22/1/2012: An update to Euribor risk premium post

On the foot of the previous post, I recomputed risk premia for 3 maturities: 12, 9 and 6 months euribor. Here's the chart:

And some top of the line numbers:

To compare against rates dynamics:

22/1/2012: What do interbank lending rates tell us about risk valuations?

Here is an interesting set of charts for euribor:

Notice that as maturity span shortens, there is an increasingly rapid decline in the rates in recent month. This, of course, is a reflection of two forces acting simultaneously - the ECB LTRO and the rate drop in December. You can see this here in the context of 12 months euribor plot for end-of-month (and end of last week for January 2012):

Sounds good? Indeed, the short-term end of liquidity curve improved dramatically, but... here's a trick - the long-term end of the curve is not improving as much as (1) the repo rate supports, and (2) LTRO (3 year facility) should lead it to. To see this - here's a chart:

And the above term premium is rising despite the risk premium falling:

Note: the last chart above is not seasonally adjusted and, with exception for 2010, euribor rates tend to fall seasonally in January compared to December.

In fact, current risk premia are well above the long-term relations and at more extreme end of the spectrum than during the previous months:

The above suggests to me that what we are observing in the liquidity markets is a combination of some improvement due to ECB's LTRO move (substitution along maturity curve) and the (very) incomplete pass through of ECB rate change to funding markets. There appears to be no evidence in risk reduction anywhere in sight.

22/1/2012: 'Markets are crazy', says market economy Ireland

So we used to have an 'Innovation Island' here that was run by the Deputy PM who confused Einstein with Darwin. She was directly in charge of Innovation policies.

Now we have a 'Competitive Market Economy' that 'Is Open for Business', as we constantly remind our potential foreign investors (domestic investors we have simply taxed into oblivion already and are even expropriating their wealth through Minister Noonan's 'levy' on pensions), run by the Minister responsible for the following statements (source here HT to @brianmlucey for flashing this one out):

"Michael Noonan, Ireland's finance minister, criticised the involvement of private creditors in the [Greek PSI] talks, arguing that it had made the crisis worse. Mr Noonan told the German newspaper Sueddeutsche Zeitung it had been a "fatal" mistake to involve the private creditors and this had "driven the markets crazy". He said that markets would only calm when they were convinced that eurozone countries were making serious efforts to solve their debt problems."

So, 'markets are crazy' and proper risk sharing with private investors in the case of insolvency is a 'fatal mistake'.

Does Minister Noonan believe in slavery? Because if he doesn't then there is no alternative in the case of Greek crisis resolution options to PSI. Of course, Minister Noonan believes in slavery - the modern variety of it - slavery that subjugates those who do not emigrate from Ireland to decades of involuntary repayment of privately accumulated debts they did not contract to accumulate. Minister Noonan has no problem with the Government of Ireland simply undertaking all private debts of a private insolvent banks and forcing ordinary people - not shareholders or lenders to these banks who were paid to take the risks in the first place - to repay them. Just like that. Without any consent: "Give us your money, granny, or else!"

But there's more to the statement above, which shows Minister Noonan in an equally unpleasant light. You see, Minister Noonan swears by the wisdom of the IMF and the ECB and the European 'partners' when it comes to his domestic policies. He did so officially earlier this week when he used Troika endorsement of Ireland's 'progress' in the programme as the reflection of their support for his policies. Yet, it is the very same Troika he so blindly follows into Ireland's economic oblivion which deemed Greek debt levels unsustainable - aka non repayable even were the modern day debt slavery terms (as imposed in Ireland) deployed in Greece as well.

So, for all our Irish concerns about the sanity of the Troika 'solutions' for Ireland, there's an even greater concern that should be preoccupying our minds - concerns for the positions taken by our own national leaders. And for all those would-be foreign investors into Ireland - please remember, you are about to invest in the economy run by those who think that 'markets are crazy' and contracts for risk pricing are 'fatal mistakes'.


PS: Never mind, Minister Noonan's only plan for Ireland is to attempt, asap, borrowing in the 'crazy' markets to finance his 'sane' fiscal management strategies.

20/1/2012: Non-News from a Road to the Second Bailout

This story in the Irish Times yesterday clearly requires a comment. So here it goes.

Here's the best time-line and explanation as to Minister Noonan's 'efforts' to secure 'savings' on the Promissory Notes.

Now, consider the following from the Irish Times today:

"We think there’s a less expensive way of doing [restructuring of the Promissory Notes] by financial engineering, and we’re not talking about private-sector involvement or restructuring,” said Mr Noonan in Berlin "...it is about pointing out to the troika that there are difficulties and that it could be less expensive – and everyone still gets their money.”


"A senior German official said Berlin could envisage extra programme funding being used for the Irish banking sector not currently earmarked for this purpose."

The above might mean many things:

1. Ireland still has some funds due under the original 'bailout' that were earmarked for banking measures, but were not yet used in the last recapitalizations round in July 2011. This will not in itself constitute any new measures materially impacting Ireland's Government debt projections. It will not constitute a second bailout (as the funds are already earmarked under the first bailout), but by reducing funding available for fiscal and other banking requirements it will increase the probability of such a bailout in the future.
2. Ireland can be allowed to borrow more from the EFSF/ESM, swapping the Notes for marginally cheaper funding. This too will not constitute any material impact on Ireland's Government debt projections. But it will constitue a second bailout.

Neither option involves any possibility for 'private sector involvement' and at any rate, Minister Noonan's reference to PSI is a red herring - there can be no PSI in relation to the Promissory Notes as these do not involve private investors or lenders at all.

However, both (1) and (2) have material impact in terms of Ireland requiring a second bailout - both increase materially the probability of such an eventuality.

Lastly, there is a catch. The problem of capital adequacy, highlighted by Minister Noonan, means that 'financial engineering' can only involve temporary relief in terms of payments timing, not material relief in terms of NPV of the debt assumed by the state under the Promissory Notes. We will be allowed to borrow more time. At a cost of longer loans, and more repayments in the end. Which, of course, does nothing to achieve sustainability of the 'solution' from the point of view of us, taxpayers, who Minister Noonan expects to pay for all of this. But it probably does give him a chance of holding a 'triumphant' pressie announcing some sort of a 'deal'.

So in the nutshell, the Irish Times story is... errr... a non-story. A sort of traditional Spin that comes out of the Government every time they are caught... errr... fantacising the reality. As NamaWineLake put is so excellently:
"...it has been four months since Minister Noonan’s meeting with the ECB and others in Wroclaw where he, to use his own words “had a ball to kick around” and has proposals. It is two months since Enda Kenny discussed the matter with Angela Merkel. It is more than two months since Minister Noonan said that “technical discussions” were ongoing. And yet the Troika yesterday downplayed any progress in the matter saying that Minister Noonan had merely “requested discussions”."


Or maybe, just speculating here, Minister Noonan is bringing up the Promissory Notes once again this week because next week we are about to repay another tranche of Anglo bonds? Last month, around the time of the repayment, there was much-a-do-about-nothing going on in referencing the very same Promissory Notes?

However, there is, in the end, something openly honest about Minister Noonan's windy trip down the 'Imagine the Superhero, ya Villain' lane.

"[Minister Noonan] said he hoped that the ECB would extend its programme of low-interest loans beyond next month to improve euro zone bank liquidity in the hope it would stimulate the market in longer-term sovereign debt papers."

Point 1: LTRO-2 was already announced, so Minister Noonan is either uninformed, or pretends to be uninformed to posit himself as a a heroic 'rescuer' proposing a real 'solution'.

Point 2: Minister Noonan clearly shows that his sole concern is how to raise more debt for Ireland. Not how to balance the books (in which case he shouldn't need banks to pawn their assets as ECB to buy Government bonds with this fake cash), or reform the economy (in which case growth would resume and the State shall not require the said scheme, again) and not with restoring functional banking system to health (since functional healthy banking system lends to the real economy, not to Minister Noonan).

At last, truth revealed?

20/1/2012: Deputy Peter Mathews v Minister Noonan

Here are some extracts from an excellent contribution by Peter Mathews TD (FG) from yesterday's topical debates in the Dail (full record available here). This was comprehensively overlooked in the media reporting which focused solely on the non-event (save for Vincent Browne's questions) of the Torika 'approving' Ireland's 'progress'. My comments in italics.


Deputy Peter Mathews: 
      Next Wednesday, 25 January, is the due date for the redemption of a bond issued originally by Anglo Irish Bank Corporation, now the Irish Bank Resolution Corporation. 
      We are at an important financial crossroads in the history of our country. Anglo Irish Bank has been insolvent and supported by financial engineering, promissory notes and the emergency liquidity assistance of the European Central Bank and funds from our Central Bank.  The debt that lies embedded in what was Anglo Irish Bank was not created by the citizens of this country.  It has been meted out onto their backs by a mixture of incompetence and mismeasurement over a certain period under the past Administration.
      We are at a moral crossroads.  We should bring to the attention of the creditors holding the bond the facts that the bank is insolvent and that, in effect, it is not a case of our not wanting to pay but of our not being able to do so...

      Consider the debt of €1.25 billion.  The attention of the creditors will be in sharp focus because the banking system, the Irish-owned banks, are in debt to the ECB and our Central Bank at a level of approximately €150 billion.  It is the forbearance and tolerance of citizens that keeps the financial edifice and engineering of the eurozone and the greater financial system of the developed world in place.  We have been doing considerable work, facing enormous challenges.  Through the great work of the Minister for Finance, Deputy Noonan, and the Taoiseach, we are bearing the load of trying to bring about a fiscal adjustment in line with the troika agreement signed in November 2010.  All that work is important and must be done but the legacy debt is outside the responsibility of the people of this State.

      One and a quarter billion euro is almost half the budget [measures] introduced in December.  It is eight times the sum that will be raised from the household charge and twice that which will be raised by the VAT increase.  The debt crisis in Ireland and other countries cannot be solved by adding more debt...  Loading more debt on this country to pay legacy debt is like suggesting a drink problem can be solved by another whisky.

Minister for Finance (Deputy Michael Noonan): 

      I thank Deputy Mathews for raising this very important issue.  The repayment of the bond in question is an obligation of the bank and will be repaid by the bank.  It is important to be clear that it is the bank and not the Exchequer which will meet this obligation. [Need anyone point the following to the Minister, that the 'bank' has no own assets or capital over and above that which has been committed to it by the State and that the Promissory Notes are being financed by the Exchequer?]

      The Government has committed to ensuring that there is no forced or coerced involvement by the private sector burden sharing on Irish senior bank paper or Irish sovereign debt without the agreement of the ECB.  This commitment has been agreed with our external partners and is the basis on which Ireland's future financing strategy is built.  While the cost to the Irish taxpayer has been and will remain significant, the Government clearly recognises the need to work as part of the eurozone in order to ensure a return to the funding markets in the future.  The only EU state where private sector involvement will apply is Greece.

      The following was agreed by all 27 member states at the euro summit last October:

      15. As far as our general approach to private sector involvement in the euro area is concerned, we reiterate our decision taken on 21 July 2011 that Greece requires an exceptional and unique solution.

      16. All other euro area Member States solemnly reaffirm their inflexible determination to honor fully their own individual sovereign signature and all their commitments to sustainable fiscal conditions and structural reforms.  The euro area Heads of State or Government fully support this determination as the credibility of all their sovereign signatures is a decisive element for ensuring financial stability in the euro area as a whole.

      This was agreed by the Heads of State and Government at their meeting in October, and Ireland was included in the 27 states that agreed to it. [Minister Noonan fails to note here that it was on insistence of his own Taoiseach that article 15 does not include Irish banking sector resolution-related debts. And he deflects the arguments made by Deputy Mathews on feasibility of repaying these debts.]

      It is not correct to state that only taxpayers have borne the burden of rescuing the Irish banks.  Holders of equity in the banks have been effectively wiped out in burden sharing while holders of subordinated debt have incurred a €15.5 billion share of the burden to date, including €5.6 billion since this Government took office less than a year ago. [Again, Minister Noonan is dis-ingenious in his comments. Equity holders and bond holders are contractually in line for these losses. Taxpayers are not. In effect, Minister suggests that there is some sort of equivalence between treating harshly contracted parties to an undertaking and treating harshly an innocent by-stander. There is no such equivalence.]

      To impose burden sharing on senior bondholders, or to postpone the repayment of this bond at this point in time, is not in Ireland's best interest.  What is in the Irish people's best interest is that we regain our financial independence and that we place ourselves in a position to re-enter the financial markets at the earliest possible date...  We do not need to scupper our recovery, scupper the goodwill generated or alienate our partners by taking unilateral action which in the medium to long term will prove wholly counterproductive. [This is an outright conjecture by the Minister that is unfounded in fact. It is not in the interest of the Irish people to simply regain access to financial markets. It is only of such interest if we can regain it at a lower cost than alternative funding provided. Furthermore, his statement assumes that not repaying Anglo bondholders will cause the detrimental impact on 'goodwill' and the 'financial markets'. This remains to be tested and proven.]

      If we were to postpone or suspend payments to creditors of IBRC, this would have a significant impact on both the bank and, ultimately, the State. The senior debt, unsecured as it is, is an obligation of the bank. If the bank does not meet such an obligation, it would lead to a default and, following that, most likely insolvency. Insolvency would result in a very significant increase in the cost to the State to resolve the IBRC. [What cost? The Minister scaremongers the public, but cannot name a single tangible expected cost. Why is the interest of the bank aligned with the interest of the State, Minister?] ... Further, the financial market's view of Ireland as a place to do business or invest would be seriously undermined. [Is Minister Noonan seriously suggesting that Ireland's reputation as a place to do business or invest dependent so critically on a bust bank with worst history of speculative decision-making ability to repay its insolvent borrowings? Would IDA confirm they are directly referencing Irish taxpayers willingness to cover private sector losses in any undertaking, no matter how risky, as some sort of the 'investment promotion' positive for Ireland? Can Minister Noonan confirm that he has done the analysis of the effects that bonds repayments by Anglo, and the resultant increases in the sovereign debt have on sustainability of our Government's reputation in the bond markets? Does he not know/ understand that any investor looking at his statements will immediately price into their valuation of Government bonds the possibility that the Irish Government can at will, out of the blue simply hike its own debt pile in the future to suit some other risky private sector fiasco? What does that risk alone do to our 'reputation'?]

Deputy Peter Mathews: 

      While I will not get into a long debate, Greece will be the beneficiary of at least a 60% write-down of its debt obligations. The Greeks got the attention of their creditors by going out in the streets and having riots and by people being killed. We have knuckled down to correcting a fiscal imbalance and, at the same time, we have stayed silent. We have been straitjacketed by the legacy debt. Our loan losses in the banking system were €100 billion. While I know the shareholders and some of the subordinated bondholders suffered, the remaining losses were in the banks without being declared. The ECB stepped in to redeem bondholders to date, which was a mistake. We are compounding the mistake by going along the same route now.

      We have got to be honest about it and open up the discussion. We are not defaulting; we are opening a discussion. I made the point that we cannot pay. I use the word "we" euphemistically or collectively in regard to the bank and the State. We cannot pay because of the guarantee that extends over the bank. It is a case of us lifting the telephone and asking, "Can we have your attention, please?"  We cannot pay and we want to open a discussion and explain to exactly how the creditor liabilities of our banking system remain, and how they should be written down. There is further writing down to do. We have a €60 billion to €75 billion of write-down to organise and negotiate.

      To use an analogy, we have a steeplechase race with about four miles to go.  We have big jumps ahead.  Normally, a steeplechase horse will start with about 12 stone on its back.  Ireland's legacy debt of private debt, non-financial corporate debt and national debt when it peaks out at €120 billion is the equivalent of 24 stone on the back.  It is not a possible race to run.

Deputy Michael Noonan: 

      I do not disagree with Deputy Mathews' analysis.  However, we are in a situation which we inherited from our predecessors, who entered into solemn and legally enforceable commitments in respect of Anglo Irish Bank, as it was then.  Of course, Deputy Mathews is correct that we should do everything possible to reduce the debt burden on the taxpayers of Ireland and to enhance Ireland's capacity to repay its debts.  We are working on that and making some progress. [So that's it, folks. The Last Refuge of the Scoundrel = the arguments the Minister puts forward for expropriating personal property and income through higher taxation and reduced services for which we paid and continue to pay is: We are where we are. This alone should be very re-assuring to the future investors here.]

20/1/2012: A view from ECB's airconditioned halls

I am sure you are all aware of this, but here is a chart on the euro area monetary aggregates:

Do you spot much of drama here? No? How about a snapshot?

No prizes for guessing an answer: there is no drama in monetary policy path chosen by the ECB through the entire period of August 2007-present. None. Which, of course, is surprising, as outside the euro monetary policymakers halls, there was and still is plenty of drama - from banks liquidity crunches, to sovereign debt crises, to sovereign deficits crises, to recessions and double-dips, to unemployment rising, to banks assets valuations crisis, to inflation falling out of sync with FX valuations, to sovereign credit crunches, to socialization of banks losses... and so on. All of the above should have an effect on a monetary policy. Some in less interventionist fashion (but with at least an ex post correlation to the aggregates), and some with more interventionist fashion (with monetary policy being a major tool for dealing with them).

Alas, all is calm, trend(y)-like in the well airconditioned offices of ECB.

20/1/2012: A Question for Keynesianistas

Keynes remarked that:


"The theory of economics does not furnish a body of settled conclusions immediately applicable to policy. It is a method rather than a doctrine, an apparatus of the mind, a technique for thinking, which helps the possessor to draw correct conclusions."


Sounds plausible. 


A question to Keinesianistas, then: Why on earth would you argue that for every recession in every country, there is only one solution that is fully anchored in one Aggregate Demand identity? And that - irrespective of the nature of the path an economy takes into a recession or its underlying causes, irrespective of the economic conditions at the onset of the recession?

19/1/2012: December Inflation - State's Fingerprints all Over the Crime Scene

There will be a much more detailed analysis of the state-sanctioned rip-off that is revealed in the latest data from CSO on Irish consumer prices in my sunday Times article this weekend, so stay tuned for that, but here are some numbers from today's release.

First off - changes yoy for 2010 and 2011:

And next, cumulated changes in prices for 2007-2011 period:

Lighter blue are categories that have either full or significant share of prices set or influenced directly by Government policies.

One thing to note: mortgage interest costs which, per CSO data have fallen 10.7% in 2007-2011. Of course, this conceals the fact that since the Irish State took over most of the Irish banking sector, in 2010-2011, mortgage interest costs are up cumulated 28.11%. Over the same period of time, ECB rates have moved from 1.0% in January 2010-March 2011, to 1.25% in April-June 2011, to 1.50% in July-October 2011, to 1.25% in November and 1.0% back in December 2011. In other words, the average rate has gone DOWN from 1.23% in 12 months pre-January 2010 to 1.13% in  24 months since then. And yet, mortgage interest keeps on climbing... up whooping 20.4% in 2011 alone.

Yet another useful comparative that is concealed by the above data is that while mortgage interest costs might be down 11.7% on December 2007, they are up 7.7% on December 2006. Now, in December 2006, ECB rate was 3.5% or 2.5 percentage points above where it was in December 2011.

So let's take a look at slightly longer horizons. Chart below show cumulated price changes between December 2001 and present and December 2006 and present also courtesy of the good folks of CSO.

Again, the same story - the higher the price increases, the more likely we are dealing with directly regulated or state owned enterprises-dominated or state-controlled sector. 

More detailed analysis in my forthcoming Sunday Times piece this week.

19/01/2012: One Question, please...

In the spirit of asking our Troika overlords questions around the time of their serial reviews of Ireland's Programme, here's mine:
"Given that since the previous review, Irish economy has posted

1. A full quarter of GDP & GNP contraction
2. Missed targets on fiscal side covered up by vague reforms papers publications and capital spending cuts, plus 'temporary' tax measures
3. Rampant tax increases & state costs rises, covered up by deflation in the private sector economy
4. Stuck sky-high unemployment, with massive contractions in labour force and emigration
5. Another botched 'austerity' budget with hope-for revenue measures substituted for reforms of spending
6. Repayment of billions in bust banks bonds
7. Continued lack of recovery in its banking sector

What part of (1)-(7) above constitutes 'successful completion' of the review?"

19/01/2012: Quarterly data on complete trade balance: Q3 2011

While we are on trade data (see previous post on November 2011 merchandise trade stats here), let's also update full trade stats for QNA results for Q3 2011. This covers all trade - merchandise and services, so it paints a full picture of our trade balance.

Chart below shows quarterly trade stats for Ireland. Per latest QNA:

• Exports of goods and services fell from €41.945bn in Q2 2011 to €41.186bn in Q3 2011, a decline of 1.81%. This comes after a qoq rise of 4.34% in Q1-Q2 2011 period. Year on year, Q2 2011 saw exports rise 3.78% and Q3 saw an increase of 1.91%.
• Despite the slowdown, Q3 results was still the second best quarterly exports performance on record.
• Imports of goods and services shrunk in Q3 2011 to €31.6bn, down 5.45% qoq, which comes on foot of a 3.06% rise qoq in Q2 2011. Year on year, imports were up 3.3% in Q2 2011 and are down just 0.29% in Q3 2011.
• This means the trade balance has reached another historical high at €9.586bn in Q3 2011. The trade surplus was up 9.66% in qoq terms and 5.69% in yoy terms in Q2 2011 and it rose 12.49% qoq and 9.89% yoy in Q3 2011.

The core driver for the dramatic gains in trade balance for goods and services was a substantial decline in trade deficit on services side. This can be best seen from annualized figures, shown below:

Based on Q3 data, we can expect:

• Total annual exports to rise to €164.75bn in 2011, up 4.48% on €157.67bn in 2010
• Total annual imports to increase 3.95% yoy to €132.953bn, and
• Total trade surplus to rise 6.55% yoy to €31.72bn
• Of the above €1.95bn improvement in the annual expected trade surplus is likely to come from a €1.66bn improvement (reduction) in the annual trade deficit in services which is expected tos shrink to €11.99bn in 2011.

19/1/2012: Irish External Trade data - November 2011

Latest trade stats for Ireland are out - covering preliminary figures for November - and... it's another record trade surplus. I recently wrote about this issue for PressEurop (link here) and for Globe & Mail (link here).

But the latest data from Ireland's external trade side is truly impressive. Until that is, you dig slightly below the surface... where some strange things are starting to pop up.

Let's take it from the top.

On seasonally adjusted basis,

• Irish merchandise imports in November stood at €3,706mln, a decline of 5.97% mom that comes on foot of a previous monthly rise of 2.68%. Imports are up 4.91% year on year and relative to 2009 they are up 0.21%. In the 11 months from January 2011, imports are up 6.46% on same period in 2010.
• Imports increases are, of course, closely linked to increases in exports - as MNCs import much of their inputs into production from abroad. I shall cover this in a second, so keep this in mind.
• Irish merchandise exports rose in November to €8,016mln - an uplift of 4.58% mom on the foot of the previous month decline of 4.32%. Year on year exports are up 8.83% and relative to November 2009 they are up 23.22%. In the 11 months through November, cumulative exports rose 4.09% relative to the same period 2010.

• As the result, trade balance (again, referencing just merchandise trade) rose 15.74% mom (after contracting 10.75% in October, mom) to an all-time record of €4,310mln. The trade surplus is now 12.44 ahead of November 2010 and 53.5% ahead of same period 2009. In the first 11 months of 2011 trade balance rose 1.61% on the same period of 2010.
• The last observation in the previous bullet point is not a strong reason to cheer. Remember, comparable rise in 2009-2010 period was 8.77% or some 5.5 times faster than in 2011.

• Updating annualized trade stats based on 11 months performance, we can expect imports to come at ca €48.46bn - up 5.82% yoy reversing average annual rate of decline of 9.85% achieved in 2007-2010 period. Exports are likely to post another record year, consistent with my predictions before, at €92.25bn - up 3.36% yoy and well behind the Government-projected rate of over 5%. Trade surplus (for merchandise trade) is likely to reach a record €43.78bn some 0.75% ahead of 2010 result - an increase that would pale in comparison with 10.6% rise in annual surplus in 2010 yoy and well below the average 19.62% increase achieved over 2007-2010 period.

So what is going on, folks? Why are we seeing record surpluses, against fairly impressive exports and growing imports? The answer can be found in two stats. The first one, relates to terms of trade, and the second one relates to transfer pricing. let's take a look, shall, we?

CSO reports terms of trade data with 1 month lag, so we do not have November results yet, but we do have october figures.

As you can see from the above chart, terms of trade improved (downward movement in series) in october for Irish exporters. And this improvement is rather dramatic both in the short-term and in the long-run. However, as the chart below shows, the improvement in terms of trade in October 2011 relative to October 2010 was not fully utilized by the exporters (we are below the long term relationship, implying that for current levels of terms of trade, our exports should be higher than they are).

What did, however, take place is a massive jump - to a record high - in overall ratio of exports to imports in merchandise trade (chart below). In more layman's terms, all of a sudden, in November, Irish exporters needed less imported materials to supply more of exports. Hmmm... Has the chemicals component of Viagra pill change? Not really. Has the value of this component become cheaper for Irish operations of the respective MNC? No. In fact it became more expensive as the euro weakened against other currencies and terms of trade improved. So what did happen?

Take another look:

 What the above suggests is that Ireland-based MNCs are:

1. Drawing down inventories to boost exports - something they would do were they planning for a slowdown in December and onward;
2. Pushing up the component of exports value that is transfer pricing, thus boosting their profit side - something that will eventually show up in wider GDP/GNP gap;
3. Both of the above.

This is not exactly the stuff the dreams of 'exports-led recovery' should be made of, but for now, let us rejoice that at least in one area we have really strong performance in this economy. Afterall, better that than nothing.

16/1/2012: Summary of S&P move and more

In the wake of the S&P action it is a good idea to put side-by-side some ratings on euro area countries. here are S&P ratings before and after downgrade along with CMA ratings and CDS data for Q1 2009 beginning of the crisis) and Q4 2011.

Per S&P: "...the agreement [between euro zone member states in December 2011 attempting to address the crisis] is predicated on only a partial recognition  of the source of the crisis: that the current financial turmoil stems  primarily from fiscal profligacy at the periphery of the eurozone. In our view, however, the financial problems facing the eurozone are as much a consequence of rising external imbalances and divergences in competitiveness  between the eurozone's core and the so-called "periphery". As such, we believe  that a reform process based on a pillar of fiscal austerity alone risks becoming self-defeating, as domestic demand falls in line with consumers' rising concerns about job security and disposable incomes, eroding national  tax revenues."

In other words, it's growth, stupid. And herein lies the main problem for Europe. While EU might - if forced hard enough - jump onto a more sustainable fiscal spending path (cut deficits and structural deficits) - the EU has absolutely no record of creating pro-growth conditions or environments. In fact, in a bizarre response to the S&P moves:

• France is discussing an increase in VAT as the means for stimulating productivity growth, while
• Austria is planning wealth taxes and increase in retirement age as its response to economic growth challenge.

Now, where do you start in dealing with this lunatic asylum?