02/06/2011: Latest shenanigans at the banks

Two junior bondholders in Allied Irish Banks - Aurelius Capital Management and Abadi Co – are taking the Irish government to court today over the AIB plans to impose burden-sharing on some bondholders in failed banks. Aurelius is a distressed debt investment vehicle which also holds debt of Dubai World so it should be well familiar with the case of haircuts.

These are not investors who bought Irish banks bonds at their full value, but those who pick up distressed debt at a significant discount. However, it is their right to maximize their returns on such investments.

Let us recall that AIB is the sickest of the 4 banks reviewed under the original PCARs back on March 31 this year. Under the stress tests, AIB is expected to lose €3.07bn on Residential Mortgages (all figures refer to stress scenario, 3-year time frame), €972mln on Corporate loans, €2.67bn on SMEs loans, €4.49bn on Commercial Real Estate loans and €1.4bn on Non-mortgage Consumer loans and Other loans. The grand total expected 2011-2013 losses under stressed scenario is €12.6bn or almost ½ of the total expected stress scenario losses across IRL-4 banks of €27.72bn.

Of the €24bn capital buffer for IRL-4 required by the Central Bank PCAR exercise, full €13.3bn is accounted for by AIB.

Which implies that AIB – accounting for just €93.7bn of the €273.94bn of loans held by the IRL-4 at the time of PCARs (just over 34.2% of the total loans of IRL-4) is responsible for over 55.4% of overall capital demands. It is, by a mile, the worst performing bank of IRL-4... Really, folks, 'Be with AIB' as their old commercials would say.

So in the case of AIB, Finance Minister Michael Noonan – the majority shareholder in AIB – is now attempting to impose losses of between 75 and 90 percent on €2.6bn of the bank’s subordinated debt. This means that the bond-holders are expected to contribute just 15-16% of the total cost of the latest bank recapitalization programme. This, of course, is a drop in a sea of pain already levied against Irish taxpayers.

The problem in Ireland is that the so-called subordinated liabilities orders (SLO), which the government is using to force a deal on bondholders is untested in law. Bondholders can claim priority over shareholders in the event of insolvency. But the banks are now existing solely on government life-support. Although they are complete zombies, they are not technically insolvent. This in turn means their equity retains some – if only tiny – value. The Irish Government in the case of AIB driving bondholders’ haircuts can be seen as the means for improving that value to the shareholder at the expense of bondholders, since equity will benefit from lower debt and changes in the capital structure.

In the case of AIB this means two possible things:

• If the court finds in favour of Aurelius and Abadi, the deal is off the table or will be more expensive to execute (lower haircuts), which will in turn imply greater demand on taxpayers to step in. Of course, this also means the Gov in effect destroying a large portion of its own shares value.
• If the court rules in favour of the Gov, the deal is on and we have a precedent for aggressive burden sharing. This, however, will only benefit the majority state-owned banks, i.e. Anglo, INBS, EBS and AIB, and only with respect to savings on subordinated debt.
  

The problem is in the timing of this burden sharing – the previous Gov insistence on paying on bonds in full means that we, the taxpayers, are now on the hook for losses on our shares in the banks via dilution. You don’t have to go far to see what happens here. Just look at Bank of Ireland (below).

Normal process of banks workout should have been:

• Step 1 – Impose losses on shareholders, while preserving depositors by ring-fencing them via specific legislation to remove equivalent status between senior bondholders and depositors. Such legislation can be enacted on the grounds that depositors are not lenders to the activities of the banks, but are clients of the banks for the purpose of safe-keeping of their money. It is also justified from the point of view of finance, as depositors are being paid much lower rates of return on their money, implying lower risk premium
• Step 2 – Impose losses on bondholders via a combination of robust haircuts and debt-for-equity swaps, but only after depositors are protected
• Step 3 – For any amounts of capital still outstanding per writedowns requirements, the Government can then take equity positions in the banks.

This sequence of actions would have prevented depositors runs and repeated taxpayer equity dilutions. It would also have given the Government a mandate to take over and reform failed banks.

By doing everything backwards, we are now in a veritable mess. This mess was not caused by the current Government – it is the toxic legacy of the previous Government which made gross errors in managing the whole banking crisis. This mess is extremely hard to unwind and my sympathies go here to Minister Noonan who is at the very least trying to do something right after years of spoofing and wasting taxpayers money by his predecessor.

Note: The Government is aiming to cut around €5bn from the total bill for bailing out Irish-6 banks. Imposing losses of up to 90 percent on junior bonds in AIB, Bank of Ireland, Irish Life & Permanent and EBS Building Society is on the cards:

• IL&P said it would offer 20cents on the euro for €840m of debt
• EBS wants to pay 10c to 20c on the euro for around €260m of subordinated bonds
• Bank of Ireland is pushing up to 90% discount on €2.6 billion worth of subordinated debt. Bank of Ireland said it would offer holders of Tier 1 securities just 10 percent of the face value of their original investment, and holders of Tier 2 securities 20 percent.

It is revealing, perhaps, of the state of our nation’s policy making that over a year ago myself, Brian Lucey, Peter Mathews, David McWilliams and a small number of other commentators suggested 80-90% haircuts for subordinated bondholders. We were, of course, promptly attacked as ‘reckless’, ‘irresponsible’ and ‘naïve’. Yet, doing this back then would have netted taxpayers savings of more than double the amount hoped for today.

And this is before the savings that could have been generated from avoiding painful dilution of equity holdings acquired by the Government in Irish banks. How painful? Look no further than the unfolding Bank of Ireland saga.

Bank of Ireland's lower Tier 2 paper is trading at 37-40 cents on the euro post-announcement of the after the announcement that T2 will be offered an 80 percent discount alongside with a ‘more attractive’ debt-for-equity swap. Tier 1 paper holders are offered 10 cents on the euro cash ex-accrued interest. Shares swap will factor in accrued interest to sweeten the deal. The debt-equity swap is so powerful of a promise that BofI shares have all but collapsed over the last few days losing over 62% of their already minuscule value. Of course, with Government holding 39% of equity pre-swap, the taxpayers have suffered the same loss as the ordinary shareholders, all courtesy of perverse timing of equity injections by the previous Government.

And there’s more. Even if successful in applying haircuts and swaps to junior bondholders, Bank of Ireland will still need to raise additional €1.6bn from either new investors or existent shareholders (including the Government). Which means even more dilution is to come.

02/06/11: Central Bank Monthly Stats - IRL 6

This is the second post of two covering Central Bank stats for April 2011. The first post (here) focused on Domestic Group of banks. This post deals with Covered Institutions (the IRL-6 banks that are on a life support from the Government).

First up - central bank and ECB lending to banks was broken down into:

• Other assets held by the CBofI - aka lending by CBofI itself to Irish banks - declined from €66.7bn in March to €54.15bn, this mans that mom lending by CBofI fell €12.64bn (-18.93%) and year on year it is now up €40.5bn (+296.8%)
• Borrowing from the Eurosystem (ECB) declined from €79.22bn to €74.23bn - a drop of €4.985bn mom or 6.29%. Relative to April 2010, borrowing increased €38.31bn which almost exactly off-sets increases in CBofI lending, suggesting a transfer of risk from ECB to CBofI
• Total loans to Irish 6 from Euro system and CBofI amounted to €128.4bn in April 2011 down €17.63bn mom (-12.1%). Relative to April 2010, loans increased €78.81bn or 159%.
  

On deposits side:

• Total deposits in IRL 6 have increased from €224.17bn in March to €235.2bn in April an increase of 4.93% mom. Relative to April 2010, deposits are still down €14.07bn or 5.65%
• However, the main driver for these increases were deposits from the Irish Government. Government deposits rose €12.743bn in April (+148.4%) mom and are up €18.566bn (+671.5%) year on year - the very same €18 billion mentioned in the first post.
• Private sector deposits also increased, 1.81% or €1.93bn mom, but remain €20.92bn on April 2010 (-16.2%)
• Monetary institutions deposits dropped €3.63bn mom (-3.32%) and €11.72bn (-9.98%) yoy
  

On lending side:

• Loans to Irish residents fell €6.97bn (-2.2%) mom to €314.14bn. Loans stood at €27.97bn below April 2010 (a decline of 8.18% yoy)
• Loans to General Government were marginally up €47mln to €28.3bn, which means that IRL 6 are the dominant players in lending to Irish Government (as asserted in the previous post)
• Loans to other Monetary Institutions werte down €4.05bn mom (-375%) and
• Loans to Private Sector fell additional €2.97bn (-1.61%) mom and €33.633bn (-15.62%) yoy to €181.71bn.

Lastly, loans to deposits ratios:

• LTDs for all IRL 6 institutions improved by 10 percentage points to 133.56% in April 2011, which represents a decline of 4 percentage points yoy
• LTDs for Private Sector lending fell 6 percentage points in April to 167.9%, an increase of 1 percentage point on April 2010.

In other words, deleveraging over the last 12 months has been led by Government and other financial isntitutions activities, not by private sector pay-down of debt to deposits ratios.

02/06/2011: Central Bank Monthly Stats - Domestic Group

Ok, folks, with some brief delay due to computational complexities - here are charts on Irish banking sector health. These are aggregates from the CBofI monthly stats for April 2011.

This release is broken into 2 post. The first post deals with Domestic Group of banks (see note Credit Institutions Resident in the Republic of Ireland). The second post will deal with Ireland-6 Zombies... err... banks that is known as Guaranteed or Covered Institutions.

Headlines first:

• Total Private Sector Deposits are now at €164.9bn or €1.93bn up on April 2011 (+1.18%) and still €19.65bn down year on year (-10.64%)
• All of this increase is due to Overnight deposits which are up €2.09bn (+2.53%) mom and down just €1.52bn yoy
• Deposits with maturity <2 years declined to €54.94bn in April, down €57mln (0.1%) mom and €13.64bn (-19.9%) yoy
• Deposits with maturity >2 years rose €56mln (+0.52%) mom to €10.78bn, which still implies a decline of €1.71bn (-13.71%) yoy
• Deposits redeemable at notice <3 months were down €162mln (-1.1%) mom to €14.5bn and down €2.77bn (-16.05%) yoy

Chart to illustrate:
Now, take a look at total deposits by source:

Please note the above marking an increase in Government deposits as an important driver of deposits dynamics. Here are the details:

• Domestic Group institutions saw their total liabilities fall to €712.72bn in April - a decline of €10.22bn mom (-1.41%) or a drop of €65.18bn (-8.38%) yoy (see chart below)
  
• Deposits rose across the Domestic Group by €10.46bn mom (+3.7%) although they remain down €12.53bn (-9.63%) yoy
• Clearly, as chart above shows, the increase in deposits was due primarily to Government deposits with Irish banks (well flagged before by many other researchers, this is really a transfer game whereby the Government mandated transfer of some €18bn of its reserves to Irish banks, increasing the risk to these funds, but creating an artificial improvement in the banks balance sheets). Government deposits rose €12.781bn (+143.6%) mom in April and are now up - yes, you;ve guessed it - €18.52bn (+586.2%) yoy
• Another positive driver, albeit much smaller than Government, were Private Sector deposits, which rose €2.0bn (more accurately €1,999mln) or 1.32% mom, while still falling €21.85bn (-12.46%) short of April 2010 levels.
• Monetary Institutions deposits with Domestic Group banks were down €4.325bn (-3.54%) mom in April and down €12.534bn (-9.63%) yoy.

Now, consider loans to deposit ratios:

Thanks to Government deposits, the series are declining for overall Domestic Group:

• Overall LTDs fell 7 percentage points mom from 136.76% in March to 129.67% in April, yoy decline is 9 percentage points
• LTDs for Private Sector declined 4% mom to 155.15% in April, this was consistent with a 12 percentage points decline year on year.

Lastly, let's consider loans to Irish residents within the system:

• Overall loans to Irish residents fell from €386.3bn in March to €379.84bn in April a decline of 1.68% mom and 11.47% yoy
• Loans to Monetary Institutions declined by €3.31bn (-2.84%) mom and are down €11.23bn (-9.03%) yoy
• Loans to Government went up €45mln mom to €28.49bn (+0.16% mom and 150.75% yoy). Over the last 12 months Irish banks have revolved some €17.13bn worth of lending (bonds purchases) back to the State in what can only be described as a circular transfer of money from taxpayers underwriting banks to banks lending back to taxpayers to underwrite the banks
• Private Sector loans meanwhile declined €3.21bn (-1.33%) mom to €238.2bn. This means that over the last 12 months credit supply to private sector dropped a massive 18.8% or €55.09bn. Roughly 1/3 of the annual GDP has been sucked out of the real economy by the banking crisis within just 12 months.

Chart to illustrate:

29/05/11: Older workers and entrepreneurship

A good friend today raised an interesting question/issue - do older cohorts of workers offer entrepreneurship potential or is entrepreneurship a predominant domain for the younger cohorts?

There are several anecdotal or conventional ways of dealing with this question.

First, as Western populations age, even statistically the average age of entrepreneurs can be expected to increase. Second, the rapid rise of new technologies and new media suggest that younger generations now hold the key to future entrepreneurship. Third, again, as Western societies age and the age of statutory retirements is pushed back, entrepreneurship among older generations can be expected to rise for those who would tend to leave their workplace to start new business before the retirement, but decline for those who would normally start business after retirement.

Thus, despite conventional perceptions that all new entrepreneurs seem to be young ICT leaders, the economic reasoning would suggest that the answer to the question above can go both ways.

As far as evidence goes, US-based Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation - a seasoned research think tank into entrepreneurship - recently (June 2009) published an intriguing study titled The Coming Entrepreneurship Boom, authored by Dane Stangler. The study is available here.

The main conclusions of the study are:

• Several facts have emerged in the course of Kauffman Foundation research that indicate the United States might be on the cusp of an entrepreneurship boom—not in spite of an aging population but because of it:
• As the economic recession plagues the job market, more and more "baby-boomers" are becoming entrepreneurs
• The decline of lifetime employment, the experience and knowledge of the age group, longer lifespan, and the effect of the current recession are all factors contributing to the increase in entrepreneurial activity in the baby boom generation
• Key findings: In every single year from 1996 to 2007, Americans between the ages of 55 and 64 had a higher rate of entrepreneurial activity than those aged 20-34, averaging a rate of entrepreneurial activity roughly one-third larger than their youngest counterparts
• The 20-34 age bracket has the lowest rate of entrepreneurial activity
• Long-term employment has fallen dramatically for people ages 35-64 over the past fifty years
  
• With longer life expectancies and greater health in later life, older generations may continue to start new firms—or mentor young entrepreneurs
• Since the first Internet-era recession, transaction costs and barriers to entry have fallen for entrepreneurs of every age
  
• The larger effects of the recession and economic trends—away from lifetime jobs and toward more new companies—will gain even greater cultural traction in favor of entrepreneurship by the older workers
  
• Emerging regulations aiming to prevent the rise of too-big-to-fail organizations also may help create a more market-oriented society. "We will see increasing numbers of new, smaller firms as they compete and cooperate; challenge incumbents; and, perhaps, rise and fall at faster rates", says the author.

This is a fascinating debate. Much of evidence suggests that even among immigrants to the US, entrepreneurship takes time to evolve, with the average tenure in the US for a non-US born entrepreneur being 13 years (see another study here). Again, this too suggests that older cohorts of workers represent significant pool of potential entrepreneurs.

Of course, one cannot make the same direct comparatives to the EU, where pension benefits are often much stronger, the market pricing of risks for entrepreneurs are much more distorted, returns to entrepreneurship are more restricted and overall culture of risk taking is less developed (except, as we have now learned, for the too-big-to-fail banks, of course).

29/05/11: Who's to be blamed?

Here's an interesting chart based on ECB data for lending rates charged on various types of loans:
What does this hart tell us? Several interesting things:

1. In so far as the euro area retail rates are linked to the ECB rates, it appears that the lenders were factoring in a positive risk premium on Irish companies for large loans and small loans alike 9as reflected by the positive premia on corporate lending of both types). throughout the 2003-2010 period, Irish companies borrowings were priced at a risk premium relative to the Euro area average.
   
2. This premium has declined (bizarrely) for larger loans (as the risk of borrowers rose during the crisis, the premium fell) and it rose for smaller loans (presumably the SME effect - with SMEs being more risky as borrowers in the crisis).
3. On the net, it is hard to make an iron-clad case that ECB was driving over-lending to Irish corporates, as these corporates did face a risk premium on their borrowings.
4. Where things really break down is in the housing mortgages lending. Here, there was and remains a deep discount on Euro area average when it comes to Irish lenders rates. Only during 2010 did this discount briefly turned to a premium. The trend is still on an increasing discount, which would be consistent with a lenders' perception that Irish house purchasers are lower risk than Euro area average. Which, of course , is a farce.
5. So the net result is that it is hard to make a real direct case that the ECB reckless interest rates policy was the sole or the main driver of Irish over-lending. Instead, the evidence suggests that it was our own lenders' (banks) enthusiasm for underpricing risk in housing finance that was at pay consistently before the crisis onset and since then.
   

28/05/11: A note on my appointment to GoldCore

As many of you have heard by now (see brief mention here) I have joined, in a non-executive capacity, the Investment Committee of GoldCore Ltd (link here).

In this capacity, I am looking forward to bringing additional expertise to the company's already rigorous and comprehensive internal processes designed to assure the quality and depth of market and product research, offered by GoldCore. In addition, I hope to be able to help the company in assuring that its core philosophy of well-diversified, client safety-focused, low cost/fee investing is consistently reflected in its research and structuring of its product offers.

Contrary to some erroneous assertions, I am not endorsing any products, nor providing any sort of investment advice. My independent opinions and views, supported by my best knowledge, error-prone sometimes, on-the-money on other occasions, will remain my own. I am stressing once again that this is a non-executive appointment.

I am on the record (in academic research and in applied analysis) in stating my views which, consistently over the years held that:
1) Diversification across asset classes (including, but not limited to precious metals) is the best risk management approach for all investors;
2) Diversification across various geographies and sectors of economies is the necessary risk management tool for structuring the investment portfolia that aim to simultaneously maximize returns and minimize risks;
3) Financial services providers should strive to deliver best suited products to their clients at a minimal possible cost to the clients;
4) Financial services should be offered on the fully legally compliant basis with all regulatory requirements and authorization requirements adhered to;
5) Regulation should strive to minimize unnecessary burden on those regulated and their clients, but provide meaningful, robust, transparent and unwavering enforcement of standards set. It should be effective, not maximal for the sake of being maximal.

If these principles are of value to some service providers in Ireland and abroad, I am happy to help. If not, I am not going to sacrifice them.

Several points worth making in relation to a couple of comments I have seen floated around:

Firstly, GoldCore provide a wide range of products as a part of their well-diversified investment offer. GoldCore philosophy is to deliver strong risk management ethos in products offered and to give investors a wide range of regulation-compliant investment products while minimising cost to investors and optimising risk-return tradeoffs inherent in any financial product.

All of the products that require regulatory approval and / or licensing offered by GoldCore are fully compliant with the Irish Financial Regulator requirements.

Secondly, the provision of precious metal product or service does not require licensing, authorisation, or registration with the Irish Central Bank and, as a result, it is not covered by the Irish Central Bank's requirements designed to protect consumers or by a statutory compensation scheme. In fact, physical purchases of commodities in general are not regulated by the Irish Central Bank, as confirmed by the Central Bank officer. This is the law of the land - no one offers investors 'Irish-regulated' sales of gold or other precious metals. Surely, no one sane enough would suggest that gold and other precious metals therefore should not be offered as an investment.

Client security in the case of precious metals investment is assured by the storage facilities where client assets are deposited. GoldCore works with the most secure storage facilities in Australia, Switzerland and the UK - as is required by the best industry-wide practices. In the current environment, these storage facilities have mechanisms to deliver security of client assets to the standards far in excess of the risk ratings attained by some European Governments, so while in the real world nothing is risk free, in my own humble opinion, and in the opinion of the majority of investors around the world, holding precious metals assets today may be safer than holding 'guaranteed' and 'regulated' government securities of some euro area Governments. (Note: please do not confuse this with an advice to buy gold at some price level or any given moment in time).

Thirdly, GoldCore are fully compliant with the Financial Regulator requirements set out for its operations. The company is listed on the Register of Investment Business Firms authorised under Section 10 of the Investment Intermediaries Act, 1995 (as amended) and Register of Investment Product Intermediaries maintained by the Central Bank of Ireland in accordance with Section 31(4) of the Investment Intermediaries Act, 1995 (as amended).

I am looking forward to working with GoldCore on providing the company with an independent, external 'sounding board' for ideas and new directions for research. GoldCore already have excellent research team and products in-house and my role is to help that team to strengthen its connections into cutting edge academic research that is being done around the world.

Note: the opinions expressed in this post are solely my own.

28/05/11: Retail sales for April 2011

As promised in the previous post, here's the analysis of retail sales for April 2011.

Headline figures:

• The volume of retail sales (i.e. excluding price effects - which in effect means excluding the revenue factor or margin factor for retail services providers) was down by 3.9% in April 2011 year on year (for the third month in a row).
  
• There was a monthly decrease of 0.8% for the first month after two consecutive months of increases (retail sales volume was up 3.1% in February and 0.8% in March with both increases attributed to the correction on big contractions in December 2010 (-1.5%) and January (-3.4%).
  
• Over the last 6 months, therefore, volume of retail sales was down cumulative 3.07%. since January 2008 the volume of retail sales has fallen total of 20.92%.
• The value of retail sales decreased by 3.5% in April 2011 year on year, marking a third consecutive month of annual decreases.
  
• There was a month-on-month decline of -0.7%. The wedge between value and volume decrease can be interpreted as being driven by inflation, suggesting modest inflation in retail sales sector. The monthly pattern of retail sales value is virtually identical to volume with April decrease coming after two months of moderate increases which compensated for the poor weather (and poor Christmas sales) in December-January.
• Over the last 6 months value of retail sales has declined by 2.56% held above the decline in volume index solely by rising prices. Since January 2008 Irish retail sector activity as measured by value of retail sales (turnover and margins being best reflected by this metric, rather than CSO-preferred volume index) has fallen by a cumulative of 26.1%.

Charts to illustrate:

• Excluding Motor Trades there was an annual decrease of 2.4% in the value of retail sales in April. This was the 34th consecutive month of annual decreases.
  
• Ex-Motors retail sales posted a monthly decrease of 0.3% in April, continuing up-down monthly cycle that started in August 2010.
• Over the last 6 months, value of ex-motor retail sales has increased by 0.1% and since January 2008 the value of core retail sales is down 18.3%.
  
• The data on value suggest that inflation is starting to pick up in core retail sales.
• Ex-Motors volume of retail sales fell a massive 5.0% yoy in April (again, supporting the assertion that the end of sales season saw price increases across core retail sales in 2011 relative to 2010, which means that with lower disposable incomes Irish consumers are now facing rising cost of living once again). This marked 12th consecutive month of volume decreases in annual terms.
  
• Month-on-month core retail sales were down 1.0% in April, after posting zero change in March and contracting 0.3% in February.
• Over the last six months, core retail sales volumes have declined by 2.16% and since January 2008 they are down 14.25%.
  

Charts to illustrate:
Sources of core declines were:

• In terms of volume: Fuel (-11.9), Pharmaceuticals Medical and Cosmetic Articles (-7.4%) and Furniture & Lighting (-16.2%) were among the ten categories that posted year-on-year decreases in the volume of sales in April. Books, newspapers & stationery fell 14.9%, Bars -6.0%, Food, beverages & tobacco were down 5.7%.
  
• In terms of value: largest annual declines were posted in Food, beverages & tobacco (-5.2%), Pharmaceuticals Medical & Cosmetic Articles (-6.2%), Furniture and Lighting (-19%), Electrical Goods (-8.5%), Books, Newspapers and Stationery (-14.4%), and Bars (-4.7%).
• The list of heaviest-hit sub-categories of retail sales in annual terms suggests that these might signal renewed push for shopping in Northern Ireland. In particular, large ticket items and higher cost items might be now more efficiently purchased outside ROI given the strength of the Euro. Another possibility might be continued drive by consumers into on-line sales channels which come from outside Ireland.
  

Lastly, some anecdotal evidence - reports by retail shop owners I had communications with - suggest that May might be another bad month for the sector already virtually decimated by the crisis.

27/05/11: Retail sales and consumer confidence

Updated chart for retail sales (see analysis of today's release to follow) and consumer confidence:
ESRI's Consumer Confidence index for April was down from 59.5 in March to 57.9. This decline was not marginal, but it does come at the end of three months of increases, so can be seen as at least in part a technical correction. Three month moving average continued to increase simply due to the momentum - a point that was missed by those observers who made much of hay out of this increase.

Contrary to the Sentiment momentum, of course, the Retail Sales fell in April:

• the volume of retail sales (i.e. excluding price effects) decreased by 3.9% in April 2011 when compared with April 2010 and there was a monthly decrease of 0.8%.
  
• ex-Motor Trades the volume of retail sales decreased by 5.0% in April 2011 yoy, while there was a monthly decrease of 1.0%.
• the value of retail sales fell 3.5% in April 2011 yoy and -0.7% mom.
  
• ex-Motor Trades annual series for value fell 2.4% and there was a monthly decrease of 0.3%.
  

Overall, it is believed that the 3mo MA is a better predictor of the general direction in the series. I am not so sure. Here's why. Both the contemporaneous (spot) indices and 3moMA are pretty much similar in tracking volume and value of retail sales. The charts below illustrate:
The 3moMA is somewhat better on both value and volume, but not by a massive margin.

Incidentally, the ESRI release on Consumer Sentiment index this month forgot (for some probably simple error reason) to update data tables from January 2011 through April 2011 (link here).

22/05/11: Ireland and BRICs - Trade flows

Just run thought the figures for external trade (goods) for February 2011 and updated my files for bilateral trade with Russia and BRICs overall. Here are the core results:
Bilateral trade with Russia is booming and the trade balance surplus is heading for historical highs, as I have predicted in a recent interviews with Rossijskaja Gazeta (here) and Voice of Russia (here).
Here's the chart:

Note that Irish trade authorities have been stressing -as strategic objective - development of trade with the BRICs. In particular, China has been a major target for Irish trade promotion and development agencies, well ahead of Brazil, India and Russia. You'd expect China to be net importer of Irish goods for suhc attention to be paid to the country. Take a look:
It turns out that our policy has been targeting the country that runs a massive trade surplus against Ireland. In other words, our imports from China are vastly in excess of our exports to China. In the mean time, Russia - which generates consistent trade surpluses for Ireland - is largely untouched by the Government agencies, when compared to China.

Here are the cumulative surpluses from our trade with Russia since 2004:

16/05/2011: Debt Restructuring - two insights

What if, folks... what if default or debt restructuring is the end game?

Here are two sets of thoughts on the topic. The first one is from the Lisbon Council and the second set is adopted (via my edits) from here.

Lisbon Council launched last week Thinking the Unthinkable: Lessons of Past Sovereign Debt Restructurings See , an e-brief by Alessandro Leipold, chief economist of the Lisbon Council and former acting director of the European Department at the International Monetary Fund (IMF). See www.lisboncouncil.net for full details

Mr. Leipold argues that "European debt resolution requires a much more forward-leaning, information-driven approach, involving

• Supplying markets with better, more timely information (including tougher banking stress tests - I would give credit here to CBofI which did carry out much more rigorous testing of Irish 4 than the EU has ever allowed to take place across the euro area)
  
• Abandoning untenable timelines (such as the “no-restructurings-before-2013” mantra), and
  
• Staying ahead of the game via recourse to tools such as pre-emptive bond exchange offers

Mr. Leipold draws five key lessons from past sovereign debt restructurings:

1. Avoid Detrimental Delays. Delays in restructuring are costly (output losses, entail “throwing good money after bad” via increasingly large official bailouts, and ultimately require a larger haircut on private claims). Realistic debt sustainability analyses are needed to detect, and communicate, the possible need for debt restructuring. The EU’s “read-my-lips: no-restructuring-until-2013” sets an arbitrary and non-credible deadline: the sooner it is abandoned, the better.
2. Repair the Banking Sector. The equation “euro debt crisis = core European bank crisis” needs to be broken. I might add that the equation 'euro debt & banks crises = European taxpayers destruction' must be broken even before we break he debt-banks link. This requires getting tough on bank stress tests, enhancing their rigour and credibility, possibly by associating the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) and IMF with European Union supervisors. Banks tests must be accompanied by much greater pressure from EU supervisors to speed up bank recapitalisation and to close down non-viable entities. Banking resolution legislation should proceed rapidly, as should creation of an EU-wide bank resolution mechanism.
3. Remove Politics from the Driver’s Seat. The current set-up, including the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which will begin operations in 2013), "virtually ensures that EU creditor countries’ domestic political interests will play a front-and-centre role. The recent attempted quid pro quo with Ireland whereby Europe would agree to a reduction in the cripplingly high interest rate on its loans in return for changes to the Irish corporate tax code is but one indication of this. Put simply, the decision-making and governance mechanism should be distanced from the high-pitched political positioning characteristic of EU ministerial meetings, thereby also facilitating constructive communication with markets, and helping shape expectations as needed to promote crisis resolution". I can only add to this that politicization of the economic concept of debt restructuring is also evident within the PIIGS themselves. In Ireland, we have now a virtual army of pundits - many well-meaning, of course - arguing against the restructuring on the basis of (1) 'default'=evil, (2) our debts are sustainable, and (3) current path of delaying restructuring until post-2013 is the optimal choice. These are supported, in some instances via lucrative public appointments, by the political elite.
4. Stay Ahead of the Curve with Preemptive Exchange Offers. "Traditional bond exchange offers, made preemptively, prior to an actual default, worked well in several emerging country debt restructurings over the last decade or so, including Pakistan, Ukraine, Uruguay and the Dominican Republic. Experience indicates that such voluntary restructurings need not, contrary to some claims, be too “soft” for the debtors’ needs. Reasonably priced, and with proper incentives, deals can be concluded rapidly with negligible free riding."
5. Do Not Expect Too Much from Collective Action Clauses. "Contractual provisions such as collective action and aggregation clauses no doubt help at the margin. But they have not shown themselves to be decisive in debt restructurings. Furthermore, they cannot help in dealing with the current stock of debt".

Much of the above prescriptions/warnings is echoed in the tables summarizing debt restructuring options available to the PIIGS that I have edited based on their original source (here).

Both provide one core lesson to us - any state close to the point of no return when it comes to its debt levels (and no one is denying that we are close to that point, all arguments today are about whether we have crossed it or not) should be:

1. Prepared to act
2. Prepared to act preemptively
3. Be transparent about the problems faced

On all 3 so far our officials are failing miserably, although we are making some progress on the 3rd point...

15/05/2011: Some data on electricity prices comparatives

Here is some interesting data on electricity prices comparatives from Eurostat (note: chart below refers to simple EU averages for EU27 and weighted EU averages for EU15, while table below is based solely on weighted EU15 averages):

15/05/2011: Public procurement

Ireland's "Social Partnership Capitalism" illustrated in one chart:
And it's getting worse. Data taken from eurostat shows that openly advertised procurement contracts for public sector purchasing have risen from 2.6% of Irish GDP in 2005 to 3.4% in 2007 before falling back to 2.2% in 2009.