15/5/20: Generational Effects of Ultra Low Interest Rates

Just because jobs are so plentiful and careers are so rewarding in terms of potential growth in life cycle income. the Millennials are really cheering their future in the Social Mobility Central, the US of A... oh, wait, sorry, theatre of absurd is so 1990s...

Here is the chart showing returns on savings for the already financially-distressed younger generations, updated through March 2020:

Things are ugly. In March 2020, retail nominal deposit rates for 3 months-duration Certificates of Deposit in the U.S. banks have fallen from December 2019 levels of 1.76% (annualized) to 1.35%. This is the lowest level since November 2017.

Think of the longer term comparatives. During the decade of the 1960s, average nominal rate of return on 3mo CDs was 5.51% with real return of 4.76%. In the 1970s, this rose to 7.27% and 5.66%, respectively. Through the 1980s, nominal average was 9.89% and real average was 8.73%. In the 1990s, things crumbled, with the nominal savings returns falling down to 5.32% and real rates down to 4.75%. The first decade of the 2000s saw nominal rates averaging 3.2% and real rates falling to 2.67%. And over 2010-2019, average nominal rate was 0.76% and average real rate was 0.39%.

Yes, avocado and toast are killing Millennial's financial wealth. Not ultra low returns on savings.

15/5/20: U.S. Retail Sales and Employment: Pandemicession

Data through April 2020 on U.S. Retail Sales is in, so here are two charts:

Retail Sales are down 15.08% m/m in April, and down 18.25% on 1Q 2020 average. Year on year, sales are down 17.83%. Losses in retail sales in April amounted to USD 65.97 billion m/m and USD80.635 billion y/y. March-April cumulated losses amounted to USD 93 billion y/y.

Meanwhile, jobs losses in the Retail Sales sector have been dramatic as well:

Employment in Retail Sales sector fell 2,127,000 in the first two months of the COVID19 pandemic compared to year prior, with April employment declining 2,111,000 or 13.5%. Overall sector employment numbers at the end of April stood around the levels last seen in 1994, effectively erasing any employment gains made over 26 years.

Good thing all the workers in the sector are at least seeing recovery in their stocks portfolios. Otherwise, there could have been social unrest, you know...

15/5/20: America's Scariest Charts Updated

Updating my America's Scariest Charts for the latest data on weekly unemployment claims:

New unemployment claims continue to rise (see table below), with data for the week ending May 9th coming in this week printing 2.6 million new claims.

While non-farm payrolls are reported on a monthly basis, we can now integrate the numbers of new unemployment claims (subject to future revisions) for the first week of may, showing the expected impact on the payrolls:

Table below summarizes past recessions experience and current COVID19 'Pandecession':

As shown above, total numbers of jobs losses so far in the pandemic exceed combined jobs losses experienced in all past recessions from 1945 through 2019, based on unemployment claims data.

Finally, here is a chart plotting employment index from the start of the new recession through the end of the recovery cycle:

11/5/20: G7: Fading into Economic Absurdity

G7 is a rather exclusive club of the 7 'largest' and, according to their own aspirations, most important - economically and geopolitically - economies. Except, of course, it isn't.

The latest IMF data (through 2019) and forecasts (for 2020-2021) published last month show just how bizarre the geopolitical influencer game got over the recent years and just how more bizarre it is likely to get over the next two.

Here are the actual ranks of the countries based on their GDP, taking into account exchange rates and price levels differences (the PPP adjustment).

And before you jump at myself, yes, PPP is imperfect. But it is much better than a simplistic U.S. dollar equivalence. 2014-present have taught us this lesson via what has happened in Russia: in dollar terms, the country should have disintegrated by now in another revolution of some color or flower or a cactus variety. Yet, when you look at the Government finances, Russia is doing really well, and when you look at the aggregate society, the pain of the 2014-on crises, devaluations, losses of income and declines in exports revenues has been real, but sustainable to-date. Why? Because Russia does not live on the US dollars when it comes to spending and investing in its economy. And, correspondingly, Russian geopolitical influence did not wane on foot of the economic troubles, dollar-valued economic decline and rounds and rounds of sanctions, including Russia's ejection from the G7+1/G8 grouping. Incidentally, this also explains why China isn't bothered by the G7 'leadership', nor does India miss its place in the group.

So, here we go, that table:

As I noted before, current G7 composition includes 4 member states which are not in the top 7 economies in the world. That means that 57 percent of the group members should not belong to the group. Worse, two of these four members are not even in top 10 economies worldwide, including 16ht ranked, but geopolitically quite loud Canada, which is just a hair-whisker away from being overtaken by globally not-too-noticeable Spain.

Better yet, Australia that loves presenting itself as some anchor of leadership in Asia-Pacific is not making it into top 20 economies in the world, having crashed out of its 19th place back in 2014 to 21st place by 2019. Australia's economic might is a bit lesser than its strategic bark, lagging behind Thailand, not to mention Indonesia.

Meanwhile, of course, the G7 excludes the largest economy in the world, as well as world's 3rd, 6th, and 7th economies. One might argue about Communism in China. One might also argue that Russia should be excluded from G7 because, well, we just don't like the Russkies as long as they are alive. But, excluding India, while including Canada and Italy?! India's economy is larger than the economies of the UK, France, Italy and Canada combined!  Excluding Indonesia? Indonesia's economy is just 3.3% shy of Italian and Canadian economies added together.

Here is a breakdown of official vs size-based groups of G7 and G20 as the share of the global GDP PPP-adjusted in 2014 vas 2019:

The above goes some distance explaining why G20 currently leads in global policy coordination the G7, and why G7 is rapidly falling out of relevance: back in 2014, G7 members states accounted for 32% of the global GDP based on PPP-adjustment; in 2019 they accounted for 30%. Based on the IMF forecasts, by the end of 2021, this number will likely be around 28%. Meanwhile, the share of global GDP accruing to the 7 largest economies in the world has risen from 54% in 2014 to 55% in 2019, and is forecast to rise to 56% in 2021. In other words, the actual G7 will be twice larger than the official G7.

10/5/20: COVID19 Charts Update

As the U.S. and many parts of Europe are moving into the 'second stage' of COVID19 measures, relaxing some of the social distancing restrictions, here are some of the top-level stats on COVID pandemic evolution.

Global view:

• May 10, 2020 data adds 87,461 new cases globally and 4,524 new deaths.
• This was the 7th highest number of new cases additions, and 36th highest day in terms of new deaths in 122 days of record.
• Worryingly, Friday posted the second highest number of new cases increases at 94,158 on record, while Thursday posted 13th highest day in terms of deaths. 

As chart below shows, there is no consistent trend in terms of reduction in global new cases or deaths:

If this situation persists, it is highly unlikely we will see much of the relaxation in international travel, as global pandemic is appearing to be shifting geographically, rather than abating in overall severity.

U.S. vs EU27 cases and deaths:

U.S. continues to post pretty poor numbers, while EU27 is showing some significant slowdown in the pandemic progression:

As chart above shows, U.S. now vastly leads the EU27 in terms of contagion numbers and rates.

• Sunday ranks 28th in data history in terms of new cases reported, and 25th in terms of deaths reported in the U.S.
• Sunday ranks 56th in new cases and 51st in terms of new deaths reported in the EU27.
• The gap in the number of deaths reported over the entire pandemic to-date between the EU27 and the U.S. has now shrunk to 28,144 cases.
• Adjusting for the 7 days differences in the onset of the pandemic, the U.S. death rate per capita now exceeds that of the EU27 (second chart below).

Note: "The death rate from seasonal flu is typically around 0.1% in the U.S., according to news reports", per https://www.livescience.com/new-coronavirus-compare-with-flu.html. Current global running death rate (case fatality rate) for COVID19 is at 6.9% for confirmed cases. In the U.S., case fatality rate current runs at 6.02% and in the EU27 the rate is 11.1%.

Russia update: 

Russia continues to experience high rates of increases in new cases, with Sunday rate of 11,012 being the second highest on record, with the highest rate to-date of 11,231 recorded on May 8, 2020. The death rate recorded Sunday is at 88, ranked 7th in the history of the series.

BRICS update:

Key concerns forward:

Key concerns forward are now shifting toward 'phase two' risks. Shifting from complete shutdown of economic and social activities to restricted levels of activities risks potential re-igniting of the contagion, as underlying pools of disease remain high. Both, Europe and the U.S. are in the situation where daily numbers of new cases and deaths remain well above the levels witnessed at the point of restrictions imposition. If these level were concern back then, why do the higher levels today not warrant continued restrictions? 

Two links of the growing fears of re-emergence of contagion worth checking out:

• Germany: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/10/fears-rise-in-germany-over-second-wave-of-coronavirus-infections
• Asia: https://www.dw.com/en/coronavirus-latest-world-fears-second-wave-of-infections/a-53383336

9/5/20: Summary of Russian COVID19 Policy Responses

Based on the Finance Ministry estimates, Russian COVID19 measures will cost between 1 and 2 percent on GDP to the Russian Exchequer, as reported by BOFIT.

The impact combines both declines in government revenues and increases in expenditures. Much of the COVID19 measures costs, however, will come from reallocation of spending priorities away from yet-to-be-launched capital expenditures and, potentially, defence budgets.

In response to COVID19, Russian government deployed significant supports for:

• SMEs, targeting primarily employment in the private sector. The government identified over 70 sub-sectors hardest hit by the social distancing measures imposed on the general population and provided funding to cover companies' payrolls as long as the companies retain the levels of employment at 90% or more compared to the start of March levels. 
• Tax deferrals for SMEs and significantly impacted sectors (excluding VAT, excise, natural resources extraction taxes and export tariffs). 
• Per BOFIT, "Federal, regional and municipal government real estate landlords are postponing rental payments for all SMEs and larger firms in hard-hit [sectors]. Private landlords renting commercial real estate (other than residential properties) have been obligated to defer payments of tenants in hard-hit branches. To help participating private landlords, regions are to grant them relief from property taxes."
• The government effectively froze all new bankruptcy proceedings for the duration of the crisis measures.
• Special social insurance payments for families with children, increased levels of benefits for the newly unemployed, and added supports for the pensioners were put in place. Pensioners can avail of a range of enhanced services and additional payments, although these vary by region.
• Frontline healthcare workers have been allocated supplementary pay increases.
• Federal government also suspended debt repayments by regional and local governments.

The Central Bank of Russia moved quickly to alleviate the immediate impact of the crisis:

1. The CBR froze banks' asset valuations at the start of March 2020 levels to delay recognition of banks' losses and prevent a wave of loans defaults.
2. "The general loosening of regulatory rules applicable by banks also covers e.g. loss reserves, credit quality and related collateral for a very large part of corporate and household loans granted, as well as their possible restructurings," per BOFIT.
3. "Authorities have also set up separate deferral programmes for bank debt repayments that are supported by regulatory easing, government interest-rate subsidies and low-interest CBR loans to banks."
4. "Deferral programmes are available for households that have suffered income losses of more than 30 %, as well as SMEs and enterprises in hard-hit sectors."
5. CBR also cut interests rates, most recently on April 24th from 6.0% to 5.5%, bringing 2020 cuts to 75 basis points.

Per BOFIT note, "the state social funds will lose revenues as wage-based social taxes of employers will be halved to 15 % for SMEs. The move will give businesses relief this year in an amount equivalent to slightly less than 0.3 % of GDP."

The latest Russian economy forecasts via CBR come in at -4% to -6% for 2020 and +3 to +5% in 2021, implying slower than V-shaped recovery in real GDP. The forecasts assume oil price averaging USD27 per barrel over 2020, which is consistent with May-December average price of USD20 per barrel, or more conservative than prior assumptions. Notably, the CBR forecast implies that Russian economy will be running a current account deficit in 2020, for the first time since 1999.


As an aside, it is worth noting that the U.S.-Government funded RFEL https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-s-pretext-covid-19-crisis-tapped-to-tax-rich-russians-offshore-wealth/30513483.html has been out in force decrying alleged use of COVID19 as a pretext for, shock-horror, taxing offshore wealth. The proposal has not been approved by the Russian government, yet.

9/5/20: Some uncomfortable facts on the U.S. wealth distribution since 1989

The distributional effects of COVID19 pandemic impact on the labour markets in the U.S. will likely result in a massive debasement of the national wealth shares of the 'Main Street' segment of American society (the 90 percent) and a further increases in the national wealth share of the top 10 percent. So much is rather clear from the data on the labour markets (e.g.: https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2020/05/8520-path-of-tornado-us-labour-force.html).

But this process is not a unique feature of the current 'ideology' prevailing in the White House, nor is it a unique feature of the 'Republican Party ideology'. Historically, both, the Democratic Party Presidencies and the Republican Party Presidencies since the start of the 1990s on have been responsible for the dramatic drops in the share of national net worth accruing to those outside the top 10 percent of the wealth distribution. Here is the data through 4Q 2019:

The last time, the 'Main Street America' enjoyed sustained increases in net worth was during the tenure of George H. W. Bush. Since then, there have been just one short-lived period of increase in net worth, with subsequent declines erasing fully those gains: the Dot.Com bubble during the tail end of the Clinton and the starting part of the George W. Bush administrations.

And the current Presidency is actually somewhat exceptional to the trend: under Trump Administration, American's Main Street witnessed the lowest rates of decline in their share of the national net worth of 'just' 0.13% per annum, of all post-1992 administrations. In fact, the share of the country's net worth accruing to the bottom 50 percent of Americans has risen under the Trump Presidency tenure at the fastest annualized clip since the data series started.

In simple terms, American policies of destroying the prosperity of the majority of the country's population are not reflective of the 'political divide'. Both, Democratic and Republican Presidencies have led to the effective debasement of the wealth of the American Main Street. And, in equally simple terms, the Trump Administration tenure so far has been more benign to the bottom 50 percent of the American wealth distribution than any presidency since 1989.

Like it or not, but the data is quite telling.

8/5/20: The Path of a Tornado: U.S. Labour Force Numbers for April

So, BLS just printed their April 2020 numbers of official non-farm payrolls: https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t01.htm. And things are, expectedly, ugly.

Civilian 'non-institutional' population is up 1,203,000 y/y, while employment is down 23,384,000. Official unemployment i up from 3.3% in April 2019 to 14.4% in April 2020. Number not in the labour force are up 7,470,000 and numbers in unemployment are up 17,117,000 y/y. Which means that those out of employment are now up 24,587,000 year on year. Labour force participation rate is down from 62.7 in April 2019 to 60.0 in April 2020. In April 2019, 60.58 percent of the non-institutional American population was in employment. In April 2020 this figure was 51.30 percent. Which means that, excluding jails and military, almost 50 Americans out of 100 were not working even part-time.

Here's a summary of y/y comparatives by education status:

As the result of the massive wave of jobs destruction primarily concentrated in the lower wages categories of services workers, U.S. average labour earnings managed to actually increase (see a post on this from our friends at the Global Macro Monitor: https://global-macro-monitor.com/2020/05/08/bad-look-of-high-stock-prices-high-unemployment/). In  fact, combined effects of exits from the labour force and unemployment increases for those with less than college degree amount to 74 percent (three quarters) of all jobs destruction compared to April 2019.

With this, based on the data through the week of May 2, 2020, total employment levels in the U.S. are now down to the levels of October-November 1999.

Meanwhile, things are going swimmingly for the financial markets recoveries:

Only foreclosures and evictions delays, unemployment checks and rent rollups are holding back a wave of mass discontent these days.

7/5/20: Visualizing COVID19 Impact: U.S. Unemployment Claims

We though the Great Recession was bad... until we got COVID19:

The most intensive, in terms of unemployment claims, six months of the Great Recession peaked in new unemployment claims in the week of May 16, 2009 when cumulative 6 months worth of new unemployment claims filings reached - until then unprecedented - 16,815,050. At the end of the week of May 02, 2020, the same number stood at 35,569,978 or more than double the prior historical peak.

7/5/20: No Value in Them, Stonks

No, folks, the markets are still not in line with fundamentals:

And that applies to all three sets of fundamentals: pre-COVID19 conditions in the underlying economy (secular stagnation), during-COVID19 collapse of the economy, and post-COVID19 expectations for the economy.

Which, of course, explains why Buffett sees no opportunities for buying, given the above chart is one of his favourite indicators of value.

7/5/20: BRIC Composite PMIs: Global Economy in a Free Fall

With Russia and China data finally in, here are the full updated BRIC PMIs for April (note: manufacturing has been covered in more details here: https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2020/05/4520-eurozone-manufacturing-pmis-crater.html).

Sharp drop in Manufacturing PMIs in April, compared to 1Q 2020, were accompanied by even more spectacular declines in Services PMIs:

Across the BRICs, Services PMI fell from 44.9 in 1Q 2020 to 30.6 in April. The two readings represent the lowest and the second lowest readings in quarterly PMIs in history of the series (since 1Q 2006).

Brazil Services PMI sunk from already-contractionary 45.9 in 1Q 2020 to 27.4 in April. Russia saw its Services PMI falling from 47.7 in 1Q 2020 to 12.2 in April, with the swing of -35.5 points in one go. India, however, went into an even worse collapse, with its Services PMI falling from 54.1 to 5.4. Indian economy should be contracting at more than 15.5 percentage points if these numbers are true.

China was a 'relative' out-performer in Services PMIs, with its index increasing from a strongly recessionary 40.4 in 1Q 2020 to 44.4 in April, signalling a moderate reduction in the rate of economic activity contraction.

In comparison, Global Services PMI stood at 24.8 in April, down from 45.5 in 1Q 2020. This means that two of the BRIC economies, Russia and India, are both underperforming Global PMI in the services sector.

As the result of the extreme changes in the Manufacturing and Services PMIs, BRICS composite PMIs have fallen sharply off their 1Q 2020 levels:

Global Composite PMI fell from 45.8 in 1Q 2020 to 26.5 in April, signalling worsening of the global recession. India matched Global Composite PMI reading in April, showing a fall from 46.9 in 1Q 2020 to 26.5 in April. China outperformed the Global Composite, with its Composite PMI rising from 42.0 to 47.6, even though April reading remains recessionary. Russian Composite PMI fell through the floor, declining from the recessionary 47.7 in 1Q 2020 to a depression-level 13.9 in April. India performed even worse, with its Composite PMI falling from growth-supportive 54.8 in 1Q 2020 to an unprecedented 7.2 in April.

Overall, movements in PMIs in March-April 2020 have been extreme. So extreme, I had to re-scale the charts and double-check the numbers, especially in the case of Russia and India.

6/5/20: Trump, Irish Pharma and Amazeballs Economics Stats

The Mondo Bizarro of Irish Economics:

Industrial production activity:

And yet, 

• Irish Manufacturing PMI plummeted to 36.0 in April, from 45.1 in March, the lowest since March 2009
• Irish Services PMI "continued its historic descent in April to 13.9, indicating the fastest decline in Irish service sector output in the 20-year survey history. The month-on-month decrease in the Index, at 18.6 points, was smaller than March’s 27.4-point plunge, but still far exceeded anything else in the series to date."

So actual industrial indices are showing booming Manufacturing across both turnover and volumes of production in March, yet PMI surveys showing collapsing activities. You really can't make this up. But, wait, worse: energy-generation is down, apparently, in volume by 0.2% y/y, yet 'modern sectors' activity is up 35.4%. Which points to the heroic efforts of the Irish economy to be the most energy-efficient in the Universe. 

Of course, the entire circus of Irish economic statistics is driven by the 'dotted-out' sectors in the industrial activity tables - the CSO's way of saying "you, peasants, don't need to know what multinationals are up to".

Amazeballs! Just in time for Mr President to muse about taking US pharma out of Ireland's tax [non] haven... https://www.rte.ie/news/business/2020/0504/1136374-pharma-trump-ireland-coronavirus-vaccine/.