Showing posts with label Irish banking crisis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Irish banking crisis. Show all posts

Friday, November 29, 2013

29/11/2013: Central Bank: Failure of Own Sustainability Criteria on Mortgages Arrears Resolutions?

So things are getting better with mortgages arrears crisis… practically easing the worries of the nation, according to the Irish media and officialdom… And the Central Bank is delighted that the banks are so actively meeting targets etc… (Note: my coverage of the arrears figures is here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/11/28112013-irish-mortgages-arrears-q3-2013.html)

Except…

Per Central Bank: “We expect that lenders will continue to progress and develop their approaches to ensure that future sustainability targets will be achieved.  With indications the banks are now offering long term sustainable solutions to customers, the Central Bank continues to encourage meaningful engagement between lenders and borrowers.”

And what these 'sustainable solutions' might be, you should ask?

Per CB: "As at end of September 2013 the lenders in total reported they had issued proposals to 43% of mortgage accounts in arrears against a target of 30%."


Now, let me be forthright here on my views:
1) Repossessions and voluntary surrenders are a part of the solutions tool kit and are unavoidable (and indeed optimal) in a number of cases.
2) However, the above can only be deemed sustainable if and only if they take place in the context of first (ex-ante repossession or surrender) concluding arrangements between borrower and lender on what is to be done with the residual balance on mortgage remaining at the end of the property sale.

Since we do not know what percentage of all repossessions and surrenders were accompanied by such an agreement, we do not know if there is ANY (repeat - any) sustainability of debt has been achieved in the process of such a resolution. In other words, the Central Bank cannot make a factual claim that 55% of the resolution measures proposed were sustainable (aka meet the CB own criteria for them satisfying the target requirement).

Worse, the massive number - 55% - is itself an indication that the entire Central Bank-led process is a complete failure. In fairness to the Central Bank, the language of the release (http://www.centralbank.ie/press-area/press-releases/Pages/CentralBankpublishesoutcomeofMortgageArrears.aspx) suggests that the bank is not entirely happy with the status quo distribution:

"There has been a change in the trend of proposed solutions from Quarter 2 to Quarter 3. In Quarter 2 62% of the proposals were in the Surrender/Repossession category, which decreased to 55% in Quarter 3."

But there are problems even with this claim. Firstly, there is no trend. There is not enough time series data to show ANY (repeat - any) trend up or down in the data. What we have is one quarter against another. Should the 'trend' of 7 percentage points per quarter continue, we will end 2014 with over 40% 'resolutions' leading to foreclosures or surrenders of properties. Given the bank wants to deliver 75% resolutions target by the end of 2014, this would imply that more than 40% of the mortgages accounts in arrears will be in liquidation. That is a trend to a national disaster.

Thursday, November 28, 2013

28/11/2013: Irish Mortgages Arrears: Q3 2013


Numbers are out for Residential Mortgages Arrears in Q3 2013 and the data shows that the chronic problem of mortgages distress is still with us with little change after months of tough talks from the authorities, 'resolute' actions from the banks and a barrage of legislative, regulatory and rhetorical changes.

Top of the line numbers are still frightening, albeit things have largely faltered out on most fronts.


  • Total number of PDH accounts at risk or defaulted (defined as all accounts currently in arrears, restructured and not in arrears, and in repossessions) at the end of Q3 2013 stood at 185,604, down 329 accounts or 0.2% from Q3 2012. 
  • Over the 12 months through September 2013, number of BTL accounts at risk or in default rose 3,022 (+5.9%) to 54,094. 
  • Thus, total number of mortgages accounts currently at risk or defaulted at the end of Q3 2013 stood at 239,698, which is 1.1% higher than in Q3 2012. 
  • Total outstanding volume of mortgages at risk or defaulted for both BTL and PDH mortgages at the end of Q3 2013 was EUR46.77 billion, up EUR1.75 billion on year ago.
  • As of the end of Q3 2013, 20.3% of all PDH mortgages accounts and 36.65% of all BTL mortgages accounts were either in arrears, restructured due to previous arrears or in repossession. 
  • Across the entire system, 26.18% of all mortgages accounts and 33.6% of all mortgages volumes outstanding in Ireland were at risk or defaulted at the end of September 2013.

Deleveraging process is not working either:

  • Total outstanding volume of mortgages debt in the country was EUR138.88 billion in Q3 2013, only 2.4% lower than a year ago.
  • Total number of mortgages accounts fell to 915,746 in Q3 2013, down 3.08% y/y.
  • Residential mortgages in arrears rose to 141,520 accounts (+0.1% y/y) and BTLs accounts in arrears numbered 40,426 (+10.35% y/y). Thus total number of accounts in arrears was up 2.2% y/y.
  • Total outstanding volumes of mortgages in arrears stood at EUR36.56 billion in Q3 2013, up 5.8% y/y (comprising EUR25.56bn in residential mortgages volumes +4.75% y/y and EUR11.0bn of BTLs +8.32% y/y).
  • Total amounts of actual arrears rose to EUR3.479bn in Q3 2013, up 28.2% y/y.
  • Repossessions rose to 1,566 in Q3 2013 from 1,503 in Q2 2013 and 1,358 in Q3 2012. Residential repossessions rose to 1,050 from 1,001 a quarter ago and 944 a year ago. The process of repossessions remains very slow and is likely to accelerate in the near future.


These figures clearly show that banks-driven approach to the process of resolving the mortgages arrears crisis, adopted by the Government and the financial sector regulatory authorities is not delivering. To-date, the speed of mortgages arrears restructuring and resolution is disappointingly slow.

Some charts to illustrate the trends:





Friday, October 4, 2013

4/10/2013: IMF 11th review of Ireland: Banks & Exchequer

IMF released its 11th review of Irish economy under the Extended Arrangement for funding. I covered growth-related issues arising from the IMF release here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/10/4102013-imf-11th-review-of-ireland.html

Now, some other topics, namely banks and the Exchequer.

Per IMF: "Ireland is expected to return to reliance on market financing in 2014, yet further European support could make Ireland’s recovery and debt sustainability more robust. Irish banks face weak profitability that hinders their capacity to revive lending. European support to lower banks’ market funding costs could help sustain domestic demand recovery in the medium term, protecting debt sustainability and financial market confidence."

What's that about? Here are two charts:



IMF: "The recent retracement of Irish sovereign bond yields has been broadly consistent with the experience of other countries in the euro area periphery." [But wait, what about Ireland's unparalleled success in fiscal adjustments and 'best-in-class' status? Are the IMF saying that Enda did not singlehandedly deliver huge improvements in Irish bonds yields? How can this be the case, unless the Irish Government uses 'we' as denoting 'Peripheral Countries' collective in claims that the Govenment has delivered stabilisation of Government funding costs.]

"After touching record lows in early May, the 10 year yield has risen 56 basis points, to 3.98 percent as of September 11. Market tensions dissipated in July after the settlement of the political crisis in Portugal and recent turbulence in emerging markets has had limited effect on Irish bond yields. No new bond has been issued by the Irish sovereign since the €5 billion ten-year issue in mid March." The latter, of course simply means that lower supply of new bonds (lack of it since mid-March) and now the new announcement by NTMA that it will not be tapping the markets any time before official exit from Troika supports, are keeping things steady in yields terms. Otherwise… well… logic suggests, at least speculatively, they can be higher.

And on banks: "From a trough in mid-May, yields on Bank of Ireland (BoI) and Allied Irish Banks (AIB) 3 year covered bonds have edged up some 40 basis points as of September 11. Since its May 30 issuance, the yield on BoI’s 3 year senior unsecured bond has been more volatile, but overall has risen by 62 basis points, to 3.37 percent."

Bah! Two things to say about the above:

  1. Banks bonds still tracing sovereign risks and that holds even for covered bonds! Not a good sign for the banking sector. The explicit guarantee is gone, so now it is don to the implicit guarantee and the state simply cannot shake off the baggage of the original 2008 Guarantee. Irish banks are still too-big-to-fail and Irish state is still a too-small-to-bail-in banks lenders.
  2. For an army of bonds sales-desks analysts out there pontification on Irish economy, I am yet to see their honest analysis on what is happening with banks funding costs and sovereign funding costs. They are a bit too keen talking about the economy and too little about debt markets. Which is sort of 'your dentist is football analyst' analogy...

"Deposit rates continued to inch downward, however, and ECB borrowing by domestic banks fell from €39.6 billion at end March to €33.4 billion at end August, reflecting a paucity of new lending, further noncore asset deleveraging, modest amounts of new market funding, and a broadly stable deposit base."

So cheap funding dissipating, deposits (stable funding) still anaemic or declining… Happy times, folks. Stabilisation bites. Come back and argue that when businesses and households are croaking under the weight of interest on their debts with the above 'improvements'.

Why wait, however, let's take a look at IMF-reported 2009-2013 data:
Banks non-performing loans (vs provisions) as % of total loans: 2009=9% (4%) or 44.4% cover, 2012 = 11.3% (5.4%) or 47.8% cover, 2013 = 11.5% (4.5%) or 39.1% cover. So cover is shrinking! Meanwhile, personal lending rates have gone up (as ECB repo rate went down) from 11.1% in 2009 to 11.6% in 2013, and SVR mortgages rates have gone up from 3.3% in 2009 to 4.4% in 2013. Government bond yields are down from 4.9% in 2009 to 4.2% in 2013. What's happening folks" The state credit costs are being dumped onto mortgagees. The 'rescue' of the banks and subsequently the rescue of the state has been loaded up onto the borrowers from the banks.


On the positive side, Exchequer performance was good. Not spectacular, but fine - in line with (and slightly better than) budgetary targets:


Do note the caveats listed below the charts - it would be nice were the Irish authorities actually provided a clear, consistent and well-defined map of all one-off payments and receipts… but then the picture of the fiscal adjustment would not have been as pretty as our politicians like to claim. Still, the picture is broadly fine.

Crucially, the above is not sufficient for us to rest on our laurels. For a number of reasons, but chiefly for the reason not even mentioned in the IMF note: has anyone looked at how sustainable, over the medium (2015-2020) term the fiscal savings delivered by the Government are? I mean: we know that pay moderation agreements with public sector unions are not sustainable and even subject to automatic reversals in 2015-on, right? We also know that much of health system 'savings' are not sustainable, since these come on foot of extracting more and more cash out of ever-dwindling supply of private insurance holders. Right? What else is not sustainable? How much? What is the risk down the line? Is corporate tax revenue uplift we have seen over the last 24 months or so sustainable? Much of it seems to have come from MNCs booking more transfer pricing profits into Ireland. Is that 'sustainable'?

IMF does some 'sustainability' tests in its analysis and here is a scary chart:


Basically, note the path of the gross financing needs for Ireland through 2018. This returns us, under baseline (no new shocks) scenario back to the situation in 2018 where financing needs of the Exchequer are slightly above the needs in 2013. This is assuming GDP is growing 2.5% annually in real terms 2015-2018. And this is incorporating the 'savings' achieved from the Promissory Notes. And this is after we impose agreed target cuts of 2014-2015. We are swimming faster and faster to be thrown back, not even to stay put.

Now, tweak few assumptions:

So in Constant PB Scenario, the change is with no 2014-2015 'austerity' factored in, which is boring stuff. But the exciting stuff is the 'Historical Scenario' where things slide back to 'normal' on growth and government deficits:

 The outcome of the above in two charts:
1) Public debt explodes

2) Financing needs of the Government explode too

Care to argue now we can afford a 'stimulus'? As Harry Callahan put it: "Go on, punk, make my day!"

Thursday, September 26, 2013

27/9/2013: Consolidating Irish Banking Sector is a Bit of a Efficiency Dodo?

A new paper by Anolli, Mario, Beccalli, Elena and Borello, Giuliana, titled "Are European Banks Too Big? Evidence on Economies of Scale" (August 6, 2013: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2306771) "…investigates the level of economies of scale, as well as their determinants, for 103 European listed banks over the period 2000-2011…"

H/T to @brianmlucey for spotting the paper. Brian blogged on this today here: http://www.irishbusinessblog.com/2013/09/26/are-irish-banks-too-big-seems-so/


According to the abstract [emphasis is mine]: "The results reveal that economies of scale are widespread and move together for all size classes, although small and medium-sized banks experience the lowest economies of scale and even diseconomies of scale in some of the years under analysis."

The economies of scale concept as applied here is whether banks become more cost efficient when their size increases. In other words, the issue is are TBTF banks more efficient and are smaller banks, perhaps created by a regulatory breaking up of larger institutions in the wake of the crisis less efficient?

According to the authors, in the wake of the crisis: "An intense debate on the “make-them-smaller” is ongoing, and we aim to contribute from a quantitative perspective."

To do so, and "to fill the gap of evidence on European banks over the most recent years, this paper aims to investigate whether, among EU listed banks, there is evidence of economies of scale also for the largest banks in terms of total asset. Moreover it aims to isolate the effects of risk-taking, diversification in the business model and profitability on economies of scale."

"We find that economies of scale are widespread across different size classes of banks, and that they are especially wide for the largest banks. Moreover, there is a scale effect of the financial system, the smallest financial systems (Iceland, Belgium and Finland) and the countries most affected by the financial crisis (Ireland, Iceland, Belgium, Portugal and Spain) experience the lowest economies of scale (if not even diseconomies of scale) probably due to the small/reduced use of their production capacity."

Put differently, in countries like Ireland, the study finds that there is small or negative effect of larger size on greater efficiency of the banking system. Now, wait, but what about Government/Central Bank plans for consolidating the banking system into 3-pillar banks? Ooops...

"As for the effects of risk-taking, diversification in the business model and profitability on economies of scale, higher economies of scale are documented for banks more oriented towards investment banking (in all periods), banks with a higher liquidity but only up to a liquidity ratio of about 5.3 percent (convex curve during the crisis only), banks with a smaller amount of Tier 1 capital (concave, although almost flat, curve during the crisis only), and banks contributing less to systemic risk. The Granger causality tests suggest the existence of unidirectional causality for liquidity, Tier 1 and systemic risk."

So in plain English, this means that authors found that larger banks are more efficient when they are more liquid, take on more risky assets (investment banking), hold less capital (i.e. run greater risk of potential need for larger bailouts) and for banks that are less wired into the economy (contribute lower systemic risks). Oh, and the casualty for the economies of scale efficiencies goes from riskier behaviour and less connection to the economy to greater efficiency related to scale. Which part of these conclusions supports the irish Government/CB plans for 3-pillar banking system? Err… none!

Now onto country-level results: "Table 4 reports the average economies of scale for each country and for the different size classes of banks during the entire period 2000-2011."


"…Three countries (Belgium, Finland and Iceland) show overall diseconomies of scale. Meanwhile in the other European countries…, large significant economies of scale are reported (in particular for banks in the Netherlands and Switzerland). When we combine country and bank size, we observe that diseconomies of scale are experienced by the smallest banks in Finland, Germany, Ireland and Spain, the small banks in Finland, Germany, UK, Iceland and Portugal, and the medium banks in Belgium and the UK. Large banks exhibit diseconomies of scale in Ireland only, whereas largest banks show diseconomies of scale in Belgium only."

Oh, wait, so the 3 Pillars are getting worse (at being efficient) as they get bigger? You betcha… And the solution is… per Irish Government plans... to grow them even more mighty by consolidating the entire banking space in their hands. But more to come on these giants of greatness in the next table.

"Table 5 shows the average values of economies of scale for each country and in each year under analysis."



"Diseconomies of scale are more pronounced during the global financial crisis. In 2007 the number of countries that experience constant economies and diseconomies of scale (Finland, Ireland, Iceland and Spain) increases, but it is especially in 2008 that the number of countries that encountered diseconomies of scale (Belgium, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) increases. This evidence confirms, as expected, that the scale of European banks, when volumes declines due to the crisis, resulted to be excessive and inefficient due to excess capacity."

Wait a second, folks… between 2010 and 2011 Irish 'banks have: (a) shed much of their bad assets into Nama; (b) got recapitalised, and (c.) spent the last few years trimming down their operations to deliver on efficiencies demanded from them by the Central Bank… And yet - the economies of scale declined for them between 2010 and 2011.

Crazy stuff, until you realise that none of the 'reforms' we put forward to our banks have anything to do with increasing their efficiency or their capacity to function like proper banks. All our 'reforms' have been designed to suppress the explosion of bad risks on their balanceshets. Extend-and-pretend across the banking system doesn't add up to gains in efficiencies in the banking system? Who could have thought that up to be the case?

Now, how about a novel approach to repairing Irish banking system? How about getting real competition going by encouraging new entrants and freeing up (regulatory) credit unions and post offices to move into banking and consolidate within their sub-sector to form medium-sized banks? That might reduce market concentration and increase the numbers of banks with economies of scale?..

26/9/2013: Even with Hopium injections, we are not that far from Greece...

Irish Fiscal Council paper "The Government’s Balance Sheet after the Crisis: A Comprehensive Perspective" authored by Sebastian Barnes and Diarmaid Smyth is an interesting read.

The paper sets out a strong promise: "While discussion often focuses around the debt-to-GDP ratio as referenced by the EU Stability and Growth Pact, the reality is far more complex. This paper takes a comprehensive look at the Government’s balance sheet following the financial crisis. This involves assessing assets and liabilities of the General Government sector, off-balance sheet contingent and implicit liabilities as well as the wider public sector."

Alas, the side of the assets equation is a bit wanting...

While it is good to see the broader approach taken by the authors to the problem of fiscal sustainability of public finances in Ireland, too often, broadening of the coverage of the crisis-impacted sovereign balance sheet slips into the stream of extolling the riches of state-owned assets, whitewashing the liabilities using imaginary assets. The paper does not do this. Which is good. However, the paper is still creating loads of confusion because it provides no clear tabulation of the assets and the way they are accounted for in the analysis.

Instead of a concise tabulation, assets analysis is presented in two parts, both overlapping. This makes it nearly impossible to disentangle what the authors include where and to what specific value.

Let's start from the top:

Per authors: "General Government financial liabilities have increased four-fold since 2007, reaching €208 billion (127 per cent of GDP) in 2012. Over this period, Ireland experienced the largest increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio of any Euro Area country." Yep. Nothing controversial here.

"The Government has substantial holdings of financial assets. These increased modestly over the same period to reach €73 billion (45 per cent of GDP) in 2012. The main assets are cash balances, holdings of semi-state entities and investments in the banking sector."

Now, that's a bit of a statement, in my opinion, open to questions.

Firstly, it creates an impression that most of the assets Government has are liquid. Not so, in my view.

Secondly, it creates an impression that the Government has a functional power to seize these assets. Also a bit of stretch in my view.

Thirdly, is suggests that even if individually liquid and recoverable, these assets can be sold in the market or used as collateral in the case of distress. Again, not something I would agree with.

The authors conclude that "The Government’s net financial assets (NFA), subtracting financial liabilities from financial  assets, gives a broader measure of the financial position of government. NFA have  declined from a position of balance in 2007 to a net liability of €135 billion (82 per cent of GDP) in 2012. Using this broader measure, the Irish government was the third most indebted country in the Euro Area in 2012 (as a share of GDP)."

I am not so sure that EUR73 billion is the real number we should be using in computing Government net financial position. My gut feeling is that we are lucky if we can count EUR50 billion in somewhat liquid and accessible funds. And even then we are at a stretch. With that, our Government's net financial assets position rises to a  deficit of 95-96% of GDP and this means that we are now challenging Greece to the Euro area's title of the second most-indebted country. And that is before Greece Bailout 3.0 which will probably result in some sort of a debt write down for the Greeks (see here:http://english.capital.gr/News.asp?id=1877516) even if small.


Here are some details on my sceptical assessment. The paper lists the following Government 'assets' (comments outside quotation marks are obviously mine):

(A.) Shares and Other Equity. "This broad asset category was valued at €24 billion. It includes: (1) the value of semi-state assets, including the equity of General Government in the Central Bank; (2) a portion of the NPRF; and (3) other equity
holdings." (1) is at least in part imaginary. The valuations of semi state companies are 'hoped for' and are not tested in the market. They also do not account fully for the shortfalls in pension funds and the knock on effects to any purchaser of equity in these companies from the role these pension funds play in running the companies' strategies. They also ignore the fact that with transfer of ownership, the semi-states are unlikely to continue enjoy state protection of their dominant market positions. All in, (1) covers EUR12 billion of semi-states equity, plus EUR2 billion of balances in the Central Bank - of which, my guesstimate is, no more than EUR5-6 billion is recoverable. The authors state clearly that "Considerable uncertainty, however,surrounds the value of these assets." per CB reserves, these are euro system money and I wonder how much of this even technically belongs to the Irish state. (2) covers NPRF-held equities and banks shares. Equities component is small, with total EUR9 billion in NPRF 'assets' accounted for mostly by banks shares (excluding preference shares). National Accounts assign EUR11 billion to the total Government holdings of banks assets. These valuations are off the mark, in my view, as the only value of the banks (ex-Bank of Ireland) today is the value of capital injected into them, net the losses they will sustain on mortgages. The rest is awash on revenue side v cost side. At any rate, these assets are not exactly liquid and if released into the market in any appreciable quantity will cause severe dilution of their value. All-in, say EUR9-10 billion of this 'stuff' is a hoped-for value in any scenario of sovereign distress.

Bit (3) above: 'Other equity holdings' "valued at approximately €3 billion. This includes the value of direct holdings of bank equity by the Exchequer, investments in the insurance sector and capital contributions to the European Stability Mechanism." Seriously? We'd get a rebate on ESM contributions? Insurance sector 'investments'? Shave off some EUR1 billion here for a dose of realism.

(B.) Currency and deposits. "The Government holds a substantial amount of relatively liquid  assets, which are managed by the NTMA. These were valued at €24 billion at end-2012. This figure includes cash balances held by the Exchequer (€18 billion), local government (€1.4 billion) and cash balances held by other Government bodies(such as the NPRF)." Can the Government expropriate the funds belonging to local authorities? Legally and actually? Can the Government capture all balances held by the Government bodies? May be. May be not. Surely it depends on contractual obligations of these bodies and the nature of assets? So suppose that EUR2.4 billion of the above is not subject to capture/recovery.

(C.) Amongst gloriously liquid Irish Government 'assets' the paper (and it is accepted methodology, I must say, which of course doesn't mean it makes any sense beyond purely theoretical exercise) list: "Loans and Other Assets(such as Accounts Receivable). This category was valued at €15 billion and includes a broad range of assets, namely loans from the Housing Finance Authority (HFA)(€4 billion), other Government loans,tax accrual adjustments (mainly VAT and PAYE (€3 billion) and a range of smaller assets such as collaterals, EU transfers and mobile spectrum receipts." Good luck, as one might say, selling these or pledging them as a collateral. The entire notion that all of these assets have the stated face value in the market is questionable. That they might have a stated value in an environment of distress sufficient enough to warrant their seizure is plain bonkers.

And so on… The point is that a claim that EUR73 billion represents assets that can be used to fund any shortfall in Irish Government funding or that they provide any yield that is NOT accounted for on the balance sheet already (remember, current debt is driven by deficits and these are driven by operating costs and revenues of the Government, which in turn are accounting for all asset yields that currently accrue from all of the above assets) is a bit of a stretch and double-counting.

In light of this 'net liabilities' discussion, we need to see some serious, detailed, models-based liquidity and legal title risks analysis of the assets that (a) in total amount to EUR73 billion and (b) amount to EUR45 billion that remains unaccountable in the paper in any appreciable details.


But never mind - on the net, the paper is very useful and worth a read. Here are two little gems (I will blog on rest later):




Ouch! You don't need to be a nuclear scientist to spot the problem above…

The true value of the above is that it shows clearly that even on the 'net liabilities' basis, with all the hopium injected into valuations of assets, Ireland is not that much different from Greece... Have a nice day, ya all...

26/9/2013: Fiscal Council Estimates of the Promissory Note Deal

So the Irish Fiscal Council published tonight "The Government’s Balance Sheet after the Crisis: A Comprehensive Perspective" paper authored by Sebastian Barnes and Diarmaid Smyth. 

The paper is good, interesting, but as always (not a criticism) is open to interpretations, questions and debate. One criticism - it is hard to wade through double-counting and incomplete reporting of the Government assets and charts nomenclature does not appear to correspond to the one used in the text. One simple table listing all assets with the estimated value attached and a column outlining core risks to valuations involved would have saved the authors pages and pages of poorly constructed material.

Overall, however, it is good to see the broader approach taken by the authors to the problem of fiscal sustainability of public finances in Ireland. We rarely observe such. And I will be blogging on this later.


But the very interesting bit relates to the final official estimates of the Promissory Notes deal. Keep in mind, here's my on-the-record estimate of the net benefit from the deal in the range of 4.5-6.3 billion euros over 40 years horizon with most of this accruing earlier on in the life span of the deal. Here's the record (see box-out at the end of the article: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/03/2332013-sunday-times-10032013.html).

So here are the Fiscal Council estimates:

Mid-range minimum sales of bonds scenario: net savings of EUR 5-7 billion. Accelerated sales scenario: mid-range estimate of EUR 2-3 billion. Base Case for Euribor+150 and Euribor +250 at minimum levels of sales of bonds: EUR4 billion and EUR7 billion. The difference to my estimate is immaterial since I am looking at a longer time horizon for my estimates than the model used by the Fiscal Council does.

Reminder - some other estimates of the net present value of the savings from the deal run into 19 billion euros… ahem!..


I am looking forward to studying the spreadsheet with the model included which the FC is promising to make available on their website.

Friday, September 6, 2013

6/9/2013: Euromoney Country Risk Survey: Upgrading Irish Banking Sector Risks Outlook

Some good news for Ireland out of a number of surveys today. First, BlackRock Investment Institute survey of country experts shows Ireland improving economic outlook 6 months forward - details here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/09/692013-blackrock-institute-survey-north.html

Now, Euromoney Country Risk survey shows significant improvements in market experts assessment of Irish banking sector stability:



While both reflect opinions of experts, including experts within the specific sectors, the two are good indicators of the general direction toward gradual improvement in country economic outlook. Let's hope the Budget 2014 and mortgages arrears workouts do not derail this trend.

Wednesday, August 7, 2013

7/8/2013: Sunday Times, July 21, 2013: New Financial Order

Catching up on some of my past articles from the Sunday Times, here's an unedited version from July 21, 2013.

Five years into the Great Recession collapse of Irish domestic investment, underpinned by the unprecedented in history of the EU drop in lending to indigenous enterprises, continues to act as the main force holding back Irish recovery. Despite serious policy efforts to unlock banks lending, especially to the SMEs sector, expanded by the current Government and its predecessor there are many structural reasons as to why a return to the rampant lending and lending-backed investment in this economy remains elusive. After years of waiting for lending to return, we need to shift our policies focus away from attempting to refuel another SMEs credit bubble toward incentivising new forms of capital formation and accelerating the rate of existent debt restructuring in the real economy.

This week, research published by the Bruegel Institute reminded us about the horrors of the Irish credit system collapse. Looking at the outstanding credit to non-financial corporations from September 2008 through April 2013, the researchers found that Irish banking system experienced the largest decline in overall credit of all EU27 states. Ireland's outstanding credit to non-financial companies has fallen more than 50 percent over the period covered in the study, with the second-worst performing economy, Spain coming in with a more benign drop of 30 percent. Bankrupted Greece is in a distant fifth place, having posted a 'mere' 25 percent credit contraction.

Most recent Central Bank data, relating directly to the SMEs lending in Ireland, shows that new lending in Q1 2013 was 41 percent below the Q1 average for 2010-2012, despite the figures showing a slight rise quarter on quarter. Netting out new loans issued for financial intermediation and property, credit extended to SMEs in the first three months of this year was down 11 percent compared to the 2010-2012 average for the same period.

Strikingly, as Irish credit volumes shrunk faster than in any other EU state, interest rates for loans to Irish enterprises under EUR1 million in volume have declined in line with those for the lower credit risk economies. When it can be had, Irish SMEs credit is priced in line with such countries as Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK.

On the other hand, SMEs’ demand for loans remains high. In Q2 2013, according to the latest ISME survey, demand for new credit rose to 41 percent from 38 percent a year ago. On average, 48 percent of all companies that applied for funding in the first six months of 2013 were refused credit by the bank, slightly down on 51 percent average rejection rate for 2012.

Good news: demand and refusal rates are starting to move in the opposite directions, just as credit supply is beginning to turn positive. Bad news: all improvements are shallow in nature and are yet to show sustainability over time.


All of this presents us with a paradox: while credit demand is high, both supply of loans and the cost is low. The reason for this is that Irish SMEs and banks are continuing to operate in a highly abnormal environment. Changing this will require reducing a severe debt overhang in the Irish SMEs sector, regulatory changes aimed at improving banks ability and incentives to restructure legacy loans, and a lengthy period of time to heal the overall collapse in SMEs willingness to undertake risky investment.

All indicators suggest that gradual improvements in the credit quality of SMEs are not keeping up with rising demand for loans.

Per ISME data, 12 percent of SMEs that do require bank finance abstain from applying for it; over half of them in fear that making an application can lead to the banks shutting down existent credit facilities. Of those SMEs that do apply, 28 percent saw demands for overdrafts reductions imposed onto them. Over half of the credit requests made but the SMEs were for overdrafts or invoice discounting/factoring.

This largely confirms the findings of our recent research based on the ECB data collected at enterprise level across the euro area. Applied to Ireland, our findings strongly suggested that significant contributor to the decline in credit was due to structural insolvency of SMEs’ balance sheets. These drivers are not being dealt with fast enough at the policy and banks levels to allow for the recovery in private sector investment.

Firstly, Irish SMEs remain heavily exposed to legacy loans secured against or for the purpose of property investment. Back in the early 2008, several investment banks have estimated that up to 90 percent of Irish business sector loans issued from 1998-1999 through 2006-2007 were exposed to the risk of collapse in property valuations. The main outcome of this is a wave of bankruptcies that is still consuming the sector. High debt levels tied to property loans mean that over one half of all Irish SMEs loans are currently in arrears, based on the Central Bank estimates. Referencing dynamics in residential buy-to-let markets (representing household side of the investment markets) and new lending data for SMEs, my own estimates suggest that closer to 70 percent of all SMEs loans still outstanding are either in arrears or at risk of failing.

However, even for the enterprises that survived the immediate drop in asset prices, property values decline has meant reduced borrowing capacity for years to come, greater propensity to avoid seeking new credit, and weakened existent production base. Behavioural studies suggest that SMEs hit by the property valuations declines, in contrast to newer enterprises formed after the property bust, will tend to reduce their future borrowings, even if they are given access to new finance. This applies also to companies that have completed successful debt restructuring. In addition, as SMEs lower their investment in new equipment, product R&D, and strategic and operational improvements, they reduce their future competitiveness and profit margins.

Secondly, Irish SMEs are operating in the environment of malfunctioning debt restructuring mechanism.

In a normal recession, banks hold sufficient capital to actively engage with SMEs in restructuring their debts. At the same time, short time span of a normal recession means that a bulk of businesses liquidations extend into the period of early economic recovery. Sales of distressed business assets, in normal recession, often take place in rising markets.

In a severe balance sheet recession, like that experienced today in Ireland, banks transfer costs of keeping the non-performing enterprises alive to other clients. One sign of this is that charges on short-term loans, often used to cover balance sheet pressures, tend to rise slower than charges on larger, capital investment-linked loans. From the bottom of the interest rate cycle through May 2013, cost of new credit for loans up to EUR1 million based on floating rate rose 33 percent. Cost of loans over EUR1 million with over 1 year fixation rose 87 percent. Such cost transfers harm better companies' ability to raise investment, while slowing down the rate at which the insolvency works through to weed out the unsustainable businesses. End game - delayed resolution of the debt crisis at the expense of suppressed capital investment and growth.


All of the above helps explain why less than a third of all Irish SMEs that do apply for credit from their bank end up drawing down any loans. But the above also suggests the policy direction that should be taken in trying to increase domestic capital formation while continuing to pursue system-wide deleveraging.

Unlocking investment requires, first and foremost, finding new sources for funding business expansion, distinct from bank lending. Such sources include equity financing and direct borrowing. The Government needs to develop incentives for equity investment in, and peer-to-peer and public-to-business lending to Irish SMEs.

To expand the pool of potential investors, we need to open these platforms and Irish investment services to international investors and institutions. Government re-insurance scheme for exports finance can be a good step forward in making Irish SMEs more attractive to foreign investors and freeing up some operating capital for growth. Another similar measure would involve more state co-investment in existent enterprises (as opposed to new ventures) based on their ability to generate intellectual property, associated with new products and services development.

While stimulating new forms of SME funding, Ireland also needs to accelerate the process of business insolvency resolution. This will require two major changes in the way our insolvency process is regulated.

We need to recognize the necessity for allowing banks to treat business equity as lower risk asset when restructuring legacy loans for sustainable enterprises. This can help increase debt-for-equity swaps between lenders and borrowers. In return, such swaps can allow banks to use their limited resources on deleveraging out of unsustainable loans. We also need to revise our targets for banks deleveraging, potentially extending the period over which the pillar banks are required to reduce their loans exposures and increase allowance for SMEs loans to be held by the banks. To reduce overall systemic risks, we can require banks to put their restructured SMEs loans through more rigorous stress-testing.

The second major change is to relax the constraints on entrepreneurship and professional standing for business owners going through bankruptcy proceedings. This will allow for a quicker return of past entrepreneurs to new ventures and will aid SME sector deleveraging.

All of the research on SME credit in the Euro area and Ireland shows that both supply and demand drivers are responsible for the collapse of investment during the current crisis. Instead of attempting to rebuild the legacy systems based on unsustainable lending, we need to think outside the box to identify new ways for funding productive investment. Both banking and the SME sector will require significant changes to deliver on this.
                                                                                                   




Box-out:

Largely ignored by the Irish media headlines, there is a new longer-term threat to our economy emerging from the EU's penchant for policies harmonisation. This week, at the talks in Vilnius, Lithuania, EU officials were discussing the need for pan-European regulation of data protection. In part, these talks were driven by the EU-US Free Trade Agreement negotiations and the recent scandal relating to e-spying. However, the main impetus for harmonising European regulations is the emerging imbalances in the ICT services investment across the EU. Ireland’s EU partners, especially Germany and France, are unhappy that our, allegedly, light-touch regulations act as a major attractor for foreign direct investment in ICT sector, ‘stealing’ jobs from Germany and tax revenues from France. The risks implied by harmonisation of EU regulations in this area are of significant economic concern. It is, perhaps, ironic that data protection regulations or their potential harmonisation did not make it into the ESRI's latest paper on ICT-related FDI, titled "Boosting Foreign Direct Investment in the Information and Communication Technologies Sector: What Works?" published this week. Foreign providers of ICT services in Ireland dominate the sub-sector which acts as the sole source of growth in Ireland from 2008 through today. Between Q1 2008 through Q1 2013, Irish ICT services credit to the current account rose from EUR5.86 billion to EUR9.35 billion. In Q1 2013, ICT services trade surplus exceeded our economy’s total external balance by 37 percent. Squeeze this sector through regulatory harmonisation and Ireland’s latest recession will look like a walk in a park, while our debt sustainability risks will go back to 2011 levels.

Friday, July 19, 2013

19/7/2013: Detroit officially files for Chapter 9

So after much of prevarication and discussions with the unions (there always discussions with the unions involved), the City of Detroit has filed for Chapter 9 federal bankruptcy protection. Detroit recently missed USD40 million payment to its own pension system and has amassed estimated USD18.5-20 billion in long-term liabilities.

Washington Post has an excellent timeline on the crisis: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/07/18/detroit-just-filed-for-bankruptcy-heres-how-it-got-there/

The city has shrunk over the decades from over 1.8 million in 1950 Census to around 700,000 currently (2010 Census put Detroit population at 713,777). In 2000-2010 the city population fell by 25% with the city rankings in the US by population falling from 10th largest to 18th largest. Meanwhile the six-counties Metropolitan Detroit area population is healthy at 4.296 million and ranks 13th largest in the US.

Quote from the Washington Post: "The official unemployment is now 18.6 percent, and fewer than half of the city’s residents over the age of 16 are working. Per capita income is an extremely low $15,261 a year…"

And another quote: "“The city’s operations have become dysfunctional and wasteful after years of budgetary restrictions, mismanagement, crippling operational practices and, in some cases, indifference or corruption,” Orr wrote in May. “Outdated policies, work practices, procedures and systems must be improved consistent with best practices of 21st-century government.” (Detroit has been a one-party city run by Democrats since 1962.)"

A good compendium of information on Chapter 9 bankruptcy for the cities from the Business Inside here: http://www.businessinsider.com/municipal-bankruptcies-explained-2013-7

Apocalyptic imagery of the city: http://www.marchandmeffre.com/detroit/

And my earlier post on the lessons Detroit bankruptcy process offers in comparatives to Ireland's errors in relation to the banks crisis:
http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/06/662013-detroit-is-about-to-go-bankrupt.html
As usual, this blog was ahead of the Irish news curve by a month...

Lastly, a ray of hope: http://www.businessinsider.com/after-filing-bankruptcy-detroit-is-on-the-verge-of-an-epic-comeback-2013-7

Which echoes some of my tweets on the subject (read from the bottom tweet up):