4/9/2012: H1 2012 Trade in Goods & busted expectations

At first I resisted (rather successfully) for a number of days from blogging about the trade in goods stats for June released on August 16th. Aside from the already rather apparent pharma patent cliff and resulting collapse of exports to the US, there is little to be blogged about here. Well, may be on some BRICs data, but that will come later, when I am to update bilateral trade with Russia stats.

Then, playing with the numbers I ended up with the following two charts showing trade stats for H1 2012:

As dynamics show in the chart above, Ireland's goods exports are... err... static in H1 2012 compared to H1 2011 - down 1.69% y/y compared to H1 2011 and this comes against a rise in exports of 5.91% y/y in H1 2011 (compared to H1 2010). The exports-led recovery has meant that in H1 2008 exports are up just 3.62% on H1 2008 and are down 0.58% on H1 2007. Recovery? What recovery?

Of course, over the same period of time, imports fell 3.14% on H1 2011 (after rising 9.25% y/y in H1 2011 compared to H1 2010), and in H1 2012 imports stood at 20.09% below their H1 2008 and down 23.20% on their H1 2007 levels.

Which means that our exports-led recovery is currently running as follows: imports are down substantially more than exports (which is accounted for primarily by the collapse in domestic demand and investment activities), while exports are running only slightly behind their pre-crisis levels.

Thus, trade balance was up 0.05% y/y in H1 2012, while it is up 58.49% on H1 2008 and 51.48% on H1 2007. The body that is the Irish economy is producing  pint of surplus blood by draining 5 pints and re-injecting 4 pints back. Hardly a prescription for curing the sick according to modern medicine approach.

But that alone is not what keeping me focused on the numbers. Instead, it is the hilarity of our captains' expectations when it comes to the proposition that 'exports will rescue us'. Many years ago, in the days when the crisis was just only starting to roar its head, I said clearly and loudly: exports are hugely important, but they alone will not be sufficient to lift us out of this mess. Back then, I had Brugel Institute folks arguing with me that current account surpluses will ensure that ireland's debt levels are sustainable. Not sure if they changed their tune, but here's what the Government analysis was based on, put against the reality.

In the chart below, I took 3 sets of Government own forecasts for growth in exports for 2009-2012, extracted from Budget 2010, 2011 and 2012. I then combined these assumptions into 3 scenarios: Max refers to maximum forecast for specific year projected by the Department of Finance, Min references the lowest forecast number, and the Average references the unweighted average of all forecasts available for each specific year. I applied these to exports statistics as reported for 2009 and plotteed alongside actual outrun:

Current H1 2012 outrun for exports is €449 million lower than the worst case scenarios built into the Budgets 2010-2012 by the Governments. It is also €4,399 million behind the highest forecasts.

Put differently, the outcome for H1 2012 is worse than the darkest prediction delivered by the Department for Finance.

Of course, the exercise only refers to goods exports and must be caveated by the fact that our services exports might take up the slack. So no panic, yet. And a further caveat should be added to reflect the fact that the above is not our exporters fault, as we are clearly suffering from the tightness in global trade. On the minus side, there's a caveat that the pharma patent cliff has been visible for years and that the Government has claimed that they are capable of addressing this.

Sleepless nights should not be caused by the latest stats, yet. But if things remain of this path, they will come.

4/9/2012: Imagining the banks costs

Excellent info-graphic on the cost of Ireland's banks rescue to the economy via Stephen Donnelly (TD, Independent):

And the link to the original.

3/9/2012: Ireland's Manufacturing PMI for August

Today's release of the NCB Manufacturing PMI data for Ireland for August 2012 came in with both a positive and a negative surprises. The positive side of the news is that the headline index did not dip below 50 (contraction territory) but stayed at 50.9 in August, down on 53.9 in July, but above 49.7 in August 2011. In other words, the rate of Manufacturing sector growth has slowed down markedly, but remained positive in August.

The slowdown is significant, however, with current reading (50.9) not statistically distinguishable from zero growth level of 50.0, against statistically significant expansion recored in July.

Here is core stats summary:

• Headline seasonally adjusted PMI is now running at below 3mo MA (52.6), and 6mo MA (51.8). However, thanks to July reading, Q3-to-date average is at 52.4 (statistically above 50.0) and well ahead of 51.5 in Q2 and 49.8 in Q1. 
• August marked the 6th consecutive month of above 50 readings.
• New Orders sub-index also fell in August from 55.8 in July to 51.8 in August. Again, August reading was not statistically significantly different from 50.0. 3mo MA is now at 53.7 and 6mo MA is at 52.7. Q3 to-date average is 53.8 and this is well ahead of Q2 2012 average of 52.0 and Q1 2012 average of 49.9.
• New Export Orders sub-index also posted moderation in growth from July 56.7 to August 53.4, although 53.4 remains a solid signal of expansion. August now marks 6th consecutive month of the sub-index above 50 readings. 3mo MA is at 54.2 and close to 6mo MA of 54.0. Q3 2012 average to-date is at brisque 55.1 against Q2 2012 average of 52.8 and Q1 average of 51.9. 
• One has to keep in mind that the above performance puts Irish manufacturing sector activity well ahead of the euro zone peers and our exporting performance well above the entire EU member states' performance.

Chart to illustrate:

Output sub-index confirmed the above trends, slipping from 54 in July to 51 in August. Again, expansion is not significantly different from zero, but still good to see the index staying above 50 in level terms. 3mo MA is at 53.2 and 6mo MA at 52.0. Quarter to quarter changes are: Q1 2012 average of 50.2, Q2 2012 average of 51.4 and Q3 2012 average of 52.4.

Chart below snapshots core series trends over shorter horizon:

Chart below shows time series for other sub-indices.

Quick synopsis of changes in prices and employment. As usual, I will be doing more detailed analysis of profitability and employment after we have Services PMI data as well, so stay tuned:

• Output prices have continued decline, albeit at slower pace than in July, while input prices returned to rapid inflation (56.8 in August from 47.8 in July).
• 3mo MA for input prices is now at 51.4 against 48.6 3moMA for output prices. 
• This points to shrinking profit margins. However, the pace of margins contraction is now slower than in Q1 and Q2.

• Manufacturing sector employment posted another (6th consecutive monthly) expansion in August, though the rate of growth in employment has moderated from 53.1 in July to 51.1 in June. Q3 average-to-date is at 52.1 which is down on 54.4 for Q2. 

So overall, the data coming out in August is a mixed bag. Comparative to the euro area peers, manufacturing in Ireland is doing as well as can be hoped for. Alas, the rates of economic growth we require to sustain our debt deleveraging are hardly benchmarkable against our peers. And on that side, things are not encouraging. 

Let's wait for Services data next...

3/9/2012: Euro Area PMIs for August

I will be blogging on Irish Manufacturing PMI for August 2012 later today (the headline numbers are encouragingly positive, albeit growth rate has slowed down markedly on July), but here's the summary of Euro area PMIs and growth dynamics from Pictet:

The two charts are confirming the dynamics presented here on the foot of eurocoin leading indicator for growth.

2/9/2012: Gun, no bullets, a charging bear

Via an excellent recent post on the SoberLook, here's a chart showing a Central Bank with no ammunition left to fire at the charging bear:

The chart plots the rapid rise of monetary base in Japan courtesy of BOJ.

And as to the portrait of the bear (via same post):

The above plots Japan's GDP y/y changes. Here's the point - in 20 years between 1995 and 2014 there will be not a single 5 year period in which Japan did not have a recession. Not a single one.

Now, recall that 'we will do everything necessary to rescue euro and, believe me, it will be enough' statement from Mr Draghi... BOJ needless to say tried the same... it has been working marvels for Japan's economy, albeit the yen is still there.

31/8/2012: Eurocoin for August 2012

Euro area leading growth indicator from Banca d'Italia and CEPR has posted eleventh consecutive monthly contraction in August, reaching -0.33 from -0.24 in July. This marks the worst reading for eurocoin since July 2009. 2008-2009 average was -0.31, so the current reading is worse than average for the first wave of the crisis.

A year ago, the indicator stood at +0.22, implying a growth swing of 2.1-2.3% annual.

3moMA indicator is now at -0.25, annual expected rate of decline is at -1.3%.

Charts to illustrate:

31/8/2012: Net, gross, gloss - FDI in Ireland 2011

So CSO headlines today that Irish Net Direct Investment Position improved to €48 billion at the end of 2011. which is fine, until you read actual numbers. Here is the synopsis from CSO itself (emphasis is mine):

"Irish stocks of direct investment abroad fell by €12bn from an end-2010 position of €254.5bn to €242.5bn at the end of 2011. ...The decline between the end of 2010 and end of 2011 was mainly due to a fall in investment of €26bn in enterprises located in Central American Offshore countries. European based enterprises partially offset this decline."

Hence, Factor 1 - explaining most of the €7.2 billion in net position change is drop in investment schemes used by Irish resident companies to wash-off tax liabilities.

Next: "The level of total foreign direct investment into Ireland also fell between the end of 2010 and the end of 2011. The decrease was €19.2bn [massively in excess of net contraction in outward investment from Ireland] giving an end-2011 position of €194.5bn. The main contributors were decreases of €18bn from US and €10bn from Central America partially offset by increased investment of almost €20bn from European countries."

Hence, Factor 2 - FDI into Ireland has actually dropped, gross, by 9% year on year (please keep in mind, irish Government has cited increased FDI into Ireland as one core 'success' metric).


"Comparing the net end-year positions Ireland’s net FDI increased from €40.8bn at the end of 2010 to €48bn at end-2011."

I know I am supposed to be cheerful about the headline CSO produced, but...

31/8/2012: Poor newsflow for Friday

Clearly confidence-instilling newsflow from the euro area today:

"Euro area annual inflation is expected to be 2.6% in August 2012 according to a flash estimate issued by  Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union. It was 2.4% in July."

ECB is expected to downgrade EZ growth forecasts once again, per this report.

"The euro area (EA17) seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate was 11.3% in July 2012, stable compared with June. It was 10.1% in July 2011. The EU27 unemployment rate was 10.4% in July 2012, also stable compared with June. It was 9.6% in July 2011." So the contagion to EU10 from EA17 is now feeding through.

And a scarier chart on youth unemployment via ZeroHedge:

And two charts to remind you where we are heading:

All of which is pretty much summarized in another blog post on euro area growth, here.

31/8/2012: James Hamilton on oil prices

An insightful (as always) and economically significant points raised in this interview (via OilPrice.com) by Prof. James Hamilton (UCSD and Econbrowser) on oil prices and demand/supply drivers:

• Why we shouldn't get too excited with the shale revolution
• The "Real" cause of high oil prices
• The incredible opportunity presented by natural gas
• Why long term oil prices will creep upwards
• The geopolitical hotspots that could cause an oil price spike
• Why sanctions could cause Iran to lash out
• Why speculators and oil companies are not to blame for high oil prices.
• Changes we can expect to see under a Romney Administration
• Why Short term oil price forecasts are worthless
• Peak oil & Daniel Yergin 

Certainly a worthy read.

31/8/2012: Financial Innovation : Positives v Negatives

Following on my previous post, here's a new paper by Frankin Allen titled "Trends in Financial Innovation and Their Welfare Impact: An Overview" (link here) published in the European Financial management (vol 18, issue 4).

Core paper findings are:

• "There is a fair amount of evidence that financial innovations are sometimes undertaken to create complexity and exploit the purchaser... As far as the financial crisis that started in 2007 is concerned, securitization and subprime mortgages may have exacerbated the problem.  
• "However, financial crises have occurred in a very wide range of circumstances, where these and other innovations were not important.  
• "There is evidence that in the long run financial liberalization has been more of a problem than financial innovation.  
• "There are also many financial innovations that have had a significant positive effect.  
• "These include venture capital and leveraged buyout funds to finance businesses.  In addition, financial innovation has allowed many improvements in the environment and in global health." 

The paper concludes that "On balance it seems likely its effects have been positive rather than negative."

I find the arguments strained. Much of the financial innovation that Allen declares to be positive is innovation that is driven directly by either force of the states or co-financed by the states. Thus these forms of innovation are not really innovative at all, but superficial. For example - debt-for-nature swaps are hardly a form of financial innovation but rather a form of state subsidy. Likewise, much of carbon permits trading is driven by restrictions imposed by the states via coercive systems. These might be positive - the point is not to dispute their social or environmental or economic value - but they are not what I would term 'financial innovations'.

About the only positive financial innovation that Allen cites that does not involve such state interventions is leveraged buyout. Allen does cite evidence that this had a positive effect, but in the periods immediately preceding some financial crises (the latest one being case in point, as was Japan's crisis of the 1990s and Nordic countries crises of the early 1990s etc) leveraged buyouts carry excessive leverage. Thus, the only unequivocally positive effect such buyouts might have at the times of rising debt overhang, in my view, is the effect of triggering future insolvencies that clear the path (via creative destruction) to new or more efficient incumbent firms growth. This positive effect, however, has little or nothing to do with the financial innovation per se.

Lastly, let me point that I am not disputing that some (the issue is really more of how much and of what variety) financial innovation is positive, but that Allen's article fails really to prove his hypothesis. Neither does it do any justice to the article to state that "the long run financial liberalization has been more of a problem than financial innovation" without actually proving this.

30/8/2012: Does Banking & Financial (De)regulation iImpact Income Inequality?

A new paper, titled "Bank Regulations and Income Inequality: Empirical Evidence", by Manthos D. Delis, Iftekhar Hasan and Pantelis Kazakis (Bank of Finland Research Discussion Paper 18/2012, linked here) studied the effects of financial regulations (deregulation) on income inequality in 91 countries over the period of 1973-2005.

The study yields some very interesting results (emphasis is mine):

• "In general, the liberalization policies from the 1970s through the early 2000s have contributed significantly to containing income inequality."
• "... Abolishing credit controls decreases income inequality substantially, and this effect is long- lasting."
• "Interest-rate controls and tighter banking supervision decrease income inequality; however, these effects fade away in the long term."
• "For banking supervision, the negative effect on inequality [higher supervision leads to lower inequality] is reversed in the long run, a pattern associated with stricter capital requirements that tend to lower the availability of credit". 
• "... Abolishing entry barriers and enhancing privatization laws seem to lower income inequality only in developed countries."
• "... The liberalization of securities markets {expanding securitization] increases income inequality." 

What are the policy implications of these findings?

• "Bank regulations and associated reforms aim at enhancing the creditworthiness of banks and at improving the stability of the financial sector. Several studies over the last decade show that regulations do matter in shaping bank risk (e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2009; Agoraki et al., 2009) or in affecting bank efficiency (Barth et al., 2010) and the probability of banking crises (e.g., Barth et al., 2008)."
• "Yet, what if bank regulations have other real effects on the economy besides those associated with banking stability? And, more important, what if these real effects counteract the intended stabilizing effects?"

Two issues should be considered in answering these questions:

1. "The literature on the relationship between bank regulations and financial stability is inconclusive. In fact, different types of regulation may have opposing effects on financial stability, according to the existing research."
2. "... even if we assume that bank regulations like more stringent market-discipline requirements lower banks' risk-taking appetite and enhance stability (Barth et al., 2008), the empirical findings here suggest that these effects are asymmetric and certain liberalization policies (i.e., liberalization of securities markets) or regulation policies (i.e., higher capital requirements) actually increase income inequality. That is, banks pass the increased costs of higher risks (coming from the liberalization of securities markets) and higher capital requirements on to the relatively lower-income population that lacks good credit and collateral. In other words a trade-off between banking stability and inequality may be present" [Note: this trade-off, I would argue, is most certainly a problem for Ireland today, with future borrowers operating in the environment of reduced family wealth due to property bust and financial assets depletion]. 

"Given the contemporary discussion surrounding (i) the rebirth of Glass-Steagall-type regulatory reforms as they relate to securities trading, and (ii) the discussions under Basel III to increase the risk-adjusted capital base of banks, there may be more to think about before taking those steps."

"On the good side, three clear suggestions emerge from this paper and are also consistent with the findings of Beck et al. (2010)": 

1. "... the liberalization of banking markets, primarily through abolition of credit controls, helps the poor get easier access to credit. This in turn allows them to escape the poverty trap and substantially raise their incomes." 
2. "... appropriate prudential regulation should provide less costly incentives to banks to increase regulatory discipline without hurting the relatively poor. Information technologies that would lower the cost of transparency and more effective onsite supervision that would enhance the trust in the banking system may help achieve this goal."
3. "... economies first need a certain level of economic and institutional development to see any positive effect of the abolishment of entry restrictions and privatizations on equality..."

30/8/2012: 22 quarters of Europe standing still

2007-present is the period during which the advanced economies world barely moved in terms of economic growth. And this is true especially for the EU27 and the euro area 17. The next three charts document the 22 quarters during which Europe stood still:

(All charts represent author own calculations based on data sourced from the OECD)