8/7/2013: IMF on Euro Area: Repetition in the Endless Unlearning of Reality

IMF released its statement on 2013 Article IV Consultation with the Euro Area

The Statement reads (emphasis mine):
"Policy actions over the past year have addressed important tail risks and stabilized financial markets. But growth remains weak and unemployment is at a record high."

So what needs to be done, you might ask? Oh, nothing new, really. Euro area needs:
-- To take "concerted policy actions to restore financial sector health and complete the banking union". Wait… err… this was not planned to-date? Really?
-- "continued demand support in the near term and deeper structural reforms throughout the euro area remain instrumental to raise growth and create jobs". In other words: find some dish to spend on stuff and hope this will do the trick on short-term growth. Reform thereafter.

Not exactly encouraging? How about this: "…the centrifugal forces across the euro area remain serious and are pulling down growth everywhere. Financial markets are still fragmented along national borders and the cost of borrowing for the private sector is high in the periphery, particularly for smaller enterprises. Ailing banks continue to hold back the flow of credit." So the solution is - more credit? Now, what did we call credit in old days? Right… debt, so: "In the face of high private debt and continued uncertainty, households and firms are postponing spending—previously, this was mainly a problem of the periphery but uncertainty over the adequacy and timing of the policy response is now making itself felt in falling demand in the core as well." Wait a second, now: more credit… err… debt will solve the problem, but the problem is too much debt… err… credit from the past…

Ok, from IMF own publication earlier this year, what happens when credit - debt - is let loose:

Source: http://blog-imfdirect.imf.org/2013/03/05/a-missing-piece-in-europes-growth-puzzle/


Just in case you need more of this absurdity: "…reviving growth and employment is imperative. This requires actions on multiple fronts—repairing banks’ balance sheets, making further progress on banking union, supporting demand, and advancing structural reforms. These actions would be mutually reinforcing: measures to improve credit conditions in the periphery would boost investment and job creation in new productive sectors, which in turn would help restore competitiveness and raise growth in these economies. A piecemeal approach, on the other hand, could further undermine confidence and leave the euro area vulnerable to renewed stress." Oh, well, 5 years ago we needed

1. 'actions on repairing banks balance sheets' - five years later, we still need them;
2. actions on 'supporting demand' - aka, no tax increases and some investment stimulus - five years on, we still need them;
3. actions on 'advancing structural reforms' and five years on, we still need them too;
4. "measures to improve credit conditions in the periphery would boost investment and job creation in new productive sectors" - wait a second ten years ago we had easy credit conditions in the periphery and they failed comprehensively to 'boost investment and job creation in new productive sectors', having gone instead to fuel property and public spending bubbles… five years since the start of the crisis, we now should expect a sudden change in the economies response to easier credit supply?

IMF is more sound on banks: "bank losses need to be fully recognized, frail but viable banks recapitalized, and non-viable banks closed or restructured". But, five years, bank losses needed to be fully recognised too and we are still waiting. And when it comes to closing or restructuring non-viable banks, pardon me, but where was the IMF in the case of Ireland when the country was forced by the ECB to underwrite non-viable banks with taxpayers funds?

"A credible assessment of bank balance sheets is necessary to lift confidence in the euro area financial system." Ok, we had three assessments of euro area banks - none credible and all highly questionable in outcomes. Five years in, we are still waiting for an honest, open, transparent assessment.

Cutting past the complete waffle on the banking union and ESM, "The ECB could build on existing instruments—such as a new LTRO of longer tenor coupled with a review of current collateral policies, particularly on loans to small and medium-sized enterprises (SME)—or undertake a targeted LTRO specifically linked to new SME lending." Ooops, I have been saying for years now that the ECB should create a long-term funding pool for most distressed banks, stretching 10-15 years. Five years into the crisis - still waiting.


On structural reforms, IMF is going now broader and further than before and I like their migration:

"For the euro area, …a targeted implementation of the Services Directive would remove barriers to protected professions, promote cross-border competition, and, ultimately, raise productivity and incomes. A new round of free trade agreements could provide a much-needed push to improve services productivity. In addition, further support for credit and investment could be achieved through EIB facilities. The securitization schemes proposed by the European Commission and the European Investment Bank could also underpin SME lending and capital market development." Do note that the last two proposals are still about debt generation (see above).

"At the national level, labor market rigidities [same-old] should be tackled to raise participation, address duality—which disproportionally hurts younger workers—and, where necessary, promote more flexible bargaining arrangements. At the same time, lowering regulatory barriers to entry and exit of firms and tackling vested interests in the product markets throughout the euro area would support competitiveness, as it would deliver a shift of resources to export sectors [ok, awkwardly put, but pretty much on the money. Except, greatest protectionism in the EU is accorded to banks and famers, and these require first and foremost restructuring]."

In short - little new imagination, loads of old statements replays and little irony in recognising that much of this has been said before… five years before, four years before, three years before, two years before, a year before… you get my point.

10/6/2013: Italian GDP for Q1 2013

Italian GDP release for Q1 2013 in few tweets and a picture

So, 'fail' on preliminary reading, showing lead indicators being too optimistic. Expectations average was for -2.2% decline. And per components:

 Note the last one - growth crisis accelerating, not otherwise.

Note one positive contributor... the only one...

And quarterly changes on real GDP side:

So we know austerity has been savage. Really, savage...

28/5/2013: Germany Might Have Caused the Euro Crisis... but...

CNBC today cites a piece of research (http://www.cnbc.com/id/100769233) that argued that "Germany's insistence on keeping wage growth in check has given the country an unfair competitive advantage vis-à-vis its euro zone peers and is preventing troubled countries from returning to growth, a new study argues."

This non-sensical argument cuts across any reasonable understanding of competitive advantage and the role of economic policy in driving this advantage. Germany undertaking structural reforms neither prevented other states from doing the same, nor imposed any costs (or reduced competitiveness) of other states. The authors of the report and the CNBC should go back to Economics 101 to brush up on their understanding of the competitive advantage concept.

In the nutshell, it is not Germany that caused the crisis - based on competitive advantage argument - but the peripheral states' lack of reforms to deliver their own competitiveness improvements.

However, the mere idea that Germany has 'caused' the crisis in the euro area still merits consideration. There are two strands of thought on this that are potentially valid:
1) Germany actively suppressed domestic demand and thus reduced aggregate demand within the euro area: while true to the point that German domestic demand was and remains too weak, this hardly implies any negative slipovers to the peripheral economies of the euro area, unless someone makes a compelling reason as to why German consumers should be buying vastly more Greek feta cheese or olive oil, and paying vastly more for their purchases; and
2) euro area construct itself induced asymmetric development within the common currency area: Germany, as the core driver of euro area creation is, thus, to be blamed for some failures of the construct.

The latter is a preferred explanation in my opinion and there is an interesting paper from the CEPR (published in March 2013: CEPR Discussion Paper No. 9404) titled "Political Credit Cycles: The Case of the Euro Zone" by Jesús Fernández-Villaverde Luis Garicano and Tano Santos that actually confirms my gut instinct.


The authors "study the mechanisms through which the adoption of the Euro delayed, rather than advanced, economic reforms in the Euro zone periphery and led to the deterioration of important institutions in these countries. We show that the abandonment of the reform process and the institutional deterioration, in turn, not only reduced their growth prospects but also fed back into financial conditions, prolonging the credit boom and delaying the response to the bubble when the speculative nature of the cycle was already evident. We analyze empirically the interrelation between the financial boom and the reform process in Greece, Spain, Ireland, and Portugal and, by way of contrast, in Germany, a country that did experience a reform process after the creation of the Euro."


Some more beef from the paper, as CEPR is password protected site:

Per authors, "Before monetary union took place with the fixing of parities on January 1, 1999, the conventional wisdom was that it would cause its least productive members -particularly Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland1- to undertake structural reforms to modernize their economies and improve their institutions. [However], due to the impact of the global financial bubble on the Euro peripheral countries, the result was the opposite: reforms were abandoned and institutions deteriorated. Moreover, …the abandonment of reforms and the institutional deterioration prolonged the credit bubble, delayed the response to the burst, and reduced the growth prospects of these countries."

How so?

"In the past, the peripheral European countries had used devaluations to recover from adverse business cycle shocks, but without correcting the underlying imbalances of their economies. The Euro promised to impose a time-consistent monetary policy and force a sound fiscal policy. It would also induce social agents to change their inflation-prone ways. Finally, … it would trigger a thorough modernization of the economy."

Germany actually is an example of what the euro was supposed to deliver:

"Faced with a limited margin of maneuver allowed by the Maastricht Treaty and with a stagnant economy, Germany chose the path of structural reforms, giving a new lease on life to German exports. But this did not happen in the peripheral countries. Instead, the underlying institutional divergence between them and the core increased. The efforts to reform key institutions that burden long-run growth, such as rigid labor markets, monopolized product markets, failed educational systems, or hugely distortionary tax systems plagued by tax evasion, were abandoned and often reversed. Behind a shining facade laid unreformed economies.

"The common origins of the financial boom are well understood. The elimination of exchange rate risk, an accommodative monetary policy, and the worldwide easing in financial conditions resulted in a large drop in interest rates and a rush of financing into the peripheral countries, which had traditionally been deprived of capital. Furthermore, demographics in Ireland and Spain favored the start of a construction boom with some foundations in real changes in housing demand, the opposite of Germany, where demographics depressed housing demand. … the percentage of the population between 15 and 64 increased dramatically in Ireland and, to a lesser degree, in Spain between the mid 1970s and 2007. In France and Germany, the peak happened about two decades earlier. Since then, both countries have experienced a slow decay in this segment of the population. These demographic trends were accompanied by an increase in the employment to population ratio and, thus, resulted in strong rates of growth even in the absence of productivity gains."

The paper identifies "two channels through which the large inflows of capital into the peripheral economies led to a gradual end to and abandonment of reforms":

1. The first channel "is the relaxation of constraints affecting all agents. It has long been observed in the political economy literature that for growth-enhancing reforms to take place, things must get “sufficiently bad” (see Sachs and Warner, 1995, and Rodrik, 1996). And, as the development literature has emphasized, foreign aid loosens these constraints by allowing those interest groups whose constraints are loosened to oppose reforms for longer. As explained in section 2, Vamvakidis (2007) also finds that this mechanism operates when debt grows, rather than aid."
2. "The second mechanism is more novel. It affects the ability and willingness of principals to extract signals from the realized variables in a bubble, where everything suggests all is well. A sequence of good realizations of observed outcomes leads principals to increase their priors of the agents’ quality. When all banks are delivering great profits, all managers look competent; when all countries are delivering the public goods demanded by voters, all governments look efficient (this mechanism applies both to real estate bubbles, as in Ireland and Spain, and to sovereign debt bubbles, as in Portugal and Greece). This information problem has negative consequences for selection and incentives. Bad agents are not fired: incompetent managers keep their jobs and inefficient governments are reelected. The lack of selection has particularly negative consequences after the crisis hits. Moreover, incentives worsen and agents provide less effort."

Combining the two channels: "Both of these mechanisms, the relaxation of constraints and the signal extraction problem, led to a reversal of reforms and a deterioration in the quality of governance in these countries. Somewhat counterintuitively, this observation implies that being able to finance oneself at low (or negative) real interest rates may have negative long-run consequences for growth."

There is little new here:

• "Other economists have already pointed out that the financial cycle reduces future growth, simply because of the debt overhang (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1999)." [Note: the R&R 2010 controversy does little to dispel the core argument of financial cycle transmission of adverse debt effects, as I am arguing in my forthcoming Village magazine column - stay tuned for later link posting on this blog];
• "Also, researchers working on resource booms have suggested mechanisms that delay growth that apply here by analogy (a financial bubble is, in a way, a form of a resource boom). Grand, ill-conceived government programs involve lasting commitments that lead to higher taxes in the long run."
• "Also, the “Dutch disease” suffered most clearly by Ireland and Spain (with land playing the role of a natural resource here) spreads, whereby human and physical capital moves from the export-oriented sector toward real estate and the government sector. But in our view, the reform reversal and institutional deterioration suffered by these countries are likely to have the largest negative consequences for growth."
• The idea also relates to Rajan (2011), "who links the real estate bubble in the U.S. with an attempt by politicians to shore up the fortunes of a dwindling middle class." 

The authors "emphasize, instead, that in Europe the real estate boom interacted with the political-economic coalition that blocked reforms, allowing large policy errors to remain uncorrected and institutions to deteriorate."

Thus, if Germany did 'cause' the crisis in the euro periphery, it is solely by not enforcing the discipline required within a common currency area - too little stick too much carrots from Berlin was the problem, not too little imports of peripheral products into the core.

28/5/2013: That Cracking Success of the Troika Programmes

Some 'stuff' is coming out of the EU nowdays to greet the silly season of summer newsflow slowdown:

The loose-mouthed Eurogroup head Jeroen Dijsselbloem [http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20130527-702547.html?mod=googlenews_wsj] is striking again. This time on Portugal's 'progress' on the road to recovery:
""If more time is necessary because of the economic setback, that more time might be considered" as long as the country is being "compliant" with the program, Mr. Dijsselbloem told reporters after meeting with Portuguese Finance Minister Vitor Gaspar."

Of course, Dijsselbloem is simply doing what is inevitable - acknowledging that the EU/Troika programme for Portugal is as realistic as it was for

• Ireland (which undertook two extensions, one restructuring, one expropriation round vis-a-vis pensions funds, and two rates cuts to-date on its 'well-performing programme' and is looking for more), 
• Greece (which received three extensions, three restructuring, PSI - aka outright default, deficit and privatizations targets adjustments),
• Spain (which so far got only banks bailouts, but has already secured two rounds of deficit targets extensions),
• Cyprus (which hasn't even received full 'support' package yet, and already needs more funds).

It is worth noting that Portugal itself has already seen debt restructuring by the Troika in two rounds of loans extensions and two rounds of interest rates cuts.

So in the world of EU logic: if loans restructuring => success.

Please, keep in mind loans restricting ⊥ <=> success (for those of you who tend to argue that my above argument can mean that absence of EU restructuring implies success).


Oh, and while on the case of Ireland, Herr Schaeuble has stepped in to put a boot into Minister Noonan's dream of ESM swallowing loads of Irish banks' legacy debts [http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2013/05/27/business/27reuters-germany-schaeuble-banks.html?src=busln&_r=0]:"European countries should be under no illusion that they can shift responsibility for problems in their national banking sectors to the bloc's rescue mechanism". Now, recall that Minister Noonan is having high hopes riding on ESM taking stakes in Irish banks to ease burden on taxpayers. See point 1 links here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/05/26052013-ireland-hard-at-work-on-troika.html

So it looks like another round of loans restructurings is in works, just to underpin the immense success of the Troika programmes in Euro area 'periphery'.

15/5/2013: Straight from 1984... The Department of Stabilisation...

Fir the fun of reading between the lines, follow my italics:

"IMF Executive Board Approves €1 Billion Arrangement Under Extended Fund Facility for Cyprus

The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) today approved a three-year SDR 891 million (about €1 billion, or US$1.33 billion; 563 percent of the country’s quota) arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility  (EFF) for Cyprus in support of the authorities’ economic adjustment program. [Given that Greece has more than double time to 'repay' its 'facilities' and Cyprus is likely to face an economic collapse worse than that experienced in Greece, good luck betting on that 3-year window not staying open less than a decade] The approval allows for the immediate disbursement of SDR 74.25 million (about €86 million, or US$110.7 million).

The EFF arrangement is part of a combined financing package with the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) amounting to €10 billion. It is intended to stabilize the country’s financial system [completely destabilised by the Troika arranging 'stabilisation' of the Greek economy], achieve fiscal sustainability [by pushing the GDP down by close to 13% in 2013 and likely another 15% by the end of the 'stabilisation' period], and support the recovery of economic activity [devastated by the Greek 'rescue' by the Troika and botched 'rescue' of Cyprus] to preserve the welfare of the population [who now need welfare as their jobs and savings are being vaporised by the economic 'stabilisation' measures of the Troika]."

14/5/2013: Ending German Austerity... and then what?

Everyone is running around with the latest catch-phrase designed to phase out thought: Germany must end austerity. So, folks, what will happen should Germany really end austerity?

Whatever it might mean, suppose end of austerity implies Germany moves from the currently projected general government deficit of -0.31% of GDP to a deficit of -3.31% of GDP, thus increasing Government spending by EUR81 billion in 2013. What then?

1. Historically (since 1997 through forecast for 2018 by the IMF) EUR1 billion increase in German GDP is associated with EUR0.21 billion rise in German Current Account, although the relationship is not strong enough to call it statistically. In other words, Germans do not spend their surpluses on goods, like other economies do. They are more likely to increase their current account surpluses when income rises.
2. Also, historically, EUR1 billion in German GDP growth is associated with EUR0.67 billion rise in German investment. 
3. Furthermore, shrinking Government deficits in Germany are associated with widening of current account deficits (see chart below) and declining overall investment in the economy
4. EUR81 billion in the euro area overall context is nothing but pittance, even before it gets diluted by German own internal demand.

Note: Change in current account balance is negative when current account deficit is falling

Let's not draw many causal conclusions out of the above, but the clear thing is: Germans do not tend to spend their budget deficits on imports of goods and services at any rate worth mentioning.

Herein rests the problem for the policy idiots squad: if Germans spend EUR81 billion more on Government, short of mandating that Berlin ships cheques out to the Euro Periphery, what on earth will this end of austerity do to help Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Greece or Italy? Add German tourists' bodies on the beaches of Italy and Greece? Fly truckloads of German youths to Spain for booze-ups? Increase sales of Fado music 700-fold? Restart bungalows sales craze in Lahinch? Open German savings accounts in Cyprus? Will these end Euro area periphery crises?

Neither one of the countries in the Euro periphery makes much of what Germans want. Irish trade with Germany is robust, but it is dominated heavily by the non-Irish corporates who channel tax arbitrage via trade, leaving little on the ground in Ireland to call 'national income'. 

So what if Germany 'ends austerity'? German demand for goods and services will go up. But it will be demand for German-made and Core-made goods and services, plus stuff from Asia Pacific. It will also push German unemployment from 5.6% to 5.4% or maybe 5.3%, depending on how many more peripheral countries' emigrants Germany can absorb. 

These might be good things for Germany. But sure as hell, if German stimulus were to work like neo-Keynesianistas hope it will, pressure on ECB to keep rates low and banks liquidity ample will be reduced, while internal German rates imbalance will amplify. German bond yields might also rise, which will only add to the already hefty debt servicing pressures in euro periphery. Does anyone think it might be a good idea for ECB to hike rates then? No?

Truth is - there is no substitute for getting Euro periphery's economies in order. German stimulus or 'end of German austerity' can sound plausibly nice, but the real problem in the EU is not German sluggish demand (it is a part of German problem, to be frank, but not the major one when it comes to the Euro area as a whole). The real problem in the EU is lack of real, tangible, non-leveraged growth sources.

5/5/2013: Things are going according to plan... in Italy & Germany

That euro area 'policy' for dealing with the crisis is working marvelously, yeah?

Source: Euromoney Country Risk
Note: lower ECR score = higher sovereign credit risk

Yes, Italy's bonds are trading at much lower yields, and the country is issuing new debt at lower costs... but how much of that has to do with something / anything that Italian Government has done, as opposed to the overall shifts in markets sentiment / liquidity flows, who knows? One thing is for sure, absent yields changes, Italian fundamentals are getting worse, not better. Ditto, between, for all other 'peripherals'.

26/4/2013: ECB's policy mismatch in 6 graphs

For those interested in the monetary drivers of the current euro area crisis, here's an interesting new paper from CESifo (WP 4178, March 31, 2013): "The Monetary Policy of the ECB: A Robin Hood Approach?" by Marcus Drometer, Thomas I. Siemsen and Sebastian Watzka.

In the paper, authors "derive four sets of counterfactual national interest rate paths for the 17 Euro Area countries for the time period 1999 to 2012. They approximate desirable national interest rates countries would have liked to implement if they could still conduct independent monetary policy. We find that prior to the financial crisis the counterfactual interest rates for Germany trace the realized EONIA rate very closely, while monetary policy has been too loose especially for the southern European countries. This situation was inverted with the onset of the financial crisis. To shed light on the underlying decision rule of the ECB, we rank different rules according to their ability to aggregate the national counterfactual paths to the EONIA rate. In addition to previous literature we find that those mechanisms which care for countries who fare economically worse than the Euro Area average perform best."

Paper is available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2244821

Here are few charts, illustrating the results. In these TR references Taylor Rule, quarterly estimated backward-looking Bundesbank rule denoted BuBa, monthly estimated Bundesbank rules with interest rates smoothing denoted BuBaS and BuBaGMM respectively for backward- and forward-looking, and realised EONIA rate.

Legend:

CHARTS

Per authors: "Two results are worth noting.

First, the counterfactual interest rate path derived from the original Taylor rule and our baseline counterfactual path (quarterly estimated backward-looking Bundesbank rule) trace each other very closely. In fact, they are hardly distinguishable. The monthly estimated Bundesbank rules with interest rate smoothing (backward- and forward-looking) deviate sometimes considerably from the quarterly paths. …all four paths yield qualitatively similar results...

Second, …all four counterfactual paths for Germany lie strikingly close to the actual realization of the EONIA rate. Especially
for the southern European countries the ECB’s monetary policy has been too loose according to all four counterfactuals."

And more: "For all four sets of counterfactual national interest rate paths the Robin Hood rules outperform the standard decision rules. Especially our "economic-needs"-rule performs exceptionally good across all four specifications. Moreover, the forward looking model performs worse than the three backward looking specifications."

In other words, ECB policy rules were completely mis-matching the reality in all countries, save Germany, with (per charts above) mismatch most dramatic in… right… Ireland.

16/4/2013: One question, Mr Market, please...

A uncomfortable question:

Faith seems to have no bounds once sentiment shifts. The Market seemed to have maintained confidence in EU's crisis-fighting 'measures' despite the fact that Cyprus case revealed an obvious lack of any real crisis-fighting 'measures' to-date.

The entire periphery-fixing policy tool kit in Europe - now into the sixth year running - still boils down to

1. Rolling out unfulfilled promises (ESM banks-sovereigns break, OMT, a banking union, fiscal policies coordination, fiscal supports for growth - do recall that EU keeps talking about the need to 'support' growth and yet does nothing about providing such supports), 
2. Dogmatic ECB stuck in a rates and money supply policies that neither ease currency and interest rates pressures, nor provide a break from the failed transmission mechanism, and 
3. Internal devaluations of the worst kind (ad hoc loading of debt on economies already carrying too much debt & lack of reforms in the real economy - keep in mind, setting deficit targets ≠ reform). 

So would The Market please run this by me: What HAS changed between Ireland 2008 (the beginning of the euro crisis) and Cyprus 2013 (it's latest iteration) other than the channels by which more debt is being piled onto over-indebted economies hit by crisis?

Well, not much. Yesterday, IMF has issued a statement on Greece (that's right - the second country that was 'repaired' by the EU approach to crisis, ...and then repaired again... and again) claiming that with the fourth round of 'reforms' promised, Greece is now (still?) on a sustainable debt path. Never mind that the 'sustainable debt paths' so far for Greece have meant debt/GDP ratios bounds for sustainability rising from 'under 120%' within Programme 1 to 'under 200%' within Programme 4.

31/3/2013: German Hartz IV reforms - evidence

Another interesting paper, worth a read: Krebs, Tom and Scheffel, Martin, "Macroeconomic Evaluation of Labor Market Reform in Germany" (February 2013). IMF Working Paper No. 13/42.

Back in 2005 Germany undertook a massive reform of social welfare systems, known as Hartz IV reform. This "amounted to a complete overhaul of the German unemployment insurance system and resulted in a significant reduction in unemployment benefits for the long-term unemployed".

The IMF paper used "an incomplete-market model with search unemployment to evaluate the macroeconomic and welfare effects of the Hartz IV reform". The model was calibrated to German data before the reform followed by simulation of the calibrated model to identify the effects of Hartz IV.

"In our baseline calibration, we find that the reform has reduced the long-run (non-cyclical) unemployment rate in Germany by 1.4 percentage points. We also find that the welfare of employed households increases, but the welfare of unemployed households decreases even with moderate degree of risk aversion."

For all the debate about the merits of such reforms, it is pretty darn clear that Hartz IV-styled reforms - currently being advocated by the IMF and the EU for the peripheral states - cannot take place in the environment of protracted and structural Euro area-wide and national recessions and especially in the presence of other exacerbating factors, such as debt overhangs,  insolvency regime breaks, dysfunctional banking sector, monetary policy mismatch, etc.

Put simply, in 2005, German economy was into its second year of (anaemic at 0.7% in 2004 and 0.84% in 2005) growth with unemployment at an uncomfortable 11.2% still leagues below the current rates in the peripheral state. German government deficit in 2005 was at relatively benign 3.42% compared to the deficits in the peripheral states, with structural deficit at even lighter load of -2.6% of p-GDP and primary deficit at 1.0%. German debt/GDP ratio on Government side was at 68.5% of GDP. All of these parameters clearly indicate that Germany was in a much better starting position for consolidating social insurance systems than the peripheral states find themselves today.

31/3/2013: Draghi calling President Napolitano: a nasty precedent

Here's one of the best examples of the total departure of the EU institutions from the normal democratic constraints on their mandate vis-a-vis national affairs:

The story link is: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/31/us-italy-vote-draghi-idUSBRE92U01W20130331?feedType=RSS&feedName=businessNews

For a reply:

That is correct (assuming the reported call did take place): the ECB represents a sub-section of the executive pillar of power in the EU (and via the national central banks - in the member states), just as the US Fed. Neither the Fed nor the ECB have any business in influencing or restricting the legislative pillar (in the case of the above incident - the electoral process) or the entire executive pillar (in the above case - pertaining to the Presidency to which monetary policy institutions are accountable or co-accountable whenever oversight over monetary policy institutions co-rests with legislature) or the judiciary (presumably, Mr Draghi might call on European or national judges too, should their workings approach the issues related to OMT or other aspects of the monetary policy).

To see this, simply replace ECB's Draghi with, say, General X of the Common Security & Defence Policy calling President Napolitano to express concerns about Italian elections. How fast will 'military interference in political affairs' rise to media headlines?

Europe is now clearly on a dangerous path that can lead to subversion or manipulation of democratic institutions and processes. 

30/3/2013: Euro area sovereign risk rises in March 2013

Here's an interesting bit of data (pertaining to analysts' survey): per Euromoney Country Risk survey:

"As of late March 2013, the survey indicates that 13 of the 17 single currency nations have succumbed to increased transfer risk [risk of government non-payment or non-repatriation of funds] since... two-and-a-half years ago." And the worst offenders are?.. Take a look at two charts (lower scores, higher risk):

Per definition of the transfer risk: "The risk of government non-payment/non-repatriation – a measure of the risk government policies and actions pose to financial transfers – is one of 15 indicators economists and other country risk experts are asked to evaluate each quarter. It is used to compile the country’s overall sovereign risk score, in combination with data concerning access to capital, credit ratings and debt indicators."

6/3/2013: BlackRock Institute Economic Cycle Survey 03/2013

BlackRock Investment Institute has released the latest results from its Economic Cycle Survey for EMEA and North America & Western Europe.

Before looking at the results, note:

1. The survey represents the summary of the views of a panel of economists polled by the BlackRock Investment Institute, and not the view of the Institute itself
2. In some instances, survey covers small number of responses (see two tables below detailing the depth of coverage), with low coverage corresponding to survey results being indicative, rather than consensus-conclusive.

So core results for North America and Western Europe regions:

In effect, little change from the previous surveys for Ireland, which remains solidly decoupled in terms of economists consensus from the peripheral states (the latter are all clustered in the upper RHS corner, corresponding to both high expectations of continued recession and current indicator of the present recession). In the case of Ireland, it is obviously very hard to tell whether or not Ireland is currently in a recession. Both GDP and GNP changes q/q and y/y do not warrant official designation of a recession, but nonetheless the economy is running at well below its potential capacity.

Per chart above, it is clear that despite the Eurostat projections for 2013 growth, Ireland does not lead the Euro Area in terms of forward expectations for economic growth when it comes to the economists' assessment.

Now on to EMEA results:

Pretty much predictable weakening of Russian growth for 2013 is reflected in the above. Two other interesting points:

1. The weakest performing states in terms of current conditions and expectations are the ones with closest ties to (and membership in) the Euro zone;
2. Weak performance for the Ukraine is reflective of the country continued political mess and the lack of sustainable fundamentals in terms of the country orientation vis-a-vis its main trading partners (the contrasting reality of the private sector closely tied into the CIS and more precisely Russian markets for investment and trade, juxtaposed by the political re-orientation toward Europe).

Note: here are the tables detailing the extent of the survey coverage depth:

4/5/2012: Fitch Bells: Ringing de Panic?

Yesterday, Fitch Ratings issued an interesting report, titled "The Future of the Eurozone: Alternative Scenarios". The report sounds alarm bells over what some markets participants have thought of as a 'past issue' - the risks of contagion from Greece to the Euro area periphery.

Fitch Ratings core view is that the eurozone will 'muddle through' the crisis, surviving in its current composition,  while taking 'gradual steps towards closer fiscal and economic integration'. 


The interesting bit comes in the discussion of possible alternatives and the associated probabilities of these alternatives. According to Fitch, there is rising (not falling, as we would expect were LTROs and Greek debt restructuring, plus the Fiscal Compact and the ESM working) risk of a protracted growth slowdown or political shock or some other shock triggering either a possible facilitated Greek exit from the Euro or a disorderly Greek exit from the common currency.


And, crucially, according to Fitch, this risk cannot be discounted. 


This bit is where Fitch's assessment is identical to mine and contradicts that of the majority of Irish 'green jersey' economists: the tail risk of a disorderly unwinding of the euro is non-zero and rising, while the disruption or cost associated with such a outcome is by far non-trivial. Prudent risk management policy would require us to start contingency planning and addressing the possible realisation of such a risk. Instead, we are preoccupied in navel gazing through the lens of the Fiscal Compact, and not even at our own 'navel', but at the European one.


Fitch view is that a full break-up and demise of the euro is probabilistically highly unlikely. This belief is based on Fitch foreseeing large financial, economic and political costs of a break-up. More interestingly, Fitch determines that a partial break-up of the euro zone - with one or more countries exiting the common currency -  would "risk severe systemic damage, although cannot be discounted". 


For those thinking we've done much to resolve the systemic euro crisis (by doing much we usually mean creation of EFSF and agreeing ESM, deploying LTROs and restructuring Greek debts, and putting in place the Fiscal Compact), Fitch has some nasty surprises. Basically, Fitch believes (and I agree with their assessment here), that "additional measures will be needed to resolve the crisis. These are likely to include some dilution of national fiscal sovereignty [beyond the current austerity programmes and Fiscal Compact], potentially some partial mutualisation of sovereign liabilities [basically - euro bonds of sorts] and resources [some transfers to peripheral states], as well as measures to enhance pan-eurozone financial supervision and intervention, combined with further institutional reforms to strengthen eurozone economic governance". Basically, you can read this as: little done, much much much more to do still...


It gets worse.


Of all the alternative scenarios presented, Fitch believes that the most likely scenario will involve a Greek exit, with Greece re-denominating its debt in a new currency and default on its bonds again. Per Fitch, the core danger will be to Cyprus, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain based on:

1. Greek exit creating an 'exit precedent' for the already distressed economies
2. Greek default impacting adversely other peripheral countries banks (especially true for Cyprus)
3. Greek default increasing the risk of capital flight from the countries
4. Greek default triggering a run on peripheral bonds just around the time when the 2013 'return to markets' horizon is in the crosshair.

Just as I usually do in my presentations on the topic, Fitch distinguishes two potential paths to Greek 'exit' - a structured and unstructured or 

• an "orderly variation with an effective eurozone policy response and minimal contagion" and 
• a "disorderly variation", involving "material contagion to the periphery and a significant increase in contingent liabilities facing the core".

Ouch, I must say, for all the folks who lost their voice arguing that my views are 'unreasonable' and 'scaremongering'. Sorry to say it, risk management approach to dealing with reality requires taking a probabilistically-weighted expected costs scenarios of the downside into the account. Simply shouting "all is sustainable here, nothing to bother with" won't do.

17/4/2012: GIPS vs Default Countries

New IMF forecasts are out for the WEO April 2012 database and so time to update some of the charts. This will happen over a number of posts, but here is the chart I used in today's presentation on the future of Irish banking and financial services.

The chart shows the impact of the current crisis in GIPS against Russia, Argentina and Iceland post their defaults. It sets pre-crisis income expressed in US dollars at 100 and then traces back years of crisis.

07/07/2011: What's in the interest rates hikes

Working away on the data for PIIGS, I was interested in a question, what if the ECB were to go to the equilibrium repo rate consistent with the current inflation & growth environment?

In a recent post (here) I did analysis of the ECB historical rates in relation to eurocoin leading indicator of growth. This chart is reproduced here with suggested ranges for the repo rates consistent with current and with higher inflation.
So if the equilibrium rates are in the neighborhood of 2.25-2.75 percent, what would 1% increase in interest rates from June 2011 rate of 1.25% do to the cost of fiscal debts financing across the PIIGS?

Using IMF projections for debt levels for PIIGS through 2016 and assuming that all interest payments are financed out of deficits / borrowing, the chart below shows the extent of the increase in the cost of interest charges on government debt by 2016:
This translates into an increase in the annual cost per capita (2016 forecast) of:

• €560.48 in Greece
• €834.84 in Ireland
• €546.74 in Italy
• €309.24 in Portugal
• €319.02 in Spain

Overall, the increases in interest costs for PIIGS will amount to ca €47.06 billion per annum or 1.23% of the PIIGS GDP and 0.44% of the Euro area GDP. Oh, and by the way, this does not take into account the additional costs of financing banks lending by the ECB.

So that should put into perspective my view of today's hike in the ECB rate, expressed earlier here. So happy wrecking ball swinging, Mr Tri(pe)chet & Co.