8/3/2013: The Cyprus' Russian Bail-in Dilemma

With the new Government in place and with more urgency than ever before, Cyprus is heading for the last ditch effort to secure the bailout from the Troika.  However, all indications are there will be no agreement in March, pushing any potential deal closer to the June 3 when EUR1.415 billion of Government bonds come to maturity. The bonds amount to a massive 9.65% of the country GDP and are unlikely to be rolled over unless at a punitive yields.

Cyprus original request for the bailout dates back to June 2011, looking for up to EUR17bn (ca 100% of GDP) and the current foot-dragging from the EU is a clear signal of Frankfurt's and Brussels' conviction that the acute peripheral crisis is now over and there is little risk of contagion from Nicosia. If the full EUR17bn were granted, the bailout would push Cypriot Government debt to ca 145% of GDP, well ahead of the IMF-set sustainability threshold of 120%.

Furthermore, the EU policymakers clearly perceive Cypriot crisis to be distinct from other peripheral states while Cypriot banking system (the cause of the crisis) to be decoupled from the rest of the euro area. The former smacks of the usual euro area denialism, while the latter is probably closer to truth. Nonetheless, someone has to be concerned with sustainability of any debt in excess of 90-100% of GDP in an economy that is about to take a massive hit at the heart of its growth engine: banking and associated exportable services.

Cypriot banks hold assets valued at 8 times the country GDP (roughly EUR 120 billion worth of assets), with deposits of roughly EUR70 billion recorded prior to the recently started 'quiet' bank runs. Within last week alone Cyprus banks lost just over 2% of their deposits. Around 42-43% of these deposits belong to foreign (primarily British and Russian) residents.

The latter are now at the crosshair in the EU vs Cyprus war for bailing-in the depositors in insolvent Cypriot banks.

In 2012, there were some 60,000 Russian expatriates living in Cyprus, a country with the total population back in 2011 at 1.116 million. Russia was the second largest source of tourists inflows into Cyprus in 2011-2012 and Russia received FDI of USD12.3bn via Cyprus (although probably 99%+ of this was recycling of funds that originally left Russia for Cyprus). In 2011 Russia extended a EUR2.5 billion bilateral loan to Nicosia. Despite common theme in the press about Cypriot banking system being used for Russian tax evasion, Russia and Cyprus have signed and ratified the Protocol to the Double Taxation Treaty.

At the end of 2011, many, but not all and not even majority, of the non-Euro deposits in Cypriot banks originated from Russia - amounting to ca EUR18 billion (more than 100% of the Cypriot GDP), but just 20% of the total deposits in the country. Russians are also major holders of equities in BOC and CPB banks. These Russian deposits have declined since then. More ominously, the accounting of these deposits is somewhat dodgy. There are many conflicting figures out there.

Below is the table - courtesy of the Piraeus Bank - detailing the deposits structure in Cypriot banking system through early 2012:

In contrast, Fitch (via International Herald Tribune) reported slightly different figures that are at odds with both above figures and the Min Fin claims (see below):

According to the Min Fin, as of end of 2012, Cyprus banks deposits remain around EUR70 billion and less than EUR30 billion of these are accounted for by foreign depositors, with Russian deposits standing around EUR15 billion. The problem is that all of the above figures include deposits in Cyprus-regulated pure Russian banks, such as division of VTB, for example, which are not going to be covered by the bailout or the haircuts.

A recent estimate by the Euromoney puts non-domiciled Russian deposits in Cyprus closer to 7-10% of total deposits or EUR5-7 billion.


Confusion aside, it is relatively clear that so-called Russian 'oligarchs' funds, while prominent in the overall deposits volumes, are neither the source of the Cypriot problems, nor a source for the sustainable solution to that problem. Even a 50% bail-in of these would not deliver (given the existent EUR100,000 guarantee on deposits, and the fact that large volumes of the Russian money is most likely held in the names of EU-registered entities) Cypriot system to health or even to contribute more than EUR2-2.5 billion to the EUR17-17.5 billion bailout.

Matters are worse, when it comes to bail-in of Russian depositors, when one considers the existent and growing links between the real economies of the two countries. In 2008, Cypriot economy gained EUR1.9 billion (11% of GDP) from tourism trade surplus. Inflows of Russian visitors to the island were up 55% in 2011 in y/y terms and they now represent the second largest source of tourism revenues after the UK (although Russian tourists account for only around 8-10% of all visitors to the island, as opposed to the UK tourists who accounted for closer to 50%). A loss of Russian tourism in the wake of any bail-in would be pretty hard to offset for Cyprus' economy left without the core pillar of International Financial Services. Country income from accounting and legal services amounted to ca EUR700 million or 4.0-4.1% of GDP in 2008, and much of that came from Russian residents, businesses, investors and depositors.

Russian investments in real estate in Cyprus (excluding Russians resident in Cyprus) amounted to ca 7% of total real estate investment back in 2006, a rate that is 1/10th of the UK residents investments there, but nonetheless - significant support for the economy. And this excludes investments by Russian nationals resident in Cyprus.

Overall, prior to the crisis, Russian business and individual activities in Cyprus contributed closer to EUR600-800 million in annual revenues to the economy, excluding taxes and wages. Applying some multipliers to that suggests overall GDP contribution from Russian-linked activities to Cypriot GDP of some EUR2 billion annually or up to 11.7% of the country GDP.

In other words, bail-in of Russian depositors can gain Cyprus some EUR2-3 billion under very adverse conditions imposed on non-resident depositors and cost Cyprus some EUR0.75-1 billion in annual economic losses. How fast does this math start spelling net loss? And how fast does this math start spelling inability to service 120% or so debt/GDP ratio post bail-in?

8/3/2013: Industrial Investment in Ireland 2012

Summary of the capital acquisitions in Irish industry over time:

 and by broad sectors:

Key conclusion: no restart of investment cycle in the Industry in 2012, including the MNCs. Stripping out Pharma sector, net acquisitions of capital in 2012 were at EUR2,516.3mln down from 2011 EUR2547.8mln, and roughly equivalent to the average of 2008-2011 period of EUR2,511.5mln.

Note: all data is based on today's update by the CSO. See http://cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/er/cai/capitalassetsinindustryquarter42012/#.UToLydFHBF8

8/3/2013: German Lawmaker Challenges Debt Restructuring for Ireland & Portugal

Not exactly good news, and not exactly earth-shattering either, but...
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/07/eurozone-germany-bailouts-idUSL6N0BZI9320130307

The point worth raising is that if Enda & Co do achieve restructuring of our Troika loans, they would de facto deliver a restructuring of Ireland's super-sovereign debt. This raises a number of issues:

1. Why are we seeking restructuring super-senior sovereign debt ahead of seeking to restructure non-sovereign debt, such as, for example banks debts?
2. If restructuring were to materially impact our long-term debt profile by lowering the NPV of our debt, would this not qualify as a 'structured' or 'cooperative' default? I know - the matter here is not material, but rather a label, yet don't we have a Government that staunchly refuses to default on private debts assumed by the State and then goes for a default (or even quasi-default) on super-senior debt?

These questions closely relate to the work I have done over the recent years on Irish Government debt and most directly to my chapter in What if Ireland Defaults? (link the chapter in a working paper format here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1985617)

7/3/2013: Irish Mortgages Arrears Q4 2012

Mortgages arrears data for private residences in Ireland for Q4 2012 was published today by the Central Bank of Ireland. Few surprises.

As expected, arrears rose. Unexpectedly, the rate of increase was much much slower than before in q/q terms and slower in y/y terms. As encouraging as this might sound, there are some points of concern outlined below. Here are some details of data dynamics first:

1. In Q4 2012 there were a total of 792,096 accounts relating to private residential mortgages in Ireland - a massive y/y increase from 765,267 accounts in Q4 2011 due to 'reclassification' of some mortgages accounts.
2. This 'reclassification' made historical comparatives in terms of, say, arrears as % of the total mortgages, utterly useless. This is how Irish official stats go: relabel, re-order, and if it makes things look better by coincidence - spin. 
3. Total number of mortgages in arrears for private residences rose from 141,389 accounts in Q3 2012 to 143,851 accounts in Q4 2012 - an increase q/q of 1.74%, well below any q/q increase since the beginning of the series. Average increase since Q3 2009 when the data started stands at 6.51%.
4. Y/y total number of mortgages in arrears increased 21.43% in Q4 2012, the slowest rate of annual increases since the beginning of the series and below the average of 27.77%.
5. Overall, in Q4 2012, 18.16% of all mortgages still outstanding in the country were in arrears. Adjusting for the CBofI 'reclassification' of mortgages accounts to allow for more direct historical comparative, 18.85% of all mortgages were in arrears. 
6. Number of mortgages at risk or defaulted (defined as mortgages currently in arrears, restructured and not in arrears, plus repossessions) has risen in Q4 2012 to 186,785 (or 24.48% of the total adjusting for 'reclassifications', 23.58% based on official data) from 185,933 in Q3 2012. This implies a rise of 0.46% q/q and 19.61% y/y. Both represent the slowest rates of increase in series (short) history.

Two charts to illustrate:

Good news: the rates of arrears build up have slowed down in Q 2012. 

Bad news, getting worse slower is not the same as getting better. Especially given the deterioration tallied from 2009 through today. 

Worrying side: impacts of property taxes, banks guarantee lift-off, repossessions orders regime change, and personal insolvency 'reforms' are not visible in the current latest data. All represent a threat of accelerating arrears once again. 

Real news: just under 1/4 of Irish private residences-linked mortgages are now at risk of default, in arreas or defaulted and some 650,000-700,000 people are currently impacted by this crisis to the point of being unable to meet the original conditions of their mortgages.

7/3/2013: Are stocks more volatile in the long run?

A recent paper by Lubos Pastor and Robert F. Stambaugh, titled Are Stocks Really Less Volatile in the Long Run? (first published NBER Working Paper Series No. 14757; Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2009.) and subsequently in the Journal of Finance (vol 67, number 2, April 2012, pages 431-477) looks at the annualized returns volatility to stocks returns - the central concern for investors and finance practitioners. 

The study uses predictive variance approach to the analysis of volatility and look at what happens to predictive variance as the investment horizon increases. Conditional variance is variance in returns conditioned on the set of information known to investors.The predictive variance is therefore the conditional variance, where conditioning information is taken at the time when investors make their assessment of the risks (volatility) and returns implied by an instrument. 

Now, it is commonly established that stock returns volatility per any given period falls over the longer periods, potentially due to mean reversion, as majority of the studies show or argue. But this only relates to volatility as measured concurrently - in other words unconditionally. Of course, investors face volatility as expected on the basis of conditioning variables, and this predictive variance, it turns out, actually is higher, not lower, over the long periods. The study shows that this reversal of the relationship between investment duration and volatility of returns holds even once we control for mean reversion. In other words, uncertainty about future expected returns is a core driver of higher long-horizon variance in stocks.

7/3/2013: New Vehicles Regs for February 2013

New data on new vehicles licensed in Ireland in February is out and it makes for some depressing reading:

Note the precipitous decline in New Goods Vehicles - down 23% in February and down 21.4% in two months through February. This suggests that even if the "131" license plates are having an adverse effect on purchases, the investment cycle is not turning around still. Good Vehicles are a form of business investment in capital. They are also subject to set depreciation schedules, implying the need for replacement at some relatively stable rate over time. If economy was showing any signs of recovery, retail and wholesale trades, plus other domestic and exports-related activities would have translated in higher rate of capacity utilisation, including for goods vehicles. This, in turn, should translate in higher rates of replacement and new investment. So far - the data shows the opposite.

It is worth noting that the total number of used imported private cars licensed in February was 3,717 against 3,312 a year ago and the number of used goods vehicles rose from 737 in January-February 2012 to 883 in the same period 2013. Still, net effect is that of a more marked decline in goods vehicles than in private cars.

Here's the summary of historical data:

And the summary clearly shows that in terms of All Vehicles, we are now back to the levels of sales consistent with January- February 1994, in terms of New Vehicles sales and in terms of New Private cars sold to the level seen back in the end of 1993. Meanwhile, the State continues to rip off motorists at the ever increasing rate via fuel costs, registrations, VRT, VAT, licenses cost, etc.

6/3/2013: BlackRock Institute Economic Cycle Survey 03/2013

BlackRock Investment Institute has released the latest results from its Economic Cycle Survey for EMEA and North America & Western Europe.

Before looking at the results, note:

1. The survey represents the summary of the views of a panel of economists polled by the BlackRock Investment Institute, and not the view of the Institute itself
2. In some instances, survey covers small number of responses (see two tables below detailing the depth of coverage), with low coverage corresponding to survey results being indicative, rather than consensus-conclusive.

So core results for North America and Western Europe regions:

In effect, little change from the previous surveys for Ireland, which remains solidly decoupled in terms of economists consensus from the peripheral states (the latter are all clustered in the upper RHS corner, corresponding to both high expectations of continued recession and current indicator of the present recession). In the case of Ireland, it is obviously very hard to tell whether or not Ireland is currently in a recession. Both GDP and GNP changes q/q and y/y do not warrant official designation of a recession, but nonetheless the economy is running at well below its potential capacity.

Per chart above, it is clear that despite the Eurostat projections for 2013 growth, Ireland does not lead the Euro Area in terms of forward expectations for economic growth when it comes to the economists' assessment.

Now on to EMEA results:

Pretty much predictable weakening of Russian growth for 2013 is reflected in the above. Two other interesting points:

1. The weakest performing states in terms of current conditions and expectations are the ones with closest ties to (and membership in) the Euro zone;
2. Weak performance for the Ukraine is reflective of the country continued political mess and the lack of sustainable fundamentals in terms of the country orientation vis-a-vis its main trading partners (the contrasting reality of the private sector closely tied into the CIS and more precisely Russian markets for investment and trade, juxtaposed by the political re-orientation toward Europe).

Note: here are the tables detailing the extent of the survey coverage depth:

6/3/2013: Reality v PR Spin - Irish Economy

An excellent article in the Irish Examiner today on the state of our economy as contrasted by the state of our PR/spin machine: http://www.irishexaminer.com/opinion/columnists/colette-browne/enda-needs-to-be-a-better-salesman-when-flogging-economic-recovery-pitch-224593.html

5/3/2013: Irish trade with BRICs: 2004-2012

Four charts on Irish bilateral goods trade with Bric countries:

5/3/2013: Another Consumer Confidence Report Goes Off-Road

To the 'turning around' reports from the Eastern Front ca 1943... err... 2013... per KBC Ireland/ESRI Consumer Sentiment Index, consumer sentiment in Ireland fell in February to 59.4 compared to January reading of blistering 64.2. The report gets 'serious' on dynamics: "The three-month moving average also decreased from 59.3 to 57.8. The index fell below the average for the last 12 months (61.9)."

Let me add some more dynamics to this. First, let's look at January 2012 data (since we do not have Retail Sales Indices for February yet):

• Current 3mo average for Retail Sales Value Index is 96.8, down from 96.9 for 3mo average through October 2012, Volume is up from 100.3 to 100.5. Overall, indices are basically flat (+/-0.1% is not a significant change by anyone's standards, even for this Government);
• 3mo average of Consumer Confidence index through January 2013 was 59.3 down on 63.7 for the 3 months though October 2012.
• 6mo average, however, shows a slightly different story: Value of sales is up from 95.3 average reading for 6 months through June 2012 to 96.8 average for 6 months through December 2012; Volume is up from 98.8 to 100.4 over the same period, and Consumer Confidence is up from 105.8 to 107.7.

KBC/ESRI Consumer Sentiment Index is about as good of a gauge for retail sector activity here as the elephants' herd gate tempo is of use for timing the Swan Lake pas de deux. If you don't believe me, here's a chart:

In the nutshell, consumer confidence hit the bottom in July 2008 and since then things were, apparently improving. So much so that by June 2012 Value of Retail sales has hit the absolute record low, whilst Volume of sales did same in October 2011. There is a gentle uptrend in consumer confidence since mid-2008 against a downtrend in both Volume and Value of core retail sales.

Taken on 3mo average basis (to cut down on volatility), Confidence indicator has virtually nothing to do with Retail Sales, except for high sounding press release comments from the experts:

Per ESRI: "The promissory note deal was announced roughly half way through the survey period. The announcement of the deal would appear to have had some positive impact, with a preliminary analysis of responses showing an improvement in sentiment after the deal. We await the March results to see if the impact on sentiment is sustained.”

Indeed, we await... eagerly. 


In addition, Austin Hughes, KBC Bank Ireland, noted that [comments are mine] “A disappointing aspect of the sentiment data for February was that the decline was broadly based. Consumer spending power remains under pressure and there is little to suggest a dramatic improvement in Irish economic circumstances that would cause a ‘feel good’ factor to emerge anytime soon. [A revelation of most profound nature] 

"About the best that can be expected is a slow easing in the ‘fear factor’ that would encourage a gradual increase in spending. This may not be spectacular but it still represents significant progress. [What progress he might have in mind beats me, as Retail Sales figures continue to show little signs of reviving from already abysmally low levels]
 

"...The Irish consumer is seeing an improvement in ‘macro’ conditions across the economy but their personal finances remain under pressure. [In other words, we are in that ESRI & KBC-lauded 'exports-led recovery' boom, folks, where you and I get screwed, while MNCs get to report greater 'sales'] 

"It may be that some consumers had unrealistic expectations as to what a deal could achieve. [Did Government enthusiasm in over-selling the potential impact propelled enthusiasm of consumers for the 'deal'?] 

"More generally, it remains the case that consumers face significant further austerity in the next two Budgets. [Doh! We'd be discovering new Solar Systems, next] 

"The deal may ease the pain somewhat but it doesn’t entirely remove it. So, we shouldn’t expect a surge in confidence. That said, the fragile situation of Irish consumers means they are sensitised to bad news. So, failure to reach a deal could have seen sentiment deteriorate quite sharply.” [In other words, we were saved from an apocalyptic collapse of consumer confidence by the wisdom and the heroic efforts of the Government... and ATMs are still working!]

Irony has it, the same 'positive newsflow' that went along with the index slide this time around also supported (according to the authors) index surge in January - see here for January release comments: http://www.kbc.ie/media/CSI.Jan20131.pdf Who says you can't have a cake and eat it at the same time?

I don't know what to do - laugh or cry... cup of coffee is needed, however, as much as some serious improvements in survey to bring it closer to reality on the ground. It is needed because:

• While Consumer Confidence index through January 2013 (to take period consistent with data availability for both Retail Sales Indices and Consumer Confidence Index) was up 13.4% y/y, while actual retail sales rose just 0.94% in Value and 0.71% in Volume. 
• Compared to 2005 average, Retail Sales Value was down 3.42%, Volume was down 0.22% and Consumer Confidence was up 26.82%.
• Even with February 2013 moderation, Consumer Confidence is now up 17.33% on 2005 average.
• Worse than that, taking Crisis Period averages (January 2008-present), Value of Retail Sales is now running at 96.6 against the average of 101.17 (or 4.51% below average), Volume at 99.8 against the average of 103.49 (or 3.56% below average), whilst Consumer Confidence is running at 7.37% above the Crisis Period average of 55.32.

5/3/3013: Irish Services PMIs: February 2013

Irish Services PMI (published by NCB) for February were out today, highlighting some interesting (for a change) shifts in the short-term trends worth discussing.

The headline numbers were good, although less strong than those recorded in January. This is not surprising since PMI surveys are biased toward multinationals in some core driving sectors (due to weighting factors attached to sectors and the overall quality, collection and reporting of data biases).

• Seasonally-adjusted Business Activity (headline index) declined to 53.6 in February from 56.8 in January 2013, but remained above 50.0 line. 
• 12mo MA through February 2013 was 53.0, which is not statistically significantly different from 50.0, but nonetheless represents a reading consistent with moderately strong expansion of activity. This marks the seventh consecutive month of readings above 50.0 although February was the second slowest month for activity over this latest period of consecutive expansions.
• 3mo MA through February is now identical to the previous 3mo MA through November 2012 - both at 55.4. For comparative purposes: 3mo MA through February 2010 was 47.2, through February 2011 - 52.1, through February 2012 - 50.0, so annualised activity is running ahead of previous 3 years.
• Main point to be made in the above is that since roughly April 2010, we have been trending along a new late- or post-crisis trend along the average of 52.1 average (49.6 to 54.6 range) as compared to May 2000-December 2007 average of 57.6 (52.5 to 62.7 range). As charts above and below clearly show, the new trend is (1) lower and (2) less steep in take-offs from the local minima (lows). In my view - this shows two factors: Factor 1: overall slower rate of growth (do keep in mind that the current trend is coming off historical lows of the Great Recession and should be consistent with much faster uplift and higher average and range than pre-crisis trend), and Factor 2: more mature nature of business in Irish Services sectors (with ICT and Financial Services now in advanced stages of late investment cycle compared to the period of 2000-2007 when these were growing rapidly and posting recovery from the dot.com bubble).

Now on to some of the components of the headline index.

• Chart above shows that New Business sub-index also posted moderation in the rate of growth in February 2013 compared to five months of robust expansion prior to February. In fact, February reading of 53.1 was the slowest pace of expansion in seven months, although it does come on foot of seven months of consecutive above 50.0 readings. 
• Trend-wise, the same conclusions that were drawn in the last bullet point on the headline index - those relating to structurally slower pace of growth in the recent years compared to pre-crisis rates of expansion - continue to hold for New Business sub-index as well. Since April 2010, the sub-index averaged 51.3 (range of 48.4 to 54.2) against pre-crisis (May 2000-December 2007) average of 57.4 (range of 52.4 to 62.5).
• On short-term dynamics, 3mo MA through February 2013 stood at 55.4, slightly down on 55.8 3mo MA through November 2012, but ahead of 47.2 3mo MA through February 2010, ahead of 52.1 3mo MA through February 2011 and ahead of 50.2 3mo MA through February 2012.

Chart below summarises the shorter-range data for the two core indices.

Two charts plotting other principal components of the overall index:

Focusing on few sub-series of interest:

• Employment sub-index remained above 50.0 in February, posting a reading of 52.5 - the shallowest expansion since September 2012, but marking a sixth consecutive month above 50.0. 3mo MA now is at 54.1 and previous 3mo MA through November 2012 was at 53.0. Good news - in 2009-2012 3mo MA through February was below 50.0 in every year. Bad news is that Employment is closely linked with Profitability (see below).
• Business Confidence / Expectations 6mo out are continuing to fly high, propelled most likely by a combination of current upbeat conditions (the two series: Expectations and Current Conditions show the strongest co-determining relationship of all series, suggesting that the real driver for Expectations is not actual anticipation of the future events, but rather firms' assessment of current conditions) and by the endless barrage of feel-good propaganda from the business lobby and the State. The last, third factor, is human nature (aka 'winner's curse' bias). We expect things to get better because they were pretty damn awful until now and for a very long time... Come on, folks, let's face the music - unless you are a transfer-pricing arbitraging MNC, things are hardly getting any better. And, unless you live in the world of Googlites (aka 25-30 year olds with no attachment to anything save a party on a weekend) you are facing a mountain of debt, shrinking assets and wealth, higher taxes and the prospect of more of the same. What 'confidence at 69.1' can we have in mind? 
• Oh, and to top things up - you'd think that Confidence comes from higher profits for the firms... Well, in the Wonderland of Transfer Pricing it is not and hence in Ireland we have Services sector where profitability is shrinking (41.5 in February on 49.2 in January) for 62 consecutive months now (since January 2008, every month there was negative profitability growth, with the average shrinkage at 41.9 - aka very very very deep contraction), but businesses confidence has been up on average at 60.9 - aka very very strong confidence growth on monthly basis).

If anything, aside from the major trend outlined in the first set of bullet points above, the point on Confidence and Profitability is the second main conclusion from the longer-term data analysis, for it exposes the surreal nature of the Irish economy - economy distorted by extreme transfer pricing and tax optimisation activities of the MNCs.

Now, let's touch briefly on the main short-term observation from today's data release: the core drivers for each of the main sub-series:

• When it comes to Business Activity index, level support at 53.6 in February was provided by a broader base of sectors, with Technology, Media & Telecoms sector (TMTS) posting comparable expansion to Transport, Travel, Tourism & Leisure sector (TTTLS). This is similar to what was observed back in October 2011 and is an improvement on the trend that (at least over the last six months) have seen TMTS being the main and dominant driver of the index improvements.
• Business Activity Index for Expectations out 12 months ahead was dominated (as in every one of the previous 6 months) by TMTS, with Business Services Index coming in as the second upside driver (same as in January 2013).
• TMTS was the main driver for the third consecutive month behind growth in Incoming New Business, while Financial Services were the main driver over the last 4 months behind the growth in the Incoming New Export Business.
• In Employment generation, TMTS again outstripped all other sectors for the third consecutive month, which, of course, means we are only reinforcing the demographic misalignment emerging in the economy with main generation of new jobs taking place in sectors that are more reliant on importing skills from abroad.
• TMTS was the only sector in which profitability improved in February 2013 (same as in December 2012 and January 2013). In all other sectors, profitability was in decline for the third consecutive month. Why, you might ask? Interestingly, TMTS saw the sharpest countermovement in input/output prices, with input costs posting sharpest acceleration in February, and output costs posting the sharpest deterioration. In any normal economy that would mean shrinking, not expanding, profit margins. But in Ireland, of course, there is little normal about the TMTS sector dominated by the massive MNCs aggressively using their Irish activities for tax arbitrage from their European and even global operations.

Some interesting stuff, eh? You bet official 'analysis' of Irish PMIs is not talking about any of this...

5/3/2013: Charts to Keep You Awake at Night

Bragging rights alert...

Business Insider published their slide deck of charts that keep investment community awake at night... The full 'horror show' is on here: http://www.businessinsider.com/wall-streets-most-worrying-charts-2013-3#

I have contributed the following chart: http://www.businessinsider.com/wall-streets-most-worrying-charts-2013-3#constantin-gurdgiev-trinity-college-dublin-37