5/2/15: Maan... it's like... Structural Reforms, like... maaan!

You know that slightly odd person who sits on a park bench repeating to anyone who bothers to ask him the same story over and over again? Well, now try imagining one that is doing so unburdened by a request.

And you have ECB...

At least Frankfurt did not mention its (and IMF's) favourite made up dream: the labour market reforms... presumably because in China, labour markets are already 'efficient' enough, why with all the factory dorms and campuses and the rest.

H/T for the ECB blurb to @LorcanRK.

5/2/15: Where the Models Are Wanting: Banks Networks, Risks & Modern Investment Theory

My post for Learn Signal blog: "Where the Models Are Wanting Part 2: Banks Networks, Risks and Modern Investment Theory" covering networks effects on risk propagation in the financial services sector and the impact of these networks on equity pricing models is now available here: http://blog.learnsignal.com/?p=153.

5/2/15: Gazprom's Nord and South Streams: Lessons Learned, Strategy Changed

I just published a long note on the trials and tribulations of the ill-fated South Stream gas pipeline project that was designed to deliver Russian gas to Bulgaria and Southern Europe. Here is the link: http://trueeconomicslr.blogspot.ie/2015/02/5215-gazproms-nord-and-south-streams.html

4/2/15: Debt Overhang and Sluggish Growth

Debt overhang and its impact on growth has been a rather controversial topic over the recent years. One of the key contributors to the debate is Kenneth Rogoff. Rogoff has a new paper out on the topic, together with Stephanie Lo, titled "Secular stagnation, debt overhang and other rationales for sluggish growth, six years on" published by the Bank for International Settlements (http://www.bis.org/publ/work482.pdf).

In the paper, Rogoff and Lo state that "there is considerable controversy over why sluggish economic growth persists across many advanced economies six years after the onset of the financial crisis. Theories include a secular deficiency in aggregate demand, slowing innovation, adverse demographics, lingering policy uncertainty, post-crisis political fractionalisation, debt overhang, insufficient fiscal stimulus, excessive financial regulation, and some mix of all of the above." Rogoff and Lo survey "the alternative viewpoints" on the causes of slow growth. The authors argue that "until significant pockets of private, external and public debt overhang further abate, the potential role of other headwinds to economic growth will be difficult to quantify."

Rogoff and Lo focus strongly on the effects of debt overhang on growth. "In our view, the leading candidate as an explanation for why growth has taken so long to normalise is that pockets of the global economy are still experiencing the typical sluggish aftermath of a financial crisis… The experience in advanced countries is certainly consistent with a great deal of evidence on leverage cycles, for example the empirical work of Schularick and Taylor (2012), who examine data for a cross-section of advanced countries going back to the late 1800s and find that the last half-century has brought an unprecedented era of financial vulnerability and potentially destabilising leverage cycles. Moreover, focusing on more recent events, Mian and Sufi’s (2014) estimates suggest that the effects of US household leverage might be large enough to explain the entire decline in both house prices and durable consumption."

Still, their conclusion is very cautious. Instead of assigning direct causality from debt to growth, they suggest increased indeterminacy of the relationship between other variables and growth in the presence of high debt overhangs. They do reinforce the point that the argument about debt overhang relates to the total real economic debt (governments, households and non-financial corporations), not solely to government debt alone.

4/2/15: Russian Services & Composite PMIs: January

Russian manufacturing PMI slipped deeper into contractionary territory posting 47.6 in January compared to 48.9 in December, as covered here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/02/2215-irish-manufacturing-pmi-january.html

Today's release of the Services PMI adds to the gloom. Services PMI posted its fourth consecutive monthly reading below 50.0, coming in at abysmal 43.9 in January, down from an already disastrous 45.8 in December. 3mo MA through January is now at 44.7 - a deep contraction, deepest since 2009 recession. This compares to the already contractionary 49.4 3mo MA through October 2014. 3mo average through January 2014 was benign 52.2. So we have a full swing of 7.5 points year on year on a 3mo MA basis.

Things are bad over both sectors of the economy, implying that the Composite PMI should be performing poorly as well. No surprise there, hence, with Composite PMI falling to 45.6 the lowest monthly reading since May 2009 and the fourth consecutive monthly reading sub-50. 3mo average through January 2015 is at 46.8, marking significant contraction that accelerated from October 2014 through January 2015. This compares to 3mo average of 50.4 for the 3 months period through October 2014 and with 51.5 3mo average through January 2014. Year on year, 3mo average reading is now down 4.7 points.

In summary, January m/m decline in PMIs was second steepest over 12 months period for Manufacturing, fourth steepest for Services and third steepest for Composite PMI.

The downward trend across all series is being reinforced since Q3 2014.

3/2/2015: Japanification of Europe?

One of the main narratives for understanding European economy's longer term growth outlook has been the risk of Japanification: a long-term stagnation punctuated by recessionary periods and accompanied by low inflation and or deflationary episodes and pressures. I posted on the topic before (see for example here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/10/19102014-chart-of-week-japanising-europe.html) and generally think we are witnessing some worrying similarities with Japan, driven primarily by longer-term trends: debt overhangs across real economy, nature of debt allocations (concentrated in less productive legacy assets, such as property in some countries, physical capital in others) and, crucially, demographics-impacted political and institutional paralysis.

One recent paper, titled "The Macroeconomic Policy Challenges of Balance Sheet Recession: Lessons from Japan for the European Crisis" by Gunther Schnabl (CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 4249 CATEGORY 7:MONETARY POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, MAY 2013) sets out the stage for looking into the direct comparatives between Japan's experience and that of the EU.

Per Schnabl, "Japan has not only moved through a boom-and-bust cycle …almost 20 years earlier than Europe but has also made important experiences with a crisis management in form of monetary expansion, unconventional monetary policy making, fiscal expansion and recapitalization of banks. Although Japan has reached the (close to) zero interest rate environment more than a decade earlier than Europe and gross general government debt (in terms of GDP) has gone far beyond the levels, which are today prevalent in Europe, growth continues to stagger."

In other words, as we know all too well, Japan presents a 'curious' case of an economy where neither monetary, nor fiscal policies appear to work, even when applied on truly epic scale.

What Schnabl finds is very intriguing. "The comparison between the boom-and-bust cycles in Japan and Europe with respect to the origins of exuberant booms, the crisis patterns, the crisis therapies, and the (possible) effects of the crisis therapies shows that despite significant differences important similarities exist. With the growing socialisation of risk Europe follows the Japanese economic policy decision making pattern, with – possibly – a similar outcome for European growth and welfare perspectives. The gradual decline in real income in Japan should be incentive enough for a turnaround in economic policy making in both Europe and Japan."

The key to the above is in the phrase "With the growing socialisation of risk Europe follows the Japanese economic policy decision making pattern" which of course has several implications:

• Mutualisation / Socialisation of risk is actually mutualisation and, thus, socialisation of debt - clearly suggesting that the path toward debt deleveraging is not the one we should be taking. The alternative path to debt deleveraging via mutualisation / socialisation is debt restructuring.
• To date, no European leader or organisation has come up with a viable alternative to the non-viable idea of 'internal devaluation'. In other words, to-date we face with a false dichotomous choice: either mutualise debt or deflate debt. Neither is promising when one looks at the Japanese experience. And neither is promising when it comes to European experience either. See more on this here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/08/1082014-can-eu-rely-on-large-primary.html and http://trueeconomics.blogspot.it/2014/08/1082014-inflating-away-public-debt-not.html.
• ECB policies activism - the alphabet soup of various programmes launched by Frankfurt - is still treating the symptom (liquidity or credit supply to the real economy) instead of the disease (debt overhang). And the outcome of this activism is likely to be no different from Japan: debt overhang growing, economy stagnating, asset prices and valuations actively concealing the problem, data detaching from reality.

Here are some slides from Schnabl's November 2014 presentation on the topic:

So here's the infamous monetary bubble / illusion:

And the associated public sector balloon (do ignore some of the peaks that were down to banks rescue measures and you still have an upward trend):

And an interesting perspective on the Japanification scenario for Europe:

Happy demanding more Government involvement in the economy, folks... for this time, all the monetary, fiscal, regulatory, institutional, propagandistic etc 'easing' will be, surely, different... very different... radically different...

3/2/15: Global Trade Growth: More Compression, Whatever About Hope...

As I noted just a couple of days ago, global trade growth is falling off the cliff (see: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/02/1215-world-trade-growthnow-scariest.html). And euro area's trade growth is leading to the downside:

So no surprise there that the Baltic Dry Index is tumbling. As noted by @moved_average, the index is now down 577 - the level below the crisis peak lows and consistent with those observed back in 1985-1986 lows.

Ugly gets uglier... but you won't spot this in PMIs...

As an aside, in the chart above, perhaps a telling bit is the lack of any positive uplift in euro area trade growth from the introduction of the euro. 

2/2/15: Greek Primary Surplus: A Steep Hill to Climb

My comment for Expresso (January 31, 2015, pages 8-9) on Greece:

Greece has undertaken an unprecedented level of budgetary adjustments as reflected in the rate of debt accumulation on the Government balance sheet and the size of the primary surplus. Stripping out the banking resolution measures, Greek Governments have managed to deliver general government deficit consolidation of some 13.8 percentage points based on forecast for 2015, compared to the peak crisis, with Irish Government coming in a distant second with roughly 9 percentage points and Portuguese authorities in the third place with 7.7 percentage points. These figures are confirmed by the reference to the structural deficits and primary deficits. 

Given the level of austerity carried by the Greek economy over the recent years, and taking into the account a significant (Euro16 billion) call on debt redemptions due this year, it is hard to see how the Greek Government can deliver doubling of a primary surplus from IMF-estimated 1.5% of GDP in 2014 to forecast 3% of GDP in 2015 and 4.5% in 2016. Even assuming no adverse shocks to the Greek economy, these levels of surpluses appear to be inconsistent with the structural position of the Greek economy and I would have very severe doubts as to whether even the 2-2.5% range of surpluses can be sustained over the medium term (2015-2020) horizon.

2/2/15: Russian External Debt: Falling & So Far Sustainable

BOFIT published an update on Russian external debt as of the end of December 2014. The update shows the extent of debt deleveraging forced onto Russian banks and companies by the sanctions.

In H2 2014, repayments of external debt accelerated.

Banks cut their external debt by USD43 billion to USD171 billion over the year, with much of the reduction coming on foot of two factors: repayment of maturing debt and ruble devaluations. Ruble devaluations - yes, the ones that supposed to topple Kremlin regime - actually contribute to reducing Russian external debt. Some 15% of banks' external debts are denominated in Rubles.

Corproate external debt fell by USD60 billion to USD376 billion, with Ruble devaluation accounting for the largest share of debt decline, as about 25% of all external corporate debt is denominated in Rubles.

So do the maths: Ruble devaluations accounted for some USD16 billion drop in banks debts, and some USD54 billion in corporate debt in 2014 (rough figures as these ignore maturity of debt composition and timing).

Additional point, raised on a number of occasions on this blog, is that about 1/3 of corporate debt consists of debt cross-held within corporate groups (loans from foreign-registered parent companies to their subsidiaries and vice versa).

All in, end-2014 external debt of Russian Government, banks and corporates stood at USD548 billion, or just below 30% of GDP - a number that, under normal circumstances would make Russian economy one of the least indebted economies in the world. Accounting for cross-firm holdings of debt, actual Russian external debt is around USD420 billion, or closer to 23% of GDP.


CBR latest data (October 2014) puts debt maturity schedule at USD108 billion in principal and USD20 billion in interest over 2015 for banks and corporates alone. Of this, USD37 billion in principal is due from the banks, and USD71 billion due from the corporates. Taking into the account corporates cross-holdings of debt within the enterprise groups, corporate external debt maturing in 2015 will amount to around USD48 billion. Against this, short-term banks' and corporate deposits in foreign currency stand at around USD120 billion (figures from October 2014).

In other words, Russian banks and companies have sufficient cover to offset maturing liabilities in 2015, once we take into the account the large share of external debts that are cross-held by enterprise groups (these debts can be easily rolled over). Of course, the composition of deposits holdings is not identical to composition of liabilities, so this is an aggregate case, with some enterprises and banks likely to face the need for borrowing from the CBR / State to cover this year's liabilities.

BOFIT chart summarising:

2/2/15: Irish Manufacturing PMI: January 2015

Markit/Investec Irish Manufacturing PMI is out for January, posting 55.1, down on 56.9 in December and the lowest reading in any month since May 2014. Still, 55.1 is a strong performance.

3mo MA is now at 56.1 which is slightly worse than 56.5 3mo reading through October 2014, but is ahead of 55.7 average for 12 months through January 2015.

The growth rate is slowing down, but the activity remains robust:

2/2/15: Russian Manufacturing PMI slips in January

Russian Manufacturing PMI (Markit and HSBC) for January came in at 47.6, below 50.0 (statistically significant sub-50 reading), down from 48.9 in December. This is the second consecutive month of below 50 readings.

3mo MA through January is at 49.4, which is well down on 3mo MA through October 2014 which stands at 50.6, but ahead of 3mo MA through January 2014 which was 47.6.

The trend remains negative and has been reinforced in January.

1/2/15: Oh, those largely repaired Irish banks...

What do foreign 'experts' like BofE Mark Carney forget to tell you when they say that Ireland's banking system has been [largely] repaired?

Oh a lot. But here are just two most important things:

Both, in level terms and in growth terms, Irish banks remain zombified. 'Repaired' into continuously shrinking credit supply and stagnant household deposits base, the banks have been flatlining ever since the beginning of the crisis. In the last 6 consecutive quarters, household deposits posted negative rates of growth - a run of 'improvement' that is twice longer than the 'recovery period' of Q3 2012 - Q1 2013 when the deposits rose (albeit barely perceptibly).  Meanwhile, credit continues to shrink in the system with not a single quarter of positive growth (y/y) since Q4 2009. In four quarters through Q3 2014, credit for house purchases shrunk at just around 3.05% on average - the steepest rate of decline since the start of the crisis.

"Yep, [largely] repaired, Mr. Carney", said undertaker firming up the dirt on top of the grave...