unsustainable levels of the real economic debt (debt that combines government obligations, non-financial corporate debt and household debt) in the case of 2008 crises.

And we were supposed to have learned the lesson. Supposed to have, because the entire conversation about structural reforms in banking and capital markets worldwide was framed in the context of deleveraging (reduction of debt levels). This has been the leitmotif of structural policies reforms in Europe, the U.S., in Australia and in China, and elsewhere, including at the level of the EU and the IMF. Supposed to have, because we did not that lesson. Instead of deleveraging, we got re-leveraging of economies - companies, households and governments.

Problem Case Study: U.S. Corporates

Take the U.S. corporate bonds market (that excludes direct loans through private lenders and intermediated loans through banks) - an USD8 trillion-sized elephant. Based on the latest research of the U.S. Treasury Department, non-banking institutions - plain vanilla investment funds, pension funds, mom-and-pop insurance companies, etc are now holding a full 1/4 of U.S. corporates bonds. According to the U.S. Treasury, these expanding holdings of / risk exposures to corporate debt are now "a top threat to stability" of the U.S. financial system. And the warning comes at the time when U.S. corporate debt is at an all-time high as a share of GDP, based on the figures from the Office of Financial Research.

And it gets worse. Since 2007, corporate debt pile in the U.S. rose some 75 percent to USD8.4 trillion, based on data from the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association - which is more than USD8 trillion estimated by the Treasury. These are long-term debt instruments. Short term debt obligations - money market instruments - add another USD 2.9 trillion and factoring in the rise of the value of the dollar since the Fed meeting this week, closer to USD3 trillion. So the total U.S. corporate debt pile currently stands at around USD 11.3 trillion to USD 11.4 trillion.

Take two:

1. Debt, after the epic deleveraging of the 2008 crisis, is now at an all-time high; and
2. Debt held by systemic retail investment institutions (insurance companies, pensions funds, retail investment funds) is at all time high.

And the risks in this market are rising. Since the election of Donald Trump, global debt markets lost some USD2.3 trillion worth of value. This reaction was driven by the expectation that his economic policies, especially his promise of a large scale infrastructure investment stimulus, will trigger inflationary pressures in the U.S. economy that is already running at full growth capacity (see here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/12/151216-us-economic-policies-in-era-of.html). Further monetary policy tightening in the U.S. - as signalled by the Fed this week (see here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/12/151216-long-term-fed-path-may-force-ecb.html) will take these valuations down even further.

Some estimates (see https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-16/republican-tax-reform-seen-shrinking-u-s-corporate-bond-market) suggest that the Republican party corporate tax reforms (that might remove interest rate tax deductibility for companies) can trigger a 30 percent drop in investment grade bonds valuations in the U.S. - bonds amounting to just under USD 4.9 trillion. The impact would be even more pronounced on other bonds values. Even making the estimate less dramatic and expecting a 25 percent drop across the entire debt market would wipe out some USD 2.85 trillion off the balancesheets of the bonds-holding investors.

As yields rise, and bond prices drop, the aforementioned systemic retail investment institutions will be nursing massive losses on their investment books. If the rush to sell their bond holdings, they will crash the entire market, triggering potentially a worse financial meltdown than the one witnessed in 2008. If they sit on their holdings, they will be pressed to raise capital and their redemptions will be stressed. It's either a rock or a hard place.


Problem Extrapolation: the World

The glut of U.S. corporate debt, however, is just the tip of an iceberg.

As noted in this IMF paper, published on December 15th, corporate leverage (debt) has been on a steady march upward in the emerging markets (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16243.pdf).

And in its Fiscal Monitor for October 2016, the Fund notes that "At 225 percent of world GDP, the global debt of the nonfinancial sector—comprising the general government, households, and nonfinancial firms—is currently at an all-time high. Two-thirds, amounting to about $100 trillion, consists of liabilities of the private sector which, as documented in an extensive literature, can carry great risks when they reach excessive levels." (see http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fm/2016/02/pdf/fm1602.pdf)

Yes, global real economic debt now stands at around USD152 trillion or 225 percent of world GDP.

Excluding China and the U.S. global debt levels as percentage of GDP are close to 2009 all time peak. Much of the post-Crisis re-leveraging took place on Government's balancehseets, as illustrated below, but the most ominous side of the debt growth equation is that private sector world-wide did not sustain any deleveraging between 2008 and 2015. In fact, Advanced Economies Government debt take up fully replaced private sector debt growth rates contraction. Worse happened in the Emerging Markets:

So all the fabled deleveraging in the economies in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis has been banks-balancesheets deleveraging - Western banks dumping liabilities to be picked up by someone else (vulture funds, investors, other banks, the aforementioned systemic retail investment institutions, etc).

And as IMF analysis shows, only 12 advanced economies have posted declines in total non-financial private debt (real economic debt) as a share of GDP over 2008-2015 period.  Alas, in the majority of these, gains in private deleveraging have been more than fully offset by deterioration in government debt:

Crucially, especially for those still believing the austerity-by-cuts narrative presented in popular media, fiscal uplift in debt levels in the Advanced Economies did not take place due to banks-rescues alone. Primary fiscal deficits did most of the debt lifting:

In simple terms, across the advanced economies, there was no spending austerity. There was tax austerity. And on the effectiveness of the latter compared to the former you can read this note: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/12/10122016-austerity-three-wrongs-meet.html. Spoiler alert: tax-based austerity is a worse disaster than spending-based austerity.

In summary, thus, years of monetarist activism spurring a massive rise in corporate debt, coupled with the utter inability of the states to cut back on public spending and the depth of the Global Financial Crisis and the Great Recession have combined to propel global debt levels past the pre-crisis peak to a new historical high.

The core root of the 2007-2010 crises is back. With a vengeance.

25/5/16: IMF's Epic Flip Flopping on Greece

IMF published the full Transcript of a Conference Call on Greece from Wednesday, May 25, 2016 (see: http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2016/tr052516.htm). And it is simply bizarre.

Let me quote here from the transcript (quotes in black italics) against quotes from the Eurogroup statement last night (available here: Eurogroup statement link) marked with blue text in italics. Emphasis in bold is mine

“On debt, I certainly think that we have made progress, Europe is making progress. Debt relief is firmly on the agenda now. Our European partners and all the other stakeholders all now recognize that Greece debt is unsustainable, is highly unsustainable, they accept that debt relief is needed.”

Do they? Let’s take a look at the Eurogroup official statement:

Is debt relief firmly on the agenda and does Eurogroup 'accept that debt relief is needed'? "The Eurogroup agrees to assess debt sustainability" Note: the Eurogroup did not agree to deliver debt relief, but simply to assess it. Which might put debt relief on the agenda, but it is hardly a meaningful commitment, as similar promises were made before, not only for Greece, but also for other peripheral states.

Does Eurogroup "recognize that Greece debt is unsustainable, is highly unsustainable"? No. There is no mentioning of words 'unsustainable' or 'highly unsustainable' in the Eurogroup document. None. Nada. Instead, here is what the Eurogroup says about the extent of Greek debt sustainability: "The Eurogroup recognises that over the exceptionally long time horizon of assessing debt sustainability there can be no forecasts, only assumptions, given the sizable degree of uncertainty over macroeconomic developments." Does this sound to you like the Eurogroup recognized 'highly unsustainable' nature of Greek debt? Not to me...

Furthermore, relating to debt relief measures, the Eurogroup notes: “For the medium term, the Eurogroup expects to implement a possible second set of measures following the successful implementation of the ESM programme. These measures will be implemented if an update of the debt sustainability analysis produced by the institutions at the end of the programme shows they are needed to meet the agreed GFN benchmark, subject to a positive assessment from the institutions and the Eurogroup on programme implementation.” Again, there is no admission by the Eurogroup of unsustainable nature of Greek debt, and in fact there is a statement that only 'if' debt is deemed to be unsustainable at the medium-term future, then debt relief measures can be contemplated as possible. This neither amounts to (1) statement that does not agree with the IMF assertion that the Eurogroup realizes unsustainable nature of Greek debt burden; and (2) statement that does not agree with the IMF assertion that the Eurogroup put debt relief 'firmly on the table'.

More per IMF: Eurogroup “…accept the methodology that should be used to calibrate the necessary debt relief. They accept the objectives in terms of the gross financing need in the near term and in the long run. They even accept the time periods, a very long time period, over which this debt has to be met through 2060. And I think they are also beginning to accept more realism in the assumption.”

Again, do they? Let’s go back to the Eurogroup statement: “The Eurogroup recognises that over the exceptionally long time horizon of assessing debt sustainability there can be no forecasts, only assumptions, given the sizable degree of uncertainty over macroeconomic developments.” Have the Eurogroup accepted IMF’s assumptions? No. It simply said that things might change and if they do, well, then we’ll get back to you.

Things get worse from there on.

IMF: “We have not changed our view on how the outlook for debt is looking. We have not gone back. We want to assure you that we will not want big primary surpluses.” This statement, of course, refers to the IMF stating (see here) that Greek primary surpluses of 3.5% assumed under the DSA for Bailout 3.0 were unrealistic. And yet, quoting the Eurogroup document: the new agreement “provides further reassurances that Greece will meet the primary surplus targets of the ESM programme (3.5% of GDP in the medium-term), without prejudice to the obligations of Greece under the SGP and the Fiscal Compact.”  So, IMF says it did not surrender on 3.5% primary surplus for Greece being unrealistic, yet Eurogroup says 3.5% target is here to stay. Who’s spinning what?

IMF: “...I cannot see us facing this on a primary surplus that is above 1.5 [ percent of GDP]. I know it's just not credible in our view. And you will see that there is nothing in the European statement anymore that says 3.5 should be used for the DSA. So there, too, Europe is moving.” As I just quoted from the eurogroup statement clearly saying 3.5% surplus is staying.

IMF is again tangled up in long tales of courage played against short strides to surrender. PR balancing, face-savings, twisting, turning, obscuring… you name it, the IMF got it going here.

Economics 29/04/2010: Debt crisis is spreading

Another credit downgrade from S&P, this time for Spain, from AA+ to AA with negative outlook, based on the outlook for years of private sector deleveraging and low growth. Spain, as you can see, is severely in red in terms of debt, ranking 14th in the world. Spain's external liabilities stand at 186.1% or $2.55 trillion (as of 2009 Q3) against estimated 2009 GDP of $1.37 trillion.

The country is actually worse off in terms of debt than Greece which has ranks 16th at debt at 170.5% of GDP or $581.68 billion, with 2009 GDP of $341 billion.

Of course, Ireland is world's number 1 debtor nation with external debt of 1,312% of GDP (IFSC-inclusive) of $2.32 trillion in Q3 2009 against the GDP of $176.9 billion. Of course, part of this debt is IFSC, but then, again, we really do not have a claim on our GDP either, with GNP being a more real measure of our income. So on the net, our debts - the actual Irish economy's debts - are somewhere in the neighborhood of 740%. This is still leagues above the UK - the second most indebted nation in the world - which has the debt to GDP ratio of 'only' 426%!

The S&P also provided estimate for expected recovery rate on Greek bonds, which the agency put at 30-50%. In other words, S&P expects investors in Greek bonds to be paid no more than 30-50 cents on the euro. Yesterday on twitter I suggested that "Greek debt should be renegotiated @ 50cents on the euro - severe default. Portugal's @ 80 cents - mild default, Irish @ 70-75 cents". Looks like someone (S&P) agrees. Before it is too late, before German and other European taxpayers have poured hundreds of billions of euro into the PIIGS black hole of delinquent public finances, Europe should cut losses and force Greece and Portugal to renegotiate their liabilities. If Ireland and Spain were to elect to follow, so be it. Of course, in Irish case, the debt re-negotiations should cover private debts, not public debt.

Just how many billions of euros are EU taxpayers in for for the folly of admitting Greece - a country that spent 90 years of the last 180 (since 1829) in defaults on its debts - into the common currency area? Well, Greek 2-year bonds were traded at yields of 26% yesterday at one point in time. This is pricing that's in excess of pretty much every developing country, save for basket cases which practically cannot issue bonds at all.

IMF's Dominique Strauss Kahn has told Bundestag yesterday that Greek package will be

• €100-120bn for three years;
• Which means German taxpayers are on the hook for €67 billion over 3 years, not €25 billion that Germany ‘s economics minister was signing for in the original deal;
• Ireland's contribution will also have to rise to €4 billion over 3 years, not €500 million we originally were told we will have to contribute;
• Greece will not be forced to restructure or reschedule debt
• The loans to Greece will be subordinated to existent bondholders, which means that if in the end Greece does pay 30-50 cents on the euro to the latter, European taxpayers will be lucky to get 10 cents on the euro.

The whole deal is now looking like a massive subsidy for Greece and entails absolutely no protection to European taxpayers.

But internationally, EU news are getting darker and darker by the minute. Last night Bloomberg reported that EU countries are in for estimated €600 billion bill for the fiscal crises that have spread across the block. That's the cost, in the end, of all the tacky policy follies that Brussels endorsed and pushed through over the last 10 years -

• from the Lisbon Agenda, which was supposed to deliver EU to the position of economic superiority over the US by 2010,
  
• to the Social Economy, which was supposed to deliver... well, who knows what...
  
• to the Knowledge Economy, which was aiming to turn us all into brains in a Petri Dish
• to the absolutely outlandish HIPCI and HIPCII agendas wholeheartedly embraced by the EU, which were supposed to deliver debt relief to the world's real basket cases (before Greece and other PIIGS took the spotlight away from them), and the rest of the international white elephants.

The problem, of course, is that €600 billion price tag for fiscal excesses has generated preciously little in returns (despite what folks at Tasc keep telling us about the fiscal stimulus) which means we will have to pay for it out of our long term wealth. The same wealth that has been demolished by the recession and the financial markets collapse!

3/8/15: IMF on Russian Economy: Debt Sustainability

In the previous post, I covered IMF latest analysis of Russian GDP growth. Here, another key theme from the IMF Article IV report on Russia: fiscal policy sustainability.

In its latest assessment of the Russian economy, IMF has reduced its forecast for General Government deficit for 2015, from -3.69% of GDP back in April 2015 to -3.3% of GDP in the latest report. However, in line with new Budgetary framework, the IMF revised its forecasts for 2016-2020 deficits to show poorer fiscal performance:

In line with worsening deficits from 2016 on, IMF is also projecting higher government debt (gross debt, inclusive of state guarantees):

Still, the IMF appears to be quite happy with the overall debt and fiscal sustainability over the short run and is taking a view that over the next 2-3 years, fiscal policy must provide some upside supports to investment.

One of the reasons for this is that IMF sees continued strong buffers on fiscal reserves side into 2020, with Gross international reserves of USD362.4 billion and 374.8 billion in 2015-2016 amounting to 13.6 months of imports and providing cover for 496% and 281% of short term debt, respectively.

Furthermore, IMF expects debt levels to remain benign, both in terms of Government debt and Private sector debt as the chart above shows.

Note: I will cover Private Sector Debt developments in a separate post, so stay tuned.

Overall, 

1) External debt situation remains positive and is improving in the sector with weaker performance (corporate sector):

Note: above figures do not net out debt written to Russian banks and corporates by their parent and subsidiary entities located outside Russia, as well as direct investment / equity -linked debt.

2) "...no sector shows maturity risk with short-term assets exceeding short-term debt in aggregate"

3) Fiscal stance appears to be expansionary, but moderate, with deficits below 4% of GDP forecast for the worst performance year of 2016.

4) "Exchange rate and liquidity risks are mitigated by the CBR's large reserve level"

Stay tuned for more analysis, including debt positions across various sectors.

21/7/15: Eastern Europe's post-2004 Convergence with EU: Financialisation

In the previous post, I covered the EU's latest report on real economic convergence in Central & Eastern European (CEE10) Accession states. As promised, here is a look at the last remaining core driver of this 'fabled' convergence: the financial services sector (which drove the largest contribution to growth in pre-crisis period 2004-2008 and remained significant since).

In summary: debt is the currency of CEE10 convergence.

Let's start with Public Debt.

As the above shows, CEE10 debt rose during the crisis despite GDP uptick. Rate of growth in debt was slower in CEE10 than in the original euro area states (EA12), which was consistent with stronger CEE10 performance in terms of fiscal balances and lower incidence / impact of banking crises.

Scary bit: "The negative impact of the 2008/09 global financial crisis as well as the following euro-area sovereign debt crisis on financial conditions in the CEE10 revealed that, despite relatively lower general government debt levels (compared to the EA12 average), some CEE10 countries might still encounter problems to (re-)finance their public sector borrowing needs during periods of heightened financial market tensions as their domestic bond markets are in general smaller and less liquid".

And that is despite a major decline in long-term interest rates experienced across the region:

In addition, Gross External Debt has been rising in all CEE10 economies between 2004 and 2014, peaking in 2009:

Which brings us to private sector financialisation. Per EU: "CEE10 countries entered the EU with relatively underdeveloped financial sectors, at least in terms of their relative size compared to the EA12. This was the case for both market-based and banking-sector-intermediated sources of funding. In 2004, the outstanding stocks of quoted shares and debt securities amounted on average to just about 20% and 30% of CEE10 GDP, compared to around 50% and 120% of GDP in the EA12. Similarly, bank lending to non-financial sectors accounted for just some 35% of CEE10 GDP whereas it reached almost 100% of GDP in the EA12."

It is worth, thus, noting that equity and direct debt financialisation relative to bank debt financialisation, at the start of 'convergence' was healthier in the CEE10 than in the euro area EA12.

Predictably, this changed. "As the government sector accounted for the majority of debt security issuance in the CEE10, bank credit represented the main external funding source for the non-financial private sector."

"The CEE10 banking sectors have generally been characterised by a relatively high share of
foreign ownership as well as high levels of concentration. The share of foreign-owned banks and the market share of the five largest banks (CR5) in CEE10 countries remained relatively stable over the last 10 years, on average exceeding 60%. There was however some cross-country divergence as Slovenia stood out with a relatively low share of foreign-owned banks, which only increased to above 30% in 2013. At the same time, the Estonian and Lithuanian banking sectors exhibited the highest levels of concentration, with their respective CR5 averaging 94% and 82% over 2004-14. On the other hand, the role played by foreign-owned banks is rather limited in most EA12 countries while their banking sectors are in general also somewhat less concentrated, with their CR5 averaging around 55% over the last 10 years."

Which, basically, means that the lending boom pre-crisis is accounted for, substantially, by the carry trades via foreign banks: the EA12 banks had another property & construction boom of their own in CEE10 as they did in the likes of Ireland and Spain.

"The 2008/09 global financial crisis …proved to be a structural break in the overall evolution of bank lending to the non-financial private sector in the CEE10. As the pace of credit growth in the pre-crisis period was clearly excessive and unsustainable, a post-crisis correction was natural and unavoidable. However, credit to the NFPS increased by "only" some 13% between May 2009 and May 2014, with bank lending to the nonfinancial corporate sector basically stagnating while lending to the household sector expanded by
about 25%."

Shares of Non-Performing Loans rose quite dramatically, exceeding the already significant rate of growth in these in EA12 across 6 out of 10 CEE10 states.

The following chart shows two periods of financialisation: period prior to crisis, when financial activity vastly exceeded real economic performance dynamics; and post-crisis period where financial activity is acting as a small drag on real economic performance. This is try for both the CEE10 and EA12 economies, but is more pronounced for the former than for the latter:

In summary, therefore, a large share of 'real convergence' in the CEE10 economies over 2004-2014 period can be explained by increased financialisation of their economies, especially via bank lending channel. As the result, much of pre-crisis convergence is directly linked to unsustainable boom cycle in investment (including construction) funded by a combination of bank debt (carry trades from Euro area and Swiss Franc) plus EU subsidies. These sources of growth are currently suppressed by long-term issues, such as high NPLs and structural rebalancing in the banking sector.

The tale of 'convergence' is of little substance and a hell of a lot of froth… 

10/4/19: Russian Foreign Exchange Reserves and External Debt

As recently posted by me on Twitter, here are three charts showing the evolution of Russian foreign reserves and external debt:

Remember the incessant meme in the Western media about Russia eminently in danger of running out of sovereign wealth funds back at the start of the Western sanctions in late 2014? Well, the chart above puts that to rest. It turns out, Russia did not run out of the reserves, and instead quite prudentially used funds available to carefully support some economic adjustments (especially in agriculture and food sector), while simultaneously balancing out its fiscal deficits.

Do note that the reserves above exclude over USD 91 billion worth of Gold that Russia holds and continues to buy at rising clips.

The result of the prudentially balanced management of the reserves and the economy was deleveraging out of debt (a lot of this was done via restructuring of intracompany loans and affiliated enterprises refinancing), with a reduction in the external debt (chart below), without use of sovereign funds:

As of current, Russian foreign exchange reserves ex-gold are more than sufficient to cover the entirety of the country public and private sectors external debts.

If the above chart is not dramatic enough, here is a contrasting experience over the same years for the U.S. economy:

Nothing that CNN and the rest of the Western media pack ever managed to capture.

19/02/2011: Paying down our debt out of Exports

Let's do a quick exercise. Suppose we take our current account - defined as the sum of the balance of trade (exports minus imports of goods and services), net factor income (such as interest and dividends) and net transfer payments (such as foreign aid and remitted profits). Suppose every year we use the current account balance solely for the purpose of repaying our Government debt. How long will it take us to do so.

Let us start with some notes on methodology.

Our current account is in deficit - since 2000, there was only one year - 2003 - when we had a surplus in the current account (charts below), which really means our external trade was not enough to generate a surplus to the economy. So let us assume that the we can reverse this 180 degrees and that the deficits posted in 2009-2010, plus those projected by the IMF to occur in 2011-2015 are all diverted to pay our Government debt.
Notice - this is impossibly optimistic, as our Government does not own current account, but suppose, for the sake of this exercise that it can fully capture net profits transfers abroad and cut the foreign aid to zero, plus divert all interest payments on own debt and private external debts to repayment of the principal on own debt.

Secondly, assume that only Government debt is taken into the account (in other words, we assume away Nama debt, some of the quasi-sovereign financing of the banks resolutions, and all and any potential future banks and spending demands in excess of the EU/IMF assumptions, as well as all future bonds redemptions - the latter assumed to have a zero net effect at roll-over, so no added costs, no higher interest rates, etc).

In other words, here is what we are paying down in this exercise:

Now, suppose we take current account balances for 2009-2015 (projected by IMF) as the starting point. The reason for this choice of years is that they omit fall-off in our exports in 2008 and also the bubble years of 2004-2007 when our current account imbalances were absurdly large due to excessive outward investment and consumption of imports.

Next, assume:

• We deal with present value of the debts
  
• We apply an average 3% annual growth rate to repayments we make (current account transfers grow 3% on average per annum)
  
• Currency effects are removed (so we use flat USD1.33/Euro FX rate throughout)

So here is the result:
And the conclusion is: if Ireland diverts ALL of its net current account (2009-2015 IMF projections taken at 3% average growth rate forward) to pay down Gov debt, it will take us until 2064 to reach 2007 level of official (ex-Nama+banks) Government debt.

Note: incidentally - the charts tell couple of interesting side-points based on our historical debt path:

The Government told us that we are not in the 1980s - as we had much higher levels of debt then. Ok, the figure above shows that as of 2010 - we ARE back in the 1980s: 2011 debt will equal as a share of GDP that attained in 1989. According to IMF database, our debt has peaked at 109.241% of GDP back in 1987. It is projected to be 104.7% in 2013. Not that much off the peak.

But, of course, in the 1980s there was no quasi-Governmental debt - the debt of Nama, some of the banks recapitalization measures and the debts that still might arise post-2013 from the Government banks Guarantees and resolution schemes. If we add Nama's 31bn worth of debt issued, this alone will push our 2011 debt levels to 121.8% of GDP and factoring in coupon rate on these, but 2015 our Official Gov Debt + Nama will stand (using IMF projections again) at 124.8% of GDP - well in excess of the peak 1980s levels of indebtedness.

Secondly, despite what any of us might think about the Celtic Tiger years, the Government never paid down the old debt, it simply was deflated by rising GDP. Which suggests that even during the Celtic Tiger boom years - our exporting economy was NOT capable of paying down actual debt levels.

22/4/2012: Sunday Times 15/4/2012 - What if Ireland Defaults?

With some delay, this is my article for Sunday Times April 15, 2012 - an unedited version, as usual.

Since 2008, judging by a number of parameters and metrics, Ireland has been firmly in the grip of a historically unprecedented financial, fiscal, banking and economic crises. This is the consensus that emerges from book, titled What if Ireland Defaults? published by Orpen Press last week and edited by myself, Professor Brian Lucey and Dr. Charles Larkin (here is the link to Amazon page for the book and for ebook version). The book brings together views on sovereign and other forms of default by twenty two academic, media, political and social policy thinkers is designed to re-start the debate about the future trajectory of the Irish economy saddled with unprecedented levels of public and private debt. Coincidentally, What if Ireland Defaults? Was published in the same week as the IMF Global Financial Stability Report that focuses on the issues of household debt overhang. The IMF report too stresses the dangers of the excess debt levels across the economy and provides strong argument in favor of a systemic restructuring of private debt in countries like Ireland.

The roots of the Irish debt problem are historical in their nature, not only in the magnitude of the debt overhang involved, but also in terms of the correlated economic, fiscal and financial crises that define our current economic environment.

First, the Irish crisis has resulted in a deep and protracted contraction in the economy that is unparalleled in the modern history of advanced economies. In current market prices terms, and not taking into the account inflation, our national output is down 24.2% on pre-crisis peak, having fallen to 2003 levels. Investment in the economy is down 59.6%. These rates of decline are so far in excess of what has been experienced in Greece and are ten-fold deeper than those experienced in an average cyclical recession.

The duration of the Irish crisis is also outside the historical records. Since Q1 2008, Irish economy recorded fourteen quarters of nominal contraction in GNP and thirteen quarters of contraction in GDP. In effect, the economic crisis has already erased 8 years of growth. At an average nominal rate of growth of 4% per annum, it will take Ireland fifteen years to regain domestic output levels comparable to 2007. And this is without accounting for inflation.

Second, Ireland is now a worldwide record holder when it comes to the cost of dealing with the banking sector crisis. Combined weight of banking sector capital injections, and Nama is now close to 80% of our GNP. Irish Exchequer exposure to the Central Bank of Ireland ELA and the ECB borrowings by the state-owned banks lifts this number well beyond 200% of the national output. No advanced economy has ever experienced such a massive collapse of the domestic banking sector.

Another unique feature of Irish crises is their inter-connected nature. Economic recession – driven originally by the external demand contraction and debt overhang in the domestic economy was further compounded by the asset bust which itself is of a historic proportions. To-date, Irish property markets are down 49.3% on pre-crisis levels and the decline continues unabated. Large numbers of 30-50 year old families – the most economically-productive cohorts of our population – are now deeply in negative equity and are increasingly unable to sustain debt servicing. Officially, over 14% of our entire mortgages are currently either in a default, officially non-performing or short-term restructured.

The property bubble collapse, twinned with the debt crisis, didn’t just undermine the banking sector and cut into household wealth. The two have also left Irish economy without a growth driver that fuelled it since 2001-2002 when the property and lending bubble replaced the dot.com bubble implosion. Put differently, we are witnessing a structural economic recession. Since 1998-1999, Irish economy has lived through one bubble into another. Currently, excessive indebtedness and lack of a functional financial system are leaving Ireland without even a chance of finding a new growth catalyst.

In these conditions, the most significant problem we face today is the debt crisis. Our combined real economic debt – the debts of households, non-financial corporations and the Government – relative to our GNP is the highest in the advanced world. And, unlike our closest competitor for this dubious distinction, Japan, we have no means for controlling the interest rates at which our economy will have to finance Government and private sector debts.

It is the totality of the real economic debts, not just the debt of the Irish Government, that concern those economists who are still capable of facing the economic reality of our collapse. This point is referenced in the What if Ireland Defaults? by a number of authors, and as of this week, their views are being supported by the IMF, the Bank for International Settlements and a growing number of academic economists internationally.

Frustratingly, at home, our views are seen as contrarian, alarmist, and even populist. As the crisis has proven, year after year, the official Ireland Inc is simply unequipped to deal with reality.

Majority of Irish economic analysts incessantly drone about the threats arising from the Exchequer debts. Some, occasionally, add to this the banking debts. Fewer, yet, might reference the households. None, save for a handful of usually marginalized by the establishment economists, bother to treat the entire debt pile carried by our economy as a singular threat.

The silence about Ireland’s total debt, and the ongoing denial of the long-term disastrous economic and social costs of the total debt overhang are the frustrating features of our current state of the nation. It is this frustration, alongside the realization that Ireland can be blindly stumbling toward a renewed debt crisis, that informed myself and two of my co-editors to re-launch the debate about the potential inevitability and consequences of debt restructuring.

To re-start this debate, What if Ireland Defaults presents a range of views on the current Irish situation, from the basis of sovereign, banking debt and household debt restructuring.

The very idea of what constitutes a default is a complex one. In the book we interchangeably use the term ‘default’ as denoting a restructuring of the debt to reduce the overall level of debt. This can be accomplished by reducing the debt level itself, restructuring interest payments, extending the maturity of debt, or any combination of the above. In addition, a default can take place in an relatively orderly and coordinated fashion, as for example in Greece, or as a disorderly, unilateral action, as in the case of Russia in 1998. Lastly, default can be pre-announced, as in the case of Iceland, or unannounced – as in the case of Argentina. All of these differences are reflected in the chapters of the book dealing with historical experiences relating to sovereign defaults.

In the case of Ireland, there is a broad consensus within the book that a sovereign default is neither desirable nor inevitable. In other words, no author sees the situation where Irish Government debt will have to be restructured unilaterally, without prior cooperation with the EU authorities via the ESM or a similar collective structure. However, substantive disagreements do arise among the authors as to whether Ireland will require a structured default on banking and household debts. In this context, some of the contributions to the book pre-date and preclude the research on the necessity of household debt restructuring published by the IMF this week.

The overriding sense from What if Ireland defaults? is of an economy on a knife edge. Given favourable economic circumstances, especially in regard to our exports, a positive change in EU’s political attitudes with regard to the legacy bank debt, and the return of domestic economic growth, the debt levels which Ireland now faces can become sustainable, in that a default on either private or public debts is not probable. However, we cannot consider these developments as guaranteed, and in their absence, restructuring of debts may become inevitable.

In short, both the IMF report this week and the wide range of contributors to What if Ireland Defaults? are in a broad agreement: Ireland should be putting forward systemic policy measures to restructure household (and by a corollary, banking) sector debts. Absent such measures, a combination of the long-term continued growth recession and debt overhang, further compounded by the risks to interest rates and debt financing costs in the medium term future will force us to face the possibility of a sovereign debt default. Avoiding the latter outcome is more than worth the effort of creating a systemic resolution to the household debt crisis.

CHART: 

Sources: Haver Analytics, National Central Banks, McKinsey Global Institute, NTMA and DÁIL QUESTION  NO 122, 14th September 2011, ref No: 23793/11

Box-out:

A recently-published Cleantech Global Innovation Index 2012 shows the potential for the development of the green-focused economies in Ireland. The study ranked 38 countries across 15 indicators that relate “to the creation and commercialisation of cleantech start-ups, …measuring each [country] relative potential to produce entrepreneurial start-up companies and commercialise technology innovations over the next 10 years.” Overall, as expected, North America and Northern Europe “emerge as the primary contributors to the development of innovative cleantech companies, though the Asia Pacific region is following closely behind.”

Ireland is ranked ninth in the world in the cleantech league tables and scored strongly on general innovation drivers (underpinned by the presence of innovation-intensive sectors dominated by MNCs and some domestic exporters) and commercialised cleantech innovation (also largely linked to MNCs and a handful of Irish indigenous companies). We fall below average on cleantech-specific innovation drivers, such as policies supporting innovation in energy and green-IT and IT-for-Green. Ireland has only average scores for supportive government policies and access to private finance, which is disappointing.

What the global rankings, and the Irish experience clearly show is that globally there is an extremely weak positive relationship between cleantech-specific innovation and commercialized cleantech innovation. In Ireland this relationship is stronger than average. This is most likely due to the more advanced MNCs and exporting base in the Irish economy in general, whereby domestic innovation activities, including those booked by the MNCs into Ireland for tax purposes, is aligned with commercialization via exports.