Showing posts with label the Great Recession. Show all posts
Showing posts with label the Great Recession. Show all posts

Sunday, July 15, 2018

14/7/18: The Second Longest Recovery


One chart never ceased to amaze me - the one that shows just how unimpressive the current 'second longest in modern history' recovery (and only 9 months shy of it being the 'first longest') has been, and just how sticky the adverse shocks impacts can be in modern crises that can be best described by the VUCA (volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity) environment:


The fact that the current recovery cycle has been weak is only one part of the story, however, that would be less worrying if not for the second part. Namely, that almost every successive recovery cycle in the past three decades has been weaker than the previous one.

Here is a handy summary of the recovery cycles in the last four recessions based on annual data, for real GDP and real GDP PPP-adjusted:




Wednesday, May 7, 2014

7/5/2014: 1980s and 2010s: Live Register tells the tale...


Here are some comparatives relating to un- and under-employment between the current crisis and the dreaded 1980s malaise summarised in a chart :

Click on chart to enlarge

Remember, Ireland today is not Ireland in the 1980s...

Thursday, December 26, 2013

26/12/2013: Ireland's Technical Recovery: Sunday Times, December 08


This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times column from December 08, 2013



In his address to the Rogers Commission investigating the explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger, Nobel Prize-winning physicist, Richard Feynmann outlined the birds-eye view of the causal relationship between the man-made disasters and the politicised decision-making. Per Feynmann, "For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled".

The laws of reality apply to social sciences as well, independent of PR.  Recent events offer a good example. While lacking longer-term catalysts for growth, Irish economy did officially exit the recession in Q2 2013. Yet, the real GDP remained 1.2 percent below the levels attained in Q2 2012. Glass is half-full, says an optimist. Glass is half-empty, per pessimist. In reality, final domestic demand, representing a sum total of personal consumption of goods and services, net government expenditure on current goods and services, and gross fixed capital formation, fell in the first half of 2013 compared to the same period of 2012. This marked the fifth consecutive year of declines in domestic demand. Recession might have ended, but we were not getting any better. The only consolation to this was that the rate of half-annual declines in demand has been slowing down over the last four years.

Data since the beginning of the fourth quarter, however, has been more encouraging and, at the same time, even more confusing. However, as in physics, in economics every action generates an opposite and equal reaction: an economy battered by a recession sooner or later posts a technical recovery.

Thus, the reality of Irish economy today suggests two key trends. One: a build up of demand on consumer side has now reached critical mass. Two: jobs destruction has now run out of steam. Some real jobs creation has started to show through the fog of official statistics. With this in mind, let me make a short-term prediction. While in the long run we are still stuck in the age of Great Stagnation, over the next year we are likely to witness some robust spike in our domestic economic growth.

Consider the data. Based on National Accounts, during the period from January 2008 through June 2013, and adjusting for inflation, Irish households cumulated shortfall in consumption spending compared to pre-crisis trends from 2000 stood at around EUR1,600 per every person residing in Ireland. Over the same period of time, shortfall on fixed capital investment by Irish firms, households and the State amounted to EUR16,400 per capita. In other words, some EUR83 billion of domestic economic activity has been suppressed over the duration of the current crisis. Even if one tenth of this were to come back, Irish GDP will post a 6.75 percent expansion on 2012 levels.

And, at some point, come back it must. Durable goods consumption has been cut back down to the bone over the last five years, as were purchases of household equipment, furnishings and cars. Depreciation and amortisation of these items are cyclical processes and we can expect a significant uptick in demand some time soon. That said, volume of retail sales was still down 1.4 percent year on year in October, once we exclude motor trades, automotive fuel and bars sales.

At the same time, purchasing power of consumers is not increasing, despite some positive news on the labour market front. Deposits held by Irish households were down at the end of September some EUR1.22 billion compared to the same period a year ago. And they were down again in October. Credit to households is continuing to shrink: in 12 months through October 2013, total credit for house purchases was down 3.1 percent, while credit for consumption purposes fell 9.3 percent.

The good news is that we are now seeing some increases in total employment in the economy. As of Q3 2013, some 58,000 more people held a job in Ireland than a year ago. Excluding agricultural employment, jobs growth was more moderate 33,000. These are the signs of significant improvements in the jobs market. However, three quarters of new jobs created were in average-to-low earnings occupations.

On another positive, however, jobs are being created in the sectors that previously suffered significant declines in employment. Key examples here are: accommodation and food services and construction.

In contrast to the employment news, earnings data offers little to cheer about. Average weekly paid hours across the economy have stuck at the crisis low in Q2 and Q3 2013. Average weekly earnings are down 2.4 percent on last year. These pressures on households’ incomes are exacerbated by hikes in taxes and charges imposed in Budget 2014.

Overall, consumption reboot is still being held up by continuous decline in after-tax incomes.

However, pockets of growth in our polarised and paralysed economy are feeding through to the aggregate statistics. This process is aided by the fact that as the rest of the economy has flat-lined, isolated growth in specific sectors and geographical areas became the main driver for national aggregate statistics.

One example of this process is visible in the property markets, where a mini-boom in residential and commercial properties in parts of Dublin is driving restart of the markets in a handful of other cities, namely Cork and Galway. Dublin residential property prices are up 18 percent on crisis period trough. In commercial markets, 2013 is shaping up to be the best year for transactional activity since 2007. On foot of this, construction sector Purchasing Manager Index, published by the Ulster Bank, stayed above the expansion line in September and October.

Another example is continued expansion of ICT services and MNCs-dominated manufacturing sectors. This week's release by the Investec of the Purchasing Managers Indices for manufacturing and services showed that in November, both sectors continued to grow. The series are volatile, but the shorter-term trend since Q2 2013 is now clearly to the upside.

All of which begs a question: Are we about to witness a Celtic Tiger rebirth from the ashes of the Great Recession, or is this a recovery that simply compensates for a huge loss in economic activity sustained to-date?
My feeling is that we are entering the second scenario.

Firstly, Irish economy is not unique in showing the signs of recovery. Other peripheral euro area economies, such as Spain, Portugal and even Greece, are also starting to stir. And all of them follow the pattern of recovery similar to that which took place in Ireland: foreign investors are followed by domestic cash-rich buyers of assets; exports uplifts are slowly building up to support domestic activity.

Secondly, given the extent of economic losses during the Great Recession, we can expect a bounce and this bounce is likely to last us some time. As argued above, over the years of the crisis we have built up a massive backlog of consumer and investor demand for everything – from durable consumption goods to assets, including property. This build up can lead to a rush-into-the-market of consumers and investors in H1 2014.

However, beyond this bounce-back period, serious headwinds loom.
In particular, latest mortgages arrears figures suggest that banks are predominantly focusing on forced sales as the main tool for dealing with the problem. These forced sales are yet to hit the markets. The same data also shows that non-foreclosure solutions are far from being sustainable even in the short-term. Over the last 12 months, the percentage of mortgages that have been restructured and not in arrears remained basically unchanged.

Further into 2014, if wages and earnings continue to decline or stagnate, the next Budget will become an even harder pill to swallow than Budget 2014. This can translate into the renewed decline in investment and consumption in the economy.  Latest exchequer figures through November this year are encouraging on the receipts side, although the safety cushion relative to both 2012 and Budget profile is thin. Tax revenues for eleven months were only EUR214 million (or 0.6 percent) ahead of profile. One third of this ‘over-delivery’ is accounted for by November payments of 2014 property taxes. Meanwhile the expenditure side is also saddled with risks. According to the latest projections from the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, Government’s total current spending in 2013 will stand at EUR 51.15 billion or EUR2.54 billion higher than in 2007.

In addition to addressing the above spending risks, budgets for 2015-2017 will also have to deal with squaring the circle on temporary public sector pay moderation savings. As these come to an end and as demands from the public sector trade unions rise once again, economy can find itself once again at a threat of renewed tax hikes.

On a greater scale, monetary policies around the world remain a major problem. In the euro area, money supply remains tight despite record low interest rates and unprecedented funding measures that injected over EUR1 trillion worth of funds into euro area banks in 2011-2012.  Irish banks might have received a clean bill of health this week, but they are not in the position to restart lending any time soon. In the US, Federal Reserve's tapering is on the agenda for 2014. If pursued aggressively, it can lead to a rise in the cost of borrowing world wide, potentially inducing a fall-off in the capital markets. For Ireland, this can spell a further reduction in investment as foreign investors continue exiting Irish Government bonds and shying away from Irish private sector assets.

For now, however, the above risks are still to materialise. Before they do, enjoy our technical recovery.


Note: the above article was publish well before the now-infamous The Economist piece calling Irish economic recovery 'a dead cat bounce'. My view, as expressed above is not that this is a 'dead cat bounce' but rather that it is a technical correction up, toward longer-term equilibrium trend. It is quite possible that the recovery will gain momentum and will turn out to be a full recovery, but it is not, in my view, a 'dead cat bounce' (or a recovery that is likely to turn to a renewed downside).



Box-out:

A recent research paper published by the Centre for Economic Policy Research studied interactions between large firms and SMEs in driving regional-level innovation in the US. As is well known, large firms generate spin-out ventures whenever innovations developed at the larger firm level are deemed unrelated to the firm's core activities. Thus, a concentration of larger firms activities in a region can be expected to increase the potential for small spin-outs formation. On the other hand, small firms generate demand for innovation, increasing spin-outs profitability and survival potential. The study finds that differences in innovation output across metropolitan regions of the US over 1975-2000 can be largely attributed to the co-existence of these effects. These findings offer us significant insights into the potential role for business partnerships between Irish SMEs and MNCs in driving innovation-focused growth. For one, the study shows that optimal innovation policies are dependent on the specific stage of innovation culture development in the economy. For example, an economy with a significant presence of larger firms, such as Ireland, should focus on policies designed to stimulate formation of new ventures and spin-outs instead of spending resources on attracting even more large firms. Last week, this column suggested using tax incentives for SMEs and MNCs to stimulate equity investment in entrepreneurial ventures and spin-out. The above evidence from the US suggests that we might want to give this a try.

Friday, August 2, 2013

2/8/2013: June's Great Recession Update

The usual monthly chart from Calculated Risk (h/t for the reminder to check to @businessinsider )... US Great Recession in comparison:


Source: http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2013/07/june-employment-report-195000-jobs-76.html

Continue to be scared... cause we've been scared for the last 65 months... And a reminder from my previous re-posts of this chart: notice how frighteningly longer are the durations of employment recoveries in recent recessions since 1981.

And while we are on this, here's a good discussion of completely unrealistic US expectations for fiscal recovery: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-01/why-the-cbo-s-deficit-forecasts-are-too-optimistic.html via @BloombergView

Wednesday, January 16, 2013

16/1/2013: US Labor Market Q4 2012 in one chart


And another stunning chart from http://oregoneconomicanalysis.wordpress.com/2013/01/11/visualizing-labor-markets/
showing the overall summary of data on the US Labor Markets compared to Q4 2007 and Q4 2009 to current state.


16/1/2013: Some charts on US unemployment: Financial Crises v Recessions


Two absolutely fascinating charts showing just how different is the current Great Recession from the previous recessions and how the financial crises disruptions are much longer lasting structural in nature when it comes to unemployment than traditional recessions.

(Source: http://oregoneconomicanalysis.wordpress.com/2012/09/24/checking-in-on-financial-crises-recoveries/ )

First, financial crises:


And now, run-of-the-mill recessions:

And financial crises duration in terms of unemployment levels:


The above charts should really be a wake up call to the European 'leaders' still pretending that the recovery is only a matter of short time stroll through deficits reductions.

Here is a link to an excellent presentation (from April 2012, albeit) by the US Treasury on the crisis responses to-date, showing the complexity and the sheer magnitude of these responses. To anyone familiar with the EU response to the crisis - these amount at best to 1/10th of the scale/scope of the US responses.

Here's a telling comparative:

It is also telling to read the level of realism in the US Treasury's presentation as to the problems remaining in the economy that is virtually unparalleled with the reports from the EU and some National Governments (e.g. Ireland).

Sunday, January 13, 2013

13/1/2013: OECD charts the Great Recession


A nice chart from the OECD's latest Economic Outlook ppt presentation comparing recoveries in previous recessions with the current one:

Notice that the 1970s recession looks more like a U-shaped in terms of recovery trajectory, while the 1980s recession shows long-lasting rotated J-shape. Current one is at L-shape so far. Also, note that the 1980s recession did not recover the pre-recession peak activity levels before the subsequent recession hit.

Now, do give some contemplation to the current recession, together with the OECD forecasts for two scenarios: baseline (main forecast) and the scenario of continued euro area crisis:

This pretty well shows the tear-away speed of the US recovery expected in 2013-2014, compared to the euro area and Japan, as well as to the OECD overall. It also shows the degree of the US economy (forecast) resilience vis the euro area crisis.

Saturday, October 27, 2012

27/10/2012: UK Q3 2012 'Growthology'


So UK is out of the second-dip recession? But, seemingly not out of the Great Recession:


via Citi Research.

At this speed of a 'recovery' UK folks can look forward to a down-cycle peak-to-peak of 5.5 years this time around, as compared to 4 years in the 1930s, 3 1/4 years in the 1970s and 1980s and 2 3/4 years in 1990s.

Never mind... it was so all curable by the Olympics & the Jubilee... Or as Citi put it:
"The rebound from the Jubilee in Q2 probably added about 0.5% to Q3 growth, while the direct effects of Olympic ticket sales added roughly 0.2%, and the ONS notes that there may have been wider positive effects from the Olympics on service sector growth (and this is the sector which was much stronger than we expected). So underlying growth in Q3 may have been 0.2-0.3% QoQ. In our view, the underlying path of the economy has been fairly flat throughout the last four quarters, with erratic swings in individual quarters: GDP fell in Q1 and Q2, reflecting weakness in construction in both quarters plus the adverse effects on activity of the Queen’s Jubilee, and the Olympics plus rebound from the Jubilee played a major role in the positive Q3 figure. The more that Q3  benefited from temporary Olympics-related positives, the more likely that Q4 GDP growth will disappoint as that boost fades."

Friday, February 17, 2012

17/2/2012: Struggling Households

Last week we saw the release of the special module from QNHS on Response of Households to the Economic Downturn – Pilot module Quarter 2 2011. This is undoubtedly a topic of much interest to economists, but also to the general public. The results are mixed - some surprises, and some 'I've told you' moments.

Summary of the findings as follows (via CSO):


  • Overall, 79% of households cut back their spending on at least one of the listed items as a result of the economic climate in the two years before the survey. Which is not surprising, given the duration and the depth of the recession. In every economy there are always those (not necessarily the rich) who have relatively stable incomes even during the downturns.
  • More than half (56% of all) households cut back their spending on groceries.
  • More than half (57%) cut back spending on going out.
  • Similarity in the two cut backs above suggest that much of these impacted the same households which were forced to cut on both - highly discretionary (going out) and necessary (food) items.
  • Almost two thirds (64%) of households cut back their spending on clothing and footwear.
  • Spending on health insurance was reduced by 15% of households and 11% of households cut back spending on pension contributions. This highlights the dangers for the Exchequer from the current course of Irish policy to continue increasing indirect tax charges and semi-state charges. Health and Pension Levies are undoubtedly likely to have the adverse impact on both expenditures, thus increasing the Exchequer exposure to health and pensions liabilities in the future. Note, the results of the survey do not cover changes in demand since June 2011.
  • One fifth of households delayed or missed paying their bills (21%) in order to meet their outgoings on basic goods and services. 
  • One in ten delayed or missed loan repayments and a further one in ten delayed or missed paying their credit card bill.
  • In the two years prior to the survey 45% of households spent some or all of their savings to pay for BASIC goods and services over the last 2 years. And this in the environment of the elevated 'savings' across the nation.
  • 62% of households reduced the amount being saved.
  • The most financially impacted are families with 2 adults and children, which highlights the plight of the middle classes in Ireland.
  • One in ten households borrowed money from family or friends to pay for basic goods and services in the two years prior to the survey. Unfortunately, we have no idea how many received transfers from the family members in kind or in cash, not in form of debt.



There were some clear differences in the behaviour of households depending on the age of the household reference person, whether or not they were working and whether or not there were children in the house.

  • Cutbacks were far more likely in a household where the reference person was aged less than 55 years. Among households where the reference person was aged less than 35 or between 35 and 54 years, three quarters had cut back on clothing and footwear, compared with half of households where the reference person was aged 55 or older.
  • While 64% of households where the reference person was younger than 35 had cut back spending on groceries, this compares with 42% of those where the reference person was 55 or more.
  • Some 81% of households where the reference person was unemployed reported that they had cut back their spending on groceries in the previous two years, compared with 57% of households where the reference person was working.
  • Households with children were more likely than those without children to cut back their spending on groceries, clothing and footwear, going out, and lessons or classes
The above age- and household- related results are not surprising. Older households tend to have lower unemployment rates, higher security or stability of income, greater savings cushions to offset cutbacks. Families with children face far smaller share of their income in the form discretionary spending, which means they generally will be forced to make more painful cuts. Families with children also have smaller savings cushions.

Overall, the picture of the household financial and consumption patterns revealed in the report shows that Irish households are facing severe recession and that the economy is unlikely to benefit from significant increases in 'confidence'-related spending and investment for a long time, including in the first few quarters of any upturn in national income, as households will most likely only slowly return to higher levels of consumption, preferring to rebuild lost savings and to repay family loans.

Crucially, the above changes are taking place while majority of Irish households are still struggling under the massive debt overhang. Going forward, this implies that (1) any hikes in interest rates will drive households deeper into cutting spending and using savings for necessities, (2) any increases in future income are likely to be consumed by debt repayments, without benefiting national consumption.