4/10/2012: Kicking, Picking... Dependency

Quite an interesting chart plotting the substitution of the Eurosystem Open Market Operations dependency for two groups of banks. Massive inversion of relative dependency there:

Source: Citi Research. 

25/9/2012: Some questions on foot of latest ESM statement

From today's Joint Statement of the Ministers of Finance of Germany, the Netherlands and Finland (link here):
"Specifically, we discussed the governance, independence, decision making and accountability of the new Single Supervisory Mechanism involving the ECB. The new framework has to ensure that the ECB can continue to conduct effectively and independently its current tasks, and it has to take into account the concerns of non euro area Member States regarding governance of the new supervision. This requires appropriate governance structures and a clear division of responsibilities between a new ECB Supervisory Council, which may include representatives from all Members States, and the Governing Council of the ECB. To ensure the accountability of the new Supervisory Council, it should report on the stability situation and its decisions to European Finance Ministers (Ecofin Council or Eurogroup ) as well as provide reports to the European Parliament and national Parliaments."

Key points in my view are:

• Core problem is the coordination of regulatory systems for euro area banks and non euro area banks is now further fractionalized into the space of 'supervised Euro area banks', 'non-supervised Euro area banks' (assuming the new Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) applies only to systemically important banks), 'non-Euro area banks in countries under mechanism', 'non-Euro area banks outside mechanism but inside the mechanism-covered countries', 'non-Euro area banks in countries outside the mechanism'.
• The role of the Supervisory Council vis-a-vis the Governing Council of the ECB
• The extent and nature of reporting by the Supervisory Council as well as the extent of the Ecofin / Eurogroup and EU Parliament oversight (if any) over the Supervisory Council activities.

"Regarding longer term issues, we discussed basic principles for enabling direct ESM bank recapitalisation, which can only take place once the single supervisory mechanism is established and its effectiveness has been determined. Principles that should be incorporated in design of the instrument for direct recapitalization include: 
1) direct recapitalisation decisions need to be taken by a regular decision of the ESM to be accompanied with a MoU; 
2) the ESM can take direct responsibility of problems that occur under the new supervision, but legacy assets should be under the responsibility of national authorities; 
3) the recapitalisation should always occur using estimated real economic values; 
4) direct bank recapitalisation by the ESM should take place based on an approach that adheres to the basic order of first using private capital, then national public capital and only as a last resort the ESM."

Points of note here are:

• ESM recapitalization of the banks can only take place after the SSM is both established and proven in its effectiveness. Time scale for this? Anyone's guess. While time scale for Spanish economic meltdown is pretty well in front of our eyes.
• Full and formal MoU will be required - a political no-go territory for some countries, though in fact the EU can fudge this requirement by simply re-printing as an MoU already ongoing 'reforms' processes.
• Legacy assets should remain under the responsibility of national authorities, which means there is no coverage under the ESM for crisis-related assets. One can interpret this, possibly, as a de facto no to any removal of the Irish banks assets off the hands of the Irish state. One can also read this as a potential for restructuring some of the Irish Government liabilities relating to banks, but only to the extent of altering the cost of funding these liabilities (e.g. ESM loan with no change in actual liability risk, so that Irish banks-related debts will remain Irish Government liability).
• Point (3) implies no 'future economic value' in computing ESM-available funding. In other words, losses incurred will not be covered. Which opens the question - who will cover the losses?
• Point (4) is clear with respect to equity holders (these take the hit first, then the state owned equity is wiped out, only after that - ESM), but what about lenders to the banks (private bondholders and official lenders, including ECB)?

29/8/2012: Slovenia & Ireland lead in banks-related risks

According to latest data from the Euromoney, Slovenia now leads the rise in bank-related risks in Europe. Here's a chart mapping declines in scores across Europe (lower score implies higher risk):

It is worth noting that Ireland shows the second largest risk increase  after Slovenia in absolute level terms, but the largest in percentage terms.

16/8/2012: €1.05 trillion bad loans + €2-2.5 trillion deleveraging problems

I twitted about the PWC stats on non-performing loans based on German newspaper report earlier today, and here's WSJ article on same. Frightening numbers.

16/7/2012: GFSR July 2012 - more alarm bells for European banks

IMF published Global Financial Stability Report update for June 2012, titled “Intense Financial Risks: Time for Action”

Per report: “Risks to financial stability have increased since the April 2012 Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR).

• Sovereign yields in southern Europe have risen sharply amid further erosion of the investor base.
• Elevated funding and market pressures pose risks of further cuts in peripheral euro area credit.
• The measures agreed at the recent European Union (EU) leaders’ summit provide significant steps to address the immediate crisis. Aside from supportive monetary and liquidity policies, the timely implementation of the recently agreed measures, together with further progress on banking and fiscal unions, must be a priority.
• Uncertainties about the asset quality of banks’ balance sheets must be resolved quickly, with capital injections and restructurings where needed.
•  Growth prospects in other advanced countries and emerging markets have also weakened, leaving them less able to deal with spillovers from the euro area crisis or to address their own home-grown fiscal and financial vulnerabilities. 
•  Uncertainties on the fiscal outlook and federal debt ceiling in the United States present a latent risk to financial stability."

Aside from the headlines, some interesting points from the report are:

• Market conditions worsened significantly in May and June, with measures of financial market stress reverting to, and in some cases surpassing, the levels seen during the worst period in November last year.  (see Figure 1)

•   The 3-year LTROs helped support demand for peripheral sovereign debt but that positive effect has waned. Private capital outflows continued to erode the foreign investor base in Italy and Spain (see Figures 3 and 4)

An interesting point on Euro area banking sector [emphasis mine]: “Notwithstanding the ample liquidity provided by the ECB’s refinancing operations, funding conditions for many peripheral banks and firms have deteriorated. Interbank conditions remain strained, with very limited activity in unsecured term markets, and liquidity hoarding by core euro area banks. Bank bond issuance has dropped off precipitously, with little investor demand even at higher interest rates.

“Banks in the euro area periphery have had to turn to the ECB to replace lost funding support, as cross-border wholesale funding dried up, and deposit outflows continue. The April 2012 GFSR noted that EU banks are under pressure to cut back assets, due to funding strains and market pressures, as well as to longer-term structural and regulatory drivers. The sharp reduction in bank balance sheets in the fourth quarter of 2011 continued, albeit at a slower pace, in the first quarter of 2012.

Growth in euro area private sector credit diverged significantly. While credit has contracted in Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland, it has remained more stable in some core countries.

Survey data on bank lending conditions show that credit supply remains tight, albeit less so than at the end of 2011, but that demand has also weakened more recently.

Deleveraging is also a concern for many peripheral corporations, given their historic dependence on bank funding and the risk that credit downgrades and diminished investor appetite could drive borrowing costs higher, even for high credit quality issuers.”

Now, here’s an interesting point not raised in the GFSR, but linked to the above observations: equities issuance accounts for roughly 55% of total corporate capital in US and EU. However, because the US corporates issue more bonds-backed debt than their EU counterparts, banks lending accounts for 40% of the European corporate funds raised, against 20% in the US. Which means that banks credit is about twice more important in Europe than in the US in terms of funding corporate capex. In fact, recent research from BCA clearly links US corporates ability to raise direct market funding by-passing banks to faster economic recovery in the US than in EU or Japan.

Add to this equation that European banks are worse capitalized than their US counterparts and that they are more leveraged than their US counterparts and you have a bleak prospect for the EU economy. BCA recently estimated that to bring Euro zone banks’ capital ratios to the levels comparable with the US average, the largest EU banks will have to raise some USD900 billion worth of new capital or cut their assets base by a whooping USD 9 trillion.

But wait, there’s more – you’ve heard about the latest report in the WSJ that Mario Draghi proposed to bail-in senior bondhodlers in Spanish banks? Much of the Irish commentary on this was positive, suggesting that Ireland is now in line for a retrospective deal from the ECB to recover some of the funds we paid to senior bondholders in Anglo and INBS. Setting aside the ‘wishful thinking’ nature of such comments – look at Draghi’s idea implications for EU economic activity. If bail-in does make it to the policy tool of European authorities, funding for the EA17 banks will only become more expensive in the medium and long term (risk premium on ‘bail-in probability’), which, in turn will mean even less credit for corporates, which will mean even less capex, and thus even lower prospect of recovery.

You know the story – pull one end of the carriage out of the quicksand pit, the other end sinks deeper… Let me quote BCA: “In Japan, credit contraction lasted well over nine years in the aftermath of the asset bubble bust. During that time, deflation prevailed and economic growth averaged a measly 0.5% annual pace.” Much of hope for Europe then? Not really. Recall that Japan had aggressive fiscal and monetary policies at its disposal plus booming global markets when it was undergoing credit bust. We, however, have psychotic monetary policy, no fiscal policy room and are running debt deflation cycle amidst global economic slowdown.

IMF is also on the note here: “Policymakers must resolve the uncertainty about bank asset quality and support the strengthening of banks’ balance sheets. Bank capital or funding structures in many institutions remain weak and insufficient to restore market confidence. In some cases, bank recapitalizations and restructurings need to be pursued, including through direct equity injections from the ESM into weak but viable banks…”

17/2/2012: Harmful Competition? Not so fast...

In recent years there has been much said about the dangers of competition in the banking sector across the EU and specifically in Ireland. Unfortunately, for the proponents of the argument that less competition will be a good thing, the facts are simply not stacking up in their favor.

Since 1997 ECB has published what is known as Herfindahl Index for European banking systems. The index is a measure of the size of banks in relation to overall sector, thus indicating the actual amount of competition in the national banking system. At 1.0 Index reading, the national banking system is fully monopolized by a single firm. Closer to zero, the system is characterized by the smaller, more directly competing banks.

So here are two charts:

Both show that

1. Higher Herfindahl Index reading (lower degree of competition) does not coincide with more stable or less crisis-impacted banking systems
2. During the period of bubble formation there was a reduction, not an increase in banking sector competition in Euro Area, so greater competition did not cause or contribute to the bubble inflation. In fact, the evidence is rather suggestive of the opposite effect.
3. In Ireland, competition pressures in the banking sector actually declined significantly in the years preceding the crisis (2001-2007) and it had subsequently dropped even more dramatically during the crisis.
4. Ireland's banking sector, at any time in the data period covered, was characterized by the levels of competition comparable to those found in Austria, Spain, and France, well below those of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the UK and relatively comparable to those in Sweden

So no, 'harmful competition' in Irish banking sector did not cause our crisis, nor did it even contribute to it.

9/2/2012: Interesting chart on Euro area deposits

Here's an interesting chart from Credit Suisse via zerohedge:

Now, it's not the blue line that worries me and the others (EAP5=Euro Area Periphery states or PIIGS). It's the massive dip in the grey line. Given there's little deleveraging of consumers and corporates in France and Germany and that there is little it terms of concerns for stability of German banks (whether or not this sense of security is justified or not), the chart suggests that deposits are flying out not just in fear of local banks risks, but in fear of the euro risks.

The link to zerohedge post is here.

9/2/2012: Few bothers

Today's mid-day CDS spreads (courtesy of CMA):

This should bother few sovereigns:

 and few banks:

And is likely linked to Greek bailout costs falling on: France, Netherlands, and Finland while doing nothing good to over-indebted Belgium and Italy and leading to a slowdown in Norway and Denmark... while taking a bite out of the balancesheets of few big banks. And that comes on top of markets already expecting the fallout from the Greek deal...

2/2/2012: Euro area credit supply remained constrained in Q4 2011

ECB's Bank Lending Survey (BLS) for January 2012 is out, showing dramatic failure of the December 2011 LTRO to kick start supply of credit to the real economy.

According to the BLS, credit standards by euro area banks tightened in the fourth quarter of 2011 on:

• loans to non-financial corporations (35% of euro area banks report tighter lending to NFCs in net terms, up from 16% in  the preceding quarter),
• loans to households for house purchase (29% of the euro area banks reporting net tightening of lending to households, up from 18% in the preceding quarter), and 
• loans for consumer credit (13%, up from 10% in the preceding quarter). 

Looking ahead, euro area banks "expect a further net tightening of credit standards, albeit at a slower pace than in the fourth quarter of 2011" in Q1 2012.  There is no easing of lending conditions on the horizon.

Overall rise in the net tightening  of credit standards was caused by:

• "the adverse combination of a weakening economic outlook" and 
• "the euro area sovereign debt crisis, which continued to undermine the banking sector’s financial position",
• In addition, "increased market scrutiny of bank solvency risks inQ4 2011 is likely to have exacerbated banks’ funding difficulties."

Euro area banks also reported a net decline in the demand for loans to NFCs in Q4 2011, albeit at  a slower pace than in the previous quarter (-5% in net terms, compared with -8% in Q3 2011).

• Banks indicated a sharp fall in the financing needs of firms for their fixed investment. 

The net demand for loans to households  declined further in Q4 2011, "broadly in line with previous expectations and with actual figures quoted in the previous survey round (-27% in the last quarter of 2011, compared with -24% in Q3 2011 for loans for house purchase, and -16% in the last quarter of 2011, compared with -15% in the third quarter for consumer credit).

For Q1 2012 banks expect a sizeable drop in the net demand for housing loans, while the decline in net demand for consumer credit is expected to remain in the same range.

Despite a massive LTRO in December 2011, "euro area banks reported a slight easing of access to wholesale funding in the last quarter of 2011, compared with replies from the previous survey,
although still a large number of euro area banks  (in net terms) continued to report significant
difficulties. ... Looking ahead, banks across the euro area overall expect some improvement  in access to wholesale market funding in the next quarter, potentially reflecting the anticipated effectiveness of non-standard measures taken by the ECB."

Banks also indicated that "sovereign market tensions led to a substantial deterioration of their funding conditions through balance sheet and liquidity management constraints, as well as through other, more indirect, channels. Banks also reported that vulnerabilities to risks stemming from the sovereign  crisis have significantly contributed to the tightening of credit standards, although some parts of the banking system were in a position to shield their lending policies from the impact of the crisis."

"...On the impact of new regulatory requirements on banks’ lending policies, banks’ replies point
to a further adjustment of risk-weighted assets and capital positions during the second half of 2011, to a larger extent than in the first half of the year and more than envisaged in July 2011. The same
applies for the impact of regulation on the net tightening of credit standards. In the coming months
banks indicate a further intensification of balance sheet adjustments and related constraints on the
bank lending channel."

22/1/2012: An update to Euribor risk premium post

On the foot of the previous post, I recomputed risk premia for 3 maturities: 12, 9 and 6 months euribor. Here's the chart:

And some top of the line numbers:

To compare against rates dynamics:

22/1/2012: What do interbank lending rates tell us about risk valuations?

Here is an interesting set of charts for euribor:

Notice that as maturity span shortens, there is an increasingly rapid decline in the rates in recent month. This, of course, is a reflection of two forces acting simultaneously - the ECB LTRO and the rate drop in December. You can see this here in the context of 12 months euribor plot for end-of-month (and end of last week for January 2012):

Sounds good? Indeed, the short-term end of liquidity curve improved dramatically, but... here's a trick - the long-term end of the curve is not improving as much as (1) the repo rate supports, and (2) LTRO (3 year facility) should lead it to. To see this - here's a chart:

And the above term premium is rising despite the risk premium falling:

Note: the last chart above is not seasonally adjusted and, with exception for 2010, euribor rates tend to fall seasonally in January compared to December.

In fact, current risk premia are well above the long-term relations and at more extreme end of the spectrum than during the previous months:

The above suggests to me that what we are observing in the liquidity markets is a combination of some improvement due to ECB's LTRO move (substitution along maturity curve) and the (very) incomplete pass through of ECB rate change to funding markets. There appears to be no evidence in risk reduction anywhere in sight.

26/12/2011: LTRO will not solve Euro banks' problem

As the annus horribilis concludes for the terminally ill, but refused (by the ECB & EU & the respective Governments) death, Euro area banks, the key note of that Mahlerian (the 5^th symphony-styled) Trauermarsch is the LTRO allocation of cheap 3 year €489 billion worth of ECB credit (at 1%) to the European banks. And, thus, the theme for 2012, the second movement in the opus magnum of the Euro destruction, is the looming recapitalization deadline for the said zombies – the end of June.

Alas, the hope that seems to sweep the markets to boost, albeit moderately, Euro area banks valuations – the hope that having the mother of all carry trades can help these banks recover their margins just in time to use ‘organic’ recapitalization path through mid 2012 – is seemingly out of reach.

Firstly, I put ‘organic’ in the inverted commas, since the margins rebuilding on the back of ECB-created artificial liquidity boost is about as organic as performing a puppet show with a corpse is ‘live-like’.

Secondly, the carry trade I am talking about - for those readers of this blog who are unfamiliar with finance – is the artificial exercise of taking cheap loans in one country/currency and carrying funds into purchase of assets in another country/currency. Of course, with nothing but loss making (or near-loss making) assets in the markets of the Euro zone, any banks who borrowed funds in the LTRO will be either buying Government paper (yielding on average, say, 3.0 percent margin on borrowings gives Euro area banks pre-tax uplift of just €7.3 billion in 6 months time (and no, there are no capital gains realizable, since buying today and selling into mid-2012 will leave this paper, at best, capital gains neutral). Thus, to make even a dent in the capital demand, the banks will be needing assets yielding more than double the junkier Euro area sovereign yields, which means carry trade, and all associated currency and asset risks.

Of course, Euro area banks can try to magnify their returns via ECB-offered leveraged carry trades. But unless ECB offers more LTRO-styled longer term operations, doing so at 3mo or even 11mo liquidity supply windows would be simply mad. 

So, having borrowed through LTRO, Euro area banks will purchase Government bonds which then can be used as a collateral for further ECB borrowing. So let us assume that the banks will be buying liquid debt, e.g. Spanish or Italian. The margin earned by banks is ca 2.6-3.5% per annum after they cover the cost of LTRO borrowing. Note, this carry trade will turn loss-making for the bank if the sovereign bonds yields fall below 1% cost of ECB LTRO funds. In my view, this is highly unlikely.

So the whole operation can provide some €14.6 billion annually to the banks in terms of profits earned. And this is pretty much the unleveraged maximum. Nice one, but through June 2012 hardly enough to support banks recaps. Even if EBA deadline is shifted to December 2012, profits from LTRO are nowhere near the required funds to cover recapitalizations. Recall that under 9% Core Tier 1 scenario, euro area banks require something to the tune of €119 billion in fresh capital.

The downside from this conclusion is that the Euro area banks will require, post LTRO either a warrant to die (the preferred option, assuming the death warrant involves orderly shutdown of the insolvent banks) or a public bailout of immense proportion. Given the EU hit some serious trouble coming up with €200 billion for loans to IMF, good luck with that latter option.

08/12/2011: Let the failed banks fail

John Cochrane on Europe's banking crisis:

"What financial system will we reconstruct from the ashes? The only possible answer seems to me, to go back to the beginning. We'll have to reconstruct a financial system purged of run-prone assets, and the pretense that nobody holds risk. Don't subsidize short-term debt with a tax shield and regulatory preference; tax it; or ban it for anything close to "too big to fail." Fix the contractual flaws that make shadow bank liabilities prone to runs."

and

"For nearly 100 years we have tried to stop runs with government guarantees--deposit insurance, generous lender of last resort, and bailouts. That patch leads to huge moral hazard. Giving a banker a bailout guarantee is like giving a teenager keys to the car and a case of whisky."

and

"European banks have all along been allowed to hold sovereign debt at face value, with zero capital requirement. It's perfectly safe, right?"

Brilliant.

Read the full note here.

23/11/2011: Is there a run on the euro?

So let's ask that uncomfortable question: is there a run on the euro going on that is being carried out by ... the European banks? Or in other terms, have the European banks lost their fate in the invincibility of the Euro?

It appears to be quite possible, folks. Per Bloomberg report (here), 'foreign banks' deposits with the Federal Reserve have risen from USD350bn at the end of 2010 to USD715bn as of September 30. And per Bloomberg report, the number of foreign banks with deposits at the NY Fed in excess of USD1bullion rose from 22 at the end of 2010 to 47 at the end of September 2011.

And there is more: "demand for Treasury securities that mature in under a year has increased as financial institutions boost holdings of the highest-quality assets to meet new regulations set by the BIS in Basel, Switzerland. Bank holdings of Treasuries and government-related debt totalled a record of USD1.69 trillion at the end of October 2011, up from less than USD1.1 trillion in 2008," per Bloomberg.

More signs of a run on the euro: "Rates on 3mo [US Treasury] bills ended last week at zero, down from this year's high of 0.157% in February and 5% in mid-2007..." said Bloomberg report. This is linked in the report to the banks hoarding USD-denominated assets while dumping euro-denominated assets. And the price of 3mo cross-currency basis swaps (used by the banks to convert euro into USD) fell to the levels consistent with the spread of 132bps on euro interbank offered rate. In other words, the price of converting euro into dollars in the interbank markets is now the highest since December 2008.

And things are getting scarier - since the EU plans for bonds, more bonds and quasi-bonds announcement today, the US Treasuries shot through the roof. Today's sale of 5-year USD35bn US Treasury notes came in priced at a yield of 0.937% - the lowest on record. The cover was a hefty 3.15 - the highest since May 2011 and above 2.82 average cover in last four auctions.

This is not going all too well, is it? And then there's ZeroHedge piece on the run on European assets and banks from around the world (here).


Amidst all of this, it is ironic (or may be it is iconic) that just few weeks ago on September 26th (see link here), Mario Monti - or "Fool Monti" as I came to call him in a pun - stated:

"Oggi stiamo assistendo al grande successo dell'euro e la manifestazione più concreta di questo successo è la Grecia, costretta a dare peso alla cultura della stabilità con cui sta trasformando se stessa"
or translated:
"What we are witnessing currently is the great success of the euro, and its most solid demonstration is that of Greece, which is being compelled to adopt the culture of stability and transform itself".

Detached, clueless and in denial, even when appointed as 'technocrats', let alone elected, euro elites are really not a good example of the leaders we need.

16/10/2011: Hot air balloon of G20 summits

Having by now grown accustomed to the vacuous and pompous non-statements from European leaders of the crisis, one could not have expected much from the G20 summit other than predictable verbal ping pong of the non-EU nations urging Europe to deal with the crisis and the EU representatives returning boisterous claims that the “solution” being presented are “robust”, “timely”, “resolute”, “breakthrough”-like, “decisive”, and so on. This is exactly what is going on.

This weekend’s G20 summit failed to provide for anything different. Here are just few points from the final comments by the participants. The sources are here (http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/16/us-g-idUSTRE79C74G20111016) and here (http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/15/us-g20-highlights-idUSTRE79E1DA20111015).

Per French Finance Minister Fracois Baroin, the Euro crisis "…took up a little part of our dinner last night. We presented ... elements of the global and lasting package which heads of state and government will present at the Oct 23 summit. It responds to the Greek issue, the maximization of the EFSF, on the level of core tier 1 with a calendar which will be coordinated by the heads of government for the recapitalization of the banks. It responds, naturally, on the governance of the euro zone... We still have a week to finalize it."

Extraordinary vanity and vacuousness of the statement is self-evident. The idea that the Euro area crisis – pretty much the only reason for G20 gatherings nowdays “took up a little part” is absurdly juxtaposed by the claim that the EU presented “elements of the global… package” for resolution of the crisis. And do note the language: “global package” and “lasting”. To the French, it is rather common to refer to anything that impacts them as “global”, but the stretch of terminology here is obvious – the ‘package’ will have to be about the euro zone. In other words, it is not even pan-European, let alone global!

And then there’s that “lasting” bit. Per report: “The [G20] communique urged the euro zone "to maximize the impact of the EFSF (bailout fund) in order to address contagion". EU officials said the most likely option was to use the 440 billion euro [EFSF] fund to offer partial loss insurance to buyers of stressed member states' bonds in a bid to stabilize the market.” Now, give it a thought. A ‘lasting’ package of ‘solutions’ will use temporary guarantees to buyers of distressed debt?! This begs two questions: (1) How on earth will such use of EFSF address the main problem faced by over-indebted nations, namely the problem of unsustainable debts? Guarantees will not reduce Greek, Portuguese, Irish, Italian and Spanish debts to sustainable levels. (2) If EFSF were to remain a €440bn fund, how can the said amount be sufficient to provide already-committed sovereign financing backstop through 2015-2017, supply funds for banks recapitalizations to cover the shortfalls on sovereign funding, provide additional backstop funds for the sovereign deficits in the future, and underwrite a new tranche of CDS-styled insurance contracts that will have to cover ALL of the debt issuance by the distressed sovereigns? Note: it will require to provide cover for all debt, not just maturities-specific issues in order for it to be meaningful and prevent massive amplification of upward sloping yield curve, leading to potential front-loading of new debt by the distressed states and the resulting dramatic rise in maturity mismatch risks.

Baroin went on to dig himself even deeper into the verbal hole: "I have to tell you in truth that the results of the European Council on October 23 will be decisive… We've made good progress [on Greece] with the German finance minister. There are points of agreement which are emerging rather clearly and we will have an agreement on this point, but it would be premature to say what accord will emerge on Oct 23." In  other words: the summit achieved nothing and we might not even get a resolution ready for October 23^rd summit.

On France position on Greek creditor haircuts: "We will find an answer. [Read: we have no plan] You know the French position which is quite clear: we will refuse any solution that leads to a credit event." So overall, there is no plan and any plan will have to avoid significant write-downs on Greek debt. Or in other words: we have no idea how to solve it, but any solution will be irrelevant, because France wants it to be such.

"Central banks will continue to supply banks with necessary liquidity, we will ensure banks have the necessary capital. This is a very important message central banks are sending." That sounds like ‘do more of the same’ and pray for a different outcome.

"We prepared ambitious decisions for Cannes including a list of systemically important financial institutions." Jeez, what a breakthrough. How about just checking http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/11/07/BV_STRSTST0711_VF.html list - it’s pretty comprehensive and you don’t need a summit to get it.

My favourite court jester was also out in force with statements. EU Economic Affairs Commissioner Olli Rehn didn’t wait for too long to stick his foot into his mouth:

"The communique of this meeting rightly underlines the urgency and need for decisive action to overcome the sovereign debt crisis and restore confidence in our economies."

Sorry, but does the EU Commissioner still need another communiqué to underline the importance of resolving the greatest crisis his employer faced since foundation of the EU?

"The communique welcomes, since the Washington meeting three weeks ago, that in the EU the reform of the economic governance has been concluded."

What reform, Olli? When and how has it been ‘concluded’? And if the ‘reform has been concluded’, why on earth would you say there’s any ‘urgency to overcome the crisis’?

"It is a very important reform ... It will help us to prevent future crisis"

So that’s it, folks. EU will never have another crisis again. As soon as they can deal with the current one, that is. Which, so far, has taken… oh… like 3 years of wholesale destruction of European economies and wealth.

"Beyond these positive steps, and in order to break the vicious circle, ... we put last week on the table a comprehensive plan, a road map. I am pleased to say that this plan received today a warm welcome from our G20 partners" If so, Olli, why on earth would the G20 continue to urge action?

On the net, the ‘summit’ was just another hot air balloon floating up above the havoc of reality, heading straight into the hurricane. Good luck to all on board.

12/10/2011: Starting on the right footing

Two longer-term points to start the day (and renewing the EFSF debate) right, folks.

Point 1 - Global macro and long term - excellent posts today from the Guardian (here) and from barry Eichengreen for Project Syndicate (here) both dealing with EFSF as a non-solution to the crisis, regardless of the size. Both post, just as all other analysis I've read so far can benefit from one additional reality check. What happens if/when the EFSF in its enlarged form gets implemented?

The focus of everyone's analysis so far has been the banks and the sovereign yields/ratings. Let's take a peek further ahead, to say 2014. With EFSF in place, some €500bn+ of liquidity has been pumped into the markets. The banks have taken some significant share of recapitalization funds and dumped these into Government bonds, EFSF bonds, and risky assets around the world. The Governments, having received a boost from the sovereign bond markets via their own banks are back on track to 'stimulating' the economy and the households are now fully pricing in not only their still intact gargantuan debt levels, but also future Government-assumed liabilities in EFSF. The ECB balancesheet is loaded with EFSF paper and short-term lending is rampant, implying that unwinding short term liquidity supply becomes impossible for the ECB without risking a massive liquidity crisis in the banking system. Next trace of post-EFSF world is... stagflation in the Euro land:

• Banks rising capital means margins on loans will rise, while private investment capital is now being courted by the banks at the same time as the corporates go for more debt and equity.
• Governments borrowing resumed means rates are pressured up to sustain euro valuations, which means policy rates are supported to the upside.
• ECB coffers full of EFSF paper means policy rates are supported to further upside.
• States-supported banking sector in Europe means lending supply down, compounded by higher capital calls.
• Taxes on ordinary income and wealth up, means no growth, compounding interest rates effects, despite Government 'stimulus'.

With European economy bifurcated into state-dependent sectors kept alive via debt issuance and private sector economy still on the death bed, as rates creep up to (retail levels) double digits for prime borrowers,wat takes place?

1. Heavily indebted households are being squeezed on both ends of their budget constraint;
2. Heavily debt-dependent European corporates are desperately trying to raise funding via equity issuance which runs against banks looking for more equity investors. Resulting capital crunch puts any hope for recovery on ice.
3. ECB, unable to unwind short-term funding to the banks and holding vast supply of EFSF-linked paper keeps the rates higher than Taylor rule would imply.

The problem, is that absent a direct and robust writedown of private debts and some sovereign debts, and restructuring of the banking sector, EFSF or any other similar measure, no matter how large it will be, will not be able to break the dilemma of "either banks go bust or economy goes bust".

Which brings us to Point 2: What needs to be done in restoring the banking sector to health?

Instead of focusing on immediate funding and capital issues, we need to focus on the actual causes of the disease:

Cause 1: too much debt in the system (real economy) highlighted here.

Cause 2: insolvent banking institutions nursing massive losses going forward.

To deal with both we need a systematic approach to restructuring the banking sector and household balancesheets. The latter is a tough call - expensive and hard to structure. But it will be impossible without the former and via netting of balancesheets it can be aided by the former. So here's the broadly outlined roadmap for restructuring Europe's banking sector:

Resolving Euro area banking crisis requires bold and immediate action. An independent panel, under the aegis of ECB and EBA should review the operational, capital and risk positions of top 250 banks across the Euro area and independently stress-test the banks based on mid-range assumed scenarios of sovereign bonds haircuts of 75% loss on Greek bonds, 40% loss on Portuguese bonds, 20% loss on Irish bonds, and 10% loss on Italian and Spanish bonds. In addition, risk weightings must reflect specific bank's dependency on ECB / Central Banks funding. 

The banks should be divided into 3 categories based on this stress test assessment: Solvent and Liquid banks (SL), with post-stress capital ratios of 8% and above and ECB/CB funding covering no more than 15-20% of the assets, Solvent but Illiquid banks (SI) with capital ratios of 6-8% and ECB/CB funding covering no more than 30% of the assets, and Insolvent and Illiquid banks (II) with capital ratios below 6% and ECB/CB funding covering more than 31% of the assets base.

SL banks should be required to raise additional funding in the private markets and de-leverage post capital raising to Loans to Deposits ratio (LDR) of no more than 110% over the next 5 years. 

SI banks are to be restructured, stripping back some of the non-performing assets, reducing LDRs to 100% over the next 2 years and recapitalizing them through public injection of funds from the EFSF-styled vehicle warehoused within the ECB with a mandate to unwind the vehicle through a 50% writedown of liabilities to EFSF (debt write-offs via cancelation of some of the real economic debts held by these banks - debts of households and non-financial corporations) and 50% recoverable from the banks over the period of 15 years. Public funding for recapitalization must follow full writedown of equity and non-senior debt and partial haircuts on senior debt.

II banks are to be wound down via liquidation - their performing assets and deposits sold and non-performing assets written down against capital and lenders' liabilities (bonds). 

If followed, this approach will deliver, within 12-18 months a fully cleansed banking sector for the Euro zone and improve debt overhang in the real economy, while encouraging new banks formation and competition.

06/10/2011: Has ECB done a sensible thing, at last?

Like a heavily Photoshopped version of Bill Gates can be expected to last, oh about a nanosecond in convincing the generation i-Apple of the need to buy Microsoft products, so did the interest rate’s junkies expectation that the ECB is about to drop rates to where Ben “The Helicopter” Bernanke has them proved to be short-lived.

Today’s decision  by the ECB not to alter the existent rates was both a shock to all those incapable of making a living in the real economy stagnated of cheap liquidity and to those who were expecting the ECB to miraculously discover some latent propensity to fuel inflation.

Yet, the decision was perfectly in line with ECB’s policies to-date. Worse, it was in-line with rational ECB policies to-date – the type of policies that should be predictable from the long-run perspective. ECB has held its nerve this time around. Here’s why.

Chart below shows the historical path relating ECB rates to the leading indicator for real growth in the euro area, eurocoin.

At the depth of the crisis back in 2009, rates consistent with the current eurocoin reading were justifiably lower than they are today because they were coming on the foot of severe contractions in economic activity from the tail end of 2008 and into 2009. In addition, monetary policy at the time was accommodative of growth recession, rather than of the banking and financial services crisis or the sovereign crisis. Today, the picture is different. While eurocoin has entered the period of signalling potential for renewed recessionary dynamics, the looming growth crisis is not underpinned by the change in economic fortunes for the euro area, but by a set of structural weaknesses (fiscal, banking and credit supply-related, depending on the specific country). Easy monetary policy can help, but it cannot restore the euro area economies to structural health. Instead, alleviating the pressure on growth through monetary tools can only delay the necessary adjustments in structural parameters. ECB is not about to do this and, perhaps, for a very good reason.

This means that the current leading indicators scenario should be compared not against 2008-2009 period, but against pre-crisis periods where eurocoin had also fallen to the current levels around zero. This is the period of December 2002-June 2003 and the underlying ECB repo rate at that time was around 2.5%. Get it? The policy-consistent move for ECB today would be from around 3% down to 2.5%, not from 1.5% to 1%. Given we are at 1.5%, the most consistent move would be to stay put. And this is what the ECB chose today.

By the way, in the long run, since eurocoin is the leading indicator of activity, there is a negative relationship between inflation and the growth projections it provides: higher growth signal into the future tends to coincide with lower inflationary pressures today. Or put differently, falling eurcocoin now is not necessarily a signal for well-anchored short-term inflationary expectations, something that coincides with the stated ECB concern expressed in today's statement.

Of course, ECB targets are set based on inflation, not leading growth indicators, although the two are strongly correlated with lags. Here, the same picture applies:

And the same logic holds. So based on inflationary dynamics, the ECB repo rate should be around 2.0% to 3.0% and falling from above 2% levels, but not below 1.75%. Given the starting position at 1.5%, a rational move would be to stay put. 

No surprise, then in today's decision. It could have gone like 25:75 - with lower chance for an irrational knee-jerk rates lowering reaction on the foot of the immediate crisis, and higher chance of what has been delivered.

Perhaps the only disappointing bit to today's ECB call is that the central bank will continue supplying unlimited liquidity to the insolvent banking sector under unlimited 1mo lending extended through July 2012. Perhaps the ECB had no choice, but to do that. Or may be a better option would have been to start properly assessing the quality of collateral pledged by the banks at the discount window. That would have achieved two things - simultaneously - both being good in the long run for the euro area banking sector:

1. It would have continued provision of supports to the banks with better quality assets (aka solvent but stressed banks), and
2. It would have put pressure on member states to purge their sick banks and drastically restructure the banking markets (getting rid of Dexia-esque zombies).

On top of that, ECB announced renewal of LTROs (12-mo and 13-mo) with delayed interest cover - in effect a heavy duty support for really stressed banks. Last time ECB did this was back in December 2009 and those operations were designed to shore up banks in the wake of the Lehman Bros bust.

Instead of applying some pressure on euro area's clownish 'leadership' in the banking sector, the ECB choose to call for some unspecified efforts by the banks to voluntarily shore up their balance sheets and retain earnings to provide cover for losses on their sovereign bonds exposures to weaker euro area countries. In the current climate, and with ECB providing unlimited liquidity, this is equivalent to suggesting that zombies should get out into the yard and work-off some of their rigor mortis. Good luck.

20/09/2011: EU banks losing corporate deposits & 'stress tests' scam

In a testament that the world continues to lose confidence in Euro area banking system, Europe's largest engineering firm, Siemens reportedly withdrew large amounts of deposits from the commercial banking system and deposited them with the ECB. The details of this transaction were reported in today's FT (link here) and other media outlets.

In the mean time, WSJ reported that documents distributed at the meeting of the euro area finance ministers in Wroclaw last weekend out to question the validity of the European banking stress tests carried out this summer.


Siemens withdrawal amounted, reportedly to €500 million and impacted "a large French bank", motivated by "concerns about the future financial health of the bank and partly to benefit from higher interest rates paid by the ECB". Again, per reports, Siemens now holds €4-6bn at the ECB, mostly in one-week deposits.

Siemens set up a banking arm almost a year ago to insure itself against adverse risks to liquidity flows in the context of the global financial crisis, enabling it "to tap the central bank for liquidity and deposit cash at the ECB"Siemens does not only use the ECB as a haven; it also gets paid a slightly higher interest rate than it would get from a commercial bank.

ECB, currently amidst sterilized bonds purchasing programme, uses deposit facilities to cut down on money supply increases created by it buying PIIGS bonds. To do this, ECB attracts deposits from commercial banks by offering 15bps margin on its deposits over 0.95% average interest rate for overnight deposits with euro are banks.

In effect, Siemens move kills two birds with one stone - the company achieves greater security of deposits (eliminating counter-party risks) and benefits from 0.15% spread on deposits - a nice sum amounting to €6-9mln per annum, which most likely covers its 'banking' operations costs.

In the severely distorted world of euro area banking, thus, smart corporates can have a decent free lunch, courtesy of ECB's continued insistence on protecting failed sovereigns and banks.


Per WSJ report (link here) EU banks stress tests carried out in July 2011 were based on archaic macroeconomic scenarios that did not cover the latest developments in sovereign credit markets. "The tests did not manage to restore market confidence,"reports WSJ based on the document discussed by finance ministers.

One specific macroeconomic assumption criticised relates to the scenario under which stress is applied to sovereign bond holdings of the banks - the core point of the entire exercise - "a scenario which was clearly taken over by events as months passed by."

So here we have it, folks, our ministers have now admitted what most of us knew all along - the stress tests in 2011 were as shambolic as those in 2010 despite being carried out under the watchful eye of EBA - the 'new' authority that is supposed to make the banks more transparent and better managed post-crisis.

I bet folks at Siemens Bank are glad they didn;t put much faith with euro area banks regulators...

13/09/2011: German and French Banks - "extreme" leverage & elevated risks

So what's the real trouble with German (and French) banks, folks? Errrm... they are kinda seriously bordering the "insolvency" territory.

The sources for this information, in addition to those cited below, include an excellent research note prepared by Peter Mathews (FG), TD for the Dail Finance Committee, the IMF GFSR and IMF WEO databases.

Deutsche Bank

Leveraged 52:1 (16 August 2011) based on a Tangible Common Equity (TCE) to Total Asset measurement.

Tangible Common Equity is a better gauge of solvency than Tier 1 capital, particularly in the midst of a liquidity crisis. Tier 1 gives no sense of a bank's ability to withstand a liquidity crunch as it includes market-sensitive instruments that are subject to liquidity and price declines risks. Tangible Common Equity is also a much better indicator of a bank's ability to raise further funds in the market as it inversely relates to the rate of assets dilution implied in any rights issuance. (1), (2)

As TCE of €36.2bn is written against €1.85 trillion of assets, DB has just 1.96% cover in form of TCE against assets it holds - a writedown of just 2% on the asset values (cross the book) will wipe out the DB TCE cushion, rendering its current equity-holders de facto bust. Even excluding derivatives, MorningStar estimated DB leverage (TCE ratio 2.1%) at 47.6:1.

DE's current leverage levels compare unfavorably against 44:1 TCE leveraging on Lehman Bros books at the time of collapse (ordinary leverage ratio in Lehman's prior to collapse was 31:1) and makes DB the second most-leveraged bank in the euro area after Credit Agricole.

To bring DB closer to sustainable levels of TCE delveraging - 8-10% reading (note this is different from Tier 1 capital) will require it raising €110-150 billion in equity (depending on specifics of risk weighting ratios) or 3-4 times the current valuation of TCE or 3-4 times the current market value of the DB. Implied dilution for current equity holders under such scenario bears the risk of 75%- 80% loss on equity.

Note that 8-10% ratios are rather conservative, considering that in 2006-2009 TCEs for countries with banking sector crisis averaged (across top100 banks) TCEs of 11.5% to 15.3%. (3) Raising TCEs to the crisis-average levels of ca 13.4% will require equity raising of ca 5.7 times current market valuations or implied dilution of current equity by 85%.

To match TCE/Total Asset leverage ratio of the most leveraged US bank, JP Morgan chase (5.58%), DB would require €67 billion of additional equity or equity raising to the tune of 1.8 times current market cap.

DE's current market capitalisation of €37 billion as of 2 September matches relatively closely tangible common equity of €36.2 billion. In previous weeks, DE market cap fell as low as €26 billion or 70% of TCE. A market capitalisation at or below TCE is a warning sign that the bank is in trouble and questions surround its solvency and stability.

Worse than that, per research from Espirito Santo, DB liquid assets as % of the short term (<1 year) funding in 2010 stood at 47%, well below global leaders Credit Suisse (82%), UBS (77%) and Barclays (59%). At the same time 2010 wholesale funding maturity requirement was 49% - in excess of the iquid assets cover. Again, Credit Suisse had 33% funding call against 82% cover.

DB is structurally important to Germany as its assets stand at around €1.85 trillion, close to 75% of Germany's 2010 GDP (€ 2.498 trillion).

DB exposure to Greek assets is €1.6 billion for the core Group components (sovereign debt only), of which €1.34 billion in Deutsche Postbank AG exposures. Under 70% haircut scenario across the entire DB Group, the total implied loss will be around 5% of TCE.

Commerzbank

Current leverage around 35:1 in TCE terms, which is elevated compared to both historical averages and 2008-2009 crisis levels for comparable institutions. Given current assets valuations at ca €700 billion, the implied TCE is 2.92%, which means that a writedown of 3% of the assets will result in a complete wipe-out of TCE.

The core problem with 35:1 TCE leveraging in the current environment of globally impaired liquidity is that any deleveraging of the balance sheet will require substantial equity rising, similar to that in DE as discussed above. Adjusting for derivatives held, TCE ratio in Commerzbank runs at 30:1 - according to MorningStar who called this leverage ratio as consistent with "extreme" risk rating.

Together with DB, Commerzbank account for ca 102% of German GDP. As German debt to GDP ratio currently stands at 83% and heading for 87% , German taxpayers can see significant adverse impact of the DB and Commerzbank recapitalizations should the calls on PIIGS come in.

Commerzbank is the most exposed of all German banks when it comes to Greek sovereign debt, with nominal exposure at of the end of Q2 2011 of €2.9 billion. Applying the market-expected mid-point writedown in the case of default of 70%, bank losses on the Greek sovereign bonds will wipe out around 19% of the bank equity.

Recent data shows deep concentrations of Greek risks exposures in German banking sector, with German commercial banks holding ca €19.3 billion in public sector debt from Greece, €2.9 billion worth of banks debt from Greek banks and €7.4 billion of corporate and private debt, to the total of €29.5 billion (per BIS data). According to Fitch research, only €13.1 billion of that is on the banks balancesheets, the rest tucked away off the books.


French Banks

Credit Agricole is leveraged 70:1 (assets €1.5 trillion), while BNP Paribas is leveraged 36:1 (assets €1.93 trillion, Common Equity Tier 1 ratio of 9.6% well below minimum standard set for SIFIs of 10%). Bank's assets to market value currently stands at 64:1. BNP's exposure to Greek debt is now at ca €4 billion. SocGen is leveraged 34:1 (assets €1.16 trillion) on TCE basis and 28:1 on ordinary basis (again, recall Lehman's numbers at the point of collapse were 44:1 and 31:1) the bank has huge short term funding requirements presently being exposed by the flight out of Europe by US money market funds and Asian investors. SocGen exposure to PIIGS debt is €4.3 billion, referring to banking book only. SocGen is also in trouble on the liquid assets side with 26% ratio of liquid assets to short-term wholesale funding calls in 2010. Worse, wholesale funding that matured within 1 year of 2010 as percent of total wholesale funding was 69% for SocGen. Three French pillar banks have assets coming in at well over 200% of French GDP.

The banks are aggressively moving out of the PIIGS with SocGen in recent note stated that it cut its exposures to the peripheral states by 23% since early June 2011, taking out $1.5 billion and $2 billion in assets from Greek and Italian books. French banks total exposure to Greece is estimated at around $89 billion.

On top of this, French banks are now becoming effectively shut out of the dollar funding markets (4). And liquidity woes do not stop there. US Prime money funds have cut their holdings in certificates of deposits from French banks by about 40% in the three months through August 11. The proportion of the remaining holdings of French banks short term funding notes maturing in less than a month increased to 56% on August 11 from 17% on June 11. (5) The banks, of course, deny this is happening.

Let's run though some grim figures for one of the French "dogs" - BNP: as of June 30, 2011, the bank had €109bn worth of sovereign bonds on its books, amounting to 190% of the bank TCE (that's JUST Government bonds!), of which €31bn (or 54% of TCE) was in PIIGS bonds split as follows: Portugal - €1.7bn, Ireland - €400mln, Italy - €23bn, Greece - €3.8bn, and Spain €2.5bn. 95% of these exposures were held on banking book. So, now, let's do the same exercise as above - apply 50% haircut to Greek bonds, 25% haircuts to Porto bonds, 15% to Spanish, Irish and Italian bonds - all below market rates of implied haircuts, but let's indulge them with this assumption. This adds up to a writedown of €6.21bn or a wipe out of 11% of TCE. Bank becomes insolvent.


Summary

To summarise the above, two of German core banking institutions are currently operating in the extremely risky environment with leverage levels that can be classified as "extreme". The French banking system is even more sick than the German one with leverage ratios close to those attained by Lehman and PIIGS exposures that are well in excess of "manageable", given already strained capital cushions.

In common parlance, if it barks & wags the tail, it's a dog... regardless of what the official stress tests and powerpoint slides say.


Notes

(1) See BASEL III: Long-term impact on economic performance and fluctuations, by P. Angelini, L. Clerc, V. Cúrdia, L. Gambacorta, A. Gerali, A. Locarno, R. Motto, W. Roeger, S. Van den Heuvel, J. Vlc_ek, BIS Working Paper 338, February 2011, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1858724

(2) Note that Tier 1 capital is classified into different Tiers of capital, based broadly on the maturity profile of the capital invested. The most stable capital is Tier 1 capital and consists of items such as paid-up ordinary shares, non-cumulative and non- redeemable preference shares, non-repayable share premiums, disclosed reserves and retained earnings.

(3) Bank Behavior in Response to Basel III: A Cross-Country Analysis, by Thomas F. Cosimano and Dalia S. Hakura1, May 2011, WP/11/119, IMF Working Paper, Table 3.

(4) http://www.forexcrunch.com/bnp-paribas-executive-admits-access-denied-for-dollars/

(5) http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-09-13/bnp-paribas-socgen-rebound-after-rejecting-funding-concerns.html

13/09/2011: Global contagion from Greece

In the torrent of newsflow from the euro area, we are forgetting about the wider geography of implications of the Greek default. Here are some of the points in addition to my comment to today's article on the topic in Canada's Globe & Mail (article here).

There are two core pathways through which the Greek default will have an adverse impact on banking and sovereign risk valuations outside the euro zone. Firstly, there is the direct impact via foreign banks exposure to Greek debt. These range from small to medium sized and can be concentrated in a small number of institutions in each country. Secondly, there is a number of inter-linked second order effects, which tend to have much larger implications once propagated across the global financial system.

Direct impacts include:

• Japanese banks hold $432 million in Greek debt
• U.S. banks hold $1.5 billion in Greek debt
• UK banks hold $3.4 billion in Greek debt
• Bulgaria has bank credit exposure of $13.5bn to Greece (banks and sovereign debt)
  
• Serbia's exposure is about $7 billion
• Romania's banking system is tied into $20.2 billion of exposures to Greek banks and sovereign debt
  
• Turkey $30.4 bn exposure
  
• Poland $8.0 bn
• Croatia, Hungary and the Czech Republic combined are exposed to some $460 million.

Indirect impact:

Were Greece to default, core euro area banks - Deutsche Bank (including Deutsche Post) carries ca €2.94 billion exposure, Commerzbank (€2.9 billion), but also SocGen, Credit Agricole, Commerz Bank etc will come under severe pressure to recapitalize. German banks have combined exposure to Greece of ca $22.65 billion, French banks $14.96 billion. Cross positions vis-a-vis Greek banks (with their exposure to Greek sovereign bonds of $62.8 billion) imply strong spill-overs. Thus, Greek default can lead to a severe liquidity crunch and flight to safety of deposits from not only Greek and euro area banks, but from a number of closely inter-connected banking systems, especially those with close trading and investment links to the European Economic Community.

This is bound to induce contagion across the entire euro area and spill overs to euro area banks cross links to Eastern and Central Europe and beyond. In effect, Romanian and Bulgarian banking systems are heavily dependent on Greek banks and their own banks collapse will put huge pressures on Hungary. The ripple effects of this can reach as far as Ukraine and Turkey.

There are other interesting cross-links worth looking at. Greek default can trigger default across Cyprus banking sector which holds ca $28.3bn exposure to Greek banks and sovereign debts (156% of Cypriot GDP). With 30% recovery rate on Greek default, Cyprus is facing with recapitalization bill for its banks to the tune of 10% of GDP. This, irony has it, can put pressure on Russian deposits in Cyprus and capital flows between Cyprus and CIS, which are massive - note that Cyprus is the largest single FDI transfer point for Russia with CB of Russia estimating that in 2007-2010 Cyprus banks channeled some 42bn USD worth of FDI to Russia.

To sum up, Greek default - which will inevitably combine sovereign and banking sectors defaults - will trigger a large-scale revaluation of assets and risk-weightings across a broad range of Eastern and Central European Economies, including Turkey, in effect slamming the breaks on the only growth engine within the European Economic Community and its nearest neighbours.

But there is a global cost to the Greek default as well, which rests with significant dislocations of risk-linked investment markets (equities and corporate debt), insurance and derivative products. The multiplier effects, consistent with 2008-2010 financial markets experience, suggest that magnification of Greek default costs across the global economy can reach 4 times the original volume of default itself. With 50% recovery rate on Greek liabilities, this implies a total expected cost of ca €240 billion, and with 30% recovery rate currently appearing to be more realistic, the propagated effects can sum up to €340 billion.