Tuesday, August 13, 2013

13/8/2013: UK Great Recession

An interesting chart comparing the historical recessions in the UK to the current one:


The longest it took before the current recession for the output to return to pre-crisis peak was 47 months (1930-34 recession and 1979-1983 recession). In the current one, the UK is at 62 months and counting. I don't need to remind you that the UK has both fiscal and monetary policy at its disposal and was aggressive in deploying both during the current crisis. Ireland has neither fiscal nor monetary policy at its disposal. 

We can (and should) reference Government failures in dealing with the crisis, but we have to keep the simple fact in perspective: by joining the euro area, we have removed virtually all and any power from the hands of our politicians to even attempt to manage the economy. Instead of Dublin, Irish Great Recession can be almost solely blamed on Frankfurt & Brussels (Strasbourg et al can be included too, for completeness). Its causes are rooted in the systemic mispricing of economic and investment risks facilitated, incentivised and even directly driven by the euro and the underlying monetary policy of the ECB. Its regulatory and institutional frameworks were shaped and influenced and informed by the European (Brussels) ethos which put political considerations over political economy, and political economy over economy. Its inability to deal effectively and economically efficiently with the crisis is due to the lack of monetary policy tools, while its fiscal collapse is 50% driven by the social partnership model of the European social democracy, and 50% driven by the severe mismanagement of the banking crisis resolution by the EU/ECB/IMF. This is not to say that Irish society and Governments were not culpable in creating the conditions for the crisis or in failures of managing the crisis. Instead, it is to point to the joint liability that befalls not only us, but also the European systems and leadership.

This should be a reminder to European politicians, especially those claiming to have learned something from the crisis (e.g. http://trueeconomics.blogspot.it/2013/08/982013-political-waffle-passing-for.html)

Monday, August 12, 2013

12/8/2013: Sunday Times August 4, 2013: Troika Programme Exit vs Fiscal Reforms


This is an unedited version of my article for Sunday Times August 4, 2013.


Irish political leaders are not exactly known for making logically consistent policy pronouncements. The current budgetary debates are case-in-point. On the one hand, minister after minister from both sides of the coalition benches are repeating ad nausea the tired cliches about their successes in managing the economy. On the other hand, the very same ministers are talking tough about the need for more pain, more adjustments, and more 'reforms' to secure the said recovery and deliver us from the clutches of the Troika. Only to turn around and start praising Troika support as the source of our recovery.

In reality, there are good, if only rarely voiced, reasons for these exhortations: seven hard budgets down, we are not really close to shaking off past legacy of wasteful fiscal practices. The state is still insolvent. The structure of the state policies formation is still dysfunctional. The legacy of pork barrel party politics continues unreformed.

Nothing exemplifies this better than the stalled structural reforms of social welfare and the resulting temporary, risk-loaded nature of much of our fiscal adjustments to-date.


Take a look at the top-line data coming from the Merrion Street.

In the first six months of 2013 tax revenues collected by the Government were EUR3.17 billion ahead of the same period three years ago, while the total voted current expenditure by the Exchequer was up EUR391 million. In other words, the only difference between the current budgetary approach and that practiced by Bertie Ahearn is that today's tax collections are starting from the low levels. Aside from that, current spending continues to ride well ahead of our economy’s capacity to fund it. The 'boom is not getting “boomier”, but the two main current spending lines: social protection and health, are still running at 65.2 percent of the total voted current expenditure, up more than 4 percentage points on 2010.

Things have changed, over the years, to be fair. There have been reductions in current expenditure during the crisis, overshadowed by tax hikes and dramatic cuts to capital spending. Thanks to tax hikes, in H1 2013, Ireland marked the first half-year period when the current spending by the Super-3 Departments: Education and Skills, Health and Social Protection, combined, was below the total tax revenue collected by the State. A significant milestone, but hardly a salvation, as three departments' current expenditure in January-June 2013 still counted for 95 percent of total tax receipts. Thus, even with all the cuts to-date, shutting down all current voted expenditure, excluding the Super-3, will only half our Exchequer deficit from EUR6.59 billion to EUR3.31 billion.

Which exposes once again the five-years-old policy dilemma: to balance the books, Ireland will require at least a EUR2.7 billion worth of further cuts on the spending side on top of what is being planned for 2014-2015. Most, if not all of these will have to come from the Social Protection and Health

Sustainability of savings achieved to-date presents a further risk. So far, cuts to the Exchequer spending that dominated the last five years were heavily concentrated on the sides of capital expenditure and public payrolls. Both are at a risk of reversal in the future.

Any return to growth will require heavier capital investment in public infrastructure, schools, medical equipment and facilities and so on. In other words, capital savings are an illusion on the longer time scale.

Meanwhile, much of the current spending cuts fell onto the shoulders of temporary and contract staff, leaving permanent and more expensive staff protected. This protection came at a cost of increased demands on their productivity. With staff feeling the bite of higher taxes and pensions contributions, while being forced to work more and outside their comfort zone of life-long assignments, public sector unions are already itching to get a new wave of wages increases going.

Back in December 2012, the Troika has pointed out that the savings delivered in public sector pay bills under the Croke Park Agreement cannot be deemed sustainable in the long run. The Haddington Road Agreement for 2013-2016 further confirms this assessment. The insolvent state is now fully committed to more rounds of increments payments, no matter what happens to the economy or exchequer finances. Virtually all ‘savings’ to be delivered under the Haddington Road Agreement are to be automatically reversed at the end of the agreement term or earlier.

The risks of policies reversals on capital and public sector pay, relating to the above measures, are non-trivial. IMF forecasts through 2021 showed the current path of fiscal adjustments taking us to a debt to GDP ratio of just over 95 percent in 2021 from the peak of 2013. Using IMF assumptions, my own estimates suggests that reversing budgetary policies to 2013 levels after 2015 can result in our Government debt to GDP ratio stuck at 108 percent in 2021.


All of which points to a simple but uncomfortable fact: to achieve long-term sustainability of our fiscal policies, Ireland requires a longer term reduction in public spending well in excess of what can be delivered without significantly cutting into current health and social welfare expenditures. Given the fact that health spending is already stretched, the above cuts will have to happen on welfare side.

The reforms, to be undertaken across a period of, say 2015-2016 will have to be sweeping and permanent, building in part on some of the piecemeal changes already in place.

To reduce the risk of replay of the devastating 2008-2010 effects of unemployment shocks on exchequer and economy at large, we need to separate unemployment benefits from other welfare supports.

Unemployment Insurance (UI) should provide a temporary, but generous safety net, sufficient to sustain reasonable family commitments to mortgages and children- and health-related expenditures. Thus, UI should be paid as a percentage of the end-of-employment salary, starting with 2/3rds of the salary up to a maximum of the median wage, with payments declining with duration of unemployment. Payments should terminate after 9 months.

Social welfare payments (SWP) to able-bodied adults can kick in following the expiration of the UI scheme on a means-tested basis. A low monthly personal SWP rate should be supplemented with access to childcare and healthcare, as well as educational grants for children, but only in the cases where recipients engage in training and/or active job searching. A recipient cannot turn down a reasonable offer of a job without facing a financial penalty. All benefits should be subject to a life-time cap of 6-7 years to prevent formation of permanent welfare dependency, while providing a broadly sufficient safety net..

All benefits payments above the monthly personal SWP rate, benchmarked for provision under the scheme, such as health, public services and transport allowance, should be cashless to reduce potential misuse of funds. To encourage better health attitudes and more careful utilisation of public services, a share of unused allowances, say 10-20 percent, accumulated in the account at the end of each year can be paid out as an annual bonus.

We also need to reform our state pensions. Given the fallout from the property bust, large numbers of Irish families are facing the prospect of pension-less retirement. They will require significant state supports - something we cannot afford while carrying the burden of unfunded state pensions.

All statutory state pensions should be means-tested to generate immediate savings and remove absurd subsidisation of the better-off at the expense of those in genuine need. Ditto for age-linked medical cards.

Automatic benchmarking of legacy public sector pensions should end and all current public employees’ pensions should be converted into defined contribution schemes. This will require a legislative decision to alter employment contracts. It will also require recapitalization of the public pensions fund, which can be done gradually over the period of, say, 10 years.

Savings to be targeted in the above measures should apply gradually, over 2014-2017, to generate new substitutes for temporary measures adopted in previous budgets.

However, even with gradual improvements in the labour markets and economy from 2014 on, implementing the above reforms will be nearly impossible. Current political system, with policy decisions based on consensus of the interest groups, is subject to stalling on big reforms and the risk of future reversals by governments seeking popular mandates. This means that we need to take a National Unity approach to structuring and enacting the new legislation dealing with reforms of the social welfare and pensions. Such a consensus is feasible, once all political parties in the Dail realise that Ireland will continue to face subdued economic recovery, elevated unemployment and anemic asset markets well into 2020-2021. With these headwinds, the pressure to carry on with prudent fiscal policies will remain. Thus, the only way of avoiding the contagion from the current long-term economic crisis to the political and state balance of power is to enact irreversible, legislatively protected structural reforms of the social welfare on the basis of bi-partisan legislative engagement.






Box-out:

A note from Davy Research on Mortgages Arrears, published this week, represents a good summary of the current crisis and draws some sensible and well-argued policy conclusions on the subject. Alas, the report commits one common, unnecessary and unfortunate error. Strategic non-payment of mortgages debt is cited in the report eighteen times. Yet, there is no direct evidence presented in the report, or in any study cited in the report, as to the true extent of the problem in Ireland. Instead, like all other analysts, Davy team references unsubstantiated statements by the banks and banking authorities, and simplistic extrapolations of other countries’ studies to the case of Ireland as evidence that "mortgage delinquency has continued to grow despite better-than-expected labour market  conditions” and that “strategic default is now a problem." Like other researchers, Davy team cites increases in employment in Q1 2013 as the evidence of a 'growing problem' with strategic non-payments.  Alas, in Q1 2013, seasonally-adjusted full-time employment (jobs that can sustain payment of mortgages) dropped 4,500 year on year. Broader measures of unemployment reported by CSO also posted increases. This hardly constitutes a material improvement on households' ability to fund mortgages repayments and it certainly does not support the thesis of significant and growing strategic defaults. Of course, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence; the employment data cited above does not prove that there are no strategic defaults in Ireland. It simply shows that absent real, direct evidence, one should take care not to fall into the trap of convincing oneself that an oft-repeated conjecture must invariably be true.

Sunday, August 11, 2013

11/8/2013: WLASze Part 2: Weekend Links on Arts, Sciences and Zero Economics


Due to travels, I will be posting shorter versions of WLASze: Weekend Links on Arts, Sciences and zero economics this week and next. Here is the second post of the series for this weekend (the first post is linked here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.it/2013/08/1082013-wlasze-part-1-weekend-links-on.html.

Enjoy!


Nightvision is a project that involved a 23-year-old videographer, Luke Shepard and his friend plus a 90 day Eurail Pass, and Kickstarter… the group traveled to 36 cities in 21 European countries "with the goal of capturing the greatest European architectural masterpieces around today." Shepard & co have shot more than 20,000 photos and he was able to create 47 image sequences of the trip, 27 of these formed his amazing timelapse called Nightvision. http://www.lshep.com/index.html
Sadly, the group did not get to Dublin… which means someone else will have to do a good time-lapse of our Grand Canal Square…


A brilliant photography/collage artist, Sergey Larenkov (his site here: http://sergey-larenkov.livejournal.com/) combines historical images with current shots of cityscapes to deliver always poignant and occasionally stunningly beautiful collages that merge history across time and physical landscapes. One example: Pushkin 1941-2011...




Yes, at certain point we must stop reviewing or even discussing Zaha Hadid's architecture for it is rapidly becoming formulaic, non-explorative and simply predictable. Here's an example: http://www.dezeen.com/2013/08/07/movie-beko-masterplan-by-zaha-hadid/ And the best bit, as usual - comments by the readers.

My own view: It is rather obvious that over-production and over-design are the two core threats to Zaha Hadid's practice and legacy. She has long became singular in form and missing any progression. Putting a stop to innovation to focus on 'iconic' semiotics is the end of an architect and artist, in my view. Hadid's architecture was recently id'd by one of the commentators on her work as "Kim Kardashian buildings: Rich in curves but no meaningful content or good taste". My sentiment too.


While reading through Taipei's solo run for Design Capital 2016 (lack of any other contestants pretty much assures that the venue will go to Korea, despite the relatively obvious lack of any serious merit in the two projects submitted for it), I came across this post from 2012 on the project called the Scrap Skyscraper http://www.dezeen.com/2012/07/31/scrap-skyscraper-by-projeto-coletivo/ A very interesting concept:


An amazing Chinese photographer, Jialiang Gao
http://www.flickr.com/photos/46999807@N03/sets/72157626997860925/



Via AtlasObscura: "Covering over 16,600 hectares in Southern Yunnan in China, the Honghe Hani Rice Terraces cut over the Ailao Mountain slopes down to the Hong Kong river. There for 1,300 years, the channels of water have supported farming of red rice, involving eel, fish, buffaloes, cattle, and ducks that all move through the landscape dotted by 82 villages."
http://www.atlasobscura.com/articles/2013-new-unesco-sites

The article linked above has some other stunning photography by, for example, Teo Gómez. The poignancy of colour, the fluidity of shapes, the compositional perfection of created landscape - necessity sometimes is not only the mother of all inventions, but also a sister of beauty… In a sense, both sets - by Gao and by Gomez - document the improbability of beauty as well as its transience and ability to return.


For those of my followers who do read Russian, a very interesting debate about the Russian national identity: http://www.snob.ru/selected/entry/63417.  The debate juxtaposes current perceptions of Russian (nationalist) identity and the long-established multicultural and multinational (subsequently federal) identity. Many outside Russia over the decades (and in Russia since the nationalist revival in the 2000s) are being sold the identity of Russian dominance (racial and cultural) over minority groups. However, this view of Russia is hugely at odds with the historical reality. this historical reality is that even in AD 880s Russian identity was organically inclusive of a large number of smaller nationalities, and that cultural, religious, ethnic, genetic and geo-political integration have been an active model for the creation of modern Russia over at least 800-900 years.

One example, striking in its powerful contradiction to the mantra of cultural or ethnic purity or dominance of the standardised 'Russian' identity is the case of Ivan Kalita - Muscovite duke - who in 1327 as a head of the Golden Horde mission burned to the ground orthodox Tver dukedom, as a response to the murder in Tver of the Tatar Ambassador. In a punitive expedition the Tatars alongside the Muscovites "Turned the whole Russian realm to ash." Tver prince fled to Novgorod and then in Pskov. Ivan Kalita demanded his extradition, and the Metropolitan Feognost sitting in Moscow, excommunicated him and all the Pskov from the church, thus revealing one of the top models of the Orthodox collusion between the Muslim Horde, Moscow and the Moscow Church. At the very time of the Muscovite power, that power rose above the notions of kinship, and above the Orthodox faith.

Sadly, I would not recommend using google translation for this article, since its format leads to translation providing exact opposite interpretation to the actual meaning of the complex phrases in a number of cases. It is, thus, to remain the material suited to Russian-language readers.


Saturday, August 10, 2013

10/8/2013: WLASze Part 1: Weekend Links on Arts, Sciences and Zero Economics


Due to travels, I will be posting shorter versions of WLASze: Weekend Links on Arts, Sciences and zero economics this week and next.

Here's the first post for this weekend. Enjoy!


Performance art meets actual art: MOCA Grand Ave hosts RETINA: http://www.digitalretna.com/




From http://www.mymodernmet.com/profiles/blogs/berlin-wall-gets-street-art-makeover


On allegorical (and humorous, or rather perhaps sardonic, though not sardonicistic… oh, ok, just elevated sarcastic… ): Chris Berens' "Lady of the Cloth"


His site: http://www.chrisberens.com/home Oh, do smile...


More whimsical, ironic… plain fun: Gregoire de Lafforest via http://www.itsliquid.com/birdcage-table.html



And another (near-)classic: http://design-milk.com/a-lamp-that-you-pump-up-olab-by-gregoire-de-lafforest/ Artist's site: http://www.gregoiredelafforest.com/#


Lovely retrospective - of secondary in ranking, but not in quality works - on the theme of "Workman and Collective Farm Woman" or "Рабочий и колхозница" - worth a scroll through the slide show from this March 2013 exhibition: http://www.iskusstvo-info.ru/exhibition/item/id/52




And while on the Russian art theme, we are now almost one month away from 17th Art Moskva show: http://www.art-moscow.ru/#



I wrote before (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/06/2162013-weekend-reading-links-part-1.html)about James Turrell's Guggenheim (NYC) show and here are some stunning photographs from it: http://design-milk.com/james-turrell-resculpts-the-guggenheim-with-light/james_turrell_guggenheim_1/




Amasing imagery of the Russian Far-North - destroyed social and environmental landscapes, but also space of raw beauty too by Justin Jim:
http://www.bjp-online.com/british-journal-of-photography/project/2201023/justin-jin-the-zone-of-absolute-discomfort


The full project site is here: http://justinjin.com/reportage/arctic/


Science-meets-art bit: A cool app from Oxford Uni gets you to track - on a mobile - high energy particle collisions directly from the Large Hadron Collider, while lounging in your chair at home or on a date in, say, a restaurant, "making it simple to understand what's going on at a glance." Now, I am not so sure about that "simple to understand" bit, but I bet rolling out a "Higgs Boson in your hand" mobile app from CERN at a bar to a hot-looking brunette will be a great ice-breaker… or an insight in the Titanic's experience… either way - hardly an indifference generator. http://collider.physics.ox.ac.uk/

Now, in case you've missed what Higgs boson thingy is, here's a popular primer: http://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/shortcuts/2012/jul/04/how-explain-higgs-boson-discovery


And for the 'laugh your pants off' bit this week around: El Pais has reported that the 200 metre-tall Intempo tower in Alicante, an apartment block of immense ugliness to start with, "has been built without a working elevator above the 20th floor. Per Dezeen.com: "It was originally designed with 20 storeys, but developers later decided to extend it to 47 storeys - offering 269 homes. However they neglected to allow the extra room required by a lift ascending over twice as far." Gas, man!
http://www.dezeen.com/2013/08/09/benidorm-skyscraper-built-without-an-elevator/

10/8/2013: EMEA Forward Economic Conditions: BlackRock Institute



The BlackRock Investment Institute Economic Cycle Survey : EMEA Aggregate Results were published recently, so here is the update.

Note: the views expressed in the survey are those of the external panel of economics and finance experts and not of the BlackRock Investment Institute.
The results of the survey must be viewed as being subject to the depth of country-level responses considerations, as these can differ widely.

Per the results: "this month’s EMEA Economic Cycle Survey presented a generally bullish outlook for the region. The consensus of respondents describe Slovenia, the Ukraine, Croatia and Czech Republic currently to be in a recessionary state, with an even split of economists gauging Slovakia to be in a expansion or contraction. Over the next 2 quarters, the consensus shifts for all these countries, except the Ukraine and Slovenia, towards expansion.
At the 12 month horizon, the positive theme continues with the consensus expecting all EMEA countries to strengthen, with the exception of Kazakhstan and Turkey."

In comparison, "Globally, respondents remain positive on the global growth cycle, with a net 68% of 62 respondents expecting a strengthening world economy over the next 12 months - this is marginally lower than from a net 70% in last month’s report."

Two charts to map regional economies prospects:



Friday, August 9, 2013

9/8/2013: Political Waffle Passing for Learning?

Mr Schulz - the President of the European Parliament - has penned an op-ed that is available here: http://www.linkedin.com/today/post/article/20130809113308-239623471-did-we-really-learn-the-lessons-of-the-crisis?trk=tod-home-art-large_0


My response is as follows:


This article is a trite rehashing of cliches, some of which have served as pre-conditions to the crisis, by a man who is presiding over the institution complicit in creation of the crisis in the first place, as well as in exacerbating the adverse impact of the crisis on the member states of the EU. 

Let me just deal with the first set of Mr Schulz's core hypotheses: 

"Firstly, the invisible hand of the market does not work and needs a robust regulatory framework." 

Given that the Euro area crisis arose from the disastrous mis-management of the monetary union, the statement is absurd and ideologically dogmatic. Markets require proper regulation and are legally-based structures. Mr Schulz seems to fail to understand this and is confusing anarchy with the 'invisible hand' of the markets. European markets have failed, in part, due to wrong regulation (not the lack of regulation) and in part due to the lack of enforcement of existent regulation. Mr Schulz seems to have no idea as to these facts. Institutions that commonly failed to enforce existent regulations and treaties include, among others, the European Commission (allegedly reporting to the EU Parliament, that Mr Schulz presides over) and the European Parliament itself.

The markets failures were, in the case of the 'peripheral' euro states, exacerbated by the inactions and actions of the European authorities, including those by the European Parliament.


"Secondly, politics should gain primacy over markets and labour over capital." 

Primacy of politics over markets (or rather economics) in Europe is exactly what led us into this crisis. 

Political dominance over economic policies design is behind the creation of the monetary union and the expansion of the union to include countries that are not ready for a single currency regime. It is also responsible for the fraudulent ways in which some member states have acceded to the monetary union (e.g. Italy and Greece, where misreporting and financial instrumentation of deficits and debt were rampant and Mr Schulz's institution was amongst those that were aware of these facts, were required to be aware of these facts, and yet were inactive in the face of these facts). Politicization of the markets for Government bonds, for foreign exchange, for credit, for equity, for risk pricing, etc has been responsible for inducing many deep failures in the markets in Europe. For one, this politicization has led to an unsustainable debt accumulation in the private sector and transfer of private debts onto the shoulders of taxpayers. 

I might agree with Mr Schulz on the point of 'labour' supremacy over 'capital'. Alas these are poorly defined concepts in Mr Schulz's case. Labour can mean labour unions (organised labour movement) or labour as human capital (skills, entrepreneurship, creativity, etc) and everything in-between. All of these definitions will contain internal contradictions in incentives, preferences for policies and responses to policies to each other and to the definitions of capital that can be deployed. Mr Schulz fails to define the categories he references, which suggests that his assertions are once again nothing more than populist sloganeering. Mr Schulz seems to have no idea that capital can be physical, technological, financial, intellectual or human. That 'labour' can be complementary to physical and technological capital in which case primacy of labour over technology can be destructive to the objectives of both. Mr Schulz appears to be inhabiting a simplistic universe more corresponding to that inhabited by Marx and Engels in the late 1840s than the one that exists today.


"Thirdly, and most importantly, the economy and politics should return to the values of solidarity, social justice, decency and respect." 

This is both historically incorrect and, frankly put, too rich coming from someone heading a powerful EU institution. 

It is inherently incorrect because a return implies existence of something in the past. European societies never possessed any real sense of 'solidarity' or 'social justice' but historically (and to-date) relied on preservation of the status quo of distribution of wealth within the set confines of the European elites and independent of merit. Thus, Europe never pursued meritocratic systems of wealth and income allocations. And subsequently never developed such systems. What Mr Schulz might mean (and we are reduced here to guessing) is the return to the status quo of interest groups-driven 'social' allocations of resources - a system commonly known as tax (someone else) and spend (on me or my friends). 


It is a rich statement coming from Mr Schulz because he presides over the EU institution that was at least complicit in forcing member states to transfer private sector losses onto taxpayers and failed to structure properly core institutional frameworks of the EU. Whether this complicity involved errors of omission or commission is irrelevant. The outcomes of these errors are Greece today, Cyprus today, Ireland today, and Italy, Spain, Portugal and so on. From this point of view, the perspective of returning to values by the political and economic institutions of Europe would first and foremost involve (require) restructuring of the European institutions from the top. Mr Schulz's job would be on the line in any such process of renewal and return to accountability. 

That, alas, is the nature of leadership: you fail and you are gone. Writing op-eds full of well-meaning waffle is, frankly, not an excuse for the failures of both action and inaction.

9/8/2013: Euromoney on Russian Economy's Risks

Deteriorating outlook for Russia and CIS is reflected in this Euromoney Country Risk note, citing my views on Russian economy's risks:


9/8/2013: Irish ICT Services: Geniuses & Jobs Creators?..

The latest annual services inquiry for Ireland, published yesterday by the CSO and available here: http://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/asi/annualservicesinquiry2011/#.UgTpe2QmlF8 offers a fascinating read into the workings in the bizarrely-distorted world of MNCs-led exporting services in the country.

Here is one interesting set of facts, not shown by the CSO.


As chart above shows, in 2008-2011, Gross Value Added in ICT Services sector in Ireland (the sector heavily dominated by the likes of Google and other tax transfer-driven MNCs) has boomed, rising 30%. This growth, as the Government et al love reminding us, is allegedly translating into jobs, jobs and more jobs.

Alas, the facts speak for themselves:

  • Over 2008-2011 wages and salaries paid out in the sector rose just 8.2% or a tiny fraction of growth in value added.
  • GVA per person engaged in the sector rose 29.9% an
  • d GVA per full time employee rose 31.1% - both by far the fastest rates of growth of any sector in the economy.
  • The numbers engaged in the sector dropped (not rose) in 2008-2011 by 5.0% while numbers of full-time employees in the sector dropped 5.9%.
Can someone explain these miracles to me, please? By anything other than ongoing substitution of activity away from actual production of services toward more tax optimisation?.. Anyone?..

While at it, here is another illustrative chart to consider:


The above shows that Irish ICT Services workers constitute a truly miraculous breed of employees - so vastly more productive than any other type of human being in Ireland. Next time, walking down the Barrow Street, do marvel at all the geniuses walking about.

9/8/2013: PM Abe: a fella who makes history, quickly...

Roger, we have a problem... or rather - we now have a historic-level problem. Swept by Abenomics - the latest Japanese policy craze that believes in simultaneous borrowing and printing of excessive amounts of cash as a form of economic development, the Japanese economy is drowning in the sea of Government debt. This week, the Government has announced that its official debt levels have surpassed Yen 1,008,600 billion or Yen 1,008.6 trillion or Yen 1.0 quadrillion.

Never fear, this for now amounts to just USD10.42 trillion - a mere 230% of GDP. Abenomics has some room to run, yet... stay tuned and buckled up.

Source: http://www.zerohedge.com/node/477408 via @zerohedge

Thursday, August 8, 2013

8/8/2013: Cars licensing numbers for July are just not that spectacular

Latest data on new vehicles licensing data for Ireland was out today with bombastic headlines (see release here: http://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/vlftm/vehicleslicensedforthefirsttimejuly2013/#.UgPQ0GQmlF8).

So what is really going on in the data? Let me just recap what you will see below in a neat summary:
  1. Increases in new licenses in July are real, but are most likely driven by timing underlying 131 vs 132 plates introduction.
  2. Increases in July licensing numbers are not a signal of any significant improvement in the motor trade fortunes in Ireland.
  3. Caution and patience (until we see full year numbers for 2013) are warranted on foot of total new licenses issued in January-July period of 2013 compared to past years numbers.

On a monthly basis, things are looking massively good, as the CSO release clearly indicates that 9,306 new private cars were licensed in July 2013, compared with 6,164 a year ago, an increase of 51.0% y/y - massive and strongly suggestive of some huge turnaround in demand. It should be noted that the 132 number plate was introduced from the 1st July 2013 (see note below).

That was the 'good' news. Was it really dramatic? Not if you look at the entire history of sales:



The only thing that was extraordinary about the July licensing figures was that in a historical context, these were not that extraordinary at all. Let's run through some numbers in more details:
  • Year on year, all vehicles new licensing rose 43.9% in July 2013. These were also up 29.1% on July 2011 and 25.1% on July 2010.
  • Alas, cumulative sales for 3 months May-July 2013 were down 13.9% on cumulative sales for 3 months of February-April 2013 although they were up 11.7% y/y. Good rise y/y but not as dramatic as 43.9%. 
  • July 2013 licenses came in at 10.2% below the monthly average for January 2000-present, putting some cold icy water between the headlines reported and actual levels achieved.
  • New private cars licensing was up, as noted above 50.8% in July 2013 compared to July 2012, but 3mo cumulative licensing numbers for new private cars were down 30.6% for the period of May-July 2013 compared to February-April 2013, although these were up 0.32% y/y.
  • Let's think in monthly volumes terms: July 2013 licensing numbers were highest in only 4 months for all vehicles and new vehicles, and in new private cars, and in only 2 months for goods vehicles. I don't see drama here, folks. Just none...

Aside: the number of new goods vehicles licensed in July 2013 was 953, down 6.2% from July 2012 and these signal activity (or lack thereof) in SMEs sector.

But back to core numbers. The omitted news is that monthly sales might tell us something, but they don't tell us as much as we would like them to. The reason for this is that possibly July 2013 was the month when buyers hunting for 132 plates came into the market, having delayed their purchases from prior months. To correct for this we need to look at y/y comparatives for cumulative licensing January-July. For the sake of taking a short-cut, let's just look at data from January 2000 through latest. Chart below plots this data:


As you can see from the above, things are not getting better in the market, at least not so far. In January-July 2013, 
  • Licensing of all vehicles declined 0.34% on 2012 and was down 11.8% on 2011. It was down 37.5% on average for the first seven months of the year for the period 2000-present and was down 5.45% on average for the crisis period from 2009 through present. Conclusion: January-July 2013 all vehicles licenses are down not up y/y and are running below the crisis period average.
  • Licensing of new vehicles (private and goods vehicles) declined 9.6% on 2012 and was down 20.5% on 2011. It was down 48.5% on average for the first seven months of the year for the period 2000-present and was down 6.6% on average for the crisis period from 2009 through present. Conclusion: January-July 2013 all new vehicles licenses are down not up y/y and are running below the crisis period average.
  • Licensing of new private vehicles declined 9.7% on 2012 and was down 22.8% on 2011. It was down 46.7% on average for the first seven months of the year for the period 2000-present and was down 6.7% on average for the crisis period from 2009 through present. Conclusion: January-July 2013 new private vehicles licenses are down not up y/y and are running below the crisis period average.
  • Licensing of goods vehicles declined 9.6% on 2012 and was down 9.2% on 2011. It was down 62.3% on average for the first seven months of the year for the period 2000-present and was down 4.8% on average for the crisis period from 2009 through present. Conclusion: January-July 2013 goods vehicles licenses are down not up y/y and are running below the crisis period average.
I am not so sure we should be rushing out to congratulate our motors trade for delivering a magic turnaround on the above numbers, although we should stay cautious in terms of interpreting the overall sales until we have full year picture. Thus: caution, not celebration, is in order.


Note: Some are telling me that the industry is benefiting from 'spreading' the demand more evenly across the year under the new registration plates. In other words, allegedly, the industry was lobbying to introduce the 131 and 132 plates in order to reduce the rush of buyers in the first half of the year that took place under the original 13 plates (full-year plates) and transfer that 'surplus' demand to the second half of the year. This makes little sense to me. Suppose you transfer some sales from H1 into H2 (i.e. delay them by up to 6 months). What does this imply? By the time you do sell these 'spread-out' vehicles that you normally would have sold in H1, the money you do receive from the sales have been devalued by up to 6 months of inflation and you have incurred an opportunity cost of losing the interest on earnings that would have accrued were you to sell these 'spread-out' vehicles in H1. Is the motor trade sector that dumb? I don't think so. 

Wednesday, August 7, 2013

7/8/2013: Sunday Times, July 28, 2013: Ireland's Polarised Paralysed Economy

This is an unedited version of my article in the Sunday Times from July 28, 2013.


The latest news from the economy front both in Ireland and across the Euro area have been signaling some shallow improvements in growth outlook for the second and third quarters of 2013. However, the end game of a recovery currently building up will be a greater polarization of the real economy and little net new jobs creation. As supply of skills by indigenous workers remains mismatched to the demand for skills by exporting sectors, restart of exports-led growth of the future will not trickle down to the ordinary families. Meanwhile, long-term unemployment is hitting harder our older indigenous workers, and our entrepreneurship is in a structural decline. Responding to these problems will require a radical shift in the way we enable entrepreneurship, support professional labour mobility and increase investment in education and skills.


To see this, first consider the drivers for the latest improvements in the news flows. June Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) for Manufacturing in Ireland has finally reached just a notch above 50.0, signaling expansion for the first time since February 2013. Services PMI jumped to 54.9, marking 11th consecutive month of index readings above 50. Across the Euro area, Spanish Manufacturing PMI reached above 50 in June for the first time in 27 months. Italian PMI posted a rise for the third month in a row, although it remains below the expansion mark of 50.0. Germany's July composite PMI estimate for services and manufacturing hit a 17-month high at 52.8 and French estimate came in at 48.8 - an improvement on 47.4 in June.

Even though the end to the longest recession in euro area's history might be in sight, the recovery is unlikely to be strong. Euro area economies, Ireland included, genuinely lack sustainable drivers for growth. In addition, the processes of establishing new sources for future growth - new entrepreneurship and investment cycles – have been severely delayed both by the crises and by our policy responses to these crises.

In normal recessions, higher unemployment leads to higher involuntary entrepreneurship, as laid off workers deploy their skills and expertise into the market through self-employment and as sole-traders. In Ireland, in part due to tax hikes hitting the self-employed the hardest, this did not take place. According to the Enterprise Ireland report published earlier this month, the proportion of early stage entrepreneurs here has fallen from 8.1% average over 2003-2008 period to 6.1% in 2012. Ireland now ranks 18th out of 34 OECD countries in terms of entrepreneurship, just as the Government is expending millions on PR campaigns extolling the virtues of its pro-entrepreneurial policies and culture.

Beyond shrinking entrepreneurship, Irish labour markets are continuing to show signs of long-term, structural distress. The headline figures on Irish unemployment tell the story.

At the end of June 2013, there were 516,751 recipients of Live Register supports, including those in state and community training programmes. Some of the latter are involuntary in so far as they are linked to continued receipt of unemployment benefits. In June 2011, the same number was 517,187. The Government is boisterously claiming the economy is creating 2,000 new jobs per month. The same Government has spent hundreds of millions on enterprise supports and investment schemes, published series of programmes promising new jets in tens of thousands. Amidst this PR circus, the unemployment supports counts have declined by less than 500 over two years.

Based on the Quarterly National Household Survey data, we can take a more granular look into the jobs creation dynamics in the economy.

Between Q1 2011 and Q1 2013, the latest period for which data is available, total non-agricultural employment in the country fell by 9,200. In 12 months through March 2013, Irish economy added only 4,900 non-agricultural jobs. Some 19,000 shy of what our ministers in charge of jobs creation and enterprise policies allege. Controlling for health and education jobs, private sector saw destruction of 11,600 non-agricultural jobs since Q1 2011 when the Government came to power. Even in the booming Information and Communication services, overall employment fell by 1,100 in 12 months through Q1 2013, despite robust hiring in the exporting MNCs operating in the sector.

Underneath the surface, the trend is for displacement of Irish workers by age cohorts and by skills. This means that more and more foreign workers are taking up new positions created in sectors such as ICT and IFS to replace positions lost in domestic sectors. It also implies that older Irish workers are now being consigned to the risk of perpetual unemployment.

On the first point, while there is virtually no net new jobs additions in the economy, the positions that are being created to replace those being destroyed by the crisis, are getting progressively worse in terms of their quality. In the higher value-added private sectors, such as ICT services, professional, scientific, and technical activities, financial, insurance services and the likes, employment shrunk by 6,100 in Q1 2013 compared to Q1 2011 and by 900 compared to Q1 2012. Year on year there have been some 9,300 new jobs created in the top three professional occupations when ranked by earnings. However, more than half of these were part-time jobs. These are hardly the jobs that are attracting foreign talent into Ireland, suggesting that of the full time jobs in ICT and IFSC sectors created, the vast majority are taken up by non-Irish workers.

Regarding the last point, in June 2013, compared to June 2010, by age, the only cohort of Irish workers that saw a decline in Live Register numbers are those under the age of 35. All other age cohorts saw increases in Live Register participation. Between June 2010 and June 2013, numbers of long-term unemployed and underemployed rose 20% for workers under 35 years of age, 54% for workers of 35-54 years of age, and 106% for workers older than 55. In effect, we are currently assigning older workers to spend the rest of their working-age life in unemployment.

All of the above is best summed by the quarterly data on unemployment. At the end of March 2013, 25% of Irish workforce was either unemployed, underemployed or marginally-attached to the workforce, up on 23.7% in Q1 2011. Adding to the above those in state training schemes pushes the true broad unemployment rate in Ireland to 29% in Q1 2013, up on 26% in Q1 2011.


As I asserted at the top of the article, evidence shows that there is basically no net jobs creation going on in Ireland since Q1 2011. It further shows that older and predominantly Irish workers are experiencing an ever-rising risk of perpetual unemployment. Amongst the younger cohorts of workers, the main beneficiaries of the ICT and IFSC exporting sectors boom are temporary residents from abroad. Of the jobs still being added in the economy, majority are of low quality and cannot be relied upon to sustain long-term financial viability of Irish households. Lastly, skills mismatches between indigenous workers and exporting sectors demand are offering little hope that exports-led growth of the future will trickle down to ordinary families in Ireland.

The response to the above problem will have to be a structural shift in the way we support and treat entrepreneurship, professional labour mobility and investment in education and skills.

Currently, government policies overwhelmingly disfavor self-employed, indigenous entrepreneurs, and risk-taking professionals. In return, our policies promote development of tax optimizing FDI-backed large enterprises. Thus, early stage entrepreneurs face higher direct and indirect taxes than mature corporations and PAYE employees. Risk-taking, mobile, highly skilled professionals face lower quality and higher cost safety nets than immobile, old-skills-reliant tenured employees. Both mobile employees and entrepreneurs are also facing higher risks of unemployment, greater prospects of disruptive shocks to their incomes and larger exposure to health and family shocks. Meanwhile, for would-be entrepreneurs and flexible markets employees currently in underemployment or unemployment, life-long learning systems are costly to access and, with few exceptions, are of dubious quality.

These obstacles to increasing functional mobility of workers and human capital investments in our workforce can only be dealt with via a drastic, costly and disruptive reforms of our welfare system.  In part, the Government is currently attempting to undertake some of these reforms, albeit against the rising tide of internal discontent between the coalition partners.

But the current reforms proposals are not going far enough. Specifically, we will need to separate unemployment supports from general welfare and make these supports available to self-employed and flex-employment workers at no increase in cost of provision to these workers. The test for accessing all benefits – unemployment insurance and general welfare – should include skills levels and the entire past history of employment and entrepreneurship. Thus, higher unemployment supports should be given to those who have contributed more in the past in terms of taxes paid and entrepreneurship or human capital investment efforts undertaken. Conversely, they should have lower access to welfare benefits. To afford the strengthening of the safety net at the front end of unemployment, we will have to cut back the general social welfare benefits for able-bodied adults.

Parallel to these reforms we also need to change the way we do business in the areas such as childcare and life-long-learning. The goal of such reforms should be to increase access and supports for families at risk of unemployment in the 30-35 years of age and older cohorts. One possible long-term improvement would be to incentivize on-shoring of corporate training services into Ireland by the multinationals, coupled with requirement that such services take on a set percentage of Irish workers for training purposes and apprenticeships. Another reform can see greater and more strategic engagement of multinationals with indigenous entrepreneurs and SMEs.

A deep re-think of our current policies on dealing with unemployment requires breaking down traditional siloes in public policy and management that exist between various departments. The last two years – filled with good intentions and loud policies announcements show that the strategies deployed to-date are not working.






Box-out:

The latest data from the Residential Property Price Index (RPPI) shows that Dublin property prices posted a year on year price increase of 4.15% in June and a 1.69% cumulative rise over the last six months. However encouraging this might sound, the data must be treated with caution for a number of reasons. Firstly, the main driver for the latest improvement in the RPPI was sales of Dublin apartments. These are highly volatile and are based on few transactions. Secondly, outside Dublin, the markets remain weak. Thirdly, latest mortgages data shows that while borrowing posted a cautious rise in the first half of 2013, mortgages affordability is falling. Lastly, current sales levels and valuations are not pricing in the upcoming wave of foreclosures (starting with Buy-to-Let markets around Q4 2013 and running though 2014) that will be required to deleverage banks balance sheets. The fact is: in June 2013 the All-Properties RPPI, was still down 1.5% on Q1 2012 average and is basically unchanged on December 2012-January 2013 levels. In other words, while pockets of strength might emerge in Dublin market, overall property market is currently bouncing at the bottom of the negative cycle, looking for a catalyst either up or down.

7/8/2013: Sunday Times, July 21, 2013: New Financial Order

Catching up on some of my past articles from the Sunday Times, here's an unedited version from July 21, 2013.

Five years into the Great Recession collapse of Irish domestic investment, underpinned by the unprecedented in history of the EU drop in lending to indigenous enterprises, continues to act as the main force holding back Irish recovery. Despite serious policy efforts to unlock banks lending, especially to the SMEs sector, expanded by the current Government and its predecessor there are many structural reasons as to why a return to the rampant lending and lending-backed investment in this economy remains elusive. After years of waiting for lending to return, we need to shift our policies focus away from attempting to refuel another SMEs credit bubble toward incentivising new forms of capital formation and accelerating the rate of existent debt restructuring in the real economy.

This week, research published by the Bruegel Institute reminded us about the horrors of the Irish credit system collapse. Looking at the outstanding credit to non-financial corporations from September 2008 through April 2013, the researchers found that Irish banking system experienced the largest decline in overall credit of all EU27 states. Ireland's outstanding credit to non-financial companies has fallen more than 50 percent over the period covered in the study, with the second-worst performing economy, Spain coming in with a more benign drop of 30 percent. Bankrupted Greece is in a distant fifth place, having posted a 'mere' 25 percent credit contraction.

Most recent Central Bank data, relating directly to the SMEs lending in Ireland, shows that new lending in Q1 2013 was 41 percent below the Q1 average for 2010-2012, despite the figures showing a slight rise quarter on quarter. Netting out new loans issued for financial intermediation and property, credit extended to SMEs in the first three months of this year was down 11 percent compared to the 2010-2012 average for the same period.

Strikingly, as Irish credit volumes shrunk faster than in any other EU state, interest rates for loans to Irish enterprises under EUR1 million in volume have declined in line with those for the lower credit risk economies. When it can be had, Irish SMEs credit is priced in line with such countries as Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK.

On the other hand, SMEs’ demand for loans remains high. In Q2 2013, according to the latest ISME survey, demand for new credit rose to 41 percent from 38 percent a year ago. On average, 48 percent of all companies that applied for funding in the first six months of 2013 were refused credit by the bank, slightly down on 51 percent average rejection rate for 2012.

Good news: demand and refusal rates are starting to move in the opposite directions, just as credit supply is beginning to turn positive. Bad news: all improvements are shallow in nature and are yet to show sustainability over time.


All of this presents us with a paradox: while credit demand is high, both supply of loans and the cost is low. The reason for this is that Irish SMEs and banks are continuing to operate in a highly abnormal environment. Changing this will require reducing a severe debt overhang in the Irish SMEs sector, regulatory changes aimed at improving banks ability and incentives to restructure legacy loans, and a lengthy period of time to heal the overall collapse in SMEs willingness to undertake risky investment.

All indicators suggest that gradual improvements in the credit quality of SMEs are not keeping up with rising demand for loans.

Per ISME data, 12 percent of SMEs that do require bank finance abstain from applying for it; over half of them in fear that making an application can lead to the banks shutting down existent credit facilities. Of those SMEs that do apply, 28 percent saw demands for overdrafts reductions imposed onto them. Over half of the credit requests made but the SMEs were for overdrafts or invoice discounting/factoring.

This largely confirms the findings of our recent research based on the ECB data collected at enterprise level across the euro area. Applied to Ireland, our findings strongly suggested that significant contributor to the decline in credit was due to structural insolvency of SMEs’ balance sheets. These drivers are not being dealt with fast enough at the policy and banks levels to allow for the recovery in private sector investment.

Firstly, Irish SMEs remain heavily exposed to legacy loans secured against or for the purpose of property investment. Back in the early 2008, several investment banks have estimated that up to 90 percent of Irish business sector loans issued from 1998-1999 through 2006-2007 were exposed to the risk of collapse in property valuations. The main outcome of this is a wave of bankruptcies that is still consuming the sector. High debt levels tied to property loans mean that over one half of all Irish SMEs loans are currently in arrears, based on the Central Bank estimates. Referencing dynamics in residential buy-to-let markets (representing household side of the investment markets) and new lending data for SMEs, my own estimates suggest that closer to 70 percent of all SMEs loans still outstanding are either in arrears or at risk of failing.

However, even for the enterprises that survived the immediate drop in asset prices, property values decline has meant reduced borrowing capacity for years to come, greater propensity to avoid seeking new credit, and weakened existent production base. Behavioural studies suggest that SMEs hit by the property valuations declines, in contrast to newer enterprises formed after the property bust, will tend to reduce their future borrowings, even if they are given access to new finance. This applies also to companies that have completed successful debt restructuring. In addition, as SMEs lower their investment in new equipment, product R&D, and strategic and operational improvements, they reduce their future competitiveness and profit margins.

Secondly, Irish SMEs are operating in the environment of malfunctioning debt restructuring mechanism.

In a normal recession, banks hold sufficient capital to actively engage with SMEs in restructuring their debts. At the same time, short time span of a normal recession means that a bulk of businesses liquidations extend into the period of early economic recovery. Sales of distressed business assets, in normal recession, often take place in rising markets.

In a severe balance sheet recession, like that experienced today in Ireland, banks transfer costs of keeping the non-performing enterprises alive to other clients. One sign of this is that charges on short-term loans, often used to cover balance sheet pressures, tend to rise slower than charges on larger, capital investment-linked loans. From the bottom of the interest rate cycle through May 2013, cost of new credit for loans up to EUR1 million based on floating rate rose 33 percent. Cost of loans over EUR1 million with over 1 year fixation rose 87 percent. Such cost transfers harm better companies' ability to raise investment, while slowing down the rate at which the insolvency works through to weed out the unsustainable businesses. End game - delayed resolution of the debt crisis at the expense of suppressed capital investment and growth.


All of the above helps explain why less than a third of all Irish SMEs that do apply for credit from their bank end up drawing down any loans. But the above also suggests the policy direction that should be taken in trying to increase domestic capital formation while continuing to pursue system-wide deleveraging.

Unlocking investment requires, first and foremost, finding new sources for funding business expansion, distinct from bank lending. Such sources include equity financing and direct borrowing. The Government needs to develop incentives for equity investment in, and peer-to-peer and public-to-business lending to Irish SMEs.

To expand the pool of potential investors, we need to open these platforms and Irish investment services to international investors and institutions. Government re-insurance scheme for exports finance can be a good step forward in making Irish SMEs more attractive to foreign investors and freeing up some operating capital for growth. Another similar measure would involve more state co-investment in existent enterprises (as opposed to new ventures) based on their ability to generate intellectual property, associated with new products and services development.

While stimulating new forms of SME funding, Ireland also needs to accelerate the process of business insolvency resolution. This will require two major changes in the way our insolvency process is regulated.

We need to recognize the necessity for allowing banks to treat business equity as lower risk asset when restructuring legacy loans for sustainable enterprises. This can help increase debt-for-equity swaps between lenders and borrowers. In return, such swaps can allow banks to use their limited resources on deleveraging out of unsustainable loans. We also need to revise our targets for banks deleveraging, potentially extending the period over which the pillar banks are required to reduce their loans exposures and increase allowance for SMEs loans to be held by the banks. To reduce overall systemic risks, we can require banks to put their restructured SMEs loans through more rigorous stress-testing.

The second major change is to relax the constraints on entrepreneurship and professional standing for business owners going through bankruptcy proceedings. This will allow for a quicker return of past entrepreneurs to new ventures and will aid SME sector deleveraging.

All of the research on SME credit in the Euro area and Ireland shows that both supply and demand drivers are responsible for the collapse of investment during the current crisis. Instead of attempting to rebuild the legacy systems based on unsustainable lending, we need to think outside the box to identify new ways for funding productive investment. Both banking and the SME sector will require significant changes to deliver on this.
                                                                                                   




Box-out:

Largely ignored by the Irish media headlines, there is a new longer-term threat to our economy emerging from the EU's penchant for policies harmonisation. This week, at the talks in Vilnius, Lithuania, EU officials were discussing the need for pan-European regulation of data protection. In part, these talks were driven by the EU-US Free Trade Agreement negotiations and the recent scandal relating to e-spying. However, the main impetus for harmonising European regulations is the emerging imbalances in the ICT services investment across the EU. Ireland’s EU partners, especially Germany and France, are unhappy that our, allegedly, light-touch regulations act as a major attractor for foreign direct investment in ICT sector, ‘stealing’ jobs from Germany and tax revenues from France. The risks implied by harmonisation of EU regulations in this area are of significant economic concern. It is, perhaps, ironic that data protection regulations or their potential harmonisation did not make it into the ESRI's latest paper on ICT-related FDI, titled "Boosting Foreign Direct Investment in the Information and Communication Technologies Sector: What Works?" published this week. Foreign providers of ICT services in Ireland dominate the sub-sector which acts as the sole source of growth in Ireland from 2008 through today. Between Q1 2008 through Q1 2013, Irish ICT services credit to the current account rose from EUR5.86 billion to EUR9.35 billion. In Q1 2013, ICT services trade surplus exceeded our economy’s total external balance by 37 percent. Squeeze this sector through regulatory harmonisation and Ireland’s latest recession will look like a walk in a park, while our debt sustainability risks will go back to 2011 levels.