22/8/2013: Sovereign Default Risk & Banks in the Euro Area Setting: Harald Uhlig

Harald Uhlig's latest paper "Sovereign Default Risk and Banks in a Monetary Union" (CEPR DP9606, August 2013, http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP9606) "seeks to understand the interplay between banks, bank regulation, sovereign default risk and central bank guarantees in a monetary union".

The rationale for the paper is that the "European Monetary Union is in distress. Mechanisms that were meant to safe-guard key institutions and to assure stability have become sources of balance sheet risk for these very institutions. Liquidity provision within
the European Monetary Union rests upon repurchase agreements, by which banks guarantee the repurchase of assets deposited with the ECB. If either the bank fails or the asset fails, but not both, this mechanism safe-guards the repayment to the ECB, since it can either rely on the repurchase by the bank or sell the asset. However, when both fail as well as the bank home country fails, the ECB incurs a loss."

Abstracting away from the (important) debate about the implications of such a 'loss', the theoretical framework described by Uhlig is insightful and interesting. The author assumes "that banks can use sovereign bonds for repurchase agreements with a common central bank, and that their sovereign partially backs up any losses, should the banks not be able to repurchase the bonds."

Furthermore, "In the model, banks pursue their investment strategy voluntarily: it is up to regulators to potentially constrain them. Other explanations are conceivable, of course". This is different from the currently dominant views, as per Reinhart (2012a) as well as Claessens and Kose (2013). Specifically, it is distinct from Reinhart (2012b) argument as to why banks hold bonds of their home country. Reinhart argues that in a “financial repression” setting the regulators "make
[the banks] hold the sovereign bonds, perhaps with strong-arm tactics, perhaps in exchange for “looking the other way” concerning weak portfolios of commercial loans and mortgages, or simply as a “favor” in a long, ongoing relationship. Since the banks could potentially refuse, though at considerable cost, it still must ultimately be preferable to them to hold own-country bonds rather than invest elsewhere or to close: so, in some ways, this paper may also be understood as a model of financial repression." Another view for the system by which the banks end up holding rising exposures to domestic sovereign bonds is a political economy argument: "if sovereign bonds are held by home banks, it makes it politically harder to default on these bonds, as this will hurt domestic banks and savers. If so, then such a portfolio arrangement might serve as a commitment device for the government in trouble."

Uhlig's (2013) paper is not covering the underlying reasons for the holding of the bonds.

Overall, "the issue of sovereign default risk, bank portfolios and the role of the central bank has received considerable attention in the recent literature. Acharya and Steffen (2013) is a careful empirical analysis of the “carry trade” by banks, which fund themselves in the wholesale market and invest in risky sovereign bonds. They document, that “over time, there is an increase in ’home bias’ – greater exposure of domestic banks to its sovereigns bonds – which is partly explained by the ECB funding of these positions"… Relatedly, Corradin and Rodriguez-Moreno (2013) show that USD-denominated sovereign bonds of Euro zone countries became substantially cheaper (i.e., delivering a higher yield) than Euro-denominated bonds during the Euro zone crisis, and ascribe it to the usefulness to banks of Euro-denominated bonds as collateral vis-a-vis the ECB, while USD-denominated bonds do not offer this advantage." In addition, "Drechsler et. al. (2013) document “a strong divergence among banks’ take-up of” Lender-of-Last-Resort assistance “during the financial crisis in the euro area, as banks which borrowed heavily also used increasingly risky collateral”. They test several hypothesis and argue that their “results strongly support the riskshifting explanation”…"

The above supports the Uhlig (2013) model that concludes that:
-- "…Regulators in risky countries have an incentive to allow their banks to hold home risky bonds and risk defaults, while regulators in other “safe” countries will impose tighter regulation."
-- "…Governments in risky countries get to borrow more cheaply, effectively shifting the risk of some of the potential sovereign default losses on the common central bank."
-- "As a result, the monetary union has become a system engineered to deliver underpriced loans from country banks to their sovereigns, and to implicitly shift sovereign default risk onto the balance sheet of the ECB and the rest of the Eurosystem."

The last sentence is the key to it all: the euro system is now "engineered to deliver underpriced" credit "from country banks to their sovereigns", while shifting "sovereign default risk onto… the ECB and the rest of the Eurosystem".

22/8/2013: Why This Time Things Might Be Different...

The readers of this blog know that I am seriously concerned with the issues of private (household) debt sustainability in the Euro area, as well as in other advanced economies around the world. In fact, my (simplified or stylised) POV on the current crisis is that we have now reached the point of long-term saturation with leverage and this is the main driver for the current Great Recession.

In a normal recession, deleveraging by one side of the economy is accommodated by leveraging up in another. For example, in a Keynesian policy set up, deleveraging of the households and non-financial corporates is accommodated by leveraging up of the fiscal side of the GDP equation. In a monetary policy setting, deleveraging of fiscal / public sector side is accommodated by lowering debt costs and thus increasing credit to the private economy. Lastly, in a normal balancesheet recession, both side of the economy can be helped in deleveraging by a combination of two policies accommodation.

In the current Great Recession, neither one of the three approaches above can work, unless at least one approach directly reduces debt levels - either via a sovereign default/writedown or a private sector writedown on a systemic scale. The reasons for this are two-fold:

1. Too much debt on all lines of the economic balancesheet: fiscal, household, NFCs and, thus, banks means that lowering the cost of debt financing is not sufficient to deliver signifcant enough room for new debt expansion; and
2. With emerging markets and middle income economies showing increasingly South-South internalised trade and investment flows patterns, the advanced economies are witnessing structural reductions in the pools of surplus (investable) savings available to them - the effect that is compounded by the adverse demographics in these economies. This means that monetary policy accommodation is funding the liquidity in the financial markets, where normally it would have been going to fund real activity.

In short, debt is the source of the crisis this time around, not the solution to the crisis as in previous recessions. And it is a proverbial perfect storm, as it comes on foot of demographic decline coincident with severe fiscal crises. The resulting squeeze on pensions in the advanced economies and on other age-related public services is yet to come.

Here is an interesting view on the continued crisis dynamics in the area of household debts in the US (with an ample warning for the rest of the advanced world) from Michael Hudson: http://www.alternet.org/economy/big-threat-economy-private-debt-and-interest-owed-it-not-government-debt (H/T to @rszbt Beate Reszat).

22/8/2013: Slow Moving Sovereign Debt Crises: a new MIT Paper

Guido Lorenzoni and Ivan Werning (LW, 2013) new paper "Slow Moving Debt Crises" (June 30, 2013, MIT Department of Economics Working Paper 13-18. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2298813) theoretically links the environment and policies conditions that can lead to self-fulfilling increases in sovereign interest rates.

To do so, the authors use a model of the dynamics of debt and interest rates in a setting where default is driven by insolvency. "Fiscal deficits and surpluses are subject to shocks but influenced by a fiscal policy rule. Whenever possible the government issues debt to meet its current obligations and defaults otherwise."

The result is a model that has multiple equilibria where both "low and high interest rate equilibria may coexist". There are self-fulfilling risks as "higher interest rates, prompted by fears of default, lead to faster debt accumulation, validating default fears. We call such an equilibrium a slow moving crisis, in contrast to rollover crises where investor runs precipitate immediate default." In a sense, Italy, and potentially the rest of the euro area periphery, ex-Ireland, appear to be stuck in this 'slow moving debt crisis'.

In September 2012, commenting on the ECB announcement of OMT, the ECB’s president,
Mario Draghi, clearly linked the on-going sovereign debt crisis in euro area peripheral states to a self-fulfilling crisis: “…we are in a situation now where you have large parts of the Euro Area in what we call a bad equilibrium, namely an equilibrium where you have self-fulfilling expectations. You may have self-fulfilling expectations that generate, that feed upon themselves, and generate adverse, very adverse scenarios. So there is a case for intervening to, in a sense, break these expectations [...]”

According to LW (2013): "If this view is correct, a credible announcement is all it takes to rule out bad equilibria, no bond purchases need to be carried out. To date, this is exactly how it seems to have played out."

In the LW (2013) model, "the government faces a fluctuating path of fiscal surpluses or deficits, that are affected by shocks and the current debt level. Each period, it attempts to meet these obligations by visiting a credit market, issuing bonds to a large group of risk-neutral investors. The capacity to borrow is limited endogenously by the prospect of future repayment and default occurs when a government’s need for funds exceeds this borrowing capacity. In equilibrium, bond prices incorporate the probability of default."

Bonds can be issued as short-term and long-term. "In the case of short-term debt", LW (2013) show that "the equilibrium bond price function (mapping the state
of the economy into bond prices) is uniquely determined."

The main point, however, is that uniqueness of he price function "does not imply that the equilibrium is unique. Multiplicity arises from what we call a Laffer curve effect: revenue from a bond auction is non-monotone in the amount of bonds issued. If the borrower targets a given level of revenue, then there are multiple bond prices consistent with an equilibrium."

"With long-term bonds the price function is no longer uniquely determined, because a
bad equilibrium with lower bond prices in the future now feeds back into current bond
prices. In addition, the existence of a good and bad equilibrium may be temporary. For
example, if we follow the bad equilibrium path for a sufficiently long period of time,
the debt level may reach a level for which there exists a unique continuation equilibrium with high interest rates; the bad equilibrium may set in."

This is important to the current case, as it links directly high level debt starting position to the bad equilibrium outcome without the need to reference investors' withdrawal from the funding market. This is the core difference to the traditional crises and LW (2013) call this a 'slow moving debt crisis' "to capture the fact
that it develops over time through the accumulation of debt" as distinguished "from liquidity or rollover debt crises". The 'liquidity crisis' occurs when "current investors, …pull out of the market entirely, leading to a failed bond auction; complete lack of credit then triggers default, analogous to depositors running on banks".

LW (2013) model "can be used to identify a “safe” region of parameters, for which
the equilibrium is unique. In particular, the safe region corresponds to a low initial debt level and to high responsiveness of the surplus to debt in the fiscal policy rule."

Very interesting conclusion from the LW (2013) paper is that "with long term debt, a slow moving crisis, by its very nature is due to a breakdown in the coordination of investors at different dates. As a result, it cannot be averted by coordinating investors meeting in a given market at a certain moment of time. If, instead, the borrower could commit to a certain bond issuance, this would eliminate the multiplicity problem." The commitment that ends such a crisis, in theory, implies commitment to specific steady levels of borrowing - a deficit path - while maintaining certain debt bounds forward. In contrast to mainstream literature, LW (2013) "assume that the borrower cannot commit to a certain bond issuance, because it cannot adjust its spending needs. Thus, it will issue the bonds needed to finance its obligations." The reason for this assumption is that while the borrowers "can control the amount of bonds issued… during any given market transaction or offer", in the long run, the actual amounts raised in the markets will not be fully predictable. Per LW (2013): "consider a borrower showing up to market with some given amount of bonds to sell. If the price turns out to be lower than expected the borrower may quickly return to offer additional bonds for sale to make up the difference in funding [and thus] …the overall size of the bond issuance remains endogenous to the bond price."

LW (2013) conclude that "it seems difficult to dismiss the concern that a country may find itself in a self-fulfilling “bad equilibrium” with high interest rates. In our model, bad equilibria are not driven by the fear of a sudden rollover crisis, as commonly modeled in the literature following Giavazzi and Pagano (1989), Alesina et al. (1992) and Cole and Kehoe (1996) and others. Thus, the problems these “bad equilibria” present are not resolved by attempts to rule out such investor runs. Instead, high interest rates can be self fulfilling because they imply a slow but perverse debt dynamic. Our results highlight the importance of fiscal policy rules and debt maturity in determining whether the economy is safe from the threat of these slow moving crises."

21/8/2013: FinReg Appointment

The Central Bank announced the appointment of the new FinReg. Announcement is here:
http://www.centralbank.ie/press-area/press-releases/Pages/NewDeputyGovernorFinancialRegulationAppointed.aspx

My (sketchy) views on the appointment are here:
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/08/21/ireland-regulator-idUKL6N0GM1AF20130821
and here:

Critically, I do not know Mr Roux stand on key points of regulatory and strategic affairs relating to the financial services in Ireland and Europe, including:

1. Role of competition in provision of services and securing systemic stability;
2. Role of consumer protection in delivering the same;
3. Role of implicit and explicit state subsidies to the incumbent institutions and the issue of TBTF institutions;
4. Legacy debt, risks and business strategies and the regulatory approaches for dealing with these;
5. Capture risk of regulatory and supervisory systems in the environment of social partnership and closely linked society, such as Ireland;
6. Recent regulatory activism, e.g. shorting bans;
7. Recent policy shifts toward centralised regulatory oversight and controls, unified banking supervision and regulation, FTT, etc.

There are other potentially important questions to be asked in days to come. 

I most certainly hope Mr Roux can continue with the competent and professional work that Mr Elderfield has started. 

To the credit of its top management team, the Central Bank today is a different institution, transformed from at the top, and still being transformed down the ranks (it takes long time to work through rank-and-file cadre pool). The transformations that took place to-date are for the better and serve as an example of what can be achieved in the rest of Irish public sector. This is not to say that the CBI is free of criticism, but to point out that there have been strongly positive changes in the institution that started with Mr. Elderfield and Prof. Honohan's appointments.

21/8/2013: Ireland's Potemkin Village (Knowledge) Economy

This is an unedited version of my Sunday Times article for August 18, 2013.


This week two news items offered significant implications for the framing of the budgetary policy direction for 2014-2015 and beyond.

First there was the revelation that the Revenue Commissioners are setting up a specialist unit to monitor the use of R&D tax credits by Irish and international firms. The second item was the publication of the Times Higher Education league tables ranking universities on their ability to attract corporate research funding. Both items are linked to the flagship of Irish economic policy that aims to establish R&D and innovation as the drivers of our future economic growth. Both touch upon our sacrosanct Potemkin village: the knowledge economy.


Since the Finance Act 2004, and throughout the crisis, governments have been keen on expanding Irish R&D activities amongst the indigenous enterprises and within the MNCs-dominated sectors. Over the last ten years, the main mechanism for doing so has been through the tax credits that allow the firms to claim R&D related spending. In Budgets 2012 and 2013, the current government significantly broadened the scope and the size of the scheme, and allowed new tax relief for key employees engaged in R&D activities.

Major consultancy firms providing supports for inward FDI, our state development agencies and business lobbyists – all have heralded these tax credits as visionary and imperative to making Ireland an attractive location for R&D.  Such framing of the policy debate makes this week’s news from the Revenue Commissioners significant. In truth, R&D tax credits are long overdue some serious scrutiny. The little evidence we do have suggests that the policy has failed to foster a pro-innovation culture in Irish economy after a decade long application of the scheme.

Firstly, tax credits-supported R&D activities remain too small to make any significant difference at the economy level. In 2004-2010 use of credits rose from EUR80 million to EUR225 million and at their peak, the credits amounted to less than one sixth of one percent of the Irish economy.

This is hardly a result of the scheme being too restrictive. In Ireland, firms are allowed to claim up to 25 percent of their R&D expenditure in credit. In the UK, the maximum is set at just 10 percent for the SMEs. The UK scheme is even more restrictive for larger enterprises. Furthermore, the UK applies strict criteria for SMEs that can qualify for such credits. Yet, UK R&D tax credits cover five times the share of GDP compared to Ireland.

Secondly, our tax credits scheme, along with the rest of the existent R&D and innovation support systems have failed to deliver any serious uplift in the R&D and innovation activities. Instead, these support systems have become a magnet for tax arbitrage by the multinationals and business cost optimization by Irish SMEs.

Take a look at the latest data on private sector R&D spend. Total R&D Expenditure by all enterprises in Ireland in 2012 stood at just EUR1.96 billion or 1.5 percent of our GNP. Between 2009 and 2012 this share of GNP has barely increased, rising only one percentage point, despite the large-scale increases in tax credits and other supports. The miracle of our 'knowledge economy' is, put frankly, quite feeble.

The achievements of 'Innovation Ireland' programmes are even less impressive when we consider what types of activities the R&D investments are being backed by tax credits. In 2007-2012 labour costs and current expenditures associated with R&D activities went up 29-31 percent, just as the economy was undergoing the alleged 'internal devaluation' normally associated with declines in these costs. In 2009-2012, costs associated with Payments for Licenses on Intellectual Property rose 357%. Total capital spending on R&D activities has fallen 30 percent over the same period. All in, CSO data shows that there might be significant cost shifting taking place via R&D tax credits being used to fund companies labour expenditures, as well as to optimise transfer pricing.


From economy's point of view, tax credits are one of the least efficient tools for stimulating investment in R&D and innovation. Research from the EU, published in February this year, examined the effectiveness of special tax allowances, tax credits and reduced income tax rates on R&D output. In assessing the quality of R&D projects, the authors looked at the R&D innovativeness and revenue potential. Using data on corporate patent applications to the European patent office, the authors found that a low tax rate on patent income is instrumental in attracting high quality innovative projects. In contrast, R&D tax credits and tax allowances were not found to have a significant impact on project quality.

International evidence shows that in general, all three forms of incentives are effective in raising the R&D activity. Ireland is one exception. Here, spending on R&D did not increase significantly in 2009-2012 period, rising in nominal terms by just EUR93 million for all companies and in real terms by 1.5 percent. The share of indigenous enterprises in total spending remained relatively stagnant at under 29 percent of total R&D spending. Total increase over 2009-2012 period in R&D spending by Irish-owned firms was only EUR14.5 million.

Tax credits are also reducing the overall transparency in the Irish economy when it comes to our firms performance and Government policies. Irish Government routinely references R&D tax credits as an example of pro-growth enterprise-focused policies. Yet there is no evidence directly linking economic growth, employment and enterprise outcomes to the tax credits.

In a welcome departure from our usual group-think, New Morning IP, the intellectual capital consultancy firm, recently published a report that argued that data shows no link between the introduction of the R&D tax credit and increased patenting activity by indigenous Irish companies. New Morning IP went on to state that “in our experience this tax credit has been used as a way of getting 'free money'…" It was a rare moment of truth in Ireland’s policy Byzantium, where interest groups routinely game the system for quick fixes, subsidies and protection, while ritualistically claiming unverified successes for such policies.

More distortions to the assessment of R&D tax credits effectiveness are induced by the fact that more than three quarters of R&D spend in Ireland is carried out by the MNCs. In some international studies, world-wide R&D investments by MNCs-based in Ireland are counted as if they take place here. One good example is the EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard which ranked Ireland in top 10 EU countries for R&D investment in 2012. Per report, Ireland was host to 14 of the top-spending companies for R&D, but 11 of these were foreign companies and these accounted for 88.5 percent of all R&D spending attributed to Ireland.

In contrast to such reports, the European Patent Office data for 2012 put Ireland in 26th place in terms of total number of patent applications and in per-capita indigenous innovation terms, right between New Zealand and Cyprus. Not quite the achievement one finds promoted in Irish Government speeches and promotional brochures extoling the virtues of ‘Innovation Ireland’.


The above data on R&D investments and patenting activities in Ireland, correlates with the poor performance by the country academic institutions in attracting private sector research funding. The two problems are conjoined twins, born out of the lack of real innovation culture in Irish business.

This week's study by the Times Higher Education, ranked Ireland at the bottom of global league table in terms of private sector funding per academic researcher. Irish academics get an average of just over €6,000 from business research grants and general funds, or 12.5 times less than the world leader, South Korea. These numbers, of course, should be taken with a grain of salt. Lower rankings for Ireland, as well as for a number of other countries, can be in part explained by much broader academic research taking place in our universities, as well as in the bias in funding volumes in favour of specific technical disciplines. They are also reflective of the anti-innovation ethos of Ireland’s domestic enterprises. However, it also highlights the simple fact that Irish academics are often lacking policy and regulatory supports necessary to attract larger research grants.

The main point of all the data is that Irish policy supports for these high value-added activities are excessively focused on targeted tax incentives and are insufficiently aligned with the needs of the innovation-intensive sectors, businesses and entrepreneurs. Over-stimulation with targeted tax credits and exemptions is no substitute for the creation of a real culture of entrepreneurship and innovation.

To develop such culture, Ireland needs more flexible, more responsive public policy formation capable of supporting knowledge-intensive and rapidly evolving sectors, such as biotech, stem cells research, content-based ICT, remote medicine, human interface technology, customizable design and development technologies and so on. While we do have a benign corporate taxation regime, we also need a benign income tax regime to attract and anchor professional researchers and investors in innovation. Equally important are active state policies promoting start-ups and early stage enterprises. These require agile state systems for helping enterprises with issues relating to access to markets, IP, legal and regulatory matters and so on. Last, but not least, Ireland requires more streamlined and investor-friendly equity funding systems, tax laws and regulations and more open systems of IP and business ownership.

Box-out:

The latest report on the European construction industry, published this week by the German Ifo Institute shows that the residential construction sector in Europe will remain on course for further cutbacks with activity expected to hit a 20-years low in 2013-2014. The Institute forecasts show no pick up in residential building sector in Europe until 2015 and the market for new construction bottoming out at 45% below the level in 2006. The proverbial silver lining in the report comes in the Ifo forecasts for Ireland. Ifo experts see residential construction sector here switching to a 5.5% growth in 2014, followed by a 10% expansion in 2015. According to the report, “…it is encouraging that Ireland, which also had to overcome a major crisis in residential construction, is no longer a problem child.” Lets put these seemingly rosy forecasts into perspective. Currently, residential construction in Ireland is down 93 percent on peak year activity, marking the largest drop of any country in the EU. If the Ifo projections hold, by the end of 2015 Irish residential construction sector will be returned to the activity last seen in 2011. Not exactly encouraging, is it?

19/8/2013: 'Tax Haven' Ireland in the (2009) news again

I've been tracking articles relevant to the debate on the tax haven status of Ireland in relation to corporation tax for some time now.

Here's the last link which sets the chain of previous links on the topic:
http://trueeconomics.blogspot.it/2013/06/1062013-corporate-tax-haven-ireland.html

And since the above, I had couple of posts relevant to the subject:
http://trueeconomics.blogspot.it/2013/06/1662013-minister-in-northern-ireland-is.html
and
http://trueeconomics.blogspot.it/2013/07/2272013-g20-spells-out-squeeze-on-tax.html

Here are couple of most recent ones:

The Guardian covers 2009 case of Vodafone in two stories:
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/aug/18/vodafone-tax-deal-irish-office
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/aug/18/tax-vodafone-dublin
while the Tax Justice Network responds to the OECD Action Plan on corporate tax avoidance, explicitly identifying Ireland as a 'tax haven'
http://blogs.euobserver.com/shaxson/2013/07/19/press-release-response-to-oecd-action-plan-on-corporate-tax-avoidance/
and lastly the editorial in the EUObserver that also labels Ireland a 'tax haven':
http://blogs.euobserver.com/shaxson/2013/05/02/the-capture-of-tax-haven-ireland-the-bankers-hedge-funds-got-virtually-everything-they-wanted/

Note 1: The Guardian article references EUR67 million rebate on EUR1.04 billion in Vodafone dividends booked into Luxembourg. The dividends were paid on underlying revenues that were booked into Irish GDP and, thus, into our GNI (netting out transfers of royalties etc).These, in turn, required a payment of 0.59% of GNI-impacting activities to the EU Budget. While is is hard to exactly assess how much Irish Exchequer unnecessarily paid into the EU budget due to Vodafone activities, the amount is probably in excess of EUR 5 million and this compounds the transfers of EUR67 million referenced by the Guardian.


Note 2: I am not as much interested in the legal definitions of a tax haven (there are none and, thus, technically-speaking no country can be definitively labeled a tax haven) or in specific groups' definitions of the tax haven (the OECD definition is so convoluted, it virtually makes it impossible for any country with any global political clout - including that acquired via membership in the EU - to be labeled one, while the Tax Justice Network definition is broad enough to potentially include a large number of countries). I am concerned with the spirit of the concept - rent-seeking via tax arbitrage, and with the potential fallout from this in terms of distortions to economic development models and risks arising from same.

Note 3: A 'thank you' is due to a number of people who reminded me - in the context of the Guardian articles linked above - that Ireland charges a 25% corporate income tax on non-trading income. TY to @jameseyryan @Gerpf @JeremyTaxman @seamuscoffey

18/8/2013: A Baby Recession for Europe?

An interesting and forward looking study from the Eurostat on the demographic fallout from the current crisis predicting a so-called 'baby recession' in Europe. The paper is downloadable here: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-13-013/EN/KS-SF-13-013-EN.PDF

The main thesis is that "Fertility is commonly assumed to follow the economic cycle, falling in periods of recession and vice-versa, though scientific evidence is still not unanimous on this. This report looks at fertility trends in 31 European countries against selected indicators of economic recession… in 31 European countries, the economic crisis spread in 2009, while decreases in fertility became a common feature in Europe with a time lag. … In 2008, there were no falls in the rate compared to the previous year, but by 2011, the TFR had declined in 24 countries."

TFR refers to the total fertility rate.

All of this sounds reasonable, and there are some signs that fertility rates might be signaling a crisis-related decline and that such a decline might be coming. However, there is a slight hick up in the data on a number of fronts:

1. The average TFR is running at 1.595% for the 31 countries sample in 2010-2011 against 2000-2009 average of 1.527%. In other words, the decline is not evident so far, except in one year of 2011.
2. On country-average for 2000-2009 period, 11 out of 31 countries have been running ahead of average. In 2010-2011 period, same 11 countries run ahead of 31 countries-average. So there is no compositional change on under-performance relative to average.
3. Over 2010-2011, TFR average for countries was ahead of 2000-2009 average for 24 out of 31 countries. 
4. Countries that saw TFR decline from average for 2000-2009 to lower average for 2010-2011 were: Cyprus (not in crisis in 2008-2011), Luxembourg (not in crisis in 2008-2011), Hungary (in a crisis), Malta (not in crisis), Portugal (in crisis), Romania (in crisis), Latvia (in crisis), suggesting a very mixed evidence on the links between TFR and crisis to-date.
5. The weak link is further reinforced by the fact that other crisis-hit countries have fared much better in terms of TFR: Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Italy, Slovenia, UK, Iceland all posted increases in terms of 2010-2011 average compared to 2000-2009 average.

Charts below illustrate (data from Eurostat report, charted and computed by myself):

Note: in the case of Ireland, weather events had potentially significant impact on 2008 and 2010 birth rates. Adjusting for these effects, 2011 reading of TFR for Ireland is hardly a significant decline.

17/8/2013: Long-Term Great Unwinding for ECB?..

On foot of David Rosenberg's pressie on Long-Term Inflation strategy switch (link here), here's the ECB Monetary Policy dilemma illustrated.

First, the steep hill 'walking':

Per chart above, the wind-in-your-face breezing down the interest rates slopes for ECB is more severe than the Fed trip so far. And the duration of this episode is longer in the ECB-own historical context:

In fact, we are into 55th month now of staying away from the mean and that is for the euro era (already too-low by historical metrics) mean. Last two episodes of deviations lasted 30 and 33 months respectively. In severity terms: average overshooting post-revision in previous downward episode (June 2003 - June 2006) was -46 bps and in this period (since March 2009) it is currently running at -146 bps or 317% of the previous episode.

Good luck to anyone believing that ECB policy (repo) rate is not going to head for 3.75-4.0%...

16/8/2013: David Rosenberg Breaks Consensus on Long-Term Inflation

The most important note on the market written in the last 12 months, if not longer (and for those forward looking - the most important note written about the next 5 years plus):

http://www.gluskinsheff.com/Assets/Documents/Musings%20and%20Special%20Reports/Special%20Report%20-%20From%20Inflation%20to%20Deflation%20And%20Back%20-%20August%2014-2013.pdf

And 11 core snapshots from the ppt:

A must-read stuff!

16/8/2013: US Mint gold sales: H1 2013

In the previous post I covered July 2013 monthly sales figures for US Mint Gold Coins. As promised, here is a more stable trends analysis using H1 aggregates from 1987 through June 2013.

In H1 2013, US Mint sold 629,000 oz of coinage gold, marking the 5th highest ranked H1 in sales terms since H1 1987. Year on year, H1 2013 sales were up 86.1% and relative to crisis period average, sales were up 22.0%, while relative to the pre-crisis period (2001-2007) H1 2013 coinage gold sales were up 261.5%. For comparison, historical H1 average sales are currently at 336,520 oz.

In H1 2013, US Mint sold 1,088,500 coins, marking the third busiest H1 sales period since 1987. For comparison, historical average sales for H1 are at 592,615 coins.

In terms of average gold volume per coin sold, H1 2013 came it at 0.578 oz/coin, which is relatively moderate, given the historical average of 0.577 oz/coin.

Chart below to illustrate the above:

Chart above shows that both coins sales and oz sales of coinage gold remained in H1 2013 on the upward trend established since 2007 and the overall 2009-2013 activity for H1 period remains at post-1999 highs. There is little indication of any serious long-term slowdown in demand for US Mint coins in the data and H1 2013 strengthened the trend away from such moderation. The correction sustained over 2011-2012 has now been more than reversed and H1 2013 numbers in terms of coins sold is sitting comfortably above previous post-1999 maximum attained in 2010.

At the same time, demand for coinage gold (oz sold), while partially correcting upward in H1 2013 remains below the local maxima set in 2009-2010.

The above is consistent with restricted buying-on-the-dip behaviour, with some upward momentum being sustained by considerations other than price movements. This is further supported by changes in correlations between sales and the spot price of gold (average of closing monthly prices in USD):

• For price vs oz correlation, correlation between H1 1987 - H1 2012 stood at +0.22 and this rose to +0.29 for the period H1 1987 - H1 2013, implying (recall that price fell for H1 2013 to USD1,484.50/oz compared to H1 2012 at USD1,664.00) some limited buying-on-the-dip behaviour.
• For coins sold vs price, correlation H1 1987 - H1 2012 stood at +0.04 and this rose to +0.11 for the period H1 1987 - H1 2013, also implying limited buying-on-the-dip behaviour.

It is worth noting that H1 2013 figures were driven largely by January )month 1 of Q1) and April (month 1 of Q2) sales. This dynamic did not replicate in July (month 1 of Q3), so we should tread cautiously in expecting robust continuation of the H1 sales in H2.

16/8/2013: US Mint gold sales: July 2013

It has been some time since I updated the data on sales of US Mint Gold Coins, so let's take a quick run through the data for July 2013.

• US Mint gold coins sales in July 2013 stood at 50,500 oz, dow 11.4% m/m (though there is little point looking at monthly figures which can be volatile) and up 65.6% y/y. The sales were close to historical average at 57,239 oz and below the crisis period average (since January 2008) of 88,694 oz.
• US mint sales of coins in July 2013 stood at 90,000 coins, down 20.4% m/m and up 97.8% y/y. This compares agains 100,286 coins sold on average per month over historical period and 124,731 coins sold on average per month over the crisis period.
• Average volume of gold sold per coin in July 2013 stood at 0.561 oz/coin, which is 11.2% ahead of June 2013 and 16.3% behind July 2012. In historical comparatives, July sales were behind 0.59 oz/coin monthly average over the historical period and well behind 0.77 oz/coin average for the crisis period.
• 24mo rolling correlation between volume sold (oz) and gold price (end of month spot price) stood at 0.009 in July 2013, up on -0.045 in June 2013 and ahead of -0.09 average rolling correlation for the historical period covered by data, but virtually identical to the 0.01 average rolling correlation for the crisis period. In basic terms, the zero correlation between gold coins sales and gold spot price remained intact in July 2013.

Charts to illustrate:

Overall, analysis above confirms a short-term trend toward increased demand for gold coins, driven by changes in prices. This trend is more directly evident in 6mo sales data (next post). In total coins sales, there is a nice reversion to the up-sloping trend (first chart above), while oz/coin sold remains below the longer-term up-sloping trend line, potentially reflective of speculative purchasing running at more subdued volumes (second chart). Per third chart, there is a clear negative correlation between demand for coinage gold and the price of gold, suggesting some 'buying-on-the-dips', although this correlation is weak (last chart above) and is getting weaker (in absolute terms). There is a long-term trend toward positive (or at least much less-negative) correlation between the price of gold and coins sales.

Tune in for the H1 2013 cumulative data analysis next.

16/8/2013: H1 2013 Trade in Goods & Balance Dynamics for Ireland

On foot of my post detailing Irish cumulated figures for trade in goods for H1 2013, some asked me to post on the relationship between exports and trade balance. Here are few charts, taking snapshot from H12000 through H1 2013:

First, two charts showing levels of exports and trade balance for trade in goods:

Note that in the first chart, there is barely any difference between the 2000-2013 average level of exports (at EUR44.145bn) and 2009-2013 period average (at EUR45.077bn). The gap is only 2.1% of EUR932mln. At the same time, the second chart shows that there is a massive gap between the average trade balance over the period of 2000-2013 (EUR17.184bn) and for the period of 2009-2013 (EUR20.728bn) -  a gap of 20.6% or EUR3,544 mln. The core reason for this is that much of the 2009-2013 'stellar' performance in our trade surplus was driven by collapse in imports, rather than a rise in exports. 

To see this, let us plot exports against trade balance:

The last chart clearly shows that in 2009-2013, on average, exports were tracking changes in trade balance, but they were not doing so 1:1.

More interestingly, the chart shows that trade in goods in Ireland is in trouble. In 2009-2013 period, Irish Government policy has been to rely solely on exports (of goods and services) in driving the economy toward recovery and debt sustainability. This hope rests on growth in exports and simultaneously positive trade balance and growing trade balance as the key parameters for consideration when it comes to both economic growth and debt sustainability.

Alas, in years 2010, 2012 and 2013 (in other words in 3 out of 5 years), measured by H1 figures alone, Irish goods traded operated in the 'pain spot' region - the region of shrinking exports and shrinking trade surpluses.

In other words, in terms of levels our merchandise trade is performing well. But in terms of growth it is performing poorly. And this is despite a huge drop-off in imports, something that is not likely to last when the economy goes back to capital investment (imports of capital goods will rise) and/or consumption recovery (imports of consumption goods will rise).