20/11/2011: Live Register - November

Live Register continued a parade of weaker Irish economy performance indicators for Q4 2011. Here are the headlines and updates.

November LR-implied unemployment rate edged up by another 10bps to 14.5% getting closer to 12mo high of 14.6% back in December 2010.

In absolute seasonally-adjusted terms, there are now 448,600 people on LR, up 1,700 month on month from October 2011. Year on year, LR rose 3,700 or +0.83%, back in October, year on year LR stood at 300 down on October 2010 (-0.07%). 3mo MA through November 2011 is 0.13% below 3mo MA through November 2010. In 3 months through November 2011, LR posted zero cumulative change, which contrasts with a decline of 2,200 over 3 months through November 2010 and 4,500 increase in LR for 3 months through August 2011. In 6 months through November 2011 LR rose 4,500, while in January-November LR rose 2,500.

Overall, seasonally adjusted LR number currently stands at the second highest level in history (same level was also attained in August this year and the highest level of 449,400 was attained in September 2010.

Numbers of casual and part-time workers rose once again from 85,029 in October to 86,612 in November or 1,583 mom (+1.86%). Year on year the number of part-time workers rose 6,404 (+7.98%). 3mo MA through November 2011 is up 8.79% year on year.

percentage of non-Irish nationals on LR rose from 17.43% in october to 17.58% in November as decline of 1,347 Irish nationals on LR mom was offset by an increase of 482 non-Irish nationals over the same period. Year on year, numbers of non-nationals on LR is up 737 or 0.99% while number of Irish nationals is up 3,828 or +1.09%. However, last 3mo saw an increase of 0.051% in non-Irish nationals on LR and an increase of 0.033% for Irish nationals.

Per CSO: "The number of long term claimants on the Live Register in November 2011 was 179,890. The number of male long term claimants increased by 19,939 (+18.1%) in the year to November 2011, while the comparable increase for females was 9,624 (+24.1%) giving an overall annual increase of 29,563 (+19.7%) in the number of long term claimants. This rate of increase in long term claimants has been slowing through the year with an annual increase of 57,597 (55.9%) having been recorded in January 2011." I am quite puzzled by CSO's apparent selective interpretation of this data, which appears to present the "positive" side of statistics. The slowdown in the rate of increases in long term claimants appears to be in line with overall slowdown in the rate of increase in the series for unemployment. January 2011 transition rates referenced Q3 2009-Q4 2009 net signees - of which there were, you guessed it, 25,400. But November 2011 transition rates are referencing net signees for Q2 2010-Q3 2010 - of which there were 10,200. So some better analysis would have done here for CSO.

29/11/2011: Retail Sector Activity Index: October 2011, Ireland

In the previous post I detailed the latests retail sales stats for Ireland. Here, I am updating my own Index of Retail Sector Activity - a weighted average of value of sales, volume of slaes and leading consumer confidence indicator. The index reflects changes in employment and profit margins conditions in the sector.

Table below summarizes the changes in all three components, and charts below illustrate:

A large jump ion consumer confidence in October (to 63.7 from September reading of 53.3) is the core driver of improvement in the  overall Index od Retail Sector Activity, which now stands at 102.2 - above the expansion level of 100. This means that we can expect a small uplift in retail sector activity in months ahead, but this uplift can manifest itself through improved volumes of sales (value static, so margins declining) or improved value of sales (inflation) or both (more demand-driven uplift).

As charts below show, RSAI still remains consistent with actual retail sales volume and value performance at below the levels consistent with medium-term consumer confidence reading:

29/11/2011: Retail Sales for October: Ireland

Irish retail sales continue on downward trend, with no respite.  I will be updating my exclusive Retail Sector Activity Index in the follow up post (so stay tuned), but here are the core headlines:

• The volume of retail sales index rose by 0.1% in October 2011 mom but is down 3.8% yoy. The volume of sales is now down 21.67% on peak. The index reading of 91.1 in October compares against 91.3 3mo AM and 92.1 6mo MA. In 2010 index average was 93.3 and 2011 to-date average is 92.0.
• There was no change in the value of retail sales on a monthly basis, however the annual change was -3.7%. The value index is now 25.6% below its peak. 3mo MA is at 86.7 against current reading of 86.5 and 6mo MA is at 87.5. 2010 annual average is 88.8 against 2011 average to-date of 87.7.

Charts below illustrate:

Focusing on core sales (ex-Motors):

• The volume of retail sales decreased by 0.2% in October 2011 mom, while there was an annual decrease of 3.6%. Core retail sales are now down 16.1% on the peak and 3mo MA is at 98.4 against October reading of 98.2, 6mo MA is at 98.8 and 2010 average is at 102.25 against 2011 average to-date of 99.5.
• There was a monthly decrease of 0.1% in the value of core retail sales and an annual decrease of 2.8%, with the value index now 20.6% below the peak. 3mo MA is 94.3, against current October reading of 94.2, and 6mo MA is 94.7. 2010 annual average is 97.6 against 2011 average to-date of 95.5.

Charts below illustrate:

So we are now in month 49 of core retail sales below pre-crisis peaks in both value and volume terms and no sustained bounce in sight. One can only wonder how on earth we still have functioning retailers left.

In October, Books, Newspapers & Stationery (-2.8%), Department Stores (-1.9%) and Electrical Goods (-1.7%) were amongst the categories that showed month-on-month decreases in the volume of retail sales. But have a closer look: seasonally adjusted sales excluding motors, fuel, bars and food are down 1.0% mom and 6.6% yoy in value and down 0.8% mom and 5.3% yoy in volume. So, basically, everything we buy that cannot be substituted for purchases in the Northern Ireland (though motors and food can, with some caveats) has tanked.

And in case you wondered: here's a chart showing annual rates of change in volume of sales for Ireland v EU27 and EA17

Clearly, things are turning around...

28/11/2011: Updated data for 2007-2010 Government Debt: Ireland

The CSO issued today updated - revised - figures for General Government Debt for Ireland. here's the core changes:

As you can see, the error due to the DofF double counting has been now rectified and the adjusted 2010 GGD now stands at €144,269 million. This, to remind you, does not include Nama liabilities, but it does include the promissory notes issued to Anglo & INBS. Table below details holdings of the Irish Government debt (as of May 2011):

28/11/2011: Employment in Irish economy: Q3/Q2 2011

The previous post (here) focused on the latest data for earnings across Irish economy, covering data through Q3 2011. Here, I provide the latest stats on employment numbers. Please note, CSO reports these only for Q2 2011 the latest, but sub-division of data for public sector is provided through Q3 2011.

Here are the core data points for Q2 2011

• In Q2 2011, there were 195,900 employed in Industry, down 1.36% yoy and up 0.82% qoq. The number is down 14.49% on Q3 2008 (third steepest rate of decline) despite the fact that industry is experiencing a pronounced exports boom.
• Construction sector employment is at 65,600 in Q2 2011, up 1.55% qoq, down 10.63% yoy and down 51.44% on Q3 2011 (the steepest drop of all series, and also the sharpest decline yoy).
• Wholesale & retail; repairs to vehicles and motorcycles sector employment stood at 276,600 in Q2 2011, down 1.18% yoy, up 2.29% qoq and down 11.71% on Q3 2008.
• Transportation and storage employment was at 65,700 in Q2 2011, up 0.77% qoq, up 6.31% yoy and down 5.06% on Q3 2008.
• Accommodation & food services employment was at 113,600, up 4.60% qoq,. down 9.84% yoy and down 24.06% on Q3 2011 (second sharpest contraction of all sectors on 2008 and also the second sharpest decline in yoy terms).
• Information & communication employed 53,400 in Q2 2011, up 5.12% qoq, down 2.73% yoy and down 10.40% on Q3 2008.
• Financial, insurance & real estate employment is at 91,000, up 3.88% qoq, down 1.09% yoy and down just 5.01% on Q3 2008, presumably they are selling more homes and financing more loans (of course, IFSC continues to perform strongly, in contrast to domestic services that are running excessive employment against continued business losses, to appease their largest shareholder - the Government).
• Professional, scientific & technical services are employing 72,100 in Q2 2011, dow 2.44% qoq, down 1.37% yoy and down 12.92% on Q3 2011.
• Administrative & support services employed 79,200 in Q2 2011, up 5.18% qoq, up 7.03% yoy and down 12% on Q3 2008.
• Public administration & defence employment stood at 112,100 in Q2 2011, down 5.72% qoq, down 6.74% yoy and down 6.97% on Q3 2008. This category posted the third sharpest decline yoy. It is also worth noting that figures for public sector reported here include census employees., although this distorts Q2 2011 data, but not Q3 2011 (as reported below).
• Education employment stood at 131,400 in Q2 2011, down 1.35% qoq, down 2.23% yoy and up 1.94% on Q3 2008.
• Human health and social work sector employment was 219,400 in Q2 2011, up 1.95% yoy, up 3.49% qoq and up 5.43% on Q3 2008.

Charts below illustrate:

Chart below summarizes Q2 2011 differences by two core sectors:

• Public sector employment rose to 404,300 in Q2 2011 up 0.02%qoq and up 0.55% yoy, but down 2.11% on Q3 2008.
• Private sector employment stood at 1,118,300 in Q2 2011, up 1.60% qoq, but down 2.60% yoy and down 15.43% on Q3 2008.
• Ratio of private sector workers to public sector wrokers has egnerally declined during the last 3 years, but improved slightly qoq in Q2 2011.

Chart below summarizes changes in employment for Q2 2011 compared to Q3 2008 listed above

CSO provides Q3 2011 data for employment in subsectors of the public sector and these are shown below compared to Q3 2008. This data is netted out for temporary census jobs that were recorded in Q2 2011, so no distortion there.

 On thing that stands out in the above. Ex-semi-states (-5.74%) and with semi-states (-5.78%) jobs losses in the public sector have been shallower in Q3 2011 than in private sector (for which we only have Q2 2011 data so far showing decline of 15.43% on Q3 2008). Even in the worst impacted Regional Bodies category, employment losses at -12.08% have been less severe than those in the private sector.

28/11/2011: Average Hourly Earnings Q3 2011 Ireland

Latest earnings and labour cost figures for Q3 2011 in Ireland are providing some interesting insights. This post will deal with data for earnings and the subsequent post will highlight findings for employment levels.

Average Hourly Earnings in:

• Industry stood at €21.28 in Q3 2011, down 0.47% qoq and unchanged yoy. AHE in Industry are up 1.77% on Q1 2008.
• Construction stood at €18.93/hour in Q3 2011, down 2.82% qoq and 4.30% yoy. AHE in Construction are down 1.82% on Q1 2008.
• Wholesale and Retail Trade and repairs of vehicles and motorcycles are now at €16.39/hour, down 1.50% qoq, up 1.93% yoy and up 0.06% on Q1 2008.
• Transportation and Storage AHE are at €19.18/hour, down 1.59% qoq,  -1.39% yoy and -3.76% on Q1 2008.
• Accommodation & food services AHE are at €12.87/hour, up 2.71% qoq, +3.21% yoy and +2.88% on Q1 2008 (highest rate of increase in AHE on Q1 2008).
• Information and Communication AHE are now at €27.36/hour, up 3.87% qoq, down 0.04% yoy and down 0.15% on Q1 2008 (currently third highest AHE).
• Financial, insurance & real estate AHE are at €28.42/hour, down 2.27% qoq, up 3.12% yoy and down 14.60% on Q1 2008 (currently second highest AHE and highest decrease in AHE since Q1 2008).
• Professional, scientific & technical AHE are now at €23.59/hour, down 0.08% qoq, down 2.64% yoy and down 3.52% on Q1 2008.
• Administrative & support services AHE stands at €16.22/hour, down 0.61% qoq, up 5.39% yoy and up 1.44% on Q1 2008.
• Public administration and defence AHE  down 0.95% qoq, up 0.31% yoy and down 6.44% on Q1 2008, currently at €25.99/hour (fourth highest AHE, but also second highest decrease in AHE since Q1 2008).
• Education AHE are at €34.58/hour (highest AHE), down 0.83% qoq, up 4.06% yoy and up 2.46% (second highest increase) since Q1 2008.
• Human health & social work AHE are at €23.54/hour, donw 0.63% qoq, up 0.09% yoy and up 1.90% on Q1 2008.
• Arts, entertainment, recreation and other services AHE at €16.26/hour, up 1.12% qoq, down 1.22% yoy and up 1.31% on Q1 2008.

Charts below illustrate:

Private sector AHE are now at €19.22/hour compared against Public sector AHE of €28.54/hour. Total economy AHE are at €21.64/hour. QOQ, public sector AHE declined 0.972%, while private sector AHE fell 0.979% (virtually identical falls), while YOY public sector AHE is up 1.06% and private sector AHE is up 1.64%. However, relative to Q1 2008, public sector AHE is down 0.35% against private sector AHE down 1.13%.

As the result, AHE gap between public and private sector now stands at 48.49%, slightly up qoq on 48.48% in Q2 2011 and slightly down on 49.34% in Q3 2010.

27/11/2011: Even with IMF's €600bn - Italy is too big to bail

There are some interesting reports in the media over the weekend, speculating that the IMF is preparing a super package for Italy, rumored to reach €600 billion. Here's a link from zerohedge that outlines the details of these rumors (here). There are several reasons to be skeptical as the feasibility of such a package and the potential effectiveness of it.

Here are these reasons.

Firstly, the IMF is a rules-based organization that normally can lend only 4-5 times (400-500%) of the country quota. Italy's country quota is SDR7.8823 billion or €10.7bn which can allow IMF to lend under normal arrangements up to €53.5 billion (at a severe stretch, I must add as the fund prefers not to lend to the full leverage of 500%).

In addition, IMF has announced two new programmes last week (discussed here). The Flexible Credit Line programme - whereby IMF does not specify lending leverage to be achieved, applies only to "members with very strong track records... based on pre-set qualification criteria to deal with all types of balance of payments problems." So IMF would have to qualify Italy as a country with "strong track record" and its solvency problems as "balance of payments problem". This, of couse, is possible, though not probable, as Italy's "strong track record" is hardly that "strong". In addition, the new lending will have to take place outside the normal arrangements mentioned above, as the deployment of such arrangements would not be consistent with "strong track record" even in theory. So to raise €600 billion, IMF will have to leverage Italy's SDR allocation 6,000%.

Let's put this number into perspective. Lehman Bros TCE leverage ratio was 4,400% at the time of collapse and its average TCE leverage ratio prior to collapse was 3,100%.

At any rate, IMF is most likely to assign Italy a precautionary borrower status under Precautionary Credit Line (see link above) which allows for 24 months leveraging up to 1,000%. This, of course means Italy will be able to raise just €107 billion through IMF loans or about 1/3rd of its roll-over requirements (not to mention new borrowings demand) through 2012.

Secondly, suppose IMF does indeed lend Italy €600 billion - enough to barely cover the country refinancing needs for 2012-2013. Then, two things happen:

1. 1/3rd of Italy's total Gross Government Debt becomes overnight senior to the rest of its debt - as IMF always assumes seniority in lending. This will push existent Italian bonds yields to 15% or 18% or more. We do not know, of course, exactly where the debt will be traded, but what we do know with almost certainty is that there is not a snowball's chance in hell Italy will be able to refinance maturing debt after 2013 on its own. So IMF lending Italy today commits IMF to lend to Italy in 2014 and on.
2. €600 billion is unlikely to cover all Italian needs for 2012-2013, especially if Italian banks are to take a hit on other sovereign bonds. let me run through the EBA banks stress tests model under the following assumptions: Greece haircut 80%, Italy haircut 10%, Portugal haircut 25%, Spain haircut 10% (notice - all very benign) and CT1 ratio of 9%. Italian banks shortfall on capital is €34 billion. Now, recall that Italy also has insurance companies (e.g. A.Gen) and pensions funds - which will see some fall-outs from the haircuts as well. Say €10 billion. Italian bonds downgrade due to IMF lending (see item 1 above) is likely to cost banks and other financial sector companies another  €11 billion and €4 billion. So we are into total bill of ca €60 billion right there. Italian deficits in 2012-2014 are expected to gross €76 billion per IMF latests forecasts. As shown in the chart above, debt maturity, plus new deficits financing will consume some €453.4 billion in 2012-2014 and €630.5 billion in 2012-2016. 

So the total funding that Italy might require is in the neighborhood of €510-690 billion, depending on which period we assume the package will cover (2012 through either 2014 or 2016 respectively).

And this assumes no deterioration in GDP growth (tax revenues) or deficit spending etc. It also assumes that market funding costs IMF built into its deficit forecasts (4% 10-year average pre-November 2010) remain under the IMF lending deal. In fact, of course, that is open to speculation if IMF can lend Italy €600 billion at anything below 5.3-5.8%.

So overall, folks, I am skeptical as to the IMF's ability to conjure €600 billion for Italy. And furthermore, I am skeptical as to Italy's ability to manage cover for its deficits, banks and roll-over needs under such a package. This doesn't even begin to address my concerns as to Spain waiting in the shadows.

Now, lastly, you might suggest that the IMF loans can come in conjunction with EFSF loans. Alas, the EFSF has some serious troubles itself - the following two posts from the zerohedge amply illustrate: here and here.

You see, Italy is too big to bail. Even if it is also too big to fail.

25/11/2011: Eurocoin signals recession for the euro area

And so the euro zone is now most likely in a recession. That's right, the R word is back.

Today, CEPR released its composite leading economic indicator for November - eurocoin - and the measure has posted it second consecutive monthly negative reading on foot of six consecutive monthly declines. Here are the details.

Eurocoin fell to a recessionary -0.20 in November 2011, from -0.13 in October and +0.03 in September.  The 3mo MA is now at -0.1 and 6 mo MA declined to +0.148. A year ago, the indicator stood at +0.45. Chart below updates, including eurocoin-consistent forecast for growth.

The following charts show the ECB decision-making inputs:

So ECB rates consistent with current growth are in the range of 1.0-1.5% - basically bang-on the current rate. However, inflation remains sticky and all indications are it will come in at around 2.7% in November, suggesting that rate expectation is for no change at beast (optimal rates consistent with this rate of inflation is in the neighborhood of 4%).

The ECB dilema continues.

25/11/201: Growth is the only solution to Europe's crisis

My latest post for Canada's The Globe and Mail is up - link here.

Please note, when I say 'growth' or 'economic growth' I obviously do not have in mind a bubble re-inflation or growth based on weak fundamentals. Hence, the concept of growth I accept and support is growth that is anchored in both demand and supply fundamentals, aka sustainable growth.

Enjoy and comment.

24/11/2011: Beggar thy citizens

Things are desperate on a new level across Euro area, folks. So desperate, the Euro leadership delusions have shifted up a notched from already feverish levels they reached before.

Until now, the talk was all about the miracle pills of first "The Firewall of EFSF" then "ECB rescue" + "Euro bonds", now the convoluted plans to underwrite the failures of the last decades are getting more esoteric and, oh so European, at the same time.

Recall the EFS 'Firewall' - launched at first with ca €275 billion in lending capacity, enlarged to €440 billion capacity, then planned for a 'leveraged' enlargement to €1 trillion capacity. Now, with realisation that (1) €1 trillion is no longer enough of a 'Firewall' once Italy caught fire and the rooftop of Chateau France is getting steamy too; and (2) There is no €1 trillion worth of international idiots (oops... err.. investors) willing to part with their money for the greater good of European 'solidarity' the EFSF 'solution' has fallen off the radar.

Next, enter the idea of the ECB rescue and Euro bonds. These too are largely problematic. The ECB 'rescue' option at this stage will have to involve €1.5-2.5 trillion worth of assets purchases - something that will be (a) costly (imagine what will happen to bonds prices if the ECB were to wade in with that sort of cash into the secondary markets) and (b) internecine to ECB's mandate and reputation (in other words, turning your Central Bank into the financial toxic waste warehouse will do to the Euro just what the PIIGS combined default can - destroy it). The Euro bonds option requires two impossible to achieve things: (1) finding idiots... err... investors willing to pony up even more cash than for the EFSF for an undertaking written against largely non-controllable borrowers with little prospect of achieving economic growth to sustain repayments of their debts, and (2) balancing the need to get another credit against the risk of destroying credit ratings (as Euro bond will in effect simply give Governments more debt and this debt will be senior to their own previously issued national debt). And, of course, the Euro bond idea requires much closer political integration first - something that will take years to deliver.

Smelling the rat... err... failure in the above magic bullets, some Governments are now desperate enough to resort to the classic European response to the crises: fleecing their own citizens to pay for their spending habits. Behold tax increases across Europe and Belgian plans to sell their unwanted bonds to their citizens (the story here). In the nutshell, the idea is that there are no idiots... err... investors out there willing to buy Belgian Government promissory notes (note: Belgium, of course doesn't even have a Government). So the solution - just as Joe Stalin did in the 1930s-1950s - is to sell these bonds to unsuspecting ordinary people of Belgium. To make the 'deal' even more egregious, the bonds are to be sold at a discount on the yields provided to banks purchasers. Not only will Belgian pople join the line of those who hold dodgy paper, cross-linked to their entire risk profile of living and working in Belgium and paying Belgian taxes, but they are expected to do so for less reward!

Priceless, really, folks. Comparable only to Irish Government 'Solidarity Bonds' and efforts to sell state junk to national pensions and insurance companies. In economics, there's a concept of policies that 'beggar thy neighbors' by shifting risks/costs/losses onto other countries via trade and investment restrictions, taxes and subsidies. In Europe, we are getting to the point of having 'beggar thy citizens' policies.

24/11/2011: Insolvent Europe

The following link is to my article on EU-wide debt crisis for presseurope.eu (and no - not just that Government debt crisis  we've heard all about): here.

23/11/2011: A longer term view of Ireland's structural deficits

Someone recently requested the analysis of structural deficits for Ireland. So here's a quick note. All data is taken from IMF WEO database for September 2011. IMF estimates 2011 deficit and forecasts deficits for 2012-2016. All frequencies and cumulative data calculations are my own.

Let's start with graphing our structural deficits. Remember, these are measured as % of total potential GDP, omitting the effects of business cycles on volatility in GDP. This makes structural deficits to be less precise than actual deficits, but useful in so far as they tell us the story of the long-term sustainability of the Exchequer spending.

Chart 1 below shows the overall structural deficits expressed as the percentage of potential GDP and in absolute national currency terms.

In the nutshell, the above chart shows that Ireland remained structurally insolvent for the entire history of the series since 1980 through 2010 and is expected to remain insolvent through 2016. It also shows that:

• Ireland was least insolvent in 1997-200 when the average structural annual deficit was just -0.65% of potential GDP
• The closest we came to structural balance was in 1997 when structural deficit hit -0.394% and in 2000 when it was at -0.209%
• Our peaks of insolvency were 1981 (-14.034%) and 2008 (-13.323%)
• Our worst periods of insolvency were the early 1980s, when 1981-1986 average annual deficit stood at -12.125% and 2007-2010 when structural deficits averaged -10.555% annually (omitting 2007 raises this to -11.266%)
• In 2011 we are expected to run structural deficit of 6.761% and in 2012-2015 we are expected to run average structural deficits of -3.753%.

All of these deficits add up to a nifty number. Chart below shows cumulative structural deficits. Per this, by the end of this year, our structural deficits since 1980 on will be adding up to €162.3billion. By 2016 these numbers are forecast to rise to €193.6 billion.

In terms of the frequencies of various solvency performance conditions, Irish structural deficits historically exceeded 3% per annum in 26 out of 32 years, implying a 84% chance of excessive unsustainable structural deficits. In contrast, relatively safe deficits (<2%) occurred in only 4 years in 36 years of history plotted above: 1997-2000. Thus, Ireland was close to sustainability only 13% of the time.