Wednesday, August 1, 2012

1/8/2012: Some interesting notes on Debt and Growth

Some interesting long-term relations between Government debt and economic growth. No comment, but few stats and charts:

First - levels of debt and levels of growth:

Weak, negative relationship above.

Now, rates of change in debt y/y and growth:


Much stronger negative relationship above. Of course, we would expect that negative growth would lead to growth in debt/GDP ratio due to stimuli and due to simple fact of shrinking GDP.

Here's the matrix of average rates:

What do we have?

  • Both debt and economy expanding (pro-cyclical expansion): 144 episodes in 1980-2012 period, debt growth on average is 3.172%pa against GDP growth on average of 2.086%pa.
  • Recession counter-cyclical growth in debt against contracting GDP: 43 episodes, average growth rate in debt 8.847% and average growth rate in GDP is -2.389%. 
  • Countercyclical contraction in debt during economic growth periods: 123 episodes, with average contraction in debt of -2.582% and corresponding (accompanying) expansion in the GDP of 3.782%
So conclusions: during expansions, debt shrinks, but by less than economy grows. During contractions, debt expands but by more than the decline rate in the economy. Worse than that - pro-cyclicality dominates counter-cyclicality. There are more episodes when debt grows during economic expansion than when debt grows during economic contractions. The average rates of debt expansion during economic expansion are greater than the average debt contraction rate during economic expansions. The gap is on average annually of ca 0.6% of GDP in terms of debt growth exceeding debt contraction during episodes of economic growth.

It is worth to note that EA12 are not unique by a significant margin when compared to Advanced economies sample:

1/8/2012: Some sub-trends in the irish Live Register for July 2012

So, now that you've been fed the 'great news' story by the Irish 'analysts', and having, hopefully read my first post on the subject of Live Register numbers (link here), you might wonder - what sub-trends dominate the time series relating to irish unemployment in July.

Trend 1: long-term unemployment is now at all time high. Here's an honest down the line analysis from the CSO: "The number of long term claimants on the Live Register in July 2012 was 200,086. The number of male long term claimants increased by 4,160 (+3.0%) in the year to July 2012, while the comparable increase for females was 5,864 (+11.1%) giving an overall annual increase of 10,024 (+5.3%) in the number of long term claimants." Let me add to this: July 2012 figure of long-term unemployed is up 837 m/m.


"In July 56.5% (260,237) of all claimants on the Live Register were short term claimants. The comparable figure for July 2011 was 59.6% (280,222). The annual fall of 19,985 (-7.1%) in the number of short term claimants consisted of a decrease of 14,140 (-8.8%) in the number of male short term claimants and a decrease of 5,845 (-4.9%) in female short term claimants."

Now, when you think about it, the long term unemployed numbers include (or are net of) those who lose their benefits due to duration and changes in family circumstances. They are also net of those who leave the LR deciding to emigrate. These effects are much less pronounced for the shorter-term unemployed. And yet, the long term unemployment continues to rise. Not, that is something you won't hear in the Irish media either. Never mind, the 'experts' Irish broadcast editors pick for their panels are smart & do original research, aren't they?

Youth unemployment next: Per CSO "In the year to July 2012 the number of persons aged 25 and over on the Live Register decreased by 1,340 (-0.4%), and the number of persons aged under 25 decreased by 8,621 (-9.7%). Annual decreases in persons aged under 25 have occurred in all months since July 2010. The percentage of persons aged under 25 on the Live Register now stands at 17.5% for July 2012, down from 19.0% in July 2011 and 20.3 % in July 2010." These are NOT seasonally-adjusted figures, so y/y comparatives is all that matters and the news is decent here - at a headline level. Alas, we have no idea whether the young unemployed are getting new jobs or simply emigrate, though given the reduction in LR benefits for the younger workers, most likely they have a stronger incentive to emigrate. They also have a much better ability to do so, due to visa restrictions differences by age and lack of debt chain holding them back in Ireland.


One related sub-theme is that of the quality of employment out there. No direct gauge for it in the LR, but a glimpse via the numbers of casual and part-time signees on LR. per CSO: "There were 88,041 casual and part-time workers on the Live Register in July, which represents 19.1% of the total Live Register. This compares with 18.3% one year earlier when there were 85,865 casual and part-time workers on the Live Register. In the year to July 2012 the number of casual and part-time workers
increased by 2,176 (+2.5%)..." So while it is much better to have a casual or part-time job than not to have one, the trend remains the same - that of deteriorating, not improving quality of opportunities.


Nationals v Non-Nationals breakdown shows a slight decline in the proportion of LR recipients who are non-nationals. The fact that this decline has been very shallow and the fact that the numbers of national on the LR is declining at a similar percentage rate as that of non-nationals suggests that emigration is most likely fairly evenly spread between the two categories.


So much more 'speculative' analysis, if you want, but all pointing to either little change or deterioration in the underlying conditions relating to the labor market in Ireland.

1/8/2012: Live Register - Hidden Unemployment Rising

There's a boisterous chatter in the Irish media (unwilling to have any reality voices on the air anymore due to reasons unknown) about the latest headline numbers coming out of the Live Register for Ireland (July 2012 data released today).

Some of it is part-true. Some of it is part-spin. None of it is fully true. So in the next couple of posts I will be uncovering what the figures really do tell us. Stay tuned.

Let's start from the headline numbers:


  • Standardized (Live Register-implied) unemployment rate remains intact at 14.8% in July, same as in June. The SUR is now between 14.7% and 14.8% every month since January 2012 and 14.8% is the highest point reached since the beginning of the crisis (hit first in February 2012). So headline story is: Irish Unemployment Remains at Record High for the Crisis.
  • Last time we had 14.7-14.8% unemployment as measured by the Live Register was back in March-April 1994. Oh, that's right, 1994! Good news, folks, I guess is that it is still off 17.0 absolute record achieved back in December 1986-January 1987, though with a major caveat (see below).
  • Want more 'good news'? Ok: crisis period average SUR is 13.5% and STDEV is 1.33, which means that the current rate of unemployment is more than 1/2 STDEV above the crisis period average.
Chart to illustrate the good news:


Bet you your local friendly radio presenter and their guests didn't mention the above, in fear of undermining your confidence in the economic turnaround.

But, hey, let's keep looking into the data:
  • Overall numbers on Live Register (seasonally-adjusted) are currently at 437,300 (July) down 9,900 on July 2011 (-2.214%). This is good. M/m decline in July 2012 is 2,300 which contrasts with m/m rise in June of 2,500. Which is sort-of good: m/m decline is a good thing, m/m decline that doesn't fully offset previous m/m rise is not so good.
  • Y/y June 2012 LR posted a decline of 6,200 (-1.39%) and this is now bettered by July decline of 9,900 (-2.21%). Which is good.
  • 3mo average LR through July is 0.13% higher than 3mo average through April 2012. Not so good. Year on year, 3mo average LR is 1.77% lower in July. Which is good.



So the above is a mixed bag story. Yet, the story is hardly complete. You see, there are some 76,533 workers out there who are 'engaged' in State-sponsored Live Register Activation Programmes. The CSO has the following to say about them: "Persons on activation programmes are not counted as part of the monthly Live Register." Ugh? That's right - they get paid LR supplements. They don't work for actual pay. They are not unemployed and are not in receipt of state unemployment benefits. Let's add them to the LR, shall we?

Taking into account the numbers engaged in the LR Activation Programmes:
  • There were 513,833 individuals in Ireland on LR as of June-July 2012 (note, Activation Programmes participation is reported with one month lag, just to make life hell for anyone trying to compile real figures).
  • The above number represents an increase m/m on June's 501,516 (some 12,300 up). Year on year, the number of those in receipt of LR benefits is now up (not down) 1,680 (+0.33%) and that is worse than June y/y figure (up 1,429, or +0.29%).
  • Recall that official Standardized Unemployment Rate is 14.8% on 437,300 LR recipients. This implies that counting those in Activation Programmes the real 'unemployment' rate is around 17% (17.4% more precisely, but there's a grey area of estimation errors around there).
  • So the main headline, really, should be - total (official + hidden) unemployment in Ireland is up m/m and up y/y. Not down. Up!



Now, do me a favour (cause I can't find time to do this myself) - check with your local friendly radio / TV station and press - see if any of the 'incisive' analysts/guests/hosts/editors/journalists give you that sort of a breakdown on the numbers? 

Now don't take me wrong - some of these programmes are good, and it is generally positive that people are drawn to them. But until they gain full paying jobs post-completion, they remain unemployed. The Government has no right to write them off as 'not unemployed' by excluding them from the LR.

Monday, July 30, 2012

30/7/2012: Euro Area forecast by Standard and Poor

S&P's note on euro area crisis is a rather entertaining read, if you are into the sort of 'entertaining' a la mode of Quentin Tarantino... The note is The Curse Of The Three Ds: Triple Deleveraging Drags Europe Deeper Into Recession, authored by EMEA Chief Economist: Jean-Michel Six.


Snapshot of views (emphasis mine):

  • A combination of public, household, and bank deleveraging are stifling growth in most European economies. [Now, I've been saying all along that we cannot ignore household debts, yes so far, European and National policymakers are utterly hell-bent on saddling indebted households with the bills for indebted states and banks. Just look at Ireland, where the banking sector is now outright moving into enslaving households by dictating to them how much they should spend on food & clothing so they can maximize extraction of mortgages repayments. And the Irish Government only eager to lend their support to the banks.]
  • This is also limiting the effectiveness of the European Central Bank's efforts to support the financial sector and eurozone economies. [Not really, folks. You might missed it, but European 'leaders' are heavily taxing economy already to subsidize insolvent banks and sovereigns. Alas, the room for more taxes is limited in Europe not by household debt - about which the respective National Governments give no damn - but by the fact that Europe already has some of the highest income taxes in the world.]
  • Subsequently, the S&P is cutting their base-case growth forecasts for the eurozone and U.K. economies for 2012 and 2013. See two tables below




  • S&P also see a 40% chance that downside risks could push European economies into a genuine double-dip recession in 2013 (second table above).
So risk-weighted expected growth is now forecast, for the Euro area to be -0.76 in 2012 and -0.08 in 2013. If we take potential growth at 1.5%, this would imply an opportunity cost of over 3% in 2012-2013 to the Euro area economy.

And the core downside risks are:
  • A hard landing in some emerging markets, delaying the recovery in world trade;
  • The prospect of one of the main eurozone countries losing access to capital markets for a prolonged period; and
  • A more pronounced retrenchment in consumer demand, especially in the core countries.
Key changes to previous forecasts:
  • "We have cut our forecast for GDP growth in France to just 0.3% this year and 0.7% in 2013, from 0.5% and 1%, respectively, in our previous forecasts. 
  • "We've also revised downward our GDP projections for Italy to negative 2.1% for 2012 and negative 0.4% in 2013. 
  • "In the case of Spain, we now forecast GDP will decline by 1.7% this year and that it will be negative 0.6% next year—a cut from our previous forecast declines of 1.5% and 0.5%. 
  • "For the U.K., we have revised our 2012 estimate to 0.3% this year. Yet, the provisional GDP estimate released on July 25 by the U.K. statistical office for the second quarter of negative 0.7% makes our full-year forecast more uncertain. If confirmed, this result would most likely lead to zero or slightly negative growth this year."

30/7/2012: Grazie, Sig Draghi?

So Mr Draghi made some serious sounding pronouncements last week. The markets rallied. Over the weekend, more serious sounding soundbites came out of Mr Juncker. The markets... oh... still rallying? And thanks to both, Italy had a 'Successories'-worthy auction today am:

  • Italy 5 year CDS fell 20bps to 478 (lowest since early July) prior to the auction
  • 5 year bond sold at yild 5.29 (against 5.84 in previous) with bid/cover of 1.34 (down on 1.54 achieved in previous auction) and maximum allotment of 2.224bn out of 2.250bn aimed
  • 10 year 2022 5.5% bond sold at 5.96% yield (previous auction 6.19%) and bid/cover ratio of 1.286 (against previous 1.28) with allotment of 2.484bn out of 2.5bn planned.

Grazie Sig Draghi?

Now, wait a sec. Yes, there's an improvement. But on less than €4.7bn of issuance... and Italy needs are:

(Source: Pictet)

And hold on for a second longer:

  • Italy's net debt financing cost was at 4.721% of GDP in 2011 with debt/GDP ratio of 120.11% which implies effective financing rate of 3.931%
  • Of course, a single auction does not lift this up in a linear fashion, but... if Italy had troubles with 3.9%, should we not be concerned with 5.29%?
  • Let's put it differently: Italy's GDP grew in 2010-2011 by 1.804% and 0.431% respectively. Over the same period of time, Italy's government debt net financing costs went from 4.236% of GDP to 4.721% of GDP. This year they are set to rise to over 5.36% of GDP as economy is likely to contract ca 1.9-2.0%.
So maybe (I know, cheeky) cheering the current yields is a bit premature? Eh?

Sunday, July 29, 2012

29/7/2012: Financial Markets Repression

In my recent conversation with Carmen Reinhart, we discussed at length various forms of financial repression to be unleashed onto the public with the coming systemic deleveraging in the US, EU and elsewhere. One of the most prominent topics in our discussion were potential capital controls. And we both agreed that most likely, it will be Eurozone that will be first in the races to impose such. Of course, there are signs of softer version of capital controls within the banking system already present. So much so that Mario Draghi had to identify national regulations as barriers to single market in banking under current conditions.

Never mind. The US Fed is not about to fall behind the curve. And in the latest suggestion for policymakers, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (Staff Report No. 564, July 2012, linked here) puts forward an idea that "for money market fund (MMF) reform [to] mitigate systemic risks arising from these funds by protecting shareholders, such as retail  investors, who do not redeem quickly from distressed funds... a small fraction of each MMF investor’s recent balances, called the “minimum 

balance at risk” (MBR), be demarcated to absorb losses if the fund is liquidated."

Wait, does this mean that fund investors can face some small share loss imposed onto them because they might be quicker than other investors in exiting or more foresightful enough to spot the fund running into trouble ahead of other investors? Yep, that's right.

"The MBR would be a small fraction (for example, 5 percent)  of each shareholder’s recent balances that could be redeemed only with a delay.  The delay would ensure that redeeming investors remain partially invested in the fund long enough (we suggest 30 days) to share in any imminent portfolio losses or costs of their redemptions.  However, as long as an investor’s balance exceeds her MBR, the rule would have no effect on her transactions, and no portion of any redemption would be delayed if her remaining shares exceed her minimum balance."

And the rationale: "to reduce the vulnerability of MMFs to runs and protect investors who do not redeem quickly in crises."


That, folks, is a hell of a capital control proposal.

29/7/2012: One ugly chart

One ugly euro chart:


Nothing new, of course, just an illustration.

29/7/2012: Irish Competitiveness



Unedited version of my Sunday Times article from July 22.



These days, with nearly 15 percent unemployment, and almost 530,000 currently in receipt of some unemployment supports, the minds of Irish policymakers and analysts are rightly preoccupied with jobs creation. Every euro of new investment is paraded through the media as the evidence of regained confidence in the economy. This week, even the insolvent Irish Government got into the game of ‘creating jobs’ with an ‘investment stimulus’.

Alas, economics of jobs creation is an entirely different discipline from the political PR accompanying it. In the real world, some private and public jobs are created on the basis of sustainable long-term demand for skills. Others are generated on the foot of tax advantages and subsidies, including stimulus. In the short run, the latter types of jobs can still yield a positive boost to economic activity. But in the longer run, they are not sustainable and drain resources that can be better allocated to other areas. The ultimate difference between the two types is found in productivity growth associated, or the competitiveness gain or loss generated in the economy.

The prospects of Irish economic recovery have been rhetorically coupled with the improvements in our cost competitiveness since early 2008. And for a good reason. Rapid deterioration in competitiveness in years before the crisis is what got us into the situation where structural collapse of the economy was inevitable.

During the Celtic Garfield era of 2001-2007, Irish Harmonized Competitiveness Indicators (HCIs) have deteriorated by some 26%. Our productivity growth, stripping out effects of MNCs transfer pricing and tax arbitrage, has been running well below the rate of the advanced economies average. In years of the property bubble, Ireland was the least competitive economy in the entire euro area.

Structurally, our lack of competitiveness was underpinned by the labour costs inflation in relation to producer and consumer prices. Consumer costs-related competitiveness indicator for Ireland deteriorated by 38 percent between the end of 2001 and mid-2008, more than one-and-a-half times the rate of deterioration in producer costs-linked measure. Another, even more pervasive and long-term force at play was creation of hundreds of thousands of jobs in the sectors, like building and construction, domestic retail and finance that lagged in value-added well behind the exporting sectors.

This was not a model of sustainable jobs creation. Instead of incentivising investment in real skills and aptitude to work and entrepreneurship, we taught our younger generation to expect a €40-45,000 starting gig in a ‘professional’ occupation or laying bricks at a construction site. Not surprisingly, uptake of degrees in harder sciences and more mathematically intensive fields of business studies slumped, while degrees in ‘softer’ social and cultural studies were booming. The workforce we were producing had a rapidly expanding mismatch between pay expectations, career prospects, and reality of an internationally competitive economy.

Placated by the opportunity to locate in the corporate tax haven, our MNCs were drumming up the myth of the superior workforce with great skills and education. The Government and its quasi-official mouthpieces of economic analysis in academia, banks, and financial and professional services were only happy to repeat the same line.

The crisis laid bare the truths about our fabled competitiveness outside the corporate tax arbitrage opportunities.

Since then, the focus of the Government labour market reforms, in rhetoric, if not in real terms, has been on regaining cost competitiveness. Sadly, this process so far replicates, rather than corrects the very same errors of judgement we pursued before the crisis erupted.

In terms of headline metrics, things are looking up. Our harmonised competitiveness indicator (HCI) has improved by 5% between January 2009 and April 2012 – the latest data available. However, these gains are accounted for by two drivers. Firstly, jobs destruction in the construction and retail sectors has led to rapid elimination of less productive – from economic value-added point of view – activities. Secondly, domestic business activity collapse added price deflation to the equation, distorting gains from any real productivity improvements. Thus, our HCI deflated by producer prices has fallen 7.7% over the above period of time, while consumer prices-deflated HCI dropped 12.5%.

Thus, much still remains to be done on the competitiveness front, especially since deflationary pressures in the economy are no longer rampant. The momentum of gains in competitiveness experienced in 2008-2010 has slowed dramatically and is likely to continue declining.

On the one hand, jobs destruction has moderated markedly, while across the economy overall earnings are rising. Wages inflation in several sectors where skills shortages are present, such as ICT and internationally traded services, now complements declining competitiveness of individual tax policies.

Year on year, Q1 2012 saw average weekly earnings rising in Ireland by 0.7%. Weekly earnings in the private sector went up 1.5% annually, while there was an increase of 2.0% in the public sector over the year. Between Q1 2008 and Q1 2012, average weekly earnings fell 3.5% in the private sector and rose 0.8% in the public sector.

The skills crunch is evident both via the earnings inflation within the larger size enterprises and by occupational categories. earnings of Managers, professional and associated professionals rose 5.7% y/y in Q1 2012 and are now 1.1% ahead of where they were in Q1 2009. Earnings for clerical, sales and service employees are up 2.4% y/y and down almost 2% on 2009.

The real problem with our labour costs competitiveness is that with rising tax burdens it is becoming increasingly difficult to import skills and our system of training and education simply cannot deliver on the growing demand for specialist knowledge. The former problem has been repeatedly highlighted by the indigenous exporters. The latter has been a major talking point for the larger MNCs. The latest example of this is PayPal, whose global operations vice-president Louise Phelan warned this week that Ireland needs to focus on language skills, especially in German, Dutch and Nordic languages “to protect our status as a European gateway”.

Sadly, the Government is listening to the latter more than to the indigenous entrepreneurs.

Reforming education system is a long-term process and should not be tailored to the current demand for narrow skills. Instead, it should aim to provide broad and diversified education base, including leading (not obscure) modern languages, proper teaching of core subjects, such as history, philosophy, arts and sciences.

Such reforms will not have a direct impact on the likes of PayPal’s ability to hire people with very narrow skill sets. Which means that Ireland will have to systemically reduce the costs of importing human capital.

To derive real competitive advantage anchored in sustainable jobs creation and productivity growth, we need to focus on creating the right mix of tax incentives, educational supports and immigration regulations to lower the cost of employing highly skilled workers and increase returns to individual investments in education and training. Let us then leave the job of selecting which areas of study should be pursued to those who intend to succeed in the market place.






Box-out
The CMA Global Sovereign Credit Risk Report for the second quarter 2012 shows Ireland improving its ranking position from the 7th highest risk sovereign debt issuer in the world in Q1 2012 to the 8th – a gain that is, on the surface, should signal that the country Credit Default Spreads (CDS) were improving compared to its peers. While Ireland’s CDS have indeed improved during the quarter falling below 600 basis points (bps) in the last two days of June for the first time since the first week of May, in effect Ireland ended Q2 2012 pretty much where it started it in terms of CDS levels. What really propelled Irish rankings gain was the return of Greece to the CDS markets few weeks after the country ‘selective default’. In fact, Ireland’s rate of improvement (by 1 notch) is identical to that of Cyprus and marks below average performance for the group of the highest risk sovereigns. Perhaps even more revealing is the comparative between Ireland and Iceland. The latter is ranked 20th in the risk league table, improving in Q2 2012 by two ranks. At the end of June, Icelandic 5 year CDS were trading at 290 bps, with implied cumulative probability of country default over the 5 years horizon of 22.9%. Ireland’s CDS were trading at 554 bps with implied cumulative probability of default of 38.6%.

Friday, July 27, 2012

27/7/2012: June 2012 Retail Sales for Ireland - Massive Disappointment

This is a second post on irish retail sales for June 2012. Digging through the numbers, the results released today by the CSO are just short of horrific.

Look at the following two charts:


So Q1 and Q2 2012 have witnessed some of the deepest falls in value and volume since Q1 2010. 

Monthly changes for June were equally bad:




To sum up:

  • Value of sales is now at the lowest point since January 2010, m/m decline is the sharpest in 5 months and y/y decline is the steepest since January 2010.
  • Volume of sales is at the lowest point since January 2010, and y/y decline is the steepest since December 2009.
  • Ex-motor sales, value of sales index is now at the lowest point on record, m/m decline is the sharpest on record.
  • Ex-motor sales, volume of sales are at the lowest point on record, m/m decline is sharpest in 5 months.
Not good!

27/7/2012: A thought... for a Happy Friday

Just a thought:

How soon will the Finns be sending a note to Merkel along the usual 'concerned neighbors' lines: "Angie, neighbors here across from de puddle. You've left for a vacation, we know, but yer kid from de Frankfurt is running wild partying. Shouts he'll buy up every lemon from the garage sale across the roundabout, yer know - where de siesta fans live - with mum's credit card. Threattens something about 'giving dem de bank'... Not to be too concerned, ...err... but de Dutch family de other side of de fence is a bit ruffled up by this ruckus... Though the pesky Frenchies the other side of the street are egging yer kid on. Enjoy sunshine, but do give your lad Draghi a buzz there to calm him a bit."

27/7/2012: Irish Retail Sales June 2012 and 'Confidence Fairy Tales'

Irish Retail sales data is out for June 2012. Here are the updates to charts:


In the above:

  • The volume of retail sales (i.e. excluding price effects) decreased by 0.7% in June 2012 when compared with May 2012 and there was an annual decrease of 5.5%. 
  • If Motor Trades are excluded, the volume of core retail sales decreased by 1.51% in June 2012 when compared with May 2012, while there was also an annual decrease of 1.71% when compared to June 2011.
  • The sectors with the largest month on month volume decreases are Food beverages & Tobacco (-9.7%), Hardware Paints & Glass (-4.8%), Fuel (-3.9%). 
  • A monthly increase was seen in Electrical Goods (2.9%), and in Books, Newspapers and Stationery (2.6%).
  • The value of retail sales decreased by 1.3% in June 2012 when compared with May 2012 and there was an annual decrease of 4.9%. 
  • If Motor Trades are excluded, there was a monthly decrease of 2.08% in the value of retail sales and an annual decrease of 0.95%.
  • Do note two sub-trend lines showing the complete detachment of Consumer Confidence trend from the Retail Sales trend. That (discussed more below) is probably the real illustration of the so-called 'confidence trick' not working in the real world.
Adding a bit more definition to core sales changes:
  • Value of core retail sales (the index I prefer to consider in this environment, as opposed to CSO focus on volume of sales, which tells me preciously nothing about the revenues and employment in the sector) is down 1.57% in June compared to March 2012. 6mo average is now running at 95.4 against previous 6mo average of 95.2. This means that last 12 months we are running below 2010-2011 average of 96.6. 
  • Compared to 2005 levels, we are now 5.72% below in value terms.
  • Volume is down 0.91% on March 2012 level and 6mo MA is now at 98.65 against previous 6mo MA of 99.5 and 2010-2011 average reading of 101.23.
  • Compared to 2005 levels, volume of retail sales is down 2.02%.
  • Despite these deep falls, consumer confidence (I should start calling it La-La-La Index) from the ESRI came in up-beat at 62.3 in June up on 61.0. Relative to March 2012, Consumer Confidence apparently rose 2.81% and y/y June Consumer Confidence is up 10.66%. Wow, things are really hotting up, folks. 6mo MA through June is boisterous 60, up on previous 6mo MA of 56.3 and ahead of 2010-2011 average of 57.3. 
  • Compared to 2005 average, current Consumer Confidence is up 23.06%.
  • To summarize: actual retail sales are down in volume (-2.02%) and value (-5.72%) on 2005 average readings in June 2012, but Consumer Confidence is up 23.06%. 



Unlike ESRI's Consumer Confidence indicator, my own Retail Sales Activity Index posted contraction in June, in line with twin fall-off in retail sales in volumes and value:



27/7/2012: Some thoughts on Draghi's thoughts

Just two reactions - reflective of the markets sentiment - to yesterday's statements by Mario Draghi:


Markets are thin, as Europe slides into its annual 'Beach lounge & sun screen' mode, but nonetheless yesterday's statement by the ECB chief is significant. Not a game changer overall, yet, but a sign that the team captain is starting to see the problem more clearly.

So what did he really say?

  1. Raised a possibility of direct bonds purchases for distressed sovereigns (read: Italy and Spain) - in my opinion a minor issue. Take Spain - from now through mid-2015 it will need €542 billion to roll over existent bonds and fund itself, plus €20 billion potentially in regional financing. ECB's hands are currently relatively tied when it comes to rescuing Spain by the fact that two out of three tools ECB can use to do so are ineffective if not damaging to Spain. Usual policy tool of lowering interest rates will have little-to-no impact on Spain which is suffering from the same breakdown in the monetary policy transmission mechanism as the rest of the euro zone. Draghi hinted at as much within the overall euro area context. ECB can use the LTRO3 tool. Alas, (1) this would mean that LTRO3 will be explicitly focused on financing sovereign (as opposed to banking sector) needs; (2) financing Spanish Government via LTRO3 would only increase contagion from the sovereign to the banks and back to the sovereigns; (3) Unable to issue LTRO to a specific country, the ECB is likely to risk even more carry trade and contagion across the euro zone as the result of such a move. So the only tool left is SMP. ECB has built up some back pressure here with no SMP purchases in 19 weeks, hence the trigger reaction yesterday to Draghi's statement, but I have severe doubts this will work, even if restarted as the scope for SMP purchases for Spain would be well under €75-80 billion - a drop in the funding requirement.
  2. Noted that elevated sovereign yields can restrict the monetary policy transmission mechanism (presumably via the heightened liquidity trap effects and carry-trade incentives), which would bring them within the ECB mandate. This is consistent with his statement to the EU Parliament earlier this month where he stressed that both inflation and deflation are part of the ECB mandate. More specifically, Draghi said that "The short-term challenges in our view relate mostly to the financial fragmentation that has taken place in the euro area... Investors retreated within their national boundaries. The interbank market is not functioning... the key strategy point here is that if we want to get out of this crisis, we have to repair this financial fragmentation... So [first] regulation has to be recalibrated completely." In other words, Draghi sees regulatory, not balancesheet barriers to interbank lending (and thus regulatory causes of a liquidity trap). Fine, but that does not mean a short-term response on the cards. And it does not mean a major departure from the previous position of the ECB that regulatory fix must be applied ahead of monetary fix.
  3. Spoke about the fact that the ECB mandate is too restrictive to deliver effective monetary policy - again re-iteration on his statement to the EU Parliament and potentially a clear signal the ECB would not mind if its mandate was expanded. Yesterday, Draghi went further to link the ECB unbalanced mandate to the ECB's ability / willingness to act in the sovereign bond markets. This is what referenced in the quote that the ECB is 'ready to do whatever it takes' to preserve the euro. But the quote contains much more than that: "...another dimension to this that has to do with the premia that are being charged on sovereign states borrowings. These premia [relate to] default, with liquidity, but they also have to do more and more with convertibility, with the risk of convertibility. Now to the extent that these premia do not have to do with factors inherent to my counterparty – they come into our mandate. They come within our remit." FTAlphaville has a good note on the convirtibility bit (here).

In short, I don't read Draghi's statement as a major and definitive turnaround in the ECB policy, but rather a continued sign of ECB drift toward pressuring both: 
  • the markets sentiment, and 
  • the euro area policymakers to act to increase ECB powers and/or carry out significant policy framework changes (ESM, banking union etc).
Continued is the key word here, because, in my view, yesterday's statement is not as divorced from the earlier Draghi comments as some analysts might suggest (or wish for).

These pressures, however, is an important component of policy drift across the euro zone. Leaderless Europe needs a jolt from the ECB to force it out of policy stalemate. That such an approach might be working is reflected in this latest report from the 'front'.