17/11/2014: All the years draining into banking cesspool...

So the tale of European banks deleveraging... record provisions, zero supply of credit for years, scores of devastated borrowers (corporate and personal), record subsidies, record drop in competition, rounds and rounds of 'stress testing' - all passed by virtually all, the Banking Union, the ESM break, forced writedowns in some countries, nationalisations, various LTROs, TLTROs, MROs, ABS, promises, threats, regulatory squeezes ... and the end game 6 years into the crisis?..

Per Bloomberg Brief, the sickest banking system on Planet Earth is... drum roll... Wester European one.

It is only made uglier by all the efforts wasted.

H/T for the chart to Jonathan. 

17/11/2014: G20 and Russia: G19+1 or G20-8?..

My comment for the Portugal's Expresso on the G20 summit in the context of the Russia-West relations: http://expresso.sapo.pt/g20-quer-acelerar-crescimento-com-mais-investimento-em-infraestruturas=f898435

16/11/2014: The Sunny Side of the Stormy Irish Recovery

My article on the state of the Irish economy published by the ZeroHedge: http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-11-13/irish-eyes-are-smiling-should-they-be

16/11/2014: America's Scariest Chart...

Yes, US unemployment is declining. Yes, US economy is adding jobs. Yes, the crisis is… almost over… Except…

Except that is:

• Average duration of unemployment rose in October (the latest we have data for) and
• Average duration of unemployment remains totally out of touch with previous recessions.

Now, note the following regularity:

• After 2001 recession, average duration of unemployment never returned to pre-recession levels;
• The same has happened in the recession of 1990-1991.

In other words, so far in all three most recent recessions there was a permanent increase in unemployment duration over and above pre-recessionary average.

Every time this happens in the economy the following takes place: some of those who were long term unemployed during the recession become permanently unemployed. And every time this happens, the jobs being created in a recovery are by-passing those who have been long-term unemployed.

Now look back at the current crisis running stats. Average time it took unemployment duration to fall back to pre-crisis levels in all previous recessions is 61 months. We are now into 77th month of unemployment duration staying above pre-recessionary levels. And counting. By length of the crisis to-date, this is the third worst recession in post-war history.

We are also at the duration levels vastly in excess of those recorded in all previous recessions. By this matrix, the US is in its worst recession in post-war history.

Here is the raw data:

While the US economy might be generating jobs, it is not generating enough of the jobs to shift the long-term unemployed, and it is not generating the types of jobs that can get this massive army of people forced to rely on unemployment benefits back into productive employment.

15/11/2014: Emerging Markets Rot Drives Russian Economic Uncertainty

Some interesting data from the Policy Uncertainty Index for Russia (see http://www.policyuncertainty.com/russia_monthly.html). I traced out the main news markers over the period covered by the index (click on the chart to enlarge):

Note: higher values of Index, greater attention to the domestic economic and economic policy uncertainty in the media.

There is a clear pattern of rising policy uncertainty from, roughly speaking, early 2008, with both geopolitical risks (Georgia conflict) and economic risks (the 2009 recession) as well as internal political risks (2012 elections) all coincident with amplification in uncertainty. Ukraine crisis period is clearly only comparable in uncertainty with the last Yeltsin elections (which almost lost to the Communist Party candidate).

Volatility in uncertainty has also been on the rising trend, since, roughly, 2009 (note: the chart below is plotting 24mo MA):

However, it is worth correcting in the above data for the general global changes, not just Russia-own trends. To do so, let's take a look at Russia's Policy Uncertainty Index relative to the average of the same indices for China and India:

Notably, Russia's relative uncertainty has peaked around April-May 2014 and then subsided despite the fact that Ukraine conflict remains active. This suggests that post-May 2014, the acceleration in the rising trend in Russian economic and policy uncertainty is driven more by the general rot setting in in the Emerging Markets, and less by the geopolitical crisis.

Here is a chart plotting Policy Uncertainty Indices for the U.S., Russia, China and India:

This further confirms the above proposition: China is now showing levels of policy uncertainty on par with those in Russia. Geopolitics take a back seat to economics of the Emerging Markets slowdown.

14/11/2014: Irish Construction Sector PMIs: A Bit Bubbly, A Bit Bonkers…

Ulster Bank and Markit published Construction PMI for Ireland, and the numbers signal huge uplift in activity across all sub-sectors, excluding Civil engineering. However, Civil Engineering post an above 50 reading (albeit consisted with virtually no growth) for the first time since Q1 2006.

So here we have it:

Total Activity PMI for Construction sector in Ireland rose to 64.9 in October, signalling huge rates of growth, despite few cranes being visible around. 3mo average through October is at 62.6 against 3mo average through July at 60.9. Similar rises were recorded in 6mo average through October. All of which suggests we should be seeing a massive boom. Of course we are not. Why? Because the levels from which the activity is rising are… well, microscopic.

Housing sub-sector PMI rose moderated slightly to 66.4 from the blistering 68.4 a month ago. 3mo average through October is at 66.17 against 3mo average through July at 62.57. Again, the above numbers would have signalled we are in a new bungalow blitz boom, except we are not. At least not yet.

Commercial sub-sector PMI hit 66.8 in October, a solid rise from already boiling 62.7 in September. 3mo average through October is at 64.23 which is up on 61.8 3mo average through July 2014.

Civil Engineering PMI came in at 50.6 in October, which is welcomed sign. Still 3mo average through October remains below 50.0 at 48.0 and that is a slight improvement on 3mo average through July (47.43).

Crucially, the improvement in the Civil Engineering sub-index pushed all sub-sectors to co-move as the table below shows:

It is worth remembering that Construction Sector PMIs seem to have little bearing to the reality in the sector activity on the ground as shown below, so it is worth taking these numbers with a grain of salt.

Just how bonkers is the above PMI data? Or just how much salt to be used with that fish:

Yep, historically, PMIs decline when activity expands and vice versa...

14/11/2014: Russia Risks Up, but No Panic, yet

Euromoney Country Risk published an interesting analysis of the country risk scores for Russia. Here are some of the highlights (link up once Euromoney produce undated note).


"As sanctions and falling oil prices force the rouble’s slide, country risk experts are questioning the ability of privately owned and/or state backed
banks and corporates to obtain credit and repay their debts amid capital flight and an economy in decline Russia’s country risk score has fallen precipitously this year, in tandem with Ukraine."

The beef is in the details: "An 8.3 point correction since 2013, to 46.2 points out of a maximum 100 available, has sent the sovereign careering 17 places down ECR’s global rankings to 71st out of 189 countries worldwide. That marks a lower score compared with 2008, indeed the lowest since Russia defaulted in 1998, with the sovereign slipping into the fourth of ECR’s five tiered groups commensurate with a B to BB+ credit rating, signalling its triple-B credit ratings are overdue a downgrade."

Per ECR: "Russia’s plight is understandable. Oil prices have come off their peak since June, falling more than $30 per barrel to $81, as of Thursday."

You bet. Here's the updated chart:

As I noted before, oil price leads Ruble, not the other way around. And also note volatility in recent days - as predicted here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/11/7112014-russian-ruble-rough-days-ahead.html

Back to ECR analysis: "With sanctions causing an estimated $130 billion of capital outflow this year, according to the central bank, the rouble has plunged to $46/$, depreciating by 42% since the end of 2013 and forcing an abandonment of its target corridor in favour of a (virtual) free float absorbing the shock and preventing forex decline."

The point worth mentioning here is that capital outflows recorded are official flows, which include:

1. Repayment of maturing debts by Russian banks and corporates (which is now becoming a serious issue, given the state of debt markets in the wake of the sanctions); and
2. Forex positions taken by households and corporates, even when deposits are held inside the country.
3. In addition, capital outflows reflect exits by financial investment funds, which are not having a direct impact on the economy in the short run, but can have adverse impact on corporate funding and investment forward over the longer term.

For the repayments schedule, see here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/11/11112014-another-wild-ride-for.html

Experts opinion

"Russia’s FX reserves totalled $429 billion as of end-October, down from $524 billion the year before. The true total is a little lower due to adjustments for the reduced valuation of gold reserves and changes in official agency reserves."

Note, I wrote about the latest foreign reserves position figures here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/11/11112014-another-wild-ride-for.html these stood at USD416.23 billion at the end of October, excluding IMF-held funds, SDRs, and covering only gold and foreign exchange.

Danske Bank analysts "believe the $50 billion FX repo facility is “reasonable
enough to cover the most urgent needs of Russian corporations regarding their external debt repayments” through to 2016. Some banks, after all, have surplus liquidity that can be redistributed to those in need, and the central bank’s forex stockpile is sufficient to imbue some confidence in averting a crisis."

Kaan Nazli, senior economist at Neuberger Berman "expects a turnaround next year “due to the currency devaluation effect, and as private sector debts are
paid down with refinancing options limited by the sanctions.”

My own comment quoted in ECR note is as follows: I do "not believe a sovereign or even selective (large scale) private sector defaults are likely in the short term in spite of some talk of difficulties. “Such an event is not in the interest of the Russian authorities and can be prevented by using the existent foreign exchange reserves cushion,” he says. However, if oil prices remain low for a prolonged period and, simultaneously, Russian companies’ and banks’ access to foreign funding is severely curtailed, “we are likely to see a significant uplift in sovereign and banks’ credit risk”, he adds."


My 'wider angle' view to add to the above comment is as follows:

In my opinion, Russian Ruble dynamics vis-a-vis the USD and EUR are underlining the overall structural and geopolitical pressures on the Russian economy.

Amongst the structural factors, the largest weight can be assigned to the developing risks to economic growth, that have been at play since H2 2012 and H1 2013.

However, additional pressures are now being presented by the geopolitical factors, namely the crisis in Ukraine and the related sanctions on Russian companies and banks, including the indirect effects of these sanctions.

Decline in the oil prices - triggered in part by the sluggish global demand, and in part by the geopolitical decisions of the Gulf countries to withdraw supply-side support for oil - a having a significant short term impact on Russian exports revenues and are driving down Ruble valuations. Financial sector sanctions have de facto cut off all Russian companies and banks (including those not explicitly covered by sanctions) from the largest foreign funding markets, triggering high outflows of capital (as Russian companies pay down their maturing foreign currency loans exposures instead of rolling them over). As the result, Russian international reserves have been depleted from USD524.3 billion at the end of October 2013 to USD428.6 billion at the end of October 2014 (although one must take into the account reductions in this figure due to lower valuation of gold reserves and changes in official agencies reserves).

Going forward, changes in the inflationary environment, global and Russian economies dynamics, as well as continued demand for corporate and banks' deleveraging from foreign debt exposures, we can expect more downward momentum in the Ruble valuations and more pressure on the Government fiscal position.

However, devaluation of the Ruble and decline in oil prices do not have a linear one-to-one effect on sustainability of Federal fiscal balance sheet, as Government expenditure is denominate in Rubles, not US dollars or Euro. Furthermore, decline in oil prices is also not translating in one-for-one decline in Russian external balances, as Russian economy is capable of very quick and deep correction in imports demands, as 2009 experience clearly indicates.

As the result, in the short- and medium-term (up to 18-24 months), I do not foresee a significant acceleration in the risk of either a Federal or selective (large scale) private sector defaults. However, if WTI price stays for a prolonged period of time (2+ years) below USD95/barrel and, simultaneously, Russian companies' and banks' access to foreign funding remain severely curtailed, we are likely to see a significant uplift in sovereign and banks' credit risk.

Risk of selective (bank of corporate) default event is harder to asses than sovereign risks, but I do not expect - at this point in time - a large-scale event involving any big Russian corporates. Such an event is not in the interest of the Russian authorities and can be prevented by using the existent foreign exchange reserves cushion. The material risk here is that a number of larger Russian banks and companies, impacted severely by the sanctions, are likely to see dilution of the current shareholdings of foreign and domestic investors, as any liquidity support from the Government will likely see issuance of new equity to the state.

13/11/2014: ECB Boldly Going Where It Doesn't Want to Go

ECB is falling way behind its own target for liquidity injections into the economy. Frankfurt has managed to shrink, not expand, its balance sheet last week, down EUR22.3 billion to EUR2.030 trillion which is roughly EUR970 billion short of the target.

Remember, ECB has set the target of expanding its balance sheet to EUR3 trillion at the last Governing Council meeting (although the target is 'soft') to bring it in line with 2012 average.

Here's the dynamic of the ECB balance sheet, courtesy of @Schuldensuehner

13/11/2014: Size of Government vs Growth

BCA Research are usually not known for silly charts and comparatives. But yesterday, they did produce a blooper …

As chart above (via BCA) shows, there appears to be a strong linear relationship between higher Government Spending as % of GDP (averaged over 2008-2014) and lower real GDP per capita growth. In fact it is very strong - at 63% explanatory power (as measured by R-Sq).

The problem with the above chart is that

1) There are likely influential outliers in the data - Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore

2) We are not quite certain that a linear relationship is a reasonable one

3) There are questions with the sample range: for example 2008-present is a sample covering the period of higher spending due to crisis (including banks measures, but also automatic stabilisers, such as unemployment insurance etc), and

4) GDP per capita is a better metric than GDP itself, but it disfavours younger economies and older economies (where a greater share of population is not at work due to age, education and training) in contrast to middle-aged economies.

So here is the exercise carrying across longer range of data (2000-2014 averages) and on the basis of actual real GDP.

Chart above shows that positive relationship continues to exist when we switch to a longer period average and base our estimates on real GDP metric, as opposed to GDP per capita. It also shows that the relationship is pretty similar for the measure of Government size either by expenditure or revenues. The former is more subject to change over time due to banks rescue measures, while the latter is more prone to change due to GDP changes.

Crucially, however, the relationship is by far not as strong as in the BCA data: we only get a R-Sq of 34.9% for Government Expenditure and even lower R-Sq of 25.3% for Government Revenue relationship to real GDP growth. 

Also note, I run analysis for logarithmic and cubic relationships and these confirm the above R-Sq readings, suggesting that a linear relationship is a reasonably good approximation to reality.

However, we still have the potential problem of outliers in the above. Which appear to be the same ones as in BCA case. So I take 1.5 sigma weight to the mean for each data set and remove all observations that fall outside 1.5 sigma range. This removes 4 countries altogether from the set and also removes another 2 countries from the set covering Government Revenue.

Chart above shows just how dramatically the relationships change when we control for influential outliers. Both R-Sq readings collapse to the point of being no longer significant at all. In other words, absent influential outliers, there is no statistically significant relationship between long-term average real GDP growth and Government spending or revenue.

Which strongly suggests that BCA findings are biased to the upside in terms of reported relationship between the size of Government and GDP by:

1) Demographic effects; and

2) Idiosyncratic factors relating to four Asia-Pacific Tiger economies.

Note: I tested the second set of estimated relations for sensitivity to model specification, including non-linear models (log, cubic, quadratic and exponential) and the result stands - there is no statistically significant relationship.

13/11/2014: Irish Banks: In a Bad League of Their Own

Standard & Poor's report published yesterday (link here) offers a dark view on the French banks, arguing that their capitalisation, based on S&P own metric, puts them into a "weaker position against their European and international peers than according to regulatory ratios".

The S&P looked at the rank order of national banking systems, "resulting from the capital measure that Standard & Poor's Ratings Services uses in its ratings analysis, the risk-adjusted capital (RAC) ratio… According to the latest available comparative data on Dec. 31, 2013, the five French banks (the four mentioned above plus Groupe Crédit Mutuel) had an average RAC ratio of 7.0% versus 7.7% for our top 100 rated banks. …The gap between our in-house measure and the regulatory one (the fully loaded ratio) mostly stems from the banks' internal models for credit risk that we view as less stringent on some asset classes than for some peers. It also results from our stricter treatment than under Basel III of French banks' large insurance subsidiaries."

So in basic terms, S&P used higher quality test of capital buffers. And here are the results for the select sample of European banking systems:

One thing is clear from the above: Ireland's banking system is faring the worst - by a mile - in the sample. In fact, by S&P measure, it is in the league of its own.

13/11/2014: There is a Household Income Crisis Out There

Irish League of Credit Unions have published their Q4 2014 survey yesterday. Some very interesting results overall (see full release here: http://www.creditunion.ie/communications/news/2014/title,8698,en.php)

• 1.76 million of adults (51% of total adult population in Ireland) have less than EUR100 left in disposable income each month after key bills and taxes are paid. This means that de facto, more than 1/2 of Irish adults have not enough money left every year to cover a mild dental emergency or child's braces.
• 730,000 of working adults in the country (41% of working adult population) have less than EUR100 left at the end of the month. This means that for an average household with 2 working adults, assuming no emergency demands on their funds, a saving of 10% downpayment on an average (nationwide) house will require 9.6 years worth of savings.
• A person aged around 35-40 should be saving around EUR350-400/month to cover pension top up, as well as to provide some cushion for emergencies. Only 632,000 people in the country currently can afford such a 'luxury' - only 21% of our adult population. Of working adults, only 427,000 (24%) can afford reasonable pensions and insurance savings cover.
• 37% of adults in this country cannot afford (regularly) to pay their bills in full every month. This is up on 32% a year ago and up on 31% in August 2014 survey.
• In Q4 2013, 90% of Irish adults said they either occasionally or regularly rinding themselves in a position of not being able to cover their monthly bills. In Q4 2014 survey, this number rose to 92%.
• The survey results largely confirm the trends in household deposits recorded by the Central Bank of Ireland.

12/11/2014: Traders 2.0: Emotionlessly Perfect and Perfectly Inhuman

My blogpost for Learn Signal blog on innovation in trading relating to neuro-finance is available here: http://blog.learnsignal.com/?p=117