19/01/2012: Quarterly data on complete trade balance: Q3 2011

While we are on trade data (see previous post on November 2011 merchandise trade stats here), let's also update full trade stats for QNA results for Q3 2011. This covers all trade - merchandise and services, so it paints a full picture of our trade balance.

Chart below shows quarterly trade stats for Ireland. Per latest QNA:

• Exports of goods and services fell from €41.945bn in Q2 2011 to €41.186bn in Q3 2011, a decline of 1.81%. This comes after a qoq rise of 4.34% in Q1-Q2 2011 period. Year on year, Q2 2011 saw exports rise 3.78% and Q3 saw an increase of 1.91%.
• Despite the slowdown, Q3 results was still the second best quarterly exports performance on record.
• Imports of goods and services shrunk in Q3 2011 to €31.6bn, down 5.45% qoq, which comes on foot of a 3.06% rise qoq in Q2 2011. Year on year, imports were up 3.3% in Q2 2011 and are down just 0.29% in Q3 2011.
• This means the trade balance has reached another historical high at €9.586bn in Q3 2011. The trade surplus was up 9.66% in qoq terms and 5.69% in yoy terms in Q2 2011 and it rose 12.49% qoq and 9.89% yoy in Q3 2011.

The core driver for the dramatic gains in trade balance for goods and services was a substantial decline in trade deficit on services side. This can be best seen from annualized figures, shown below:

Based on Q3 data, we can expect:

• Total annual exports to rise to €164.75bn in 2011, up 4.48% on €157.67bn in 2010
• Total annual imports to increase 3.95% yoy to €132.953bn, and
• Total trade surplus to rise 6.55% yoy to €31.72bn
• Of the above €1.95bn improvement in the annual expected trade surplus is likely to come from a €1.66bn improvement (reduction) in the annual trade deficit in services which is expected tos shrink to €11.99bn in 2011.

19/1/2012: Irish External Trade data - November 2011

Latest trade stats for Ireland are out - covering preliminary figures for November - and... it's another record trade surplus. I recently wrote about this issue for PressEurop (link here) and for Globe & Mail (link here).

But the latest data from Ireland's external trade side is truly impressive. Until that is, you dig slightly below the surface... where some strange things are starting to pop up.

Let's take it from the top.

On seasonally adjusted basis,

• Irish merchandise imports in November stood at €3,706mln, a decline of 5.97% mom that comes on foot of a previous monthly rise of 2.68%. Imports are up 4.91% year on year and relative to 2009 they are up 0.21%. In the 11 months from January 2011, imports are up 6.46% on same period in 2010.
• Imports increases are, of course, closely linked to increases in exports - as MNCs import much of their inputs into production from abroad. I shall cover this in a second, so keep this in mind.
• Irish merchandise exports rose in November to €8,016mln - an uplift of 4.58% mom on the foot of the previous month decline of 4.32%. Year on year exports are up 8.83% and relative to November 2009 they are up 23.22%. In the 11 months through November, cumulative exports rose 4.09% relative to the same period 2010.

• As the result, trade balance (again, referencing just merchandise trade) rose 15.74% mom (after contracting 10.75% in October, mom) to an all-time record of €4,310mln. The trade surplus is now 12.44 ahead of November 2010 and 53.5% ahead of same period 2009. In the first 11 months of 2011 trade balance rose 1.61% on the same period of 2010.
• The last observation in the previous bullet point is not a strong reason to cheer. Remember, comparable rise in 2009-2010 period was 8.77% or some 5.5 times faster than in 2011.

• Updating annualized trade stats based on 11 months performance, we can expect imports to come at ca €48.46bn - up 5.82% yoy reversing average annual rate of decline of 9.85% achieved in 2007-2010 period. Exports are likely to post another record year, consistent with my predictions before, at €92.25bn - up 3.36% yoy and well behind the Government-projected rate of over 5%. Trade surplus (for merchandise trade) is likely to reach a record €43.78bn some 0.75% ahead of 2010 result - an increase that would pale in comparison with 10.6% rise in annual surplus in 2010 yoy and well below the average 19.62% increase achieved over 2007-2010 period.

So what is going on, folks? Why are we seeing record surpluses, against fairly impressive exports and growing imports? The answer can be found in two stats. The first one, relates to terms of trade, and the second one relates to transfer pricing. let's take a look, shall, we?

CSO reports terms of trade data with 1 month lag, so we do not have November results yet, but we do have october figures.

As you can see from the above chart, terms of trade improved (downward movement in series) in october for Irish exporters. And this improvement is rather dramatic both in the short-term and in the long-run. However, as the chart below shows, the improvement in terms of trade in October 2011 relative to October 2010 was not fully utilized by the exporters (we are below the long term relationship, implying that for current levels of terms of trade, our exports should be higher than they are).

What did, however, take place is a massive jump - to a record high - in overall ratio of exports to imports in merchandise trade (chart below). In more layman's terms, all of a sudden, in November, Irish exporters needed less imported materials to supply more of exports. Hmmm... Has the chemicals component of Viagra pill change? Not really. Has the value of this component become cheaper for Irish operations of the respective MNC? No. In fact it became more expensive as the euro weakened against other currencies and terms of trade improved. So what did happen?

Take another look:

 What the above suggests is that Ireland-based MNCs are:

1. Drawing down inventories to boost exports - something they would do were they planning for a slowdown in December and onward;
2. Pushing up the component of exports value that is transfer pricing, thus boosting their profit side - something that will eventually show up in wider GDP/GNP gap;
3. Both of the above.

This is not exactly the stuff the dreams of 'exports-led recovery' should be made of, but for now, let us rejoice that at least in one area we have really strong performance in this economy. Afterall, better that than nothing.

16/1/2012: Summary of S&P move and more

In the wake of the S&P action it is a good idea to put side-by-side some ratings on euro area countries. here are S&P ratings before and after downgrade along with CMA ratings and CDS data for Q1 2009 beginning of the crisis) and Q4 2011.

Per S&P: "...the agreement [between euro zone member states in December 2011 attempting to address the crisis] is predicated on only a partial recognition  of the source of the crisis: that the current financial turmoil stems  primarily from fiscal profligacy at the periphery of the eurozone. In our view, however, the financial problems facing the eurozone are as much a consequence of rising external imbalances and divergences in competitiveness  between the eurozone's core and the so-called "periphery". As such, we believe  that a reform process based on a pillar of fiscal austerity alone risks becoming self-defeating, as domestic demand falls in line with consumers' rising concerns about job security and disposable incomes, eroding national  tax revenues."

In other words, it's growth, stupid. And herein lies the main problem for Europe. While EU might - if forced hard enough - jump onto a more sustainable fiscal spending path (cut deficits and structural deficits) - the EU has absolutely no record of creating pro-growth conditions or environments. In fact, in a bizarre response to the S&P moves:

• France is discussing an increase in VAT as the means for stimulating productivity growth, while
• Austria is planning wealth taxes and increase in retirement age as its response to economic growth challenge.

Now, where do you start in dealing with this lunatic asylum? 

16/1/2012: Irish Bailout Redux - Sunday Times 15/01/2012

Several articles in the press yesterday on why Ireland will require / need a second 'bailout' - here's an excellent piece from Namawinelake and here's a piece from Colm McCarthy.

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times (January 15, 2012) article on the same topic.

In May 2011, as Greece was sliding toward the second bailout, I conjectured that within 24 months, Ireland and Portugal will both require additional bailout packages as well. This week, my prediction has been echoed by the Chief Economist of the Citi, William Buiter.

According to Buiter, the costs of borrowing in the markets are currently prohibitive and the expiration of the €67.5 billion loans deal with the Torika, scheduled for 2014 will see Ireland once again unable to borrow to cover remaining deficits and refinancing maturing bonds. Ireland should secure additional funding as a back up, to avoid seeking it later “in a state of near panic”.

Buiter’s suggestion represents nothing more than a prudent planning-ahead exercise. In addition to Buiter’s original rationale for securing new lending, Ireland is facing significant fiscal and economic challenges that will make it nearly impossible for the State to finance its fiscal adjustment path through private borrowing in 2014-2016.

Speaking to the RTE, Buiter said that although Ireland’s situation was different from that of Greece, the economy remains under severe stress from banking sector bailouts. Addressing this stress should involve restructuring of the promissory notes issued by the state to IBRC, as the Government was hoping to do in recent months. But it also requires anchoring our longer-term fiscal adjustment path to predictable and stable sources of funding at a cost that can be carried by the weakened economy.

The Government will do well to listen to these early warnings to avoid repeating mistakes of their predecessors.

On November 18, 2011, Carlo Cottarelli, IMF Director of Fiscal Affairs Department gave a presentation in the London School of Economics, titled Challenges of Budgetary and Financial Crises in Europe. In it, Mr Cottarelli provided three important insights into the expected dynamics for debt and deficits that have material impact on Ireland.

Firstly, he showed that to achieve the ‘golden rule’ debt to GDP ratio of 60% of GDP by 2030, Ireland will be required to run extremely high primary surpluses in years to come. Only Greece and Japan will have to shoulder greater pain than us over the next 19 years to get public debt overhang down to a safety level.

Secondly, amongst all PIIGS, Ireland has the highest proportion of outstanding public debt held by non-residents (84%), implying the highest cost of restructuring such debt. The runner up is Greece with 65%. In general, bond yields are positively correlated with the proportion of debt held by non-residents.

Thirdly, Cottarelli presented a model estimating the relationship between the observed bond yields and the underlying macroeconomic and fiscal fundamentals that looked at 31 countries. This model can be recalibrated to see what yields on Irish debt can be consistent with market funding under IMF growth projections for Ireland. Using headline IMF forecasts from December 2011, 2014-2016 yields for Ireland are expected to range between 4.7% and 6.5%. Incorporating some downside risks to growth and other macroeconomic parameters, Irish yields can be expected to range between 5.3% and 7.0%.

Even in 5.5-6% average yields range, financing Irish bonds rollovers in the market in 2014-2016 will be prohibitively costly as at the above yields, Ireland's debt dynamics will no longer be consistent with the rates of decline in debt/GDP ratio planned for under the Troika agreement. This, in turn, means that the markets will be unlikely to provide financing in volumes, sufficient to cover debt rollovers. Thus, Ireland will either require new bridging loans from the Troika or will have to extract even greater primary surpluses out of the economy, diverting more funds to cover debt repayments and risking derailing any recovery we might see by then.

What Butier statement this week does not consider, however, are the potential downside risks to the Irish fiscal stability projections. These risks are material and can be broadly divided into external and internal.

Per external risks, the latest CMA Global Sovereign Risk Report for Q4 2011, released this week, shows Ireland as the 6^th riskiest country in the world with estimated probability of sovereign default of 46.4% and credit ratings of ccc+. Despite stable performance of our bonds in Q4 2011, CMA credit ratings for Ireland have deteriorated, compared to Q3 2011. And, our 5 year mid-point CDS spreads are now at around 747 bps – more than seven times ahead of Germany. This highlights the effect of a moderate slowdown in euro zone growth on our bonds performance.

Even absent the above risks, Irish debt dynamics can be significantly improved by significantly extending preferential interest rates obtained under the Troika agreement to cover post-2014 rollovers and adjustments. Based on IMF projections from December 2011, such a move can secure savings of some €9 billion or almost 5% of our forecast 2016 GDP in years 2014-2016 alone (see chart).

CHART

Chart source: IMF Country Report 11/356, December 2011 and author own calculations

Looking into the next 5 years, there is a risk of significant increase in inflationary pressures once the growth momentum returns to the Euro area. A rise in the bund rates can also take place due to deterioration in the German fiscal position or due to Germany assuming greater role in the risk-sharing arrangements within the euro area. Lastly, German and all other bonds yields can also rise when risk-on switch takes place in post-recessionary period, drawing significant amounts of liquidity out of the global bond markets. All of these will adversely impact German bunds, but also Irish bonds.

On the domestic front, we should be providing a precautionary cover for the risk of a more protracted slowdown in the Irish economy especially if accompanied by sticky unemployment. The risk of deterioration in Irish primary balances due to structural slowdown in the rate of growth in Irish exports (potentially due to strengthening of the euro in 2013-2016 period or significant adverse effect of the patent cliff on pharma exports) is another one worth considering well before it materializes. Lastly, there is the ever-growing risk that the markets will simply refuse to fund the vast rollovers of debt which is currently being increasingly warehoused outside the normal markets in the vaults of the Central Banks and on the books of the Troika.

Overall, Ireland should form a multi-pronged strategic approach to fiscal debt adjustment. Recognizing future risks, the Government should aggressively pursue the agenda of restructuring the promissory notes issued to the IBRC with an aim of driving down notes yield down to ECB repo rate and push for ECB acceptance of burden sharing imposition on IBRC bondholders to reduce the principal amount of the promissory notes. Pursuit of longer-term objective of forcing the ECB to accept a writedown on the banks debts accumulated through the Emergency Liquidity Assistance lines at the Central Bank of Ireland is another key policy target. Lastly, Ireland needs to secure significant lines of credit with the EU at preferential rates for post-2014 period with longer-term maturity than currently envisaged under the Troika deal.

Given the general conditions across the Eurozone today, the last priority should be pursued as early as possible. In other words, there’s no better time to do the right things than now.

Box-out:

The latest EU-wide statistics for Retail sales for November 2011 released this week present an interesting reading. Retail sector turnover index, taking into account adjustments for working days, shows Irish retail activity has contracted by 0.4% in November 2011 year on year. Overall activity is now down 5.2% on same period 2008, but is up 7.9% on 2005. For all the Irish retail sector woes, here’s an interesting comparative. Euro area retail sales turnover is now down 2.5% year on year and 1.6% on 2005. In terms of overall contraction in turnover, Ireland is ranked 15^th in EU27 in terms of the rate of contraction relative to November 2010 and November 2008 and 12^th in terms of contraction relative to 2005. Not exactly a catastrophic decline. Once set against significant losses in retail sector employment since 2008, these numbers suggest that to a large extent jobs losses in the sector were driven by lack of efficiencies in the sector at the peak of the Celtic Tiger, as well as by declines in revenues.

15/1/2012: Research Update - January 2012

Research update for January 2012:

Two new papers added to my ssrn page:

• http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1985617 and 
• http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1985618

Two papers now published (since last update):

• http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1881444 and
• http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1919792

Five papers in various working stages:

• Tsallis Entropy: Does the Market Size Matter? with G. Hearte
• Review of core properties of gold as financial diversification instrument, with Brian M. Lucey and Fearghal O'Connor
• Tobin Tax: Literature Review, with Brian M. Lucey
• Modeling the Risks of Large House Price Falls: International Evidence, with Caoimhe Proud-Murphy, and
• http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1940481

14/1/2012: Irish banking crisis - on a road to nowhere

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article from January 8, 2012.

In the theoretical world of Irish banking reforms, 2012 is supposed to be the halfway marker for delivering on structural change. Almost a year into the process, banks are yet to meet close to 70% of their total deleveraging targets, SMEs are yet to see any improvements in credit supply, households are yet to be offered any supports to reduce their unsustainable debt burdens, longer-term strategic plans reflective of the banks new business models, now approved by the EU not once, but twice are yet to be operationalized, and funding models are yet to be transitioned off the ECB dependency.

In the period since publication of the banking sector reforms proposals, total banks core and non-core assets disposals are running at some €14 billion of the €70 billion to be achieved by the end of 2013. Even this lacklustre performance was heavily concentrated in the first nine months of 2011, when few of Irish banks competitors were engaging in similar assets sales.

Since then, things have changed. Plans by the euro area banking institutions, already announced in Q4, suggest that some €775 billion worth of euro area banks’ assets will come up for sale in 2012. That is more than 8.5 times the volumes of assets disposals achieved in 2011. And 2012 is just the tip of the proverbial iceberg. According to the Morgan Stanley research, 2012-2013 can see some €1.5-2.5 trillion worth of banks assets hitting the markets. With 2012 starting with clear ‘risk-off’ signals from the sovereign bond markets and banks equities valuations, the near term future for Irish banks deleveraging plans can be described as bleak at best.

Further ahead, the process of rebuilding capital buffers, in both quantity and quality, can take core euro zone banks a good part of current decade to achieve. In this context, Irish banks deleveraging targets are grossly off the mark when it comes to timing and recovery rates expectations.

Progress achieved to-date leaves at least €35-40 billion in new assets disposals to be completed in 2012 – two-and-a-half times the rate of 2011. The two Pillars of Irish banking alongside the IL&P are now facing an impossible dilemma: either the banks meet their regulatory targets by the end of 2013, which will require deeper haircuts on assets and thus higher crystallized losses, or the 2013 deleveraging deadline is bust. In other words, Irish banks have a choice to make between having to potentially go to the Government for more capital or suffer a reputational cost of delaying, if not derailing altogether, the reforms timetable.

This is already reflected in the negative outlook and lower ratings given by S&P to AIB last month. The rating agency stressed their expectation of the slowdown in assets deleveraging in 2012 as one key rationale for the latest downgrades. Post-recapitalization in July, AIB core Tier 1 regulatory capital ratios stood at a massive 22%, the fact much lauded by the Irish authorities. However, per S&P “AIB’s capital ratio… will be between 5.5% ad 6.5% by 2013” due to materially “higher risk weights [on] capital, estimated deleveraging costs, as well as further capital erosion from the core business”.

Bank of Ireland finds itself in a better position, but, unlike AIB, it has much smaller capital reserves to call upon in the case of shortfall on July 2011 recapitalization funds.

Another area of concern for Irish banking sector relates to funding. Central Bank stress tests (PCAR) carried out in March 2011 assumed that by the end of 2013 Irish banking institutions will be funded on commercial terms. This too is subject to significant uncertainty as euro area banks enter a period of rapid bonds roll-overs in 2012-2014. Overall, the sector will face ca €700 billion of bonds maturing in 2012 and total senior debt maturing in 2012-2014 amounts to close to €2.2 trillion once ECB’s latest 3-year long term refinancing facility is factored in. For comparison, in 11 months through November 2011, euro area banks have managed to raise less than €350 billion in capital instruments, and various senior bonds. Again, international environment does not provide any grounds for optimism about Irish banks ability to decouple themselves from the ECB supply of funds.

In the short run, Irish Pillar Banks dependency on central banks’ funding is a net subsidy to their bottom line, as central banks credit lines come at a fraction of the expected cost of raising funds in the marketplace. This makes it possible for the banks to sustain their extend-and-pretend approach toward retail borrowers.

However, in the longer term, reliance on this funding represents major risks of maturity mismatch and sudden liquidity stops. The latest data clearly shows that the major risk of Irish banking sector becoming fully dependent on ECB as the core source of funding is now a reality. Reductions in the emergency liquidity assistance loans extended by the Central Bank of Ireland are now matched by increases in ECB lending to these banks. A recent research paper from the New York Federal Reserve shows that Irish banks continue to account for the largest proportion of all loans extended by the ECB to the banking systems of the euro area ‘periphery’.

Lacking functional banking sector, in turn, puts a boot into Government’s plans to use reforms as the vehicle for reversing credit supply contraction that has been running uninterrupted since 2008.

Another major risk inherent in the Irish banks’ funding and capital dependencies on Central Banks and the Government is the risk that having delayed for years the necessary processes of restructuring household debts, the banks can find themselves in the dire need of calling in the negative equity loans. This can happen if the Irish banking sector were to be left lingering in its quasi-transformed shape when ECB decides to pull the plug on extraordinary liquidity supply measures it deployed. While such a prospect might be 2-3 years away, it is only a matter of time before this threat becomes a reality and the very possibility of such eventuality should breath fear into the ranks of Ireland’s politicians.

As the current reforms stand, the sector will not be able to provide significant protection against the ECB policies reversal, even if the Central Bank-planned reforms are completed on time. The reason for this is simple. Our twin Pillar banks will be facing – over 2013-2018 – a rising tide of mortgages defaults and voluntary property surrenders, as well as continued mounting corporate loans losses as the economy undergoes a lengthy and painful debt overhang correction, consistent with the historical evidence of similar balance sheet recession.

While the capital for writing these assets down might have been at least in part supplied under PCAR 2011, the banks have no means of managing any added risks that might emerge alongside the mortgages defaults, such as, for example, the risk of their cost of funding rising from the current 1 percent under the ECB mandate to, say, 6 or 7 percent that private markets might charge.

For all the plans for banking reforms proclaimed for 2012 by the Central Bank and the Government, in all likelihood, this year is going to see more mounting corporate and household loans writedowns, amidst the continuation of the extend-and-pretend policies by the banks. The longer this process of delaying losses realization continues, the less viable the remaining banks assets become. And with them, the lower will be the credit supplied into the real economy already starved of investment and funding.

Box-out:

Irish banking sector structure envisioned under the Government reforms plans will not be conducive to an orderly deleveraging of the real economy and simultaneous repairing of the banks balance sheets. Sectoral concentration, in part driven directly by the Government dictate, in part by the massive subsidies provided to insolvent domestic banks, will see a colluding AIB & BOFI duopoly running circles around the regulators, supervisors and politicians.

How serious is this threat of the duopoly-induced markets distortions in post-reform Irish banking? Serious enough for the latest EU Commission statement on Bank of Ireland restructuring plans to devote significant space to outlining high-level set of subsidies that the Irish authorities are planning jointly with ECB.

No one as of yet noticed the irony of these latest amendments to the Government plans for the banking sector reforms: to undo the damaging effects of state subsidies to the incumbents, the EU and the Government will offer more subsidies to the potential newcomers. Such approach to policy would be comical, were it not designed explicitly to evade the real solution to the banking sector collapse in this country – a wholesale restructuring of the sector, that would have used insolvent banks’ performing assets as the basis for endowing new banking institutions to serve this economy.

13/1/2012: Irish Household Income and Consumption: Q3 2011

The latest data on disposable income (Institutional Accounts) from CSO presents the picture of real recession ravaging Irish economy. Here are the core details from Q3 2011 - the quarter when Irish economy tanked once again in terms of aggregate GDP and GNP.

• Gross disposable income of Irish households in Q3 2011 amounted to €21,761 million - a decline of 4% yoy and a drop of 4.3% qoq.
• By use of disposable income (separate database proving longer historical series), gross disposable income of households dropped 3.8% yoy and 4.2% qoq.
• Final consumption has declined 3.8% yoy and 2.5% qoq.
• Gross savings of the households fell 3.9% yoy and 11.6% qoq

Using Q1-Q3 2011 data we can compute expected annualized series for 2011, which are shown in chart below. In annualized terms:

• 2011 is forecast to see gross disposable income of Irish households drop 2.9% yoy on 2010 and reach -14.2% cumulative fall on the peak at 2008
• Final household consumption expenditure is set to fall 2.7% yoy and 16.2% on peak at 2008
• Gross household savings is expected to fall 4% yoy and 17% on the peak in 2009

 Of course, in the above, Gross household savings includes repayments of debts, which is reflected in the fact that since the beginning of the crisis, our savings were rising, just as out incomes tanked.

13/1/2012: EU27 External Trade - Greece falling out of trade picture

As German lawmakers are putting pressure on the parties in the PSI negotiations in Greece with calls for Greece to exit the Euro to devalue and regain competitiveness have some serious basis in real economic performance of the country.

Today's data on trade balance across EU27 clearly shows that Greece is unable to sustain serious debt repayments under the current arrangements. Here are the details:

The first estimate for November 2011 euro area (EA17) trade surplus came in at €6.9 bn surplus, against the deficit of -€2.3 bn in November 2010. October 2011 trade balance was +€1.0 bn, against a surplus of +€3.1 bn in October 2010.

In November 2011 compared with October 2011, seasonally adjusted exports rose by 3.9%, while imports remained unchanged.

The first estimate for the November 2011 extra-EU27 posted trade deficit of -€7.2 bn, compared with a deficit of -€16.8 bn in November 2010. In October 2011 the trade balance extra-EU27 was -€11.2 bn, compared with -€9.5 bn in October 2010.

In November 2011 compared with October 2011, extra-EU27 seasonally adjusted exports rose by 2.8%, while imports fell by 0.6%.

EU27 detailed results for January to October 2011:

• The EU27 deficit for energy increased significantly (-€317.5 bn in January-October 2011 compared with -€246.4 bn in January-October 2010)
• Trade surplus for manufactured goods rose to +€198.9 bn compared with +€136.4 bn in the same period of 2010. 
• The highest increases were recorded for EU27 exports to Russia (+28%), Turkey (+23%), China (+21%) and India (+20%), and for imports from Russia (+26%), Norway (+21%), Brazil and India (both +20%). 
• The EU27 trade surplus increased slightly with the USA (+€60.8 bn in January-October 2011 compared with +€60.1 bn in January-October 2010) and more significantly with Switzerland (+€24.1 bn compared with +€16.6 bn) and Turkey (+€21.3 bn compared with +€14.7 bn). 
• The EU27 trade deficit fell with China (-€132.2 bn compared with -€139.8 bn), Japan (-€16.1 bn compared with -€18.3 bn) and South Korea (-€3.9 bn compared with -€9.6 bn), but increased with Russia (-€76.0 bn compared with -€61.1 bn) and Norway (-€38.7 bn compared with -€29.8 bn). 
• Concerning the total trade of Member States, the largest surplus was observed in Germany (+€129.2 bn in January-October 2011), followed by Ireland and the Netherlands (both +€35.9 bn) and Belgium (+€10.1 bn). The United Kingdom (-€98.2 bn) registered the largest deficit, followed by France (-€72.5 bn), Spain (-€40.1 bn), Italy (-€24.2 bn), Greece (-€16.9 bn), Portugal (-€13.3 bn) and Poland (-€12.0 bn).

Some charts:

The charts above clearly show that:

• Of all PIIGS, Ireland is the only country showing capacity to generate significant trade surpluses, with Irish merchandise trade surplus of €2.5bn in November being the second highest in EU 27 in absolute terms and the highest in terms relative to GDP. Exactly the same is true for Irish trade surplus recorded in October. Irish trade surplus in November was almost as large as the combined surpluses of all other countries with positive trade balance, ex-Germany (€2.9bn).
• In November 2011 Ireland posted the third fastest rate of mom growth in exports in EU27 (+8.3%), the effect compounded by the 9.4% drop (4th deepest in EU27) in imports.
• In contrast, Greece posted a 14.4% contraction in its exports in November 2011 compared to October 2011 - the largest drop of all countries in EU27. Greek trade balance in October stood at a deficit €0.1 billion and in November 2011 this widened to €0.2 billion.

So in terms of trade, Ireland is not Greece, and Greece is not showing any signs of ability to sustain internal debt adjustment within the euro structure.

13/1/2012: The need for political reforms

An interesting paper from the World Bank (linked here), by Torgler, Benno, titled "Tax Morale and Compliance: Review of Evidence and Case Studies for Europe" (December 1, 2011). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series, 2011 (World Bank Policy research Working Paper 5922) presents an overview of the literature on tax morale and tax compliance. Perhaps unsurprisingly, it finds that accountability, democratic governance, efficient and transparent legal structures, and crucially, "trust within the society" are important in enforcing tax compliance and tax morale.

Which offers an interesting point for observation: in 2011, trust in Irish system of government as measured by the Edelman Trust Barometer stood at 20%, against the average of 52% for 23 countries surveyed in the report, making Ireland the lowest ranked country in the study. 


But things are even worse than the above number suggests: 

• Ireland ranks lowest 23rd in terms of average trust measures across four institutions of government, media, business and NGOs
• The above result is driven by: high trust in NGOs at 53%, although this is still below global trust in NGOs at 61%, high trust in business at 46% against global trust in business at 56%, low trust in media at 38% and abysmally low trust in government.

So may be, just may be, folks, in order to improve our fiscal performance we need deep political and leadership changes at least as much as tax increases and spending cuts? Perhaps, one of the problems with Irish fiscal crisis response to date is that the current Government and its predecessor are not doing enough to make Ireland's elites more accountable, more transparent, and better governed? There's an old Russian saying that every fish rots from the head (although Chinese, British and other nations claim the origin of this phrase as well).

12/1/2012: Q4 2011 Sovereign Bonds performance

Four charts covering Q4 2011 sovereign bonds (CDS) performance:

Data sourced from CMA Global Sovereign Risk Report Q4 2011

12/1/2012: Q4 2011 Sovereign Bonds Report

CMA released their Quarterly Global Sovereign Risk Report Q4 2011 which makes for an interesting reading. Here are some highlights:

"The Eurozone debt situation continued throughout Q4, with the region widening 9% overall. A bail out of Dexia at the beginning of the quarter was followed by continued concerns on Italy’s debt in November and risk of an S&P downgrade of the entire Eurozone in December.

"Nearly all global CDS prices widened during November’s volatile period, clearly indicating the significance of Western Europe to the global economy and the importance of finding a permanent resolution to the debt crisis.

• Italy’s austerity measures failed to move the market tighter in Q3, and the spread widened to a high of 595bp in-mid November. This prompted the end of the Bersculoni era, a new president [obviously, they mean PM] and a new set of austerity measures aimed at reducing the 2 trillion dollars of debt and 120% debt-to-GDP ratio. Implied FX devaluation from a default in Italy is around 17% according to CMA DatavisionTM Quantos.
• Spain and Belgium’s charts were a mirror image of Italy’s.
• Ireland remained relatively stable throughout the quarter, perhaps indicating a balance between a well capitalised banking sector and IMF concerns about the prospects for growth in exports to Europe."
• Greece was the worst performer worldwide (see tables below charts), while Portugal outperformed Ireland

Charts:

Summary of 10 highest and lowest risk sovereigns:

 

So despite our 'gains' in the bond markets, Ireland moved into 6th highest risk position in Q4 2011 from 7th in Q3 2011. 

And amongst the safest bond issuers there are just 2 euro zone countries: Finland and Germany (an improvement on Q3 2011 where only Finland was there).

Here's the summary of our performance since Q1 2009.

11/1/2012: Great Moderation or Great Delusion

A recent (December 2011) paper published by CEPR offers a very interesting analysis of the macroeconomic risks propagation in the current crisis. The paper, titled Great Moderation or Great Mistake: Can rising confidence in low macro-risk explain the boom in asset prices? (CEPR DP 8700) by Tobias Broer and Afroditi Kero looks at the evidence on whether the period of Great Moderation in macroeconomic volatility during the period from the mid-1980s (the decline in macroeconomic volatility that is unprecedented in modern history) had an associated impact on the rise of asset prices that accompanied this period, setting the stage for the ongoing crash.

In recent literature, this rise in asset prices, and the crash that followed, have both been attributed to "overconfidence in a benign macroeconomic environment of low volatility" or to excessively optimistic expectations of investors that the lengthy period of macroeconomic stability and upward trending is the 'new normal'. 

The study introduced learning about the persistence of volatility regimes in a standard asset pricing model of investor decision making. "It shows that the fall in US macroeconomic volatility since the mid-1980s only leads to a relatively small increase in asset prices when investors have full information about the highly persistent, but not permanent, nature of low volatility regimes." In other words, in the rational expectations setting with no errors in judgement and perfect foresight (investors are aware that volatility reductions are temporary), there is no bubble forming.

However, when investors "infer the persistence of low volatility from empirical evidence" (in other words when knowledge is imperfect and there is a probabilistic scenario under which the moderation can be permanent, then "Bayesian learning can deliver a strong rise in asset prices by up to 80%. Moreover, the end of the low volatility period leads to a strong and sudden crash in prices."

Specifically, calibrated model generates pre-collapse rise in asset prices of 77% and overvaluation of assets by 79% over the case of no learning. The subsequent collapse of asset prices is 84% in the case of imperfect information learning.

A pretty nice result!