29/10/2012: Euro Area and GIIPS: banks & bonds

An interesting set of two charts from BIS (through Q2 2012) documenting Euro area banks' exit from GIIPS (click to enlarge):

13/10/2012: Europe's Banks are now Global Growth Zombies

Back in 2011 the IMF was concerned that in the current crisis, the European banks will withdraw / deleverage from/out Asia Pacific and other emerging regions, thus reducing the supply of credit there. 

I thought the concern to be completely misplaced. My view is currently for accelerating maturity of the credit and financial services markets in the middle income economies and emerging markets, leading to increasing independence of these regions from funding from the West and rising self-sufficiency of internal markets. In contrast to the IMF, I posited the proposition that the deleveraging of the European banks out of Asia Pacific will (1) lead to enhanced credit activity in the region itself, as regional players exploit economies of scale from buying out European operations assets, and 2) result in the reduced supply of credit in Europe, as Asian and other middle income economies' banks focus more their efforts in internal Asia Pacific markets, while using Latin American and African markets as the platforms for deploying home-grown expertise in financing rapid growth activities.

I said this then… and the evidence is coming in now to show that I was right. Today's data from the Euromoney Credit Risk analytics shows that European banks are pulling out of the merging and middle-income markets, globally, and that "the real surprise is not the pace of retreat but the speed at which the gaps are being plugged".

Per ECR: "As [the European banks] slink home to shore up capital and preserve their dwindling reserves of credibility, they leave yawning gaps that are in most (but not all) cases quickly and happily filled by non-European rivals. …Is this, in terms of long-term global reach and relevance, curtains for Europe’s battered banks, and if it is, will anyone really miss them?"

Here's some evidence: 

• "In the first eight months of 2007, the last calendar year of growth before the financial crisis, the global syndicated loans market was dominated by European banks. Eleven filled the top 20 rankings, according to Dealogic, with five in the top 10 alone. Scroll forward five years and only two names, Barclays and Deutsche Bank, sneak into the global top 20."
• "In the first eight months of 2007, nine European lenders jostled for position at the sharp end of the pan-Asia Pacific syndicated loans markets. By 2012, just two names, HSBC and Standard Chartered, featured in the top 20, and both, it can be argued, are emerging markets specialists with their roots and futures fixed firmly in Asia."
• "The most notable national absence involves France’s leading standard bearers: the likes of BNP Paribas, Société Générale and Crédit Agricole, names that once bestrode Asia, particularly in areas like trade and project finance. In just five years, all three have disappeared almost entirely from every conceivable bank ranking."
• "In Africa, the pace of [European banks] extraction is slower but just as systematic. In Latin America, some European names are selling off the silverware piece by piece; others simply cannot appear to get out fast enough."
• In Africa's banks league tables, "just three European names sneak in, while the top-20 table is a cultural sprawl of names and geographies. Four African banks – against none in 2007 – make the rankings, along with lenders from Japan (three of them), Russia (one), and the Middle East (three). Perhaps the most compelling two names, however, squeeze quietly into the table at eighth and 15th: China Construction Bank and Industrial and Commercial Bank, Beijing’s third-largest and largest lenders by market cap respectively. This is the first time over the past five years that any Chinese lender has made it into the top 20 in the pan-African syndicated loan table, but given Beijing’s apparently unstoppable rise and the seemingly inexorable waning of Europe’s financial star, surely not the last."

But the departure of European banks is being compensated for by growth of domestic finance:

• "Europe’s mass departure has been treated with a mixture of unrestrained glee and raw opportunism across Asia; whenever a European financial asset has been on the block, buyers – mostly Asian – have flocked to buy it. …Western lenders, reckons RBS Capital Markets, sold $12 billion worth of equity stakes in emerging markets in the 24 months to end-June 2012 – and over half of that sell-off has taken place in Asia."
• "In January 2012, HSBC sold its credit card business in Thailand to Bank of Ayudhya for $115 million." 
• In May 2012, "Malaysia’s CIMB completed a deal to buy most of RBS’s Asia investment banking and cash equities business for $142 million.. giving the group instant global scale."
• Dutch ING is "seeking to shed assets as fast as it possibly can: it is currently trying to sell its €43 billion Asian funds business, it has already divested a majority stake in its Chinese life insurance joint venture, Pacific Antai, to China Construction Bank, and is now looking to exit its 26% stake in an insurance joint venture with Indian battery producer Exide Industries."
• ANZ is absorbing its $550 million acquisition of the bulk of RBS’s Asia retail banking assets, and the Australian banking group "is hungry for more deals."

European banks' deleveraging – lasting from mid-2009 to the present day – has been led "… by what critics called short-sighted regulators in Brussels, Paris, Frankfurt and London desperate to boost liquidity to avoid a repeat of the financial crisis":

• Basel III rules insist on tier-one capital levels of at least 9%. 
• Political pressure is "brought to bear on, say, French banks by French politicians to ensure that French banks, first and foremost, lend French money to French clients. The same reverse-protectionism move is being played out by lenders in the UK, Belgium, Spain and the Netherlands. Pressures were put by the UK government on nationalized RBS and Lloyds to lend more to British companies, while Belgium’s KBC, which has received state aid, has sold non-core assets to focus more on its home market. Spanish Santander and other big banks are buying Spanish government bonds, according to dealers, while ING’s biggest exposure is the Netherlands, some analysts say."

The contrasting story is now with the US banks, with little evidence of these aiming to deleverage by reducing their emerging markets exposures:

• Citi "remains a top 10 player in the syndicated loans market in the first eight months of 2012 in both Latin America and Asia Pacific, just as it was in the same time period five years ago, while retaining its number one position in Africa syndicated loans."
• "JPMorgan, Citi and Bank of America Merrill Lynch filled out the top three spots in global syndicated loans for the first eight months of 2007; fast forward five years and those same players now rank first, second and fourth, separated only by Japan’s Mizuho."
• "Non-US developed-world banks are also boosting their presence in key markets at Europe’s expense."

Asia Pacific story is now also playing out in Eastern Europe and Latin America:

• "A few non-European lenders are pushing into the eastern half of Europe in search of bargains" 
• Russian Sberbank "…snapped up Volksbank International, the CEE and central Asia division of Austria-based Oesterreichische Volksbanken, for €505 million ($710 million)." 
• "… in 2011, SocGen sold its booming consumer finance, ProstoKredit, to Eurasian Bank, owned by three Kazakh and Russia oligarchs."
• Latin America "…is a region crammed with outperforming economies as well as banking groups transformed, in less than a decade, from lepers to would-be global leaders, notably the likes of Itaú Unibanco and BTG Pactual, both Brazilian, and Davivienda and Grupo de Inversiones Suramericana (Grupo Sura), both Colombian. All are ramping up their presence around Latin America, mostly at the expense of retrenching European names."
• "RBS was the first to cut and run, exiting Brazil last year, followed in short order by its withdrawal from Chile, Venezuela, Colombia and Argentina."
• Grupo Sura in 2011 completed a deal "to buy the entire Latin American operations of ING, in another blanket deal."
• HSBC sold its operations in Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras in September last year to Davivienda for a shade over $800 million. 
• "Spain’s Santander, one of Latin America’s biggest banking groups… shed its operations in Colombia, where it was a peripheral player, pocketing $1.225 billion."
• "In September, Mexico’s Grupo Financiero Banorte (GFB) announced it was formally running the rule over pension fund assets owned by Spanish lender BBVA in Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. BBVA is open, even eager, for a sale; in a statement to the Mexican Stock Exchange, GFB announced its intention to explore “opportunities to generate greater scale in the pension and retirement fund business”. BBVA manages $70 billion-worth of assets in the four countries, generating a combined profit of $300 million."
• "Again, deleveraging in Latin America appears to be the sole purview of twitchy European lenders. Scotiabank is quietly gaining strength in Latin America: the Canadian lender shelled out $1 billion last year to buy a majority stake in Colombia’s Banco Colpatria, its 20th acquisition across the region in the past six years. Citi remains solid across the region, while UBS, an investment bank more global than Swiss by nature, pumped $500 million into Grupo Sura before its ING raid."

The core problem with this is that quick deleveraging out of growth-focused regions spells diminished prospects for future profits growth for European banks and loss of access to rich deposits rapidly growing on foot of rising incomes in the regions outside sick Europe. As I warned a year ago, contrasting the IMF alarmist views, Asia, Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe will probably be fine in the short run as European banks run for the exit. In the long run, these regions' banking systems are likely to be strengthened by the current processes. Instead, the real risk is for the European lenders who are likely to be relegated to the back water of credit growth - the stagnant pool of the euro area economies. 

Thus, the real question about the future is not 'What if Europe's banks stop lending in Asia?' (as posited by the IMF), but rather 'What if the Asian banks won't care for lending in Europe?'

7/10/2012: Goldman on Euro Area banks

Some very interesting stats on the Euro Area (comparatives) banking sector from the recent (October 4) research note from the Goldman Sachs (link here). Here are some bits:

In a recent (October 4) presentation to retail investors in Cork I was speaking about the mismatch in non-financial corporations funding sources between the US and Euro Area. My conclusion was that in the medium term (2013-2015) Euro Area corporates will be forced to increase issuance of corporate bonds since their preferred source of funding - banks lending - is going to stay subdued on supply side, while the equity issuance cannot absorb simultaneous deleveraging of the banking sector, and demand for increased equity from the corporate sector, especially as Governments across the EU are going into 'tax-em-to-hell' mode when it comes to potential investors.


Here are two charts from GS note on the same:

And where are banks largest, dominant players in the economy? Why, in usual suspects...

Now, what's the problem with the above chart? Oh, let's see: Swiss and UK bankers are bankers to the world, with more exposures to assets outside their countries than inside. Irish banks listed include some IFSC banks, but... adjusting for that and adjusting for GNP/GDP gap, Irish figure is as follows:

• Covered banks: 295% of GNP as of Q2 2012 (using 2011 GNP)
• Total Assets of Domestic Group of banks as of August 2012 are 447% of 2011 GNP. Of these, 318% are purely assets relating to Irish residents.

Thus, if we are to control for the international exposures of the banks, the same relative position for Ireland is most likely to be maintained as in the chart, albeit the numbers will be smaller across all banking systems. And now think of adjusting these for the quality of assets held... and weep.


And here's a note for Michael Noonan and his friends at Irish banks: this time it is NOT going to be much different:

Do note the above is in nominal Yen, which is kinda telling - Japanese banks have not grown since 1990, inflation-adjusted, through probably 2009-2010. And that with Japanese printing cash and piling up public debt like there is no tomorrow between 1990 and today. What hope is there for the return of lending and profitability in Irish banking ca 2014 that the Central Bank and the Government and the banks have been betting on throughout their disastrous disaster management practices 2008-present?


Lastly, here are two tables neatly summarizing the epic fiasco of European (and Irish - see second table) banking:

Do note prominent positioning of Ireland's zombies, right there, with Tier Last Marfin, B of Cyprus, and Dexia...


Now for a quote... but wait a second first a preliminary set up: Irish Government claims that new regulatory regime will be a departure from the past for Irish banking. The same Government claims that too much competition in Irish banking was contributing to regulatory failures. So a duopoly of BofI + AIB zombies should foster more effective regulatory regime, right? Oh... Goldman on that (italics mine):

"At the other end of the spectrum, countries with central banks as their supervisor have generally done better, the two exceptions being the Netherlands and Ireland (where supervisors fared badly owing to the huge size of the banks that these countries had relative to their GDP – the sheer size of these made it much too difficult to supervise these, ‘too big to save’ banks in these cases)." So, tell me - if having TBTF banks = "much too difficult to supervise" banking system, how will having Duopoly banking system help supervisory effectiveness? Answer: it will hinder such effectiveness. Instead of being captive to a bunch of banks, Irish regulatory regime will be captive to two banks - incidentally, the very same ones that led capture of regulators back in 1990s-2000s.

Let's stop the reading here...


Update: In a fair criticism of the GS report, it ignores Solvency II implications, although does cover Basel III and Dodd-Frank. Solvency II omission was pointed out by the @creditplumber / David McKibbin. 

4/10/2012: Kicking, Picking... Dependency

Quite an interesting chart plotting the substitution of the Eurosystem Open Market Operations dependency for two groups of banks. Massive inversion of relative dependency there:

Source: Citi Research. 

25/9/2012: Some questions on foot of latest ESM statement

From today's Joint Statement of the Ministers of Finance of Germany, the Netherlands and Finland (link here):
"Specifically, we discussed the governance, independence, decision making and accountability of the new Single Supervisory Mechanism involving the ECB. The new framework has to ensure that the ECB can continue to conduct effectively and independently its current tasks, and it has to take into account the concerns of non euro area Member States regarding governance of the new supervision. This requires appropriate governance structures and a clear division of responsibilities between a new ECB Supervisory Council, which may include representatives from all Members States, and the Governing Council of the ECB. To ensure the accountability of the new Supervisory Council, it should report on the stability situation and its decisions to European Finance Ministers (Ecofin Council or Eurogroup ) as well as provide reports to the European Parliament and national Parliaments."

Key points in my view are:

• Core problem is the coordination of regulatory systems for euro area banks and non euro area banks is now further fractionalized into the space of 'supervised Euro area banks', 'non-supervised Euro area banks' (assuming the new Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) applies only to systemically important banks), 'non-Euro area banks in countries under mechanism', 'non-Euro area banks outside mechanism but inside the mechanism-covered countries', 'non-Euro area banks in countries outside the mechanism'.
• The role of the Supervisory Council vis-a-vis the Governing Council of the ECB
• The extent and nature of reporting by the Supervisory Council as well as the extent of the Ecofin / Eurogroup and EU Parliament oversight (if any) over the Supervisory Council activities.

"Regarding longer term issues, we discussed basic principles for enabling direct ESM bank recapitalisation, which can only take place once the single supervisory mechanism is established and its effectiveness has been determined. Principles that should be incorporated in design of the instrument for direct recapitalization include: 
1) direct recapitalisation decisions need to be taken by a regular decision of the ESM to be accompanied with a MoU; 
2) the ESM can take direct responsibility of problems that occur under the new supervision, but legacy assets should be under the responsibility of national authorities; 
3) the recapitalisation should always occur using estimated real economic values; 
4) direct bank recapitalisation by the ESM should take place based on an approach that adheres to the basic order of first using private capital, then national public capital and only as a last resort the ESM."

Points of note here are:

• ESM recapitalization of the banks can only take place after the SSM is both established and proven in its effectiveness. Time scale for this? Anyone's guess. While time scale for Spanish economic meltdown is pretty well in front of our eyes.
• Full and formal MoU will be required - a political no-go territory for some countries, though in fact the EU can fudge this requirement by simply re-printing as an MoU already ongoing 'reforms' processes.
• Legacy assets should remain under the responsibility of national authorities, which means there is no coverage under the ESM for crisis-related assets. One can interpret this, possibly, as a de facto no to any removal of the Irish banks assets off the hands of the Irish state. One can also read this as a potential for restructuring some of the Irish Government liabilities relating to banks, but only to the extent of altering the cost of funding these liabilities (e.g. ESM loan with no change in actual liability risk, so that Irish banks-related debts will remain Irish Government liability).
• Point (3) implies no 'future economic value' in computing ESM-available funding. In other words, losses incurred will not be covered. Which opens the question - who will cover the losses?
• Point (4) is clear with respect to equity holders (these take the hit first, then the state owned equity is wiped out, only after that - ESM), but what about lenders to the banks (private bondholders and official lenders, including ECB)?

16/8/2012: €1.05 trillion bad loans + €2-2.5 trillion deleveraging problems

I twitted about the PWC stats on non-performing loans based on German newspaper report earlier today, and here's WSJ article on same. Frightening numbers.

17/2/2012: Harmful Competition? Not so fast...

In recent years there has been much said about the dangers of competition in the banking sector across the EU and specifically in Ireland. Unfortunately, for the proponents of the argument that less competition will be a good thing, the facts are simply not stacking up in their favor.

Since 1997 ECB has published what is known as Herfindahl Index for European banking systems. The index is a measure of the size of banks in relation to overall sector, thus indicating the actual amount of competition in the national banking system. At 1.0 Index reading, the national banking system is fully monopolized by a single firm. Closer to zero, the system is characterized by the smaller, more directly competing banks.

So here are two charts:

Both show that

1. Higher Herfindahl Index reading (lower degree of competition) does not coincide with more stable or less crisis-impacted banking systems
2. During the period of bubble formation there was a reduction, not an increase in banking sector competition in Euro Area, so greater competition did not cause or contribute to the bubble inflation. In fact, the evidence is rather suggestive of the opposite effect.
3. In Ireland, competition pressures in the banking sector actually declined significantly in the years preceding the crisis (2001-2007) and it had subsequently dropped even more dramatically during the crisis.
4. Ireland's banking sector, at any time in the data period covered, was characterized by the levels of competition comparable to those found in Austria, Spain, and France, well below those of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the UK and relatively comparable to those in Sweden

So no, 'harmful competition' in Irish banking sector did not cause our crisis, nor did it even contribute to it.

22/1/2012: An update to Euribor risk premium post

On the foot of the previous post, I recomputed risk premia for 3 maturities: 12, 9 and 6 months euribor. Here's the chart:

And some top of the line numbers:

To compare against rates dynamics:

22/1/2012: What do interbank lending rates tell us about risk valuations?

Here is an interesting set of charts for euribor:

Notice that as maturity span shortens, there is an increasingly rapid decline in the rates in recent month. This, of course, is a reflection of two forces acting simultaneously - the ECB LTRO and the rate drop in December. You can see this here in the context of 12 months euribor plot for end-of-month (and end of last week for January 2012):

Sounds good? Indeed, the short-term end of liquidity curve improved dramatically, but... here's a trick - the long-term end of the curve is not improving as much as (1) the repo rate supports, and (2) LTRO (3 year facility) should lead it to. To see this - here's a chart:

And the above term premium is rising despite the risk premium falling:

Note: the last chart above is not seasonally adjusted and, with exception for 2010, euribor rates tend to fall seasonally in January compared to December.

In fact, current risk premia are well above the long-term relations and at more extreme end of the spectrum than during the previous months:

The above suggests to me that what we are observing in the liquidity markets is a combination of some improvement due to ECB's LTRO move (substitution along maturity curve) and the (very) incomplete pass through of ECB rate change to funding markets. There appears to be no evidence in risk reduction anywhere in sight.

30/12/2011: Taleb's quote

AN excellent quote from Nassim Taleb via @econbrothers :

"If we attempt to systematically extinguish all forest fires, we will eventually experience a big one".

Which, of course, goes to describe concisely and precisely the fallacy of rescuing all banks that Europe has pursued as a principled policy. The old Schumpeterian creative destruction is a required condition for functioning of the private economy, with the latter being the required condition for functioning of the public economy as well. Bankruptcy - as a tool for clearing the hazardously dead forest of private enterprises - must apply to the banks too.

By underwriting the entire private banking system, the EU has created the Mother of All Hazards - a dry forest with numerous pockets of quasi-extinguished fires burning. Now, all we need is wind...

26/12/2011: LTRO will not solve Euro banks' problem

As the annus horribilis concludes for the terminally ill, but refused (by the ECB & EU & the respective Governments) death, Euro area banks, the key note of that Mahlerian (the 5^th symphony-styled) Trauermarsch is the LTRO allocation of cheap 3 year €489 billion worth of ECB credit (at 1%) to the European banks. And, thus, the theme for 2012, the second movement in the opus magnum of the Euro destruction, is the looming recapitalization deadline for the said zombies – the end of June.

Alas, the hope that seems to sweep the markets to boost, albeit moderately, Euro area banks valuations – the hope that having the mother of all carry trades can help these banks recover their margins just in time to use ‘organic’ recapitalization path through mid 2012 – is seemingly out of reach.

Firstly, I put ‘organic’ in the inverted commas, since the margins rebuilding on the back of ECB-created artificial liquidity boost is about as organic as performing a puppet show with a corpse is ‘live-like’.

Secondly, the carry trade I am talking about - for those readers of this blog who are unfamiliar with finance – is the artificial exercise of taking cheap loans in one country/currency and carrying funds into purchase of assets in another country/currency. Of course, with nothing but loss making (or near-loss making) assets in the markets of the Euro zone, any banks who borrowed funds in the LTRO will be either buying Government paper (yielding on average, say, 3.0 percent margin on borrowings gives Euro area banks pre-tax uplift of just €7.3 billion in 6 months time (and no, there are no capital gains realizable, since buying today and selling into mid-2012 will leave this paper, at best, capital gains neutral). Thus, to make even a dent in the capital demand, the banks will be needing assets yielding more than double the junkier Euro area sovereign yields, which means carry trade, and all associated currency and asset risks.

Of course, Euro area banks can try to magnify their returns via ECB-offered leveraged carry trades. But unless ECB offers more LTRO-styled longer term operations, doing so at 3mo or even 11mo liquidity supply windows would be simply mad. 

So, having borrowed through LTRO, Euro area banks will purchase Government bonds which then can be used as a collateral for further ECB borrowing. So let us assume that the banks will be buying liquid debt, e.g. Spanish or Italian. The margin earned by banks is ca 2.6-3.5% per annum after they cover the cost of LTRO borrowing. Note, this carry trade will turn loss-making for the bank if the sovereign bonds yields fall below 1% cost of ECB LTRO funds. In my view, this is highly unlikely.

So the whole operation can provide some €14.6 billion annually to the banks in terms of profits earned. And this is pretty much the unleveraged maximum. Nice one, but through June 2012 hardly enough to support banks recaps. Even if EBA deadline is shifted to December 2012, profits from LTRO are nowhere near the required funds to cover recapitalizations. Recall that under 9% Core Tier 1 scenario, euro area banks require something to the tune of €119 billion in fresh capital.

The downside from this conclusion is that the Euro area banks will require, post LTRO either a warrant to die (the preferred option, assuming the death warrant involves orderly shutdown of the insolvent banks) or a public bailout of immense proportion. Given the EU hit some serious trouble coming up with €200 billion for loans to IMF, good luck with that latter option.

23/11/2011: Is there a run on the euro?

So let's ask that uncomfortable question: is there a run on the euro going on that is being carried out by ... the European banks? Or in other terms, have the European banks lost their fate in the invincibility of the Euro?

It appears to be quite possible, folks. Per Bloomberg report (here), 'foreign banks' deposits with the Federal Reserve have risen from USD350bn at the end of 2010 to USD715bn as of September 30. And per Bloomberg report, the number of foreign banks with deposits at the NY Fed in excess of USD1bullion rose from 22 at the end of 2010 to 47 at the end of September 2011.

And there is more: "demand for Treasury securities that mature in under a year has increased as financial institutions boost holdings of the highest-quality assets to meet new regulations set by the BIS in Basel, Switzerland. Bank holdings of Treasuries and government-related debt totalled a record of USD1.69 trillion at the end of October 2011, up from less than USD1.1 trillion in 2008," per Bloomberg.

More signs of a run on the euro: "Rates on 3mo [US Treasury] bills ended last week at zero, down from this year's high of 0.157% in February and 5% in mid-2007..." said Bloomberg report. This is linked in the report to the banks hoarding USD-denominated assets while dumping euro-denominated assets. And the price of 3mo cross-currency basis swaps (used by the banks to convert euro into USD) fell to the levels consistent with the spread of 132bps on euro interbank offered rate. In other words, the price of converting euro into dollars in the interbank markets is now the highest since December 2008.

And things are getting scarier - since the EU plans for bonds, more bonds and quasi-bonds announcement today, the US Treasuries shot through the roof. Today's sale of 5-year USD35bn US Treasury notes came in priced at a yield of 0.937% - the lowest on record. The cover was a hefty 3.15 - the highest since May 2011 and above 2.82 average cover in last four auctions.

This is not going all too well, is it? And then there's ZeroHedge piece on the run on European assets and banks from around the world (here).


Amidst all of this, it is ironic (or may be it is iconic) that just few weeks ago on September 26th (see link here), Mario Monti - or "Fool Monti" as I came to call him in a pun - stated:

"Oggi stiamo assistendo al grande successo dell'euro e la manifestazione più concreta di questo successo è la Grecia, costretta a dare peso alla cultura della stabilità con cui sta trasformando se stessa"
or translated:
"What we are witnessing currently is the great success of the euro, and its most solid demonstration is that of Greece, which is being compelled to adopt the culture of stability and transform itself".

Detached, clueless and in denial, even when appointed as 'technocrats', let alone elected, euro elites are really not a good example of the leaders we need.

12/10/2011: Starting on the right footing

Two longer-term points to start the day (and renewing the EFSF debate) right, folks.

Point 1 - Global macro and long term - excellent posts today from the Guardian (here) and from barry Eichengreen for Project Syndicate (here) both dealing with EFSF as a non-solution to the crisis, regardless of the size. Both post, just as all other analysis I've read so far can benefit from one additional reality check. What happens if/when the EFSF in its enlarged form gets implemented?

The focus of everyone's analysis so far has been the banks and the sovereign yields/ratings. Let's take a peek further ahead, to say 2014. With EFSF in place, some €500bn+ of liquidity has been pumped into the markets. The banks have taken some significant share of recapitalization funds and dumped these into Government bonds, EFSF bonds, and risky assets around the world. The Governments, having received a boost from the sovereign bond markets via their own banks are back on track to 'stimulating' the economy and the households are now fully pricing in not only their still intact gargantuan debt levels, but also future Government-assumed liabilities in EFSF. The ECB balancesheet is loaded with EFSF paper and short-term lending is rampant, implying that unwinding short term liquidity supply becomes impossible for the ECB without risking a massive liquidity crisis in the banking system. Next trace of post-EFSF world is... stagflation in the Euro land:

• Banks rising capital means margins on loans will rise, while private investment capital is now being courted by the banks at the same time as the corporates go for more debt and equity.
• Governments borrowing resumed means rates are pressured up to sustain euro valuations, which means policy rates are supported to the upside.
• ECB coffers full of EFSF paper means policy rates are supported to further upside.
• States-supported banking sector in Europe means lending supply down, compounded by higher capital calls.
• Taxes on ordinary income and wealth up, means no growth, compounding interest rates effects, despite Government 'stimulus'.

With European economy bifurcated into state-dependent sectors kept alive via debt issuance and private sector economy still on the death bed, as rates creep up to (retail levels) double digits for prime borrowers,wat takes place?

1. Heavily indebted households are being squeezed on both ends of their budget constraint;
2. Heavily debt-dependent European corporates are desperately trying to raise funding via equity issuance which runs against banks looking for more equity investors. Resulting capital crunch puts any hope for recovery on ice.
3. ECB, unable to unwind short-term funding to the banks and holding vast supply of EFSF-linked paper keeps the rates higher than Taylor rule would imply.

The problem, is that absent a direct and robust writedown of private debts and some sovereign debts, and restructuring of the banking sector, EFSF or any other similar measure, no matter how large it will be, will not be able to break the dilemma of "either banks go bust or economy goes bust".

Which brings us to Point 2: What needs to be done in restoring the banking sector to health?

Instead of focusing on immediate funding and capital issues, we need to focus on the actual causes of the disease:

Cause 1: too much debt in the system (real economy) highlighted here.

Cause 2: insolvent banking institutions nursing massive losses going forward.

To deal with both we need a systematic approach to restructuring the banking sector and household balancesheets. The latter is a tough call - expensive and hard to structure. But it will be impossible without the former and via netting of balancesheets it can be aided by the former. So here's the broadly outlined roadmap for restructuring Europe's banking sector:

Resolving Euro area banking crisis requires bold and immediate action. An independent panel, under the aegis of ECB and EBA should review the operational, capital and risk positions of top 250 banks across the Euro area and independently stress-test the banks based on mid-range assumed scenarios of sovereign bonds haircuts of 75% loss on Greek bonds, 40% loss on Portuguese bonds, 20% loss on Irish bonds, and 10% loss on Italian and Spanish bonds. In addition, risk weightings must reflect specific bank's dependency on ECB / Central Banks funding. 

The banks should be divided into 3 categories based on this stress test assessment: Solvent and Liquid banks (SL), with post-stress capital ratios of 8% and above and ECB/CB funding covering no more than 15-20% of the assets, Solvent but Illiquid banks (SI) with capital ratios of 6-8% and ECB/CB funding covering no more than 30% of the assets, and Insolvent and Illiquid banks (II) with capital ratios below 6% and ECB/CB funding covering more than 31% of the assets base.

SL banks should be required to raise additional funding in the private markets and de-leverage post capital raising to Loans to Deposits ratio (LDR) of no more than 110% over the next 5 years. 

SI banks are to be restructured, stripping back some of the non-performing assets, reducing LDRs to 100% over the next 2 years and recapitalizing them through public injection of funds from the EFSF-styled vehicle warehoused within the ECB with a mandate to unwind the vehicle through a 50% writedown of liabilities to EFSF (debt write-offs via cancelation of some of the real economic debts held by these banks - debts of households and non-financial corporations) and 50% recoverable from the banks over the period of 15 years. Public funding for recapitalization must follow full writedown of equity and non-senior debt and partial haircuts on senior debt.

II banks are to be wound down via liquidation - their performing assets and deposits sold and non-performing assets written down against capital and lenders' liabilities (bonds). 

If followed, this approach will deliver, within 12-18 months a fully cleansed banking sector for the Euro zone and improve debt overhang in the real economy, while encouraging new banks formation and competition.

06/10/2011: Has ECB done a sensible thing, at last?

Like a heavily Photoshopped version of Bill Gates can be expected to last, oh about a nanosecond in convincing the generation i-Apple of the need to buy Microsoft products, so did the interest rate’s junkies expectation that the ECB is about to drop rates to where Ben “The Helicopter” Bernanke has them proved to be short-lived.

Today’s decision  by the ECB not to alter the existent rates was both a shock to all those incapable of making a living in the real economy stagnated of cheap liquidity and to those who were expecting the ECB to miraculously discover some latent propensity to fuel inflation.

Yet, the decision was perfectly in line with ECB’s policies to-date. Worse, it was in-line with rational ECB policies to-date – the type of policies that should be predictable from the long-run perspective. ECB has held its nerve this time around. Here’s why.

Chart below shows the historical path relating ECB rates to the leading indicator for real growth in the euro area, eurocoin.

At the depth of the crisis back in 2009, rates consistent with the current eurocoin reading were justifiably lower than they are today because they were coming on the foot of severe contractions in economic activity from the tail end of 2008 and into 2009. In addition, monetary policy at the time was accommodative of growth recession, rather than of the banking and financial services crisis or the sovereign crisis. Today, the picture is different. While eurocoin has entered the period of signalling potential for renewed recessionary dynamics, the looming growth crisis is not underpinned by the change in economic fortunes for the euro area, but by a set of structural weaknesses (fiscal, banking and credit supply-related, depending on the specific country). Easy monetary policy can help, but it cannot restore the euro area economies to structural health. Instead, alleviating the pressure on growth through monetary tools can only delay the necessary adjustments in structural parameters. ECB is not about to do this and, perhaps, for a very good reason.

This means that the current leading indicators scenario should be compared not against 2008-2009 period, but against pre-crisis periods where eurocoin had also fallen to the current levels around zero. This is the period of December 2002-June 2003 and the underlying ECB repo rate at that time was around 2.5%. Get it? The policy-consistent move for ECB today would be from around 3% down to 2.5%, not from 1.5% to 1%. Given we are at 1.5%, the most consistent move would be to stay put. And this is what the ECB chose today.

By the way, in the long run, since eurocoin is the leading indicator of activity, there is a negative relationship between inflation and the growth projections it provides: higher growth signal into the future tends to coincide with lower inflationary pressures today. Or put differently, falling eurcocoin now is not necessarily a signal for well-anchored short-term inflationary expectations, something that coincides with the stated ECB concern expressed in today's statement.

Of course, ECB targets are set based on inflation, not leading growth indicators, although the two are strongly correlated with lags. Here, the same picture applies:

And the same logic holds. So based on inflationary dynamics, the ECB repo rate should be around 2.0% to 3.0% and falling from above 2% levels, but not below 1.75%. Given the starting position at 1.5%, a rational move would be to stay put. 

No surprise, then in today's decision. It could have gone like 25:75 - with lower chance for an irrational knee-jerk rates lowering reaction on the foot of the immediate crisis, and higher chance of what has been delivered.

Perhaps the only disappointing bit to today's ECB call is that the central bank will continue supplying unlimited liquidity to the insolvent banking sector under unlimited 1mo lending extended through July 2012. Perhaps the ECB had no choice, but to do that. Or may be a better option would have been to start properly assessing the quality of collateral pledged by the banks at the discount window. That would have achieved two things - simultaneously - both being good in the long run for the euro area banking sector:

1. It would have continued provision of supports to the banks with better quality assets (aka solvent but stressed banks), and
2. It would have put pressure on member states to purge their sick banks and drastically restructure the banking markets (getting rid of Dexia-esque zombies).

On top of that, ECB announced renewal of LTROs (12-mo and 13-mo) with delayed interest cover - in effect a heavy duty support for really stressed banks. Last time ECB did this was back in December 2009 and those operations were designed to shore up banks in the wake of the Lehman Bros bust.

Instead of applying some pressure on euro area's clownish 'leadership' in the banking sector, the ECB choose to call for some unspecified efforts by the banks to voluntarily shore up their balance sheets and retain earnings to provide cover for losses on their sovereign bonds exposures to weaker euro area countries. In the current climate, and with ECB providing unlimited liquidity, this is equivalent to suggesting that zombies should get out into the yard and work-off some of their rigor mortis. Good luck.

21/09/2011: ESRB warns of contagion across euro area financial systems

The General Board of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) held its third regular meeting today on September 21st, and here are the highlights.

In terms of assessing the current situation, the ESRB stated that "since the previous ESRB General Board meeting on 22 June 2011, risks to the stability of the EU financial system have increased considerably. Key risks stem from potential further adverse feedback effects between sovereign risks, funding vulnerabilities within the EU banking sector, and a weakening of growth outlooks both at global and EU levels."

So what ESRB is saying here is that the crisis has completed full circle: if in 2008-2009 transmission of risks worked from insolvent banking sector to insolvent sovereigns and (technically always solvent) monetary authorities via liquidity supports & recapitalization schemes, since 2010 through today the risks have flown the other way - from insolvent sovereigns to insolvent banks via bust bond valuations. The only question that remains now, is where the vicious spiral swing next. In my view - at least in anti-taxpayer, anti-competition Europe it will force taxpayers to directly recapitalize the banks (see IMF's latest calls and the rumor that France is about to go this way) to protect incumbent banking license holders from bankruptcy, receiverships and competition from healthier and new banks.

"Over the last months, sovereign stress has moved from smaller economies to some of the larger EU countries. Signs of stress are evident in many European government bond markets, while the high volatility in equity markets indicates that tensions have spread across capital markets around the world. The situation has been aggravated by the progressive drying-up of bank term funding markets, and availability of US dollar funding to EU banks had also decreased significantly. In that context, central banks have decided on coordinated US dollar liquidity-providing operations with longer maturities."

Nothing new in the above, but it is nice to see an honest admission of the ongoing liquidity crisis. Now, recall that I have said on numerous occasions that bank runs start with a run on the bank by its funders. This is what we term a liquidity crunch - interbank markets freeze, banks bonds funding streams dry out. Only after that can the depositor run develop, usually starting with corporate depositors. Funny enough - the ESRB wouldn't say it out-loud, but in effect it already called in the above statement a bank run in funding markets. Worse, we also know - from the likes of Siemens transaction reported here (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2011/09/20092011-eu-banks-losing-corporate.html ) - that to some extent (unknown) corporate deposits run might be taking place as well. Next?

"The high interconnectedness in the EU financial system has led to a rapidly rising risk of significant contagion. This threatens financial stability in the EU as a whole and adversely impacts the real economy in Europe and beyond."
Boom!

So, per ESRB:
"Decisive and swift action is required from all authorities. In the immediate future this includes:
* implementing, fully and rapidly, the measures agreed upon at the 21 July meeting of the Heads of State or Government of the euro area;
* adopting sustainable fiscal policies and growth-enhancing structural measures so as to achieve or maintain credibility of sovereign signatures in global markets; and
* enhancing the coordination and consistency of communication.
Now, I am not a fan of July 21 decisions, primarily because they do not address the core issue of the crisis - too much debt in the system and too little growth. EFSF purchasing sovereign bonds and lending to insolvent states is not going to reduce the debt pile accumulated by European Governments. Nor will extending maturity and lowering interest rates on its loans help improve economic situation in PIIGS and beyond. So I would disagree with ESRB on the first bullet point.

Calling for adoption of sustainable fiscal policies and growth enhancing measures is like telling a person sinking in a bog to pull harder on his hair. Fiscal sustainability is not being delivered in any of the PIIGS so far, and there is absolutely no appetite for any Government in Europe to take properly drastic measures required to get their finances on sustainable path. Even the very definition of sustainability used by EU is a mad one (let alone not a single state actually adhered to it so far with exception of Finland). A deficit of 3% pa means that you get to 100% debt/GDP ratio in longer time than with a deficit of 5% pa. But you will still get there, folks. Debt to GDP ratio of 60% is only sustainable if, in the environment of 3% 10-year yields your economy expands by more than 1.8% pa (assuming no population growth and no amortization and depreciation under balanced budget). That has not happened in the euro zone in any single 10 year period since we have full data for its members.

Growth-enhancing measures adoption is another case of pure 'wishful' thinking. In most of the Euro area and indeed in the EU Commission, this usually means more subsidies and more state spending. In parts of Central and Eastern Europe it usually means promoting real private sector competition and investment. Of course, we know who weathered the storm best in the last two recessions. But, hey, ESRB wouldn't make a call as to what it means by this "adopting... growth-enhancing measures" despite the fact that much of "growth enhancements" unleashed on euro area economies in recent past is precisely what got us into the current sovereign debt mess in the first place.

As per its last bullet point, one starts to wonder if ESRB is going down the slippery line of 'rhetoric ahead of action'. What does "enhancing the coordination and consistency of communication" mean? All of the EU policymakers 'speaking with one voice'? Curtailing or otherwise minimizing dissent? Controlling information flows? What the hell, pardon my French here, does it really mean, folks?

On a beefy ending, ESRB prescribes that: "Supervisors should coordinate efforts to strengthen bank capital, including having recourse to backstop facilities, taking also into account the need for transparent and consistent valuation of sovereign exposures. If necessary, this could benefit from the possibility for the European Financial Stability Facility to lend to governments in order to recapitalise banks, including in non-programme countries."

I am sorry to say this, but if anyone reading this is going to vote in the Dail on the European Financial Stability Facility and Euro Area Loan Facility (Amendment) Bill 2011 you really have to understand this statement. In effect, ESRB here welcomes loading of the risks of insolvent banking systems - including in non-programme countries - into one single facility, the EFSF, which will have preventative powers to intervene in the markets to buy distressed debts of banks and sovereigns. In a sense, EFSF will become a super-dump - a motherload of super toxic financial refuse from both radioactively insolvent sovereigns and biochemically toxic banks. You wouldn't want THIS anywhere near your local constituency.

20/09/2011: EU banks losing corporate deposits & 'stress tests' scam

In a testament that the world continues to lose confidence in Euro area banking system, Europe's largest engineering firm, Siemens reportedly withdrew large amounts of deposits from the commercial banking system and deposited them with the ECB. The details of this transaction were reported in today's FT (link here) and other media outlets.

In the mean time, WSJ reported that documents distributed at the meeting of the euro area finance ministers in Wroclaw last weekend out to question the validity of the European banking stress tests carried out this summer.


Siemens withdrawal amounted, reportedly to €500 million and impacted "a large French bank", motivated by "concerns about the future financial health of the bank and partly to benefit from higher interest rates paid by the ECB". Again, per reports, Siemens now holds €4-6bn at the ECB, mostly in one-week deposits.

Siemens set up a banking arm almost a year ago to insure itself against adverse risks to liquidity flows in the context of the global financial crisis, enabling it "to tap the central bank for liquidity and deposit cash at the ECB"Siemens does not only use the ECB as a haven; it also gets paid a slightly higher interest rate than it would get from a commercial bank.

ECB, currently amidst sterilized bonds purchasing programme, uses deposit facilities to cut down on money supply increases created by it buying PIIGS bonds. To do this, ECB attracts deposits from commercial banks by offering 15bps margin on its deposits over 0.95% average interest rate for overnight deposits with euro are banks.

In effect, Siemens move kills two birds with one stone - the company achieves greater security of deposits (eliminating counter-party risks) and benefits from 0.15% spread on deposits - a nice sum amounting to €6-9mln per annum, which most likely covers its 'banking' operations costs.

In the severely distorted world of euro area banking, thus, smart corporates can have a decent free lunch, courtesy of ECB's continued insistence on protecting failed sovereigns and banks.


Per WSJ report (link here) EU banks stress tests carried out in July 2011 were based on archaic macroeconomic scenarios that did not cover the latest developments in sovereign credit markets. "The tests did not manage to restore market confidence,"reports WSJ based on the document discussed by finance ministers.

One specific macroeconomic assumption criticised relates to the scenario under which stress is applied to sovereign bond holdings of the banks - the core point of the entire exercise - "a scenario which was clearly taken over by events as months passed by."

So here we have it, folks, our ministers have now admitted what most of us knew all along - the stress tests in 2011 were as shambolic as those in 2010 despite being carried out under the watchful eye of EBA - the 'new' authority that is supposed to make the banks more transparent and better managed post-crisis.

I bet folks at Siemens Bank are glad they didn;t put much faith with euro area banks regulators...

19/09/2011: Highly Leveraged Banks' real impact on economy

An interesting paper from CEPR sheds some (largely theoretical) light on the real side of the current global financial crisis.

CEPR DP8576 titled "Financial-Friction Macroeconomics with Highly Leveraged Financial Institutions" by Sheung Kan Luk and David Vines (September 2011: available here) models the current crisis by adding "a highly-leveraged financial sector to the Ramsey model of economic growth". The paper shows that the presence of high leverage in financial sector "causes the economy to behave in a highly volatile manner" and thus exacerbate the macroeconomic effects of aggregate productivity shocks.

The model is based on the mainstream financial accelerator approach of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (BGG). The core BGG model assumes leveraged goods-producers are subjected to idiosyncratic productivity shocks, inducing them to borrow from a competitive financial sector.

Luk and Vines, by contrast, assume that "it is the financial institutions which are leveraged and subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks." As the result of this, leveraged financial institutions "can only obtain their funds by paying an interest rate above the risk-free rate, and this risk premium is anti-cyclical [ in other words the premium is higher at the time of adverse productivity shock, i.e. during the recession], and so augments the effects of shocks."

Luk and Vines parameterise the model to US data under the assumption that "the leverage of the financial sector is two and a half times that of the goods-producers in the BGG model". The assumption is relatively robust for the current environment in the US. It is probably less robust in the case of the EU where financial sector leverage is likely to be higher in a number of countries due to:

1. Traditional over-reliance on debt financing of the banking sector
2. Lower rates of deleveraging in the banking sector than in the US, and
   
3. Greater deposits attrition during the crisis.
   

The study finds that the presence of leveraged financial institutions "causes a much more significant augmentation of aggregate productivity shocks than that which is found in the [traditional] BGG model."

In the nutshell, this provides a plausible explanation as to the channels through which financial sector funding and operational strategy risks (leading to higher leverage) transmit through to real economy. It also links more directly monetary policy to the real economy as well. Ben, keep that printing press running... nothing can possibly go wrong with negative interest rates, mate.

05/09/2011: Ackermann: cover us

Deutsche Bank CEO, Josef Ackermann, speaking today at a conference "Banks in Transition", organized by the German business daily Handelsblatt in Frankfurt, made some far reaching comments on the state of European banking system.

"We should resign ourselves to the fact that the 'new normality' is characterized by volatility and uncertainty... All of this reminds one of the autumn of 2008." And as a reminder of these very days 3 years ago, the ECB reported that banks have raised their overnight deposits with ECB to €151 billion - the highest level in more than 12 months. Overnight deposits with ECB are seen as a safe haven as opposed to lending money in the interbank markets, with latest spike suggesting that even European banks are now becoming weary of lending to each other.

Crucially, according to Ackermann, "it is an open secret that numerous European banks would not survive having to revalue sovereign debt held on the banking book at market levels" to reflect their current market value. This is an interesting point - not because it is novel (every dog in the street knows that to be true), but because it is being made by the man who leads the largest banking institution in the land where banks have vigorously fought EBA on methodology and disclosure of stress test results. The battle line drawn back then was precisely their sovereign bond holdings.

And there is an added contradiction in what Ackermann was saying - if banks in Europe will not survive mark-to-market revaluation of their books, then how come Mr Ackermann claims they don't require urgent recapitalization?

In truth, Ackermann was really saying that were the banks in Europe forced to mark-to-market their holdings of PIIGS and Belgian bonds, they would take such losses that can lead to destabilization of banks equity valuations across the EU, thus triggering calls on governments' funding, which will therefore destabilize the bonds markets. Truth hurts, folks. It hurts over and over again when it is denied.

Mr Ackermann also appears to be saying: "Hey politicians. Don't force us to fix our books to the market. Fix the market for us."

Ackermann also repeated his earlier statement that calls for robust and rapid recapitalization of the banks were "not helpful" and threatened to undermine European efforts to assist crisis-stricken euro-zone sovereigns. In his view, such a recapitalization would send the message that the EU had little faith in its own strategy for dealing with the crisis. In other words, in Ackermann's view, if banks need urgent capital to cover losses on sovereign bonds, then the current valuations of these bonds in the market are irreversible. Which, of course, would mean that all efforts of the EU to roll back sky-high yields on PIIGS + Belgian debt are not likely to produce long-term results any time soon.

Which brings us to the point of asking: if so, why the hell are we burning through tens of billions of ECB and taxpayers' funds to buy out sovereign bonds and repay banks bond holders? Is it simply an exercise of buying time?

Another interesting comment from Ackermann relates to longer term prospects of the banking sector: "Prospects for the financial sector overall ... are rather limited... The outlook for the future growth of revenues is limited by both the current situation and structurally." What this means is that with regulatory tightening, new capital requirements (both on quality and quantity of capital) and with devastated savings and investment portfolia of investors, plus rising taxes on income and capital, margins in the banking sector will be depressed over long term horizon, while more risk averse investors will be weary of buying into higher margin high risk structured products.

In other words, all that Mr Ackermann's speech today amounts to is a call by a banker on the European governments to cover up the banks' cover up of losses: "Print money, buy out our bonds, but don't restructure or recapitalize us".

But Ackermann's warning presents an even more dire warning for the Irish officials who have made significant bets (using taxpayers money) on Irish banking sector returning to high rates of profitability soon. If Ackermann is correct and long term profitability of the entire sector is on decline, Irish banks will be unlikely to recover without a dramatic restructuring of their books.

23/08/2011: July Banks Survey - Euro area credit supply - Expectations

3 months forward expectations for lending conditions in Euro area, based on July 2011 data from the Banks Lending Survey run by ECB indicate that:

• Overall lending standards by Euro area banks are expected to tighten in 3 months following July 2011 by 9% of survey respondents - a number that has been rising now consecutively for 3 quarters.
  
• Overall lending standards are expected to ease by just 2% of survey respondents, down from 5% reporting back in April 2011.
• The respondents expect virtually no change in lending conditions for SMEs
• Lending to large enterprises is expected to tighten over the next 3 months by 10% of the banks surveyed, while only 3% are expecting lending to ease.

23/08/2011: July Banks Survey - Euro area credit supply - costs & controls

In the previous two posts I looked at the supply of credit to enterprises and the core drivers for changes in banks lending within the Euro area over the 3 months through July 2011. Here is a quick snapshot of what these changes mean on the ground.

The survey question this relates to is: Over the past three months, how have your bank's conditions and terms for approving loans or credit lines to enterprises changed?

• Bank margins on average loans to enterprises have tightened across 19% of the banks in 3 months through July 2011, while 18% of the banks reported easing of the average margins. Thus, overall margins remained largely unchanged across 57% of the banks - same as in 3 months to April 2011. However, in 3 months to April 2011, the percentage of the banks reporting easing of conditions on margins exceeded the percentage of the banks reporting tightening by 3 percentage points. This compares against zero percentage points differential in 3 months through July 2011 (note - these are adjusted percentages, compensating for respondents' errors).
• Number of the banks reporting tightening of margins on riskier loans exceeded numbers reporting easing by 23 percentage points in 3 months to July 2011.
• Non-interest rates charges have tightened in 2 percentage points more banks than eased
• Size of the loans granted tightened in 7% of the banks and eased in 3%, with 84% reporting no change in 3 months through July 2011.
• Collateral requirements have become tighter in 6% of the banks, while the requirements eased in 4%, suggesting de-accelerating rate of collateral requirements barriers growth.
  
• There was tightening of loans covenants reported by 9% of the banks and 6% reported easing. In previous quarter, the comparable numbers were 5% and 4%, implying tighter covenants are getting tougher.

While margins and non-interest rate charges are running at virtually no change since early 2010, there is a slight uptick in pressures in these credit costs. Collateral requirements remain on moderating tighter path, while riskier loans are posting second consecutive quarter of tightening of the margins.

Overall, these responses paint a mixed picture of costs of the bank lending to enterprises and suggests that market funding and capital and liquidity concerns drive banks lending dynamics in the Euro area, rather than costs and conditions structures.