29/5/2012: Fiscal Compact - one very interesting view

I rarely post articles by others on this site, usually preferring links, alas the following article is not available on the web. Its full attribution goes to the Irish Daily Mail (Monday 28, 2012 edition) and it is written by one of the best - if not the best - commentators in the paper both sides of the pond - Mary Ellen Synon.

It is a must-read to understand the context of the Referendum, because it places our vote into the broader and more real context than any domestic debate we might have on merits or failings of the Treaty.

Please note, I am not advocating you follow Mary Ellen's conclusion on the vote - as you know, I am not advocating in favour of any direction of the vote. Make your own choice. I am posting this because I think that many risks highlighted in the article are real.

To be fair to the 'Yes' side, if any of you, readers, spot an excellent article on that side of the argument, I will be delighted to post it. So far, I have not come across one, but that might be due to the omission, rather than lack thereof. (see update below)

Thus, judge for yourselves:

Update: I remembered - the best argument for 'Yes' side I ever read is from another economist, one whose opinion I respect and who has provided many clarifications during this debate to my own occasionally erroneous positions - Professor Karl Whelan. Here's the link and here are his full remarks on the Treaty - certainly worth reading.

13/5/2012: Village Magazine May 2012: Fiscal Rules & actual outruns

This is an unedited version of my article for Village magazine, May 2012.

However one interprets the core constraints of the Fiscal Compact (officially known as the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union), several facts concerning Ireland’s position with respect to them are indisputable.

Firstly, the new treaty will restrict the scope for the future exchequer deficits. This has prompted the ‘No’ side of the referendum campaigns to claim that the Compact will outlaw Keynesian economics. This claim is a significant over-exaggeration of reality. Combined structural and general deficit targets to be imposed by the Compact would have implied a maximum deficit of 2.9-3.0 percent in 2012 as opposed to the IMF-projected general government net borrowing of 8.5 percent of GDP. With the value of the Fiscal Compact-implied deficit running at less than one half of our current structural deficit, the restriction to be imposed by the new rules would have been severe. However, in the longer term, fiscal compact conditions allow for accumulation of fiscal savings to finance potential liabilities arising from future recessions. This is exactly compatible with the spirit of the Keynesian economic policies prescriptions, even though it is at odds with the extreme and fetishized worldview of the modern Left that sees no rational stops to debt accumulation on the path of stimulating economies out of recessions and broader crises.

Secondly, the Fiscal Compact will impose a severe long-term debt ceiling, but that condition is not expected to be satisfied by Ireland any time before 2030 or even later.

One interesting caveat relating to the 60 percent of GDP bound is the exact language employed by the Treaty when discussing the adjustment from excess debt levels. The ‘Yes’ camp made some inroads into convincing the voters to support the Compact on the grounds that debt paydowns required by the debt bond will involve annually reducing the overall debt by 1/20^th of the debt level in excess of 60% bound. However, the Treaty itself defines “the obligation for those Contracting Parties whose general government debt exceeds the 60 % reference value to reduce it at an average rate of one twentieth per year as a benchmark” (page T/SCG/en5). Thus, there is a significant gap between the Treaty interpretation and its reality.

Another debt-related aspect f the treaty that is little understood by the public and some analysts is the relationship between deficit break, structural deficits bound and the long-term debt levels that are consistent with the economy growth potential. Based on IMF projections, our structural deficit for 2014-2017 will average over 2.7% of GDP, which implies Fiscal Compact-consistent government deficits around 1.6-1.7% of GDP. Assuming long-term nominal growth of 4-4.5% per annum, our ‘sustainable’ level of debt should be around 38-40% of GDP. Tough, but we have been at public debt to GDP ratio of below 40 percent in every year from 2000 through 2007. It is also worth noting that we have satisfied the Fiscal Compact 60% debt bound every year between 1998 and 2008.

Similarly, the Troika programme for fiscal adjustment that Ireland is currently adhering to implies a de facto satisfaction of the Fiscal Compact deficit bound after 2015, and non-fulfilment of the structural deficit rule and the debt rule any time between now and 2017. In other words, no matter how we spin it, in the foreseeable future, we will remain a fiscally rouge state, client of the Troika and its successor – the ESM.

On the negative side, however, the aforementioned 1/20^th rule would be a significant additional drag on Ireland’s economic performance into the future, compared to the current Troika programme. If taken literally, an average rate of reduction of the Government debt from 2013 through 2017, required by the Compact would see our state debt falling to 87.6% of GDP in 2017, instead of the currently projected 109.2%. In other words, based on IMF projections, we will require some €42 billion more in debt repayments under the Fiscal Compact over the period of 2013-2012 than under the Troika deal.

On the net, therefore, the Compact is a mixture of a few positive, some historically feasible, but doubtful in terms of the future, benchmarks, and a rather strict short-term growth-negative set of targets that may, if satisfied over time, convert into a long-term positive outcomes. Confused? That’s the point of the entire undertaking: instead of providing clarity on a reform path, the Compact provides nothing more than a set of ‘if, then’ scenarios.

Let me run though some hard numbers – all based on IMF latest forecasts. Even under the rather optimistic scenario, Ireland’s real GDP is expected to grow by an average of 2.27% in the period from 2012 through 2017. This is the highest forecast average rate of growth for the entire euro area excluding the Accession states (the EA12 states). And yet, this growth will not be enough to lift us out of the Sovereign debt trap. Averaging just 10.3% of GDP, our total investment in the economy will be the lowest of all EA12 states, while our gross national savings are expected to average just 13.2% of GDP, the second lowest in the EA12.

In short, even absent the Fiscal Compact, our real economy will be bled dry by the debt overhang – a combination of the protracted deleveraging and debt servicing costs. It is the combination of the government debt and the unsustainable levels of households’ and corporate indebtedness that is cutting deep into our growth potential, not the austerity-driven reduction in public spending. In this sense, Fiscal Compact-induced acceleration of debt repayments will exacerbate the negative effect of fiscal deleveraging, while delaying private debt deleveraging.

However, on the opposite side of the argument, the alternative to the current austerity and the argument taken up by the No camp in the Fiscal Compact campaigns, is that Ireland needs a fiscal stimulus to kick-start growth, which in turn will magically help the economy to reduce unsustainable debt levels accumulated by the Government.

There is absolutely no evidence to support the suggestion that increasing the national debt beyond the current levels or that increasing dramatically tax burden on the general population – the two measures that would allow us to slow down the rate of reductions in public expenditure planned under the Troika deal – can support any appreciable economic expansion. The reason for this is simple. According to the data, smaller advanced economies with the average Government expenditure burden in the economy of ca 31-35% of GDP have expected growth rates averaging 3.5% per annum. Countries that have Government spending accounting for 40% and more of GDP have projected rates of growth closer to 1.5% per annum. Ireland neatly falls between the two groups of states both in terms of the Government burden and the economic growth rate. So, if we want to have growth above that projected under the current forecasts, we need (a) to accept the argument that growth is not a matter of the stimulus, but of longer-term reforms, and (b) to recognize that for a small open economy, higher levels of Government capture of economy is associated with lower growth potential.

Despite our already deep austerity and even after the Compact becomes operational, Irish Exchequer will continue running excess spending throughout the adjustment period. Between 2012 and 2017, Irish government net borrowing is expected to average 4.7% of GDP per annum, the second highest in the EA12 group of countries. Between this year and 2017, our Government will spend some €47.4 billion more than it will collect in taxes, even if the current austerity course continues. Of these, €39 billion of expenditure will go to finance structural deficits, implying a direct cyclical stimulus of more than €8.4 billion. The Compact will not change this. In contrast, calling on the Government to deploy some sort of fiscal spending stimulus today is equivalent to asking a heart attack patient to run a marathon in the Olympics. Both, within the Compact and without it, the EU as well as the IMF will not accept Irish Government finances going into a deeper deficit financing that would be required to ‘stimulate’ the economy.

The structural problem we face is that under current system of funding the economy and the Exchequer, our exports-driven model of economic development simply cannot sustain even the austerity-consistent levels of Government spending. IMF projects that between 2012 and 2017 cumulative current account surpluses in Ireland will be €40 billion. This forecast implies that 2017 current account surplus for Ireland will be €10 billion – a level that is 56 times larger than our current account surplus in 2011. If we are to take a more moderate assumption of current account surpluses running around 2012-2013 projected levels through 2017, our Government deficits are likely to be closer to €53 billion. Our entire exporting engine will not be able to cover the overspend of this state. In short, there is really no alternative to the austerity, folks, no matter how much we wish for this not to be the case.

Instead, what we do have is the choice of austerity policies we can pursue. We can either continue to tax away incomes of the middle and upper-middle classes, or we cut deeper into public expenditure.

The former will mean accelerating loss of productivity due to skills and talent outflows from the country, reduced entrepreneurship and starving the younger companies of investment, rising pressure on wages in skills-intensive occupations, while destroying future capacity of the middle-aged families to support themselves through retirement. Hardly trivial for an economy reliant on high value-added exports generation, higher tax rates on upper margin of the income tax will act to select for emigration those who have portable and internationally marketable skills and work experience. Given that much of entrepreneurship is formed on the foot of self-employment, high taxation of individual incomes at the upper margin will further force outflow of entrepreneurial talent. In addition, to continue retaining high quality human capital here, the labour markets will have to start paying significant wages premia to key employees to compensate them for our tax regime. All of these things are already happening in the IFSC, ICT and legal and analytics services sectors.

The latter is the choice to continue reducing our imports-intensive domestic consumption, especially Government consumption, and cutting the spending power of the public sector employees, while enacting deep structural reforms to increase value-for-money outputs in the state sectors. This, in effect, means increasing the growth gap between externally trading sectors and purely domestic sectors, but increasing it on demand and skills supply sides, while hoping that corrected workplace incentives will lift up the investment side of domestic enterprises.

Both choices are painful and short-term recessionary, but only the latter one leads to future growth. Anyone with an ounce of understanding of economics would know that the sole path out of structural recession involves currency devaluation. And anyone with an ounce of understanding of economics would recognize that the effects of such devaluation would be to reduce imports, increase differential in earnings in favour of returns to human capital and drive a wider gap between domestic and exporting sectors. The former choice of policies is only consistent with giving vitamins to a cancer-ridden patient – sooner or later, the placebo effect of the ‘stimulus’ will fade, and the cancer of debt overhang will take over once again, with even greater vengeance.

Looking back over the Fiscal Compact, the balance of the measures enshrined in the new treaty is most likely not the right – from the economic point of view – prescription for Ireland today. It is probably not even a correct policy choice for the future. But the reasons for which the treaty is the wrong ‘medicine’ for Ireland have nothing to do with the austerity it will impose onto Ireland. Rather, the really regressive feature of the Treaty is that it will make it virtually impossible for our economy to deal with the issue of private debt overhang and to properly restructure our taxation system to create opportunities for future growth.

CHARTS:

Update:  In the above, I reference the 1/20th rule and identify it as 'taken literally'. This can cause some confusion for the readers. To clarify the matter, here is the discussion of the rule as 'taken' literally' as opposed to 'taken as implied' under the Treaty. The article has been filed before the linked discussion took place. Additional material on this can be found on Professor Karl Whelan's blog here.

It is also worth pointing out that I have consistently (until April 26th blogpost) referenced the 1/20th rule as applying to debt portion in the excess over 60% bound. This referencing traces back to my comments on the issue to the Prime Time programme for which I commented on the issue back in late January 2012. However, subsequent reading of the document has shown very clearly that the primary language of the Treaty clearly references one rule in the preamble, while the conditional statement in the Treaty article itself references the other. On the balance, I agree with Karl Whelan, that the implied and valid wording should relate to 1/20th of the excess over 60% bound.

Really shoddy job done by those who wrote this Treaty.

4/5/2012: Fitch Bells: Ringing de Panic?

Yesterday, Fitch Ratings issued an interesting report, titled "The Future of the Eurozone: Alternative Scenarios". The report sounds alarm bells over what some markets participants have thought of as a 'past issue' - the risks of contagion from Greece to the Euro area periphery.

Fitch Ratings core view is that the eurozone will 'muddle through' the crisis, surviving in its current composition,  while taking 'gradual steps towards closer fiscal and economic integration'. 


The interesting bit comes in the discussion of possible alternatives and the associated probabilities of these alternatives. According to Fitch, there is rising (not falling, as we would expect were LTROs and Greek debt restructuring, plus the Fiscal Compact and the ESM working) risk of a protracted growth slowdown or political shock or some other shock triggering either a possible facilitated Greek exit from the Euro or a disorderly Greek exit from the common currency.


And, crucially, according to Fitch, this risk cannot be discounted. 


This bit is where Fitch's assessment is identical to mine and contradicts that of the majority of Irish 'green jersey' economists: the tail risk of a disorderly unwinding of the euro is non-zero and rising, while the disruption or cost associated with such a outcome is by far non-trivial. Prudent risk management policy would require us to start contingency planning and addressing the possible realisation of such a risk. Instead, we are preoccupied in navel gazing through the lens of the Fiscal Compact, and not even at our own 'navel', but at the European one.


Fitch view is that a full break-up and demise of the euro is probabilistically highly unlikely. This belief is based on Fitch foreseeing large financial, economic and political costs of a break-up. More interestingly, Fitch determines that a partial break-up of the euro zone - with one or more countries exiting the common currency -  would "risk severe systemic damage, although cannot be discounted". 


For those thinking we've done much to resolve the systemic euro crisis (by doing much we usually mean creation of EFSF and agreeing ESM, deploying LTROs and restructuring Greek debts, and putting in place the Fiscal Compact), Fitch has some nasty surprises. Basically, Fitch believes (and I agree with their assessment here), that "additional measures will be needed to resolve the crisis. These are likely to include some dilution of national fiscal sovereignty [beyond the current austerity programmes and Fiscal Compact], potentially some partial mutualisation of sovereign liabilities [basically - euro bonds of sorts] and resources [some transfers to peripheral states], as well as measures to enhance pan-eurozone financial supervision and intervention, combined with further institutional reforms to strengthen eurozone economic governance". Basically, you can read this as: little done, much much much more to do still...


It gets worse.


Of all the alternative scenarios presented, Fitch believes that the most likely scenario will involve a Greek exit, with Greece re-denominating its debt in a new currency and default on its bonds again. Per Fitch, the core danger will be to Cyprus, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain based on:

1. Greek exit creating an 'exit precedent' for the already distressed economies
2. Greek default impacting adversely other peripheral countries banks (especially true for Cyprus)
3. Greek default increasing the risk of capital flight from the countries
4. Greek default triggering a run on peripheral bonds just around the time when the 2013 'return to markets' horizon is in the crosshair.

Just as I usually do in my presentations on the topic, Fitch distinguishes two potential paths to Greek 'exit' - a structured and unstructured or 

• an "orderly variation with an effective eurozone policy response and minimal contagion" and 
• a "disorderly variation", involving "material contagion to the periphery and a significant increase in contingent liabilities facing the core".

Ouch, I must say, for all the folks who lost their voice arguing that my views are 'unreasonable' and 'scaremongering'. Sorry to say it, risk management approach to dealing with reality requires taking a probabilistically-weighted expected costs scenarios of the downside into the account. Simply shouting "all is sustainable here, nothing to bother with" won't do.

4/5/2012: Sunday Times - 29/4/2012: Fiscal Compact

My Sunday Times article from April 29, 2012 (unedited version).

When first published, the Fiscal Compact (formally known as the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union) was billed as a ground-breaking exercise in European legislative activism. The main innovation of the treaty was not its content (which largely regurgitates already existent fiscal constraints established under the Maastricht Treaty), but its compact size and designed-to-be-digestible language.

Few months down the road, and the Fiscal Compact has become a subject to numerous conflicting claims and interpretations, thanks to both side of the referendum debate in Ireland. Mythology that surrounds the Fiscal Compact is impressively wide and growing. The fog of politicised sloganeering and scaremongering on the ‘Yes’ side is well matched by the clouds of emotive and quasi-economic nonsense from the ‘No’ camp.

The main alleged problem with the Compact is that its core rules – the 60% debt/GDP limit for Government borrowings, the 1/20 adjustment rule for dealing with excess public debt, the 3% deficit ceiling and the 0.5% structural deficit break – amount to prohibiting of the Keynesian economic policies in the future. This argument is commonly advanced by the Fiscal Compact opponents and implies that in the future crises, Ireland will not be able to use stimulative Government spending to support its economy.

In practice, however, Fiscal Compact restricts, but not eliminates the room for deficit financing. In the current economic conditions, under full compliance with the deficit rules, Irish Government would have been able to run a deficit of at least 2.97% of GDP – much lower than 8.6% targeted under Budget 2012, but close to 3.2% deficit forecast for 2012 for the euro area.

Far from ‘killing Keynesianism’, the Fiscal Compact induces in the longer run fiscal policies that are consistent with Keynesian economics. Any state that wants to secure a ‘fiscal stimulus’ cushion for future crises should accumulate surplus resources during the times of economic expansions, not rely on the goodwill of the bond markets to supply debt financing to the Governments when their economies begin to tank.

The treaty does limit significantly the state capacity to accumulate debt in the future. In the long run, debt to GDP ratio should converge to the ratio of average deficits to the long-term growth potential. Based on IMF projections, our structural deficit for 2014-2017 will average over 2.7% of GDP, which implies Fiscal Pact-consistent government deficits around 1.6-1.7% of GDP. Assuming long-term nominal growth of 4-4.5% per annum, our ‘sustainable’ level of debt should be around 36-40% of GDP. Although no one expects (or requires) Ireland to draw down our public debt to these levels any time soon, over decades, this is the level we will be heading toward if we are to comply with the Fiscal Compact rules.

On the ‘Yes’ side, the biggest myth concerning the Fiscal Compact is that adopting the treaty will ensure that no more fiscal crises the likes of which we have experienced since 2008 will befall this state.

In reality, the collapse of exchequer finances in Ireland has been driven by a number of factors, completely outside the matters covered by the Fiscal Compact.

Firstly, significant proportion of our 2008-2011 deficits arises from the state response to the banking sector implosion and closely correlated property sector collapse. The latter was also a primary driver for the decline in tax revenues. The former was a policy choice. Thirdly, our deficits were driven not just by the fiscal performance itself, but also by the unsustainable nature of our government spending and taxation policies. For example, during the boom, Irish Governments consistently acted to increase automatic payments relating to unemployment and social welfare financed on the back of tax revenues windfall from property transactions. Property revenues collapse coincident with increases in unemployment has led to an explosion of unfunded state liabilities.

None of these shocks could have been offset or compensated for by the Fiscal Compact-mandated measures. In fact, during the 2000-2007 period, Irish Governments’ fiscal stance, on the surface, was well ahead of the Fiscal Compact requirements. Ireland satisfied EU Fiscal Compact bound on structural deficits in all years between 2000 and 2007, with exception of two. Of course, in all but one year over the same period, we also failed to satisfy the very same bound if we were to use the IMF-estimated structural deficits in place of those estimated by the EU, but that simply attests to the difficulty of pinning down the exact value of the potential GDP, required to estimate structural deficits. We also satisfied EU-mandated debt break in every year between 2000 and 2008. In fact, between 2000 and 2007 our debt to GDP ratio was below 40% - the benchmark consistent with long-term compliance with the Fiscal Compact. More than fulfilling the requirement for a 3% maximum Government deficit, Irish Exchequer run an average annual net surplus of 1.97% of GDP, accumulating 2000-2007 period surpluses of €11.3 billion and the NPRF reserves which peaked in Q3 2007 at €21.3 billion.

In short, the Fiscal Compact is not a panacea to our current crisis, nor is it a prevention tool capable of automatically correcting future imbalances, especially given the difficulty of forecasting future sources of risk.

Instead, Ireland needs a combination of institutional reforms to enhance our domestic capacity to identify points of rising risks and to deploy policies that can address these risks in advance. A flexible and highly responsive early warning system, such as a truly independent Fiscal Advisory Council, coupled with reformed Civil Service, aiming at achieving real excellence and accountability within the key Departments and regulatory offices can help. Furthermore, abandonment of the consensus-focused systems of governance, eliminating the expenditure-centric Social Partnership and the Dail whip system, and reformed legislative and executive systems to increase the robustness of the checks and balances on local and central authorities, are needed to develop capacity to respond to emerging future crises. Legal reforms, to address the imbalances of power of the vested groups, such as bondholders or state monopolists, vis-à-vis the taxpayers, are required to prevent future bailouts of private and semi-state enterprises at the expense of the Exchequer. Local authorities reforms are required to ensure that the madness of over-development and land speculation do not build up to a systemic crisis. Taxation reforms are needed to stabilize future revenues and develop an economically sustainable tax system.

The Fiscal Compact is a wrong policy for all of the above because it risks creating a confidence trap, which can replace or displace other reforms. It represents a wrong set of objectives, as it diverts state attention from considering the nature of underlying imbalances. It also re-directs much of the fiscal responsibility away from Irish authorities, potentially amplifying the reality gap between the real economy and the decision-makers. By endlessly blaming Europe for tying Government’s hands, the Compact will continue building up voters’ perception disenfranchisement, fueling stronger local political orientation toward parochialism and narrow interests representation, while alienating voters from European institutions.

In short, the Compact is not an end to the politics as usual. This, perhaps, explains why no independent analyst or politician is prepared to vote in favour of the new Treaty except under the threat of the Blackmail Clause contained not in the Fiscal Compact itself, but in the forthcoming ESM Treaty and which requires accession to the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union as a pre-condition for gaining access to the ESM funds. Not exactly a moment of glory for either Europe or Ireland.

  

Box-out:

By now, we have become accustomed to the endless repetition of the boisterous claims that the continued declines in Government bond yields since mid-2011 signal the return of the markets confidence in Ireland. Alas, based on the last two months worth of data, things are not exactly going swimmingly for this school of thought. Based on weekly data, Irish benchmark 9-year bond yields spreads over Germany have contracted sharply in year on year terms, falling on average 1.30 percentage points since March 1, 2012 and 1.26 percentage points in April. The former is the second best performance in the euro zone after Italy, and the latter marks the third best performance after Italy and Portugal. Alas, weekly changes have been much less impressive. Since March 1, our yields have actually risen, in weekly terms, with an average rate of increase of 0.02 percentage points. For the month of April, the same metric stands at 0.05 percentage points. The same performance pressure on Ireland is building up in the Credit Default Swaps markets, with our 5 year benchmark CDS spreads declining just 0.24 percentage points compared to Portugal’s 5.2 percentage points drop since a month ago. Overall, European CDS and sovereign bonds markets are now signalling the exhaustion of the positive momentum from the December 2011 and February 2012 LTROs. Ireland’s bonds and CDS are no exception to this rule, suggesting that the ‘special relationship’ that we allegedly enjoy with the markets might be now over.

4/5/2012: Irish Examiner 26/4/2012: Is there an alternative to austerity?

This an unedited version of my article that appeared in the Irish Examiner, April 26, 2012.

However one interprets the core parameters of the fiscal discipline to be imposed under the Fiscal Compact, several facts concerning the new treaty and Ireland’s position with respect to it are indisputable. Firstly, the new treaty will restrict the scope for future exchequer deficits. Combined structural and general deficit targets to be imposed imply a maximum deficit of 2.9-3.0 percent in 2012 as opposed to the IMF-projected general government net borrowing of 8.5% of GDP. Secondly, it will impose a severe long-term debt ceiling, but that condition will not be satisfied by Ireland any time before 2030 or even later.

At the same time, the Troika programme for fiscal adjustment that Ireland is currently adhering to implies a de facto satisfaction of the Fiscal Compact deficit bound after 2015, and non-fulfilment of the structural deficit rule any time between now and 2017. In other words, no matter how we spin it, in the foreseeable future, we will remain a fiscally rouge state, client of the Troika and its successor – the ESM.

Let me run though some hard numbers – all based on IMF latest forecasts. Even under the rather optimistic scenario, Ireland’s real GDP is expected to grow by an average of 2.27% in the period from 2012 through 2017. This is the highest forecast average rate of growth for the entire euro area excluding the Accession states (the EA12 states). And yet, this growth will not be enough to lift us out of the Sovereign debt trap. Averaging just 10.3% of GDP, our total investment in the economy will be the lowest of all EA12 states, while our gross national savings are expected to average just 13.2% of GDP, the second lowest in the EA12.

In short, our real economy will be bled dry by the debt overhang – a combination of the protracted deleveraging and debt servicing costs. It is the combination of the government debt and the unsustainable levels of households’ and corporate indebtedness that is cutting deep into our growth potential, not the austerity-driven reduction in public spending.

There is absolutely no evidence to support the suggestion that increasing the national debt beyond the current levels or that increasing dramatically tax burden on the general population – the two measures that would allow us to slow down the rate of reductions in public expenditure planned under the Troika deal – can support any appreciable economic expansion. The reason for this is simple. According to the data, smaller advanced economies with the average Government expenditure burden in the economy of ca 31-35% of GDP have expected growth rates of 3.5% per annum. Countries that have Government spending accounting for 40% and more of GDP have projected rates of growth closer to 1.5% per annum. Ireland neatly falls between the two groups of states both in terms of the Government burden and the economic growth rate.

Despite the already deep austerity, Irish Exchequer will continue running excess spending throughout the adjustment period. Between 2012 and 2017, Irish government net borrowing is expected to average 4.7% of GDP per annum, the second highest in the EA12 group of countries. Put differently, calling on the Government to deploy some sort of fiscal spending stimulus today is equivalent to asking a heart attack patient to run a marathon in the Olympics. Between this year and 2017, our Government will spend some €47.4 billion more than it will collect in taxes, even if the current austerity course continues. Of these, €39 billion of expenditure will go to finance structural deficits, implying a direct cyclical stimulus of more than €8.4 billion.

The exports-driven economy of Ireland simply cannot sustain even the austerity-consistent levels of Government spending. IMF projects that between 2012 and 2017 cumulative current account surpluses in Ireland will be €40 billion. This forecast implies that 2017 current account surplus for Ireland will be €10 billion – a level that is 56 times larger than our current account surplus in 2011. If we are to take a more moderate assumption of current account surpluses running around 2012-2013 projected levels through 2017, our Government deficits are likely to be closer to €53 billion.

In short, there is really no alternative to the austerity, folks, no matter how much we wish for this not to be the case.

Instead, what we do have is the choice of austerity policies to pursue. We can either continue to tax away incomes of the middle and upper-middle classes, or we cut deeper into public expenditure. The former will mean accelerating loss of productivity due to skills and talent outflows from the country, reduced entrepreneurship and starving the younger companies of investment, rising pressure on wages in skills-intensive occupations, while destroying future capacity of the middle-aged families to support themselves through retirement. The latter is the choice to continue reducing our imports-intensive domestic consumption and cutting the spending power of the public sector employees, while enacting deep structural reforms to increase value-for-money outputs in the state sectors. Both choices are painful and short-term recessionary, but only the latter one leads to future growth. The former choice is only consistent with giving vitamins to a cancer-ridden patient – sooner or later, the placebo effect of the ‘stimulus’ will fade, and the cancer of debt overhang will take over once again, with even greater vengeance.

26/4/2012: One interesting point on Fiscal Compact 1/20 rule

One interesting point on Fiscal Compact, folks. The 1/20th adjustment rule has been interpreted widely as the rule requiring states with debt/GDp ratio in excess of 60% to reduce their debt levels by 1/20th of the gap between their existent debt level and the 60% bound. However, the Treaty itself states: "the obligation for those Contracting Parties whose general government debt exceeds the 60 % reference value to reduce it at an average rate of one twentieth per year as a benchmark" (page T/SCG/en5). In other words, there is a big gap between interpretation and reality.

Hat-tip for this discovery goes to Peter Mathews, TD.

Say, Ireland's debt/GDP ratio peaks at 120% GDP (I am rounding up the actual forecasts here). Under 'interpreted' adjustment mechanism, we would be expected to reduce the overall debt by 1/20th of 120% minus 60% or by 3% of GDP in year one. Under the actual Treaty, we are expected to reduce it by 1/20th of 120% or 6% of GDP in year one. Say our GDP is 175 billion in that year. Under interpreted rule, we have to find €5.25 billion to reduce debt levels, under actual Treaty language, we are expected to come up with €10.5 billion. To put this into perspective, the average level of gross investment in the Irish economy is forecast by the IMF to be around 10%pa between 2012 and 2017 or ca €17.5 billion under above assumptions. This means that the Fiscal Compact adjustment path would take out 60 percent of the entire annual investment in the economy. That is hardly a chop-change of a difference.


Updated: Thanks to Prof Karl Whelan for pointing this:

Applying the 1/20^th to the full amount is not consistent with the Treaty.

Article 4 ...makes reference to  “as provided for in Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, as amended by Council Regulation (EU) No. 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011”

And Regulation 1177/2011 states: “When it exceeds the reference value, the ratio of the government debt to gross domestic product (GDP) shall be considered sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory pace in accordance with point (b) of Article 126(2) TFEU if the differential with respect to the reference value has decreased over the previous three years at an average rate of one twentieth per year as a benchmark, based on changes over the last three years for which the data is available.”

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:306:0033:0040:EN:PDF

So it’s the gap to 60%.

25/3/2012: Irish GDP and Structural Deficits - forecasting unpredictable?

The pitfalls of forecasting Irish GDP and structural deficit in handy charts...

First - the range of forecasts and outruns for annual GDP growth in constant prices:

Not only the range of forecasts is wide (exclude the 2008-2009 period for obvious reasons), but what is worse is that there is virtually no agreement within the WEO database on past rates of growth. For example, take year 2000:

• WEO September 2011 claims 2000 saw growth of 9.298%
• WEO April 2011 and September 2010 state it was 9.665%
• WEO April 2010 and October 2009 claimed it was 9.447%
• WEO April 2009 and October 2008 set it at 9.237%
• WEO April 2008 at 9.15%
• WEOOctober 2007 at 9.1%
• WEOApril 2007 reported it to be 9.4%
• WEOOctober 2006 and April 2006 showed 9.2%

So which is the real growth rate, then? And how long do we need to wait to confirm it? Of course, much of the above is due to referencing to different prices bases - in other words, inflation 'target' changes' but you do get the point - even past rates are changing over time, implying the difficulty of actually comparing past performance.

Meanwhile, the range of forecasts is outright massively all over the place. Take this year forecasts (and we exclude the fact that between WEO database releases twice a year, we have intermediate updated forecasts published in separate documents without actually updating the database. So back in 2009 the IMF predicted 2012 rate of growth to be 2.325% to 2.337% (April-October versions). By April 2010 it was 2.306% and by October 2010 it was 2.446%. InApril 2011 the forecast for 2012 was revised to 1.908% and in September 2011 it was revised to 1.484%. So much for planning: the range over just 1.5 years is 2.446% to 1.484%.

Structural deficits - the reverse is true. Forecasts are tighter (as potential GDP assumes away cyclical effects) and outrun estimates are all over the place instead:

There is also a strangely strong correlation between conservative estimates of the structural deficits and the average estimates of the structural deficit and the IMF reported and forecast GDP growth rates. In other words, the models used by the IMF appear to produce more consistent lower end deficit estimates.

Which, of course, begs a question. You see, per IMF, Ireland's structural deficits were on average and at the minimum levels strongly outside the fiscal sustainability in 2000-2006 and well outside the Fiscal Compact bound of -0.5%. Over the same period of time, EUCommission reported structural deficits were actually within the parameter bounds for Fiscal Compact. Given that the IMF min and average estimates closely reflect the growth estimates and reported outruns, it appears that the IMF metric is probably a more reasonable reflection of the fiscal realities than that of the EUCommission.

Which is not exactly the great news for the Fiscal Compact as far as the treaty expected ability to achieve any real impact on fiscal discipline goes.

8/3/2012: Economy on a flat-line: Sunday Times 4/3/2012

This is an unedited version of my article in Sunday Times March 4, 2012.

This week, the conflicting news from the world’s largest economy – the US, have shown once again the problems inherent in economic forecasting. Even a giant economy is capable of succumbing to volatility while searching to establish a new or confirm an old trend. The US economy is currently undergoing this process that, it is hoped, is pointing to the reversal in the growth trend to the upside in the near future. The crucial point, however, when it comes to our own economy, is that even in the US economy the time around re-testing of the previously set trend makes short-term data a highly imperfect indicator of the economic direction.

In contrast to the US economy, however, Irish data currently bears little indication that we are turning the proverbial corner on growth. It is, however, starting to show the volatility that can be consistent with some economic soul-searching in months ahead. Majority of Irish economic indicators have now been bouncing for 6 to 12 months along the relatively flat or only gently declining trend. Some commentators suggest that this is a sign of the upcoming turnaround in our economic fortunes. Others have pointed to the uniform downward revisions of the forecasts for Irish growth for 2012 by international and domestic economists as a sign that the flattening trend might break into a renewed slowdown. In reality, all of these conjectures are at the very best educated guesswork, for our economy is simply too volatile and the current times are too uncertain to provide grounds for a more ‘scientific’ approach to forecasting.

Which means that to discern the potential direction for the economy in months ahead, we are left with nothing better than look at the signals from the more transparent, real economy-linked activities such as monthly changes in prices, retail sales and house price indices, and longer-range trade flows statistics, unemployment and workforce participation data.

This week we saw the release of two of the above indicators: residential property price index and retail sales. The former registered another massive decline, with residential property prices falling 17.4% year on year in January 2012, after posting a 16.7% annual decline in December 2011 and 15.6% decline in November 2011. With Dublin once again leading the trend compared to the rest of the country, there appears to be absolutely no ‘soul-searching’ as house prices continue to drop. House prices, of course, provide a clear signal as to the direction of the domestic investment – and despite all the noises about the vast FDI inflows and foreign buyers ‘kicking tyres’ around empty buildings and sites – this direction is down.

More interesting are the volatile readings from the retail sales data.

The headline indices of retail sales volumes and values for January 2012, released this week were just short of horrific. Year on year, retail sales declined 0.34% in value terms and 0.76% in volume terms. Monthly declines were 3.7% across both value and volume. Relative to peak, overall retail sales are now down 25% in value terms and 21% in volume. January monthly declines in value and volume were the worst since January 2010. Stripping out motor trade, on the annual basis, core retail sales fell 1.94% in value terms and 2.74% in volume terms, although there was a month-on-month rise of 0.3% in value index. Monthly performance in volume of sales was the worst since February 2011.

Looking at the detailed decomposition of sales, out of twelve core Retail Businesses categories reported by CSO, ten have posted annual contractions in January in terms of value of sales. The two categories that posted increases were Fuel (up 5%) and Non-Specialised Stores (ex-Department Stores) (up 1.7%). The former posted a rise due to oil inflation, while the latter represents a small proportion of total retail sales – neither is likely to yield any positive impact on business environment in Ireland. In volume terms, increases in sales were recorded also in just two categories. Non-Specialised Stores sales rose 1.0%, while Pharmaceuticals Medical and Cosmetic Articles rose 1.5% year on year. Overall, only one out of 12 categories of sales posted increases in both value and volume of sales. All discretionary consumption items, including white goods and household maintenance items posted significant, above average declines in a further sign that households are continuing to tighten their belts, cutting out small-scale household investment and durables. The trend direction is broadly in line with November 2011-January 2012 3-months averages, but showing much sharper rates of contraction in demand in January.

The above confirm the broader downward trend in domestic demand that is relatively constant since Q1 2010 and is evident in value and volume indices as well as in total retail sales and core sales. More importantly, all indications are that the trend is likely to persist.

One of the core co-predictors – on average – of the retail sector activity is consumer confidence. Despite a significant jump in January 2012, ESRI consumer confidence indicator continues to bounce along the flat line, with current 6 months average at 56.5 virtually identical to the previous 6 months average and behind 2010-2011 average of 57.3. Based on the latest reading for consumer confidence, the forecast for the next 3 months forward for retail sales is not encouraging with volumes sales staying at the average levels of the previous 6 months and the value of sales being supported at the current levels solely by energy costs inflation.

Lastly, since 2010 I have been publishing an Index of Retail Sector Activity that acts as a strong predictor of the future (3 months ahead) retail sales and is based both on CSO data and ESRI consumer confidence measures, adjusted for income and earnings dynamics. The Index current reading for February-April is indicating that retail sales sector will remain in doldrums for the foreseeable future, posting volume and value activity at below last 6 months and 12 months trends.

Which means that the sector is likely to contribute negatively to unemployment and further undermining already fragile household income dynamics for some of the most at-risk families. During the first half of the crisis, most of jobs destruction in both absolute and relative terms took place in the construction sector, dominated by men. Thus, for example, in 2009 number of women in employment fell 4.2%, while total employment declined 8.1%. By 2010, numbers of women in employment were down 2.8% against 4.2% overall drop in employment. Last year, based on the latest available data, female employment was down 2% while total employment fell 2.5%. In other words, more and more jobs destruction is taking place amongst women, as further confirmed by the latest Live Register statistics also released this week, showing that in February 2012, number of female claimants rose by 3,479 year on year, while the number of male claimants dropped 8,356 over the same period.

The misfortunes of the retail sector are certainly at play in these. Per CSO, female employment in the Wholesale and Retail Trade sector has fallen at more than double the rate of overall retail sector employment declines in 2010 and 2011. Relative to the peak, total female employment is now down 10.2%, while female employment in retail sector is down 17.9%.

Traditionally, acceleration of jobs destruction amongst women is associated with increasing incidences of dual unemployment households. This is further likely to be reinforced by the increasing losses of female jobs in the retail sector, due to overlapping demographics and relative income distributions. Such development, in turn, will put even more pressure on both consumption and investment in the domestic economy.

CHART

Source: CSO and author own calculations

Box-out:

The forthcoming Referendum on the EU Fiscal Compact will undoubtedly open a floodgate of debates concerning the economic, social and political implications of the vote. Yet, it is the economic merits of the treaty that require most of the attention. A recent research paper by Alessandro Piergallini and Giorgio Rodano from the Centre for Economic and International Studies, University of Rome, makes a very strong argument that in the world of distortionary (or in other words progressive) taxation, passive fiscal policies (policies that target constitutionally or legislatively-mandated levels of public debt relative to GDP) are not feasible in the presence of the active monetary polices (policies that focus solely on inflation targeting). In other words, in the real world we live in, the very idea of Fiscal Compact might be incompatible with the idea of pure inflation targeting by the ECB. Which is, of course, rather intuitive. If a country or a currency block were to pre-commit itself to a fixed debt/GDP ratio, then inflation must be allowed to compensate for the fiscal imbalances created in the short run, since levying higher taxation will ultimately lead to economic distortions via household decisions on spending and labour supply. Given that ECB abhors inflation, the Fiscal Compact must either be associated with increasingly less distortionary (less progressive) taxation or with the ECB becoming less of an inflation hawk.