OECD has put forward their proposals for new international tax rules that, in theory, could eliminate tax-optimisation structures that have allowed many multinational companies (such as Google, Apple, Pfizer, Amazon, Yahoo and numerous others) to cut billions of dollars off their tax bills. The proposals were prompted by the G20 request issued last year and the measures announced this week have already been agreed with the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs (44 countries).
The proposals form just a part of the overall international tax reforms package called “Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” that will be unveiled in 2015 and is commonly known as BEPS.
There are two pillars in the current announcement.
The first pillar addresses only some of the abuses of dual-taxation treaties that generally aim to prevent double taxation of companies trading across the borders. The OECD is proposing to make amendments to its model treaty package that would prevent cross-border transactions from availing of tax treaty reliefs whenever the principal reason for the transaction is to avoid tax liability. This is a principles-based change, recognising the spirit or the principle of the dual-taxation treaties. De facto, the aim is to prevent the situation where preventing dual taxation leads to the scenario of dual non-taxation.
As with all principles-based reforms, the devil will be in the fine print of the actual regulations and economist's mind is not the best guide for sorting through these. From the top, were the measures to succeed, profits shifting via the likes of Ireland to tax havens will be if not fully stopped, at least significantly impaired. The result will be putting at risk tens of billions of economic activity booked via Ireland. In some cases, practically, this will mean that activity will be re-domiciled to other jurisdictions, where it really does take place. In other, however, it will become subject to tax in the country that stands just ahead of the tax haven in the pecking order of revenues flows. Ireland might actually benefit here, since our tax regime is still more benign than that offered in other countries.
To support the first pillar, however, the OECD also wants to restrict the amount of profits that a company can report in its intra-company accounts when these are based offshore. In effect this will put a cap on how much of their activity companies can attribute to the intra-company transactions or to force companies to redistribute profits generated by intra-company divisions across the entire group.
This is likely to undermine our ability to gain from re-allocation of revenues mentioned above. For example, suppose a company has a division based in Ireland that holds the company IP. The division is highly profitable, despite being very small: revenues it earns from other parts of the company operating around the world are covering the alleged cost of IP. If these profits were capped and/or required to be redistributed around the world to other divisions of the same company, the incentive for the company to retain its IP in tax optimising location, such as Ireland, will be gone no matter what our tax rate is.
The second pillar relates to the rules on tax residency. In particular, the OECD said that the existent rules that allow companies to operate facilities in a country without registering tax residency there should be abolished. The result, if adopted, will be to force companies like Google, Apple and Amazon to pay taxes on activities carried out in larger European states in these states by removing the channel for profit shifting to Ireland and other countries. The OECD is explicit about this by insisting that companies with 'significant digital presence' in the market should be forced to declare tax residence in that country.
Ireland's official response to this threat is that majority of MNCs trading from here do have significant presence here in form of large offices and big employment numbers. This is a weak argument for two reasons. One: Irish operations are relatively small for the majority of MNCs, compared to their global workforce. Two: majority of Irish operations of MNCs are sales, sales-support, marketing and back office. In other words, these support larger markets workforce.
The first pillar of the proposal is likely to impact sectors such as phrama and tech, where significant profits are generated by IP, trademarks and patents and these are often held off-shore in what are de facto shell subsidiaries not registered for tax purposes in the countries where actual activities of the company are based.
The second pillar is even more damaging to smaller open economies such as Ireland, because it mirrors the old EU proposal for CCCTB basis of corporate taxation. This pillar will likely push activities that are registered in countries like Ireland back into the countries where actual transactions take place, favouring larger economies over smaller ones.
For example, take a US company running sales support centre in Ireland servicing Spain. This activity is supplied by Spanish-speaking, largely non-Irish staff that has been imported into Ireland not because they are more productive here or have better human capital or face lower costs of employing, but because their presence in Ireland allows the company to book sales in Spain into Ireland. In fact, absent tax arbitrage, it would probably be cheaper for the company to employ these workers in Spain.
Back in 2013, Reuters reported that 3/4 of the largest US MNCs in tech sector channeled their revenues from sales across the EU into Ireland and Switzerland, avoiding reporting these activities in the countries where actual customers resided.
If OECD proposals are implemented to reflect the spirit of the reforms, the tax arbitrage bit of the abnormal return on locating labour-intensive activities in Ireland will be gone. This, by itself, may or may not be enough to put those jobs on the airplanes back to Spain, Italy, Germany, France and elsewhere. But if other countries start making themselves more competitive in labour costs, tax and regulatory regimes, defending Ireland's competitive proposition will be harder and harder.
This process - of erosion of Irish competitive advantage - will be further accelerated by the OECD proposals on tax data sharing and clearance which envisages massive increase in the data reporting burdens on the multinational companies. The cost of compliance and audits this entails will be large and increasing in complexity of companies' structures, leading to more incentives for them to rationalise and streamline their operations worldwide. A tiny market, like Ireland, much more efficiently serviceable via the larger economy like the UK, is unlikely to win in this race.
OECD proposals can have a pronounced effect on economic growth, employment and financial health of a number of countries, including Ireland, Luxembourg, Switzerland, and the Netherlands because the proposals will force MNCs to change their global operations structures and move jobs out of tax optimisation states toward the states where real activity takes place.
From Ireland's point of view, closing off of the loopholes can have a dramatic effect on the ground if it is accompanied by other trends, such as renewed corporate tax rate competition that can challenge our attractive headline rate of 12.5%, erosion of Irish regulatory and supervisory regimes competitiveness, increase in cost inflation and other inefficiencies. Instead of competing on being a tax arbitrage conduit, Ireland will have to start competing on the basis of real economic fundamentals, such as skills, public policy, public goods and services, private markets efficiencies, etc.
Ironically, the threat of the elimination of tax arbitrage opportunities can result in Ireland becoming more competitive and more successful over time, assuming the Governments - current and subsequent - play it smart.
The proposals form just a part of the overall international tax reforms package called “Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” that will be unveiled in 2015 and is commonly known as BEPS.
There are two pillars in the current announcement.
The first pillar addresses only some of the abuses of dual-taxation treaties that generally aim to prevent double taxation of companies trading across the borders. The OECD is proposing to make amendments to its model treaty package that would prevent cross-border transactions from availing of tax treaty reliefs whenever the principal reason for the transaction is to avoid tax liability. This is a principles-based change, recognising the spirit or the principle of the dual-taxation treaties. De facto, the aim is to prevent the situation where preventing dual taxation leads to the scenario of dual non-taxation.
As with all principles-based reforms, the devil will be in the fine print of the actual regulations and economist's mind is not the best guide for sorting through these. From the top, were the measures to succeed, profits shifting via the likes of Ireland to tax havens will be if not fully stopped, at least significantly impaired. The result will be putting at risk tens of billions of economic activity booked via Ireland. In some cases, practically, this will mean that activity will be re-domiciled to other jurisdictions, where it really does take place. In other, however, it will become subject to tax in the country that stands just ahead of the tax haven in the pecking order of revenues flows. Ireland might actually benefit here, since our tax regime is still more benign than that offered in other countries.
To support the first pillar, however, the OECD also wants to restrict the amount of profits that a company can report in its intra-company accounts when these are based offshore. In effect this will put a cap on how much of their activity companies can attribute to the intra-company transactions or to force companies to redistribute profits generated by intra-company divisions across the entire group.
This is likely to undermine our ability to gain from re-allocation of revenues mentioned above. For example, suppose a company has a division based in Ireland that holds the company IP. The division is highly profitable, despite being very small: revenues it earns from other parts of the company operating around the world are covering the alleged cost of IP. If these profits were capped and/or required to be redistributed around the world to other divisions of the same company, the incentive for the company to retain its IP in tax optimising location, such as Ireland, will be gone no matter what our tax rate is.
The second pillar relates to the rules on tax residency. In particular, the OECD said that the existent rules that allow companies to operate facilities in a country without registering tax residency there should be abolished. The result, if adopted, will be to force companies like Google, Apple and Amazon to pay taxes on activities carried out in larger European states in these states by removing the channel for profit shifting to Ireland and other countries. The OECD is explicit about this by insisting that companies with 'significant digital presence' in the market should be forced to declare tax residence in that country.
Ireland's official response to this threat is that majority of MNCs trading from here do have significant presence here in form of large offices and big employment numbers. This is a weak argument for two reasons. One: Irish operations are relatively small for the majority of MNCs, compared to their global workforce. Two: majority of Irish operations of MNCs are sales, sales-support, marketing and back office. In other words, these support larger markets workforce.
The first pillar of the proposal is likely to impact sectors such as phrama and tech, where significant profits are generated by IP, trademarks and patents and these are often held off-shore in what are de facto shell subsidiaries not registered for tax purposes in the countries where actual activities of the company are based.
The second pillar is even more damaging to smaller open economies such as Ireland, because it mirrors the old EU proposal for CCCTB basis of corporate taxation. This pillar will likely push activities that are registered in countries like Ireland back into the countries where actual transactions take place, favouring larger economies over smaller ones.
For example, take a US company running sales support centre in Ireland servicing Spain. This activity is supplied by Spanish-speaking, largely non-Irish staff that has been imported into Ireland not because they are more productive here or have better human capital or face lower costs of employing, but because their presence in Ireland allows the company to book sales in Spain into Ireland. In fact, absent tax arbitrage, it would probably be cheaper for the company to employ these workers in Spain.
Back in 2013, Reuters reported that 3/4 of the largest US MNCs in tech sector channeled their revenues from sales across the EU into Ireland and Switzerland, avoiding reporting these activities in the countries where actual customers resided.
If OECD proposals are implemented to reflect the spirit of the reforms, the tax arbitrage bit of the abnormal return on locating labour-intensive activities in Ireland will be gone. This, by itself, may or may not be enough to put those jobs on the airplanes back to Spain, Italy, Germany, France and elsewhere. But if other countries start making themselves more competitive in labour costs, tax and regulatory regimes, defending Ireland's competitive proposition will be harder and harder.
This process - of erosion of Irish competitive advantage - will be further accelerated by the OECD proposals on tax data sharing and clearance which envisages massive increase in the data reporting burdens on the multinational companies. The cost of compliance and audits this entails will be large and increasing in complexity of companies' structures, leading to more incentives for them to rationalise and streamline their operations worldwide. A tiny market, like Ireland, much more efficiently serviceable via the larger economy like the UK, is unlikely to win in this race.
OECD proposals can have a pronounced effect on economic growth, employment and financial health of a number of countries, including Ireland, Luxembourg, Switzerland, and the Netherlands because the proposals will force MNCs to change their global operations structures and move jobs out of tax optimisation states toward the states where real activity takes place.
From Ireland's point of view, closing off of the loopholes can have a dramatic effect on the ground if it is accompanied by other trends, such as renewed corporate tax rate competition that can challenge our attractive headline rate of 12.5%, erosion of Irish regulatory and supervisory regimes competitiveness, increase in cost inflation and other inefficiencies. Instead of competing on being a tax arbitrage conduit, Ireland will have to start competing on the basis of real economic fundamentals, such as skills, public policy, public goods and services, private markets efficiencies, etc.
Ironically, the threat of the elimination of tax arbitrage opportunities can result in Ireland becoming more competitive and more successful over time, assuming the Governments - current and subsequent - play it smart.
