Showing posts with label EU bailout. Show all posts
Showing posts with label EU bailout. Show all posts

Tuesday, July 26, 2011

26/07/2011: Greek deal will increase Greek debt

Eurointelligence.com today reports that (emphasis is mine):

"Hugo Dixon, at Reuters Breakingviews, did the math on the Greek package, and concludes that the calculation by the European Council and the IIF regarding the projected rate of debt reduction is wrong. He said that Nicolas Sarkozy’s calculation of a 24 percentage point fall in the Greek debt-to-GDP ratio ignores the effect of credit enhancement, which is going to be massive.

Once you include the efforts Greece has to make to secure the rollover deal, the debt-to-GDP ratio rise by 14% to 179% of GDP.

As part of the deal with the IIF, Greece will need to secure some of the rolled over bonds with zero coupon bonds. The four options have different implications for the extent of the credit enhancement. But on the IIF’s own assumptions, the costs of the exercise would be €42bn for Greece to finance credit enhancements for the €135bn of bonds in the IIF’s scheme."

You can read the entire proposal by IIF here. And, by the way - I run through their proposal figures. The massive savings for Greece stated in this are referencing the future payouts that are being saved assuming Greece were to pay full set of coupon payments and principal on its bonds over their history. This is slightly misleading, as the markets have been pricing significant (40%+) discounts on much of Greek bonds for over 1 year now.

Aside from that, the IIF calculations assume 9% discount rate through 2030. This is a strange assumption, given that the deal replaces / writes down bonds with an average coupon yield of ca 4.5% and Greece can borrow from EFSF/EFSM at ca 5% effective rate.

Adjusting for these, my 'back of the envelope' calculations suggest that the actual value of the Greek programme is closer to €26-32 billion instead of €37 billion when it comes to net private sector contribution.

In addition, rollovers to longer maturity, in my opinion, are reducing peak debt levels, but extend payments burden over time, implying that adverse impact of debt on growth and economic performance in Greece are simply extended into the future. In other words, extended maturities do not do much to improve Greek situation. They can be effective if the Greek debt spike were a 'one-off' event. But since debt overhang in Greece is structural (see chart below - showing Greek debt becoming a structural problem around 1993) and underpinned by long term (endemic since at least 1987) current account deficits, extending maturity of debt simply increases life-time cycle of debt overhang.

In summary, there is no substitute to a full default by Greece. The latest 'deal' simply, potentially, pushes this default into 2016-2020 period, and that with optimistic forecasts for growth at hand.

Another can meets the EU boot, and... fails to roll far down the proverbial road.

Monday, July 11, 2011

11/07/2011: A simple guide to an EU bailout

How EU countries go bust - a Simple 13-steps Guide for Asking for Bailouts:

Stage 1: Deny the problem (debt/deficit/banks - or all three) exists
Stage 2: Blame the Markets (ban short selling 'speculation' and condemn irresponsible profiteering)
Stage 3: Announce first round of cuts to purely "increase markets confidence" (no need to actually want to implement them)
Stage 4: Deny again that problem exists ("Our resolute measures - stage 3 - have resolved the problem")
Stage 5: Claim your country is not like Portugal/Greece/Ireland/Iceland
Stage 6: Announce a turnaround in the economy's prospects (or the imminent arrival of one)
Stage 7: Blame domestic 'doomsayers' for 'turnaround' being delayed
Stage 8: Announce more fake/ineffective/unimplemented austerity
Stage 9: Claim solvency for the next 6-9mo ("We are pre-funded for... months")
Stage 10: Ask Ohli "Imagineerer" Rhen / Grabosso / Lag(behind reality)arde / Frumpy von Rompuy to confirm Stages 4, 5, 6, and 9 announcements during a trip to your country
Stage 11: Send a motorcade to the airport to meet ECB/IMF team and Ask for a Bailout.

Post Bailout:
Stage 12: Blame ECB/IMF/EU/Markets/Rating Agencies for collapse of your economy
Stage 13: Repeat from Stage 4 through 10 to arrive at Bailout-2...

Monday, December 6, 2010

Economics 6/12/10: IMF stress tests for Irish banks

Here are three things that are worth asking about the latest details of the EU/IMF 'rescue' package released over the weekend. All relate to the issue of banking sector restructuring:

  1. According to reports, some €2 billion will be available to enable the banks to sell €20 billion worth of assets (which, of course, implies sales of performing loans, as all other assets, such as foreign divisions, auxiliary services providers, asset management branches etc have already been flogged or put on the market). As reports issued today specify: the funds may come in the form of a loss protection or as a guarantee for asset purchasers. These €2 billion come on top of the €10 billion set aside for the immediate re-capitalization of the banks, and on top of further €25 billion in contingency funding allocated. So it appears that it either comes from the Exchequer side of the EU/IMF deal, reducing deficit financing available to the Government or, alternatively, on top of the €67 billion in lending extended under the whole deal. In effect, the EU/IMF will now engage Irish taxpayers funds (remember - these €2 billion are loans) to sweeten the bitter pill for buyers of Irish banks assets. A small, but lovely morsel of taxpayers income that will be spent on artificially propping Irish assets for sale.
  2. According to the Irish Times, stress testing scenarios deployed by the IMF in pricing the overall demand for taxpayers funding for the banks involved the following assumptions: losses of 10% on buy to let mortgage books and 6.5% for residential mortgages. These assumptions underwritten the demand for €25 billion in contingency funding, spread as €15 billion in required capital, plus €10 billion additional cushion. This is rather interesting and worrying. Buy-to-let mortgages are most certainly completely under water right now, given collapsed rents and capital values, as well as more recent vintage of these mortgages. If investment and commercial books are facing up to 35-40% losses currently (as consistent with the Government own estimate of €50 billion final cost of banking sector recapitalization), is it safe to assume that buy-to-rent mortgages will tank at 10%? Similar questions arise with respect to 6.5% assumption on mortgages defaults. In fact, we already know that over 100,000 mortgages are either in official distress or under renegotiated repayment holidays or interest rates adjustments. This pushes the effective default and at-risk of default numbers will in excess of 6.5% as of today.
  3. If contingency fund of €10 billion were to be taken as covering any losses in excess of 6.5% defaults on mortgages and 10% default on buy-to-rents, then this amount is expected to cover: (1) Haircuts by Nama on additional €14 billion in loans transfers (cost ca €6-7 billion at past haircuts), plus (2) Losses in excess of assumed rates on mortgages and buy-to-rents, plus (3) any further losses on investment and development books, plus (4) any further losses on derivatives exposures. This is hardly realistic of a cushion. So it appears that the IMF was either not given the full realistic picture of the Irish banks balance sheets, or it is seriously underestimating the demand for future losses cover in the banks.
Either way, the numbers continue to suggest that the €67 billion package of loans will not be enough to provide simultaneously a cover for Exchequer deficits and the funds required to underwrite losses and capital requirements of the banks. Somehow, the Irish Exchequer will have to make up for this shortfall.