7/3/2013: Irish Mortgages Arrears Q4 2012

Mortgages arrears data for private residences in Ireland for Q4 2012 was published today by the Central Bank of Ireland. Few surprises.

As expected, arrears rose. Unexpectedly, the rate of increase was much much slower than before in q/q terms and slower in y/y terms. As encouraging as this might sound, there are some points of concern outlined below. Here are some details of data dynamics first:

1. In Q4 2012 there were a total of 792,096 accounts relating to private residential mortgages in Ireland - a massive y/y increase from 765,267 accounts in Q4 2011 due to 'reclassification' of some mortgages accounts.
2. This 'reclassification' made historical comparatives in terms of, say, arrears as % of the total mortgages, utterly useless. This is how Irish official stats go: relabel, re-order, and if it makes things look better by coincidence - spin. 
3. Total number of mortgages in arrears for private residences rose from 141,389 accounts in Q3 2012 to 143,851 accounts in Q4 2012 - an increase q/q of 1.74%, well below any q/q increase since the beginning of the series. Average increase since Q3 2009 when the data started stands at 6.51%.
4. Y/y total number of mortgages in arrears increased 21.43% in Q4 2012, the slowest rate of annual increases since the beginning of the series and below the average of 27.77%.
5. Overall, in Q4 2012, 18.16% of all mortgages still outstanding in the country were in arrears. Adjusting for the CBofI 'reclassification' of mortgages accounts to allow for more direct historical comparative, 18.85% of all mortgages were in arrears. 
6. Number of mortgages at risk or defaulted (defined as mortgages currently in arrears, restructured and not in arrears, plus repossessions) has risen in Q4 2012 to 186,785 (or 24.48% of the total adjusting for 'reclassifications', 23.58% based on official data) from 185,933 in Q3 2012. This implies a rise of 0.46% q/q and 19.61% y/y. Both represent the slowest rates of increase in series (short) history.

Two charts to illustrate:

Good news: the rates of arrears build up have slowed down in Q 2012. 

Bad news, getting worse slower is not the same as getting better. Especially given the deterioration tallied from 2009 through today. 

Worrying side: impacts of property taxes, banks guarantee lift-off, repossessions orders regime change, and personal insolvency 'reforms' are not visible in the current latest data. All represent a threat of accelerating arrears once again. 

Real news: just under 1/4 of Irish private residences-linked mortgages are now at risk of default, in arreas or defaulted and some 650,000-700,000 people are currently impacted by this crisis to the point of being unable to meet the original conditions of their mortgages.

13/12/2012: Mortgages at Risk: Acceleration in the Trend

In the previous post (here) I detailed the trends in mortgages arrears in Ireland based on Q3 2012 data released today. Since then, I have seen some comments on the 'dynamics' of the mortgages arrears, suggesting that things are 'getting worse more slowly'.

This is simply incorrect. Here's a chart graphically showing acceleration of overall crisis since Q2 2012:

Note that data through Q3 2010 is imputed by estimating back trend from Q4 2010-Q2 2012 data reported by CBofI. Hence, the jump in orange line at Q3-Q4 2010.

13/12/2012: Irish Mortgages Arrears - Q3 2012

Q3 2012 data for Irish residential mortgages in arrears is out and here is the first summary of horrific details:

• Total number of residential mortgages in arrears more than 90 days rose from 47,627 to 49,482 between Q3 2011 and Q3 2012 - a rise of 3.89% y/y. This marks acceleration in the rate of increase in arrears 90 days + from 1.13% in Q2 2012.
• Total number of mortgages in arrears less than 90 days rose to 86,146 in Q3 2012 from 62,970 in Q3 2011 - an increase of 36.8% y/y, compared to a rise of 45.3% in Q2 2012.
• Total number of accounts in arrears (90 days and over, and under 90 days) rose from 110,597 in Q3 2011 to 135,628 in Q3 2012 - an annual rate of growth of 22.63%. In Q2 2012 the rate of increase was 25.20%.
• Total number of accounts at risk of default (currently in arrears, plus restructured and not in arrears, plus repossessed) rose to 180,314 in Q3 2012, up 6.5% q/q and up 21.95% y/y. In Q2 2012 the rate of annual increase was 20.92%.
• Overal value of mortgages at risk now stands at €31,835,683,000 up 6.0% q/q and 19.8% y/y

Charts to illustrate:

Let's make it simple:

1. Between Q3 2011 and Q3 2012, the % of loan accounts in arrears for more than 90 days rose from 8.1% or all accounts (10.8% of outstanding mortgages values) to 11.3% (15.1% of outstanding mortgages values).
2. A a year to Q3 2012, the number of mortgages at risk of default or defaulted (including mortgages in arrears, restructured and current not in arreas and repossessions) rose from 147,857 to 180,314
3. In Q3 2012, mortgages at risk accounted for 24% of all mortgages outstanding accounts and 29% of the total value of outstanding mortgages, up from 19% and 23%, respectively, in Q3 2011.

That's right - almost 1/4 of all mortgages accounts are now at risk or have defaulted, and almost 30% of the total value of outstanding mortgages is at risk.

Updated: here's the Irish Mortgage Holders Organization response to today's Arrears figures.

22/10/2012: Financial Crises: Borrowers Pain, Creditors Gain

A very interesting paper on the effects of the financial crises on imbalance of power (and thus the imbalance of the incidence of costs) between the borrowers and the lenders. The paper is a serious reality check for Irish policymakers in the context of the 'reforms' of the Personal Insolvency laws currently being proposed. In fact, the Irish proposed 'reforms' actually tragically replicate the very worst implications of the study summarized below.

"Resolving Debt Overhang: Political Constraints in the Aftermath of Financial Crises" by Atif R. Mian, Amir Sufi, and Francesco Trebbi (NBER Working Paper No. 17831, February 2012 http://www.nber.org/papers/w17831) shows that "debtors bear the brunt of a decline in asset prices associated with financial crises and policies aimed at partial debt relief may be warranted to boost growth in the midst of crises. Drawing on the US experience during the Great Recession of 2008-09 and historical evidence in a large panel of countries, [the study explores] why the political system may fail to deliver such policies. [The authors] find that during the Great Recession creditors were able to use the political system more effectively to protect their interests through bailouts. More generally we show that politically countries become more polarized and fractionalized following financial crises. This results in legislative stalemate, making it less likely that crises lead to meaningful macroeconomic reforms."

Mortgage recourse:

"The higher level of recourse and tougher rules for declaring bankruptcy are likely to prevent borrowers from declaring default. As a result, debtors in European countries are more likely to absorb financial shocks internally than declare default. …We investigate this …by comparing the change in default rates across Europe and the United States during the 2007 to 2009 global housing crisis. Since the bankruptcy regime is relatively more lax in the United States, one would expect a larger increase in default rates." Controlling for rates of decline in house prices and the level of indebtedness of the borrowing households (LTVs at origination) the authors test explicitly data for US, U.K., Spain, France and Ireland from 2007 to 2009 using data from the European Mortgage Federation. 

Figure 1 

"The change in default rate (red bar) for USA between 2007 and 2009 is 5.9 percentage points. While the default rate level in 2007 is not shown in Figure 1, it is quite low and similar across the five countries (0.4%, 1.2%, 0.7%, 1.9%, and 2.1% for France, Ireland, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States, respectively). …All European countries in Figure 1 have high recourse and tough bankruptcy laws relative to the United States. The very large increase in default rates for the US is consistent with the notion that lower level of recourse and easier bankruptcy legislation helps indebted borrowers declare default. …A collective look at the three housing market variables in Figure 1 shows that the United States experienced the highest increase in default rates by far, despite some of the European countries experiencing very similar (if not stronger) decline in house price (e.g. Ireland) and having similar housing leverage (Ireland and the United Kingdom)."

  

The Political Response to Financial Crises and Debt Overhang:

                                                

"The 2007-2009 US financial crisis provides an interesting case study to examine the political tug of war between debtors and creditors. …[In the US], housing assets were the main asset for low net worth individuals, and their housing positions were quite levered. As a result, the collapse in house prices disproportionately affected low net worth individuals. Mian, Rao, and Sufi (2011) show that at the 10th percentile of the county-level house price distribution, house prices dropped by 40 to 60% depending on the house price index used. This decline would completely wipe out the entire net worth of the median household in lowest quintile of the net worth distribution. CoreLogic reports that 25% of mortgages are underwater; for the low net worth individuals in the US, this effectively means that their total net worth is negative." 

"It is in this context that Mian, Sufi and Trebbi (2010a), henceforth MST, document the political economy of two major bailout bills that were passed in the US Congress in 2008. The first of these bills, the American Housing Rescue and Foreclosure Prevention Act (AHRFPA), provided up to $300 billion in Federal Housing Administration insurance for renegotiated mortgages, which translated into using public funds to provide debtor relief… At the same time, creditors--i.e., the shareholders and debt-holders of large financial institutions--pushed a second bill which was closely tied to protecting their own interests [the $700 billion Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) which eventually led to TARP]…"

"While both debtors and creditors were effective in passing legislation in their favor, there were two important differences in the magnitude of their effectiveness. First, the debtor friendly bill provided fewer resources ($300 billion versus $700 billion) than the creditor friendly legislation… [despite the fact that] debtors faced substantially larger losses …than creditors in the face of the US housing crisis. Second, while the creditor friendly EESA bill was fully implemented and executed, the housing legislation was a miserable failure. As of December 2008, there were only 312 applications for relief under the program and the secretary of Housing and Urban Development was highly critical of the program. … When Obama Administration …implemented the Home Affordability Modification Program under AHRFPA, their initial goal was to help 3 to 4 million homeowners with loan modifications. In July, 2011 President Obama admitted that HAMP program has “probably been the area that's been most stubborn to us trying to solve the problem.”" 

"It is worth noting that one of the main reasons for the ineffectiveness of the HAMP program has been the lack of cooperation from creditors. The initial legislation made creditor cooperation completely voluntary, thereby enabling many creditors to opt out of the program despite qualifying borrowers. In fact, as Representative Barney Frank noted, banks actually helped formulate the program in the summer of 2008."

Need I remind you that in Ireland's reform bill to alter the draconian personal insolvency laws currently on the books, the banks not only have an option of voluntary participation, but an actual veto on resolution mechanism deployed.

"Cross-country evidence on financial crises and change in creditor rights The seminal work of La Porta et al (1998), followed by Djankov et al. (2007), introduced cross-country index of “creditor rights” from 1978 to 2002. The index captures the rights of secured lenders under a country’s legal system. A country has stronger creditor rights if: 

1.  there are restrictions for a debtor to file for reorganization [In the case of Ireland's Insolvency Law reform, this factor is actually made worse than in the current legislation since the reform law is going to force debtors to undergo a period of compulsory arrangements dictated solely by the banks before they can file for bankruptcy]; 
2. creditors are able to seize collateral in bankruptcy automatically without any “asset freeze” [again, my reading of Ireland's 'reform' proposals suggests automatic seizure of assets once bankruptcy is granted]; 
3. secured creditors are paid first [as is the case in Ireland]; and 
4. control shifts away from management as soon as bankruptcy is declared.  

"Overall, while creditor rights promote the origination of more credit, a financial crisis that results from excessive debt tends to reduce creditor rights. These results highlight a fundamental tension between the benefits of stronger creditor rights ex-ante and the debt overhang costs associated with giving creditor too much power in the financial crisis state of the world. Ex-post relaxation of creditor rights is not the norm after a financial crisis. …More specifically, we show that financial crises are systematically followed by political polarization and that this may result in gridlock and anemic reform. …Financial crises polarize debtors and creditors in society. On the one hand, debtors are weakened by a fall in the value of assets they hold. On the other hand, creditors become more sensitive to write-offs during bad times …and possibly more reluctant to converge onto a renegotiated platform because of their increased reliance on the satisfaction of the original terms of agreement."

18/10/2012: ARMs - compounded effects of austerity and banks deleveraging

As the Irish banks are hiking ARMs, it is worth reminding us as to why this is a bad news for Irish economy:

Now, here's the Catch22.

1. Irish banks funding costs are joined at a hip with the Sovereign funding costs, thus reducing these costs will require reducing Sovereign costs, which in turn means taking in more taxes and cutting back more Government spending.
2. The former part of (1) means that households on the ARMs will be bearing all of the burden of the high funding costs for the banks.
3. The latter part of (2) means that households on the ARMs are going to experience, alongside all other economic agents, the cost of Government deleveraging.

(2) + (3) means that in our 'fairness-concerned' society, ARMs holders will be paying twice the rate of the fiscal adjustment that any other group of agents.

Good luck, Michael Noonan, bankrupting the ARMs.

3/10/2012: AIB hikes mortgages rates. Government plays banjo.

The logic of Irish Government's policy on the banking crisis:

Fallacy 1:
Government Position: Irish Government claims that it is protecting and shoring up Irish banks so they can start lending into the economy.
Irish Banks Position: jack up variable mortgages rates, thus taking money out of the economy.

Fallacy 2:
Government Position: Irish 'savings rate is irrationally high' so we must reduce the rate of savings to incentivise demand.
Irish Banks Response: jack up variable mortgages rates, thus reducing domestic demand.

Fallacy 3:
Government Position: Mortgages crisis must be dealt with while protecting family homes, where feasible.
Irish Banks Response: jack up variable mortgages rates, thus making homeownership less sustainable for many financially stressed homeowners.

Fallacy 4:
Government Position: Strategic defaults must be avoided.
Irish Banks Response: jack up variable mortgages rates, thus incentivising more strategic defaults.

Fallacy 5:
Government Position: Property markets must be returned to healthy functional state (aka: price increases are good, price drops are bad).
Irish Banks Response: jack up variable mortgages rates, thus pushing more properties into distress sales and removing more borrowers out of the pool of potential home buyers.

Which part of this 'market' is rational?

23/8/2012: Mortgages Arrears in Ireland - Q2 2012

At last we have the data for Q2 2012 mortgages arrears in Ireland, and these are ugly. That's right, folks - ugly.

Let's keep in mind: Irish average household size is at 2.73 persons per household as per Census 2011.

Top numbers:

• Total number of outstanding mortgages in the state stood at 761,533 in Q2 2012, down 0.34% q/q and down 2.03% y/y. In the previous quarter (Q1 2012) the rate of mortgages decline was 0.63% q/q and 2.34% y/y. This suggests a slowdown in mortgages repayments (deleveraging) in the economy, despite the Government claims to the economic stabilization (something that would be consistent with accelerating deleveraging).
• Outstanding balances of mortgages are at €111.99 billion in Q2 2012, a decline of 0.62% q/q and 2.69% y/y. Again, compared with Q1 2012, there is a slowdown in deleveraging (-0.70% q/q and -2.82% y/y in Q1 2012).
• Of all mortgages outstanding, 45,165 mortgages or 5.93% (totaling €7.53 billion or 6.73% of all balances) were in arrears less than 90 days. In Q1 2012 the number was 46,284. This is a mew category of reporting and Central Bank deserves credit for continuing to improve data disclosure to the public.
• Of all mortgages outstanding, 17,533 (2.3%) of mortgages were in arrears between 91 and 180 days, with mortgage balance of €3.13 billion (2.79%). Good news, there has been a deecrease q/q in these mortgages - down 3.52% (in Q1 2012 there was a rise of 2.06% in this category) in number of accounts and a drop of 5.73% (against a rise of 1.32% in Q1) in mortgages volumes. Year on year, this category of mortgages arrears is up 11.64 in Q2 2012 which marks a slowdown from 27.5% rise y/y in Q1.
• However, the decline in the 91-180 days category of mortgages in arrears (-640 mortgages q/q) is almost ten-fold smaller than the rise in the arreas 180-days and over category (up 6,261 q/q in Q2). In other words, the decline in mortgages in arrears 91-180 days is explained fully by the rise of mortgages in arrears over 180 days.
• Number of mortgages in arrears in excess of 180 days now stands at a massive 65,698, up 10.53% q/q in Q2 2012 (in Q1 2012 the same rate of increase was 11.89%) and up 64.1% y/y. These mortgages amount to €13.35 billion - which represents a 10.64% q/q increase and a 67.22% increase y/y.
• Using old methodology, total arrears over 90 days now amount to 83,251 mortgages (up 7.24% q/q and 49.3% y/y), with a balance of €16.48 billion (up 7.11% q/q and 52.1% y/y). 
• Thus, currently, 10.93% of all mortgages in Ireland are in arrears 90 days and more, and these amount to 14.72% of total mortgages balances. For comparison, in Q2 2011 these percentages were 7.17% and 9.42% respectively.
• Using newly available data on mortgages in arrears less than 90 days, total number of mortgages in arrears in Ireland is 128,416 (16.86% of all mortgages outstanding) and these amount to €24.01 billion (21.44% of all outstanding balances).
• Now, put the above number in perspective - that is around 350,576 people (actually more, since mortgages arrears are likely to impact younger and larger households over retired and smaller households) in this country who are missing payments on their mortgages.
• In Q2 2012 there were 84,941 restructured mortgages (up 6.56% q/q and 21.63% y/y). The rate of restructuring has declined from Q1 2011 when q/q there was a rise of 7.17% and y/y there was a rise of 26.66%.
• Of restructured mortgages, 47.35% were not in arrears. Percentage of restructured mortgages in arrears has fallen from 56.41% in Q2 2011 and from 48.50% in Q1 2012. Which, of course, means that more an more restructured mortgages are falling back into arrears, implying that the restructuring solutions do not work for at least 53% of mortgages to which they were applied.
• As of the end of Q2 2012, there were total of 169,598 mortgages (22.27% of all mortgages outstanding) that were at risk (in arrears, restructured and not in arrears, and subject to repossessions). This represents (using average household size) 463,003 persons.

Charts to illustrate above trends:

At this stage, there is no point of denying that all restructuring and other 'solutions' deployed by the banks and designed by the Government are not working. The mortgages crisis is raging on. When you look at the third chart above, even using old definition of mortgages at risk (>90 days arrears), the trend up is linear, implying a constant rise in mortgages risk. Even abstracting away from the possible effects of the new insolvencies legislation on mortgages defaults, the trend above suggests that by Q1 2013 we will be close to 150,000 mortgages at risk (using in arrears more than 90 days metric). This would push overall mortgages at risk to beyond 200,000. More than half a million Irish people will be living in households at risk of falling behind on their mortgages repayments. The question I would like to ask of our 'leaders' is "Then, what?"

7/6/2012: Sunday Times May 27, 2012

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article from May 27, 2012.

Slowly, but with punctuality and certainty of a German train system, Irish mortgages crisis continues to roll on.

This week’s comments from the Central Bank of Ireland, the Financial Regulator and the Department of Finance have exposed the reality of the problem. Our banks’ extend-and-pretend ‘solutions’ to dealing with defaulting mortgagees, was only compounded, not ameliorated, by the State prevarication on core crisis resolution measures, such as personal bankruptcy reforms, developing robust measures to compel banks to deal with the owner-occupier loans arrears and putting forward an infrastructure of supports for Irish mortgagees.

Now, pretending that capital injections based on year-old PCAR tests were sufficient to manage ‘the isolated cases’ of defaults no longer works for the Government. As revealed in the Central Bank comments this week, mortgages arrears have now spread like a forest fire, overwhelming the banking system. Per Central Bank admission, almost one quarter of all mortgages in Ireland are now at risk of default or defaulting, with mortgages in arrears 90 days and over accounting for 10.2% of all mortgages outstanding or 13.7% in terms of the amounts of mortgages involved.

Based on the latest available data, 77,630 mortgages across the nation were in arrears over 90 days in Q1 2012. Using the trends in figures to-date, that would imply de-acceleration in the quarterly rate of arrears build-up from 11.5% in Q4 2010 to Q1 2011, to 9.5% in Q1 2012, although in absolute numbers, arrears increased by 6,719 in Q1 2012 on previous quarter, against a rise of 5,101 a year ago.

There are more ominous signs in mortgages data that are likely to be confirmed in the forthcoming Q1 2012 report.

The main one is the rate of deterioration in the quality of already restructured mortgages. In Q4 2010, 59.4% of all restructured mortgages were classified as performing. In Q4 2011, only a year after, that number was 48.5%. This doesn’t even begin to address the bleak reality of previously restructured mortgages that are currently ‘maturing’ out of the temporary interest-only and reduced payment periods.

Courtesy of the Central Bank of Ireland, we do not have any meaningful data for mortgages restructured in 2008-2009, nor do we have any data on what exact vintages and arrangements these restructurings cover. But we do have some information on the matter from the four state-backed banks annual reports. In the case of these, 10.8% of owner-occupied mortgages were in arrears at the end of 2011, while the arrears rate amongst the mortgages that have been previously restructured was running at close to 33%. More significantly, the rate of arrears build up amongst restructured mortgages was running at 77% over 2011, outstripping a 59% rise in overall number of mortgages in arrears.

Now, recall that the entire Government strategy for dealing with mortgages defaults rests on the extend-and-pretend principle of delaying the recognition of the losses. This is done through imposition of forbearance period, introduction on the voluntary basis of a repayments reliefs. Thus, the restructured mortgages are supposed to be cheaper to maintain than ordinary mortgages. Presumably, the restructured mortgages are also closely monitored by the banks, allowing for earlier flagging of growing problems with repayments and potential additional restructuring before the arrears build up.

Yet, as counterintuitive as it might be, the overall strategy is patently not working exactly for those who were supposed to have benefited from it. The menu of solutions developed by our reformed Financial Regulator and the Central Bank and the policy-active Government departments, alongside numerous working groups and task forces is both woefully short of tools and largely ineffective in scope.

The belated realisation of this has now led the Central Bank of Ireland and the Financial Regulator to make repeated calls for the banks to proactively engage in driving up foreclosures and repossessions, appointments of receivers and enforcers. The problem, from the consumer-conscious, yet banks-supporting Dame Street institution is that its estimates for mortgages-related losses produced back in March 2011 are now at a risk of being overrun by the reality. The problem from the economy’s point of view is that these calls come at the time when we have no new tools for dealing with negative equity involved in such foreclosures, thus risking accelerated foreclosure process to become nothing more than an extension of the crisis itself.

Back in March 2011, the Central Bank estimated base-line scenario 2011-2013 banks losses on residential mortgages books of the four core banking institutions to reach €5,838 million. The adverse scenario is for losses of €9,491 million. Taking into the account changes in house prices since the beginning of the crisis, the current running rate of arrears can put losses on mortgages, if the delinquent properties were to be foreclosed, closer to the levels that would wipe out the capital cushion provided for mortgages losses. And this just for the first two years of the three-year programme. Thereafter, either capital for mortgages losses will have to come from other assets cover (such as Commercial Real Estate or SME loans or corporate lending), or fresh capital will have to be injected.

The irony, of course, is that as I suggested in my analysis of the PCAR results a year ago, the Blackrock original adverse case scenario for life-time losses on residential mortgages – put at €16,898 million – was probably closer to what can reasonably be expected to materialize in the current crisis. Incidentally, the difference between Blackrock’s estimates and Central Bank provisions would mean an injection of €2-4 billion of new capital into the banks to deal with worsening mortgages losses over 2013-2014. This is exactly the volume of additional capital required as estimated by the Deutsche Bank analysts in a note published last week.

So the crisis has now crossed or is about to cross the lower bound of PCARs-allowed losses. And the Central Bank is spurring on the banks to more aggressively foreclose on defaulting mortgages. A major issue with such calls is that absent reforms of personal insolvency regime, accelerated foreclosures will mean lower banks losses at the expense of households. Central Bank’s vision for ‘more robustly addressing the crisis’ would put more people into a perpetual serfdom to the banks in order to undercut banks losses.

Instead of forcing banks to foreclose on defaulting and at-risk mortgages, the Central Bank should create a series of structural incentives that will compel banks to share burden of negative equity with households in financial distress.

CB should shed their pro-banks stand and force banks to take on deeper losses on defaulting mortgagees for owner-occupiers. They should re-evaluate banks capital allocations, and ring-fence specific funds, well in excess of those allocated under PCAR to mortgages writedowns only. In the case where mortgages are at risk of default bit not yet defaulting, banks must be forced to restructure these with a haircut on overall debt relative to equity.

One of the vehicles for restructuring can be the model deployed in the 1920s under the land purchase annuities. Funding a combination of interest relief and mortgage maturity extension can be secured via Central Bank underwriting for a ring-fenced distressed mortgages pool. In addition, it is crucial that banks are forced to consider both the current and the expected future taxes and charges increases in computing mortgages affordability.

Mortgage-to-rent scheme and split mortgages are valid tools in some cases, but these are not being deployed fast enough and the banks have no incentive to structure these in favour of the households. Short-term forbearance should be replaced by measures aimed at achieving long-term sustainability.

A functional and robust mechanism must be put in place to independently oversee the on-going restructuring of these debts. Having sided with the banks all the way through the crisis, existent State bodies cannot be trusted to deliver on this. Instead, a transparent and fully independent entity, involving the non-profit sector operating in the areas of assisting people in mortgages difficulties, plus the strengthened Financial Services Ombudsman and the National Consumer Agency, should be put in place to police the resolution process. Legacy institutions, such as Mabs, should be reformed, if not reconstituted top-to-bottom. Alongside the reform, their resources, professional and board-level, should be strengthened.

Simply talking tough at the banks, as our Financial Regulator and the Central Bank are doing, will not resolve the crisis we face.

CHARTS:

Source: Author calculations based on data from the Central Bank of Ireland

Box-out:

A recent World Bank research paper “Performance-Related Pay in the Public Sector: A Review of Theory and Evidence” surveyed the literature on the theoretical and empirical studies of performance-related pay schemes in the public sector spanning the fields of public administration, psychology, economics, education, and health. The authors found that, based on a comprehensive review of 110 studies of public sector and relevant private sector jobs, a majority of studies (some 60%) found a positive effect of performance-related pay, with higher quality empirical studies generally more positive in their findings (68%). However, these studies predominantly covered jobs where the outputs or outcomes are more readily observable, such as teaching, health care, and revenue collection. There is insufficient evidence, positive or negative, of the effect of performance-related pay in organizations characterized by task complexity and the difficulty of measuring outcomes. Several observational studies identify problems “with unintended consequences and gaming of the incentive scheme”. With a number of caveats in place, this evidence strongly suggests that Irish Government approach to ‘reforming’ the public sector within the confines of tenure-based, rather than performance-based salaries and bonuses, as enshrined in the Croke Park agreement, is a false start on achieving meaningful productivity improvements in the sectors where outputs can and should be measured and cross-linked to actual performance.

25/5/2012: Mortgages in Arrears: Q1 2012

Latest mortgages arrears data from the CB of Ireland came in with a slight surprise that most of the media should have anticipated. During the launch of the annual report, the CBofI has pre-leaked some of the top-level figures for arrears, with media reports of 10.5% (or ca 80,000) of mortgages in arrears expected in Q1 2012 figures. Of course, given the usual tactic of first exaggerating, then underwhelming (presumably there's some psychological strategy working its magic somewhere here), it should have been expected that actual numbers - bad as they may be otherwise - will 'surprise' to the positive side relative to the leak-related expectations. It might have worked.

Alas, the end numbers - whether or not they are better than leaked out 'estimates' - are pretty dismal.

In Q1 2012, there were 764,138 mortgages outstanding amounting to €112,688.5 million. The latter number is €789 million down on Q4 2011 and€3.27 billion lower than Q1 2011 figure. So in 12 months, with foreclosures and restructuring factored in, Irish mortgagees were able to pay down just 2.82% of the mortgages outstanding. This is not exactly a massive rate of de-leveraging for heavily indebted households.

Of these, 77,630 mortgages were in arrears over 90 days (up 9.4% qoq and 56.5% yoy), with total outstanding amounts of €15,386 million (up 10% qoq and 60.3% yoy). Previous quarter-on-quarter increases were, respectively, 12.7% and 13.1%.

Repossessions in Q1 2012 stood at 961 up from 896 in Q4 2011.

Restructured mortgages:

• At the end of Q1 2012, there were 38,658 mortgages restructured, but not in arreas, up 5.06% qoq (against previous qoq rise of 1.16%) and up 5.44% yoy.
• In addition, there were 41.054 restructured mortgages that were in arrears, up 9.23% qoq against previous quarterly rise of 12.67%, and up 56.25% yoy.

Overall, defining at risk or defaulted mortgages as those mortgages that are currently in arrears (including restructured and in arrears), plus restructured but not in arrears mortgages and repossessions:

• At the end of Q1 2012 there were 117,249 at risk or defaulted mortgages, constituting 15.34% of all mortgages outstanding and amounting to €21.72 billion, or 19.27% of total volume of mortgages outstanding.
• Number of mortgages at risk or defaulted has increased 7.93% qoq in Q1 2012 as compared to a rise of 8.39% qoq in Q4 2011. Annual rise in Q1 2012 was 34.83%.
• Volume of mortgages at risk or defaulted has increased 8.09% qoq in Q1 2012 as compared to a rise of 9.8% qoq in Q4 2011, and there was an annual increase of 37.67%.
• In Q4 2011, mortgages that are at risk or defaulted constituted 14.13% of the total number of mortgages, while in Q1 2011 the proportion was 11.11%, and this rose to 15.34% in Q1 2012.

CHARTS:

Note: more on this next week.

18/2/2012: Mortgage Arrears Q4 2011

The Central bank of Ireland has published Q4 2011 stats for mortgages arrears. And it's a trend-breaking one. Not quite touching my forecast from Q3 2011 data for 114,000 mortgages at risk (see definition below), but jaw-dropping 108,603 and counting mortgages that were written off since Q34 2010 when more detailed records were first published - closer to 102,200.

Now, let me run through the core details of the data.

The number of outstanding mortgages accounts has fallen from 786,745 in Q4 2010 to 768,917 in Q4 2011 - a drop of 2.19% or 17,247. In previous quarter, yoy decline in mortgages numbers was 1.94% or 15,325. The outstanding balance of mortgages has dropped from €116,683.25 mln in Q4 2010 to €113,477.28 mln in Q4 2011, so yoy Q4 2011 decrease in mortgages balances was 2.75%, against 2.55% decrease yoy in Q3 2011.

Of all mortgages, 17,825 mortgages were in arrears 91-180 days in Q4 2011, an increase of 7.39% qoq and 35.35% yoy. In Q3 2011, qoq increase in same type of mortgages was 5.6% and yoy increase was 33.62%. So the rate of mortgages in arrears 91-180 days category is accelerating in qoq and yoy terms. Mortgages in arrears 91-180 days have accounted for €3,273.8 mln in Q4 2011, which is 7.02% ahead of Q3 2011 and 34.37% ahead of Q4 2010. This means than we are now seeing smaller mortgages (in absolute size) on average entering into arrears. Amounts of arrears in this category rose 10.04% qoq and 13.61% yoy in Q4 2011 to €89.15 mln. This represents another acceleration from Q3 deterioration.

Mortgages in arrears over 180 days (usually seen as mortgages that are extremely highly unlikely to ever rise from the ashes) now stand at 53,086 up 14.5% qoq and 69.4% yoy. Yep, that right, in Q4 2010 there were just 31,338 mortgages in this category. Compare these dynamics to Q3 2011 when same category of mortgages in arrears rose 15.8% qoq and 65.32% yoy. So the dynamics are slightly shallower on qoq but are sharper yoy. Balance of all mortgages in arrears over 180 days now stands at €10,667.02mln - up 14.56% qoq and 72.34% yoy. The dynamics are very much the same as with the number of mortgages - qoq slightly slower growth, yoy accelerating growth.

So total number of mortgages over 90 days in arrears is now 70,911, up 12.61% qoq and 59.32% yoy. In Q3 2011 the quarterly rate of increase in these mortgages was 12.92% and yoy increase was 55.59%. Balance of all mortgages over 90 days in arrears is now €13,490.8mln - up 12.7% qoq and 61.62% yoy, compared to Q3 2011 increase of 14.14% qoq and 58.69% increase yoy. Total amount of arrears registered is €1,117.12mln which is 12.7% ahead of Q3 2011 and 61.62% higher than Q4 2010.

 The above means that a massive 12.29% of all mortgages accounts in Ireland are now in arrears 90 days or over by total volume of mortgages in arrears and 9.22% by the number of mortgages accounts in arrears.

Now, take all mortgages in arrears 90 days or over, add to them those mortgages that were restructured, but are currently not in arrears and the mortgages currently in the process of repossessions. Call this 'mortgages at risk of default, in default or defaulted' or for short, mortgages at risk. Chart below illustrates the stats:

 In Q4 2011 total number of mortgages 'at risk' stood at 108,603 - a number that represents 14.12% of all mortgages in the country. This represents an increase of 8.35% qoq (in q3 2011 qoq rate of increase was 4.44%) and 35.25% yoy.

As chart above shows, there is deterioration in mortgages performance even amidst those mortgages that have been restructured.  Total number of restructured mortgages in Q4 2011 was 74,378, which represents an increase of 6.66% qoq and 25.58% yoy. In Q3 2011 there was a qoq decrease of 0.15%. Of the restructured mortgages, 36,797 were not in arrears in Q4 2011 - an increase of 1.16% qoq and 4.52% yoy. However, while number of restructured mortgages not in arrears rose by 421 in Q4 2011 (qoq), the number of total restructured mortgages rose by 4,644. Which means that some 4,223 restructured mortgages went into new arrears in Q4 2011. Overall, percentage of mortgages that are restructured but are not in arrears has dropped from 59.44% in Q4 2010 to 49.47% in Q4 2011. Restructuring of mortgages now works for less than 50% of restructured mortgages - and that is only within 2 years of the beginning of the entire data on these!

Now, do keep in mind that restructuring was quite severe in many cases. See bottom of CBofI release on this here. And it doesn't seem to work all too well for just over 50% of those entering new temporary arrangements. So what will happen to these families when the 'temporary' arrangements expire?

20/12/2011: IMF IV Review of Ireland Programme

Fourth review of Ireland's programme under the Troika package is out and makes for some interesting reading. As usual, between-the-lines reading skills required. This is the first post on the report, focusing on housing markets and mortgages arrears.


The review is overall positive, complimentary and almost glowing. This warrants a number of caveats:

• The review is based on QNA data through H1 2011, so Q3 2011 fall-off in GDP and GNP are not factored in
• The review is based on the general data sources through mid-October, so November Exchequer results do not appear to have been factored in either

Aside from the strengths highlighted in the media, here are the critical points of the report. Mortgages arrears first, with subsequent posts dealing with other core issues covered.

"However, housing market and household debt indicators continue to deteriorate (Figure 2). With the fall in house prices accelerating in October to 15.1 percent on an annual basis, prices are down 45.4 percent from their peak in 2007. The rate of mortgage arrears by value continued to rise, reaching 10.8 percent in September 2011 (8.1 percent in terms of the number of mortgages), up from 6.6 percent in September 2010. With the share of longer-term arrears (greater than 180 days) continuing to rise, the authorities have deepened their analysis of the mortgage arrears problem (Box 1)."

Of interest here is the analysis the IMF refers to. Here is the summary (quoted from the IMF report, my comments in italics):

1. Aggregate mortgage arrears continue to rise sharply and in September 2011 reached 8.1 percent by the number of loans to owner-occupiers. 
2. To better understand the nature of mortgage distress, the CBI has utilized loan-by-loan data from end-2010 that were collected as part of the review of banks’ capital needs published at end-March 2011. [I am puzzled with this statement. CBI clearly stated at the time of PCARs that they did not analyse individual loans data for mortgages, but considered samples of mortgages. At a later date - in September 2011, CBI gave a presentation of a study based on the specific loans data, but this was also based on a sample of data, a large sample, but still a sample, not the entire population of the mortgages on the books of 4 banks.]
3. Of those households in arrears over 90 days, almost 40 percent have been in this position for a year or more. The average amount of arrears on these loans is €27,000, compared with an average outstanding balance of just over €200,000. [Please, keep in mind, per IMF, this is data through the end of 2010, so it is, by now - one year old!]
4. On top of arrears of 90 days or more, there are a significant number of borrowers who have restructured loans or delinquent payments of less than 90 days, bringing the total affected to about 20 percent of borrowers at end-2010. [These figures - 20% of borrowers either in arrears or restructured, or as I call these 'at risk' - is much greater than reported by the CBI in their quarterly report, showing for Q3 2011 that only 12.96% of all mortgages outstanding were either in arrears, restructured or repossessed]
5. Arrears tend to be highest in relation to buy-tolet properties and first-time buyers, as these purchasers took on large debts owing to high house prices during 2005–08. 
6. Negative equity is extensive. It is estimated that 36 percent of owner-occupier households with mortgages in these institutions are in negative equity (at September 2011 house prices). [This, of course, is now higher again, as October and November price declines totalled 3.71%] 
7. For owner-occupier loans taken between 2005 and 2008 (half of outstanding loans), 48 percent of properties are in negative equity, while 52 percent of buy-to-let loans are in negative equity. [The two numbers are remarkably close to each other.]
8. Negative equity does not imply arrears. Despite widespread negative equity amongst borrowers, the vast majority of negative equity borrowers, over 90 percent, were not in arrears at end-2010. 
9. About half of owner-occupier borrowers in arrears at end-2010 had positive equity, with around 38 percent having at least 20 percent equity in their homes. The average negative equity of owner-occupiers without arrears is €68,000, modestly smaller than the average of €84,000 for owner-occupiers in arrears. [Which, of course, means that these arrears can be dealt with at no loss to the banks via a combination of restructuring, equity stakes assumption by the banks and/or foreclosures. In the end, this also means that significantly less resources will be needed to help those who are in negative equity and at risk of arrears - i.e. those who are subject to punitive provisions of our personal bankruptcy code]
10. Buy-to-let properties. Of the total loan book analyzed, 22 percent (€20 billion out of €87 billion), relates to buy-to-let property debt. The average outstanding balance for the 52 percent of buy-to-let properties in negative equity is about €320,000 and the average negative equity is just over €100,000.
11. Within the four institutions covered by the Financial Measures Program, 33 percent of buy-to-let borrowers also have an owner-occupier mortgage with the same lender.  

Some very interesting observations from the IMF summary of the CBI evidence on drivers of arrears: 

• Studies, including from other countries, point to unemployment, debt service, and loan-to-value ratios as key determinants for arrears, although geography and loan vintage are also important, as are rental and payment rates for buy-to-let properties. 
• Data availability can be an issue, however, especially for current income. 
• An alternative approach developed a transition matrix for predicting mortgage arrears based on loan vintage, borrower type, interest rate type, and region.

There's no summary of the transition matrix provided.

Here are three more interesting charts relating to the Irish property market:

18/11/2011: Mortgages Arrears for Q3 2011

Data for Irish Mortgages defaults for Q3 2011 was released today by the Central Bank and is already causing some commotions. That is because by the broader metric I deployed recently, including in last week's Sunday Times article (see here), we are now beyond 100K number when it comes to mortgages at risk.

let me un through the figures. Note that the CB has changed methodology for reporting back in Q3 2010, expanding reporting. So I estimated some of the sub-series back to Q3 2009 when the narrower reporting was first introduced. Thus, caution should be applied to taking Q3 2009-Q2 2010 data. Also, note that 2011 figure - corresponding to Q4 2011 - is a forecast based on mortgages arrears dynamics by each subcategory of mortgages.

• In Q3 2011 there were 773,420 mortgages outstanding in Ireland a decline of 3,901 on Q2 2011 (-0.5% qoq) and 15,325 yoy (-1.94%). This represents a drop of 2.7% or 21,189 mortgages on Q3 2009.
• The outstanding value of mortgages has declined €676,166 or 0.59% qoq to €114.41bn down from €115.09bn in Q2 2011 and €117.40bn in Q3 2010. Note that in Q2 2011 Irish household deposits were €87.00bn which implies that Mortgages to Deposits ratio in Ireland is at 131.5% well ahead of the LTDs mandated for the irish banks for all loans at 125.5%.

Of the above mortgages:

• In Q3 2011 there were 62,970 mortgages in arrears 91 days and over with the balance of €12.37bn. This represents an increase of 7,207 mortgages qoq (+12.92%) and 22,498 mortgages yoy (+55.59%). Compared to Q3 2009, the number of mortgages in this category is estimated to have risen by 36,699 mortgages or 139.7%. In terms of value of the mortgages in arrears, the value rose 14.13% qoq and 58.7% yoy. I mentioned in the previous articles on the subject that we can expect faster increases in mortgages in arrears values, rather than numbers as arrears primarily hit most those households that tended to borrow more in the years around the peak of the property markets.
• Repossessions also rose from 809 in Q2 2011 to 884 in Q3 2011 (+75 or 9.27% qoq). Repossessions are now up 69.7% yoy (+363) and are estimated to have risen 501% on Q3 2009 (+737).
• Restructured loans that are no in arrears are down from 39,395 in Q2 2011 (value of these loans was €6.66bn) to 36,376 (€5.93bn) - a decline of 3,019 mortgages qoq or 7.7%. Year on year these mortgages are up 9.7% or 3,212.

Based on the above we can define mortgages at risk and defaulted to include all mortgages that are currently in arrears, all mortgages that are restructured, but are not in arrears and mortgages that went through the repossessions. 

• In Q3 2011 total mortgages at risk or defaulted stood at 100,230 with the total value of €18.3bn, up 4,263 mortgages (+4.4%) qoq and 26,073 mortgages (+35.2%) on Q3 2010. Since Q3 2009 these mortgages rose in number some estimated 125.9%. In value, mortgages at risk or defaulted have risen €803mln qoq (+4.6%) and €10.5bn yoy (+134.7%).

As chart above summarizes, percentage of mortgages at risk relative to overall number of mortgages has risen in Q3 2011 to 12.96% from 12.35% in Q2 2011. The value of mortgages at risk has increased from 15.2% of all mortgages value to 15.99%.

It is worth noting that Q3 dynamics represent a marked slowdown on the rates of increases in mortgages at risk in previous quarters. This decrease is accounted for as follows:

• Total number of mortgages outstanding paydown slowed from -0.65% in Q2 2011 relative to Q1 2011 to -0.50% in Q3 2011 relative to Q2 2011. This means that the base decline was slower, pushing down the percentage change in the relative share of mortgages at risk.
• Number of mortgages in arrears rose +12.9% in Q2 2011 relative to Q1 2011 and this rate was +12.4% in Q3 2011 relative to Q2 2011 - hardly a marked slowdown here.
• Number of mortgages restructured but not in arrears rose +7.5% in Q2 2011 relative to Q1 2011 and declined -7.7% in Q3 2011 relative to Q2 2011 - this is the core driver of mortgages at risk growth slowdown. Unfortunately we do not know if this decline was driven by these mortgages exiting the restructuring arrangement by going into arrears, or returning back to performing mortgages (for how long can these be expected to remain there is another question), or going into new renegotiations for further restructuring.

16/10/2011: Negative Equity and Debt Restructuring

This is unedited version of my article in Irish Mail on Sunday (October 16):

This week, we finally learned the official figure for what it would cost to address one of the biggest problems facing this country.

According to the Keane Report - or the Inter-Departmental Mortgage Arrears Working Group Report - writing off negative equity for all Irish mortgages will cost “in the region of €14 billion”. Doing the same just for mortgages taken out between 2006 and 2008 would require some €10 billion.

These numbers are truly staggering, not because of they are so high, but the opposite: because they contrast the State’s unwillingness to help ordinary Irish families caught in the gravest economic crisis we have ever faced with the relatively low cost it would take to do so.

Let me explain.

Firstly, the figure of €14billion itself is a gross overestimate of the true cost of dealing with negative equity. This is because this figure appears to include not just owner-occupiers but also people with buy-to-let loans in his sums.

Secondly, the real amount required to get rid of negative equity where it matters most – for ordinary first-time buyers - is lower still. For example the scheme could be set up in a sliding scale based on value of house compared to average house prices. This would reduce the final cost of the scheme and help those who need it most - moderate income and younger-age households.

In other words, a realistic and effective debt cancellation scheme can be priced at closer to €6-8 billion instead of the €10-14 billion estimated in the report.

In its simplest form it would work like this: say you bought a house for €300,000, with a mortgage of €250,000, and it is now worth just €150,000. The government, or the bank using the recapitalisation funds they have received, would pay off the €100,000 difference.

By doing this your monthly payments would be less, and you could now sell up to pay off the debt or move house, and in the meantime the extra money you have to spend could go back into the economy.

The scheme could even be set up so that write downs would be smaller on houses with above average values so as to prioritise young and low-earning families. In the above example, if the house was purchased for, say €500,000 and is no worth half that amount, the bank would write-off, say, €200,000, leaving the household with residual negative equity of €50,000. This would still improve affordability, but will also cut the overall cost of the scheme.

So why did the report completely rule this out? It was very clear on this topic: “a blanket debt or negative equity forgiveness scheme would not be an effective use of State resources and would not solve the problem,’ it says.

But it goes further, claiming that “the primary driver of mortgage arrears is affordability, not negative equity. While a write-down of negative equity would help mortgage holders in arrears, in many cases it is unlikely to create an affordable mortgage”.

I believe this rejection betrays the overall lack of understanding by our senior civil service officials of the problems we face.

The Irish economy is suffering primarily from three things. The biggest is excessive household debt.

While this would be bad enough, it is exacerbated by two additional factors. The cost of the government’s policy of bailing out our banks, which is being paid for with higher taxes on ordinary working households. And the rising cost of mortgagesdue to aggressive drive by Irish banks to improve their profit margins at the expense of the most vulnerable mortgage holders - those with adjustable rate mortgages who cannot protest. Both contribute to mortgages defaults.

By saying that cancelling negative equity will not be a magic bullet solution to the problem of the defaulting mortgages, the report is simply referencing the smaller problem of mortgage affordability to evade addressing the effects of the much larger crisis facing us.

Negative equity is the single most egregious and damaging segment of the debt problem faced by Irish families.

It is the most egregious because it was caused not by reckless borrowing, but by reckless lending by the banks - actively supported at the time by the Irish Government.

The problem of negative equity is the result of state policy in the first place, and it is up to the state to rectify it.

And contrary to the assertion of the report and Government claims, we do have the funds to deal with negative equity. Freeing these funds to help ordinary families is just a matter of priorities for the Government and the state-controlled banks.

To-date, the Irish Government has injected €63 billion worth of taxpayers’ funds into Irish banks.

Various other commitments, and the banks’ own state-guaranteed borrowings from the Central Bank bring the total cost of keeping our banking sector working to a gross figure of about €125 billion.

Yet while they have saved the banks, all of these measures have acted to increase, rather than reduce, the level of debt being carried by the households of this country.

In addition to their own household borrowings like credit cards or credit union loans, mortgages-holders are now in effect liable both for banks’ debts and their losses on property development and investment.

In contrast, even at Keane’s upper estimates, the cost of paying off negative equity liabilities for household mortgages would require just one ninth of the funds we have made available to the banks.

Last July the Government injected some €19 billion worth of capital into Irish banks. This capital is provided to cover potential future losses on loans. This included €9.5 billion, which was the estimated worst-case scenario for losses on residential mortgages. It also included another €8.9 billion to cover remaining expected losses on commercial property.

If some of these funds were used instead to restructure negative equity mortgages on family homes it would do two things for the banks.

Firstly, because the banks would now have securities as valuable as the mortgages they have given, a mortgage default would not be such a threat in terms of losses. This then reduces the bank’s need for further capital.

Secondly, the writedown of the mortgages will prevent defaults in the first place, at least for some families.

This implies that prioritising how that money is used to help mortgages rather than losses on commercial property loans, will be a more effective way to improve their balance sheets.

And it’s not like the money is not there. Our banking system currently has surplus capital available. Since August this year, our ‘pillar’ banks, instead of helping the struggling households, have used taxpayers funds to quietly buy high-yield Irish Government bonds.

Some €3 billion worth of Government debt was bought by the banks using our money in order to beef up their own profits. Don’t tell us that the banks cannot afford negative equity restructuring when they clearly can afford buying junk bonds in the markets to book higher profits.

And the farcical nature of Irish government responses to the mortgages and personal debt crises continues.

The Keane report ruled out increasing tax relief on mortgage interest finance for first time buyers during the boom, 2004-2008. Why? Because the estimated cost each year would have been €120 million.

Yet, come November, the very same state will pay in full the unguaranteed and unsecured €737 million debt of the bankrupt zombie Anglo. Between Anglo and INBS, the state has also committed to repaying in full €2.4 billion more of similar bonds in 2012.

Instead of repaying un-guaranteed bondholders, the Government should use the funds available to the banks to cancel commercial property-related losses on banks books, freeing the capital injected for this purpose in July this year to restructure negative equity mortgages.

Earlier this year, I proposed that Irish Government impose an obligatory restructuring of all mortgages to achieve a maximum Loan-to-Value ratio of 110%.

This would reduce the problem of ‘moral hazard’ because households with greater borrowings will still be left with more debt than their more prudent counterparts. But it would also reduce the overall debt burden faced by our families, freeing them to return to active economic and social life, helping to restart the Irish economy. Based on the Keane Report’s own estimates of the cost of such a scheme we have more than enough money to make this choice.

All we need is the will - the will to free hundreds of thousands of Irish families from the negative equity jail that was built by reckless banks which lent the money with explicit approval of the previous Governments.