06/09/2011: Recapitalization of Irish Banks 2011

On August 31, 2011 Irish Government committed €17.3 billion of our - taxpayers - money to underwrite banks recapitalization following the PCAR 2011 exercise carried out by the CBofI. Three "banks" - BofI, AIB and IL&P received the funds. Here is the official summary of how these funds were distributed. No comment to follow.

10/08/2011: Bank of Ireland Interim Results H1 2011

Bank of Ireland interim results are out today, confirming, broadly speaking several assertions I've made before. You can skip to the end of the note to read my conclusions, unless you want to see specifics.

The numbers and some comments:

• Operating profit before impairments down from €479mln to €163mln. Profits before tax rose to €556mln compared to €116mln a year ago. Please remember that PCAR tests assumed strong operating profit performance for the bank through 2013. BofI net loss was €507mln reduced by the one-off gains of €143mln. While it is impossible to say from these short-run results if PCAR numbers are impacted, if deterioration in underlying profit takes place, ceteris paribus, recapitalization numbers will change.
• Impairment charges fell from €1,082mln to €842mln - which is good news. The decline is 22.2% - significant, but on a smaller base of assets and contrasted with 72% drop off in operating profit.
• Residential mortgages impairments shot straight up from €142mln to €159mln against a relatively healthier mortgages book that BofI holds. This 11% rise overall conceals a massive 30% increase in Irish residential mortgages impairments in 12 months. Again - predicted by some analysts before, but not factored fully into either PCAR tests or banking policies at large. Despite claims by Richie Boucher that these are in line with bank expectations, the bank expects mortgages arrears to peak in mid-2012. This is unlikely in my view, as even PCAR tests do not expect the peak to happen until 2016-2017. In addition, the bank view ignores the risk of amplified defaults should the Government bring in robust personal bankruptcy reform. The PCAR indirectly accounted for this, but in a very ad hoc way.
  
• So mortgages arrears in Ireland are now running at 4.55% for owner-occupiers and 7.84% for buy-to-let mortgages, with 3,900 mortgage 'modified' in the period and 5,000 more in process of 'modifications'.
• Past-due loans stood at €5.743 billion in H1 2011 down from €5.892 billion in H2 2010. However, impaired loans rose from €10.982 billion in H2 2010 to €12.311 billion in H1 2011. So overall, past-due and impaired loans accounted for 16% of the loan book (at €18,054 million) in H1 2011 against 14% of the book (€16,874 million) in H2 2010. (see table below)

• Total volumes of mortgages held by the bank is now €58 billion down from €60 billion in H1 2010. However residential mortgages held in Ireland remain static at €28 billion, so there appears to be no deleveraging amongst Irish households despite some writedowns of mortgages in the year to date.
• SME and corporate loans volumes dropped from €31 billion a year ago to €28 billion in H1 2011.
• Property and construction loans declined €1 billion to €23 billion of which €19 billion is investment loans (down €1 billion) and the balance (unchanged yoy) is land.
• So far, as the result of deleveraging, bank assets book became more geared toward residential mortgages (52% as opposed to 51% a year ago), less geared toward SME and corporate sector (25% today as opposed to 26% a year ago) and unchanged across Property and Construction (20%), but slightly down on consumer loans (3%). In other words, the bank is now 72% vested into property markets against 71% in H1 2010.
  
• With only 1/2 Bank of Ireland's assets sourced in Ireland, impairments were reduced by 22% by its operations abroad, which contributed to almost 50% reduction in its underlying pretax loss. This suggests that as the bank continues to sell overseas assets, its longer term exposure to Ireland will expand, implying that the positive impact of the disposed assets on the bottom line will be reduced as.
• Table below breaks down impaired loans and provisions, showing - as the core result that overall impaired loans as % of all loans assets is are now at 11%, against 9.2% at the end of December 2010.
• Coverage ratios are generally determined by the nature of the loan assets and the extent and quality of underlying collateral held against the loan. Across the bank, impairment provisions as a percentage of impaired loans declined from 45% in H2 2010 to 44% at H1 2011. The coverage ratio on Residential mortgages increased from 67% to 72% over the period. However, Residential mortgages that are ‘90 days past due’, where no loss is expected to be incurred, are not included in ‘impaired loans’ in the table below. This represents added risk due to potential inaccuracies in valuations on underlying collateral and/or value of the assets. If all Residential mortgages that are ‘90 days past due’ were included in ‘impaired loans’, the coverage ratio for Residential mortgages would be 29% at
  30 June 2011, unchanged from 31 December 2010. Which, means that risk offset cushion carried by the bank would not have increased since December 2010. In H1 2011, the Non-property SME and corporate loans coverage ratio has increased to 42% from 40% on H2 2010. The coverage ratio on the Property and construction loans was 38% at 30 June 2011 down from 42% at 31 December 2010 primarily due to an increase in Investment property loans which are ‘90 days past due’ that are "currently being renegotiated but where a loss is not anticipated".
  
  

• Per bank own statement: ‘Challenged’ loans include ‘impaired loans’, together with elements of ‘past due but not impaired’, ‘lower quality but not past due nor impaired’ and loans at the lower end of ‘acceptable quality’ which are subject to increased credit scrutiny.
• Table below highlights the volumes of challenged loans.
• Pre-impairment total volume of loans stood at €111.902bn of which €24.464bn were challenged - a rate of 21.9%. In H2 2010 the same numbers were €119.432bn, €23.787bn or 19.9%. In other words, they really do know how to lend in BofI, don't they? Every euro in five is now under stress according to their own metrics.
  

• Per bank statement, deposits remain largely unchanged at the bank at €65 billion (through end of June), same as at the end of December 2010.
  
• This is offset by the fact that parts of its UK deposits book has grown over this period of time, implying contraction in deposits in Ireland. The bank statement shows Irish customer deposits at €34 billion in H1 2011, down from €35 billion in H1 2010. The UK deposits overall remained static at €21 billion (due to stronger Euro against sterling, with sterling deposits up from 18bn to 19bn year on year).
• With ECB/CBofI funding BofI to the tune of €29 billion, the above figures imply that the bank in effect depends on monetary authorities for more funds than its entire Irish customers deposits base, which really means that it is hardly a fully functional retail bank, but rather a sort of a hybrid dependent on the good will of Euro area subsidy.
  
• Loans to deposits ratio fell to 164% - massively shy of 122.5% the Regulator identified as the target for 2011-2013 adjustments. Which means that the scale of disposals will have to be large. This in turn implies higher downside risk from disposal of performing assets (selection bias working against the bank balance sheet in the future). The bank needs to sell some €10 billion worth of loans and work off €20 billion more by the end of 2013 to comply with PCAR target to reduce its dependence on ECB funding.
  
• Reliance on the Central Bank funding is down €1 billion to €29 billion - and that is in the period when the Irish Government put €3 billion of deposits into BofI.
  
• The Gov (NTMA) deposits amount to €3 billion and were counted as ordinary deposits on the Capital markets book, in which case, of course, the outflow of the real Irish deposits from the bank was pretty big. BofI provides an explanation for these numbers on page 2o of its report, stating: "Capital Markets deposits amounted to €9.7 billion at 30 June 2011 as compared with €9.2 billion at 31 December 2010. The net increase of €0.5 billion reflects the receipt of €3 billion deposits from the National Treasury Management Agency (which were repaid following the 2011 Capital Raise in late July 2011) partly offset by loss of deposits as a result of the disposal of BOISS whose customers had placed deposits of €1 billion with the Group at 31 December 2010 and an outflow of other Capital Markets deposits of €1.5 billion during the six months ended 30 June 2011."
  
• Hence, excluding Government deposits, the bank deposit book stood at €62 billion. Factoring out Gov (NTMA) deposits into the loans/deposits ratio implies the ratio rising to 172% from 164%.
  
• Wholesale funding declined €9 billion to €61 billion with some improved maturity (€3 billion of decline came from funding >1 year to maturity, against €6 billion of decline in funding with <1 year in maturity). The bank raised €2.9 billion in term loans in 2 months through July 2011 - a stark contrast to the rest of the IRL6 zombies.

• Net interest margin - the difference between average lending rates and funding costs - fell from 1.41% in H1 2010 to 1.33% in H1 2011 as funding costs rose internationally and as Irish households' ability to pay deteriorated further. Net interest income was down 14% as costs of deposits rose.
  
• In addition, the cost of the government guarantee of Bank of Ireland's liabilities rose 58% from H1 2010 to €239mln in H1 2011.
  
• By division, underlying operating profit before impairment charges fell in all divisions.
• Cost income ratio shot up from 61% a year ago to 83% in H1 2011.
• It's worth noting the costs base at the bank: Operating expenses were €431mln for H1 2011, a decrease of €36mln compared to H1 2010. Average staff numbers (full time equivalents) = 5,519 for H1 2011 were 101 lower on H1 2010. The staff numbers, therefore, are really out of line with decreasing business levels

• Bank Core tier 1, and total capital ratios were 9.5% and 11.0% respectively, against 31 December 2010 Core tier 1, and total capital ratios of 9.7%, and 11.0%. Were €3.8 billion (net) equity capital raising completed at 30 June 2011, the Group’s Core tier 1 ratio would have been 14.8%. Note that, much unreported: "A Contingent capital note with a nominal value of €1.0 billion and which qualifies as Tier 2 capital was issued to the State in July 2011." This comes with maturity of 5 years. The note has a coupon of 10%, which can be increased to 18% if the State wish to sell the note. If the Core tier 1 capital of the Group’s falls below 8.25%, the note automatically converts to ordinary stock at the conversion price of the volume-weighted average price of the ordinary stock over the 30 days prior to conversion, subject to a minimum conversion price of €0.05 per unit.

Summary:

• Overall, BofI confirmed with today's results that it is the only bank that we can feasibly rescue out of the entire IRL6 institutions, as impairments in BofI decline is contrasted with ca 30% rise in impairments at the AIB over the same H1 2011.
• However, severe headwinds remain on mortgages side and provisioning, funding and costs.
• The figures for impairments and 'challenged' loans show that the bank faces elevated risks on at least 22% of its loans.
• The figures on funding side show that the bank is still far from being a functional self-funding entity.
• The figures on deposits side show that it continues to lose business despite shrinking its margins to attract depositors.
• The figures on staffing and costs side show that the bank management has no executable strategy to bring under control its operating costs.
• The figures on lending side show the the bank is amplifying its exposure to property rather than reducing it, in effect becoming less diversified and higher risk.
• The figures on deleveraging side show that the bank risk profile can be severely adversely impacted by the CBofI-mandated disposals of assets.
  

And that's folks, is the best bank we've got of all IRL6!

10/08/2011: Was US markets panic behind Irish banks shares crash?

I've just crunched through some interesting data on VIX and Irish Financials index IFIN and there are some interesting results.

To remind you - VIX is in effect a market-based metric of risk in the US markets.

The main premise advanced by the proponents of the argument that US financial crisis drove Irish financial crisis is that panics in the US have caused irrationally pessimistic revaluations of the Irish financial equities and thus led to the collapse of the banks shares in H2 2007- H2 2009.

To assess this, I divided daily data from VIX and IFIN into three periods. Pre-crisis period covers data from January 2000 through July 2007. Financial crisis period covers data from August 2007 through December 2009, while Sovereign crisis period runs from January 2010 through today.

Given the nature of data, VIX data for intraday spreads is only available since September 2003.

Table below summarizes core stats on the data:
Several features worth highlighting in the above:

• IFIN data shows declining positive skew over the evolution of the crises, while VIX shows growing positive skew. This suggests that rising US risk aversion (VIX) was becoming structural over time as crises progressed from financials to sovereigns, while Irish financials were moving from positively skewed distribution in the pre-crisis period (positive non-risk premium to Irish financials) to progressively smaller positive skew in the crises periods. This is not consistent with the risk spillover from the US to Ireland story.
• Intraday variation in Irish financials remains smaller than in VIX, but shows qualitatively similar dynamics to VIX. However, increase in intraday variation during the crises is much stronger in the Irish financials than in VIX, which again suggests that risk pricing in the US markets had little to do with Irish financials risk-pricing. Notice that intraday spreads are highly non-normal in their distribution with third and fourth moments off the charts.
  
• 1-month dynamic correlations between VIX and IFIN remained negative across all periods (implying that rising US risk was associated with falling IFIN valuations), but relatively weak (at maximum mode of 0.35 on average). median correlations show a bit more dynamism during the crisis, rising from -0.41 in pre-crisis period to -0.51 during the Financial crisis period and declining to -0.45 in Sovereign crisis period. However, these are not dramatic either. In fact, positive skewness was reinforced during the Financial crisis period, while negative kurtosis declined in absolute value.

Chart above summarises the entire series of data, showing historically relatively weak, but negative (as expected) correlation between the values of Irish financial shares and the risk levels in the US markets.

Chart below breaks this down into three periods:
What's interesting in the above chart is that:

1. Correlation remains negative but explanatory power significantly declines in the period of Financial Crisis (so the picture is the opposite of the claim that the US 'panic' spilled over into Irish markets), while the slope remains relatively stable.
2. More interestingly, the relationship completely disappears since the onset of the Sovereign crisis. basically, once the IFIN hit 4,000 levels, there is no longer any meaningful connection between Irish financial shares prices and risk attitudes or perceptions in the US markets. Guess what - that magic number was reached around 29/09/2008.

Chart below plots 1mo dynamic correlations between VIX and IFIN
While correlations tend to stay, on average, in the negative territory, as the table above shows, they are not significantly large. In fact, overall during the Financial crisis period there were 318 instances of the correlation equal to or exceeding (in mode) 0.5 - or 51% of the time. In pre-crisis period this number was 42% and during the Sovereign crisis so far - 45%. But there is a slight problem in interpreting this 51% as the spillover effect from the US. During the Financial crisis period, pre-Lehman collapse, higher correlations took place 58% of the time, while post-Lehman collapse they took place 45% of the time. So overall, it appears that US risk attitudes (aka 'panics') were more related to adverse movements in IFIN before the Big Panic took place than during and after the Big Lehman's Panic set on.

Interestingly, there is also no evidence that changes/volatility in the US attitudes to risk had any significant serious impact (adverse or not) on volatlity Irish financial shares valuations, as shown in the chart below:
In no period in our data is there a strong relationship between changes (volatility) in US risk attitudes and the Irish financial shares valuations volatility.

A note of caution - these are simple tests. The data shows a number of problems that require serious econometric modeling, but overall, so far, there is no strong evidence to support the proposition that Irish banks shares or financial shares have been significantly and systematically adversely impacted by the US 'panic' or by 'Lehman collapse'. Our banks problems seem to be largely... our banks own problems...

17/06/2011: Who's Confidence is it, folks?

Here are few charts to illustrate the fact that some 3 years into the 'Restoring Confidence' strategy of the successive Irish Governments... and things are not exactly working out.

First straight up, the markets 'voting' on Irish banks:
Looks like investors are not really in tune with Irish Government plans for 'repairing' our banking system despite unprecedented guarantees from the Sovereign which have:

• Explicitly underwritten virtually all deposits and most of the bonds held or issued by the IRL6;
• Implicitly underwritten virtually any extent of losses in the IRL6;
• Explicitly purchased some of the worst 'assets' held by the IRL6; and
• Explicitly underwritten all of the IRL6 funding through ECB and CBofI lending facilities

And what about the entire system of domestic financial institutions? Well, the story is pretty much the same:Recall, thus that at the present (and the picture remains stable in this context since around late 2008):

• Financial investors have no confidence in IRL6 (as these charts illustrate)
  
• Fellow peer banks around the world have no confidence in IRL6 (as clearly indicated by the fact that other banks are not willing to lend to IRL6)
• Bond markets have no confidence in IRL6 (since none of IRL6 can issue any debt paper)
• The ECB has no confidence in IRL6 as it desperately tries to shed their borrowings off its balance sheet (including by shifting it onto CBofI balancesheet)
• Private sector have no confidence in IRL6 as they have taken out some €24 billion worth of funds from IRL6 (per April 2011 data from CBofI) or 23% relative to peak
  

So the only ones still showing confidence in IRL6 is... Irish Government itself, with the Sovereing - itself severely strapped for cash - putting some €18.566 billion worth of taxpayers money into Irish banks deposits since April 2010. That's a whooping ca 8-fold increase in Confidence, then.

02/06/2011: Latest shenanigans at the banks

Two junior bondholders in Allied Irish Banks - Aurelius Capital Management and Abadi Co – are taking the Irish government to court today over the AIB plans to impose burden-sharing on some bondholders in failed banks. Aurelius is a distressed debt investment vehicle which also holds debt of Dubai World so it should be well familiar with the case of haircuts.

These are not investors who bought Irish banks bonds at their full value, but those who pick up distressed debt at a significant discount. However, it is their right to maximize their returns on such investments.

Let us recall that AIB is the sickest of the 4 banks reviewed under the original PCARs back on March 31 this year. Under the stress tests, AIB is expected to lose €3.07bn on Residential Mortgages (all figures refer to stress scenario, 3-year time frame), €972mln on Corporate loans, €2.67bn on SMEs loans, €4.49bn on Commercial Real Estate loans and €1.4bn on Non-mortgage Consumer loans and Other loans. The grand total expected 2011-2013 losses under stressed scenario is €12.6bn or almost ½ of the total expected stress scenario losses across IRL-4 banks of €27.72bn.

Of the €24bn capital buffer for IRL-4 required by the Central Bank PCAR exercise, full €13.3bn is accounted for by AIB.

Which implies that AIB – accounting for just €93.7bn of the €273.94bn of loans held by the IRL-4 at the time of PCARs (just over 34.2% of the total loans of IRL-4) is responsible for over 55.4% of overall capital demands. It is, by a mile, the worst performing bank of IRL-4... Really, folks, 'Be with AIB' as their old commercials would say.

So in the case of AIB, Finance Minister Michael Noonan – the majority shareholder in AIB – is now attempting to impose losses of between 75 and 90 percent on €2.6bn of the bank’s subordinated debt. This means that the bond-holders are expected to contribute just 15-16% of the total cost of the latest bank recapitalization programme. This, of course, is a drop in a sea of pain already levied against Irish taxpayers.

The problem in Ireland is that the so-called subordinated liabilities orders (SLO), which the government is using to force a deal on bondholders is untested in law. Bondholders can claim priority over shareholders in the event of insolvency. But the banks are now existing solely on government life-support. Although they are complete zombies, they are not technically insolvent. This in turn means their equity retains some – if only tiny – value. The Irish Government in the case of AIB driving bondholders’ haircuts can be seen as the means for improving that value to the shareholder at the expense of bondholders, since equity will benefit from lower debt and changes in the capital structure.

In the case of AIB this means two possible things:

• If the court finds in favour of Aurelius and Abadi, the deal is off the table or will be more expensive to execute (lower haircuts), which will in turn imply greater demand on taxpayers to step in. Of course, this also means the Gov in effect destroying a large portion of its own shares value.
• If the court rules in favour of the Gov, the deal is on and we have a precedent for aggressive burden sharing. This, however, will only benefit the majority state-owned banks, i.e. Anglo, INBS, EBS and AIB, and only with respect to savings on subordinated debt.
  

The problem is in the timing of this burden sharing – the previous Gov insistence on paying on bonds in full means that we, the taxpayers, are now on the hook for losses on our shares in the banks via dilution. You don’t have to go far to see what happens here. Just look at Bank of Ireland (below).

Normal process of banks workout should have been:

• Step 1 – Impose losses on shareholders, while preserving depositors by ring-fencing them via specific legislation to remove equivalent status between senior bondholders and depositors. Such legislation can be enacted on the grounds that depositors are not lenders to the activities of the banks, but are clients of the banks for the purpose of safe-keeping of their money. It is also justified from the point of view of finance, as depositors are being paid much lower rates of return on their money, implying lower risk premium
• Step 2 – Impose losses on bondholders via a combination of robust haircuts and debt-for-equity swaps, but only after depositors are protected
• Step 3 – For any amounts of capital still outstanding per writedowns requirements, the Government can then take equity positions in the banks.

This sequence of actions would have prevented depositors runs and repeated taxpayer equity dilutions. It would also have given the Government a mandate to take over and reform failed banks.

By doing everything backwards, we are now in a veritable mess. This mess was not caused by the current Government – it is the toxic legacy of the previous Government which made gross errors in managing the whole banking crisis. This mess is extremely hard to unwind and my sympathies go here to Minister Noonan who is at the very least trying to do something right after years of spoofing and wasting taxpayers money by his predecessor.

Note: The Government is aiming to cut around €5bn from the total bill for bailing out Irish-6 banks. Imposing losses of up to 90 percent on junior bonds in AIB, Bank of Ireland, Irish Life & Permanent and EBS Building Society is on the cards:

• IL&P said it would offer 20cents on the euro for €840m of debt
• EBS wants to pay 10c to 20c on the euro for around €260m of subordinated bonds
• Bank of Ireland is pushing up to 90% discount on €2.6 billion worth of subordinated debt. Bank of Ireland said it would offer holders of Tier 1 securities just 10 percent of the face value of their original investment, and holders of Tier 2 securities 20 percent.

It is revealing, perhaps, of the state of our nation’s policy making that over a year ago myself, Brian Lucey, Peter Mathews, David McWilliams and a small number of other commentators suggested 80-90% haircuts for subordinated bondholders. We were, of course, promptly attacked as ‘reckless’, ‘irresponsible’ and ‘naïve’. Yet, doing this back then would have netted taxpayers savings of more than double the amount hoped for today.

And this is before the savings that could have been generated from avoiding painful dilution of equity holdings acquired by the Government in Irish banks. How painful? Look no further than the unfolding Bank of Ireland saga.

Bank of Ireland's lower Tier 2 paper is trading at 37-40 cents on the euro post-announcement of the after the announcement that T2 will be offered an 80 percent discount alongside with a ‘more attractive’ debt-for-equity swap. Tier 1 paper holders are offered 10 cents on the euro cash ex-accrued interest. Shares swap will factor in accrued interest to sweeten the deal. The debt-equity swap is so powerful of a promise that BofI shares have all but collapsed over the last few days losing over 62% of their already minuscule value. Of course, with Government holding 39% of equity pre-swap, the taxpayers have suffered the same loss as the ordinary shareholders, all courtesy of perverse timing of equity injections by the previous Government.

And there’s more. Even if successful in applying haircuts and swaps to junior bondholders, Bank of Ireland will still need to raise additional €1.6bn from either new investors or existent shareholders (including the Government). Which means even more dilution is to come.

02/06/11: Central Bank Monthly Stats - IRL 6

This is the second post of two covering Central Bank stats for April 2011. The first post (here) focused on Domestic Group of banks. This post deals with Covered Institutions (the IRL-6 banks that are on a life support from the Government).

First up - central bank and ECB lending to banks was broken down into:

• Other assets held by the CBofI - aka lending by CBofI itself to Irish banks - declined from €66.7bn in March to €54.15bn, this mans that mom lending by CBofI fell €12.64bn (-18.93%) and year on year it is now up €40.5bn (+296.8%)
• Borrowing from the Eurosystem (ECB) declined from €79.22bn to €74.23bn - a drop of €4.985bn mom or 6.29%. Relative to April 2010, borrowing increased €38.31bn which almost exactly off-sets increases in CBofI lending, suggesting a transfer of risk from ECB to CBofI
• Total loans to Irish 6 from Euro system and CBofI amounted to €128.4bn in April 2011 down €17.63bn mom (-12.1%). Relative to April 2010, loans increased €78.81bn or 159%.
  

On deposits side:

• Total deposits in IRL 6 have increased from €224.17bn in March to €235.2bn in April an increase of 4.93% mom. Relative to April 2010, deposits are still down €14.07bn or 5.65%
• However, the main driver for these increases were deposits from the Irish Government. Government deposits rose €12.743bn in April (+148.4%) mom and are up €18.566bn (+671.5%) year on year - the very same €18 billion mentioned in the first post.
• Private sector deposits also increased, 1.81% or €1.93bn mom, but remain €20.92bn on April 2010 (-16.2%)
• Monetary institutions deposits dropped €3.63bn mom (-3.32%) and €11.72bn (-9.98%) yoy
  

On lending side:

• Loans to Irish residents fell €6.97bn (-2.2%) mom to €314.14bn. Loans stood at €27.97bn below April 2010 (a decline of 8.18% yoy)
• Loans to General Government were marginally up €47mln to €28.3bn, which means that IRL 6 are the dominant players in lending to Irish Government (as asserted in the previous post)
• Loans to other Monetary Institutions werte down €4.05bn mom (-375%) and
• Loans to Private Sector fell additional €2.97bn (-1.61%) mom and €33.633bn (-15.62%) yoy to €181.71bn.

Lastly, loans to deposits ratios:

• LTDs for all IRL 6 institutions improved by 10 percentage points to 133.56% in April 2011, which represents a decline of 4 percentage points yoy
• LTDs for Private Sector lending fell 6 percentage points in April to 167.9%, an increase of 1 percentage point on April 2010.

In other words, deleveraging over the last 12 months has been led by Government and other financial isntitutions activities, not by private sector pay-down of debt to deposits ratios.

02/06/2011: Central Bank Monthly Stats - Domestic Group

Ok, folks, with some brief delay due to computational complexities - here are charts on Irish banking sector health. These are aggregates from the CBofI monthly stats for April 2011.

This release is broken into 2 post. The first post deals with Domestic Group of banks (see note Credit Institutions Resident in the Republic of Ireland). The second post will deal with Ireland-6 Zombies... err... banks that is known as Guaranteed or Covered Institutions.

Headlines first:

• Total Private Sector Deposits are now at €164.9bn or €1.93bn up on April 2011 (+1.18%) and still €19.65bn down year on year (-10.64%)
• All of this increase is due to Overnight deposits which are up €2.09bn (+2.53%) mom and down just €1.52bn yoy
• Deposits with maturity <2 years declined to €54.94bn in April, down €57mln (0.1%) mom and €13.64bn (-19.9%) yoy
• Deposits with maturity >2 years rose €56mln (+0.52%) mom to €10.78bn, which still implies a decline of €1.71bn (-13.71%) yoy
• Deposits redeemable at notice <3 months were down €162mln (-1.1%) mom to €14.5bn and down €2.77bn (-16.05%) yoy

Chart to illustrate:
Now, take a look at total deposits by source:

Please note the above marking an increase in Government deposits as an important driver of deposits dynamics. Here are the details:

• Domestic Group institutions saw their total liabilities fall to €712.72bn in April - a decline of €10.22bn mom (-1.41%) or a drop of €65.18bn (-8.38%) yoy (see chart below)
  
• Deposits rose across the Domestic Group by €10.46bn mom (+3.7%) although they remain down €12.53bn (-9.63%) yoy
• Clearly, as chart above shows, the increase in deposits was due primarily to Government deposits with Irish banks (well flagged before by many other researchers, this is really a transfer game whereby the Government mandated transfer of some €18bn of its reserves to Irish banks, increasing the risk to these funds, but creating an artificial improvement in the banks balance sheets). Government deposits rose €12.781bn (+143.6%) mom in April and are now up - yes, you;ve guessed it - €18.52bn (+586.2%) yoy
• Another positive driver, albeit much smaller than Government, were Private Sector deposits, which rose €2.0bn (more accurately €1,999mln) or 1.32% mom, while still falling €21.85bn (-12.46%) short of April 2010 levels.
• Monetary Institutions deposits with Domestic Group banks were down €4.325bn (-3.54%) mom in April and down €12.534bn (-9.63%) yoy.

Now, consider loans to deposit ratios:

Thanks to Government deposits, the series are declining for overall Domestic Group:

• Overall LTDs fell 7 percentage points mom from 136.76% in March to 129.67% in April, yoy decline is 9 percentage points
• LTDs for Private Sector declined 4% mom to 155.15% in April, this was consistent with a 12 percentage points decline year on year.

Lastly, let's consider loans to Irish residents within the system:

• Overall loans to Irish residents fell from €386.3bn in March to €379.84bn in April a decline of 1.68% mom and 11.47% yoy
• Loans to Monetary Institutions declined by €3.31bn (-2.84%) mom and are down €11.23bn (-9.03%) yoy
• Loans to Government went up €45mln mom to €28.49bn (+0.16% mom and 150.75% yoy). Over the last 12 months Irish banks have revolved some €17.13bn worth of lending (bonds purchases) back to the State in what can only be described as a circular transfer of money from taxpayers underwriting banks to banks lending back to taxpayers to underwrite the banks
• Private Sector loans meanwhile declined €3.21bn (-1.33%) mom to €238.2bn. This means that over the last 12 months credit supply to private sector dropped a massive 18.8% or €55.09bn. Roughly 1/3 of the annual GDP has been sucked out of the real economy by the banking crisis within just 12 months.

Chart to illustrate:

Economics 21/12/10: BofI & Irish derivatives warning from the IMF

How wonderful is the world of international banks linkages? And especially, how wonderful it can get when regulators are so soundly asleep at the wheel, a firecracker from the IMF can be shoved in their faces and popped, and the snoring still went on.

A 2007 working paper from the IMF, republished earlier this year in an IMF journal, has warned Irish regulators that (referring to the data through 2005):

“BofI had launched a new venture with a leading Spanish bank, La Caixa to provide extra mortgage options for Irish people buying property in Spain, which included equity release from existing BofI mortgages” (IMF WP/07/44: External Linkages and Contagion Risk in Irish Banks, by Elena Duggar and Srobona Mitra).

Now, think of those La Caixa/BofI borrowers leveraging levels. But here’s the bit that relates directly to securitisation threats I hypothesize about in the previous post (here): on page 8 of the report, IMF folks state: “Irish banks could be indirectly exposed to property markets by selling risk protection (buying of covered bonds, credit default swaps, and mortgage backed securities) to other banks which are exposed to foreign property markets. From anecdotal evidence, some small IFSC banks, exposed to international property markets, are selling CDS to other domestic-oriented banks, making the latter indirectly exposed to these property markets even though their loan books are not.”

Of course, the Irish banks were also selling protection to the SPVs they were managing as well. And now, lets jump to IMF’s conclusions:

“Some tentative policy lessons could be drawn from the results of this exercise. The Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland (CBFSAI) may want to stress test specific categories of exposures of Irish banks to both the U.S. and the U.K. Even though linkages with the U.S. do not come out strongly from aggregate consolidated balance sheet exposures, there might be derivatives or other off-balance sheet exposures that the bank supervisors may need to be vigilant of. The Irish authorities may need to collect more information about types and counterparties of derivative positions and risk transfers through structured products of Irish banks, as the use of these is likely to grow rapidly in the future. This would especially be necessary if Irish banks are buying CRT products from foreign banks (that is selling risk protection) that are in turn exposed to property markets or other loan products in the U.S. or the U.K., thus exposing the Irish banks to these markets even though there is no direct loan exposure.”

Sounds like a warning against Irish banks exposures to lending against the US-based property? Oh, no – not at all. In fact recall a basic stylized fact of mortgages finance – in the long run (equilibrium) long term yields on Government debt and long term mortgage rates converge. Which means that if an Irish bank was underwriting an interest rate swap for the US SPV that purchased Irish bank’s securitised loans, then Irish bank was taking a position in providing insurance into the US interest rates environment.

The article – based on 2005 data – couldn’t have imagined what followed in 2007 and 2008. But, needless to say - judging by their staunch silence on the issue of derivatives and securitisation - our regulators didn't bother with the IMF warnings back then... and still are not bothered by them...


Update: It is worth noting that today the EU Commission approved measures for AIB, Anglo and INBS (details here) that include "a guarantee covering certain off-balance sheet transactions" - a code name for things like securitisations and derivatives...

Economics 21/12/10: Derivatives hole?

Updated (end of post)

The following post is attempting to put some numbers behind a highly uncertain, opaque and completely under-reported side of the Irish banks operations - the side relating to securitisations and derivatives exposures. My numbers below are pure estimates and their objective is to at least start raising the questions as to the depth of our (taxpayers) exposure to this murky world of banks' securitised assets.

Before we begin, I must also relay my thanks to Brian Lucey and 3 anonymous experts for providing advice and comments on the earlier draft and to LorcanRK who was involved in trying to scope the problem earlier.


Years ago, before our sick puppies (banks) became sick, in the golden days when the Anglopup, AIBickey, permo, INBiSquit, EBSsie and BofIpooch were still wagging their happy tails around the streets of Dublin, securitisation was all the rage.

The basic idea behind this transaction runs innocuously enough as follows: a bank holds a bunch of loans, say mortgages. These yield an annual revenue stream, but hold up capital, restricting new lending. To help unlock this capital, a bank can package these loans together and sell them to an SPV which will issue a paper security against these loans that entitles the owner to a share of the total package of loans as they yield returns over time. An SPV, of course, doesn’t manage the mortgages but leaves them in the custody of the bank which acts as a manager/custodian, responsible for collecting the moneys due and paying out to the SPV.

Now, for a bit relevant to us: an agreement between the SPV and the custodian has two key covenants:

1. loans are held by the custodian in trust, so that the custodian is obliged, upon either the termination of the management contract or should other covenants be breached, to deliver the actual loans/mortgages to the SPV owner;
2. ability of the custodian/manager to hold on to the loans is subject to a minimum credit rating, usually - investment grade.
   

The first point means that should an SPV ask an Irish bank for its loans (due to a breach in its covenants), the banks must deliver these loans.

The second point means that if the covenants are breached, by, say for the sake of argument, Irish banks rating sinking to junk, the banks can be found in a breach of covenants and face:

• a margin call – according to my sources, of up to a whooping 20% face value of the securitized loans in some cases; and/or
• a call on the actual loans to be transferred to a different manager/custodian nominated by the SPV

Every securitized contract runs alongside it a derivative security designed to protect against the risk exposures relating to the loans.

These derivatives can be

• symmetric – covering both sides of the potential exposure – e.g. interest rates swaps going both ways or
  
• asymmetric or uni-directional, covering only one side of the risk exposure (e.g. an interest rate swap insuring against a future rise in the interest rates).
  

The derivatives can be written by an independent entity or by the bank, but for the reasons of good risk management (maturity mismatch risk and direct exposure to underwriter risk) these derivatives should really be underwritten by the third parties, not the custodians.

Now, let’s go back to the history. Earlier this year, I wrote about our ‘national derivatives accounts’:

• AIB held the total derivative exposure to the notional value of €261bn in 2008 which fell to €197bn in 2009 (here)
• BOI held €360.5bn (here) in 2009
• Anglo held some €268.3bn worth of notional value derivatives in 2008 (here), falling to €184.5bn in 2010 (here)
  

The above is very close to the gross notional exposure amounts of €640 billion (for two banks ex-Anglo) reported in 2008 by the employee of the Financial Regulator - Grellan O'Kelly (here).

So now, suppose that the notional value reflects symmetric hedges, and even there, let's assume that directionality is such that benign risk is weighted by twice the weight assigned to maximum loss-linked risk, so that the underlying value of these derivatives is around 1/3rd of the €742.3 billion of notional value, or €245 billion.

Here is the beefy problem. Since these derivatives are written against real loans contracts, what happens if the covenants of the SPVs behind them are breached?

Let’s talk some hypotheticals (since we have no actual clarity on these):

• Scenario 1: Irish Government debt sinks to junk, which automatically means banks debt sinks to junk (while I was writing this, the latest Moody’s downgrade pushed it even deeper...). There’s a margin call on derivatives of say ½ of 20% mentioned above, or 10%. Oops – Irish banks are in a hole for up to 24.5bn off the starting line (10% of the 245bn above)
• Scenario 2: Instead of a call on the derivatives, SPV breaks management agreement with an Irish bank and asks for its loans to be moved out of the bank. Wouldn't be a problem, unless: what if the bank, in the mean time, has leveraged the same loans it held in custody for the SPV at the ECB (or CBofI or both) discount window? Well, should the SPVs insist, the Irish banks will be forced to buy their collateral out of ECB and CB of Ireland to the amount that the banks borrowed against such collateral.

Things are starting to smell rotten… But do not be afraid, those in charge who still have some brains left spotted the dodgy stuff. To our chagrin, however, the smart ones are in Frankfurt, not in Dublin. Back in August 2008, the ECB has pulled the plug on taking Irish banks-securitised loans as collateral. Miraculously, in the end of 2008, CBofI lent Anglo €10.5bn against some mysterious collateral that, several of my sources argued, was previously rejected by the ECB.

Why would the ECB decline to take securitised packages as collateral, while taking the loans? Surely this signals something is amiss with the vehicle of securitisation as carried out by the Irish banks?

Two things can be dodgy with the securitized packages in general:

1. Underlying derivatives, and/or
2. Security over the loans/assets that are securitized.
   

I am not going to speculate what it is – time will tell. Instead, let’s run through some scenarios on potential losses due to the above positions.

Assumptions:

• Assume that the above gross notional amounts of derivatives are 2/3 covering one side of exposure (e.g. expected increases in interest rates, for interest rate swaps) and 1/3 covering less expected opposite direction risk. This means that of the total values of derivatives written by the 3 banks, these derivatives were covering a collateralised pool of loans/assets equal to 1/3 of the gross notional derivatives.
• Now, some of collateralised assets were held by the banks themselves, but we do not know how much. So let’s assume that 25% and 50% are reasonable amounts for these shares, implying that banks sold on some 50% to 75% of the securitised assets
• Next suppose that the banks have written down these securitised assets by 20% (a gross overestimate, but let’s allow it to be conservative) and that the ECB has applied the usual 15% haircut in lending against the above writedowns
• Table below shows the estimates of potential losses

So the downside from the derivatives exposure and securitization can range between €12.25bn and €50.8bn.

Pretty wide.

Let’s take a look at the underlying assumptions. Running through the ‘What if covenants are breached?’ scenarios, one has to remember that many of the securitized loans borrowed against are related to more stable, longer-term mortgages. Since default rates across mortgages are lower it is highly unlikely that SPVs wouldn’t want to claim them out of the hands of the insolvent banks. This means that the 10% margin call on all loans scenario is highly unlikely to materialize. More likely – either the margin calls will be larger, or full call backs will be triggered. Which suggests that the range above more realistically should be expected around €17.15bn and €25.7bn.

Also, recall that Irish banks weren’t really at the races in speculating on financial instruments, preferring instead to speculate on property. This means that my assumption of 50% unidirectional net derivatives relating to property securitization is pretty conservative.

And remember that none of this has been factored by either the IMF or anyone else into the expected losses across the Irish banks. It hasn’t been incorporated into my earlier estimates of

• €67-70 billion total losses on NAMA, recognized losses and post-2010 commercial and investment books’ losses, and
• €9-11 billion total losses on mortgages post-2010, plus
• the lower €17bn figure as an estimate for the derivatives and securitization-related losses.
  

The total expected loss across the entire banking sector, net of recoveries might be as high as €93-98 billion. Or it might go as high as €107bn. And at this point, folks, even an old hawk like myself starts to feel scared.


Note: these are potential estimates. Given that we have been given no clarity as to the depth of securitisations, or the derivative instruments underlying it, nor do we have any idea as to what the banks have been doing with custodial-managed loans that relate to securitised products, one can only guesstimate - or speculate - as to the true extent of losses. I tried my best to be very, very conservative in the above, with my upper limit of factored estimate of €25.7bn in losses being below the average of the most benign scenario (€12.25bn) and the worst case scenario (€50.8bn). I was also very conservative in my assumptions. Note also that in the end, €17-25bn range of losses used in final estimate of the total cost of banks bailouts corresponds to just 2.29-3.37% of the notional value of all derivatives held in 2009 by the three banks.


Update: things are hardly trivial when it comes to potential securitisation-linked derivatives exposure. Back in 2007, the IMF has warned Irish regulators that:

“BoI has transferred the bulk of its domestic residential mortgage assets to a designated mortgage credit institution, which has a banking license to issue mortgage covered securities.—these are used both for hedging interest risk and for generating additional funding. Almost 60 percent of these securities were held by other Euro Area members, while 25 percent was held in USD by other countries. (IMF WP/07/44: External Linkages and Contagion Risk in Irish Banks, by Elena Duggar and Srobona Mitra - here)

Did IMF say 'the bulk'? So as of 2006-2007, the bulk of mortgages were out to securitisation in a 'conservatively' run BofI?

Economics 6/11/10: Two charts - IRL & Spain

Two interesting charts on 5 year bonds for Ireland and Spain, courtesy of CMA:
What's clear from these charts is the extent of inter-links between banks and sovereign credit default swaps. In Spain at least three core banks - La Caixa, BBVA and Banco Santander act as relative diversifiers away from the sovereign risk since late October. In Ireland - all of the banks carry higher risk than sovereign. Another interesting feature is a significant counter-move in the Anglo CDS since late September. This, undoubtedly underpinned by the large-scale bonds redemption undertaken by Anglo at the end of September. Thirdly, an interesting feature of the Irish data is that CDS contracts on Anglo, IL&P and AIB are now trading at virtually identical implied probability of default.

Lastly, Irish sovereign debt is now trading at probability of default higher than that of the Spanish banks!

Economics 19/9/10: Irish banks - Government intervention still has no effect

Returning to my old theme - let's take a fresh look at the Government and its policy cheerleaders success rate with repairing our banking sector. Here is a quick snapshot of history and numbers as told through the lens of Irish Financials index.
So clearly, we have some really powerful analysts out there and keen commentariat (actually one and the same in this case) on the future prognosis for our banks.

But what about recent moves in the index itself?
Take a look at the chart above, which maps the Financials Index for two subperiods:
Period 1: from Guarantee to March announcement of the 'final' recapitalization of our banks,
Period 2: from Guarantee to today.
Now notice the difference between two equations. That's right, things are not getting any better, they are getting worse.

Next, let's put some historical markers on the map:
Surely, our financials are getting better, the Government will say, by... err... not getting much, much worse. The reality, of course is, any index has a natural lower bound of zero. In the case of Irish Financials Index, this bound is above zero, as the index contains companies that are not banks. As far as the banks go, there is a natural lower limit for their share values of zero. Our IFIN index is now at 80% loss relative not to its peak, but to its value on the day of Guarantee!

Having pledged banks supports to the tune of 1/3 of our GDP already, the Government policy still has not achieved any appreciable improvement in the index.

Forget longer term stuff - even relative to Q4 2009, Government policies cannot correct the strategic switchback away from Irish banks shares that took hold:
A picture, is worth a 1000 words. Unless you belong to the upbeat cheerleaders group of the very same analysts who missed the largest market collapse in history, that is.

Economics 25/8/10: Derivatives time bomb?

An interesting number popped out today from the dark depths of the past (hat tip to Ed).

With my emphasis, quoting from the article published in December 2008 by the Chartered Accountants Ireland (linked here) titled "Financial Derivitives (sic), Villian (sic) or Scapegoat" written by Grellan O'Kelly (who worked at the time in the Policy Section of the Financial Institutions and Funds Authorisation Department of the Financial Regulator):

"...when looking at the outstanding derivative positions (notional values) of our main banks as reported in their annual reports, the amounts are extremely small when compared to the total global amounts. A recent BIS survey2 on global OTC positions shows that global notional amounts come to a staggering $516 trillion. The most recent disclosures from our two main retail banks show that their gross notional exposures amount to €640 billion, only 0.17% of the total. ...noting that access to accurate data on derivative products is not always publicly available."

The article contains the usual caveat that "Any views expressed in this article are made in a personal capacity and are not intended to represent the views of the Financial Regulator." Nonetheless, it would be good to get some comment from the FR on this. After all, €640bn might be a small level of exposure to derivatives from the point of view of global banks, but for BofI and AIB to have such an exposure... is roughly 170% of the total 2009 asset base of all Irish banks combined.

For now, I cannot confirm whether this was a typo or not.

The problem is that unwinding even the straight forward swaps can be extremely costly. Buffet's unwinding of lost contracts against reinsurance claims cost Berkshire some $400mln back in 2008. In the case of interest rates swaps written against property, De Montfort University research in June 2010 has estimated that for a book of £143bn of interest rate swaps in the UK (57% of the total existing UK £250bn book of loans is estimated to be hedged by derivatives - here), the cost of unwinding these positions runs into ca £10bn.

So applying the UK estimate to our potential exposure, the cost of unwinding those €640bn in derivatives can be to the tune of €45bn.

Of course, this is just an estimate, but it gives some perspective to the numbers.

But let's ad some relative comparatives (hat tip to Conor for both):

• Ireland accounted for 0.17% of global estimates of OTC derivatives but only 0.03% of Global GDP (based on CIA fact book and CSO data)
• €640bn is 4.12 times our 2008 Gross Value Added (ca €155bn)
  

I am totally at a loss as to this figure - given its size - so any comment on its validity will be appreciated.

Economics 11/8/10: Bank of Ireland H1 results

Bof I results for the H1 2010 did represent a significantly different picture from those reported by AIB, with one notable exception – both AIB and BofI are yet to catch up with reality curve on expected future impairments.

BofI profit before provisions was €553mln against €811mln in H1 2009. This, however, doesn’t mean much, as a score of one-off measures were included in H1 2010 figure:

• Losses on sales of loans to NAMA’s were factored in at €466mln
• Debt exchange added a positive of €699mln
• Pension deal brought in a positive contribution of €676mln.
• Net positive of the one-off measures was, therefore around €909mln implying that BofI really was running a loss €356mln before provisions and after one-offs are factored in.
  

Underlying loss before tax, net of charges, was €1.246bn or almost double the €668mln loss last year. The impairment charges amounted to €1.8bn in H1 2010, inclusive of €893mln non NAMA provisions. The impairment charge therefore almost doubled on €926mln in H1 2009.

Big ‘news’ today was that BofI continues to guide for €4.7bn in impairments charges for March 2009-2011. Given that the bank has taken €3.9bn of these provisions to date, it will have to deliver an €1.2bn gain on H1 2010 (roughly 1% of its loan book value) before March 2011 to stick with the impairments estimate. How much can BofI squeeze out of its customers remains uncertain, but to get to its target figures, the bank needs either a helping hand of Nama (on valuations for Tranche 3) or a dramatic reduction in cost of funding (unlikely) or a 30%+ increase in what it charges on loans (without any subsequent deterioration in their quality).

These are unlikely for the following reasons.

Impaired loans are up by a significant €2.1bn reaching 7.1% of the total loan book (these were 5.5% at the end-December 2009). Risk weighted assets stood at €93bn down on €98bn in December. And asset quality is still declining: impaired loans were €15.8bn of which €8.86bn were on non-NAMA book. This compares to €13.35bn in December of which €6.79bn related to non-NAMA book. Provisions were €6.64bn in June of which €3.725bn non-NAMA, implying 42% cover, down from 43% in December when provisions amounted to €5.8bn in total, with €3.0bn non-NAMA.

BofI maintains that bad debts peaked in H2 2009, showing a charge of 1.4% on gross loans in H1, compared with a charge of 2.9% in Q4 of last year.

This looks optimistic. BofI business side continues to suffer from income declines and costs overruns. Total income was down 8% yoy at €1.76bn. Cost cutting this year will have to come at a premium as BofI prepares to shed some 750 more jobs. Total staff numbers are down by 805 or 5% yoy so far in 2010.

BofI H1 2010 net interest margin was 130 bps down 40bps relative to H1 last year. Causes: higher deposit and funding costs, lower capital earnings and Government guarantee. Assets repricing helped by adding 19bps to the margin. Cost to income ratio increased to 61% relative to 54% a year ago, despite costs falling by 3% to €916mln. This means income is seriously under pressure. Impaired loans on residential lending book have increased by 58.5%.

One improved side – capital ratios came in at Core Equity Tier 1 of 8.2% up on 5.3% in December and ahead of 7% regulatory target, but still low relative to European and US peers. Tier 1 ratio was 9.9% virtually unchanged on 9.8% in December.


BofI might be right in some of its rosy projections. You see, Nama has been rolling over for the bank so far. BofI originally guided Nama discount of €4.8bn on €12.2bn it planned to transfer to Nama, or 39% haircut. Nama obliged so far by shaving off 36% on the €1.9bn of loans transferred in Tranche 1 in April and then 35% on Tranche 2 transfer of €1.5bn in July. This was done despite the fact that impaired loans proportion continues to rise in the sub-portfolio of BofI loans destined for Nama.

And this rise is a serious one. At the end of June, 69% of the loans remaining in the Nama-bound portfolio were impaired, up on 54% in the overall Nama portfolio set aside in December 2009. So Tranche 1 transfer picked out better loans or the loans have deteriorated dramatically since Tranche 1 transfer or both. Either way, lower discount on Tranche 2 loans suggests a blatant subsidy from Nama.


Funding side remains under threat, though BofI put a brave face in stating that it raised €4.6bn in term funding so far (mostly in the beginning of the year before the proverbial sovereign debt sh***t hit the fan). The bank still has to raise €9.5bn more before the end of the year 2010. The balancesheet numbers as well as market conditions suggest that this might be tight.

Total loans held grew by €3bn in H1 2010 to €125bn driven by sterling appreciation. Meanwhile, deposits were down €1bn to €84bn, so bank’s loan-to-deposit ratio, ex-NAMA, rose to 143% from 141% in December 2009. Deposits decline was driven by ratings downgrade for S&P in January 2010 which shaved €3bn worth of value from the ratings-sensitive deposits.

This doesn't make BofI any more attractive to the lenders.

But the bank has done coupple of things right. BofI is gradually improving its funding outlook by extending funding maturity – up to 41% of wholesale funding being in excess of 12 months in H1 compared to 32% back in December 2009. And BofI has been reducing its reliance on wholesale funding – down €3bn in H1 to €58bn total. BofI still holds €41bn worth of contingent liquidity collateral, theoretically eligible for ECB borrowings.

The bank also has €8bn exposure to ECB – same as at the end of 2009. You can either read this as the brokers do, meaning that BofI still has massive reserve it can tap if it needs to go to ECB. Alternatively you can say that in the last 6 months, the bank did nothing to work itself off the reliance on ECB funding.

Finally, virtually all analysis (with exception of one brokerage – if I recall correctly it was NCB) overlooked the data released on the deposits breakdown. Per note, “deposits with a balance greater than €100,000 amounted to €50bn at end-June. …As it stands, the ELG guarantee will no longer cover corporate deposits greater than €100,000 with a maturity of less than three months — presumably a significant proportion of these balances — after September, with the ELG set to go completely at year-end. It seems certain to us that the ELG will have to be extended to shore up confidence and facilitate the as yet unfinished wholesale terming effort.”

Economics 22/7/10: Banks downgraded - expect more fireworks

After hammering Irish sovereign ratings, Moody’s rightly took the shine off the six guaranteed banks’ bonds. Not surprising, really, and goes to show just how meaningless the term ‘stable outlook’ can be. Now, few facts:

• Moody’s has downgraded the long-term ratings for EBS Building Society and Irish Life & Permanent from A2 to A3, stable outlook didn’t help much here.
• Moody’s also downgraded the government-guaranteed debt of all six guaranteed institutions: AIB, Bank of Ireland, EBS, Anglo, IL&P and Irish Nationwide.
• Prior to the latest downgrade, AIB and BofI both had stable outlook, and this has been maintained.
• The reason for the downgrades was the reduction in the government’s ability to support the banks stemming from the sovereign debt downgrade announced Monday.
  

What’s next, you might ask? Barring any news on loans impairments etc, the growth prospects for banks will have to be the key. And here, folks, there isn’t any good news. No matter how you can spin the thing.

BofI and AIB are disposing of their performing assets – divisions and businesses in the US, UK and elsewhere – in order to plug the vast holes in their balance sheets caused by their non-performing assets.

And it’s a fire sale: Polish BZWBK – 70.5%-owned by AIB – is the only growth hopeful in the entire AIB stable. Yesterday, some reports in Poland suggested that PKO Bank Polski, Banco Santander, BNP Paribas and Intesa San Paolo are the only ones remaining in the bidding. Neither one can be expected to pay a serious premium.

Take a look at M&T in which AIB holds a 22.5%. Not a growth engine, but a solid contributor to the balance sheet. The US bank Q2 profit quadrupled as it is facing the market with structural aversion to banks shares. So M&T is losing value in the market as it is gaining value on AIB’s balance sheet. But hey, let’s sell that, the gurus from Ballsbridge say, and pay off those fantastic development deals we’ve done in Meath and Dundalk.

Likewise, BofI are selling tons of proprietary assets, including proprietary wholesale services platforms, which are performing well.

Will the money raised go to provide a basis for growth in revenue in 2010-2012? Not really. BofI needs new capital. Not as badly as AIB, but still - €2.9bn capital injection in June is not going to be enough to cover future losses. It is just a temporary stop-gap measure to cover already expected losses plus new regulatory capital floors. Future losses will require future capital.

AIB is desperate. €7.4bn is a serious amount of dosh and there are indicators they’ll need more. Of course, in order to properly repair its balance sheet, AIB will need closer to €10bn this side of Christmas (as estimated by Peter Mathews - see here).

However, the bank won’t make any noise about that for political reasons.

Even after getting no serious opposition to their banks recovery plans for some two years already, the Government is starting to get concerned about continuous and never diminishing demand for capital from our banks. This concern is not motivated by the suddenly acquired desire to be prudent with taxpayers’ cash. Instead it is motivated by the optical impressions Irish banks appetite for Exchequer funding is creating around the world. Sovereign ratings are now directly being impacted by banks weaknesses and some investors are starting to ask uncomfortable questions about viability of AIB outside state control. There’s an added sticky issue of Irish Government deficit potentially reaching 20% of GDP this year should our banks come for more cash.

And they will... not in 2010, possibly, but in 2011, once Nama last tranche closes in February (or thereabouts - remember, it has blown through few deadlines already and can strategically move past February 2011 with closing off its purchases, to allow more time for banks to play the 'Head in the Sand' game).

If you want to see what is really happening in our sovereign bonds markets, check out the next post on this blog, which will be covering this.

Economics 30/06/2010: The curve is getting curvier

This wasn't supposed to be news, folks. ECB has pre-announced that it will be closing down its 12 months lending facility some time ago, and the readers of this blog would have known this much - see here. So what's the rush to shout 'Stop!' now, then?

Well, it turns out that in the best European tradition, Euro area banks have conveniently decided not to do much about their deteriorating loan books, preferring the Ponzi scheme of monetizing their poor loan books via ECB funding, and ignoring all warning lights.

Per Bloomberg report today: the ECB said it will lend banks €131.9bn more under its 3-mo lending facility. European banks tomorrow will have to repay €442bn in 12-mo funds, assuming ECB wants to preserve the remaining shreds of monetary credibility and shuts down the pyramid game. So, promptly a week after Bank for International Settlements' dire warning that zero interest rates are leading to shortening maturity of banks & sovereign debts, inducing greater maturity mis-match risks for both, we have a roll over of 1/3rd of the ECB quantitatively-eased banks debts into a much shorter maturity instrument.

ECB said that Euro area-wide, 171 banks asked for the 3-mo funds at 1%, with banks allowed to borrow in the market at about 0.76% euribor and rising (again, the theme picked up by this blog ahead of general media attention: here).

And there is not a chance sick-puppies, like Irish, Greek, Spanish or Portuguese banks, can borrow at the euribor rates. Instead, as the Indo reports today, Fitch ratings agency estimates that the Irish banks borrowed a whooping 12% of the €729bn the ECB has lent to all Euro area banks in 2009. Some of this is accounted for by the IFSC-based facilities. But some, undoubtedly, is held by the Irish banks, and their own IFSC affiliates. Not surprisingly, Irish banks shares have been running red in days preceding July 1...

The liquidity fall-off curve is getting curvier for Irish banks, to use Bertie Ahearne's model of dynamic analysis.


Bloxham morning note reports on an interesting development: the Arms index - an index measuring overall bullishness (for values <1.0)>1.0) of the stock markets "rose to one of the highest levels in at least the last seventy years yesterday rising to over 16 before closing at 5.88". This is an extreme move and at these valuations it is consistent with the overall markets bottoming. As Bloxham note states, "what is fascinating is that yesterdays extreme reading was in fact higher than the 11.89 found at the absolute bottom of the 1987 crash. The pullback in February 27^th 2007 also ended on an extreme reading of 14.84." Here's the chart - again, from Bloxham's note:
Exceptional!