Sunday, October 5, 2014

5/10/2014: US Removes Russia from GSP Access as Biden Admits US 'Leadership' over Europe


This week, amidst generally holding ceasefire in Ukraine and with Russia continuing to constructively engage in the multilateral process of normalisation of Eastern Ukrainian crisis, the US leadership once again shown its hand on the issue of Russian relations with the West. Instead of pausing pressure or starting to return trade and diplomatic relations toward some sort of normalisation, the US actually continued to raise pressure on Russia.

First, earlier in the week, the US issued a decision to terminate Russia's designation as a beneficiary developing country in its Globalised System of Preferences (GSP) - a system that allows developing economies' exporters somewhat 'preferential' access to the US markets at reduced tariffs. This decision was notified on May 7th and officially published by the White House on Friday when it came into force.

The US GSP is a program designed to aid economic growth in developing economies (more than 100 countries and territories) by allowing duty-free entry for up to 5,000 products.

According to the White House statement, President Obama "…determined that Russia is sufficiently advanced in economic development and improved in trade competitiveness that it is appropriate to terminate the designation of Russia as a beneficiary developing country effective October 3, 2014."

The likely outcome of this is, however, uncertain. Russian exports to the US in the categories covered by the GSP programme are primarily in the areas of strategically important materials, including rare-earth metals and other key inputs into production for US MNCs. The same MNCs can purchase these inputs indirectly from outside the US. So, if anything, the White House decision is harming its own companies more than the Russia producers by de facto raising the cost of goods with low degree of substitution.

While, personally, I do not think Russia is a developing country - it is a middle income economy - in my opinion, the best course of diplomacy (in relation to trade) is opening up trade markets and reducing (not raising) trade barriers. This is best targeted by lowering tariffs first and foremost in the areas where private (not state) companies supply exports. GSP is a scheme that should be expanded to include all economies, not just developing ones and the US and Europe should pursue more open trade with Russia and the rest of the CIS. Sadly, the Obama Administration is using trade as a weapon to achieve geopolitical objectives (notably of questionable value, but that is secondary to the fact that trade should not be used as a weapon in the first place, but as a tool for helping achieve longer term objectives closer economic and social cooperation).


In a related matter, the US VP, Joe Biden, openly confirmed this week that the US has directly pressured its European allies to impose sanctions against Russia. On October 3rd, speaking at Harvard University, Joe Biden said that: “It is true - they [European countries] did not want to do that [impose sanctions against Russia] but again it was America’s leadership and the President of the United States insisting, oftentimes almost having to embarrass Europe to stand up and take economic hits to impose cost,” the vice president said.

So, apparently, there was quite a bit of discord in the Western 'unity' camp over the actions against Russia. Which makes you wonder: was that resistance based solely on the European countries concern for the economic impact of sanctions on their own economies, or was it a function of their scepticism over the actual events in Ukraine (the nature of the latest Ukrainian 'revolution'? the role of the Western powers in stirring the conflict? the role of Russian in the conflict? etc)? Or may be all of the above?..


One way or the other, the US is driving a dangerous game. It is pursuing extremely aggressive course of actions against Russia with no concrete road map for de-escalation, no specific targets for policy and no back up strategy for addressing the adverse effects of isolating Russia in other geopolitical issues, such as ISIS, Middle East, Iran, North Korea and so on.

Saturday, October 4, 2014

4/10/2014: IMF on Russia: What Never Hurts Repeating...


As predicted (see here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/09/2992014-russian-economy-briefing-for.html) IMF came in weighing heavily on the doom for its outlook for Russian economy this week.

In its "Russian Federation: Concluding Statement for the September 2014 Staff Visit" report from  October 1, 2014, the Fund notices (quite a sharp eyesight there) that: "Geopolitical tensions are slowing the economy already weakened by structural bottlenecks."

According to the IMF, the solution is for the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) to "tighten policy rates further to reduce inflation and continue its path towards inflation targeting underpinned by a fully-flexible exchange rate." Investment is falling down, capital flight de-accelerated but remains a problem, deposits are desperately needed for the banks to stay liquid (absent foreign funding sources and coming bonds maturities), so has to kill the economy to keep economy alive dilemma...

On fiscal side, things are ok-ish: "While the projected overall fiscal stance is appropriately neutral in 2015, the needed fiscal consolidation should resume in the following years… The proposed federal budget, which is consistent with the fiscal rule, envisions a loosening in 2015. However, this is offset by a tightening at the sub-federal levels. This strikes an appropriate balance between the need to consolidate in the medium term, with the non-oil deficit remaining near historical high, and the need for supportive fiscal policy in the face of the current downturn." And as I noted in the note linked above: "The use of the National Wealth Fund for domestic infrastructure projects may be appropriate to consider if done in the context of the budget process and subject to appropriate safeguards. The diversion of contributions from the fully-funded pillar weakens the viability of the pension system, creates disincentives to save, and dilutes the credibility of the fiscal rule."

On growth: "The economic outlook appears bleak. GDP is expected to grow by only 0.2 percent in 2014 and 0.5 percent in 2015." Not as gloomy as the World Bank but uuuuugly…
Drivers, predictably are:

  • "Consumption is expected to weaken as real wages and consumer credit growth moderate." No… wait… they are already weak and moderated… 
  • "Geopolitical tensions—including sanctions, counter-sanctions, and fear of their further escalation—are amplifying uncertainty, depressing confidence and investment. Capital outflows are expected to reach USD 100 billion in 2014 and moderate somewhat but remain high in 2015." Again, no surprises here.
  • "Inflation is projected to remain over 8 percent by the end of 2014 mostly due to an increase in food prices, caused by import restrictions, and depreciation of the ruble. In the absence of further policy actions, inflation is expected to stay above target in 2015." That we know too. No surprises here. 

On banks, pretty much same as I have been saying: "Increased oversight and heightened financial stability remain a priority. Banks and the corporate sector are facing a challenging environment due to the weak economy, limited access to external financing, and higher financing costs. Existing financial buffers together with appropriate policy responses by the CBR have limited financial instability thus far. Nonetheless, the current uncertain environment could create difficulties in individual banks and businesses, even in the near term. In case of acute liquidity pressures, emergency facilities should be temporarily offered to eligible counterparties, against appropriate collateral, priced to be solely attractive during stress periods."

On structural side, I would have expected more clarity. Instead, we have more generalities: "Despite the slowdown, the economy is expected to have limited excess capacity owing to structural impediments to growth… Even if [geopolitical] uncertainty dissipates next year, domestic demand and potential growth are projected to remain weak in the medium term due to insufficient investment and deterioration in productivity. Potential growth is projected to be about 1.2 percent in 2015, reaching 1.8 percent in 2019, with downside risks. Structural reforms are needed to provide appropriate incentives to expand investment and allocate resources to enhance efficiency. Protecting investors, reducing trade barriers, fighting corruption, reinvigorating the privatization agenda, improving competition and the business climate, and continuing efforts at global integration remain crucial to revive growth."

Then again, all this you could have heard at our briefing breakfast for IRBA… to stay ahead of the IMF analysis… 

3/10/2014: East Asian Crisis, European Disaster: Tale of Two Recoveries


My post for Learning Signal blog on IMF report covering East Asian Crisis of the 1990s comparatives to the Euro area crisis 2007-present is available here: http://blog.learnsignal.com/?p=55 

Friday, October 3, 2014

3/10/2014: Ireland: Quarterly PMIs and Composite Activity Index: Q3 2014


As promised in the previous post, covering monthly Services PMI (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/10/3102014-services-pmi-for-ireland.html), here is my analysis of quarterly data and my own Composite Activity Index across manufacturing and services sectors, as well as construction sector.

All data reported is based on my calculations using Markit/Investec PMIs.

In Q3 2014, Manufacturing PMI averaged 56.1 which is up on 55.5 average for Q2 2014 and is up on Q3 2013 average of 51.9. Q3 2014 marks the 5th consecutive quarter of expansion in the series.

Services PMI stood at 62.1 in Q3 2014, unchanged from 62.1 in Q2 2014 and up on 58.7 Q3 2013 reading. This quarter marked 15th consecutive quarter of above 50 readings in PMI.

Construction PMI (data through August so far only) is at 62 in Q3 2014, up on 61.2 in Q2 2014 and 51.0 in Q3 2013. This marks 5th consecutive quarter of expansion in the sector.

Composite Activity Index is now at 60.35 in Q3 2014 ex-Construction, up on 60.16 in Q2 2014 and on 59.95 in Q3 2013. This is 18th consecutive quarter of composite indicator above 50.0. Including construction, Composite Activity Index is at 60.38, up on Q2 2014 reading of 60.18 and up on Q3 2013 reading of 56.81.

Chart to illustrate:

On a note of caution: showing just how weak the PMI indices are in predicting Irish growth, here are two charts plotting log changes in PMIs against log changes in GDP and GNP. In all cases, explanatory power of changes in PMIs is weak when it comes to matching the outcomes in growth in the real economy. The same qualitative results hold for levels of PMIs against log changes in GDP and GNP and to levels of PMIs against actual GDP and GNP levels.



3/10/2014: Services PMI for Ireland: September 2014


Markit/Investec released their Services PMI for Ireland today. I covered Manufacturing PMI release here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/10/1102014-irish-manufacturing-pmi.html

On Services side:

  • MNCs-driven activity in the sector expanded once again, with PMI for September rising to 62.5 from 62.4 in August and almost matching 62.6 reading in June.
  • 12mo MA is now at 60.9 - which is simply unbelievable, given the overall economy performance over the last 12 months. Predictably, of course, there is somewhat little connection between the survey - weighted heavily on MNCs side, such as ICT Services giants we house in Ireland - and the real economy.
  • 3mo average (Q3 2014 average) is at 62.1 which is identical to Q2 2014 average and is ahead of Q3 2013 average of 58.7. In other words, judging by the figures coming out of PMIs, Irish services economy is growing roughly at 7-8 percent per annum. Good luck spotting that on the ground.

Still, the above chart clearly shows that whether connected to real lives or not, Services economy is now averaging growth rates (post-crisis) that are above those recorded in pre-crisis period. This suggests two things:
  1. There has been a significant switch in economic activity in favour of services (dominated by the dynamics in ICT Services); and
  2. There has been a larger gap opening up between the real economy and tax optimisation-based economy.
I will blog on composite performance on quarterly basis, pooling together both Manufacturing and Services PMIs next, so stay tuned.

3/10/2014: Russian Services & Composite PMIs: September 2014


Russia Services and Composite PMIs were released today by Markit/HSBC for September.

I covered relatively poor performance of the Manufacturing PMI here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/10/1102014-russian-manufacturing-pmi.html and comparatives between BRICs for Manufacturing were discussed here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/10/2102014-bric-manufacturing-pmis-things.html

On Services PMI side:

  • September PMI came in at 50.5 which is basically unchanged on 50.3 in August and signals weak growth (statistically, this reading is not significantly different from 50.0).
  • 3mo MA is now at 50.2 (barely above 50.0) although that is an improvement on Q2 2014 reading of 47.6, yet poorer than Q3 2013 reading of 50.7.
On Composite PMI side:
  • Composite PMI declined marginally from 51.1 in August to 50.9 in September, still staying ahead of 50.0. Both readings were, however, statistically not significantly different from 50.0, implying weak expansion in output.
  • Q3 average is at 51.1, which is a lot better than 48.3 average for Q2 2014 and is ahead of 50.4 average in Q3 2013.
Chart below shows three PMIs together and identifies October-November 2012 are the period of trend shift toward falling PMIs.


Overall, activity remains subdued across all sectors of the Russian economy and growth signals from PMIs suggest that this year growth is likely to be in the range of around 0.4-0.5%.

Comparatives with BRICs are coming up later today, so stay tuned.

Thursday, October 2, 2014

2/10/2014: That Oil Price Shock: Russia


In a recent Russian Economy briefing (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/09/2992014-russian-economy-briefing-for.html) I highlighted the risk of oil price changes on Russian economy. Here is a chart showing dramatic elevation of these risks:

via @MacrobondF

2/10/2014: IMF Report: Risk Taking Behaviour in Banks


As some of you might have noticed, I started to contribute regularly to Learn Signal Blog last week. This week, my post there covers IMF Global Financial Stability Report update released this week, dealing with the drivers for risk taking behaviour of the banks prior to and since the Global Financial Crisis: http://blog.learnsignal.com/?p=46

2/10/2014: BRIC Manufacturing PMIs: Things are getting slower...


Yesterday, I covered Manufacturing PMIs for Russia (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/10/1102014-russian-manufacturing-pmi.html) so today time to update all BRICs chart:


And from the above, things that were ugly in the merging markets continue to be ugly and get worse.

In September, according to Markit (and all its marketing partners paying for the releases of its data):

  • Manufacturing PMIs posted rather significant slowdown in growth in Russia: from 51.0 in July and August to 50.4 in September. However, on a 3mo MA basis, the index is performing better: 3mo average through September (Q3 average) stood at 50.8 (anaemic, but growth) compared to 3mo average through June (Q2 average) of 48.7 and 3mo average through September 2013 of 49.3. M/M slowdown in growth was 0.6 points, which is the second best performance in the BRIC group and September level of index signals second fastest growth in BRIC group.
  • In China, Manufacturing PMI posted zero change in September (50.2) on August (52.4). 3mo average through Q3 2014 was 50.7, which is better than 3mo average for Q2 2014 (49.1) and 3mo average for Q3 2013 (49.3). With zero change in growth in PMI m/m, China is the best performer in the group, but its level of PMI is only third best.
  • India Manufacturing PMI posted the largest drop in PMIs in September (51.0) on August (52.4) in the group. 3mo average through Q3 2014 was 52.1, which is better than 3mo average for Q2 2014 (51.4) and 3mo average for Q3 2013 (49.4). With PMI falling 1.4 points m/m, India is the worst performer in the group in terms of m/m dynamics, but its level of PMI is still the highest in the group, which is not surprising, given there appears to be a strong upward bias in India PMI readings across data history (see chart).
  • Brazil Manufacturing PMI fell from 50.2 in August to 49.3 in September, switching from growth to contraction - the only country posting contractionary PMI reading in the group. Q3 2014 average reading is at 49.5 which is almost identical to the Q2 2014 reading of 49.4 and to Q3 2013 reading of 49.3. M/m Brazil posted the second worst level of decline in PMI and level-wise it is the worst performer in the group.
Notably, there appears to be little level difference across China and Russia in Q3 2013 Manufacturing activity, despite the fact that Russia is under sanctions pressure relating to Ukraine crisis. Both China and Russia outperformed Brazil, but under-performed India in this sector. Adjusting for Indian data apparent bias upwards, there is also little difference between India and China and Russia.

Summary table of changes and levels:


Wednesday, October 1, 2014

1/10/2014: IMF's out of Ideas, but still full of Analysis: WEO Chapter 4

IMF WEO October update is steadily creeping toward its main denouement, the release of the database update at the very end of the process that normally starts with releases of analytical chapters of the WEO - bigger thematic pieces dealing with the core topics relating to the global economy.

This week, IMF released its Chapter 4, covering the issue of current accounts imbalances across the world.

Per IMF, "Global current account (“flow”) imbalances have narrowed significantly since their peak in 2006, and their configuration has changed markedly in the process. The imbalances that used to be the main concern—the large deficit in the United States and surpluses in China and Japan—have more than halved. But some surpluses, especially those in some European economies and oil exporters, remain large, and those in some advanced commodity exporters and major emerging market economies have since moved to deficit."

You don't need to say. Just see this post from earlier today: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/10/1102014-that-exports-led-recovery-in.html

But IMF shows some pretty interesting data on composition and levels of imbalances across the globe. Chart below details these:



The IMF argues that "the reduction of large flow imbalances has diminished systemic risks to the global economy." Sounds happy-all-around.

But as usual, there is a kicker, or rather two:
"First, the nature of the flow adjustment—mostly driven by demand compression in deficit economies or growth differentials related to the faster recovery of emerging market economies and commodity exporters after the Great Recession—has meant that in many economies, narrower external imbalances have come at the cost of increased internal imbalances (high unemployment and large output gaps).

This straight into the teeth of the EU, where 'internal devaluations' (beggar thy own consumers and households) policies are all the rage. But it is also a warning to the emerging markets, where the latest stage of economic growth is translating into falling commodities prices, threatening to unravel their own economic 'recoveries' based on beggar-thy-trading-partners economic environment of elevated commodities prices in the past.

"The contraction in these external imbalances is expected to last as the decrease in output due to lowered demand has likely been matched by a decrease in potential output." Which means a Big Boom! Potential output is the stuff economies supposed to produce once the effects of the business cycle (recession-to-expansion) is netted out. In other words, the stuff that is somewhat long-term 'sustainable'. And the above statement says it is down.

"However, there is some uncertainty about the latter, and there is the risk that flow imbalances will
widen again." Which means 'choose your poison' - either risks are materialising in structural growth slowdown or risk will be materialising in current account imbalances returning once again. Rock. Hard place. The world stuck in-between.

"Second, since flow imbalances have shrunk but not reversed, net creditor and debtor positions (“stock imbalances”) have widened further. In addition, weak growth has contributed to increases in the ratio of net external liabilities to GDP in some debtor economies.These two factors make some of these economies more vulnerable to changes in market sentiment. To mitigate these risks, debtor economies
will ultimately need to improve their current account balances and strengthen growth performance."

And here we have the usual bangers-n-mash dish from the IMF. What it says is that debt overhang is not getting better, but might be getting worse. And with that, the IMF runs out of any solutions other than go back to 'internal devaluations'. Which, of course, gets us back to the first kick in teeth. Bigger rock. And an even harder place. And Euro area is now wedged in-between.

"Stronger external demand and more expenditure switching (from foreign to domestic goods and services) would help on both accounts," says IMF. And this is the statement of surrender. Basically IMF says that if more people were to buy stuff from the countries with weak external balances and loads of debt, things will improve. No sh*t Sherlocks. And if money was growing on trees in Sahara Desert, things would improve even more.

IMF's out of idea. But IMF is still full of analysis. QED.

1/10/2014: That Exports-Led Recovery... in Germany


And a Scary Chart of the Day prize goes to @IanTalley who produced this gem:

That's right, Germany is now officially producing more stuff that its people can't afford than China...

But its a good thing, for it means that people in countries like Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Cyprus etc who owe Germany money can buy more stuff from Germany they can't quite afford either, except for the credit supplied from Germany funded by the credit they take from Germany... Confused? Try confused.edu for some academic analysis... or just look at KfW bank latest foray into Ireland (apparently it took months of planning to get us to this absurdity http://www.independent.ie/business/irish/kfw-deal-to-fund-irish-firms-was-months-in-the-planning-29896868.html).

1/10/2014: Russian Manufacturing PMI: September


Markit and HSBC released Manufacturing PMI for September for Russia. Here are the headline numbers:

  • Manufacturing PMI declined from 51.0 (signaling already weak expansion) in August to 50.4 in September. 
  • This marks 8th consecutive month of index falling within the range that is statistically indifferent from 50.0. Over the last 3 months, the index was trending just above 50.0 line (not statistically significant difference to 50.0). 
  • 3mo MA for the index is at 50.8. 3mo MA through June 2014 is at 48.8. 3mo MA through September 2013 was at 49.3. This really does illustrate structural slowdown in the Russian economy setting on at around Q4 2012, well before the onset of Kiev protests in November 2013 and much before the onset of the Ukrainian crisis in February 2014.

Today's reading puts into question the hopes of a nascent recovery we could have expected from PMI readings in August. Recall that in July Russian GDP fell estimated 0.2% and in August it posted zero growth. My most recent update on Russian economic situation (from Monday) is here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/09/2992014-russian-economy-briefing-for.html