19/07/2011: Irish Trade Stats for May 2011

External trade figures for May (provisional) and terms of trade figures for April are out this week, so time to do some updates.

PS: Please, note - the source for these is CSO and all complaints about numerical values reported/shown arising due to some readers disliking some results for whatever reason - out to them.

• Imports in May 2011 came in at €3,727.9 million in seasonally adjusted terms, which was €1,199.6 million below April figure (-24.35% mom), €154.7 million above the same figure in May 2010 (+4.33%) and €357.5 million below May 2009 figure (-8.75%).
• Exports in May 2011 came in at €7,511.3 million which was €48.8 million below April figure (-0.65%), up €76 million (+1.02%) yoy and up €534.6 million (+7.66%) on May 2009.

• Trade balance in May stood at €3,783.5 million which is €1,150.9 million above April 2011 level (+43.72% mom), but down €78.7 million (-2.04%) yoy and up €892.2 million (+30.86%) on May 2009.

• Terms of trade continued to improve (vis-a-vis external sales with price of exports ratio to the price of imports falling) in April (there is 1 month lag in TT data compared to trade volumes data), posting an improvement for the 4th consecutive month. TT measured index 76.6, down from 77.1 in March and down 8.70 points yoy (-10.20%). Compared to April 2009, this year April reading was down 11.80 points or 13.35%.
  

So mapping the above progression:
The chart above suggests that in 2011 we are potentially entering some structural (and much expected - remember IMF forecast for trade growth for Ireland is about 50% below that attained in 2010) slowdown in the rate of growth in external trade.

Lastly, imports-intensity of exports (a ratio of exports volume to imports) has increased in May from 153.4% in April to 201.5% in May 2011 - an increase of 31.3% mom. At the same time, imports-intensity declined from a year ago by 3.2% although it is up on May 2009 by 18.0%.
So courtesy of CSO:

• "With seasonally adjusted exports remaining static and imports decreasing by 24% (or €1,200m) between April and May, the trade surplus increased by 44% to €3,784m" in mom terms. The improvement, therefore is solely due to decline in inputs imports and further contraction in consumption.
• "On an unadjusted basis, the value of exports in May 2011 (€7,390m) was slightly down (-0.6%) on the May 2010 figure of €7,435m. The value of imports (€3,749m) was up 5% on the May 2010 figure."

In January-April 2011, compared to the same period in 2010 exports increased by 8% to €31,161m:

• Exports of Medical and pharmaceutical products increased by 17% or €1,324m,
  
• Organic chemicals by 14% or €896m
• Overall Chemical and related products category exports rose from €17,347.3m in January-April 2010 to €19,607.7m in the same period of 2011, while imports in this category rose from €2,889.9m to €3,591.9m over the same period of time
  
• Petroleum by 126% or €208m. of course over the same period, petroleum imports rose from €1,410.1m to €1,752.8m
  
• Exports of food and live animals rose from €2,077.1m to €2,465.1m as trade balance in this category rose from €635.4m in the first 4 months of 2010 to €831.0 million in the same period of 2011
  
• Exports of goods to the USA increased by 17% or €1,069m, to France by 18% or €276m and to Switzerland by 25% or €258m. Exports to Belgium fell by 5% or €232m and to Spain by 19% or €225m.
• In the first four months of 2011, 52% of Ireland’s exports went to the USA, Belgium and Great Britain.
  

Over the same period, imports increased by 13% to €17,293m:

• Imports of Other transport equipment (including aircraft) increased by 27% or €401m,
  
• Petroleum increased by 24% or €342m and
  
• Medical and pharmaceutical products by 22% or €251m.
• Goods from Great Britain rose by 19% or €782m, from the United States by 7% or €188m and from Germany by 15% or €167m.
• Over half (54%) of Ireland’s imports came from Great Britain, the USA and Germany in the first four months of 2011.
  

18/07/2011: Some thoughts on Irish stocks bubble

There is a classic defined relationship between the various stages of bubble formation and markets responses, as illustrated in the chart from (source here) below.

Of course, there is an argument to be made that ‘normal’ bubbles are driven by either information asymmetries or behavioural ‘exuberance’ or both, and are, therefore, significant but temporary departures from the steady state ‘mean’ growth trend. The return to the mean, thus implies the end of the correction phase, as also shown in the chart below.


Of course, one can make an argument that what we have experienced in the case of Ireland is more than a simple bubble, but a structural break underwritten by underlying fundamentals, such as lower permanent rate of growth.

Irish GDP grew 8.82% cumulative in the period 2003-2010 in terms of constant prices or annualized rate of growth of 1.215%. In per capita terms current prices it grew by 14.85% cumulatively and at an annualized rate of 1.998%. Taken from these rates, from 2003 on through today, the average expected value of IFIN should be around 8,898 (mid-point between 8,659 and 9,139 implied by above rates from the ‘Smart Money’ period mid-point valuation). Note that, crucially, the new mean post-bubble bursting should be at least at or above the ‘Smart Money’ end-of-period valuations.

This is certainly not the case with Irish financials as shown in figure below:
Note that three forecasts (my own calculations, so treat as indicative, rather than absolute) provided assume that the average annual growth rate of 1.998% (upper forecast from the starting point at 2003-2004 average), mean forecast (based on 1.215% annualized average growth, starting from 2003-2004 average) and lower forecast (based on 1.215% annualized growth, starting from 2000-2003 average). All three are well above the post-Despair peak.

What about other signs of a classic bubble?
In the run up to the Public Money phase, it is clear that IFIN shows a number of sell-offs and shallow bear traps, but these can be linked to higher overall volatility of the index.

For any period we can take, IFIN exhibits more volatility than either S&P or FTSE bank shares sub-indices. Historically, across indices (to assure comparable scale), IFIN standard deviation stands at 65.40 against S&P’s BIX at 36.84 and FTSE A350 Banks at 32.70. January 2003 through June 2006, IFIN standard deviation was 25.16 against that for BIX of 10.29 and FTSE A350B at 12.07. For the run up to the crisis period between June 2006 and June 2007, IFIN standard deviation was 15.66 against S&P’s BIX of 4.64 and FTSE A350B of 5.22. Lastly, during the crisis – from July 2007 through today, IFIN standard deviation was 56.40 against 28.07 for S&P BIX and 27.83 for FTSE A350B.

To see the relationship, or the lack there of between the volatilities, consider the following chart.
Even from the simple consideration of the rates of change, week on week, IFIN has the lowest correlation with the S&P Banking BIX index – with relatively low explanatory power. Things are even worse if we are to look at the downside risks. Chart below plots downside weekly movements for the three indices that correspond to market declines of 2% or more week-on-week. Again, you can see that both before and during the crisis, there is little relationship between downside risk to Irish financials and to S&P measure.
And the same story is formally confirmed by the Chart below which plots the pair-wise relationships between S&P BIX and FTSE A350 and IFIN.
So overall, IFIN data strongly suggests that we are not in a “normal” financial bubble scenario.

But what about that claim that Lehman's Bros collapse had influence on our banks shares? Recall, Lehman was in trouble since Spring 2008 and went to the wall on September 15, 2008. Also recall that the issues started with Bear Sterns troubles in March 2008 and JPMorgan Chase completed its acquisition of Bear Stearns on May 30, 2008. So let's take the data subset on extreme downward volatility for the period from May 2008 through September 2009. If Lehmans and/or Bear had much of an effect on Irish financials we should expect either one of the following two or both to hold:

1. Correlation between IFIN and S&P BIX to be large and significant
2. Correlation between IFIN and BIX to be larger in the period considered than over the history from 2003 through today.

Overall, evidence suggests that actually the opposite of both (1) and (2) above holds. In fact, based on data for weekly market declines greater than 2% (relatively significant events, but not really too dramatic by far), the period between Bear & Lehman collapse and the next 12 months, Irish financials were less impacted by the US financial shares movements than in the period of 2003-present overall. The impact of Lehmans & Bear on UK financials was stronger, although not dramatically strong, however.

18/07/2011: Two charts on electricity prices

Another look at the residential and industrial prices for electricity across EU27 + 3 (Norway, Turkey and Bosnia candidate states). All information within the charts.

15/07/2011: Irish electricity prices and subsidies

Some interesting data on electricity prices within the EU - the latest is now available from the Eurostat, covering H2 2010. Keep in mind, between 2008 and 2010 we have experienced the largest deflation of overall consumer prices in the Euro area.

In terms of household prices for electricity, 2010 H2 price in Ireland was €0.1875/kWh up on €0.1855/kWh in H2 2009 and down from €0.2033/kWh in H2 2008. Back in H2 2008, Ireland ranked as the 6th most expensive electricity market for households in EU27, plus Norway, Turkey, and Bosnia & Herzegovina (let's call these EU27+3 for brevity hereinafter). The ranking improved to 7th most expensive in H2 2009 and to 9th in H2 2010. Chart below (arranged in order of increasing cost for H2 2010) illustrates.
Small, but progress: over 2 years overall decline was 7.8% in average prices.

Next, the cost of electricity for industrial users: In H2 2010 Irish electricity prices for industrial users averaged €0.1131/kWh down from €0.1419/kWh in H2 2008 and down on €0.1175/kWh in H2 2009. So the decline in the industrial electricity prices over the same period of time was almost 3times larger than for households - 20.3%.
Why? One reason - taxes. Our Government, incapable of creating a level playing field for investment and entrepreneurship has made a conscious choice to shift tax burden from the shoulders of producers/employers onto the shoulders of employees/households. Hence, as with income tax and other taxes, business taxes are kept lower for electricity than for households.

Before taxes are added, Irish household electricity cost was 0.1629 in H2 2010, which was 44.9% above the comparable pre-tax price for industrial users. Now, suppose this premium was justified by higher transmission costs to the households. And do note that Ireland and France are the only two countries that do not report break down of final prices by generation and transmission. For all other countries, network transmission costs account for about 42.15% on average of the total pre-tax price of household electricity in H2 2010. But here comes a tricky thing. After taxes are factored in, final price premium for electricity paid by households over and above industrial users rises to 65.8%.

What's the 20.85% tax wedge on the premium about? Most likely - a subsidy from the households to industrial users, cause, you know, to be competitive we have to charge someone to subsidise someone else... Although the subsidy is a sort of Pyrrhic victory, you see, since even with this transfer, Irish industrial users face the 6th highest electricity tariff in the EU27+3 in H2 2010, same as in H2 2009, but an improvement on the 4th highest in H2 2008.

Let us say thank you to the Social Partners and CER who work this hard protecting our consumers' interests.

12/07/2011: Irish Tax Rates in International Perspective - Part 2

More tax comparatives, courtesy of OECD dataset. Note, these refer to 2009 tax returns.

In the previous post (here), I provided some assessments of the overall taxation burden in Ireland compared to EU27, plus Norway, Israel and Switzerland. Now, let's look at components of the total taxes.

First - taxes on production:
What this chart above tells us is that we are not distinct from the sample average in terms of our taxes on production expressed as a function of GNP, while we are below average when expressed in terms of GDP:

• Total production and imports tax revenues in Ireland stood at 14.0% of GNP and 11.5% GDP in 2009. Sample average stood at 13.1% (median 13.0%) and +/- 0.5 STDEV band is (11.0, 14.4). So Irish taxes on production and imports as a share of GNP were above sample average. Again, for comparison : Switzerland was at 6.8% of GDP, while Sweden at 19.0%.
• Total production and imports tax revenues are broken down into Taxes on Products, and Other Taxes on Production. Taxes on Products in Ireland yielded 12.4% of GNP and 10.2% of GDP against sample average of 11.6% (median 11.3%), with +/- 0.5 STDEV band around the mean of (10.6,12.7). Again, Irish tax yields here were within the band when expressed in terms of GNP and below the mean when expressed against GDP. Other Taxes on Products (other than Vat, Import Duties and direct taxes on products) accounted for 1.3% of GDP and 1.6% of GNP - against the mean of 1.5% and the +/- 0.5 STDEV band of (0.9,2.1). Neither GDP nor GNP comparative here was out of line with the mean.
• Taxes on Products mentioned above can be further broken down into Vat, Taxes & Duties on Imports (ex-Vat), Taxes on products ex-Vat & Import taxes. VAT in Ireland in 2009 accounted for 6.4% of GDP and 7.8% of GNP. Sample average here was 7.3% with +/- 0.5 STDEV band around the mean of (6.6,8.0), median of 7.4, which means that Irish Vat receipts were in line with the sample average in terms of GNP, but below the mean in terms of GDP. In terms of Taxes on products ex-Vat & Import taxes, the same picture holds. In terms of taxes and Duties on Imports ex-Vat, Irish receipts were above the mean (statistically significantly) for both GDP and GNP measures.
  

Next, Irish Times / ESRI / Trade Unions' favorite taxes on Income and Wealth:
Remember, we allegedly have very low taxes on these and more needs to be extracted out of the 'Irish rich' :

• Total current taxes on income and wealth in Ireland stood at 10.7% of GDP and 13% of GNP. This compares against the sample average of 11.9% of GDP (median of 10.8%) with +/- 0.5 STDEV band around the mean of(9.3, 14.5). In other words, our taxes were slightly (but statistically insignificantly) above average in terms of GNP and also slightly (and again statistically insignificantly) below average in terms of GDP.
• The above can be broken down into Taxes on Income, and Other Current Taxes. Taxes on income yielded 12.5% of GNP and 10.3% of GDP. Both are within sample average range: sample average was 11.3%, +/- 0.5 STDEV band around the mean was (8.8,13.8) and median was 10.4%. Other current taxes were small at 0.4% of GDP and 0.5% of GNP, but also within the range of the mean of 0.6% of GDP.
• Capital taxes came in within the mean range in terms of both GDP and GNP comparatives.
• Total income tax related receipts and capital taxes accounted for 22.4% of GDP and 27.2% of GNP in Ireland in 2009. The sample average was 25.2% and the median was 24.4%. +/- 0.5 STDEV band around the mean was (22.0, 28.5), which means that our income and wealth taxes were solidly within the range of the mean for both GDP and GNP measures. An interesting coincidence - Swiss and Netherlands' taxes in this heading were bang on identical as a function of GDP to ours.
  

Social Contributions taxes:
Now, keep in mind that social contributions are meant to pay for social protection services. For which we, in Ireland, should have lower demand than in other states of EU due to younger population, but the demand on social welfare side does offset this due to a spike in unemployment. Social protection taxes in Ireland have also been dramatically increased in Budget 2011 - not reflected in the data above.

• Social Contributions is the largest component of the tax receipts here, with Irish contributions accounting for 7.0% of GNP and 5.8% of GDP. The mean was 10.6 and the median 11.2, while +/- 0.5 STDEV band around the mean was (8.7,12.5). This means Irish Social Contributions overall were below the mean in terms of GDP and GNP.
• Let's take a look as to why. Our Employers' contributions (at 3.3% of GDP and 4.0% of GNP against the mean of 6.3% and band of (4.9, 7.7)) fell short of the mean in terms of GDP and GNP. The same was true for our Contributions by self- and non-employed (o.2% of GDP and GNP against the average of 1.1% with the median of 0.7% and the band of (0.6, 1.6)).
• The above 'below average" performance was offset slightly by the Employees Contributions which came in at 2.3% of GDP and 2.8% of GNP against the mean of 3.2% with the median of 3.1% and +/- 0.5 STDEV band around the mean of (2.4, 4.1). In other words, our Employees Contribution is within the average for GNP metric, but below the average for GDP metric.

So now on to the overall tax burden in this economy. As highlighted in the previous post, our total tax revenue stood at 35.9% of GNP and 29.6% of GDP. The average for the sample was 36.5% against the median of 35.9%. The +/- 0.5 STDEV band around the mean was (33.5, 39.6) which means that our overall tax burden

• expressed as a function of GNP was bang on with the median, and statistically indistinguishable from the mean;
• ex pressed as a function of GDP was statistically significantly below the mean.
  

Again, folks, the data above shows that by virtually all comparisons, we are a country with average tax burdens - not a low tax economy.

11/07/2011: Real value of the Euro and Irish trade

A new paper from IMF looks at the effects of Euro currency valuations and the effect on competitiveness-trade links for trade within the Euro area and for trade outside the Euro area. The study, authored by Tamim Bayoumi, Richard Harmsen and Jarkko Turunen and titled Euro Area Export Performance and Competitiveness is available from the IMF as a working paper from June 2011, IMF WP/11/140.

The main issue assessed is: "Concerns about export growth within the euro area peripheral countries due to a lack of competitiveness within the euro area are a key policy issue."

The main results are:

1. Long-term price elasticities for exports within the euro area are at least double those for exports outside euro area. In other words, exports outside the euro area are much less responsive, in the long term, to price changes than exports within the euro area. Which, of course, is good news for countries with diversified direction of exports. Ireland is a relatively good performer here, as we re-exports to the US, UK and as our exports to the rest of the world are also growing.
2. (1) above means that traditional real effective exchange rate indexes may overstate the effectiveness of euro depreciation in restoring exports growth in the euro area periphery. Specifically, the study shows that Real Effective Exchange Rate metrics of competitiveness yield highly volatile effects on countries exports. Wholesale Price Indices-based measures provide a better metric for competitiveness within the Euro area and poorer metrics for competitveness for exports outside the euro area. Unit Labour Cost-based competitveness metrics too perform best for trade within the euro area, but are signifcant performance metrics for outside the euro area exports as well. (Note - in my own analysis on this blog, I use consistently only ULC-based metrics). Finally, CPI-based metrics are yeilding totally counter-intuitive results and represent the poorest metric.
3. So, per (2), the pace of deterioration in exports due to appreciation of the euro, depends on the measure of relative prices used.

In particular, the four REER indicators for the peripheral countries "give only partial support to the much-discussed view that external competitiveness deteriorated significantly since the adoption of the euro became likely enough that interest rates started to narrow":

• In Ireland, the CPI-based REER has appreciated by about 20 percent since 1995, while the WPI- and ULC-based REERs have depreciated by about 20-30 percent over this time period.
• Portugal shows similar divergences.
• While Italy’s competitiveness does appear to have eroded, the size of this effect is, frankly, anyone’s guess—while the CPI- and WPI-based measures show only modest appreciation since 1995, the ULC- and XUV-based indicators have appreciated by about 50 and 110 percent, respectively.
• The data for Greece and Spain show a more consistent story, involving steady appreciation of some 10-40 percent on all four measures.

You can read the charts below just as you read my charts on Harmonized Competitiveness Indicators: higher values mean bad things. Higher REERs in the second figure reflect export-related REERs for wthin and outside the Euro area trade.

Figure 1. Real Effective Exchange Rates in Euro Area Countries, 1995 to 2009 , Index 1995 = 100

Figure 2. Real Effective Exchange Rates in Euro Area Countries: Intra/Extra-Euro Area, 1995 to 2009, Index 1995 = 100

"There is surprisingly large variation across our four measures of extra- and (in particular) intra-euro area relative prices—based on wholesale prices, consumer prices, unit labor costs, and export unit values. For some countries, such as France and Ireland, the picture becomes clearer if one ignores the CPI price series that generate unconventional results".


All together, a very interesting study which suggests that in particular for Ireland, intra-Euro area trade has been consistent with continuously depreciating Euro, while extra-Euro trade is consistent with consistently appreciating Euro. Since exports within Euro area are more price-sensitive than exports outside Euro area, this clearly explains, at least to some extent, why nominally appreciating Euro (in Forex markets) had so far little adverse effect on Irish trade outcomes: we benefit from effective real devaluation within the Euro zone and are not signficantly hurt by effective euro appreciation outside the Euro area.

11/07/2011: A simple guide to an EU bailout

How EU countries go bust - a Simple 13-steps Guide for Asking for Bailouts:

Stage 1: Deny the problem (debt/deficit/banks - or all three) exists
Stage 2: Blame the Markets (ban short selling 'speculation' and condemn irresponsible profiteering)
Stage 3: Announce first round of cuts to purely "increase markets confidence" (no need to actually want to implement them)
Stage 4: Deny again that problem exists ("Our resolute measures - stage 3 - have resolved the problem")
Stage 5: Claim your country is not like Portugal/Greece/Ireland/Iceland
Stage 6: Announce a turnaround in the economy's prospects (or the imminent arrival of one)
Stage 7: Blame domestic 'doomsayers' for 'turnaround' being delayed
Stage 8: Announce more fake/ineffective/unimplemented austerity
Stage 9: Claim solvency for the next 6-9mo ("We are pre-funded for... months")
Stage 10: Ask Ohli "Imagineerer" Rhen / Grabosso / Lag(behind reality)arde / Frumpy von Rompuy to confirm Stages 4, 5, 6, and 9 announcements during a trip to your country
Stage 11: Send a motorcade to the airport to meet ECB/IMF team and Ask for a Bailout.

Post Bailout:
Stage 12: Blame ECB/IMF/EU/Markets/Rating Agencies for collapse of your economy
Stage 13: Repeat from Stage 4 through 10 to arrive at Bailout-2...

11/07/2011: Industrial production for May 2011

Industrial Production data for May was published earlier today by CSO, so here are updated charts and some core results:

Per CSO: "Production for Manufacturing Industries for May 2011 was 0.3% higher than in May 2010. The seasonally adjusted volume of industrial production for Manufacturing Industries for the three month period March 2011 to May 2011 was 1.4% lower than in the preceding three month period." Let's add some more analysis to that:

• May level of production in Manufacturing stood at 110.9, down 0.18% on 3 months ago and up 0.54% yoy.
  
• There was zero change mom from April.
  
• May 2011 index stood 2.43% above the comparable period in 2007. Last 3mo simple average of industrial production was 1.28% below the same figure for 3 mo before and 1.75
• % above the same period yoy.
  
• So on the net, there is roughly no improvement since Q2 2010.

All industries high level data:

• May index for volumes in All Industries stood at 109.6, up from 109.1 in April (+0.46% mom) and up 0.27% on 3 mo ago. Index is up just 0.09% on May 2010.
• Index is now up 1.56% on May 2007
  
• 3mo average to May 2011 fell 1.24 compared to 3 mo period before but rose 1.27% yoy.
• So just as with volume index for Manufacturing, All Industries volumes remain relatively flat since Q2 2010.
  

Again, per CSO: "The “Modern” Sector, comprising a number of high-technology and chemical
sectors, showed an annual decrease in production for May 2011 of 1.5% while an increase of 4.4% was recorded in the “Traditional” Sector." Some more details:

• Modern Sectors volume of production fell 0.88% mom from 124.8 in April to 123.7 in May, relative to 3mo ago index is down 0.72% and yoy index is down 1.12%. Index is now 13.51% above the reading in may 2007 - an impressive cumulated performance.
• However, the current 3mo average declined 1.93% on previous 3mo average, though March-May 2011 stands 0.79% above the same period average year ago.
• So again, moderately flat trend along 123.8 since Q2 2010.
• Traditional sectors reversed 3 consecutive months of relatively shallow declines in May to show a 5.83% mom improvement - a strong monthly gain. Index is now 4.04% up on 3mo ago and 4.16% up yoy. However, index remains 12.78% down on May 2007 levels.
• Traditional sectors volume index average for 3mo to May is 0.26% above 3mo average for the period before March and 2.25% above same reading for 2010.
• On the net, strong showing in Traditional Sectors in terms of volumes.
  

What about the Turnover indices:

• Turnover index for Manufacturing Industries rose to 99.6 in May from 98.2 in April (and increase of 0.91% yoy and 1.43% mom). This seems to contradict recent PMIs showing compressing profit margins in recent months, though PMIs are leading indicators while the reported indices reflect activity at the time. Turnover in Manufacturing is now 7.06% below the same reading for 2007. 3mo average through May 2011 is 2.79% below that for the 3mo period through February 2011 and 2.48% above the comparable period in 2010. The change during 2011 so far is not enough to attain the 12mo high of 102.1 achieved in January 2011, though we are moving in the right direction.
  
• Turnover index for Transportable Goods industries also rose from 97.8 in April to 99.2 in May, registering a mom increase of 1.43%, a 3mo rise of 0.61% and a yoy increase of 1.02%. Relative to may 2007, index now stands at -8.18%. 3mo average has moved down 2.67% relative to 3mo through February 2011 and is up 2.34% yoy.
• Finally, New Orders Index rose strongly from 98.4 in April to 100 in May, up 0.20 on 3mo ago, +2.35% yoy and +1.63% mom. Index is now down 7.42% compared to same period in 2007. 3mo average through May fell 3.58% compared to 3mo average through February, but is up 2.47% on a year ago.

To sum, up, slower growth rates in Turnover Indices and New Orders index, as well as contracting indices in volumes for Manufacturing and and Modern Sectors, plus slower growth in Volume index for All Industries suggest that overall PMI signals of slower growth through May are holding. Traditional industries bucked the trend here, but we can expect further small slowdowns in June and July. Growth, to put it briefly, is flattening out in the sector.

10/07/2011: Irish Tax Rates in International Perspective

Some interesting international comparisons for tax revenues across the EU27, plus Israel, Norway and Switzerland (no Iceland, sadly), courtesy of the OECD dataset - last updated April 27, 2011. I added Ireland's tax ratios relative to GNP based on CSO data for all the years 1999-2009.

Let's run some comparisons:

• In 1999, total tax revenues in Ireland were 33.2% of GDP and 38.9 GNP which compares to 37.% of GDP for the simple average of 30 countries in the sample and 37.2 median. There was a slight (0.3) skew in the data. With a standard deviation of 7.0 that year, Irish tax/GNP ratio was well within the average, which is confirmed by the rank attained by Ireland as 12th highest tax economy in the group.
• In 2003, total tax revenues in Ireland were 30.3% of GDP, which of course would be consistent with FF/PDs 'low tax' policies the Left is keen of accusing them of. Alas same year total tax revenue in Ireland stood at 35.9% GNP which compares to 36.7% of GDP for the simple average of 30 countries in the sample and 36 median. So as Irish tax revenue as a share of economy declined, so did the sample average. The new skew was 0.2 lower than in 1999. Hence, with a standard deviation of 6.5 that year, Irish tax/GNP ratio was again well within the average - actually even closer to the average - which is confirmed by the rank attained by Ireland as 16th highest tax economy in the group.
• Now, note that within both of the above years, in terms of GDP comparative, Irish taxes were ranked 22nd and 26th highest in the sample.
• Zoom on to 2007 when Irish tax revenues accounted for 32.0% of GDP and 38.8% of GNP against the sample average of 38% of GDP and a standard deviation of 5.8. There was zero skewness that year. Once again, there was no statistical difference between Irish tax rates and the average. Ireland ranked 25th highest tax economy in comparison against GDP and 14th in comparison to GNP.
• 2009 is the latest year we have comparatives for and in that year, Irish Government tax revenue accounted for 29.6% of GDP and 35.9% of GNP, which (GNP figure) again was statistically indistinguishable from the mean which was 36.7% (with standard deviation of 6.1 and skew of 0.2).

So now, let's map the above data:
Notice the following features of the above chart:

• Irish tax returns as a function GDP are more volatile than in terms of GNP - in fact historical standard deviation for Irish tax revenues in terms of GDP is 1.406 against that for GNP of 1.210. The median standard deviation for the sample of 30 countries is 0.736.
• Irish tax returns as a function of GDP are always statistically significantly different from the average, but our tax returns as a function of GNP are never once outside the average. In other words, folks, our tax burdens are average. Not low, not high - average.
• Only within the period of 2001-2003 did our tax returns as measured in relation to GNP fall statistically significantly below those for Euro area (EA17).

Let's put our tax revenues against some comparable countries. I divided the following two charts into Small Open Economies that are members of the Euro area and those that are not:
Interestingly, for the Euro are countries, Sweden, Belgium, Austria and Finland have tax burdens in excess of the average (note they are above the 1/2 STDEV band relating to the mean. Notice that all of the countries in that group, with exception of debt-ridden Belgium, are experiencing declines in their tax burden since 1999. Apparently, to the chagrin of our friends in the Trade Unions, Tasc and Irish Times - the ones so keen on shouting about the FF/PD coalition tax policies - the Nordics too were run by right-wing free-marketeers.

Next, notice the countries within the trace band around the mean - these are the Netherlands, Lux, Slovenia, Ireland (GNP), Portugal and Czech. Greece has dropped below the average range around 2004. It's an interesting neighborhood we are in, which includes highly aggressive tax competitor such as the Netherlands.

Lastly, we have a truly aggressively competitive Slovakia.

So again, there is no evidence in sight that Ireland is or was a low tax haven.

Now, for non-Euro countries:
Speaks for itself, but let me cover one little point. Switzerland has ranked within lowest 5 tax economies in 10 out of 11 years between 1999 and 2009. The country with functional public services and great public infrastructure has managed its affairs on the average tax revenues of just 29.3% of its GDP against the average of 31.7% of GDP and 37.5% of GNP for Ireland. So, really, folks, cut this crap about 'low taxes have ruined Irish economy/society'. The Swiss do it on less than us, better than us and achieve great social cohesion, civility and cultural development while using three languages where we can't master two. It's not in how much you spend, it's how you spend it.

10/07/2011: Irish Trade Stats: some interesting points

Here are some interesting end-of-year numbers for 2010 in terms of our external trade. Note - these are from OECD stats via ST Louis Federal Reserve database, so slightly off compared to CSO data. All are reported in Euro, unless otherwise specified.

First, consider the flows of trade and trade balance:
There is a clear regime shift in the data since 2009 with a rise in trade surplus. This confirms that Irish net external trade has entered a recovery stage post-crisis in 2009, not in late 2010-early 2011 as the IMF officials claimed recently. The second thing the chart highlights is the dramatic rise in trade balance in 2009-2010, even compared to the strong performance pre-2002. In fact, we reached beyond our trend (for 1997-2010 period) back in 2009.

This might suggest validity to the 'exports-led recovery' thesis, except for two issues:

1. Two years are hardly a trend, especially if coincident with extremely robust global trade recovery post-crisis, and
2. The trade balance is only relevant to Irish economy as a whole if we actually get to keep it here - in other words, if it accrues to companies with really sizeable investment and employment activities here. Note that in the chart above, the last two years have actually seen a negative relationship between growth in the economy and growth in the trade balance.
   

The latter issue is easy to see if we net out of the trade balance the remittances of profits and payments abroad, as done in the chart below:
Notice the decline in Net Factor Income from Abroad (NFIAF) in 2009-2010 period. This is linked directly (more closely than in the case of GDP and GNP changes) to our trade balance:
In other words, what gets produced here in terms of trade surplus gets remitted out of here. As we become more open to trade - as shown below - by any metric possible, we get more open to exporting profits and surpluses accumulated in the economy.
This is similar to an analogy of draining water out of a sinking boat with a coal bucket - when you scoop up water, the bucket is full, by the time you turn it overboard, the bucket is empty...

Some interesting correlations to that effect - all for data from 1997 through 2010, so small sample bias obviously is there:

• Trade balance correlations with GDP and GNP are 0.613 and 0.543, but with NFIFA it is -0.866
• NFIFA itself is correlated with GDP and GNP at -0.904 and -0.861.

So NFIFA has more sgnifcant links to GDP and GNP than our trade balance. In other words, the propensity of our MNCs to take out profits from Ireland has more effect on our GDP and GNP than the trade balance. The recovery, therefore, if it were to be driven by external trade, has less to do with our Exports and Imports, than with profits expatriation decisions by MNCs.

09/07/2011: Construction Activity : Ireland 1980-2010

Rummaging through the Federal Reserve database, I came across a fascinating set of numbers on the number of construction permits issued in Ireland. These are based on index with 100=2005 level of activity.

• By the end of 2010, new dwelling construction activity has fallen from the high of 102.4 attained in 2004 to the low of 15.3.
• Year on year, 2010 activity was down 56.8%. 2010 marks a decline of 80.7% on 5 years ago, 80.6% decline on 10 years ago, 56.4% decline on 15 years ago, 26.1% decline on 20 years ago, 8.5% rise on 25 years ago and 58% decline on 30 years ago.
• The only sustained decline period - other than current - was 1983-1996 period, when activity dropped from 35.2 in 1983 to the trough of 12.8 in 1988 - 4 years of decline and the cumulative drop of 63.6% (much more benign that the current drop of 85.1% to the end of 2010). The recovery in that contraction took over 13 years.
  

So we had a cycle of over 17 years and if one were to count 1981 as a peak with 1982-1983 as a temporary bounce, then the last cycle took 19 years to unwind. Good luck to anyone still hoping for a return to "normal" unless your normal is pre-boom average activity at 51-52 or roughly a half of the construction activity in 2004-2005.

Here's the chart:

08/07/2011: Effects of the spending stimulus on unemployment

An interesting study on the effectiveness of fiscal spending on unemployment was recently published in the CESifo working paper series. The full study can accessed here: Steinar Holden and Victoria Sparrman, "Do Government Purchases Affect Unemployment?" CESifo Working Paper No 3482, May 2011.

The study presents estimated effects of 1% increase in Government purchasing of goods and services on unemployment in 20 OECD countries for the period 1960-2007, controlling for a number of factors, including the size and the openness of the economy, the exchange rate regime and the economy position in the business cycle.

To summarize relevant results (found in Table 7) in the case of small open economies within the currency union, the effect of 1% increase in government purchases of goods and services translates into 0.37 decrease in unemployment rate. The effect can be as high as 0.47% decrease. Year after there is no net effect of jobs creation from the purchasing.

So what does this mean in the case of Ireland? Per latest QNA, Irish GDP in current market prices was €155,992 million in 2010. 1% of that spent on new purchases of goods and services amounts to €1,559,920,000. Q1 2011 unemployment, per QNHS, amounted to 295,700 and the unemployment rate stood at 14.1%. These are our inputs into the estimate.

Now, let's make an assumption concerning jobs created - suppose these pay €35,000 per annum in wages. Suppose that they pay €7,067 in income-related taxes (inclusive of USC etc), as consistent with single tax filer with no deductions. Suppose the social welfare benefits savings amount to €350 per week (note these are taken on purpose to be larger to account for other benefits that might be foregone) to the annual total of €18,200. Suppose that additional 30% is collected on income tax contributions due to higher consumption taxes contributions in employment - generating savings of additional €2,120 per annum.

So total savings per person moved off welfare into employment are roughly speaking €27,287. In other words, we assume that for each €35,000 job created, the Government get back almost €28,000 through various tax returns and savings.

Now on to the estimated impact of 1% increase in Government purchases of goods and services:

1. Case 1: maximum effect of 0.47% reduction in unemployment rate will result in 9,857 jobs created with the total cost of €158,260 per job created. Net of Government returns and savings, this means net cost per each job created of €130,873. Total impact is to generate a loss of 0.84% of GDP due to 'stimulus'. If we are to assume that all of the jobs created remain for ever after the 'stimulus' (a very tall assumption, but let's be generous), while the Government finances the stimulus at a constant interest rate of 6%, it will take almost 7 years for the economy to recover the costs of the 'stimulus' (if the rate of borrowing is zero - e.g. by using NPRF or some other 'free' funding, the period to recovery shrinks to 5.8 years).
2. Case 2: most likely effect of 0.37% reduction in unemployment rate will result in 7,760 jobs created with the total cost of €201,033 per job created. Net of Government returns and savings, this means net cost per each job created of €173,646. Total impact is to generate a loss of 0.88% of GDP due to 'stimulus'. If we are to assume that all of the jobs created remain for ever after the 'stimulus', while the Government finances the stimulus at a constant interest rate of 6%, it will take over 9 years for the economy to recover the costs of the 'stimulus' (if the rate of borrowing is zero, the period to recovery shrinks to 7.3 years).