Economics 25/05/2010: Looking at the Financial sector

As of now, both BofI and AIB are trading below 52-weeks lows. The financials are continuing to experience pressures. But a look back at the overall sector is warranted. Here are some stats:
Let's start from a far: dramatic or not, but the current market conditions are in line with the long term time trend in Irish financials. If anything, per almost 11 years of data, we are currently above the long run trend line. Guess there's more room for downward pressures, should long run dynamics matter.

Zooming in:
Note the chart above - this shows the totality of value destruction since the beginning of the credit crunch back in July/August 2007.

To see some more dynamics, consider the snapshot from the peak to today:
The chart above shows the entire extent of the crisis, with the medium term (through crisis) trend pointing to consistent positioning of the current market valuations. In other words, per trend, nothing dramatic is happening in the markets right now. I also posted some key dates that mark our policy and opinion makers' ability to track markets and predict the future.

Lastly, chart above shows the dynamics in Irish financials over the span of the 'rebirth of optimism' - the last 12 months during which various Government officials and politicians have made a score of statements to the effect that:

• Ireland has turned the corner on recession
• Irish banks are now in a stronger position than before
• Irish Government has made right decisions and these are now evident in the markets' approval, etc.
  

Revealing, isn't it?

Economics 24/05/2010: Another day of bloodletting at BofI

So, you've paid €0.19-0.32 per rights per share of BofI - following, undoubtedly your brokers advice (for the €0.24-0.32 part of the range, or Friday close per €0.19 bit). You shelved out €0.55 per share on the promise of a discount of 42% on the post-rights price from the brilliant boys at BofI. You are now €0.02-0.15 per share in a hole, or down 2.7-20.8% in a span of 2 trading days (using latest quoted price of €0.725 per share).

Consolation / silver lining?

You could have been an Irish taxpayer (most likely you are), in which case you would be nursing a loss of €0.63-0.83 on your earlier purchases of the same shares, assuming Brian Lenihan cuts the losses and sell the rights (a tall order assumption).

Then again, although all of us lost - either as bank's new shareholders or as taxpayers, there is yet a much more adversely impacted group of people out there - the poor souls who, while paying taxes in this land also bought a-new into BofI rights issue...

Really, a rare example of all lose, no one wins... except for the existent shareholders and BofI management, who so far enjoyed artificial support from the State.

Now, do recall this: on Thursday September 18 2008, our former Leader Supremo Bertie Ahern told George Hook (Newstalk)that: Bank of Ireland shares are €3.80 today. Now, if I meet you here next year, or the year later, do you seriously think Bank of Ireland shares will be €3.80? I'd go out and buy Bank of Ireland shares... that's what I'd do" (quoted from the next day Irish Times - here). Errr...

Economics 17/05/2010: BofI rights offer - back of an envelope

Update: Tasc have published a very interesting piece of research (here) mapping the real Golden Circle of Ireland's interconnected political and economic elites. Fair play to Tasc for covering semi-state bodies and companies. Well done to the authors! (hat tip to RDelevan)



Back of an envelope calculations for the BofI rights offer - self explanatory stuff:
But what about taxpayers' buy-in into BofI under this deal? Well, if the value of this offer is negative at the buy-in price of 55 cents per share, think what the value is for the taxpayers, who bought at €1.80 per share! Ok, let's do the maths: we have post-rights price of BofI at 81.9 cents, for which we paid 180 cents - the net return is the loss of 98.1 cents per share bought by the Irish Exchequer... Amazingly, there is no reason for this loss whatsoever - as an existent shareholder in the bank, Irish Exchequer is entitled to participate in the same deal offered to all current shareholders. we, therefore, could have limited our losses to 24.75 cents per share from 81.9 cents per share and still done the same deal!


Note: the above estimates are based on straight forward linear model of equity-price relationship. These are, therefore approximations. Based on expected balance sheet model, the returns can be estimated different - with upside growth scenario over the next few years potentially yielding a positive return, while downside growth scenario can yield an even deeper loss. You be the judge, but my figures should be treated as being closer to risk-adjusted (static model) averages.

Disclaimer - I do not hold any shares or any other financial instruments (equity or debt) in any of the Irish banks.

Economics 05/05/2010: Third Force's Burn-out Bench

The news stream is getting thicker and thicker with Irish financials and sovereign / fiscal debacles stories. Reuters is reporting (hat tip to Brian) (here) that the Third Force now looks more like a Burn-out Bench and that there is little prospect for growth or profitability for BofI and AIB.

All's fine, as far as the arguments go, except, there is that silly ending to the article putting blame for the crisis on 'too much competition' in the Irish banking sector. I'd say this pure rubbish. Here is an earlier note I wrote on that subject. In simple terms, it does not matter what profit margins could have been were we to have lower competition. Irish banking crisis was caused by excessive willingness to take risks, spurred on by the Government, the Regulator, the Central Bank and ECB. May be there was too much competition amongst the incompetent cooks in that kitchen?


Oh, and Nouriel Roubini puts a clear number on the fear of European contagion: "European banks hold claims of US$193 billion on Greece and more than US$1 trillion of further claims on Portugal, Ireland and Spain. It cannot be ruled out that the ECB will eventually have to resort to more aggressive measures such as buying government bonds in the secondary market in order to stop the contagion."

So the next stage of contagion can cost Germany (and make no mistake - Germany will be paying for this in the end) upwards of 5 times what the Greek bailout will cost.

Economics 26/04/2010: Bank of Ireland Conversion Deal

Bank of Ireland deal: per latest report from the RTE, the State's shareholding in BofI will increase to 36% from 16% through a conversion of €1.7bn of funds given to the bank last year into ordinary shares. The bank will now attempt to raise the other €1.7bn in equity from private markets with a rumored discount on first-offer of 40%.

Minister for Finance Brian Lenihan said that 'This transaction is good news for our economy, good news for the taxpayer and good news for Bank of Ireland's shareholders and investors.'

This is another extraordinary statement made by the Minister. The Minister has just informed the nation that we are overpaying some 11%+ (see below) for the shares gained under this conversion, since 'the transaction has been agreed on market terms'.

Aside: the Minister does not appear to clearly understand the terms of conversion he agree to, as 'market terms' would mean that the state is converting at a current price (Friday close of €1.80) less cumulated dividends (2 years @8%), less the discount extended to the market (38-42%). 'Market terms' therefore would imply conversion at €0.88 per share, not €1 per share achieved.

Finally, the Minister failed to negotiate a discount that should be due any large-scale investor. All in, the estimated overpayment of 11% is really a likely underestimate. In exchange for our money, we, the taxpayers, got a pile of over-priced shares which are about to be diluted!

Looking closer at the details: BofI plans to raise €500mln from private placements with institutionals, priced at €1.53 or 15% discount on Friday close price. The main issue will be €1.2bn (net) with 38-42% discount. Preference shares held by the taxpayers will be converted at €1 per share (they were bought at €1.2 per share and paid no dividend), which actually means we de facto are paying €1.16 per share, while existing shareholders can get shares at as low as €1.04-1.06. Government-held warrants are priced at ca €491mln.

Economics 09/04/2010: Bank of Ireland: strategic insanity

And so, as I predicted in the press some months ago and confirmed (also in the press) following the AIB rate hike and previous BofI hike in the non-mortgage rates, Bank of Ireland had succumbed to the temptation to destroy its own paying clients in order to plaster up the gaping hole in its capital base.

There are, as you have noticed, a number of things going on in the above statement. Let me briefly explain:

• A hike of 50bps on variable rate mortgages announced by BofI is a short-sighted strategy: the bank holds ca 25% of all mortgages in the country (about 190,000) of these, more than 20% are already in negative equity (over 40,000). BofI should be concerned about preserving those mortgages that are currently at risk - in other words, the bank should focus on helping (or at least not hurting) those who are close to the margin of defaulting. Variable rate hike will most severely impact those households with higher LTV ratios, who are younger and thus at higher risk of unemployment. Thus, the interest rate elasticity of the mortgage default rate is the highest exactly for this category of clients. Put in 'can my grandma understand this' terms - BofI move today is equivalent to destroying that parts of its performing loans book which it should be focusing on saving.
• A hike of 50bps on variable rate mortgages will do absolutely nothing to BofI's balancesheet. Bank might be estimating that it can get few million worth of funds from the move. But the wholesome destruction of its own client base and their loans, in my view, will cost it more than it will bring in in the longer-term.
• A hike of 50bps will further amplify the already destructive force of precautionary savings wrecking destruction across the Irish domestic economy. This effect will be driven by two forces. First, any money the banks take in higher mortgage rates will not be recycled into the economy through higher investment or new lending because the banks will force the new cash into capital reserves to pay down defaulting debts. Thus, every penny taken by the banks in will mean a one-for-one contraction in direct consumer spending and household investment, amplified through the usual multiplier effects 3-4 fold in the course of just one year. Second, households will now rationally expect more hikes in mortgage rates, thus increasing further their saving. For every €1 that BofI, AIB, ptsb, and the rest of the gang collect from mortgage holders, consumer spending will therefore decline by at least €4-5.

The BofI move today is, therefore, equivalent to a deranged asylum patient having fallen off the cliff, hanging onto the last available branch of a tree frantically sawing off the said branch with a fervor.

And since we are on the theme of deranged asylum patients, why not mention the latest, and perhaps the most comical idea our state-backed financial engineers can conjure: the Anglo Irish Bank taking over Quinn Insurance. That one is equivalent to AIG being taken over by General Motors. A bank that is as full of bad loans as Hindenberg was full of hydrogen is taking over an insurance company that is so disturbingly short of capital - sparks are flying from underneath its wheels.

What can possibly go wrong here? Oh, just about countless more billions from the taxpayers wasted...

Economics 31/03/2010: An expensive joke called Nama

I must confess, the last thing I expected in yesterday's quadruple whammy of one Ministerial speech, one Nama document release, a Central Bank statement and the Financial Regulator's decision was a joke. But there it was. For all to see, for few to notice.

Armed with a law degree-backed mastery of logic, Minister Lenihan has issued a statement that he will be requiring Irish Bankers Federation to run courses for the benefit of our bankers on how to lend money to projects other than property. That statement, coming from the Minister after he announced that the Anglo will be provided with up to €18.3 billion in taxpayers cash, and the rest of our banks will swallow billions more was worthy of a comedian. In an instant - we had a Minister for Finance throwing money at the banks which, by his own admission, have no idea of how to lend.

Anything else had to take a back seat to this farce. And it almost did. If not for another pearl of bizarre twist in the Nama saga. Recall that this Government has promised the world an arms-length entity to control and legally own Nama - the Special Purpose Vehicle arrangement which, in order to keep Nama debts out of the national debt accounts was supposed to be majority (51%) owned by external investors.

At the time of the original announcement of this arrangement I publicly stated that there was absolutely nothing in the Nama legislation precluding parties with direct interest in Nama from investing in this SPV. And boy, clearly unaware of such pithy things like conflict of interest, Nama announced that its majority owners will be:

• Irish Life Assurance (a part of the IL&P that has been at the centre of the Anglo deposits controversy and one of the most leveraged banks in the nation),
• New Ireland (an insurance branch of BofI), and
• AIB Investment Managers.

In other words, the very institutions that will be benefiting from Nama's taxpayers riches will also own Nama and will comprise SPV board. They couldn't have given a share to Seannie Fitz and Mick Fingleton, could they?

Having a good laugh - even at the cost of tens of billions to us, the ordinary folks - is a great end for a day in the Namacrats land. So much for responsible and vigilant policies of the Government.


Now to the beef: Nama release figures.

In its note on the first tranche of loans transferred, Nama provides a handy (although predictably vague) description of the loans the taxpayers are buying as of March 30, 2010. Table below summarizes what information we do have:

Let us take a further look at the data provided in the official release and the accompanying slide deck.
Applying more realistic valuations on the loans transferred against the average Nama discount, while allowing for 11% assumed LTEV uplift (Nama own figure), net of 2% risk margin - the last column in the above table shows the amounts that should have been paid for these assets were their valuations carried out on the base of March 30, 2010 instead of November 30, 2009 and were the discounts applied reflective of realistic current markets conditions.

Thus, in the entire first tranche of loans, Nama has managed to overpay (or shall we say squander away) between €1.2 and €3.1 billion - a range of overpayment consistent with 14-37% loss under the plausibly optimistic assumptions. Returning this loss across the entire Nama book of business and adding associated expected costs of the undertaking implies a taxpayer loss of €9.6-25.3 billion from Nama operations.


In Nama statement, Brendan McDonagh, Chief Executive of NAMA said: “Our sole focus at NAMA is to bring proper and disciplined management to these loans and borrowers with the aim of achieving the best possible return and to protect the interests of the taxpayer. ...NAMA is willing to engage with an open mind to our acquired clients ...”

Pretty amazing, folks - Nama CEO clearly sees the borrowers as his 'clients', while claiming that his organization objective is to benefit the taxpayers. Would Mr McDonagh be so kind as to explain the difference? Is Nama going to serve the 'clients' or is it going to protect the taxpayers? The two objectives can easily find themselves at odds - the fact Mr McDonagh is seemingly unaware of.

Economics 21/03/2010: Reckless expectations, not competition

This is a lengthy post - to reflect the importance of the issue at hand. And it is based largely on data from Professor Brian Lucey, with my added analysis.

The proposition that this post is proving is the following one:

Far from being harmed by competition from foreign lenders, Irish banking sector has suffered from its own disease of reckless lending. In fact, competition in Irish banking remains remarkably close (although below) European average and is acting as a stabilizing force in the markets relative to other factors.


I always found the argument that ‘too much competition in banking was the driver of excessive lending’ to be an economically illiterate one. Even though this view has been professed by some of my most esteemed colleagues in economics.

In theory, competition acts to lower margins in the sector, and since it takes time to build up competitive pressure, the sectors that are facing competition are characterized by stable, established players. In other words, in most cases, sectors with a lot of competition are older, mature ones. This fact is even more pronounced if entry into the sector is associated with significant capital cost requirements. Banking – in particular run of the mill, non-innovative traditional type – is the case in point everywhere in the world.

As competition drives margins down, making quick buck becomes impossible. You can’t hope to write a few high margin, high risk loans and reap huge returns. So firms in highly competitive sectors compete against each other on the basis of longer term strategies that are more stable and prudent. Deploying virtually commoditized services or products to larger numbers of population. Reputation and ever-increasing efficiencies in operations become the driving factors of every surviving firm’s success. And these promote longer term stability of the sector.

Coase’s famous proposition about transaction costs provides a basis for such a corollary.

This means that in the case of Irish banking during the last decade, if competition was indeed driving down the margins in lending (as our stockbrokers, the Government and policy analysts ardently argue today), then the following should have happened.

1. Banks should have become more prudent over time in lending and risk pricing,
2. There should have been broader diversification of the banks lending portfolia, with the bulk of new loans concentrating in the areas relating directly to depositor base – corporate and household lending, and a hefty fringe of higher-margin inter-mediation lending to financial institutions, and
3. Banks would be seeking to ‘bundle’ more services to differentiate from competitors and enhance margins.
   

In Ireland, of course, during the alleged period of ‘harmful competition’ exactly the opposite took place. Let me use Prof Brian Lucey’s data (with added analysis from myself) to show you the facts.

Firstly, Irish banks became less prudent in lending – as exemplified by falling loans approvals criteria, and by rising LTVs:

1. Lending to private sector as % of GDP was ca 50% in 1995, reaching 100% in 1998 and rising to 300% in 2009
2. Vast increases in lending to developers: in 1997 there were €10bn lent out to developers against €20bn in mortgages; in 2008 these figures were €110bn and €140bn respectively
3. Over the time when lending to private sector rose 600%, mortgages lending rose 550%, our GDP rose by 75%
   

Secondly, banks reduced their assets and liabilities diversification (charts 1-3 below) setting themselves up for a massive rise in asymmetric risk exposures.

On the funding side, out went customers deposits, in came banks deposits, foreign deposits and bonds and Irish bonds.
Capital ratios fell out of the way.

And so there has been a change in the world of Irish banking that no other competitive and mature sector of any economy has ever seen. Why? Was it because foreign banks started pushing the timid boys of BofI and AIB and Anglo and INBS out into reckless competitive lending?

You’ve gotta be mad to believe this sop. In reality, the Irish banks’ assets tell the story.

Business loans collapsed, personal loans (the stuff that allegedly, according to the likes of the Irish Times have fuelled our cars and clothing shopping binge during the Celtic Tiger years) actually declined in importance as well. Financial intermediation – the higher margin, higher risk thingy that so severely impacted the US banks – was down as well. No, competition was not driving Irish banks into the hands of higher margin lending. It was driving them into the hands of our property developers. We didn’t have a derivatives and speculative financial investment crisis here – the one that was allegedly caused by the foreign banks coming in and forcing our good boys to cut margins on run-of-the-mill ordinary lending. No, we had an old fashioned disaster of construction and property lending.

And this lending could not have been driven by foreign banks. It came from the total expansion of credit in the economy, presided over by our Central Bank and Financial Regulator, our Government and ECB.

Just how dramatic this change was? Take a look at the ratio of private sector credit to national income in the chart below.
Even a child could have seen the bust coming. The reason that our Financial Regulator and Central Bank failed to see this, despite publishing all this data in the first place, is that they were simply not looking. The former probably obsessed with the pension perks, the latter – well, may be because all the fine art in the Central Bank’s own collection was just too much of a distraction. Who knows? But judging by the above chart lack of significant correction during the crisis – we know who will pay for this in the end. Us, the taxpayers.
As chart above shows, the fundamentals for the boom – in lending and in construction – were never there, folks. And the banks missed that completely. As did our regulators and our policymakers. Brian Lucey of TCD School of Business provides evidence on what was really going on in the Irish banks (again, note that some of the analysis below is mine).
Chart above, based on the Central Bank Credit Survey, basically shows the impact three major forces: expectations of increased competition by the banks, improved banks outlook on the Irish economy three months ahead, and LTVs expectations had in Irish banks willingness to increase lending. Scores above 3 represent tightening of credit conditions (as in banks expecting to cut lending to households), while scores below 3 show forces driving looser credit to households.

If the proposition that foreign banks competition pressures drove Irish banks into looser credit supply were to be correct, one would expect the blue line above to reach far deeper into ‘below 3’ scores than the other two lines. Alas, it did not dip. In fact, competition from other banks was recognized by Irish Bankers themselves to be the least improtant factor contributing to credit supply expansion. Instead, their over-optimism about economic prospects (red line) and their willingess to give away cash at massively inlfated LTVs (the orange line – also a proxy for Bankers’ optimism regarding future direction of house prices) were the two main drivers of credit boom.

Where’s the evidence on ‘harmful competition’ that so many Central Bank leaders, the stockbrokers and Government spokespersons have decried in recent past?

The delirium of our bankers was actually so out of any proportion that, as the surveys data shows, even amidst the implosion of the housing markets since early 2008 they were still saying “hang on....we expect that changes in LTV and economic prosoects will cause us to loosen in the next 3 months". In other words, they were chasing the deflating bubble, not the imaginary foreign banks competitiors.

Let’s take another look at Brian Lucey’s data. Take the scores for Ireland in the above surveys and take their ratios to the Euro area average scores. If the ratio is in excess of 1, then the said factor has contributed to greater tightening in credit supply in Ireland than in the Euro area. If it is less than 1, then the said factor has contributed more to loosening in lending in Ireland than in the Euro area.
So, really, folks, competition in Ireland was actually more of a stabilizing force, than de-stabilizing one. LTV’s optimism and lack of realism in economic forecasts were the two main driving forces of the boom.

Lastly, ECB Herfindahl Index (ratio of Ireland to “big5” EU states) provides exactly the same conclusions:
Again, what above shows is that on virtually every occasion, Irish reading for Herfindahl Index (measuring degree of concentration in banking sector) is in excess of the average Index reading for top 5 EU countries. In other words, there was no such thing as ‘too much competition’ going on in Irish banking sector. If anything, there was somwhat too little of it, compared to Germany, France, Italy, UK and the Netherlands.

And now, for the test of all of this. The chart below regresses each survey factor on the private sector credit index. The negatively sloped line – for LTV and economic prospect factors combined - shows that when this factor scoring in the survey increased, lending became tighter. Positively sloped line – for competition – shows that when competition pressures rose (factor reading declined), lending actually got tighter. And the statistical significance of the LTV and expectations factors is more than double that of competition...
Let’s just stop talking nonesense about too much competition in Irish banking sector drove unsustainable lending. More likely – an anticiaption by our bankers that no matter what they do, they will never be allowed to fail by the state, plus an absolutely rediculous expectations about opur economy drove our banks to the brink.

Economics 22/02/2010: Leading indicators of an Irish recovery

For those of you who missed my Sunday Times article yesterday, here is the unedited version (note: this is the last article of mine in the Sunday Times for the time being as Damien Kiberd will be back with his usual excellent column from next week on):


The latest Exchequer results alongside the Live Register figures clearly point to the fact that despite all the recent talk about Ireland turning the corner, the recession continues to ravage our economy. And despite all the recent gains in consumer confidence retail spending posted yet another lackluster month in December 2009. Predictably, credit demand remains extremely weak, with the IBF/PwC Mortgage Market Profile released earlier this week showing that the volume of new mortgages issued in Ireland has fallen 18% in Q4 2009.

Even industrial production and manufacturing, having shown tentative improvement in Q3 2009 have trended down in the last quarter.

As disappointing as these results are, they were ultimately predictable. Economic turnarounds do not happen because Government ‘experts’ decide to cheer up consumers.

Instead, there is an ironclad timing to various indicators that time the recessions and recoveries: some lead the cycle, others are contemporaneous to it, or even lag changes in economy.

In a research paper published in 2007, UCLA’s Edward E. Leamer shows that in ten recessions experienced in the US since the end of World War II, eight were precluded by housing markets declines (first in terms of volumes of sales and later price changes). The two exceptions were the Dot Com bust of 2001 and the end of the massive military spending due to the Korean Armistice of 1953. Residential investment also led the recovery cycle.

Despite being exports-dependent, Irish economy shares one important trait with the US. Housing investments constitute a major proportion of our households’ investment. In fact, the weight of housing in our investment portfolios is around 65-70%. It is around 50% in the US. As such, house markets determine our wealth and savings, and have a pronounced effect on our decisions as consumers.

Consider the timing of events. Going into the crisis, Irish house sales volumes turned downward in the first half of 2007. House prices declines followed by Q1 2008, alongside changes in manufacturing and services sectors PMI. A quarter later, the whole economy was in a recession.

House price declines for January 2010 indicate that roughly €200 billion worth of wealth was wiped out from the Irish households’ balancesheets since the end of 2007. With this safety net gone, the first reaction is to cut borrowing and ramp up savings, to the detriment of immediate consumption and new investment.

So, if housing markets are the lead indicator of future economic activity, just where exactly (relative to the proverbial corner) are we on the road to recovery? Not in a good place, I am afraid.

Per latest data from the Central Bank, private sector credit continues to contract in Ireland, with December 2009 recording a drop of 6% on December 2008. Residential mortgage lending has also fallen from €114.3 billion in December 2008 to €109.9 billion a year later. This suggests that at least some households are deleveraging out of debt – a good sign. Of course, the decline is also driven by the mortgages writedowns due to insolvencies.

Worse, as Central Bank data shows, the process of retail interest rates increases is already underway. In November 2009 retail interest rates for mortgages have increased for all loans maturities and types. Irish banks, spurred on by the prospect of massive losses due to Nama, are hiking up the rates they charge on existent and new borrowers.

And more is to come. Based on the current dynamic of the interest rates and existent lending margins for largest Irish banks compared to euro area aggregates, I would estimate that average interest rates charged on mortgages will rise from 2.67% recorded back at the end of November 2009 to around 3.3-3.5 % by the end of this year, before the ECB increases its base rate. This would imply that those on adjustable mortgages could see their cost of house financing rise by around 125 basis points, while new mortgage applicants will be facing rates hike of well over 150-160 basis points.

On the house prices front, absent any real-time data, all that we do know is that residential rents remain subdued. Removing seasonality out of Daft.ie most recent data, released this week, shows that downward trend in rents is likely to continue. Commercial rents are also sliding and overall occupancy rates are rising, with some premium retail locations, such as CHQ building in IFSC, are reporting over 50% vacancy rates.

Does anyone still think we have turned a corner?

The problem, of course, is that the structure of the Irish economy prevents an orderly and speedy restart to residential investment.

First, there are simply too many properties either for sale or held back from the market by the owners who know they have no chance of shifting these any time soon. We have zoned so much land – most of it in locations where few would ever want to live – that we can met our expected demand 70 years into the future. We also have 350-400,000 vacant finished and unfinished homes, majority of which will never be sold at any price proximate to the cost of their completion. To address these problems, the Government can use Nama to demolish surplus properties and de-zone unsuitable land. But that would be excruciatingly costly, unless we fully nationalize the banks first. And it would cut against Nama’s mandate to deliver long-term economic value.

Second, there is a problem of price discovery. Before the crisis we had ESRI/ptsb sample of selling prices. Based on ptsb own mortgages, it was a poor measure. But now, with ptsb having pushed its loans to deposits ratio to 300%, matching Northern Rock’s achievement, there is not a snowball’s chance in hell it will remain a dominant player in mortgages in Ireland. Thus, we no longer have any indication as to the actual levels of property prices, and absent these, no rational investor will brave the market. The Government can rectify the problem by requiring sellers to publish exact data on prices and property characteristics.

Third, the Government can aid the process of households deleveraging from the debts accumulated during the Celtic Tiger era. In particular, to help struggling mortgage payers, the Government can extend 100% interest relief for a fixed period of time, say 5 years, to all households. On the one hand such relief will provide a positive cushion against rising interest rates. On the other hand, it will allow older households with less substantial mortgage outlays to begin the process of rebuilding their retirement savings devastated by the twin collapse in property and equity markets. Instead of doing this, the Government is desperately searching for new and more punitive ways to tax savings. Finance Bill 2010 with its tax on unit-linked single premium insurance products is the case in point.

Fourth, the Government can get serious about reducing the burden of our grotesquely overweight public sector. To do so, the Exchequer should commit to no increases in income tax in the next 5 years. All deficit adjustments from here on will have to take a form of expenditure cuts. Nama must be altered into a leaner undertaking responsible for repairing banks balancesheets, not for providing them with soft taxpayers’ cash in exchange for junk assets.

Until all four reforms take place, there is little hope of us getting close to the proverbial corner for residential investment, and with it, for economy at large.


Box-out:

Back in January 2009, unnoticed by many observers, a small change took place in the Central Bank reporting of the credit flows in the retail lending in Ireland. Per Central Bank note, from that month on, credit unions authorized in Ireland were classified as credit institutions and their deposits and loans were included in other monetary financial institutions. This minute change implies that since January 2009, Irish deposits and loans volumes have been inflated by the deposits and loans from the credit unions. Thus, a search through the Central Bank archive shows that between November 2008 and February 2009, the total deposits base relating to resident credit institutions and other MFIs rose from €166 billion to €183 billion, despite the fact that the country banking system was in the grip of a severe crisis. Adjusting for seasonal effects normally present in the data, it appears that some €14-15 billion worth of ‘new’ deposits were delivered to the Irish economy though this new accounting procedure. Of course, deposits on the banks liability side are exactly offset by their assets side, which means that over the same period of time more than €16 billion of ‘new’ credit was registering on the Central Bank radar. Now, this figure is also collaborated by the credit unions annual reports which show roughly €14 billion worth of loans issued by the end of 2007 – the latest for which data is available. This suggests that the credit contraction in the Irish economy during 2009 is understated by the official figures to the tune of €14-15 billion. Not a chop change.

Economics 19/02/2010: Bank of Ireland deal

And so it comes to pass - the saga of missing dividend from Bank of Ireland, and the taxpayers are left holding the bag... The background to the story is here. Karl Whelan's post here gives the relevant links to the documents. And my analysis is as following:

Following the conversion of dividend due (€250 million) from the Bank of Ireland preference shares owned by the state to ordinary shares on 22 of February, the state will emerge as an almost 16% owner of the bank equity.

The relevant ISE document stipulates that:
"As a consequence of this and, in accordance with Bye Law 6(I)(4), the Directors of the Bank of Ireland announce that on 22 February 2010 it will issue and allot to the NPRFC 184,394,378 units of Ordinary Stock being the number of units equal to the aggregate cash amount of the 2010 dividend of €250.4m divided by 100% of the average price per unit of ordinary stock in the 30 trading days prior to and including today's date. Application will be made in due course for the listing of these units of stock. This increases the units of Ordinary Stock of Bank of Ireland in issue to 1,188,611,367. As a result the NPRFC will own 15.73 per cent of the issued Ordinary Stock (excluding the NPRFC Warrant Instrument)"

Which means a massive shareholder dilution and a significant set back to the BofI ability to raise equity. Recall that the BofI was planning for a €1 billion rights issue which would have meant roughly a 38.6% dilution of existent shareholder rights. Now, with a preemptive 16% dilution by the state, a rights issue planned will mean a 44% dilution post-rights should the price of the shares remain constant at Monday. And this is before we factor in 25% option on ordinary shares that is held within the preference shares we already have.

Of course it won't. A rational valuation model of shareprice will require that the price declines roughly 15% on Friday close post State dilution. Which means that market cap of the BofI will fall, at current average to €1,353 million, implying the post-right dilution of 48%.

In a way, Government taking the stake in BofI prior to rights issue at current valuation means the taxpayer is buying an asset that is likely to drop in value almost 50% within months after the State takes its stake. With one sweep of the pen, Minister Lenihan just signed off on an investment - using our cash - that will be worth 1/2 of its current value once BofI goes into equity raising.

Of, course, a much grimmer reality beckons should the State move tonight spell the end to the BofI equity issue prospects. In this case, today's announcement forces the Government to fully recapitalise the bank out of taxpayers funds, leading to a 90% plus State ownership and a massive liability to the taxpayers.

Irony of all ironies - the Government will end up transferring bad assets from its own bank to its own holding entity - Nama. What can possibly go wrong?


PS: In their September 3, 2009 note titled "Irish Banking - Crossing the Rubicon", Bloxham Stockbrokers said: "There is already a €825 million benefit to taxpayers from recovery in the market value of Allied Irish Bank and Bank of Ireland: Holding options worth a 25% stake in both AIB and Bank of Ireland, the taxpayer has benefited by €825 million as a result of the shareholding. This is apart from the benefit of the annual 8% yield from the €7 billion injection into the two main banks, which adds a further €560 million to the return per annum."

Run this by us, please, Bloxham - €825 million? Again? Crossing the Rubicon it was.

Wanna see some more fantasy estimates from the brokers? Davy:
"19 June 2009 17:26 Bank of Ireland could raise €1.5 billion in September and pay off some of the €3.5 billion in Government preference shares, according to stockbrokers Davy. ...In a report on Bank of Ireland today, Davy Research says the effect of a rights issue, in which the bank would issue more shares, could be used to pay funds back to the State and potentially leave the Government with a stake of 7%. "

7%? Run this by us, please, Davy Research - 7% state ownership? Right.

Economics 02/02/2010: NTMA and the banks

Per RTE Business (here which so far cannot be confirmed by any official material published on the NTMA website):

The NTMA "will now hold talks on capital needs with the institutions covered by the NAMA legislation. Among the other responsibilities it is assuming, the NTMA will also hold discussions with financial institutions on their realignment or restructuring within the banking sector. It will manage the Minister for Finance's shareholding in the banks, advise on banking matters, and crisis prevention, management and resolution."

Here are the interesting aspects of this change that raise a multitude of questions:

1. How will NTMA manage the conflict of interest between its own objectives per above and Nama objectives?
2. How will the potential conflicts of interest be disclosed to the markets?
3. What does it mean that NTMA will hold discussions with financial institutions? Will these discussions be subject to usual market disclosure rules or will they risk constituting a price fixing behavior?
   
4. How can NTMA's direct interference with the banks be compatible with the rights of other shareholders?
5. How will NTMA advising on banking matters etc play out vis-a-vis the roles of the Financial Regulator and the Central Bank?
6. What does 'crisis prevention, management and resolution' refer to? Systemic banking crises? Specific institutions crisis? Will it also include industrial relations crises? How will this process be carried out while respecting the general rules of disclosure and non-collusion with the market?
7. With massive firepower and own objectives, how NTMA will assure that the rights and interests of minority shareholders in the banks are protected?

In effect - even the mere raising of these questions implies that there is a risk that NTMA will be engaged in interfering with the markets for shares and debt in Irish banks in markets-distorting fashion. Amazingly we have no details as to how the Government and NTMA/Nama plan to avoid these problems.


There is another issue at hand here. If, at least in theory, DofF is a publicly accountable institution, NTMA by its statues is a secret entity (with extremely secretive culture to boot). What transparency can we, banks customers, have and what assurance can we hold that NTMA will not act to undermine or violate our rights, the safety of our deposits or our ability to access these?


Lastly, I am rather surprised at the timing of this change. In my view, this statement coming before Nama begins transfers of loans suggests that the Government is preparing for taking up a majority stake in the banks - a majority stake that will require full state control of these institutions management and activities.

So is this statement a precursor to full nationalization of the banks?

Economics 31/01/2010: February look

This is an unedited version of my article in Business & Finance magazine for February, 2010.

Over the last few weeks, a host of data releases – both Irish and international – have provided an insight into our economy’s performance over 2009 relative to our major competitors. The news, while predominantly adverse, still show an occasional proverbial silver lining.

Let us start on a positive note first. Per US Federal Reserve data, the current crisis has been yielding improvements in our productivity over 2009. Table 1 highlights this development.
Spurred on by the cuts in private sectors employment and nominal wages, Irish productivity has posted a 1.9% increase in 2009, just as the rest of the developed world experienced either deteriorating or much lower labour productivity growth. Of course, in part, our labour productivity performance was driven by a precipitous collapse in hours worked. It was also helped by the growing GDP/GNP gap. This makes our productivity expansion over 2009 somewhat superficial and attributable to the tear away performance of a handful of MNCs, especially those in pharma and medical devices sectors, where exports rose 20% on 2008 figures.

This means that although unemployment rose dramatically, cuts in hours and numbers worked were probably too shallow relative to cuts in output value. There is still some remaining surplus capacity clogging up domestic sectors – a problem that can only be corrected either via a significant increase in domestic demand or via a new wave of layoffs. Lacking the former, the latter is now appearing to be the case, with several larger employers announcing new rounds of redundancies in mid January.

Returning back to aforementioned data, it is interesting to consider just how large was the transfer pricing effect from our MNCs to our labour productivity growth. As no detailed data on such operations is available for Ireland, we have to look elsewhere for evidence as to what has been going on over the course of 2009.

One study from Germany – published last month by the CESIfo institute – shows that across 27 European countries, on average, multinational firms operating in lower tax regimes have managed to incur labour costs that are some 56% lower than those incurred by their domestic counterparts. These significant tax savings were, of course, taken not in the form of lower wages paid to the employees, but in higher profit margins booked through lower tax countries. And this was the average for 27 countries, of which Ireland sports one of the lowest corporate tax rates.

Incidentally, transfer pricing also explains the surprising data on FDI inflows revealed in mid-January by the UNCTAD. According to UNCTAD, 2009 was a bumper crop year for inward FDI into Ireland, with gross inflow of USD14 billion – a reversal of fortunes on USD20 billion gross outflow in 2008. These figures prompted a slew of rosy reports in the media. Of course, our gross FDI inflows also reflect the extent of transfer pricing being carried out through Ireland.

In 2009, Ireland-based MNCs booked record profits through their local operations in order to reduce their tax exposure back in the home countries. The proof of this is in robust corporate tax returns booked by the Exchequer. Now, there is a new push for tax arbitrage, and this time around its coming through beefing up the investment side of the balancesheet – higher investment in Irish subsidiaries today mean higher returns on investment booked tomorrow. Not surprisingly, there is no evidence of the USD14 billion new ‘investment’ to be found neither in terms of new employment in the MNCs-supported sectors, nor in much more realistic IDA end-of-year results.

One added point to our labour productivity growth figures is that even with record layoffs in 2009 we were clearly staying below historic productivity growth trend. In 1987-1995 our annual labour productivity grew by 2.4%, rising to over 3.4% in 1995-2000, before slowing down to 2.3% on 2000-2008. But the reversal of the economy out of full employment during the recession should have boosted our productivity growth beyond the 2.4-2.5 levels. Once again, the 1.9% productivity expansion, as positive as it is, shows that some slack capacity remains.


Clearly, shedding personnel with below average performance and reducing hours worked to their more optimal levels (reflective of the long term changes in private and public demand) has improved our competitiveness over the last two years. This, ultimately, leads to better prospects for future growth, and, as Table 2 below shows, is reflected in terms of labour input cuts over 2009. For example, Spain, which enjoyed higher rates of labour utlisation growth in 1995-2008 bubble than Ireland, recorded weaker hours contraction and thus lower productivity expansion during the crisis.
The net result of this is that despite having recorded the most dramatic of all EU15 states’ contraction in output, Ireland has emerged from 2009 with unchanged average per capita income position when compared against the US, as table 3 below shows.
Overall, these figures show that during 2009, private sector in Ireland has led the painful, but necessary process of productivity improvements that ultimately can provide a sound basis for restoring our economy to a new growth path. This is the good news.

The bad news is that despite having suffered unprecedented, compared to our competitors worldwide, cuts in overall employment (in terms of both numbers employed and hours worked), Ireland still remains below its historic trend for labour productivity growth. Barring a remarkable (and at this stage highly unlikely) return of robust domestic consumption growth, this means that 2010 will require further rationalization of employment to inflict deeper cuts into remaining surplus capacity.

Box-out:

The latest newsflow on Bank of Ireland and AIB strongly suggests that the current market valuation of the two banks is out of line with their balance sheet realities. Given current trends, the two banks may require a post-Nama recapitalization to the tune of €9.7-10.5 billion in total under conservative assumptions. Most of this recapitalization will have to take form of equity, as internationally, banking sector is moving toward much higher proportion of equity in overall composition of Tier 1 capital. Given that this amounts to over three-and-a-half times the current market value of the two banks and over 6.5 percent of Irish GNP, a recapitalization at these levels will mean two things for the current shareholders. Firstly, share prices target following the rights issue will be around €0.65-0.75 for AIB and around €0.5-0.6 for BofI – multiples below their current trading ranges. Second, barring a miracle spike in demand for distressed assets by international investors, the new rights will have to be mopped up by the Irish Exchequer. Even assuming extremely generous (to the banks) pricing conditions under the preference shares purchases back in 2008, the new rights issues will imply possible state ownership of up to 80% of AIB and up to 75% of BofI. Current shareholders, thus, are facing a double squeeze on their shares values – one from the volume of new issuance, and another from a massive dilution of their rights (by a factor of 5 times the current warrants held by the State).

Interestingly, my estimate, based on the macroview of the banking system in Ireland as compared against the UK counterparts is basically in line with last month’s research note on the two banks by RBS which put post-rights price target of €0.70 for AIB and €0.52 for BofI, with the prospect of up to 75% state ownership of the banks.

Another interesting aspect of the RBS note is that it provides an estimate of €20bn of cumulative loan losses for the two banks; “majority of which will be crystalised over the next two years”. These losses are linked by the analysts, in part to the banks participation in NAMA, but also due to expected increases in funding costs and the real risk of political intervention. Of course, this column has warned about exactly these risks to the Irish banks valuations for over a year now.

Economics 26/01/2010: S&P Note on Irish Banks

Standard & Poor's has finally thrown in the towel and after having to “periodically increase” their “credit loss assumptions over the course of the current economic cycle” concluded “that Irish banks' asset quality and earnings will, in general, likely remain under significant pressure over the medium term”.

Anyone surprised so far?

“We have considered the implications for each rated Irish bank and lowered the ratings on some of them.” But even after that action, “the ratings on all Irish banks are currently uplifted because of our view of high systemic importance to Ireland and related government support, or their relationship with a higher-rated parent.”

We never would have guessed that if not for the State guarantee plus 11 billion worth of public capital, plus Nama’s countless billions of pledged support, the banks bonds would be junk. Wait, some of them actually would be ‘high risk junk’ as one Russian fund manager once described to me his own bonds (I ran away as fast as I could).

How junk? Take a load of honesty from S&P (with my emphasis added):

“We have lowered the ratings on Allied Irish Banks PLC (A-/Negative/A-2) by a notch. This reflects our view that the environment will remain challenging over the medium term, leading to high credit losses, and a weakened revenue base. We consider AIB to be of high systemic importance and the Irish government to have made a strong statement of support, as a result of which we have incorporated five notches of support into the ratings. The negative outlook reflects our view that AIB's anticipated recapitalization may not fully occur in 2010, and may be of an insufficient size to support an 'A-' rating, as well downside risk to our earnings expectations arising from the weak environment.”

Absent state support, AIB should be BB/Negative/C+. Errr, that is squarely in the junk bonds category.

“We have also lowered the ratings on Bank of Ireland (A-/Stable/A-2) by a notch. This reflects our view that the environment will remain challenging over the medium term and BOI's financial profile will be weaker than we had previously expected, with capital expected to be only adequate by our measures and BOI continuing to make losses through 2011. We consider BOI to be of high systemic importance and the Irish government to have made a strong statement of support, as a result of which we have incorporated four notches of support into the ratings. The stable outlook reflects our expectation that the government will remain highly supportive of BOI, BOI's core Irish banking franchise will remain materially intact, and it will raise significant equity capital in 2010, from the market or the government or both.”

So absent support, BofI would be at BB+/Negative/BB-. Junk status as well.

“The ratings on Irish Life & Permanent PLC (ILP; BBB+/Stable/A-2) are unchanged. In our view, ILP faces continuing uncertainty around its strategic direction and desired business profile, in addition to the near-term pressure on the banking operations from weak earnings prospects and difficult wholesale funding conditions. Nevertheless, the ratings continue to benefit from the relative strength of the ILP group's life assurance operations. They also incorporate two notches of government support, reflecting our view of ILP's high systemic importance and our expectation that the Irish government would provide further support if required. The expectation of government support also underpins the stable outlook."

Absent state aid IL&P would be, then, at BBB-/Negative/B. Barely above water line.

Please, be mindful – S&P expects (and prices in) that the Irish state will be likely to buy equity in the banks. So we all can become investors in junk bonds-issuing institutions.


Very good, although bland, outlook statement:

“We consider the current operating conditions for the Irish banking industry to be weak, and expect that any recovery in earnings prospects will prove to be sluggish. In the coming year, we anticipate that many of the Irish banks may undergo operational and financial restructuring, which will likely lead to consolidation in the sector. Our overall assessment of the sector incorporates our opinions reflected in the following key points:

• The recovery in Irish economic performance appears likely to be gradual, with growth only consistently established in late 2010 at the earliest;
• Loan losses will likely be elevated between 2009-2011 and will likely peak in 2010; Wholesale funding conditions appear likely to remain pressurized, with strong competition for retail deposits...

"Under our base case, we expect loan losses on bank lending to the Irish private sector to peak at about 4.6% or EUR16 billion in 2010, and to total about 10.7% or EUR37 billion over the period from 2009 to 2011."

In country rankings analysis, S&P highlights that they expect the need for significant deleveraging by the banks in the future, reflective, presumably, of the lack thereof so far in the crisis – a risk I warned about consistently over time.

“The impact of the continuing challenging economic environment, which we view as weakening asset quality and earnings prospects” – presumably the S&P is on the same note as the rest of sane analysts: poor economy will drag banks down. Which means that Government logic – restore banks and see economy recover – is out of the window.


Next – a gem: “We have additionally revised our assessment of Gross Problematic Assets (GPAs) in the system to 15%-30% from 10%-20%. GPAs are our estimation of a country's potential problem loans to the private sector and nonfinancial public enterprises in a severe economic downturn, such as that being experienced in Ireland, and includes restructured and foreclosed assets, as well as overdue loans, and nonperforming loans sold to special-purpose vehicles.”

Oh yes – up to 30% GPA means that we can expect 45-50% of the loans to be stressed one way or the other at some point in time – some defaulting, some skipping couple of payments, some restructuring with various haircuts. That is, potentially, up to €200 billion in loans in various forms of distress for the 6 guaranteed banks alone.


With this sort of an outlook, not surprisingly, AIB's CDSs are now at around 650bps, BofI's at 250bps and virtually no action is taking place in bonds. Which, of course, does hint at the market reading Irish banks' bonds as being in effect a purely speculative bet on one probability - that of survival...

The share prices are yet to follow the same path of logic.

Economics 19/01/2010: Nama - adverse selection is happening

Newspapers today are reporting that banks may be pressuring Irish developers to sell their UK assets to write down the loans that are bound for NAMA. This is an interesting development. As UK market has shown some signs of revival (although these signs are tenuous at best), prime properties with less recent vintage can be sold off to generate cash to pay down some loans. Now, the problem for Nama is that of selection bias.

On one side of this equation, developers willing to do this will be disposing of the more liquid and better properties, depleting their own risk-weighted assets base.

They will be using cash to pay down the loans that are marginally at the boundary of being transferred to Nama. Why? Elementary, Watson!

Suppose Nama imposes a discount of 30% on your loans. You have two loans. One is recoverable at 80%, another at 0%. You have a choice – pay down one loan and let the other go Nama. If you take loan A with 80% recovery, you get 70cents on the euro from Nama. If you hold it to maturity you get 80 cents. If you take loan B with 0% recovery, you get 70 cents on the loan from Nama and zilch from the market. Guess which loan will be repaid and which will be heading for Nama?

In the mean time, naïve and inexperienced in collection and recovery business Nama is still sticking to 30% average discount claims, thus further incentivising this adverse selection process against itself. NAMA chief executive Brendan McDonagh few days ago repeated this much.

So the end game here is that, if the banks are successful, even poorer quality loans will be transferred to Nama, while Nama’s CEO is running around town committing himself to valuations before any valuations are even done.

Lovely.