3/12/15: BRIC Services PMI: November

BRIC Services PMIs are in for November, so let’s take a quick look at the headline numbers:

Russia: 
Russian Services PMI came in at 49.8 in November - a whisker away from 50.0 - and up on 47.8 in October. This marked second consecutive month of sub-50 readings in the series. 3mo average through November is at 49.6, which is weaker than the 3mo average through August 2015 (50.1) but stronger than the 3mo average through November 2014 (47.5). Per Markit: Service sector business activity declined only fractionally in November, although new business contracted for first time in eight months and outstanding business deteriorated further. “With backlogs of work falling, Russian service providers continued to shed jobs during November. Moreover, job cuts have been recorded in every survey period since March 2014. Panel members mentioned a contraction in employee numbers reflected efforts to cut excess capacity”.

China: 
Chinese Services PMI weakened in November to 51.2 from 52.0 in October, with 3mo average through November now at 51.2, down on 52.4 3mo average through August 2015 and on 53.1 average through November 2014. Given that Chinese Services PMI never registered sub-50 reading, current reading is consistent with statistically zero growth. Per Markit release, the index is now in a six=months long trend of falling PMI readings. “After a solid expansion in October, total new work placed at Chinese service providers rose only slightly in November. According to panellists, relatively weak market conditions had softened client demand in the latest survey period. Furthermore, September 2015 excepted, the latest increase in new work was the slowest seen in 16 months.”

India: 
Indian Services PMI posted a significant retrenchment from 53.2 in October to 50.1 in November, effectively signalling zero growth in the sector and falling to the lowest level in 5 months. 3mo average through November is at 51.5, well ahead of current month reading that matches exactly 3mo average through August 2015. 3mo average through November 2014 stood at 51.4. Per Markit: “Sub-sector data indicated that output growth in the Financial Intermediation, Post & Telecommunication, Renting & Business Activities and ‘Other Services’ categories was offset by declines at Transport & Storage and Hotels & Restaurants firms. In fact, the latter recorded a sharper rate of reduction. Indian services companies saw demand growth lose strength during November, leading to the slowest rise in incoming new work since July. Survey members blamed fierce competition and frail economic conditions for the slowdown in growth of new work.”

Brazil: 
Brazil remains the weakest link in the BRIC group in terms of economic activity, with country Services PMI rising to 45.5 in November from 43.0 in October, still signalling sharp contraction in the sector, and marking ninth consecutive month of sub-50 readings. On a 3mo average basis, 3mo average through November was 43.4, which is an improvement on 3mo average through August 2015 (41.3) but down on 3mo average through November 2014 (49.3). Per Markit: “Sub-sector data highlighted a broad-based recession, with output, new business and employment falling across all six monitored categories. Leading services activity to decrease was a further drop in incoming new work, the ninth in as many months. Despite being the softest since August, the rate of reduction was sharp. Evidence from survey participants indicated that demand had been suppressed by the country’s fragile economic situation.”

Summary: Overall, therefore, BRIC services sectors have been performing poorly in November 2015, with no upside to growth form the sector in any economy. Brazil is the weakest performer in the group, with Russia being second weakest. India’s growth momentum of July-October 2015 is now exhausted, while China showing downward trend in Services growth since July 2015.


Next up: Composite PMIs and analysis

3/12/15: Updating that Euro Donkey of Global Growth

While Mario Draghi kept talking justifying the course of ECB policy decisions (or indecisions, as some might want to put), the ECB released staff projections for GDP growth. Here they are, in full glory:

Source: @fwred 

So, that poverty of low aspirations has now been firmly replaced by the circular forecasts: 2015: 1.5% to 1.4% to 1.5%; 2016: 1.9% to 1.7% to 17.%, 2017: 2.1% to 1.8% to 1.9%, whilst inflation expectations are now ‘anchored’ in the proverbial ditch. Meanwhile, Mr Draghi says:

Just as the Euro went through the roof on USD side and with it, Europe's 'exports-led recovery' went belly up.

Though never mind. The bigger headache (that few Europeans can even spot) is that the ECB forecasts are talking about 'growth' at below 2 percent with all this QE and with inflation at extremely low end. Which makes the whole exercise of monetary and fiscal policies activism... err... academic. For as far as I know, no donkeys are allowed to compete in Kentucky Derby. 

2/12/15: BRIC Manufacturing PMI: November

BRIC countries manufacturing PMIs are out via Markit, so here are the main insights:

• Russia: I covered Russian Manufacturing PMI earlier here, with a core conclusion as follows: In November, Russian Manufacturing posted a second monthly reading consistent with weak stabilisation, but virtually no signs of recovery. That said, Russian Manufacturing performance was second strongest in the BRIC group after India’s in November, which is consistent with all readings since July 2015.
• Brazil: In contrast to Russia, Brazil posted another massive deterioration in Manufacturing PMI, with index reading falling to an 80-months low of 43.8 from an already extremely poor reading of 44.1 in October. Overall, we now have 10 consecutive months of sub-50 readings and this dovetails with the latest GDP figures showing Brazil’s economy in a third consecutive quarter of recession at -1.7% in 3Q 2015. Per Markit: “PMI slides further, reaching 80-month low; Production contracts at steep rate amid sharp drop in new projects; Workforce numbers fall at quickest pace since April 2009.” Brazil is now the main laggard in the BRIC group in Manufacturing sector every month since March 2015. Dynamics-wise, things are getting worse: 3mo average through November is at 45.0, which is below 3mo average through August (46.5) and 3mo average through November 2014 (49.0).
• China manufacturing PMI remained below 50.0 mark for the 9th consecutive month in November, posting a reading of 48.6 - marginally better than 48.3 in October. 3mo average through November 2015 is at 48.0, which is marginally worse than 3mo average through August 2015 (48.2) and well below 50.2 3mo average reading through November 2014. Per Markit: “Chinese manufacturing firms signalled that output stabilised in November, thereby ending a six-month sequence of reduction. Meanwhile, total new work continued to decline, and at a similarly modest rate to that seen in October, despite a pick up in new export business growth. Relatively soft overall client demand led firms to scale back their purchasing activity again in November, while inventories also declined. Deflationary pressures intensified over the month, as highlighted by sharper decreases in both input costs and output prices.” China is currently the second weakest BRIC economy in Manufacturing terms every month running, since July 2015.
• India: Continuing to outperform other BRIC, India Manufacturing PMI has, nonetheless, posted a major deterioration in growth conditions in November, falling to 50.3 in November - a 25 months low - from 50.7 in October. 3mo average through November 2015 is at 50.7, below 3mo average through August (52.1) and below 3mo average through November 2014 (52.0).Per Markit: “The health of India’s manufacturing economy improved for the twenty-fifth successive month in November, although to the least extent in this sequence. The latest PMI data showed slower increases in incoming new business and output, while subdued demand growth led firms to keep workforce numbers broadly unchanged. Meanwhile, input cost inflation accelerated to the strongest since May, whereas factory gate prices were raised at a weaker rate that was marginal overall.” Given the historical levels of the series, 50.3 is not statistically distinguishable from 50.0, which implies that statistically, November reading (as well as October) was not consistent with above zero growth. 

Core outrun:

Overall, Manufacturing activity contracted in November across BRIC economies, signalling continued pressure on growth in world’s largest emerging markets. Forward indicators are also weak, with new orders pipeline and backlogs of work being depressed across majority of BRIC manufacturing sectors.

1/12/15: US Mint Gold Coins Sales: November

Following October fall-off, sales of U.S. Mint gold coins rose strongly in November to 135,000 oz by weight (+86.2% y/y) and 237,500 units (+95.5% y/y). These figures include sales of both Eagles and Buffalo coins. Average weight of coin sold also rose strongly to 0.5684 oz compared to 0.4709 oz in October and close to 0.5967 oz/coin in November 2014.

As noted in my note covering October sals, October decline was a correction reflective of volatile demand and also significant uplift in sales in previous months. As chart above shows, sales by weight are now well above period average and above peak period average. In 11 months of 2014, US Mint sold 679,500 oz of gold coins; over the same period of 2015 sales totalled 1,020,000 oz. November 2015 also marked 20th consecutive month of gold sales/price correlations (12mo running) being negative, suggesting strong and entrenched demand from buyers pursuing long hold strategy and taking advantage of improving cost of holding gold. 

1/12/15: Markets at a Lower Edge of Growth

During a number of recent financial conferences that I had an honour of contributing to, the repeated leitmotif of Q&As with the audiences has been: "Where's the value in today's markets?" This is hardly surprising, given the state of prime sovereign fixed income and equities markets (both overbought), corporate fixed income markets (closer to fair valuation, but with elevated spreads and volatility), and commodities markets (depressed by long running fundamentals of demand and supply). Short of investing in 17th century furniture futures or philately options, any investor today will be hard pressed to find a broader theme for a buy-and-hold allocation.

Now, the same anecdotal evidence is confirmed by the Morgan Stanley analysts:

Source: Bloomberg

So equities/fixed income allocations for traditionally structured neutral portfolio have converged in returns for both the U.S. and European markets and at levels not worth taking a punt at. Meanwhile, risk-adjusted returns have all but evaporated:

 Source: Bloomberg

A handful of quotes (all via Bloomberg):

"What is notable for 2016 is that, unlike past years, both our long- and short-term forecasts point to muted equity upside.”

"Having been positive on developed market equities in recent years, it is notable that all of our regional index targets now imply little upside for stocks in 2016. Morgan Stanley’s economists forecast that global GDP growth will nudge slightly higher next year (to 3.3 percent from 3.1 percent in 2015), but our regional earnings forecasts suggest companies are having a tougher time turning modest economic growth into decent profit growth."

"The flatness of the [efficiency] frontier means that the optimal portfolio will lie near the left-hand extreme of the red line for a variety of investor utility functions. Relative to prior later-cycle periods, growth looks weaker, central bank policy looks looser, and credit risk premiums are more elevated."

In summary, then: there is no story of growth and with this, there is no story of financial returns uplift. 

1/12/15: Russian Manufacturing PMI: November

Russian Manufacturing PMI released by Markit remained within near-zero growth territory, posting 50.1 in November, down on 50.2 in October. Overall, some positives and key negatives were:

• Both output and new orders rose at fastest pace in 12 months; 
• Growth conditions in manufacturing remain extremely sluggish; 
• New export orders fell “at sharpest rate in seven months”;
• Workforce continued to contract, as “employment levels have contracted in each of the past 29 survey periods”;
• Most of uplift in production was signed to agricultural sector production rise (Russian grain crop posted second strongest performance at 117 mL tons through early November, after there record 2014 crop);
• Majority of new orders increases took place in domestic markets

So overall, Russian Manufacturing showed repeated signs of weak stabilisation, but virtually no signs of recovery.

1/12/15: Euro area Manufacturing PMI and Forward Growth Indicators

Eurocoin for November - euro area's leading growth indicator - remained basically flat at 0.37, rising only marginally from 0.36 in October. Both months are posting readings below 3mo and 6mo averaged (0.373 and 0.392), signalling growth at around Q2-Q3 2015 average.

In summary: little evidence in growth acceleration from 3Q 2015 levels. It is worth noting that preliminary growth estimate for 3Q 2015 came in at 0.3%, joint-lowest since 2Q 2014 (3Q 2014 growth was identical to 3Q 2015). This stands contrasted to today's Markit Manufacturing PMI for Eurozone which posted a reading of 52.8 for November (moderately strong expansion) up on 52.3 in October.

It is worth noting that both PMIs and Eurocoin have posted over-estimates of actual growth conditions in recent months.

30/11/15: WarningSignals on Secular Stagnation Threats

The readers of this blog know that I have been covering the twin theses of Secular Stagnation (long-term trend in slowdown of global growth) consistently over recent years.

Here is an interesting summary of the theses and literature on it, with extensive references to this blog (among other sources): http://www.warningsignals.org/#!Where-are-we-on-Secular-Stagnation/covf/565464fb0cf29e70f2253e70.

My own view summarised most recently here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/10/41015-secular-stagnation-and-promise-of.html.

29/11/15: Simple analysis of the EU-Turkey 'deal' on refugees

What does EU-Turkey refugees 'deal' means:

• With closure of land-crossing, duration of refugees passage to Europe over sea is going to be up;
• This means that cost of smuggling refugees will rise, which means safety of refugees during crossing is down (due to quality of boats / procedures, as their ability to pay higher costs is severely restricted, and due to longer crossing routes); 
• Thus, risk of losses of lives is up 
• Which will require greater sea monitoring & rescue missions efforts to avoid horrific losses of lives (unless EU abandons all and any humanitarian considerations);
• Which means EU dilemma of what to do with sea-crossing refugees has gone even less solvable, whilst adding a new dilemma of facing Turkey acting as a physical barrier for legitimate refugees, triggering potential humanitarian crisis on Turkish borders.

So, in summary, it is hard to see how the 'deal' is not a humanitarian crisis gone more acute.

27/11/15: More Tiers, Lower Risks, But Higher Costs: FSB Latest Solutions to Systemic Crises

The Financial Stability Board (a mega quango set up under the G20 cover to make policy recommendations aimed at assuring that Too-Big-To-Fail banks are brought under some international oversight) has recently issued its position on the bank capital shortfalls under the assessment of their balance sheets designed to ‘prevent taxpayers bailouts of lenders’.

The FSB report based on stress tests stated that big international banks operating globally will have to raise anywhere between EUR42 billion and up to as much as EUR 1.1 trillion in funding by 2022 to cover the shortfall in bailable (special) tier debt that can be written down in the case of a bank running into trouble in the future. The tests explicitly covered what is known as banks’ Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) - debt that can be converted into equity when a bank fails, in effect forcing debt holders to shoulder the cost of bank collapse and freeing taxpayers from the need to step in. The TLAC approach to bank funding also breaks the pari passu chain of rights distribution across the banks’ liabilities, separating (at last) depositors from bondholders. (1)

In releasing its estimates for TLAC shortfall, the FSB also provided final guidance as to the levels of TLAC it expects to be held by the globally important TBTF banks: 16% of total bank risk-weighted assets by 2019, rising to 18% by 2022. (2)

To be clear, the TLAC cushion is not an iron-clad guarantee that in a future crisis, depositors’ bail-ins and taxpayers’ supports won’t ever arise. Instead, it is just a cushion, albeit at 18 percent target - a significant one. And the cost of this insurance will also be material and likely to be shared across depositors and borrowers worldwide. Current estimates show the cost of 16% hurdle for TLAC to be around 2% of total income of the largest banks, spread over roughly 4 years, this would imply that up to 1/3 of average bank interest margin can be swallowed by the accumulation of cushion. Maintenance of this cushion will also require additional costs as TLAC instruments will likely carry higher cost of funding.

In a silver-lining for Western banking groups, the hardest hit banks amongst the 30 Globally Systemically Important Banks (GSIBs) (3) FSB are four Chinese banks: Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, China Construction Bank and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, will no longer be exempt from TLAC. These banks currently hold no senior debt liabilities that can count as a part of TLAC cushion. In total, there are 60 GSIBs covered by TLAC, but in Europe, some 6,000 smaller banks are also covered by the Minimum Requirement for Eligible Liabilities (MREL) due in January 2016.

The core point for both, the MREL and TLAC is the issue of ‘loss-absorbing capital’. While the issue has been with regulators since the end of the Global Financial Crisis (2010), there is still no clarity on the mechanics of how this concept will work in the end. Currently there are three channels through which liabilities can be subordinated (bailed-in) in case of a crisis. All relate to bank-issued debt instruments:

1. Contractual channel for subordination: banks can issue senior subordinated debt (tier-3 debt) which ranks ahead of tier-2 debt already outstanding in case of normal crises, but is bailable in the case of a structural crisis. 
2. Statutory channel: bank-issued debt can be subordinated by statute.
3. Structural channel: bailable debt is issued through a holding company to be subordinated to debt issued by the bank itself.

Euromoney recently covered these channels, concluding that whilst all three channels are complex, contractual channel is the hardest to structure. It appears that FSB view is that the contractual channel is the one to be pursued. In contrast, Italian authorities have pursued statutory channel, with legislative proposal to make un-guaranteed depositors super-senior liabilities, bailable only in the last instance. German legislation currently in draft stage will make all bonds suboridinatable in the case of bank insolvency. Another case of statutory instrument that defines contractual subordination channel is Spanish regulator introduction of a legislation that will simply subordinate all tier-2 debt by creating a tier-3 debt wedged between senior and tier-2 debt. In contrast, two Swiss GSIBs - Credit Suisse and UBS - have issued at holding company bonds in 2015, opting for the structural channel to subordination. Finally, in the U.S. the Federal Reserve already applied (as of October 30, 2015) the TLAC standards, covering eight of the biggest U.S. banks, with total shortfall of long-term debt arising under TLAC rules estimated at $120 billion. On November 9, U.S. giant Wells Fargo & Co announced that it will need to issue between $40 billion and $60 billion in new debt to cover TLAC requirements, with $40 billion representing the minimum required volume.

Per Fed, U.S. GSIBs will be required to hold:

• A long-term debt balance of 6% of their respective GSIB surcharge of risk-weighted assets or 4.5% of total leverage exposure, whichever is greater; 
• Maintain a TLAC amount of 18% of RWAs or 9.5% of total leverage exposure, whichever is greater. 
• Maintain sufficient high-quality assets (proposed in 2014) as well as a cushion to raise capital levels by an additional $200 billion, over and above the industry requirements. (4)

The key problem with the most functional - contractual and statutory - channels is that TLAC approach requires creation of a new tier-3 debt that has to be ‘wedged’ between current senior and tier-2 levels. And this, as noted in Euromoney article (5) can violate the pari passu clauses already written into existent bank debt.

In simple terms, the regulatory innovations aiming to address the need to break the link between the state and the banks, including for the systemically important banks, seems to continue going down the route of creating added tiers of risk absorption that improve, but not entirely remove the problem of banks-sovereign contagion. At the same time, all these innovations continue to raise the cost of running basic banking operations - costs that are likely to translate into more expensive credit and lower credit-related activities, such as capex and household investment. On long enough time frame, if successful, the new tier of bank debt can, if taken to higher ratios, displace the problem of pari passu vis-a-vis the depositors. Question is - at what cost?


(1) Some basic details are available here: http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/2015/11/total-loss-absorbing-capacity-tlac-principles-and-term-sheet/,  http://www.euromoney.com/Article/3408580/TLAC-what-you-should-know.html and http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/2015/11/total-loss-absorbing-capacity-tlac-principles-and-term-sheet/

27/11/15: The Welfare State Going Broke, and You Know It...

Bruegel’s  Pa Huttl and Guntram Wolff have recently posted on Capx.co results of their study, under a handy title “Lack of confidence in the welfare state in the year 2050” (link here).

One chart sums up key evidence:

Thus, across eight European countries,

• Majority of those polled felt that by 2050 public welfare systems will provide inadequate supports for pensions (59.5% of those polled) and for the unemployed (52.4%). 
• Roughly half of those polled thought that care for the elderly (49.5%) will be inadequately supplied by the public welfare systems, and 
• Over 45% thought that healthcare supply will fall short of their expected standards (45.4%). 

Darn scary numbers these are, even though, in my opinion, these are still too optimistic. The levels of implied state debt relating to what we call 'unfunded obligations' - contractually specified future commitments across pensions and healthcare benefits (excluding statutory, but non-contractual obligations) implies much lower probabilities of the modern welfare states being able to sustain current levels of funding.

Good example is the U.S. where current official debt stands at around USD18.5 trillion, whilst unfunded civilian and military pensions, plus Social Security and Medicare, inclusive of other contractually set Federal commitments and contingencies add another USD46-47 trillion to that (you can read more on this here)

26/11/15: Counting Down to ECB's Big Surprise...

Counting the week to December 3rd ECB meeting, I have to ask one simple question: does anyone over in Frankfurt has a clue what they are doing?

Earlier this week, Reuters reported on a conversation with an unnamed ECB source

Here’s what we have learned:

1. Things are far from smooth in the Euro area. We had some serious talking up on Money Supply side earlier this week, and we had incessant chatter about improving credit conditions. We even had promises of accelerated purchases in December (to offset holidays). But the ECB still appears to be directionless in so far as it still views QE road as insufficient. Menu of options is as wide as ever: more government bonds buys, deeper cuts to deposit rates, including a possible two-tier charge, purchases of municipal and regional debt, and even “buying rebundled loans at risk of non-payment has been discussed in preparatory meetings, although such a radical step is highly unlikely for now”. You really have to wonder: do they have any sense of direction (other than strictly forward)?
2. "There are some who say you should surprise markets. But you cannot surprise indefinitely. Sooner or later, you are bound to disappoint." That is per ECB official. Wait a second, sooner or later? Just how many iterations of this circus will we be looking at? ECB’s commitment (rumoured) to push through a major surprise is a desperate bet. If surprise works, markets are likely to overshoot fundamental valuations on all fronts: from EUR/USD and EUR/Sterling to major equities indices and bond prices. But overshooting is not likely to hold unless the ECB continues to surprise the same markets. If, as likely, inflation remains anchored at low levels over the time of these surprises, the ECB will find itself in a situation where the only way to trigger any positive response from the markets will be to double down on every turn. Scared yet?..
3. ”We have deflation, so you have to do something," said a second person. "How this all looks in a few years, nobody knows." And that is the scary bit - it appears that no one is willing to venture a field view deeper than a few months. Back to that directionless driving…
4. Things, however, are clearly not working for Count Draghul: “Failing to [surprise the markets with expanded QE] so risks disappointing investors who expect ECB policy-setters to bolster a one-trillion-euro plus programme of quantitative easing when they meet on Dec. 3, in a move so significant it has been dubbed 'QE2’.” It seems the Euro area monetary policy is now equivalent to showing up in an alligator park with a crate of chickens: the faster you throw them, the closer you get to becoming a meal yourself, yet try not throwing any at all and you are a meal. And as an aside, what kind of a strategist bets on surprise and then pre-leaks all possible routes for such a surprise?..  
5. Meanwhile, the gators are getting a sight of the chicken man slipping into their pond: “One person familiar with the matter said [non-performing loans that ECB might consider buying] could be packaged with more creditworthy loans before being put up for sale [to ECB]. "You could buy rebundled non-performing loans, combined with good loans," said the person. "If we get to that, then things are very bad.”” Oh dear, slice-and-dice tranches of MBS anyone? The ECB is moving closer and closer to tracing Lehman strategy ca 2006…
6. If the ECB does buy municipal and regional debt, we are in yet another fiscal corner. Buying such paper will absolutely nothing to stimulate private sector capex. But it will loosen the purse for local governments, thus undoing all the ECB-led efforts to reign in fiscal profligacy. And, given the horrific state of public finances across the Euro area, it will set up the ECB to support municipals and regions for many years to come.

So for now, we have captain Draghi steering the ship at faster speeds and with greater determination. Except we don't quite have any idea of the exact course. Thursday should be fun…