6/9/2012: ECB's OMT: Negatives slightly outweigh Positives

Here's the distilled version of what ECB did and did not do today. A usual caveat applies - the markets can agree or disagree with this economist's view and other economists will  disagree with this economist's view.



ECB President Mario Draghi attempted to do the tight rope walking and keep markets guessing as to what ECB will do in the end in sovereign debt markets while not deflating the expectations bubble he created with his earlier pronouncements.  That he seemingly delivered on. The core potentialities of his announcements (I stress - potentialities, as in none of these are set in stone and all are subject to huge set of uncertainties) were outlined by me here. These remain functional.

In terms of today's announcement, the overall sentiment is that of a small net negative, driven by the three major negatives: conditionality (linked to the OMT), the three remaining uncertainties (design, deployment and delivery - to be explained below), and sterilization; only partially off-set by positives: unlimited programme (in theory), pari passu purchasing (risk-sharing), maturity focus and collateral easing.

Now on to details:

Positives from the OMT announcement:

• Lack of pre-set limits on bonds purchases is a positive, although, of course, there is always a physical limit and there is also an economic bound to be imposed implicitly by sterilization operations (remember, under sterilization, in effect the ECB will be pumping liquidity into sovereign markets, while pumping same liquidity out of the already distressed private markets). The 'unlimited' purchasing will be severely tested by Italy and Spain (when/if these countries swallow the conditionality costs and join the programme, as Spanish and Italian bonds redemptions for suited horizon (2013-2015) will be in the region of €530 billion or more than 1/2 of the LTROs 1 & 2 combined.
• ECB accepted the premise of official lender participation in future restructurings, by committing to pari passu treatment of its OMT purchases. Sadly for Greece, this comes too late to save some €100 billion or so that could have been restructured under the SMP in the beginning of this year, but is now off-limits. In fact the SMP purchases remain senior. It is unclear if the ECB will mop up SMP holdings into OMT or how these will be unwound. If they are to be held to maturity, they will remain a risk drag for private holders and we have a two-tiered seniority market on our hands.
• Maturity focus remains on 1-3 year horizon, which comfortably works with the economic logic I outlined in the note linked above. However, one issue is that the ECB will hold OMT purchases to maturity, implying a potential redemption cliff for the sovereigns engaged in OMT that can be exacerbated, from the ECB point of view by coincident maturity of the LTROs. 
• Easing of the collateral, and in particular allowance for FX-denominated collateral is similar to what ECB undertook in 2008-2010 period transactions and should provide a wider range support.

Negatives from the OMT announcement:

• Very strong conditionality rhetoric from the ECB, with access to the OMT only via EFSF/ESM and with full macroeconomic conditionality in the form of compliance with the Enhanced Conditions Credit Line (ECCL). IMF oversight involvement is sought, making the OMT a sort of Troika-junior engagement for any country involved. This dramatically reduces the likelihood of any country going into OMT and in particular is a net negative for the countries that might benefit from the OMT when in the process of exiting the current Troika arrangements, such as Ireland and Portugal. In fact, the two countries can only qualify for OMT as they exit Troika deal and this will de facto mean that exiting the Troika deal will re-enter them into another Troika-light deal with OMT - a political no-go territory. It is also a major barrier for Spain and Italy.
• The OMT is a time-buying exercise, in so far as it can only allow the Governments some time (1-2 years) to put in place structural reforms. It does not resolve the crisis itself. The problem is that the Government now have to 
• design the right set of reforms (which is not as straight forward as one can imagine - of the 3 current Troika-programme run countries, only Ireland and Portugal have so far managed to design some sustainable reforms and not all so far, after a number of years of attempting such designs pre-Troika and during the Troika reign);
• deploy the designed reforms (which is a tough process that has to be sustained over time and across political elections. In the sub set of three states currently in Troika programmes, again, only two have managed to partially achieve this, and again, with varying degree of success); and
• the deployed reforms must deliver desired outcomes (subject to heavy set of risks and uncertainties: of the three participant states, none have so far managed to deliver desired outcomes on reforms packages, especially when it comes to achieving economic recovery).
• The OMT will rely on sterilization of monetary supply flows into sovereign bond markets, which means that in order to buy government bonds, the ECB will have to somehow remove liquidity out of the euro system. This can only be achieved by reducing liquidity supply to the real economy and/or financial sector. This, in turn, makes OMT hardly accommodative of private sector growth and can derail the 'delivery' bit in the OMT's DDD challenge outlined above.
• Other negatives worth keeping in mind are: 
• No numerical targets for yields and no way of assessing these ex ante as bonds purchases will be disclosed only on a weekly basis
• No change to collateral eligibility for non-government bonds (other than for government-guaranteed bonds), meaning OMT will have no easing effect on liquidity supply in financial sector.
• Excessive optimism on ECB behalf, with Draghi announcing that the OMT will be a "fully effective backstop that [will] remove tailrisks from the euro area". As I noted earlier, the biggest 'Black Swans' arise when policymakers start believing in non-existence of 'Black Swans'

Update: And here's a map of Draghi's comments on OMT announcement (via Prof Brian M Lucey):

Lets take a note: word 'growth; is the most prominent operative term used and yet, nothing within OMT is about growth. In fact, the policy rate remains unchanged, hence no pro-growth move in policy dimension. The logic of growth-OMT link is a tenuous one at best, and contradictory to the OMT operational objectives. Here's why. OMT - if successful - is supposed to ease the cost of Government's transition to fiscal austerity. It is to be sterilized. Hence, OMT is neither a fiscal nor a monetary tool for sustaining or generating any growth. Other key words to note relate to 'financial' and 'risks' - I commented above on the perverse effect on financial system the OMT is likely have. I have also commented above on the bizarre discounting of risks remaining within the system once OMT is up and running.

Note: I will be working on this post throughout the evening, so stay tuned for additional comments

5/9/2012: Services PMI for Ireland: August

I covered manufacturing PMI for Ireland for August in the previous post (here). This time, lets take a look at the Services Sector PMI released today by NCB.

In July, the Services Sector PMI registered the reading of 49.1 - the third consecutive month of below-50 readings, albeit at statistically insignificant difference from 50. In August, the headline Business Activity index reached 51.7, which is above 50, though once again not statistically significantly so. Still, good to see the number above 51, and at 51.7 we have a signal of modest growth.

Headline trends are:

• 3moMA is at 50.2, previous 3 months average is at 51.1, so we are still in a fragile bounce above 50. 
• 12mo MA is at 50.8, which compares relatively poorly to 12moMA through August 2011 (51.7) and 12mo MA through August 2010 (54.7).
• New Business Activity sub-index also reached above 50 in August, up to 52.6 compared to 49.5 in July.
• New Business 12mo MA is at 50.6 and this compares to same period MA in 2011 of 48.8 and same period MA for 2010 of 53.3. 3moMA is at 50.8 still below previous period 3mo average of 51.5.

You can see the moderating in volatility flat trend just above 50.0 for both series in the charts above that set in around April 2010. Good news, this is above 50.0. Bad news it is throwing fewer and fewer upside surprises. 

To the slight downside on the news front, New Export Business sub-index moderated growth signal from 55.7 in July to 54.1 in August, albeit this is still significantly above 50.0 line. I wouldn't call it a weak reading by any means, but a slippage in the rate of growth.

• 12mo MA through August 2012 is at 53.5 against same period 2011 at 51.0 and 2010 at 54.6.
• 3mo MA is now at 54.7 and this is an improvement on previous 3mo period of 54.1.
• Overall trend is relatively strong here and is sustained, which is good news.

In the chart above another notable trend is in Employment, which registered sub-50 reading once again in August - for the fourth month in a row - at 49.1. The decline in employment sub-index, however was moderated relative to July reading of 48.3.

• 12mo MA through August 2012 is at 48.2 which is virtually identical to same period average of 48.1 in 2011 and 2010.

Profitability also declined and is now at 42.9 - well into contraction territory. 

More on employment and profitability signals in subsequent posts.

Overall we have an improved performance in the Services sector in August, compared to May-July period, which is good news. Confidence is running high, rather too high (relative to actual activity levels), but that is relatively normal coming out of depressing three months around the end of Q2.

5/9/2012: The balance of imbalance: Irish Exchequer deficit in January-August 2012

In the previous two posts I examined the Exchequer receipts and net voted expenditure for January-August 2012. Now, on to the overall balance.

In July 2012, the Exchequer deficit stood at €9.13 billion against July 2012 headline deficit of €18.89 billion. In August, cumulated 2012 deficit rose to €11.35 billion (up €2.22 billion in one month) compared to €20.43 billion in 2011 (2011 monthly rise in August was €1.54 billion).
Fact 1: Irish Exchequer deficit rose at faster pace in August 2012 than in August 2011, so in monthly changes terms, August 2012 was not an improvement on August 2011.

However, the headline figures are incorporating several factors that gold-plate our deficit performance in 2012 compared to 2011, none of which the Government is willing to actually directly separate to identify the true performance. Let's try doing this job for them:

• As mentioned earlier, €233 million on 2011 revenue side came from the one-off sale of the Bank of Ireland shares, while €251 million of corporate tax receipts booked into 2012 is really the revenue from 2011. This means the deficit in 2011 should be adjusted by -€18 million and the balance in 2012 should be adjusted by +€251 million.
• In January-August 2011 the state spent €7.6 billion on recapitalizing banks, while this year the spending was only €1.3 billion plus there was a payment of €450mln in 2012 into the ICF (Insurance Compensation Fund). This means we should adjust the Exchequer balance on 2011 side by -€7.6 billion and 2012 by -€1.75 billion.
• Promo notes 'restructuring' this year meant the net cost of the Notes booked at €25mln, against €3.1 billion in 2011. This means adjusting 2011 deficit by -€3.1 billion and 2012 deficit by €25 million.
• In 2011 revenues from the banks measures - clearly a temporary source, as the EU Commission has warned Ireland already about the future tapering off of these receipts - amounted to €1.27 billion, while in 2012 they amount to €2.06 billion.

Accounting for the above one-off and temporary measures, the underlying deficit figures are:

• 2011 January-August period: €10.98 billion or €9.71 billion if we omit accounting for banks receipts;
• 2012 January-August period: €11.88 billion or €9.82 billion if we omit accounting for banks receipts.
• Hence, January-August 2012 period deficit, comparable to that for the same period in 2011 is worse, not better, by €109-896 million depending on whether we consider windfall differences in temporary revenues from banks.

Fact 2: On comparable basis, stripping out one-off measures and temporary allocations, Irish Exchequer deficit is worse in the first 8 months of 2012 than it was in 2011.

4/9/2012: Six Key Facts About Irish Government Spending: August 2012

In the previous post I looked at the receipts side of the Exchequer returns for January-August 2012. Now, let's take a quick tour through the expenditure side.

In January-August 2012, the Government total Net Voted Expenditure stood at €29,593 million or €244 million (0.8%) above the same period of 2011. In other words, the Government is spending more in 2012 than it spent in 2011 on the expenditure side that it actually controls. In July 2012, the overrun was €138 million or 0.5%.

Fact 1: things are getting worse month on month, not better, on the spending side

Fact 2: things are getting worse year on year, not better, on the spending side

Current Net Voted Expenditure rose €444 million (+1.8%) y/y in January-July 2012 compared to same period of 2011. In August, this figure went up to €659 million (+2.4%).

Fact 3: the core driver for rising Government spending is Current Expenditure, and the increases in spending in this area are getting worse, not better, with time. 

On the total expenditure side, the Government is now exceeding its target for 2012 (these are revised targets published in May, so the overruns are compared for just 4 months running) by 1.1%, and on current expenditure side these overruns are at 1.6%. In July 2012 the same figures were +0.8% and +1.3% respectively.

Fact 4: even by revised targets the Government is already behind its set objectives, just 4 months into running and the set-back is accelerating month to month.

In July 2012, five departments exceeded their targets on current expenditure side, including (as expected) Health (+1.0%) and Social Protection (+4.4%). In August 2012, six departments were in breach of their targets on current spending, with Health performance deteriorating (+1.5%) while Social Protection performance showing shallower miss on target (+4.2%).

Fact 5: More departments are slipping into underperformance relative to target in August than in July.

In August, five departments posted increases y/y in Current Net Voted Expenditure, in July there were seven departments in the same position.

Fact 6: year on year cuts in spending in smaller departments are not sufficient to offset increases in spending in larger departments. 

Capital expenditure has fallen €415 million (down 20.9%) y/y and is now €120 million (7.1%) below the target. In an ironic twist, these 'savings' will be totally undone through the Government capital expenditure boost once privatization process gets underway. 

However, annual estimates assume 13.4% or €562 million reduction in capital spending. With 74% of thse already delivered on, it is hard to see how the Government can extract more savings from this side of the balancesheet to plug the widening gap on the current expenditure side.

To summarise, therefore, the Irish Government continues to increase, not decrease the overall Exchequer expenditure year on year and is now behind its own targets. 

Neither the receipts side of the fiscal equation, nor the expenditure side are holding.

4/9/2012: The Fog of Exchequer Receipts: August 2012

The Exchequer receipts and expenditure figures are out for August and the circus of media rehashing that way and this way the Department of Finance press releases is on full blast.

From the way you'd read it in the media outlets, tax receipts are up, targets are met, deficit is down, spending is down. The problem is that the bunch of one-off measures conceals the truth to such an extent that no real comparison is any longer feasible for year on year figures. The circus has painted the Government finances figures so thickly in a rainbow of banks recaps, shares sales receipts, tax reclassifications, tax receipts delays and re-bookings etc that the Government can say pretty much whatever it wants about its fiscal performance until, that is, the final annual figures are in. Even then, the charade with promo note in March will still have material influence on the figures, as will tax reclassifications and delayed tax receipts booking.

With this in mind, let's try and make some sense out of the latest Exchequer receipts results, first (expenditure and balance in later posts).

Take total tax receipts for January-August 2012. The official outrun is €22.076bn which is 1.7% ahead of target set in the Budget 2012. Alas, monthly receipts of €1.763bn is 7.1% short of target. In July 2012, monthly tax receipts were 0.2% below target. So:
Point 1: As a warning flag: revenues are now running increasingly below target levels.

Year on year tax receipts were down 1.7% in July on a monthly basis and were up 9% on aggregate January-July basis. Year-on-year receipts were down 5.7% in August on a monthly basis, and were up 7.7% on January-August aggregate basis.
Point 2: As another warning flag: tax receipts are now running for two months under last year's and this is even before we adjust for 2011-2012 reclassifications and delayed bookings of some receipts.

Now, the Department of Finance states in the footnote to its tax receipts analysis that: "Adjusting for delayed corporation tax receipts from December 2011 and the techncial [sic] reclassification of an element of PRSI income to income tax this year, aggregate tax revenues are an estimated 5.2% year-on-year at end-August, coproration [sic] tax is up 6.7% and income tax is up just under 10%". What does it mean? this means that by Department estimates, the two factors account for roughly €511 million in combined bookings into 2012 that are not comparable to 2011 figures.

Subtracting €511 million our of the total cumulated receipts implies tax receipts for January-August 2012 of €21.565bn which would be 0.7% below the Budget 2012 target. Thus,
Point 3: Tax receipts, on comparable basis, are running at below target, not ahead of it, albeit the difference is still materially small.

Here's what else is interesting, however, at the end of June the Department provided an estimate for the above adjustments of ca €472 million, at the of July it was €467 million and now at €511 million. Even allowing for rounding differences on percentages reported this looks rather strange to me.

On non-tax revenues:

• In 2011 the Government collected €233 million from selling its shares in Bank of Ireland. This year - nil booked on that. Which largely accounts for the capital revenues being down from €1,036 million in 2011 to €813 million in 2012.
• Again on the capital receipts side, total EU contributions to Ireland in January-August 2012 stood at €68.401 million against €43.671 million a year ago.
• Total non-tax revenue on the current line of the balancesheet is €2.403 billion in January-August 2012 and this is up 49.4% on the same period in 2011.
• Of the increase registered in 2012 compared to 2011, €487 million came from increases in clawbacks from the banks and Central Bank of Ireland remitted profits. In other words, that was roughly half a billion euros that could have gone to writing down mortgages, but instead went to the Government. €302 million more came from the Interest on Contingent Capital Notes, which is the fancy phrase to say it too came from the banks. Thus, all in, current non-tax revenues increases of €794.1 million were almost fully accounted for by the increases of €789 million in the state clawbacks out of the insolvent and semi-solvent banks that the state largely owns.

Point 4: Unless you believe that the banks conjure money out of thin air, any celebration of non-tax receipts improvements in January-August 2012 compared to 2011 is a celebration of Pyrrhic victory of the Exchequer witch craft inside our (as banks customers and mortgage holders) pockets.

Now, let's add all receipts together:

• Total Exchequer receipts in January-August 2012 stood at €25.937bn against €23.146bn in 2011. 
• The 'rise' in total Exchequer receipts of €2,791 million in 8 months of 2012 compared to the same period in 2011 includes €511 million in tax adjustments (re-labeling) and carry over from 2011, plus €789 million in new revenues clawed out of the banks. In addition, €645.7 million is booked on receipts side via the Sinking Fund transfer (which is netted out by increased expenditure).
• So far, over the 8 months of 2012, the actual net increase in total (tax, non-tax current and non-tax capital) receipts is ca €845 million, or 3.7%.

Point 5: Disregarding expenditure effects (to be discussed later), Irish Exchequer has managed to hike its policy-controlled receipts by 3.7% y/y over the January-August period. Better than nothing, but a massive cry from the headline figure of 7.7% increase in total tax receipts and 12% rise in total receipts.

4/9/2012: H1 2012 Trade in Goods & busted expectations

At first I resisted (rather successfully) for a number of days from blogging about the trade in goods stats for June released on August 16th. Aside from the already rather apparent pharma patent cliff and resulting collapse of exports to the US, there is little to be blogged about here. Well, may be on some BRICs data, but that will come later, when I am to update bilateral trade with Russia stats.

Then, playing with the numbers I ended up with the following two charts showing trade stats for H1 2012:

As dynamics show in the chart above, Ireland's goods exports are... err... static in H1 2012 compared to H1 2011 - down 1.69% y/y compared to H1 2011 and this comes against a rise in exports of 5.91% y/y in H1 2011 (compared to H1 2010). The exports-led recovery has meant that in H1 2008 exports are up just 3.62% on H1 2008 and are down 0.58% on H1 2007. Recovery? What recovery?

Of course, over the same period of time, imports fell 3.14% on H1 2011 (after rising 9.25% y/y in H1 2011 compared to H1 2010), and in H1 2012 imports stood at 20.09% below their H1 2008 and down 23.20% on their H1 2007 levels.

Which means that our exports-led recovery is currently running as follows: imports are down substantially more than exports (which is accounted for primarily by the collapse in domestic demand and investment activities), while exports are running only slightly behind their pre-crisis levels.

Thus, trade balance was up 0.05% y/y in H1 2012, while it is up 58.49% on H1 2008 and 51.48% on H1 2007. The body that is the Irish economy is producing  pint of surplus blood by draining 5 pints and re-injecting 4 pints back. Hardly a prescription for curing the sick according to modern medicine approach.

But that alone is not what keeping me focused on the numbers. Instead, it is the hilarity of our captains' expectations when it comes to the proposition that 'exports will rescue us'. Many years ago, in the days when the crisis was just only starting to roar its head, I said clearly and loudly: exports are hugely important, but they alone will not be sufficient to lift us out of this mess. Back then, I had Brugel Institute folks arguing with me that current account surpluses will ensure that ireland's debt levels are sustainable. Not sure if they changed their tune, but here's what the Government analysis was based on, put against the reality.

In the chart below, I took 3 sets of Government own forecasts for growth in exports for 2009-2012, extracted from Budget 2010, 2011 and 2012. I then combined these assumptions into 3 scenarios: Max refers to maximum forecast for specific year projected by the Department of Finance, Min references the lowest forecast number, and the Average references the unweighted average of all forecasts available for each specific year. I applied these to exports statistics as reported for 2009 and plotteed alongside actual outrun:

Current H1 2012 outrun for exports is €449 million lower than the worst case scenarios built into the Budgets 2010-2012 by the Governments. It is also €4,399 million behind the highest forecasts.

Put differently, the outcome for H1 2012 is worse than the darkest prediction delivered by the Department for Finance.

Of course, the exercise only refers to goods exports and must be caveated by the fact that our services exports might take up the slack. So no panic, yet. And a further caveat should be added to reflect the fact that the above is not our exporters fault, as we are clearly suffering from the tightness in global trade. On the minus side, there's a caveat that the pharma patent cliff has been visible for years and that the Government has claimed that they are capable of addressing this.

Sleepless nights should not be caused by the latest stats, yet. But if things remain of this path, they will come.

4/9/2012: Imagining the banks costs

Excellent info-graphic on the cost of Ireland's banks rescue to the economy via Stephen Donnelly (TD, Independent):

And the link to the original.

3/9/2012: Ireland's Manufacturing PMI for August

Today's release of the NCB Manufacturing PMI data for Ireland for August 2012 came in with both a positive and a negative surprises. The positive side of the news is that the headline index did not dip below 50 (contraction territory) but stayed at 50.9 in August, down on 53.9 in July, but above 49.7 in August 2011. In other words, the rate of Manufacturing sector growth has slowed down markedly, but remained positive in August.

The slowdown is significant, however, with current reading (50.9) not statistically distinguishable from zero growth level of 50.0, against statistically significant expansion recored in July.

Here is core stats summary:

• Headline seasonally adjusted PMI is now running at below 3mo MA (52.6), and 6mo MA (51.8). However, thanks to July reading, Q3-to-date average is at 52.4 (statistically above 50.0) and well ahead of 51.5 in Q2 and 49.8 in Q1. 
• August marked the 6th consecutive month of above 50 readings.
• New Orders sub-index also fell in August from 55.8 in July to 51.8 in August. Again, August reading was not statistically significantly different from 50.0. 3mo MA is now at 53.7 and 6mo MA is at 52.7. Q3 to-date average is 53.8 and this is well ahead of Q2 2012 average of 52.0 and Q1 2012 average of 49.9.
• New Export Orders sub-index also posted moderation in growth from July 56.7 to August 53.4, although 53.4 remains a solid signal of expansion. August now marks 6th consecutive month of the sub-index above 50 readings. 3mo MA is at 54.2 and close to 6mo MA of 54.0. Q3 2012 average to-date is at brisque 55.1 against Q2 2012 average of 52.8 and Q1 average of 51.9. 
• One has to keep in mind that the above performance puts Irish manufacturing sector activity well ahead of the euro zone peers and our exporting performance well above the entire EU member states' performance.

Chart to illustrate:

Output sub-index confirmed the above trends, slipping from 54 in July to 51 in August. Again, expansion is not significantly different from zero, but still good to see the index staying above 50 in level terms. 3mo MA is at 53.2 and 6mo MA at 52.0. Quarter to quarter changes are: Q1 2012 average of 50.2, Q2 2012 average of 51.4 and Q3 2012 average of 52.4.

Chart below snapshots core series trends over shorter horizon:

Chart below shows time series for other sub-indices.

Quick synopsis of changes in prices and employment. As usual, I will be doing more detailed analysis of profitability and employment after we have Services PMI data as well, so stay tuned:

• Output prices have continued decline, albeit at slower pace than in July, while input prices returned to rapid inflation (56.8 in August from 47.8 in July).
• 3mo MA for input prices is now at 51.4 against 48.6 3moMA for output prices. 
• This points to shrinking profit margins. However, the pace of margins contraction is now slower than in Q1 and Q2.

• Manufacturing sector employment posted another (6th consecutive monthly) expansion in August, though the rate of growth in employment has moderated from 53.1 in July to 51.1 in June. Q3 average-to-date is at 52.1 which is down on 54.4 for Q2. 

So overall, the data coming out in August is a mixed bag. Comparative to the euro area peers, manufacturing in Ireland is doing as well as can be hoped for. Alas, the rates of economic growth we require to sustain our debt deleveraging are hardly benchmarkable against our peers. And on that side, things are not encouraging. 

Let's wait for Services data next...

3/9/2012: Euro Area PMIs for August

I will be blogging on Irish Manufacturing PMI for August 2012 later today (the headline numbers are encouragingly positive, albeit growth rate has slowed down markedly on July), but here's the summary of Euro area PMIs and growth dynamics from Pictet:

The two charts are confirming the dynamics presented here on the foot of eurocoin leading indicator for growth.

2/9/2012: Gun, no bullets, a charging bear

Via an excellent recent post on the SoberLook, here's a chart showing a Central Bank with no ammunition left to fire at the charging bear:

The chart plots the rapid rise of monetary base in Japan courtesy of BOJ.

And as to the portrait of the bear (via same post):

The above plots Japan's GDP y/y changes. Here's the point - in 20 years between 1995 and 2014 there will be not a single 5 year period in which Japan did not have a recession. Not a single one.

Now, recall that 'we will do everything necessary to rescue euro and, believe me, it will be enough' statement from Mr Draghi... BOJ needless to say tried the same... it has been working marvels for Japan's economy, albeit the yen is still there.

31/8/2012: Eurocoin for August 2012

Euro area leading growth indicator from Banca d'Italia and CEPR has posted eleventh consecutive monthly contraction in August, reaching -0.33 from -0.24 in July. This marks the worst reading for eurocoin since July 2009. 2008-2009 average was -0.31, so the current reading is worse than average for the first wave of the crisis.

A year ago, the indicator stood at +0.22, implying a growth swing of 2.1-2.3% annual.

3moMA indicator is now at -0.25, annual expected rate of decline is at -1.3%.

Charts to illustrate:

31/8/2012: Net, gross, gloss - FDI in Ireland 2011

So CSO headlines today that Irish Net Direct Investment Position improved to €48 billion at the end of 2011. which is fine, until you read actual numbers. Here is the synopsis from CSO itself (emphasis is mine):

"Irish stocks of direct investment abroad fell by €12bn from an end-2010 position of €254.5bn to €242.5bn at the end of 2011. ...The decline between the end of 2010 and end of 2011 was mainly due to a fall in investment of €26bn in enterprises located in Central American Offshore countries. European based enterprises partially offset this decline."

Hence, Factor 1 - explaining most of the €7.2 billion in net position change is drop in investment schemes used by Irish resident companies to wash-off tax liabilities.

Next: "The level of total foreign direct investment into Ireland also fell between the end of 2010 and the end of 2011. The decrease was €19.2bn [massively in excess of net contraction in outward investment from Ireland] giving an end-2011 position of €194.5bn. The main contributors were decreases of €18bn from US and €10bn from Central America partially offset by increased investment of almost €20bn from European countries."

Hence, Factor 2 - FDI into Ireland has actually dropped, gross, by 9% year on year (please keep in mind, irish Government has cited increased FDI into Ireland as one core 'success' metric).


"Comparing the net end-year positions Ireland’s net FDI increased from €40.8bn at the end of 2010 to €48bn at end-2011."

I know I am supposed to be cheerful about the headline CSO produced, but...