4/7/2014: Q1 2014: GDP & GNP dynamics

In the previous posts I covered the revisions to our GDP and GNP introduced by the CSO and sectoral decomposition of GDP. The former sets out some caveats to reading into the new data and the latter shows that in Q1 2014, four out of five sectors of the economy posted increases in activity y/y. These are good numbers.

Now, let's consider GDP and GNP data at the aggregate levels.

First y/y comparatives based on Not Seasonally-Adjusted data:

• GDP in constant prices came in at EUR44.445 billion in Q1  2014, which marks an increase of 4.14% y/y and the reversal of Q4 2013 y/y decline of 1.15%. 6mo average rate of growth (y/y) in GDP is now at 1.49% and 12mo average is at 1.14%. Over the last 12 months through Q1 2014, GDP expanded by a cumulative 1.13% compared to 12 months through Q1 2013.
• Net Factor Income outflows from Ireland accelerated from EUR7.013 billion in Q1 2013 to EUR7.584 billion. Given the lack of global capes, this suggests that MNCs are booking more profit out of Ireland based on actual activity uplift here, rather than on transfers of previously booked profits. But that is a speculative conjecture. Still, rate of profits expatriation out of Ireland is lower in Q1 2014 than in Q1 2012, Q1 2011 and Q1 2010, which means that MNCs are still parking large amounts of retained profits here. When these are going to flow to overseas investment opportunities (e.g. if, say, Emerging Markets investment outlook improves in time, there will be bigger holes in irish national accounts).
• GNP in content prices stood at EUR36.861 billion in Q1 2014, up 3.35% y/y and broadly in line with the average growth rate over the last three quarters. This marks the third consecutive quarter of growth in GNP. Over the last 6 months, GNP expanded by 2.98% on average and cumulative growth over the last 12 months compared to same period a year before is 2.67%.

Two charts to illustrate:

The above clearly shows that the GDP has been trending flat between Q2-Q3 2008 and Q1 2014, while the uplift from the recession period trough in Q4 2009 has been much more anaemic than in any period between 1997 and 2007.

The good news is that in Q1 2014, rates of growth in both GDP and GNP were above their respective averages for post-Q3 2010 period. Bad news is that these are still below the Q1 2001-Q4 2007 averages.

GNP/GDP gap has worsened in Q1 2014 to 17.1% from 16.4% in Q1 2013. The same happened to the private sector GNP/GDP gap which increased from 18.3% in Q1 2013 to 19.1% in Q1 2014. This implies that official statistics, based on GDP figures more severely over-estimate actual economic activity in Ireland in Q1 this year, compared to Q1 last.

Chart to illustrate:

Switching to Seasonally-Adjusted data for q/q comparatives:

• GDP in constant prices terms grew by 2.67% q/q in Q1 2014, reversing a 0.08% decline in Q4 2013 and marking the first quarter of expansion. 6mo average growth rate q/q in GDP is now at 1.30% and 12mo at 1.26%. 
• GNP in constant prices terms grew by 0.48% q/q in Q1 2014, a major slowdown on 2.24% growth in Q4 2013. Q1 2014 marked the third quarter of expansion, albeit at vastly slower rate of growth compared to both Q3 2013 and Q4 2013. 6mo average growth rate q/q in GNP is now at 1.36% and 12mo at 1.34%. 

Chart to illustrate:

Finally, let's re-time recessions post-revisions.

Red bars mark cases of consecutive two (or more) quarters of negative q/q growth in GDP and GNP:

04/11/2011: October PMIs - risk of recession rising

Continuing with the analysis of the latest PMI figures for October 2011 for Ireland, this post is looking into the relationship between employment, PMIs and exports-led recovery both over historical horizon and the latest performance. The previous two posts dealt with detailed data on Manufacturing (here) and Services (here).

Manufacturing PMI posted a rise from 47.3 to 50.1 between September 2011 and October 2011, moving above 50 reading for the first time in 5 months. However, as explained in previous post this increase does not signal expansion, as 50.1 is statistically insignificant relative to 50. At the same time, employment sub-index for Manufacturing PMI remains in contraction at 47.1 (statistically significantly below 50) for the second month in a row.

Services PMI posted a slight improvement in the rate of growth at 51.5 in October, up from 51.3 in September, but once again, given the volatility in the series, these readings are not statistically different from 50 (no growth) mark. Meanwhile, Employment sub-index of Services PMI remains below water at 46 - same reading for both October and September.

Charts below show two core trends:

The trends are:

• Both manufacturing and Services PMIs are flatlining around 50 mark, signaling stagnation
• Both in Manufacturing and Services, there are no signs of easing in jobs destruction

Consistent with these trends, overall Services sector has moved from the position of relative jobless recovery signalled at the beginning of 2011 to border-line recession and jobs destruction in October. Manufacturing sector has moved from the optimal growth area (jobs creation and recovery) in the beginning of 2011 to a recession in October 2011.

In addition to weaknesses in employment and overall PMIs, October figures show deterioration in exports growth, with Manufacturing New Export Orders sub-index at 49.8 and below 50 for the second month in a row (note that 49.8 is statistically not significant compared to 50) and Services New Export Business sub-index at 50.1 (down from 53.1 in September). Both sub-indices show stagnant exports performance in the sectors. Chart below shows that we are now in a recession (albeit border-line) - vis-a-vis exports-led recovery in Manufacturing and are getting close to a recession in Services.

A Patent Lie: Ireland's Capital Investment Stimulus

In its April 2008 review of Ireland's economy, seen by the Government some 5 months prior to its publication, OECD has identified two salient medium term problems linked to the twin crises we are currently experiencing:

Reforming the taxation of housing. "...the unusually favourable tax treatment increases the role of housing in the economy and adds to volatility in the housing market. There should be a gradual move towards a more neutral system of housing taxation," said OECD. Thus, even assuming its ignorance prior to the OECD report, the Government had at least 15 months since to design a functioning system of either land-value or property taxation, there by reducing the impact of the house prices slowdown.

Public spending needs to slow. "Fiscal performance has been strong in recent years but revenue growth has moderated as the economy, particularly the housing market, has weakened. Public expenditure is set to slow but it is important to avoid locking-in expensive commitments, particularly on public sector pay. As spending rises more slowly, improving public services will have to rely more on undertaking further reforms to public sector management and getting better value for money." Once again, nothing has been done in over 15 months to address these recommendations.

Chart below - taken from the OECD report, illustrates the extent of the problem.
However, a closer examination of the components of the public expenditure in Ireland show even more dramatic failure by the Irish Governments to stop the gravy train of wasteful expenditure.

Consider the following chart plotting actual net current expenditure against capital expenditure, incorporating my own forecast for fiscal consolidation in 2009-2010 and DofF January 2009 forecasts for the same period.
Two features can be glimpsed from the chart:

1. Over the last decade, there has been a steady, unrelenting rise in the current expenditure - largely reflecting social welfare spending and the wage bill increases in the public service.
2. Even before the mini-Budget this month, our capital expenditure has peaked in 2008. Recall that Brian Cowen and Mary Coughlan are endlessly repeating that in 2009-2010 NDP-linked capital investments will act as a stimulus to the economy. Either they have not seen their own Government projections, or cannot comprehend the reality. During the recessionary 2009-2010, Ireland Inc is planning to spend decreasing net amounts of funds on capital programmes. If the Government can think of the NDP (created two years ago) as a recession-busting stimulus, then it has fired virtually all of its ammunition in 2008. And, of course, that has made no difference to the recession, as we all know.

But there are more sinister trends in the expenditure figures. The DofF does not provide a historical data set for budgetary dynamics over time. Instead, possibly to keep the taxpayers in the dark about the real nature of our spending, DofF produces a multitude of largely useless, technologically backward annual reports. A troll through these reveals the following.

Chart below shows the net current and capital expenditures as a percentage of GDP.
According to this chart, the economically unproductive spending which is largely absorbed into public sector wages and social welfare subsidies (our current expenditure):

• has grown virtually exponentially as a share of economy, whilst the capital investment programmes have bounced along a declining trend, and
• has far outstripped capital investment in terms of its role in the economy.

This blows apart Governments' arguments that since the beginning of this century Ireland Inc was aggressively investing in the productive capacity of its economy. Instead, it shows that we were 'investing' in wages, perks and working conditions of our public sector 'servants' and in welfare subsidies at the time of unprecedented growth in prosperity and low unemployment. First Bertie & Cowen and now Cowen & Lenihan have engaged in a classic tax-and-spend banquet where the already-stuffed were getting fatter and fatter on taxpayers cash.

Should you wonder how high were the rates of growth in current and capital expenditure over the last decade, chart below shows that in 2000-2009, even by DofF own (excessively optimistic) projections for this year, cumulative capital investment's importance in overall economy will decline by 39%. In contrast, cumulative current expenditure growth will reach +27%.In short, the above figures show that:

• Our leaders have deceived us about the importance of capital investment in the economy: between 2000 and 2009, capital expenditure share of GDP has actually fallen, while the current expenditure share of GDP has risen much faster than the GDP itself;
  
• Since 2000, our Governments have misled the public about the nature of Exchequer expenditure growth by stressing less rapidly expanding investment portion of the budget and downplaying a rampant expansion of payoffs to the public and social welfare sectors promoted by the Social Partners;
• Our current leadership is now deceiving the country and the markets by referring to a falling capital-spending programme as economic stimulus. That 'stimulus' applied to 2008 and not 2009-2010 and even in 2008 it was relatively small, compared to the current spending waste;
  
• Our Governments since at least 1999 have engaged in reckless and unsustainable increases in the current expenditure - in 2000-2009, current spending has grown in nominal terms by 138%, outstripping almost 2:1 the rate of growth in the nominal GDP (72%). Meanwhile capital expenditure has grown by 57% - over 2.5times slower than the current expenditure.
  

Mr Cowen and the rest of the Government should stop talking about Ireland's plans to invest in infrastructure and knowledge economy. They should come clean on the fact that their leadership has left the country with a current spending bill well beyond our means.

A train wreck of Irish economic policy

In managing the ongoing economic crisis, observing Irish Government policy can only be compared to watching a train wreck in slow motion. The banks re-capitalization scheme announced this week is just another example. By ignoring Ireland's impoverished and debt-overloaded consumers and companies, the latest plan will not deliver any real benefits to growth, credit flows or consumer/producer confidence.

One frame…

First, the rails buckle underneath as the Exchequer balance snaps under the weight of reckless public spending. Pop, pop – the fastenings fly off as tax line after tax line comes short. “No worries, we have a plan”, calls out the engineer. Enter the emergency budget – empty of any ideas as to how to mend the path or to lighten the load.

Then, the engine slumps oil-less. Banks hit the friction of bad corporate and household loans. The sparks of private unemployment fly. “All’s fine,” shouts the engineer, “we have insurance”. Emergency banks guarantee follows, but panic engulfs the carriages.

For what seems like an eternity the train pushes on. Dust, gravel and engine parts are shooting in all directions. Business insolvencies double year on year under the weight of the heaviest corporate debt load in the EU. Consumers crumble under the largest debt mountain in the OECD. Homes repossessions are on the rise and retail sales crash. The policy engine spins out of control: income, savings and consumption taxes go up and business rates increase. “The fundamentals are sound,” shout engineers. The rest of the world is selling off Irish shares and assets.

By the end of last week, the index of Irish financial companies shares has fallen 67% relative to the Black Monday of September 29th – the point that triggered the banks guarantee. “This will all end happily,” chirp engineers, “We’ll commission new reports, appoint new committees and issue more emergency responses.”

… to another

Enter this Sunday’s desperate ‘capitalization’ package. This promises to deliver some €10 billion to the banks in a swap for equity. The details, predictably, are sparse. Everyone expects the capital injections to be a copy-cat of those instituted by Germany and the UK – the countries hardly facing the same problems as Ireland. This implies a mixture of private and public funds to be made available to the banks with some token conditions, e.g dividends and management bonuses caps.

In a statement the Department of Finance said the plan will underpin the availability of loans to individuals and businesses.

Ooops. By-passing Ireland’s impoverished consumers and companies, the plan will not deliver any such benefits.

Elsewhere in Europe and the US, similar capitalization schemes have failed to reduce the cost of corporate borrowing or to restart lending to the households. In the UK, a £43 billion capital injection scheme has been in place for almost two months and the supply of consumer and business credit continues to fall - whether due to demand slowdown, lenders withdrawal from the market or both. In the US, massive banks’ capital supports have lowered the mortgage rates, but there is no meaningful increase in new mortgages uptake.

Three reasons for State-to-Banks recapitalization in-effectiveness

First, heavily indebted households are unlikely to take up new credit regardless of the cost. Short of the Government scheme to reduce the household debt or to increase after-tax incomes, no policy will shift consumers out of precautionary savings and into credit markets. So the retail sales will continue falling, businesses will suffer and consumers will keep on heading North for shopping. Our engineers, who two months ago raised VAT and now stubbornly refuse to back-down will see even less VAT revenue in 2009.

Second, heavily indebted Irish businesses can use new credit to either roll-over existent debts, or to finance short-term operational expenses, e.g export transactions. With exception of export credits, any new lending will simply re-arrange the deck chairs on the sinking Titanic of corporate Ireland. None of the new loans will go into capital acquisition, investment or hiring. These activities have stopped not because credit got dear, but because economic demand for goods and services has collapsed.

Third, for the banks, turning recapitalization proceeds into business loans will defeat the entire purpose of the scheme. Assuming re-capitalization is needed because bank’s capital is running too low relative to the size of the impaired or threatened loans, recapitalization must drive up the capital-to-loans ratio. Taking the money and using it to issue more loans will do exactly the opposite.

And this brings us to the issue of costs. The scheme will use the last of the remaining taxpayers’ money – the National Pensions Reserve Fund – to increase capital reserves of the banks. This means the state will no longer have any remaining capacity to inject a meaningful stimulus into the real economy. The consumers will go on cutting spending, business will go on laying off workers and the Exchequer will go on issuing new emergency responses. The more things change…