Friday, June 10, 2016

10/6/16: Wither Manufacturing? Evidence from Denmark


Couple of posts relating to most current research on the recovery and longer term prospects in global manufacturing. As usual here, we shall focus on the advanced economies.

A recent NBER paper, by Andrew Bernard, Valerie Smeets, and Frederic Warzynski, titled “Rethinking Deindustrialization” (March 2016, NBER Working Paper No. w22114: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2755386) looked at decline in manufacturing activity in Denmark, showing that “manufacturing employment and the number of firms have been shrinking as a share of the total and in absolute levels.” The authors examine this phenomena over the period of 1994 to 2007.

“While most of the decline can be attributed to firm exit and reduced employment at surviving manufacturers, we document that a non-negligible portion is due to firms switching industries, from manufacturing to services.”

Here is an interesting list of related findings based on looking closer at the “last group of firms before, during, and after their sector switch”:

  • “Overall this is a group of small, highly productive, import intensive firms that grow rapidly in terms of value-added and sales after they switch.”
  • “By 2007, employment at these former manufacturers equals 8.7 percent of manufacturing employment, accounting for half the decline in manufacturing employment.”
  • “…we identify two types of switchers: one group resembles traditional wholesalers and another group that retains and expands their R&D and technical capabilities.”

Net result? Quite surprising conclusion that the “findings emphasize that the focus on employment at manufacturing firms overstates the loss in manufacturing-related capabilities that are actually retained in many firms that switch industries.”


Monday, May 30, 2016

30/5/16: Aid:Tech Through to the Irish Times Innovation Awards Finals


Some really great news for a start up I have been working with for some time now, https://aid.technology/ Aid:Tech has been selected as one of three finalists in the Fintech category of the Irish Times Innovation Awards: http://www.irishtimes.com/business/irish-times-innovation-awards-finalists-original-thinkers-from-all-sectors-1.2663210.

Per Irish Times citation: "Aid:tech is an Irish start-up tech firm using the Blockchain system to help aid agencies and NGOs control and manage the distribution of international aid. Its system already delivered aid to 500 Syrian refugees in Lebanon. The firm’s system significantly overcomes the risk of fraud, a major problem with the distribution of aid funds."

In simple terms, Aid:Tech is the largest blockchain (private blockchain, as opposed to Bitcoin or other e-coins) application for provision of services in international development and aid areas in the world. Aid:Tech platform is now fully developed and ready for engaging with our partners in the global NGO sector. It has been field-tested in a series of trials, including a pilot in Lebanon, mentioned by the Irish Times.

We will be announcing some major forthcoming business and platform news over the next few weeks, so keep an eye out for Aid:Tech.

Last, but not least, all credit for these (and forthcoming) wins is due to our fantastic team!


30/5/16: On-shoring Russian start ups into Ireland


My comment for the Irish Independent on some aspects of the reported increases in Russian tech start ups presence in Ireland: http://www.independent.ie/business/technology/russian-advance-into-irish-tech-sector-facilitated-by-bonoenda-double-act-34754317.html.


Must add that the EI are doing excellent job in Russian marketplace in sourcing some really exciting business development opportunities and providing huge support for Irish companies exporting into the market.

Also, note: Ireland Russia Business Association has merged with i-Cham at the beginning of 2016.

30/5/16: ECB's TLTROs, via Expresso


Portugal's Expresso on ECB's TLTROs programme, with quotes from myself (amongst others):




Friday, May 27, 2016

27/5/16: Ifo on the Effects of German Minimum Wage on Internships


Germany's Ifo institute issued the following press release concerning the effects of the recently introduced minimum wage law on internships (emphasis is mine):

"Munich, 27 May 2016 - The new minimum wage law in Germany has eliminated numerous internship positions. This is the result of the latest Ifo Personnel Manager Survey, conducted for Randstad Deutschland, which was published on Friday.

The number of companies offering internships has roughly halved. Before the introduction of the minimum wage, 70% of the companies said they offered voluntary internships, a number which has now fallen to 34%. This is also the case for compulsory internships, where the percentage of companies likewise fell from 62% to 34%.

The decline in internships is evident in companies of all sizes. For companies with more than 500 employees, the proportion of firms with voluntary internships decreased from 88% to 52% and for compulsory internships from 91% to 68%. In companies with fewer than 50 employees, the shares fell from 59% to 26% (voluntary) and from 49% to 21% (compulsory internships).

More than a few human resource managers indicated that because of personnel budget constraints the number of internships offered has been, in part, significantly reduced. Other companies now only offer compulsory internships or have reduced the duration of voluntary internships to three months. Some companies expressed complaints about the additional documentation requirements as well as uncertainty over the distinction between voluntary and mandatory internships.

Excluded from the minimum wage since 1 January 2015 are only internships that are compulsory as part of study or training regulations as well as voluntary internships of up to three months before or during vocational training or higher education. Additional exemptions from the minimum wage are the long-term unemployed for the first six months on the job."

Note: German labour markets are currently relatively tight when it comes to supply of skills, so reductions in internships, if confirmed by other sources, would be even more significant in such a setting.

26/5/16: After the Crisis: Why the Slowdown in Productivity Growth?


My article for Cayman Financial Review 2Q 2016 is out, covering the structural nature of labour productivity growth decline in post-crisis economy: see here http://caymanianfinancialreview.cay.newsmemory.com/ pages 66-67 or click on images below to enlarge:




26/5/16: European Reforms: Mostly "No Show" grades


An interesting heat map from Moody's covering the deteriorating pace of reforms in the euro area:

Source: @Schuldensuehner 

The key point is that under the monetary easing created by the ECB, Euro area sovereigns are all slacking off on reforms, especially more politically difficult reforms, such as product markets reforms (9 out of 11 states are in red, none in green), pensions & healthcare reforms and fiscal reforms (5 out of 11 are in read). The best performing countries are, bizarrely, Spain and Italy. Farcically, Ireland apparently does not require reforms to improve efficiency of public administration. Presumably, Moody's analysts never heard of tsunami of public waste unleashed by the likes of HSE and Irish Water.

Take it for what it is - a sketchy top-level view of the reforms landscape and give it a wonder: are ECB policies helping long term sustainability of European institutions or harming it?.. In 23 out of 60 point observations, the reforms have delivered so far 'no or limited progress' and only in 6 out of 60 point observations, the reforms have delivered 'substantial progress'. Go figure...

Thursday, May 26, 2016

26/5/16: Some recent media links to TrueEconomics


Couple of recent links and citations for Trueeconomics blog:

Delighted and really honoured that my comment on the blog has been cited by one of the best opinion writers for Bloomberg View, Leonid Bershidsky, here: http://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-05-25/new-deal-aims-to-forget-greece-not-forgive-it.

Econintersect.com are carrying a link to the post from the blog on new behavioural research: http://econintersect.com/pages/contributors/contributor.php?post=201605220131.

Finland's http://anttironkainen.fi/ blog is also linking to my piece on Greece: http://anttironkainen.fi/euroryhma-sopi-etta-kreikan-kriisi-jatkuu-viimeistaan-2018/.

Capital Greece citing same: http://www.capital.gr/story/3128569.

Meanwhile, my brief chat with Max Keiser on Keizer Report, covering (mostly) Ireland, and some broader european issues, such as ongoing debt crisis: https://www.rt.com/shows/keiser-report/344412-episode-max-keiser-919/.

My article on commodities prices (mostly oil and gas) for Sunday Business Post last week: http://www.businesspost.ie/invested-the-commodities-rollercoaster/.

My last week appearance on Bloomberg radio covering eurozone growth: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/audio/2016-05-13/gurdgiev-headwinds-remain-across-eurozone.


25/5/16: Does the Global Trade Slowdown Matter?


The transition from the Global Financial Crisis, to the Great Recession and to currently fragile recovery has been marked not only by weaker structural growth across the economies and by massive outflows of funds from the emerging markets, but by a dramatic decline in world trade growth. Another stylised fact is that since the onset of the recovery, growth in global trade volumes has been also lagging behind growth in GDP terms.

This has been a puzzling phenomena, inconsistent with the previous recessions. Factually, global trade grew at or below 3 percent in 2012-15, which is below the pre-crisis average of 7 percent (over 1987-2007) and less than the growth of global GDP.

One recent paper (see full citation below) by Neagu, Mattoo and Ruta (2016) attempted to explain this transition to the new global growth environment of relatively subdued global trade growth. Here is a quick summary of their paper.



As chart above shows, there has been a major slowdown in growth in world trade volumes. Per Neagu, Mattoo and Ruta (2016), “proximate explanations of the trade slowdown link it to changes in GDP and, hence, to the fallout of the Global Financial Crisis. While weak global demand matters for trade growth as it depresses world import demand, cyclical factors are not the only determinants of the trade slowdown.”

In simple terms, trade is growing slower than GDP not only because GDP growth is slow itself, but “also because the long-run relationship between trade and GDP is changing. The elasticity of world trade to GDP was larger than 2 in the 1990s and declined throughout the 2000s.” So in simple terms, a 1% change in world GDP used to be associated with 2% change in world trade volumes. It no longer is.

“Among the leading causes of this structural change in the trade-income relationship is a shift in vertical specialization. The long-run trade elasticity increased during the 1990s, as production fragmented internationally into global value chains (GVCs), and decreased in the 2000s as this process decelerated.” In other words, logistic revolution of the 1990s is now over and the low-hanging fruit of improving cost margins on production outsourcing and enhancing delivery efficiencies has been picked, leaving little new momentum to drive growth in trade flows over each unit of increase in global income.

Per Neagu, Mattoo and Ruta (2016), “Economists disagree regarding the implications of the trade slowdown for economic growth (and welfare). Some believe that the slowing down of global trade has no real consequences for economic growth. For instance, commenting on the global trade slowdown, Paul Krugman noted that “The flattening out is neither good nor bad, it’s just what happens when a particular trend reaches its limits”. Others take the opposite view. For instance, in a speech as governor of the Central Bank of India, Raghuram Rajan concluded that “We are more dependent on the global economy than we think. That it is growing more slowly, and is more inward looking, than in the past means that we have to look to regional and domestic demand for our growth.”

According to the authors, “both views have elements of truth but neither may be completely right. On the one hand, the impact of the trade slowdown should not be overstated. Most economies are more open today than they were in the 1990s. In so far as openness per se is associated with dynamic benefits, trade will continue to foster growth. On the other hand, there is a risk of understating the implications of the trade slowdown. If the expansion of trade growth in the 1990s contributed to countries’ economic growth, one may suspect that the flattening of this trend will imply that the contribution of trade to the growth process will be lower.”

So, in summary, then: “Trade is growing more slowly not only because growth of global gross domestic product is lower, but also because trade itself has become less responsive to gross domestic product.”

Neagu, Mattoo and Ruta (2016) go on “to try to investigate the economic consequences of the recent trade slowdown.” The authors focus “…on two channels through which the changing trade-income relationship documented in the literature may affect countries’ economic performance.” These are:

  1. “The demand-side Keynesian concern is that sluggish world import growth may adversely affect individual countries’ economic growth as it limits opportunities for their exports.”
  2. “The supply side (Adam) Smithian concern is that slower trade may diminish the scope for productivity growth through increasing specialization and diffusion of technologies. In particular, a slower pace of GVC expansion may imply diminishing scope for productivity growth through a more efficient international division of labor and knowledge spillovers.”


So what do they find?

Firstly, “preliminary evidence is mixed”:

  • “On the demand side, we find that the elasticity of exports to global demand has decreased for both high-income and developing economies in the 2000s relative to the 1990s.”
  • “We also find that the sensitivity of domestic growth to export growth is higher, and has increased more over time, for developing economies compared to high-income economies.”
  • Both of “these results, however, hold only when we measure exports in traditional gross terms.”
  • “When we use value added exports, which are more relevant for the demand-side mechanism, the change in estimated elasticities is smaller and not statistically significant (although a qualification is that value added trade data are available for a shorter period and fewer countries).”


Secondly, the authors “…try to assess the Smithian concern by focusing on the growth implication of a slowing pace of GVC growth”:

  • “…estimates indicate that increasing backward specialization has a positive impact on labor productivity growth…” 
  • Quantifying “the growth in labor productivity due to the growth in backward vertical specialization”, the authors find that “while this share is not large, as productivity growth is explained by many factors beyond vertical specialization, its contribution has decreased by half in recent years, suggesting that the trade slowdown is a contributing factor of the decrease in productivity growth.”



In the above, note the change from blue lines (positive link between the degree of vertical specialization and productivity growth) to red lines (negative link).

In short, things are pretty bad: both factors - demand slowdown and trade slowdown - are cross-related and linked. Both are reinforcing each other, yielding growth slowdown across both supply side and demand side margins. And the side effect is: the two effects being correlated also at least in part captures productivity slowdown - aka, secular stagnation dimension.



Neagu, Cristina and Mattoo, Aaditya and Ruta, Michele, "Does the Global Trade Slowdown Matter?" (May 13, 2016). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 7673. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2779830

Wednesday, May 25, 2016

25/5/16: IMF's Epic Flip Flopping on Greece


IMF published the full Transcript of a Conference Call on Greece from Wednesday, May 25, 2016 (see: http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2016/tr052516.htm). And it is simply bizarre.

Let me quote here from the transcript (quotes in black italics) against quotes from the Eurogroup statement last night (available here: Eurogroup statement link) marked with blue text in italics. Emphasis in bold is mine

On debt, I certainly think that we have made progress, Europe is making progress. Debt relief is firmly on the agenda now. Our European partners and all the other stakeholders all now recognize that Greece debt is unsustainable, is highly unsustainable, they accept that debt relief is needed.

Do they? Let’s take a look at the Eurogroup official statement:

Is debt relief firmly on the agenda and does Eurogroup 'accept that debt relief is needed'? "The Eurogroup agrees to assess debt sustainability" Note: the Eurogroup did not agree to deliver debt relief, but simply to assess it. Which might put debt relief on the agenda, but it is hardly a meaningful commitment, as similar promises were made before, not only for Greece, but also for other peripheral states.

Does Eurogroup "recognize that Greece debt is unsustainable, is highly unsustainable"? No. There is no mentioning of words 'unsustainable' or 'highly unsustainable' in the Eurogroup document. None. Nada. Instead, here is what the Eurogroup says about the extent of Greek debt sustainability: "The Eurogroup recognises that over the exceptionally long time horizon of assessing debt sustainability there can be no forecasts, only assumptions, given the sizable degree of uncertainty over macroeconomic developments." Does this sound to you like the Eurogroup recognized 'highly unsustainable' nature of Greek debt? Not to me...

Furthermore, relating to debt relief measures, the Eurogroup notes: “For the medium term, the Eurogroup expects to implement a possible second set of measures following the successful implementation of the ESM programme. These measures will be implemented if an update of the debt sustainability analysis produced by the institutions at the end of the programme shows they are needed to meet the agreed GFN benchmark, subject to a positive assessment from the institutions and the Eurogroup on programme implementation.” Again, there is no admission by the Eurogroup of unsustainable nature of Greek debt, and in fact there is a statement that only 'if' debt is deemed to be unsustainable at the medium-term future, then debt relief measures can be contemplated as possible. This neither amounts to (1) statement that does not agree with the IMF assertion that the Eurogroup realizes unsustainable nature of Greek debt burden; and (2) statement that does not agree with the IMF assertion that the Eurogroup put debt relief 'firmly on the table'.

More per IMF: Eurogroup “…accept the methodology that should be used to calibrate the necessary debt relief. They accept the objectives in terms of the gross financing need in the near term and in the long run. They even accept the time periods, a very long time period, over which this debt has to be met through 2060. And I think they are also beginning to accept more realism in the assumption.

Again, do they? Let’s go back to the Eurogroup statement: “The Eurogroup recognises that over the exceptionally long time horizon of assessing debt sustainability there can be no forecasts, only assumptions, given the sizable degree of uncertainty over macroeconomic developments.” Have the Eurogroup accepted IMF’s assumptions? No. It simply said that things might change and if they do, well, then we’ll get back to you.

Things get worse from there on.

IMF: “We have not changed our view on how the outlook for debt is looking. We have not gone back. We want to assure you that we will not want big primary surpluses.” This statement, of course, refers to the IMF stating (see here) that Greek primary surpluses of 3.5% assumed under the DSA for Bailout 3.0 were unrealistic. And yet, quoting the Eurogroup document: the new agreement “provides further reassurances that Greece will meet the primary surplus targets of the ESM programme (3.5% of GDP in the medium-term), without prejudice to the obligations of Greece under the SGP and the Fiscal Compact.”  So, IMF says it did not surrender on 3.5% primary surplus for Greece being unrealistic, yet Eurogroup says 3.5% target is here to stay. Who’s spinning what?

IMF: “...I cannot see us facing this on a primary surplus that is above 1.5 [ percent of GDP]. I know it's just not credible in our view. And you will see that there is nothing in the European statement anymore that says 3.5 should be used for the DSA. So there, too, Europe is moving.” As I just quoted from the eurogroup statement clearly saying 3.5% surplus is staying.

IMF is again tangled up in long tales of courage played against short strides to surrender. PR balancing, face-savings, twisting, turning, obscuring… you name it, the IMF got it going here.



24/5/16: Greek Crisis: Old Can, Old Foot, New Flight


So Eurogroup has hammered out yet another 'breakthrough deal' with Greece, not even 12 months after the previous 'breakthrough deal' was hammered out in August 2015. And there are no modalities to discuss at this stage, but here's what we know:

  1. IMF is on board. Tsipras lost the insane target of getting rid of the Fund; and Europe gained an insane stamp of approval that Greece remains within the IMF programme. Why is this important for Europe? Because everyone - from the Greeks to the Eurocrats to the insane asylum patients - knows that Greece is insolvent and that any deal absent massive upfront commitments to debt writedowns is not sustainable. However, if the IMF joins the group of the reality deniers, then at least pro forma there is a claim of sustainability to be had. Europe is not about achieving real solutions. It is about propping up the PR facade.
  2. With the IMF on board we can assume one of two things: either the deal is more realistic and closer to being in tune with Greek needs (see modalities here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/05/23516-debt-greek-sustainability-and.html) or IMF once again aligned itself with the EU as a face-saving exercise. The Fund, like Brussels, has a strong incentive to extend and pretend the Greek problem: if the Fund walks away from the new 'breakthrough deal', it will validate the argument that IMF lending to Greece was a major error. The proverbial egg hits the IMF's face. If the Fund were to stay in the deal, even if the EU does not deliver on any of its promises on debt relief, the IMF will retain a right to say: "Look, we warned everyone. EU promised, but did not deliver. So Greek failure is not our fault." To figure out which happened, we will need to see deal modalities.
  3. What we do know is that Greece will be able to meet its scheduled repayments to EFSF and ECB and the IMF this year, thanks to the 'breakthrough'. In other words, Greece will be given already promised loans (Bailout 3.0 agreed in 2015) so it can pay back previous extended loans (Bailouts 1.0 & 2.0). There are no 'new funds' - just new credit card to repay previous credit card. Worse, Greece will be given the money in tranches, so as to ensure that Tsipras does not decide to use 'new-old' credit on things like hospitals supplies. 
  4. Greece is to get some debt reprofiling before 2018 - one can only speculate what this means, but Eurogroup pressie suggested that it will be in the form of changing debt maturities. There are two big peaks of redemptions coming in 2017-2019, which can be smoothed out by loading some of that debt into 2020 and 2021. See chart below. Tricky bit is the Treasury notes which come due within the year window of maturity and will cause some hardship in smoothing other debts maturities. However, this measure is unlikely to be of significant benefit in terms of overall debt sustainability. Again, as I note here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/05/23516-debt-greek-sustainability-and.html Greece requires tens of billions in writeoffs (and that is in NPV terms).
  5. All potentially significant measures on debt relief are delayed until post-2018 to appease Germany and a number of other member states. Which means one simple thing: by mid-2018 we will be in yet another Greek crisis. And by the end of 2018, no one in Europe will give a diddly squat about Greece, its debt and the sustainability of that debt because, or so the hope goes, general recovery from the acute crisis will be over by then and Europeans will slip back into the slumber of 1.5 percent growth with 1.2 percent inflation and 8-9 percent unemployment, where everyone is happy and Greece is, predictably, boringly and expectedly bankrupt.

Source: http://graphics.wsj.com/greece-debt-timeline/

Funny thing: Greece is currently illiquid, the financing deal is expected to be 'more than' EUR10 billion. Greek debt maturity from June 1 through December 31 is around EUR17.8 billion. Spot the problem? How much more than EUR10 billion it will be? Ugh?..So technically, Greece got money to cover money it got before and it is not enough to cover all the money it got before, so it looks like Greece is out of money already, after getting money.

As usual, we have can, foot, kick... the thing flies. And as always, not far enough. Pre-book your seats for the next Greek Crisis, coming up around 2018, if not before.

Or more accurately, the dead-beaten can sort of flies. 

Remember IMF saying 3.5% surplus was fiction for Greece? Well, here's the EU statement: "Greece will meet the primary surplus targets of the ESM programme (3.5% of GDP in the medium-term), without prejudice to the obligations of Greece under the SGP and the Fiscal Compact." No,  I have no idea how exactly it is that the IMF agreed to that.

And if you thought I was kidding that Greece was getting money solely to repay debts due, I was not: "The second tranche under the ESM programme amounting to EUR 10.3 bn will be disbursed to Greece in several disbursements, starting with a first disbursement in June (EUR 7.5 bn) to cover debt servicing needs and to allow a clearance of an initial part of arrears as a means to support the real economy." So no money for hospitals, folks. Bugger off to the corner and sit there.

And guess what: there won't be any money coming up for the 'real economy' as: "The subsequent disbursements to be used for arrears clearance and further debt servicing needs will be made after the summer." This is from the official Eurogroup statement.

Here's what the IMF got: "The Eurogroup agrees to assess debt sustainability with reference to the following benchmark for gross financing needs (GFN): under the baseline scenario, GFN should remain below 15% of GDP during the post programme period for the medium term, and below 20% of GDP thereafter." So the framework changed, and a target got more realistic, but... there is still no real commitment - just a promise to assess debt sustainability at some point in time. Whenever it comes. In whatever shape it may be.

Short term measures, as noted above, are barely a nod to the need for debt writedowns: "Smoothening the EFSF repayment profile under the current weighted average maturity: Use EFSF/ESM diversified funding strategy to reduce interest rate risk without incurring any additional costs for former programme countries; Waiver of the step-up interest rate margin related to the debt buy-back tranche of the 2nd Greek programme for the year 2017". So no, there is no real debt relief. Just limited re-loading of debt and slight re-pricing to reflect current funding conditions. 

Medium term measures are also not quite impressive and amount to more of the same short term measures being continued, conditionally, and 'possible' - stress that word 'possible', for they might turn out to be impossible too.

Yep. Can + foot + some air... ah, good thing Europe is so consistent...