Thursday, September 2, 2010

Economics 2/9/10: Exchequer results - tax receipts

So folks, with some trepidation - given the ambitious statements concerning yet another 'turnings of the corner' by Minister Lenihan in today's 'Voice of the Irish Civil Services Gazette' (err... commonly known as The Irish Times) - I awaited the August Exchequer results.

The surprise, I must say, is all my, at least on the tax take side. Things have improved... dramatically... by what I would described as a 'nil change'. In other words, there is no improvement on the tax side.
Total tax take is now moving deeper down relative to 2009 and is nowhere near 'turning around'. It is not even stabilizing on the downward trajectory. Year-on-year total tax take is down 9%. End of July the same figure was 8.2%. Oops...

Income tax and Vat two mega tax heads:
The two are 8.2% and 6.4% behind January-August figures for 2009. A slight improvement on the gap in 7 months to July (8.4% and 6.9% respectively), but not that much of an improvement.

Corporate and excise taxes:
Corporate tax take is now on a trend of erasing the surplus on 2008 accumulated since June. This is bad, folks. In 7 months to July 2010, corporate tax receipts were 13.8% behind 2009 figure. In 8 months to August 2010 these are a massive 24.1% behind. As far as excise tax goes - receipts in 7 months to July 2010 were -3.3% behind corresponding period for 2009, by August 2010 8-months cumulative receipts gap to 2009 period shrunk to 2.7%. Good weather and more partying at home (instead of taking vacations) means booze is being consumed, while euro weakness relative to 2009 means we are buying more of it at home instead of N Ireland.

Next the 'Celtic Tiger Taxes', aka Stamps:
No sign of a serious improvement on abysmal 2009 here either. Poor showing continues with receipts down 18.2% on 2009 in seven months to July and down 11.1% on the first 8 months of the year in August. Let's see what happens in the big boost month of September.

Capital gains:
CGT was down on 2009 in the first 7 months of the year by 44.1% and down on the first 8 months of the year by 42.6%. Marginal gain in relative performance is clearly not enough to bring us even close to the extremely poor performance of 2009.

Summarizing year on year changes in all tax heads:
And to entertain our 'official analysts' favorite pass time: performance relative to targets
One noticeable and real change in monthly returns is the share of the burden that befalls our ordinary incomes:
Table below summarizes:
Nothing really to add to this except this: Minister Lenihan clearly thinks we are seeing improvements on the fiscal side. I see continuously increasing burden of Minister Lenihan's deficits on the ordinary taxpayers and consumers. In my economics books, this is bound to add pressure on Irish growth. Severe pressure.

Wednesday, September 1, 2010

Economics 1/9/10: Live Register

Live Register came in with no surprise - a moderate increase in the calm of August was so predictable, my forecast for unemployment to reach 13.8% in August made back in May came in bang on.

Here are few charts and some analysis.
Per chart above, seasonally adjusted LR rose from 452,500 in July to 455,000 in August, an increase of 2,500. Added cost to the Exchequer - ca €63mln per annum. Added cost to the economy - 2.5 times that. Added cost to the society - much greater than the latter. Added cost to those who lost their jobs and their families - incalculably high.

So far, year on year to August 2010 there was an unadjusted increase in the Live Register of
30,198 (+6.9%). This compares with an increase of 34,403 (+8.0%) in the year to July 2010. Now, that doesn't look like a stabilization to me.

There was an increase of 700 males and 1,900 females in the seasonally adjusted series in August. Which means services are tanking faster than manufacturing.

The average net weekly increase in the seasonally adjusted series in August 2010 was 625, which compares with a weekly increase of 1,700 in the previous month. Chart below illustrates
Both monthly and weekly increases are now below 6 months moving average lines, both of which are still trending up. Momentum suggests moderate mean reversion in September/October. Which brings us to unemployment levels.
Standardised unemployment rate in August was 13.8%, and all indications are it will continue to rise.

Finally, charting the changes together:

My suggestion that latest breakdown between men and women joining LR shows jobs destruction in services sectors is supported by the CSO analysis of detailed data.

Overall,
  • Craft and related (25.5%) was the largest occupational group on the Live Register in August,
  • Plant and machine operatives (15.4%) second largest, followed by
  • Personal and protection service (10.7%) and
  • Clerical and secretarial (10.7%).
Six of the nine occupational groups showed monthly Live Register increases in August:
  • Largest percentage increase was in the Professional group (+1.2%)
In the six months to August 2010 Professional (+26.8%) group also showed the largest increase, followed by Clerical and secretarial (+14.6%) and Sales (+ 11.9%). The smallest percentage increase was in the Managers and administrators group (+1.0%).

Per CSO: "There were increases in six of the nine occupational groups in the six months to August for males on the Live Register. The largest percentage increase was in the Associate, professional and technical group (+12.0%), with the largest decreases in the Managers and administrators and Personal and protective service groups (both -0.8%). For females there were increases in all occupational groups in the six months to August 2010. The largest percentage increase was in the Professional group (+43.3%) followed by the Other occupation group (+25.8%)."

Live Register duration also rose, for males and females in 6 months to August 2010, suggesting severe pressures in the jobs market continue.

Of greater interest will bee changes in the labor force participation - to be shown in QNHS results. I suspect we will see severe contraction in overall number of people working or seeking work in the country.

Economics 1/9/10: Retail Sales

Today's retail sales figures continue to provide the backdrop to my previous analysis of the Irish economy as the one still facing strong headwinds and showing no real signs of a recovery. After months of 'turning the corner' statements (by now clearly deserving to be serialized in The Simpsons or perhaps in the Sponge Bob) and the drone of the ESRI data on 'consumer confidence' improvements, people still continue to vote by withdrawing their spending.

Here are the charts and the results.

Overall volume of retail sales (i.e. ex-price effects or ex-deflation that is ruining retail sector jobs that is) contracted 0.1% yoy in July 2010. There was a monthly decrease of 0.2% - steeper than the annual decrease. We now have 3 months of continued declines.

Ex-Motor Trades the volume of retail sales shrunk by an impressive 2.5% in July 2010 yoy and -1.0% mom. Year-on-year and mom volumes rose in Motors, Fuel and Food, and decreases in everything else.

Stop for a second and think. Volume is just the bulk of stuff we buy. If the retail sector were to stop losing jobs and start growing again, increased volumes of sales (not that we have them anyhow, but give it a thought nonetheless) must be accompanied by non-falling value of sales.
Oops... the value of retail sales collapsed by 3.2% in July 2010 yoy and fell -0.6% mom. Ex-Motor Trades things were even worse: sales values fell 4.9% yoy and -0.6% mom. In fact, per CSo own admission: "only Motor Trades and Fuel showed year-on-year value increases in July 2010. All other sectors showed year-on-year declines in the value of retail sales" And boy these declines were rather large:
  • Non Specialised Stores (-1.5%)
  • Department Stores (-7.3%)
  • Pharmaceutical Medical & Cosmetics (-10.6%)
  • Clothing, Footwear and Textiles (-5.7%)
  • Other Retail (-8.8%)
  • Bars (-13.8%)
In mom terms, Motor Trades, Non-Specialised Stores and Electrical Goods showed increases in
the value of retail sales in July 2010. All other sectors showed mom value decreases in July 2010.

Now, these are not the results of 'improving consumer confidence' are they?

Overall, retails sales suggest that Q2 consumer spending will be a likely positive contributor for GDP growth, but Q3 will do the opposite. Of course, there is a catch here - the RSI data covers only sales of goods, but not of services, yet consumption expenditure on the latter accounts for 55% of the total consumption spending. Indications are - based on Live Register results showing contraction in services employment - services sales might be even weaker. Another sign of hidden weaknesses is in the ex-Motors sales. Ex-Motor volumes posted Q1 growth of 1.2%, followed by a preliminary estimate of 1.1% growth in Q2. The latter has been now revised down to a miserly 0.3% for Q2. Since then, ex-motor sales have been falling in both July and August.

Tuesday, August 31, 2010

Economics 31/8/10: IL&P reporting

The ‘healthiest of the sick’, IL&P reports its numbers today. Here are the headlines:
  • Operating loss is €10mln in H1 2010, down from a loss of €51mln H1 2009 – causes – lack of further deterioration on 2009 figures on the bank side and serious gains on the life insurance side.
  • Operating profits on the life side are €92mln (up from €84mln in H1 2009)
  • Bank operating loss of €131mln – equivalent to that in H1 2009. Its clear that 'healthy' IL&P is bleeding heavily on ptsb side.
  • Ptsb is one of the largest mortgages lenders in the country, so their mortgages book should be – on average – performing above other banks. Here are some data: arrears > 90 days to the end of June 2010 in Irish residential mortgage book increased to 5.2% of the portfolio (H12009 figure was 3.9% so there was a significant jump). Non-performing mortgages are at 6.9% of the total loan book, up on 4.9% at the end of H2 2009. 32% of arrears cases are related to 100% mortgages – a predictable result as (a) 100% interest-only mortgages are of more recent vintage, hence written against younger families with higher probability of unemployment, and (b) these types of mortgages are more likely to involve purchases of buy-to-rent properties .
  • Bad debt provisions are at €150mln compared with €189mln in H1 2009, highlighting the fact that more realistic provisioning earlier in cycle usually helps to underpin the book better than the AIB-style denials. Overall provisions balance is up €141mln to €618m.
  • Margins are down to 0.81% (2009 full year margin was a poor 0.83%) despite hikes in the mortgage rates.
  • As IL&P needs to raise ca €1.3-1.8bn more in bonds (good luck to them trying), higher cost of borrowing is going to further depress margins. So expect even more mortgage rates hikes from IL&P in months ahead. The bank has currently a €8 billion reliance on the ECB, unchanged. Hefty for a minnow.
  • Bank’s loan to deposit ratio was down to 240% from 246% - far, far away from the prudential banking model that would imply LTDs of 95-100%.

Monday, August 30, 2010

Economics 30/8/10: Euro area growth indicator slows in August

Eurozone's leading growth indicator, Eurocoin has fallen once again to 0.37 in August from July already anemic reading of 0.4. This means that my updated forecasts for Euro area growth remain in the range of 0% - 0.26%, with mid-range forecast of 0.20% for Q3 2010.

Chart below illustrates:In the mean time, continued pressures on Euro area economies and unbalanced nature of recovery (with Germany powering ahead, while the rest of Europe stagnates or continues to decline) are taking their toll on public confidence in European institutions.

Overall voters confidence in EU has dropped to record lows in most countries according to the Eurobarometer published on August 26th. Just 49% Europeans think that their country's membership of the EU is a "good thing" – lowest in 7 years. Trust in EU institutions has dropped to 42% from 48% recorded in Autumn 2009. Latest survey results are most likely impacted by the survey timing - carried out in May 2010 - at the peak of sovereign debt crisis worries. But it is unlikely that August events would have done much to repair this. PIIGS, plus Cyprus, Lux and Romania lead in terms of declines. Confidence in all PIIGS countries declined 10-18% yoy.


The latest Eurocoin leading indicator reading clearly suggests that unemployment and economic performance will remain leading causes of concerns across the EU (Eurobarometer recorded 48% of EU citizens being primarily concerned with rising unemployment, while economic crisis in general is a cause for concern for 40%). For the first time Eurobarometer also included Iceland, now a candidate for EU accession. Only 19% believe accession will be a good thing for their country and only 29 percent believe their country will benefit from EU membership.

Another interesting result was that when asked what they associate the EU with – most of the respondents said free travel and the euro, followed by peace and, amazingly, "waste of money" (23%). The latter category was led by Austrians (52%), Germans (45%) and Swedes (36%). Just 19% of respondents said the EU stands for democracy, a drop of seven points yoy. Just 10% of respondents in Finland, UK and Latvia identified "democracy" as a principle that is linked to the EU objectives. Romania (33%), Bulgaria (32%) and Cyprus (30%) were the countries with most positive view of the link between democracy and the EU. Overall, in no country did 'democracy' figure as the EU core objective for more than 1/3 of the population.

Support for EU acting as a policeman of financial markets was much stronger. 75% of the respondents said more coordination of economic and financial policies among member states would be effective in fighting economic crisis. 72% back a stronger supervision by the EU of international financial groups (though this majority increased just 4 points since 2009).


Perhaps encouraged by the public support for greater coordination, French and German authorities continue to move in the direction of enhanced harmonization of their tax systems. French budget minister Francois Baroin visited his German counterpart Wolfgang Schaeuble, making an announcement that "Germany is a model which should be a source of inspiration for [France]." Baroin also stated that France "intends to accelerate the harmonisation of both fiscal systems, on corporate as well as personal income taxes". President Sarkozy has requested the French court of auditors to issue a report (due for early findings release at the end of September) looking at areas of fiscal convergence with the German system. The report is due by the end of the year, but a pre-report will be published at the end of September. It is likely that France might move to abolish wealth tax as Germany did back in 1997. Per reports: "in the longer term, Paris is also looking at harmonising Vat, which is higher in France – 19.6% compared to the German 19%" and "capping the EU budget" to give national Governments more opportunities to slash domestic deficits. Mr Schaeuble indicated that Berlin wants consensus on European harmonisation on bank profits taxation - a subject for the next ministerial meeting between the French and German finance ministers in September.

Friday, August 27, 2010

Economics 27/8/10: The path & cost of banks bailouts

On the foot of today's comment in the Financial Times, here are few quick estimates as to the extent to which current policy on banks recapitalization is bleeding the economy dry.

As estimated by myself (comfortably within the S&P projections), Ireland will stand to lose net:
  • Nama - net loss of (mid-range) €12-19bn;
  • Banks - net losses are €50-55.6bn.
These are mid-range estimates.

My estimates translate into:
  • Anglo Irish Bank expected supports are likely to exceed the overall decline in our GDP by a factor of more than 1.5 times (constant prices GDP fell €20.26bn between 2007-2009). Thus Anglo alone will cost Irish economy more than the entire Great Recession;
  • The bailout will cost us €23,422-34,880 per each person in our labour force as of Q1 2010. Mid range estimate loss is €27,121. Note, labour force includes both employed and unemployed.
  • The entire bailout of the banking system can end up costing Ireland in excess of x3 times the total economic loss incurred during this Great Recession.
  • Anglo alone will cost us the equivalent of providing unemployment benefits for 2 years to over 1.25 million Irish workers.
  • Anglo bailout would cover current Live Register costs for more than 6 years
  • The banking bailout would have covered over one half of all outstanding mortgages in the nation once we adjust for interest accruals (a note to our FR: that's one hell of a real moral hazard, Mr Elderfield, much more real than any aid to mortgage holders you can ever fathom)
  • The cost of bailout risks running at over €69,000 per family of 2 able-bodied adults either employed or unemployed
  • 'Repairing' the banks Government-way can cost 35% of constant prices 2010 GDP or 43.2% of 2010 Gross Disposable National Income, using mid-range estimates for the expected bailout

Lastly, let me note that the alternatives to this 'blank cheque' recapitalization approach always existed and were known to the Government: see links here & here. Members of the cabinet were briefed as to the above-linked proposal and were provided with full cost estimates of these proposal. In at least one case, one cabinet member sought analysis/appraisal of the above proposal from official advisers, with evaluation returning 'no objections to the numbers cited' according to my source. In other words - they couldn't find anything wrong with it at least on the basis of quick evaluation.

Thursday, August 26, 2010

Economics 27/8/10: Manifesto I (?)

I will continue posting on this and will aggregate all ideas in my Long Term blog, with a banner link on my main page as well. All suggestions welcomed & will be published, some will make it to the list as well (as always - with proper attribution). So engage with me on this one!


Given the current market and economic conditions and the dire lack of credible economic policies (from any political party) aimed at moving Irish economy out of the combination of:
  • deeply rooted crisis in public finances;
  • structural collapse of the banking sector;
  • stratospherically high and increasingly long-term unemployment levels;
  • lack of significant gains in competitiveness (not limited to the area of wages competitiveness, but including basic utilities costs, and costs of living and doing business relating to state-controlled sectors);
  • malfunctioning markets for provision of domestic services - dominated and restricted by the excessive market power of the incumbent state-owned and state-regulated oligopolies;
  • a clear predominance of policy measures that are designed to saddle ordinary families and individuals (consumers and taxpayers) with the full cost of stabilizing vested interests and elites (manifesting themselves in rising tax burden, falling provision of public services, lack of reforms in banking and public sectors); and
  • continued devastation of private entrepreneurship and businesses, contracting investment and lack of confidence in the future of the economy and broader social progress
it is now time to ask:
Is Ireland's electorate ready for an alternative political and popular movement that would put the interests of consumers and taxpayers at the top of governance and policy agenda?

Irish democracy cannot be surrendered to the vested interests, no matter how broadly-based, and elites (no matter how meritocratic or mobile they might be).

The current crisis has clearly shown that the corporatist state - where a group of vested interests colludes with the Government and state structures to set economic and social parameters for development priorities - is morally, politically and economically bankrupt.

The only two ways forward from this status quo are
  • a generations-long and exceptionally deep crisis of stagnation and declining standards of living, or
  • a path of structural reforms aimed at realigning the current political system to serve the interests of consumers and taxpayers - aka - the ordinary citizens and residents of this land.
Such a reform can only be achieved by creation of a radically different alternative to the existent structures. A new popular movement can champion the rights of consumers and taxpayers to counterbalance existent system that promotes the interests of the vested pressure groups and elites.

It is therefore, clear to me that at this point in time Ireland is on the cusp of either opting for change or electing to undertake decade (if not decades) long descent into the nightmare of economic stagnation.

In my view, the agenda of such a movement should include the following reforms:

1) Banking reforms:
  • Banks should be recapitalized following Swedish model (imposing haircuts/equity swaps on bond holders; accepting correct amounts of writedowns; equity taking by the State in the name of taxpayers; equity to be held in a Trust for individual taxpayers until disbursal; at disbursal - equity sales proceeds to be rebated, net of cost to the taxpayers)
  • Nama to be reversed
  • Anglo Irish Bank and INBS to be shut down and their liabilities and assets to be wound up within 5 years
  • All banks boards and senior management teams replaced within 3 months
  • All banks middle management teams reassessed and rebuilt within 12 months
  • FDIC insurance scheme to be set up for the future needs of the sector
  • No future bailouts constitutional amendment to be put to a referendum to prevent a possibility of any future calls on taxpayers wealth from any private sector firm
2) Fiscal reforms:
  • Flat tax to be enacted on all incomes (preliminary estimates suggest 15-17% tax rate) with no discretionary deductions, but a generous upfront deduction of 1/2 of the median wage to be made available to all earners, plus 1/5 median wage deduction per child.
  • Provision of strong (current level -10%), but life-time capped welfare provisions. Life-time cap will allow any able bodied adult in the country to have access to a cumulative maximum of 7 years of welfare provisions over their life time. Provision of welfare supports to those unable to work due to health or family circumstances (e.g caring for the disabled relative etc) to continue without life-time limits.
  • Strong support for the disabled and the elderly must continue
  • Wages for politicians and all senior servants earnings are to be tied to the National Disposable Income (NDI) on per capita basis (pcNDI): Taoiseach=3.5 times pcNDI; Ministers=3 times pcNDI; senior civil servants=max 2.7 times pcNDI; TDs/Senators=2.5 times pcNDI and so on. If the country earns more in disposable income, then those running it should get a reward, otherwise, they will automatically bear the same burden as the rest of economy. No bonuses to be allowed and all pensions to be converted to Defined Contribution plans.
  • Benchmark Government spending to 35% of GDP, with emergency spending not to exceed 37% of GDP in any given year, and a balanced budget over every 3 year period. This allows for small emergency spending boosts in recessions, but prevents spending sprees in elections etc
  • All quangoes, except those with immediate independent oversight authority (e.g FR and Competition Authority) are to be abolished and their functions transferred to respective departments. Responsibility for governance and management must rest with the executive branch of the state - i.e. Government.
  • There should be no taxation without representation - self-employed individuals who are fully tax compliant should have access to same unemployment benefits as anyone else.
  • Tax system should be fully reformed to simplify existent taxation and ensure full compliance. This will include, in addition to the flat income tax - abolition of all indirect charges and taxes, other than direct user fees which will be fully ring-fenced to provide revenue necessary to maintain specific service (e.g. bin charges, water rates etc). VRT will be abolished. Any excise taxes will be set at a level required solely to support provision of services directly associated with the underlying consumption charged. For example, petrol levy will apply only to the amount required to support environmental programme related to CO2 abatement and improvement of the environment. It will not be allocated into the general budget. There will be a fully transparent tax on land values (LVT), but not a property tax. The revenue from LVT will be split 50:50 between central & local authorities and local authorities will be allowed a discretion to vary their rate of LVT within reasonable parameters. For example, if LVT is levied at 1% pa, then local authority can be allowed to charge between 0.25% and 0.5% as it deems suitable, while the central government will collect 0.5%. CGT and CAT will be abolished for all investments held for 5 years or longer to encourage longer term savings and investment.
3) Governance reforms:
  • Core change to the Government model will be transparency and accountability based on automatic systems of disclosure and control that are not subject to tampering by individual ministers/politicians or civil servants
  • Transparency: all state data/decisions/discussions not subject to secrecy of the state considerations will be published on the web and made accessible free of charge to all residents of the state. Commercially sensitive data will be published with exclusion of sensitive information and identifiers, until the time when it can be published in full. All data requested under FOI will be released free of charge to the requestee and will be automatically published also on the public web portal to remove any need for future FOI requests
  • Accountability: performance and productivity metrics will be designed for all branches of public sector and wages and earnings in the public sector will be tied into these.
  • Any attempts by public employees or office holders to undermine the principles of transparency and accountability in dealing with the public will be punished on the basis of publicly available procedures. All disciplinary actions against aforementioned employees or office holders will be made publicly available.
  • Local authorities will be reformed, reducing the overall number of local authorities to 7, covering: West & North West, South, Greater Cork, Greater Dublin, Greater Limerick, Greater Galway and Border & Midlands.
  • Seanad will be reformed (subject to referendum) to give it real powers of the upper chamber comparable to the US Senate. It will be elected directly by the people of Ireland, with equal representation of 5 senators from each of the 7 geographic region outlined above.
  • Dail will be reformed - there will be no expenses, no additional pay for work in special committees (every TD will be required, subject to seniority to carry such work as a part of their duties). The number of TDs will be reduced to roughly 2/3rd of the current. TDs will be entitled to a defined contribution pension top up to their existent private pensions with the state matching 1:1 every euro they put into their pension.
  • Members of the cabinet will have no drivers, state cars and there will be no Government jet. Members of the cabinet will qualify for a car allowance equivalent to €10,000 per annum. All members of the Oireachtas and Government traveling on official business will be reimbursed only to the full cost of the ticket for economy flight on any flight under 5 hours of length and business class for flights of longer duration. No employee of the State will be entitled to any travel reimbursement in excess of an economy class ticket.
  • No member of the Oireachtas or employee of the state will be exempt from any of the standard tax codes or laws of this land. There can be no privilege for the servants of the public that the public itself cannot claim.
  • All state purchasing will be carried on-line, made public and transparent.
  • State will purchase services, such as health care, care for the elderly, disabled etc for those who cannot afford them, but the State will not own service providers. Instead, public companies will be mutualized or privatized and forced to compete directly for the custom of the people. Transition to such an arrangement will require significant reforms, but also support for current employees in training them in running a private/mutual/non-profit etc enterprises. This support will be provided.
  • Higher education will be fees-based, with fees set by universities and overseen by the Department for Education. The State will set up (with participation of charities and other private agencies) a number of funds that will administer financial aid to students based on need (with an objective of creating an equal opportunity for all qualified students to undertake studies) as well as merit (with an objective of rewarding real achievement).
In the name of sanity, I should pause for now. I will continue posting on this and will aggregate all ideas in my Long Term blog, with a banner link on my main page as well.

All suggestions welcomed & will be published, some will make it to the list as well (as always - with proper attribution). So engage with me on this one!

Wednesday, August 25, 2010

Economics 25/8/10: Derivatives time bomb?

An interesting number popped out today from the dark depths of the past (hat tip to Ed).

With my emphasis, quoting from the article published in December 2008 by the Chartered Accountants Ireland (linked here) titled "Financial Derivitives (sic), Villian (sic) or Scapegoat" written by Grellan O'Kelly (who worked at the time in the Policy Section of the Financial Institutions and Funds Authorisation Department of the Financial Regulator):

"...when looking at the outstanding derivative positions (notional values) of our main banks as reported in their annual reports, the amounts are extremely small when compared to the total global amounts. A recent BIS survey2 on global OTC positions shows that global notional amounts come to a staggering $516 trillion. The most recent disclosures from our two main retail banks show that their gross notional exposures amount to €640 billion, only 0.17% of the total. ...noting that access to accurate data on derivative products is not always publicly available."

The article contains the usual caveat that "Any views expressed in this article are made in a personal capacity and are not intended to represent the views of the Financial Regulator." Nonetheless, it would be good to get some comment from the FR on this. After all, €640bn might be a small level of exposure to derivatives from the point of view of global banks, but for BofI and AIB to have such an exposure... is roughly 170% of the total 2009 asset base of all Irish banks combined.

For now, I cannot confirm whether this was a typo or not.

The problem is that unwinding even the straight forward swaps can be extremely costly. Buffet's unwinding of lost contracts against reinsurance claims cost Berkshire some $400mln back in 2008. In the case of interest rates swaps written against property, De Montfort University research in June 2010 has estimated that for a book of £143bn of interest rate swaps in the UK (57% of the total existing UK £250bn book of loans is estimated to be hedged by derivatives - here), the cost of unwinding these positions runs into ca £10bn.

So applying the UK estimate to our potential exposure, the cost of unwinding those €640bn in derivatives can be to the tune of €45bn.

Of course, this is just an estimate, but it gives some perspective to the numbers.

But let's ad some relative comparatives (hat tip to Conor for both):
  • Ireland accounted for 0.17% of global estimates of OTC derivatives but only 0.03% of Global GDP (based on CIA fact book and CSO data)
  • €640bn is 4.12 times our 2008 Gross Value Added (ca €155bn)

I am totally at a loss as to this figure - given its size - so any comment on its validity will be appreciated.

Economics 25/8/10: S&P & the horrific cost of banks bailouts

As you all know, Standard & Poor (S&P) downgraded Irish sovereign debt to AA- from AA with a negative outlook. The downgrade was mainly motivated by the fact that the cost of the Irish banking bailout has increased significantly over previous expectations. S&P now estimate the cost of recapitalising the Irish financial system at €45-50bn, up from €30-35bn.

In my view, this is still behind the news curve in terms of estimated total costs.

My projections for total losses are as follows:
  • Nama - net loss of (mid-range) €12bn, rising to €19bn in the worst case scenario (although I have not redone estimates for this scenario for some time and they reflect 55% haircut applied on Tranche 1);
  • Anglo - €33bn in mid-range case, rising to €38.6bn in the worst case scenario (another update is due once the bank reports its results in the next few weeks);
  • INBS - €6bn, no range as we have little clarity as to their balance sheets details;
  • AIB - €7bn mid-range, assuming successful disposal of M&T and BZBWK, worst case scenario €9bn;
  • BofI - €2bn.
So the total expected banks losses are €50-55.6bn in my estimates.

Importantly, S&P's negative outlook allows for the possibility that the rating could be cut
further if the Government fails to deliver on promised fiscal stabilization. This can occur either due to significant continued deterioration in underlying economic conditions or due to the failure of the Government to actually implement planned cuts, or both.

S&P's current position rates Ireland at the same level as Fitch and one notch below Moody’s, but both of these are keeping Ireland on a stable outlook.

S&P latest estimate is for Ireland net government debt / gross GDP ratio reaching 113% in 2012. Forever cheerful folks at DofF projected this ratio to be 83.9% in 2012 in their Budget 2010 figures. This shows just how much can change in 8 months time. S&P's estimate for debt implies Ireland is facing greater debt mountain than similar rated Belgium and Spain.

But here comes a tricky part. Remember that our debt is currently yielding in excess of 5.5% for 10 year notes. This implies that in 2012, we can expect to pay out 6.215% of our GDP in interest payments alone, or 7.52% of our domestic economy total income. The bill will be €10,241 million - using DofF forecasts - or 20.5% of the total current expenditure planned by the Government. All in, even by rosy projections from DofF for tax revenue, our interest bill alone will be swallowing every third euro revenue will bring in.

This puts into perspective recent ECB research that concluded that debt levels above 90-100% of GDP are, "on average, harmful for growth" and that porblems could arise at the debt levels of as low as 70% of GDP. ECB currently projects that euroarea-wide average debt levels will reach 88.5% in 2011. Does anyone believe anymore that Ireland can run 2.5-3% annual growth rate in the current conditions as projected by the IMF? Or 4.5-4.3% (2012-2013) real GDP growth as projected by DofF?

Monday, August 23, 2010

Economics 24/8/10: Anglo Tranche 2 goes 'Boom!'

Two weeks ago in a post on Anglo (here) I provided a quick explanation of my forecasts for why the mid range expected capital hit on the entire Anglo book of ca €72bn worth of loans (original face value) will be in the region of €33bn. This estimate referred to the mid-range assumptions.

In the light of today's speculations/reports (here) that the final Tranche 2 haircut on Anglo loans will be 61.93% I am now more confident in my original lower- and mid-range estimates, though adjusting my upper margin loss estimate down a notch.

To repeat my projections are:
  • Worst case scenario for Anglo requires €38.6bn (down from €38.9bn)
  • The mid-range is €33bn in total hit (same as earlier)
  • The best case scenario is €30bn (same as earlier)
Some details: Tranche 2 of Anglo loans was valued at €6.75bn. Combined total amount of loans transferred to Nama in Tranche 2 is €11.9bn on an average discount of 55.6%. Tranches 1 & 2 combined is €27.2bn of the total €81 bn planned with an average discount of 52.3%. If this discount stands, remaining Tranche 3 transfers of €53.7bn to be completed by February 2011 will incur capital hit of RWA-adjusted €28.1bn - to a combined Nama-induced capital loss to all 6 banks of €42.3bn. Nama expects further €12bn to be transferred by the end of September - a highly unlikely deadline, at least if Anglo-INBS stuff were to be included here. Provisions by the

As telling as the haircuts are the assumed LTEVs - in Tranche 1 the implied LTEV was 11 percent. In Tranche 2 this is down to 9 percent. Since Nama marks to November 2009, this change can be explained either by lower quality of loans being taken on board (bad news for Nama, better news for banks) or by Nama aggressive drive into raising cash flow (good news for Nama, bad news for the banks).

Now, to my valuations. Table below summarizes:
Notice, I allow for interest margins of 1.5% pa in my mid-range assumptions. This is rather unlikely. To end of 2009, interest margin on Anglo loans (performing) was roughly 1% and this did not reflect Nama costs. In addition, my mid-range scenario assumes Nama recovering 100% of the principal amount of the loans - something that I believe to be equally unlikely. Either way, mid-range estimate implies that Messr Aynsley and Dukes will be coming in with new demands for cash soon - to the tune of €8.5bn more based on my mid-range scenario.

Economics 23/8/10: ECB & IRL bonds

Per report today: "FRANKFURT, Aug 23 (Reuters) - The ECB said on Monday it bought and settled €338mln worth of bonds last week, the highest amount since early July and bolstering recent market talk it had ramped up purchases of Irish bonds. The amount is well above €10mln of purchases settled the previous week... It follows recent comments by market participants that the ECB bought 60 million euros of 2012 Irish government bonds just over a week ago, after spreads over German Bunds ballooned. The ECB has not given any details of its bond buying."

I speculated after last auction results were announced by the NTMA that extraordinary level of cover (x5.4) on 4 year bonds issue looked strange and that ECB buying might be the case. To remind you - NTMA sold €500mln of 4-year bonds. It now appears that the ECB did indeed engage in potentially substantial buying of Irish bonds. If so, such buying cold have
  1. pushed other purchasers out of the shorter term paper into 10 year bonds; and/or
  2. pushed yields on both shorter and longer term paper down.
€338mln figure includes trades executed between August 12 and August 14 - the auction of shorter term paper that is known to have involved ECB buying.

All in, we are clearly now in the yields zone where the markets are happy to watch us lean on ECB, the ECB is happy to watch us skip one-legged across budgetary deficit that keeps opening up wider and wider. Clearly, such an equilibrium is unlikely to be stable. Expect some fireworks once markets come back to full swing a week from now.

Economics 23/8/10: Is ECB contradiciting itself on banks stability?

Updated below

Here is a note of the day, to be followed by a question of the day:

ECB's Axel Weber (a 'hawk' in his pre-crisis life) is proposing in the FT today that the ECB should extended unlimited refinancing operations for Eurozone banks up to three months until at least early 2011.

This call, if followed upon, would
  1. make it harder for the ECB to execute any serious QE exit strategy,
  2. shows that the situation in the EU banking sector remains critical;
  3. indicates that forward looking central bankers, like Weber don't really believe that the funding markets are ready to properly price the risks of European (including, of course, German) banks, even in the short run (under 1 year);
  4. shows clearly that despite statements to the contrary, ECB governors (at least some) don;t really buy into the idea that Euro area banks will be able to unwind, absent ECB help, the €1.3 trillion in debt coming due in the next 2 years.
Now, question of the day: If the EU stress tests were anything better than a shambolic PR exercise (I don't think they were, but let's entertain the idea), why would ECB need to worry about the banking sector funding situation? After all, the tests, allegedly, have shown that Eurozone banks are well capitalized and present no systemic risk.

So either the tests were useless (in which case Weber is right in his call) or ECB has no business continuing priming the liquidity pump (in which case Weber is wrong in his call).


And a couple of hours after my question of the day note above, Bloomberg weighed in with a mighty crack at the ECB's position (here).