Friday, October 4, 2013

4/10/2013: IMF 11th review of Ireland: Banks & Exchequer

IMF released its 11th review of Irish economy under the Extended Arrangement for funding. I covered growth-related issues arising from the IMF release here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/10/4102013-imf-11th-review-of-ireland.html

Now, some other topics, namely banks and the Exchequer.

Per IMF: "Ireland is expected to return to reliance on market financing in 2014, yet further European support could make Ireland’s recovery and debt sustainability more robust. Irish banks face weak profitability that hinders their capacity to revive lending. European support to lower banks’ market funding costs could help sustain domestic demand recovery in the medium term, protecting debt sustainability and financial market confidence."

What's that about? Here are two charts:



IMF: "The recent retracement of Irish sovereign bond yields has been broadly consistent with the experience of other countries in the euro area periphery." [But wait, what about Ireland's unparalleled success in fiscal adjustments and 'best-in-class' status? Are the IMF saying that Enda did not singlehandedly deliver huge improvements in Irish bonds yields? How can this be the case, unless the Irish Government uses 'we' as denoting 'Peripheral Countries' collective in claims that the Govenment has delivered stabilisation of Government funding costs.]

"After touching record lows in early May, the 10 year yield has risen 56 basis points, to 3.98 percent as of September 11. Market tensions dissipated in July after the settlement of the political crisis in Portugal and recent turbulence in emerging markets has had limited effect on Irish bond yields. No new bond has been issued by the Irish sovereign since the €5 billion ten-year issue in mid March." The latter, of course simply means that lower supply of new bonds (lack of it since mid-March) and now the new announcement by NTMA that it will not be tapping the markets any time before official exit from Troika supports, are keeping things steady in yields terms. Otherwise… well… logic suggests, at least speculatively, they can be higher.

And on banks: "From a trough in mid-May, yields on Bank of Ireland (BoI) and Allied Irish Banks (AIB) 3 year covered bonds have edged up some 40 basis points as of September 11. Since its May 30 issuance, the yield on BoI’s 3 year senior unsecured bond has been more volatile, but overall has risen by 62 basis points, to 3.37 percent."

Bah! Two things to say about the above:

  1. Banks bonds still tracing sovereign risks and that holds even for covered bonds! Not a good sign for the banking sector. The explicit guarantee is gone, so now it is don to the implicit guarantee and the state simply cannot shake off the baggage of the original 2008 Guarantee. Irish banks are still too-big-to-fail and Irish state is still a too-small-to-bail-in banks lenders.
  2. For an army of bonds sales-desks analysts out there pontification on Irish economy, I am yet to see their honest analysis on what is happening with banks funding costs and sovereign funding costs. They are a bit too keen talking about the economy and too little about debt markets. Which is sort of 'your dentist is football analyst' analogy...

"Deposit rates continued to inch downward, however, and ECB borrowing by domestic banks fell from €39.6 billion at end March to €33.4 billion at end August, reflecting a paucity of new lending, further noncore asset deleveraging, modest amounts of new market funding, and a broadly stable deposit base."

So cheap funding dissipating, deposits (stable funding) still anaemic or declining… Happy times, folks. Stabilisation bites. Come back and argue that when businesses and households are croaking under the weight of interest on their debts with the above 'improvements'.

Why wait, however, let's take a look at IMF-reported 2009-2013 data:
Banks non-performing loans (vs provisions) as % of total loans: 2009=9% (4%) or 44.4% cover, 2012 = 11.3% (5.4%) or 47.8% cover, 2013 = 11.5% (4.5%) or 39.1% cover. So cover is shrinking! Meanwhile, personal lending rates have gone up (as ECB repo rate went down) from 11.1% in 2009 to 11.6% in 2013, and SVR mortgages rates have gone up from 3.3% in 2009 to 4.4% in 2013. Government bond yields are down from 4.9% in 2009 to 4.2% in 2013. What's happening folks" The state credit costs are being dumped onto mortgagees. The 'rescue' of the banks and subsequently the rescue of the state has been loaded up onto the borrowers from the banks.


On the positive side, Exchequer performance was good. Not spectacular, but fine - in line with (and slightly better than) budgetary targets:


Do note the caveats listed below the charts - it would be nice were the Irish authorities actually provided a clear, consistent and well-defined map of all one-off payments and receipts… but then the picture of the fiscal adjustment would not have been as pretty as our politicians like to claim. Still, the picture is broadly fine.

Crucially, the above is not sufficient for us to rest on our laurels. For a number of reasons, but chiefly for the reason not even mentioned in the IMF note: has anyone looked at how sustainable, over the medium (2015-2020) term the fiscal savings delivered by the Government are? I mean: we know that pay moderation agreements with public sector unions are not sustainable and even subject to automatic reversals in 2015-on, right? We also know that much of health system 'savings' are not sustainable, since these come on foot of extracting more and more cash out of ever-dwindling supply of private insurance holders. Right? What else is not sustainable? How much? What is the risk down the line? Is corporate tax revenue uplift we have seen over the last 24 months or so sustainable? Much of it seems to have come from MNCs booking more transfer pricing profits into Ireland. Is that 'sustainable'?

IMF does some 'sustainability' tests in its analysis and here is a scary chart:


Basically, note the path of the gross financing needs for Ireland through 2018. This returns us, under baseline (no new shocks) scenario back to the situation in 2018 where financing needs of the Exchequer are slightly above the needs in 2013. This is assuming GDP is growing 2.5% annually in real terms 2015-2018. And this is incorporating the 'savings' achieved from the Promissory Notes. And this is after we impose agreed target cuts of 2014-2015. We are swimming faster and faster to be thrown back, not even to stay put.

Now, tweak few assumptions:

So in Constant PB Scenario, the change is with no 2014-2015 'austerity' factored in, which is boring stuff. But the exciting stuff is the 'Historical Scenario' where things slide back to 'normal' on growth and government deficits:

 The outcome of the above in two charts:
1) Public debt explodes

2) Financing needs of the Government explode too

Care to argue now we can afford a 'stimulus'? As Harry Callahan put it: "Go on, punk, make my day!"

4/10/2013: IMF 11th review of Ireland: Growth Warnings

So IMF released its 11th review of Irish economy under the Extended Arrangement for funding.

Key points:

"Real GDP declined in the first quarter, reflecting a fall in exports and weak domestic demand. Nonetheless, fiscal results remain on track and sovereign and bank bond yields have risen relatively modestly in response to declining global risk  appetite. A range of other economic indicators are more encouraging, suggesting lower but still positive growth in 2013, though uncertainty remains. Growth projections for 2014 are also lowered given weaker prospects for consumption recovery and for trading partner growth."

So weaker than forecast growth conditions… ok… How much weaker?

"Balancing the weak GDP results for the first quarter against a range of more positive indicators, the growth projection for 2013 has been pared back by a ½ percentage point to 0.6 percent y/y, but uncertainties remain." Boom! Ugly stuff, folks. And replace 'but' with 'and' and you will get a double Boom!


"Most importantly, export growth has been cut by 1½ percentage points as data indicate a larger impact from the patent cliff and tepid recoveries in important trading partners. Lower imports dampen the impact on growth." Wait, weren't we told that patent cliff doesn't matter much cause exports are offset by imports etc?

"Domestic demand is expected to be flat, with private consumption still contracting modestly owing to fiscal consolidation and household debt reduction, cushioned by employment growth and low inflation. Fixed investment is expected to expand by some 2 percent given improving business sentiment and the uptick in housing starts, but remains the most volatile GDP component. This projection will need to be further reviewed when Q2 national accounts data become available near end September." We have that Q2 data available now… see here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/09/2092013-domestic-economy-continuing-its.html and it ain't pretty…

More details here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/09/2092013-h1-2013-qna-domestic-economy-vs.html Net: Gross Fixed Capital Formation (basically investment in the economy) is down 9.40% in H1 2013 compared to H1 2012, down 14.09% compared to H1 2011 and down 67.73% compared to H1 2007. The reductions in capital investment jun H1 2013 compared to H1 2007 are ten-fold the size of reductions in current Government spending at EUR17,542 million. For another comparison, reductions in personal expenditure on goods and services by households over the same period is EUR4,757 million.

"Weaker consumption and export growth are expected to dampen the pace of recovery, with growth now penciled in at 1.8 percent in 2014. Export and consumption growth are expected to benefit from a projected rise in trading partner growth with employment growth contributing to incomes and confidence. Although consumption growth is still expected to become modestly positive in 2014, the pick up is weaker because a 1½ percentage point downward revision to household saving in 2012 suggests less room for lower savings given the priority households attach to debt reduction. Public consumption is also expected to be softer than previously anticipated as the full effects of the Haddington Road Agreement feed through in 2014. Export growth in 2014 is scaled back to reflect the possibility that recent weakness could persist."

Per IMF: "Growth firms to 2½ percent in 2015 as external growth rises further and fiscal consolidation eases, but durable recovery hinges on reversing the tide of NPLs." The miracle of 3%+ growth for ever, projected back in 2010-2011 to start in 2013-2014 is now replaced by the miracle of 2.5% growth projected to start in 2015… And the new projections out to 2018 no longer feature a single year of growth expected to rise above 2.5%… but all is still sustainable, just as it was in 2010 and 2011 and 2012 and… And the dream of 2.5% growth will, per IMF, be consistent with a positive output gap of ca 0.3%, which means that that is not the expected long-run real growth rate.

In effect, IMF admits now that Ireland cannot be expected to grow sustainably at the rates in excess of 3% per annum in real terms. Say goodbye to Ireland's 'growth miracle', say hello to Ireland's Belgium decades...


Another kicker: after 2015: "…the recovery continues to rely principally on net exports as domestic demand recovery is expected to be protracted as many households continue to deleverage in the medium term. Resolution of mortgages is not expected provide significant direct support to consumption recovery, as while some households may have a reduction in debt service due under a split mortgage restructuring, they may have previously been temporarily on interest-only terms, while other households may need to adjust consumption to serving their debt even if the debt service due is reduced. Rather it is expected that progress in reducing NPLs and enhancing bank profitability will gradually enhance the terms of banks’ access to market funding and their ability and willingness to lend to less indebted borrowers—which includes the younger cohort of households—unlocking housing market turnover and reducing household uncertainty."

Wow! So the IMF is warning us that things are going to remain tough even after the mortgages crisis 'resolutions'… Not like our Government is listening… And the IMF is telling us that the economy is going to get more polarised and paralysed... where did you hear that? Oh... http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/08/782013-sunday-times-july-28-2013.html

Employment: long-term unemployment remains a problem (we know that)… and surprisingly: "Facilitating SME examinership could aid resolution of SMEs in arrears, supporting their potential to invest and create jobs." Now, here's the key point: in all this excitement about family homes and repossessions we forgot that roughly 50% of SMEs loans are in arrears… and of the remaining 50%, unknown quantum is at risk… Hm… I wonder how that 'facilitated examinership' going to work for the employment stats and for property markets and mortgages arrears, when examiners go into the SMEs books to uncover potential subsidies to proprietor's income or when examinerships lead to cuts in employment levels?..

So back in 2011, IMF predicted Irish economy to grow 2.4% (GDP) in 2013, 2.9% in 2014 and 3.3% in 2015. This time, IMF is projecting Irish economy to grow 0.6% in 2013, 1.8% in 2014 and 2.5% in 2015. Nominal GDP was supposed to reach EUR182.5 billion by end of 2015 back in 2011 projections and is now forecast to reach EUR178.4 billion… What's being down EUR4.1 billion (one year difference) between friends, or EUR6.5 billion over three years, eh? Especially when all of this is sustainable, right?..

Still, gives us some perspective as to the whole circus going on: we are sticking to EUR3.1 billion fiscal target for 'adjustment' and washing off EUR4.1 billion in growth expectations underpinning 'sustainability' analysis… You'd think this is monkeys with abacus, but no - these are highly paid 'analysts', 'economists' on Government side, state side, sell-side at stockbrokerages and banks, ECB side, EU side, IMF side… And they all sing in unison: all is sustainable, just as they revise continuously their forecasts down and down and down. Which begs a question: at what stage will the sustainability malarky be replaced by the admission of the crisis? Presumably when GDP growth is revised to nil into perpetuity?

I will be updating charts on Irish economy forecasts from the IMF over the next few days, so stay tuned. Before that, I will be blogging more on key topics covered by the IMF review later today, also stay tuned…

Thursday, October 3, 2013

3/10/2013: Irish PMIs - are they meaningful?


Having covered Services and Manufacturing PMIs (see links here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/10/3102013-services-and-manufacturing-pmis.html) in terms of Q3 2013 averages, let's have a reminder as to the links to actual growth in Irish GDP and GNP these series have.

Two charts covering through Q2 2013:



Thus, overall:

  • Changes q/q in Manufacturing PMIs have only a weak correlation with actual real (constant prices) GDP and GNP changes q/q: R-squares of just 35.6% and 29.4% respectively when we remove the constant factor (which is not significant by itself at any rate). This is weak to say the least.
  • Changes q/q in Services PMIs have only a very weak correlation with actual real (constant prices) GDP and GNP changes q/q: R-squares of just 16.4% and 17.6% respectively when we remove the constant factor (which is significant). This is very poor.
  • With positive intercepts of 0.0023 for GDP and 0.0024 for GNP, the Services PMI R-square rises to 23.7% for GDP and 22.7% for GNP. Once again, no change to the above conclusion.
The above suggests that a significant component of both PMIs come from transfer pricing and not real economic activity on the ground. Or put differently, the PMIs are not that exceptionally meaningful indicators of actual levels of activity in the economy and are only weakly-significant in indicating the direction of that activity. 

Note: this is quarterly averages data, not much more volatile data based on monthly series. Which puts to question monthly movements in PMIs even more...

3/10/2013: Services and Manufacturing PMIs for Ireland: September 2013


In the previous posts I covered separately both Service PMI for Ireland and Manufacturing PMI (released by Markit & Investec). As noted, both series show strong performance in September. Here is the combined analysis:

Both Services and Manufacturing PMIs are now above their historical crisis-period averages. Manufacturing PMI is slightly ahead (0.1 points) of its historical pre-crisis average since May 2000 when both series start running coincidently. Services PMI is now slightly below its historical pre-crisis average.

Services PMI have broken out of the flat trend and are now trending up for the last 12 months. However, Manufacturing PMI continues to move side-ways, although on average remaining positive.


Two major points: September 2013 reading puts both indices at statistically significant levels above 50.0, which is the first such occurrence since February 2011:


In addition, we are seeing stronger positive correlation between the two indices (the 12mo rolling correlation below is only indicative) established since February 2013 low:


In other words, both sides of the economy are now performing better, but we need this momentum to be sustained over 2-3 months to see serious feed-through into actual economic activity figures.

3/10/2013: Services PMI: September 2013


Markit and Investec released Services PMI survey press release for Ireland. As usual - the note is full of statements that can not be confirmed by information contained in the note itself.

On the side that can be reported/interpreted:

  • PMI slipped from what appeared to be an unlikely jump to 61.6 in August to slightly lower, yet still strongly-expansionary 56.8. This is still a robust rate of growth. 
  • I cannot tell if it was driven by a handful of MNCs or was broadly-based. Allegedly, the UK was the main source of strength for new exports orders, which are expanding, seemingly (reading the Markit release) at a more modest pace than headline PMI indicates. The UK receives huge volume of exports from Ireland on ICT services side (the likes of Google et al) and this is the major point of contention the UK Government has with Irish tax structures, so it might be that much of the services exports 'boost' comes from transfer pricing.

  • Dynamics are good: there is new upward sub-trend established since September 2012 and this breaks the period of flat trend between September 2010 and September 2012. 
  • Significantly, since around September 2012 the series have been - on average - in the statistically-significant zone of expansion (again, distinct from September 2010-September 2012 period when expansions on average were not statistically significant).


  • On quarterly averages basis: Q1 2013 came in at 53.7, Q2 at 54.3 and Q3 came in at 58.7. Sounds impressive, however, if we account for the freakishly high reading in August (partially and imperfectly controlling for weather effects) the Q3 average sits within 55-56 range. Thus even with weather effects taken out, the overall Q3 result is strong.
  • On annual basis, using quarterly averages: Q3 2010 stood at 52.5, Q3 2011 at 51.4, Q3 2012 at 51.6 and the current running average is well ahead of all of these, even if we take adjustment for unusually good weather.
Overall: good numbers. However, we have no tangible information as to the movements on profit margins, employment, export orders, new orders etc. You should read this note on some caution regarding interpreting PMI for Services for Ireland: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/09/592013-cautionary-note-on-irish.html. Combined analysis of Manufacturing and Services PMIs to follow shortly.


Note: To add to this, I have now been seemingly removed from the mailing list for the slightly more detailed version of release (or Investec stopped supplying one altogether). 

2/10/2013: Euro area sovereign crisis: predictable and reasonably priced?



  • Can a model-based credit ratings system be used to predict future fiscal distress? Answer seems to be: yes.
  • And have the fiscal downgrades of the euro area peripheral states been predictable in advance? Answer seems to be: yes.
  • In other words, are the downgrades warranted by the actual pre-crisis dynamics in the economies? Answer seems to be: yes.
  • Lastly, were there useful signals of stress build up that could have been considered by the policymakers prior to the onset of the crisis to alleviate or prevent the collapse of euro area peripherals? Answer seems to be: yes.


A new paper from CEPR (DP9665) titled "Sovereign credit ratings in the European Union: a model-based fiscal analysis" and authored by Vito Polito and Michael R. Wickens (September 2013: http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP9665) presents "a model-based measure of sovereign credit ratings derived solely from the fiscal position of a country: a forecast of its future debt liabilities, and its potential to use tax policy to repay these." [emphasis is mine]

The authors "use this measure to calculate credit ratings for fourteen European countries over the period 1995-2012. This measure identifies a European sovereign debt crisis almost two years before the official ratings of the credit rating agencies."

Ouch!

Now, the fourteen European (EU14) countries in the model-based calculations are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the U.K.

So the main findings are: "…The model-based credit ratings:

  1. Anticipate the downgrades of Ireland, Spain, Portugal and the U.K. that occurred from the end of the 2010s; 
  2. Downgrade Greece to the lowest rating (coinciding with its highest default probability) from at least mid 2000; 
  3. Suggest that the Italian sovereign credit rating has been overstated. 
  4. For all other countries, the model-based credit ratings are similar, but not identical, to the credit ratings provided by the CRAs 

"An implication of these results is that the cross-section distribution of the model-based sovereign credit rating is no longer concentrated within the investment grade prior 2010 and it starts changing significantly from 2008. This suggests that a model-based credit rating would have identified and signalled to market participants signs of the impending European sovereign debt crisis well before 2010, when the CRAs first reacted to the crisis."

And the kicker: "A by-product of the methodology proposed in this paper is the quantification of a country's debt limit (measured as its maximum borrowing capacity) and how this changes over time. The numerical analysis suggests that for most EU14 countries the scope for increasing borrowing capacity by increasing taxation is limited as actual tax revenues are similar to tax revenues maximized with respect to tax rates."

In other words, we've run out of the road for taxing our way out of the crisis.

"Our findings suggest that EU14 countries are more likely to be able to raise debt limits and achieve fiscal consolidation by reducing their expenditures than by increasing taxes."

Any wonder? Ok, check out the first link here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/10/2102013-low-tax-free-market-economy.html

Wednesday, October 2, 2013

2/10/2013: Clusters Resilience in Downturns


Interesting research paper from CEPR on the resilience of firms clusters to the downturns. The DP 9667 "Are clusters more resilient in crises? Evidence from French exporters in 2008-2009" by Philippe Martin, Thierry Mayer, and Florian Mayneris (September 2013) looks at two types of clusters: traditional clusters and incentivised clusters.

Per abstract [emphasis mine]:

  • "Clusters have already been extensively shown to favor firm-level economic performance (productivity, exports, innovation etc.)."
  • "However, little is known about the capacity of firms in clusters to resist economic shocks."
  • "In this paper, we analyze whether firms that agglomerate in clusters and firms that have been selected to benefit from the "competitiveness cluster'' industrial policy, implemented in France in 2005, have performed better on export markets during the recent economic turmoil."
  • "We show that, on average, both agglomeration and the cluster policy are associated with a higher survival probability of firms on export markets, and conditioning on survival, a higher growth rate of their exports."
  • "However, these effects are not stronger during the 2008-2009 crisis; if anything, the opposite is true."
  • "We then show that this weaker resilience of competitiveness cluster firms is probably due to the fact that firms in clusters are more dependent on the fate of the "leader", i.e. the largest exporter in the cluster."
Note: couple of things to note as a potential lesson to be learned:
  1. Make clusters more horizontal, rather than vertical, to reduce excessive dependency on one 'leader' firm.
  2. The above is probably even more critical of a consideration for clusters involving partnering of smaller firms with larger MNCs.


2/10/2013: Low Tax, Free Market Economy that is Ireland...

Two stories from 'low tax' 'market economy' marvel that is Ireland:

http://www.independent.ie/business/personal-finance/latest-news/6000-a-year-the-hit-taken-by-families-29626588.html

and

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/google/10345335/Google-under-fire-over-tax-arrangements.html

Now, I know, 'employer' etc... FDI... investing in Ireland... confidence... best little country to do business in... (or rather from, since most of the revenue discussed by google has virtually nothing to do with any business done in Ireland)... etc... etc...

At least spare us the insults of telling us we are under-taxed, low-tax, free market etc...

You can follow sets of links to the topic of Ireland as corporate tax haven from this post: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/09/1392013-another-month-another-look-into.html

Tuesday, October 1, 2013

1/10/2013: Irish Patenting Activity Q3 2013


Data on patents and patent applications for Ireland was published today by New Morning IP. Here's their summary and couple of my comments:

"In summary for September 2013:

  • 192 published applications or patents issued to Irish applicants through USPTO, EPO and PCT.
  • Top three assignees: Zamtec, Accenture Global Services and Digital Optics
  • Academic institutions accounted for 14% of Irish invention published this month
  • 41% of publications were Irish-originating inventions"
Now, my look at the data:
  • There was an increase from previous levels for Irish academic institutions share of all patents filed to 13.0%. In Q4 2012 - Q2 2013 these ranged between 7.9% and 10.7%.
  • In Q3 2013 there were total of 84 Irish academic patents granted or applied for, against the total number of Irish inventions at 274 and overseas inventions at 371. 
  • Numbers of Irish inventions in total declined from 283 in Q2 2013 to 274 in Q3 2013 and now stand at the lowest level since full quarterly records begin (Q4 2012).
  • Number of all patents applied for or granted rose to 645 in Q3 2013 from 636 in Q2 2013. This represents the second lowest level of activity for the entire period since Q4 2012.
Charts:


1/10/2013: Irish Manufacturing PMI: September 2013


Some good readings from Irish Manufacturing PMI (Investec-sponsored Markit data) for September:

  • Headline PMI is at 52.7 up on 52.0 in August and the highest reading since 53.9 in July 2012.
  • Critically, this appears to be the first statistically significant reading above 50.0 since November 2012.
  • I use 'appears' above since we have no formal analysis from Markit on this (Investec don't do analysis). The distribution is Laplace. August reading was close to being statistically significant.
  • In terms of trend, Q1 2013 average reading was 50.13, Q2 2013 at 49.33, Q3 now reads 51.9. 
  • 12mo MA is at 50.8.
  • 3mo MA through September 2013 is at 51.9, which is below the same period 2012 (52.2), but ahead of 2011 (49.2) and slightly ahead of 2010 (50.4).

Now, it appears we have broken the downward trend at last. Index volatility (36mo rolling) has fallen slightly to around 2.3 in terms of 3mo average through September, which is close to historical average of 2.4 and is well below the crisis-period average of 3.4. Positive skew on change is at 3mo average of +0.75 (for deviations from 50.0) and this contrasts with a negative -0.34 skew for historical data and -0.25 skew for crisis period data. So let's call it a trend reversal for the short term:


Sadly, nothing else to report, since Investec/Markit continue to push out data-less releases. Wish I could tell you about employment, exports orders, total orders... but there is not a single number in the press release, only comments.

Sunday, September 29, 2013

29/9/2013: Irish Retail Sales: August 2013


Retail Sales Index data was out last week and this is an update on series through August 2013.

From the top (excluding motor sales), 
  • Retail sales activity by value declined from 97.4 in July to 96.0 in August 2013. Current 3mo MA is 96.1 which is still ahead of the 3mo MA through May 2013 at 95.2. Year on year August 2013 reading was down 0.21%. 6mo MA is a 95.7 which is lower than 6mo MA through February 2013 at 96.7. 
  • Value reading in August 2013 stood at exactly the 12mo average for 2012 and 3.47% below annual average for 2005. Crisis period average is 100.6 which is significantly higher than the August reading and 3mo MA reading through August and 6mo MA arcading through August.
  • Retail sales activity by volume remained largely unchanged (statistically) between July (100.9) and August (100.7). Current 3mo MA is 100.3 which is ahead of 99.1 3mo MA through May 2013. Year on year the index is up 1.31%. However, 6mo MA through August at 99.7 was lower than 6mo MA through february 2013 (100.4).
  • Volume reading in August 2013 was 2.22% below crisis period average and 2.22% ahead of 2005 average.

The above figures illustrate the extent of deflation in the sector, where volume activity stayed more buoyant than value activity. Which means retailers have been burning through margins for a good part of five years now. There is severe doubt as to whether there are any profit margins left in the sector. 

Meanwhile, Consumer Confidence indicator is moving sideways, as ever detached from reality. ESRI's Consumer Confidence Index in August 2013 stood at 66.8, only slightly catching up to the downside with the overall retail trade stats, declining from 68.2 in July. CCI is now at blistering 68.5 3mo MA which is massively up on 60.0 3mo MA through May 2013. Year on year the CCI is down 4.6% signalling the index desperate attempt to claw back toward reflecting the trends in the sector.


However, as the chart below clearly shows, the Consumer Confidence Index continues to show no signs of coinciding with the broader retail sector trends.


To remind you, crisis-period correlations between CCI and retail sales are negative: -0.70 for correlation with Value of sales and -0.59 for correlation with Volume of sales. The CCI used to perform better in pre-crisis period, when strong trend in sales was evident. 

My own Retail Sales Activity Index (a composite of there measures weighted by relevance to employment and revenue generation) dipped slightly to 109.4 in August from 110.7 in July. The index is down 0.75% y/y. 3mo MA is at 110.0 in August and this is above 105.9 3mo MA through May 2013. RSAI has modest positive correlation with crisis-period data: value at 0.59 and volume at 0.63.



Overall: weak data for August, despite the fact that pre-school season was running at the time when weather did not impede shopping and given that overseas travel for summer breaks was low this year once again. September will be more important to watch to see how the sales and confidence are moving in advance of key shopping season in November-December.

29/9/2013: Economic Sentiment in Europe: Not Exactly a 'Crisis Over' Signal

There's a lot of optimism in the air nowadays across the EU with eurocrats of all shades of grey busying themselves declaring the end of the euro crisis... and the media is firmly on the bandwagon too - even signs of shallower contractions are interpreted as 'huge bounces' into growth.

Amidst all of this, the data on economic sentiment across all productive sectors, collected by the European Commission is a bit more sombre.

Take this simple chart, showing how economic sentiment in the euro area compares against the same in the EU27.



Yep, that's right: in September 2013, economic sentiment in the euro area was at the lowest point compared to the economic sentiment in the EU27 for any month since the formation of the euro... in fact, it was at the lowest point since July 1988 when many EU27 non-euro nations were struggling members of the Warsaw Pact. Congratulations on that recovery, folks!

Things behind the above numbers are even worse. Here's a chart plotting economic sentiment across the three sets of countries that are members of the euro area: the euro area core (Austria, Finland, Germany, and the Netherlands), the periphery, and the rest...


Things are improving, all right, but are these improvements a miracle of the euro area recovery or a bounce from somewhere else? Take again the gap to EU27...


Now, we already know about downward direction across the euro area relative performance as a whole. Now we also know that all  part of the euro area are under-performing relative to the EU27 and that this underperformance has accelerated in recent months for two sub-regions other than the 'periphery'. Worse, the core is about to hit the levels of sentiment under-performance comparable to the peripherals back in H1 2013, while the non-core, non-periphery states are about to converge in earnest with the periphery. This is some 'improvement'...