13/5/2012: Sunday Times 06/05/2012: Irish labour costs competitiveness

This is my Sunday Times column from May 6, 2012 (last week), unedited version.

Latest research from ESRI shows that, contrary to the prevalent opinion in the media and official circles labour earnings in Ireland have been rising, not falling, during the early years of the crisis. This trend, on the surface, appears to contradict claims of wages moderation in the private sector, the very same claims that have been repeatedly used to argue that structural reforms and changes in Ireland during the crisis have seen a dramatic return of productivity growth.

The ESRI research, carried out by Adele Bergin, Elish Kelly and Seamus McGuinness used data from the National Employment Surveys on the changes in earnings and labour costs between 2006 and 2009. Per authors, “despite an unprecedented fall in output and rise in unemployment, both average earnings and average labour costs increased marginally over the period.”

Surprising for many outside the economics profession, these findings actually confirm what we know from Labour Economics 101.

Firstly, wages and earning are sticky when it comes to downward adjustment. In other words, while wages inflation can be rampant, wages deflation is a slow and economically painful process. This is precisely why currency devaluations are always preferred to cost deflation (or internal devaluations) as the means for correcting recessionary and structural imbalances.

Secondly, wages deflation  is even slower in the economies where collective bargaining is stronger. Ireland is a strong candidate for this with its Social Partnership and tenure-linked pay structures.

Thirdly, average earnings movements reflect not only changes in wages, but also changes in the composition of the national and sectoral employment. More specifically, as the ESRI study concludes, the core drivers of rising earnings during 2006-2009 period were “increases in both the share of and returns to graduate employment and a rising return to large firm employment”. Of course, both of these factors are correlated with the destruction of lower-skilled and less education-intensive construction and domestic services jobs.

Lastly, increases in part-time employment also drove up average earnings. In fact, the latest figures from the Eurostat show that a total of 7.4% of our currently employed workers are classified as part-time employees willing to work longer hours, but unable to secure such employment. This is the highest proportion in the entire EU27, and well above the 3.9% reading for Greece.

Overall, ESRI researchers concluded that “a good deal of the downward wage rigidity observed within Irish private sector employment since the onset of the recession has largely been driven by factors consistent with continued productivity growth.”

In my opinion, this is not a foregone conclusion. Irish labor productivity may have risen during the period of the crisis, but much of that increase is probably accounted for by the very same four forces that drove increases in earnings. Higher proportion of jobs in the economy within the MNCs-dominated exporting sectors, higher survival rate for jobs requiring higher skills, and the nature of the early stages of public sector employment cuts most likely simultaneously explain changes in both earnings and productivity.

The latter aspect is worth explaining. In the early part of the crisis, all public sector employment reductions took place out of cuts to part-time and contract positions, thus most heavily impacting lower earning younger workers. This would simultaneously increase the proportion of higher paid public employees and the average productivity in the sector. Post-2009, cost reductions have been running via early retirement schemes, but these are not reflected in the 2009 data.

In other words, on the surface, it might appear that Irish labour productivity has grown over time, but in reality, it is the reduction in less productive workers’ employment that has been driving these ‘improvements’. Incidentally, this story, not the ESRI conclusion, is consistent with the situation where domestic economic activity has contracted more than domestic employment.

In brief, our ‘productivity gains’ outlined by the ESRI might be a Pyrrhic victory in the Irish economy’s war for internal devaluation.

And the said victories continued since 2009 – the period not covered in the ESRI study.

Since January 2010, earnings have been falling in Ireland as jobs contraction became less pronounced and as public sector entered the stage of early retirement exits. Irish average hourly labour costs peaked at €28.0 per hour in 2009, 5.7% above the Eurozone average. In 2011, however, the average hourly labour cost in Ireland stood at €27.4 per hour, 0.7% below Eurozone average. If in 2009 Ireland had the eighth highest average hourly cost of labour in EU27, by 2011 we were 11^th most expensive labour market.

According to the Eurostat, across the Irish economy, labour costs rose 7.7% in 2007-2009 period followed by a drop of 1.6% in 2010-2011. However, over the period of the entire crisis, the labour costs are still up 5.2%. The only good news here is that our euro area competitors have all posted higher labour costs inflation. The same pattern is repeated in Industry, Services and across the Public Sectors. Only ICT and Financial Services broke this pattern, driven by fixed wages in the state-owned domestic banking, robust demand for IFSC and ICT specialists. In Professional, Scientific and Technical Activities, earnings rose 6.3% between 2007 and 2011, with wages moderation kicking in only from 2010 with a relatively strong decline of 4.8%. Still, this is just half the rate claimed in the official promotional brochures extolling the virtues of decreased labour costs in this area in Ireland.

With relative stabilization of unemployment and longer duration of joblessness, our average earnings are now set to decline over time as younger educated workers come into the workforce to replace retiring older workers. In the mean time, our productivity metrics will continue to improve in specific MNCs-dominated exporting-heavy sub-sectors. Competitiveness will improve, but not because real productivity will expand. Instead, continued re-orientation of economy toward MNCs will drive headline numbers as we become more and more a tax haven, rather than indigenous entrepreneurship engine.

These accounting-styled gains in productivity and cost competitiveness are likely to coincide with stagnation of Ireland’s GNP. In the period since 2007, Irish after-tax earnings have actually suffered significant deterioration compared to our counterparts in Europe. This deterioration is strongly pronounced for demographically most productive part of our workforce – those in the 25-45 years of age.

Eurostat data shows that in 2007-2011, after-tax earnings in Ireland have increased only for single persons with no children earning 50% of the average wage (a rise of 2.3%) and households with two parents and two children on 100% of the average wage income and sole earner (up 1.8%). The smallest declines in after-tax earnings occurred for the category of single person households with no children earning 100% of the average wage (down 0.8%), families with two earners and no children bringing in 200% of the average wage in combined earnings (down 0.8%), and families with similar income (down 0.6%). At the same time, the largest declines in after-tax earnings were recorded for single persons and families with no children and earnings of 167% of the average wage (declines in the range of 2.3% and 3.7%). Above-average after-tax earnings drops were recorded for all other types of households, including families with children on combined earnings in excess of 133% of the average wage. In other words – younger households and households with two earners have been the hardest hit by the recent trends.

With decline in net after-tax earnings, Irish economy is now facing a number of pressures. Costs of living, commuting and housing are likely to continue rising in months and years ahead, driven by the state desire to extract more in indirect taxation and the market structure that is largely captured by the less competitive state enterprises and defunct banks. Direct tax burden will also continue to rise, while pre-tax earnings will fall. These pressures will imply further reductions in consumer spending and domestic savings. The latter means, among other things, that we will see renewed pressure on banks (as part of our savings reflects repayment of household debts) and on domestic investment.

CHARTS: 

Box-out:

The latest Community Innovation Survey for Ireland for the period of 2008-2010 has been released by the CSO, detailing some very interesting trends in overall innovation activity in Irish economy. Headline figure shows that 28% of enterprises in the industrial and selected services sectors had product innovations in 2008-2010, with 33% of enterprises engaged in process innovations. However, only 18% of enterprises were engaged in both process and product innovations. Not surprisingly, foreign-owned enterprises led Irish-owned enterprises in terms of product innovation 38% to 25%, in process innovation 40% to 30%, and in dual product and process innovation 25 to 16%. Irish-owned enterprises derived slightly more of their total turnover from adopting innovations new to the firm, while foreign-owned enterprises led strongly (more than 2.5 times) in terms of new to market innovations. This suggests that Irish enterprises strength remained in adopting new innovations developed outside, while foreign-owned enterprises are strong leaders in creating new products, services and processes for the market. Not surprisingly, of €2.5 billion spent on innovation in 2010, just 49% went to finance in-house R&D. The most innovation-intensive sector of the MNCs-dominated economy was, not surprisingly Manufacture of petroleum, chemical, pharmaceutical, rubber and plastic products (72.5% of enterprises with technological innovation activities), while the most intensive traditional sector was Manufacture of beverages and tobacco products (91.7%). Did someone mention booze and pills sciences?

11/5/2012: Ignoring that which almost happened?

In recent years, I am finding myself migrating more firmly toward behavioralist views on finance and economics. Not that this view, in my mind, is contradictory to the classes of models and logic I am accustomed to. It is rather an additional enrichment of them, adding toward completeness.

With this in mind - here's a fascinating new study.

How Near-Miss events Amplify or Attenuate Risky Decision Making, written by Catherine Tinsley, Robin Dillon and Matthew Cronin and published in April 2012 issue of Management Science studied the way people change their risk attitudes "in the aftermath of many natural and man-made disasters".

More specifically, "people often wonder why those affected were underprepared, especially when the disaster was the result of known or regularly occurring hazards (e.g., hurricanes). We study one contributing factor: prior near-miss experiences. Near misses are events that have some nontrivial expectation of ending in disaster but, by chance, do not."

The study shows that "when near misses are interpreted as disasters that did not occur, people illegitimately underestimate the danger of subsequent hazardous situations and make riskier decisions (e.g., choosing not to engage in mitigation activities for the potential hazard). On the other hand, if near misses can be recognized and interpreted as disasters that almost happened, this will counter the basic “near-miss” effect and encourage more mitigation. We illustrate the robustness of this pattern across populations with varying levels of real expertise with hazards and different hazard contexts (household evacuation for a hurricane, Caribbean cruises during hurricane season, and deep-water oil drilling). We conclude with ideas to help people manage and communicate about risk."

An interesting potential corollary to the study is that analytical conclusions formed ex post near misses (or in the wake of significant increases in the risk) matter to the future responses. Not only that, the above suggests that the conjecture that 'glass half-full' type of analysis should be preferred to 'glass half-empty' position might lead to a conclusion that an event 'did not occur' rather than that it 'almost happened'.

Fooling yourself into safety by promoting 'optimism' in interpreting reality might be a costly venture...

9/5/2012: Carat, Stick, Gold, Council Estate. Boom!

This week, Irish Times have ventured to cover gold in an article titled “The carat and stick approach to investment".  

Please see my disclaimer at the bottom of this post.

We can debate the semantics of the Irish Times headline, but the ‘stick’ suggests some sort of compulsion for investors to purchase gold. 

In reality, few dealers in Ireland actually offer direct access to properly stored gold at an affordable margin. I have not seen any ‘Buy Gold, or Else...’ marketing campaigns, comparable in the force of conviction or compulsion to the tsunami of sell-side promotions unleashed onto Irish investors in property and banks shares in the recent past. Irish Times does not have a dedicated portal 'MyGold.ie' or a special 'Buy Gold' supplement where gold dealers can advertise their coins, nuggets, bars, etc. When gold is covered on the pages of the Irish business press, it is almost invariably painted in apocalyptic terms.

In-line with this tradition, the article opens on a horror story of a young couple living on a council estate, all their savings in gold, stored on-site. One has to wonder if Irish Times writings on, say, pet ownership always relay bone-chilling tales of killer pooches attacking unsuspecting elderly owners. One has to wonder, because a gold bar has about as high probability of ending up under the mattress in a council dwelling as an average retiree faces the threat of being mauled by a man-eating Chihuahua.

I actually agree with the article implied thesis that no investor should be advised to put all their savings into gold or any one specific asset or asset class. Such an atrocity of mis-selling should never befall a retail investor.

However, prudent risk management does imply, in my view, that investors should hold a relatively fixed percent of their invested wealth allocation in gold. Not for speculative reasons, but for risk hedging reasons to cover over the long run wealth volatility induced by other assets and the adverse effects of inflation.

Hardly a ‘stick’ approach.

There’s a point about Gold being a rollercoaster-styled investment vehicle compared to stocks and bonds, raised in the article. Indeed, gold prices show high volatility. Less so on the semi-variance side (downside) than on the overall variance side (downside and upside). And less on geometric weighting (that concern wealth preservation) than on arithmetic (the one that is more suited for short-term returns comparatives), but this is too nuanced for a newspaper article.

The Irish Times seems to be unaware of the ‘survivorship bias’. Over the time horizon glimpsed across by the article, many investments in stocks and bonds have gone in value from ‘hero’ to ‘zero’, as companies went bust, sovereigns and local issuers of bonds defaulted or restructured, currencies disappeared and hyper-inflation bouts have demolished the value of assets, banks deposits have been lost, and so on. Pesky gold ‘relic’ is still here.

There is a priceless moment in Simpsons where Montgomery Burns checks his ticker tape to discover his Confederated Slave Holdings has gone bust. On a more serious note, Nassim Taleb wrote books and academic peer-reviewed articles on the stuff. And Taleb also brings up the value of gold as a hedge against such risks.

Irish Times frequently quizzes serious economics luminaries from stockbrokers and real estate agents. And with clear disdain, the article references the opposite sort – the ‘pop economists’. Let's take a look at some of those using historical valuations / references for highlighting gold’s functions in the real world:

• Nobel Prize winner Robert Mundell recognizes the value of gold as inflation hedge, stating that “Gold will be part of the structure of the international monetary system in the twenty-first century.” Yep, there’s even a website for this sort of pop populism: http://robertmundell.net/economic-policies/gold/, where he is quoted saying that “When the international monetary system was linked to gold, the latter … established an anchor for fixed exchange rates and stabilized inflation. When the gold standard broke down, these valuable functions were no longer performed and the world moved into a regime of permanent inflation.
• Another pop economist is Professor Roy W. Jastram, University of California, Berkeley. His The Golden Constant shows how gold maintained its purchasing power over very long periods of time.
• Professor Steve Hanke of the populism-swept Johns Hopkins University is another one who argues in favour of gold standard currencies precisely because he believes that gold is a long-term inflation hedge.
• John Nash, an unscrupulous peddler of gold with a Nobel Prize medal around his neck (made of gold, note), has called for a gold standard, presumably to sell more gold bars to London Council flats inhabitants.

Yes, there is much of a debate going on the virtues and pitfalls of gold as an investment vehicle or a monetary base. Yes, both sides of the argument have serious research behind them. But that is not what the Irish Times article portrays. Instead of presenting a debate, or actual evidence on the dangers of over-investing in an asset class, the article draws an extremely selective depiction of reality framed in derogatory terms.

Meanwhile, the article description of various gold investment vehicles is incomplete, omitting, for example, the fact that some gold ETFs are synthetic, rather than physical gold-backed, and that some products available in the market allow to purchase gold on price-averaging basis, reducing exposure to price volatility.

A ‘rollercoaster’ investment vehicle that is gold is the only asset in existence that actually provides a risk hedge and a safe haven over long-term structural adjustments and short-term fluctuations across the majority of other asset classes, including stocks. If the Irish Times want proof of this, they can read research on the topic available on ssrn or repec or econlit. Professor Brian Lucey, researcher and lecturer Fergal O’Connor and myself are co-authoring on a database of studies on gold as an asset class, its properties, behavioural implications and empirical analysis, which is available at http://preciousmetalsresearch.wordpress.com/.

There is a priceless bit in the article on determination of an asset bubble. The author logic goes as follows: “In 2007, more than 80 per cent of the demand for gold was for jewellery and industrial use, while less than 20 per cent of demand was from investors. By 2009, this had changed dramatically. Investment demand had risen to 43 per cent of the total. The rise in demand from investors raises the question as to whether speculation is a key driver of the gold rally.”

This does a number of things:

•  It answers a question with a question.
•  It also suggests that investor demand is always speculative.
• It confuses speculation, investment and bubble formation. 90%-plus of equities (other than retained shares) and 100% of bonds are held by investors, and yet Irish Times does not call equities or bonds bubbles every day of the week.
•  It ignores the other side of the equation, what happens with the non-investment demand for gold.

Let me provide some more numbers:

Between 2002 and 2007, demand for physical use gold (jewellery, dentistry and technological) has declined on average at the rate of 1.5% pa, since 2008 through 2011 the rate of decline was -4.42%. At the same time, demand for gold bars and coins rose at 4.83% pa on average in 2002-2007 and at 41.93% pa on average in 2008-2011. Demand for ETFs-held gold, meanwhile, more directly instrumenting ‘speculative’ (or shorter-term) investments has 79.9% pa on average in pre-2007 period and at 5.14% pa on average in 2008-2011 (or crisis period).

Drama all around, unless you look slightly deeper into demand drivers.

Physical gold demand has been abating over the 2000s primarily due to diversification in jewellery demand away from gold (rise of prominence of platinum during the years of 2002-2007 and silver in the latter years, driven by tastes and price effects, plus recession-related income effects and tax and local currency considerations). A quick read through demand drivers analysis from the World Gold Council would help here.

In addition, it is wrong to classify sales of bars and coins as ‘speculative’. Behavioural studies suggest that sales of bars & coins are driven strongly by savers, rather than traditional speculative investors. These ‘savers’ are more often than not wealthier individuals (especially in the case of bars buyers) who tend to hold both instruments over longer horizon. Coins holdings are even less sensitive to price changes than demand for bars. For example, coins demand for US Mint Eagles has spiked around 1997-2000 with no reaction in the coins price. I doubt even the Irish Times would have spotted a bubble there. (chart).

These are not to be ignored, as roughly 20% of the investment gold demand is accounted for by coins and medals.

Lastly, one has to distinguish between speculative (capital gains-driven) investments and short-term risk management objectives (such as flight to safety or flight to quality considerations). These factors are hard to control for, but smoothing demand for investment gold in 2008 and 2011 – the two core years of the crisis, using historical trend suggests that the ‘hedging’ demand for gold to cover the spikes in markets volatility around the equities and sovereign crises peaks accounts for about 9-10% of total gold demand at the end of 2011.

A quick note below the post does some back-of-the-envelope illustration on price-demand links.

In brief, the issue of gold valuation is complex and very much open to the debate. I, personally, have no opinion on whether gold price today is a bubble or not. It might be, it might be at the beginning of the bubble formation or at the tail end of it. I have no idea. Nor do I have any idea where the gold price will be in 3 months time.

What I can say is what I keep repeating any time someone asks me about gold: gold is a wealth management tool suited for risk hedging and wealth preservation, not for chasing speculative gains.

Disclaimer:
1) I am a non-executive member of the GoldCore Investment Committee.
2) I am a Director and Head of Research with St.Columbanus AG, where we do not invest in any individual commodity.
3) I am long gold in fixed amount over at least the last 5 years with my allocation being extremely modest. I hold no assets linked to gold mining or processing companies.
4) I have done and am continuing doing academic work on gold as an asset class, but also on other asset classes. You can see my research on my ssrn page the link to which is provided on this blog's front page.

5) I receive no compensation for research appearing on this blog. Everything your read here is my own personal opinion and not the opinion of any of my employers, current, past or future.

6) None of my research - including that on gold - should be considered as an investment advice or an advise to buy or invest in any asset or asset class.

Note: using annual data we can look at the relationship between demand for gold by various types and prices. Chart below illustrates.

Three things are relatively clear: 

1. Between 2002 and 2011 there is a rather strong positive relationship between gold price and demand for bars and coins;
2. Between 2002 and 2011 there is relatively strong negative relationship between gold price and demand for physical use gold;
3. Between 2002 and 2011 there is relatively weak relationship between gold price and demand for gold by investment funds

Now, here's a question, if bubble in gold is to be traced to 'speculative' demand spikes in response to the price movement, why on earth would there be less of a relationship between price and the most speculative type of gold investment - the ETFs and more of a relationship between less speculative physical demand for gold and price of gold?

7/5/2012: Analysis of April Irish PMIs (4): Profitability

This is the last post on April 2012 PMIs. In the first and the second posts, I covered headline index readings forManufacturing PMI and Services PMI for April 2012. In the third post, I looked at the Employment sub-indices for both sectors. This post will focus on profitability conditions, an index I derived from the PMI data.


April 2012 saw profit margins conditions deterioration slowing down in Services from -15.06 in march to -11.96 in April. 12mo MA is now at -15.9, shallower than the average deterioration in profit margins during the pre-crisis period (-17.8), but deeper than -14.7 average reading for the period since January 2008. Overall, -11.96 April 2012 reading is the slowest pace of profit margins deterioration recored since October 2010. 3mo MA is now at -13.8 and this marks a significant improvement on -19.8 deterioration for 3mo MA a year ago.

Manufacturing profitability index has moved from -24.84 in March 2012 to -22.86 in April 2012, marking the second sharpest decline since March 2011. 12mo MA is now at -17.1, while 3mo MA is at -23.3. This compares against pre-crisis average reading of -11.6 and January 2008-present average of -14.55.

So on the net, profitability conditions continue to deteriorate, but deterioration in Services is less pronounced and de-accelerating continuously compared to historic trends. Deterioration in Manufacturing profit margins continues unabated and is running well beyond historical averages.


The above suggests that while some positive momentum is possible for employment in Services sector, it is unlikely that profits conditions will support much of an employment uptick in Manufacturing.

7/5/2012: Analysis of April Irish PMIs (3): Employment

In the last two posts I covered headline index readings for Manufacturing PMI and Services PMI for April 2012. In this post, I am looking at the Employment sub-indices for both sectors.

Employment index rose to 52.9 in Manufacturing from 51.2 in March. The move is against 49.5 12mo MA and 50.0 average for Q1 2012, suggesting some expansion in Manufacturing employment. The change comes coincident with a decline in the rate of growth in overall sector PMI to 50.1 from 51.5 in March.

In Services, employment index declined to 50 from 51.9 in March 2012. The index 12mo MA is at 47.9 and Q1 average was 48.1. In contrast to Manufacturing, decline in Employment growth rate came against an improvement in PMI from 52.1 in March to 52.2 in April.

Short-term changes in the series, however, are pretty volatile. Chart below shows the counter-moves in the two sectors:

and the chart below plots relationship between Employment and Exports:

The good news is, March and April 2012 mark two consecutive months when exports expansions in both sectors led to above 50 readings in employment as well. Last time that happened on a monthly basis was in April 2011 and last time it happened in two consecutive months was in October 2007.

If sustained over the next 2-3 months, the trend might shift firmly to the upside.

7/5/2012: Analysis of April Irish PMIs (2): Core Services

Previous post dealt with the high level trends in Manufacturing PMI for Ireland. In this post we look at the core data for Services PMI.

Back in March, markit - the agency releasing Irish PMI data for NCB - headlined the changes in the Services index with a rather bombastic "Growth of Activity Sustained in March, and Optimism Hits a 22-month High". Of course, such was the booming time in Irish economy a month ago.

Fast forward one month to April and the headline remains bombastic: "Activity Growth Maintained in April as New Business Rises for Third Month Running"... Ok... so...

Headline PMI in Services (Business Activity index) improved from 52.1 in March to 52.2 in April, which is good news nominally, but statistically still indistinguishable from 50. Good thing is, the moving averages are a bit stronger along the just-above-50 trendline. 3mo MA is at 52.5, 12mo MA at 51.3, and 3mo MAs for 2011 and 2010 are all below the current running at 52.1 and 49.8 respectively. So business activity is indeed somewhat on the rise, albeit a very shallow rise.

Overall, headline Services Activity has been running on average above 50 since June 2009. Anyone noticed the boom, yet?

New Business Activity firmed up to 52.7 in April, from 52.1 in March, marking the third consecutive month of above 50 readings. 12mo MA is at 50.0 and 3mo MA is at 52.8, ahead of same period 3mo average in 2010 and 2011 (49.1 and 51.9, respectively). All, however, remain statistically indistinguishable from 50.

Again, trend pattern in New Business sub-index is identical to the pattern in overall Business Activity index - flat just above 50 since, roughly Q2 2011. The snapshot of more recent data illustrates, next.

Input-output prices are both moderating in trend, but input prices continue to expand, while output prices continue to post significant deflation. Profit margins, therefore, are shrinking more and more - the pattern that is running solidly since August 2009. More on this in future posts, however.

On core components of PMI: New Export Business growth moderated, but remained above waterline at 54.3 in April, down from 55.5 in March 2012. Both monthly readings were statistically significantly above 50, the same as in February. 12mo MA is now at 52.7 - barely statistically significantly above 50, while 3mo MA is at 55.0 - strong reading, ahead of 54.6 in 3mo through April 2011 and 52.8 reading for the same period of 2010.

As mentioned earlier, Profitability remained in the contraction territory, posting a reading of 47.5 in April, worse than 47.9 in March. Last time Profitability sub-index posted a reading above 50 was in December 2007.

Employment sub-index declined to 50.0 in April 2012, down from 51.9 in March 2012. 12mo MA is at 47.9 and 3mo average through April 2012 is at 49.9. This is virtually identical to 3mo MA through April 2011 which came in at 49.8 and is better than a rapid contraction-signaling 43.7 for the sub-index 3mo MA through April 2010.

Confidence slipped to 64.1in April 2012  from 70.4 in March. The series reading is now at 3mo low, but ahead of 12mo MA of 62.5. 3mo MA through April is very strong 67.1, while 3mo average through April 2011 was 66.5 and for 2010 period it was at 64.2. Overall, business confidence is relatively inflated indicator, as shown in the chart below. The indicator has relatively strong coincidental connection - in historical data - to the same period Business Activity index.

Overall, Services PMIs are showing stronger performance in the sector than in Manufacturing, but the numbers are more volatile and trending along the flatline. Business expectations continue to out-perform actual activity and exports orders, although this is hardly a new trend. With profitability severely constrained and actually deteriorating, I wonder if the 50+ readings in the last two months in Employment sub-index are credible.

7/5/2012: Analysis of April Irish PMIs (1): Core Manufacturing

With both Services and Manufacturing PMI data out last week, time to update some charts. This post will deal with core trends in manufacturing PMIs, following by posts covering core data in Services PMIs, employment trends and profitability trends.

Core PMI in manufacturing slid to 50.1 in April 2012 - level consistent with zero growth - from 51.5 in March. Although nominally, the PMI remained for the second month above 50, both March and April readings were not statistically significantly different from 50. Longer term averages also disappointed: 12mo MA slipped to 49.5 - below 50, nominally, 3mo MA is at 50.4. This compares to same-period 3mo average of 56.1 in 2011 and 51.7 in 2010. So overall PMI activity is at the slowest in 3 years. 6mo MA is down at 49.45 and 9mo MA at 49.3.

New Orders sub-index came in at 51.4 in April, a decline from 52.7 in March. March reading was barely statistically significantly different from 50, with April level of activity sliding below the statistical bound. 12mo MA for sub-indicator is now at 49.3 and 3mo MA through April 2012 at 51.4 compares poorly compared to same period average of 58.1 in 2011 and 53.2 in 2010. 6mo MA is at 49.45 and 9mo MA at 49.07.

New Export Orders sub-index is at 53.1, still above the expansion line of 50 and statistically significantly so, but down from 55.1 in March 2012. 12mo MA is at 52.0 and 3mo MA at 52.6, compared to same period 3mo MA of 59.9 in 2011 and 58.7 in 2010.

Thus, out of all 3 core indices, only one - New Export Orders - is consistent with growth. On the positive side, however, all three indices have deteriorated on March, but remained above 50 in nominal terms.

Chart below plots shorter-range highlight for the above series, plus Output sub-index. Output sub-index slipped to 48.6 in April from 52.8 in March - a sizable swing of 83% of the crisis-period STDEV. A nasty surprise pushed 12mo MA to 50.2 - within a whisker of 50, with 3mo MA at 50.6, compared to 2011 same period 3mo average of 59.1 and 2010 of 55.0.

The trend of flat - on average virtually zero growth - in all four series continues since June 2011.

All other core sub-indices are underperforming as well:

The gap between input and output prices is staying wide, implying continued pressures on profit margins (to be covered in a separate post), while employment outlook improved from 51.2 in March to 52.9 in April.

All core series show flat trend at below 50 since, roughly June 2011.