24/4/2013: Credit demand conditions in Irish banks: Q2 2013

All's quiet in the Irish Banking 'sector' Zombieland, per CBofI latest missive (link):

Good news: there was an improved demand for Fixed Investment in Q4 2012. Since then, Q1-Q2 2013 shows zero growth in demand. Non-news: Operating capital is now again tight (Q4 2012 and Q2 2013) against zero change in Q1 2013. Bad news: restructuring demand is up again after posting zero growth in Q1 2013.

So on business credit demand side: no real economic activity growth is signalled by investment demand, poorer conditions in operating capital signalled by the respective demand increase (albeit very moderate rate of increase) and credit restructuring pressures are slightly up as well.

On households side:

House purchases credit demand is up, at weak and moderating rate. Nothing dramatic, really, but good-ish sort of news. 

Basically, things are flat. Again, you can read this as a somewhat positive (things are not getting worse), or you can treat it as somewhat negative (given rates of contraction in credit during the crisis, real recovery should see demand and supply spiking rapidly up). My view is - the above confirms the proposition that Irish economy is at near-zero real growth trendline and the banking sector remains a drag on growth.

24/4/2013: Systemic biases in income, consumption & savings surveys

A subtle, but important from policy and business strategy perspective paper from the Banca d'Italia, Working Paper No. 908, titled "Asking income and consumption questions in the same survey: what are the risks?" (April 2013) by Giulia Cifaldi and Andrea Neri.

The issue at hand is of relevance to:

• Marketing and market surveyors who aim to identify the relationship between sub-groups or categories of consumers in terms of their incomes and consumption, as well as savings;
• Policymakers concerned with use of surveys to accurately gauge savings and consumption (in the recent case in Ireland the issue relates to the accuracy of the estimates of required income expenditure and available disposable income in the case of Personal Insolvency Guidelines).

Per authors: "Sample surveys … focusing on income usually do collect some information on expenditure data. A main drawback of this practice is that it could let some researchers think that both sets of information have similar accuracy, as they are derived from the same survey. This paper provides an empirical investigation of the consequences of such an assumption.

We draw on the Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW, thereafter) as a case study, since it collects information on both income and consumption. We combine this survey with the information coming from other surveys that are assumed to be more reliable than the SHIW for specific items."

Core findings:

• On average, "the underestimation of household income is lower than the one relating to consumption."
• "As a consequence, in the survey saving rates are likely to be overestimated," and  "…measurement error in income data is proportionally higher for high incomes."
• In the case of consumption data: "Household saving is likely to be overestimated, especially for households in the low income classes."
• Authors also "find evidence that measurement error may bias the relationship between household savings and its determinants."

Link to the study: http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/econo/temidi/td13/td908_13/en_td908/en_tema_908.pdf

24/4/2014: Mandatory or Voluntary Board Independence?

An interesting paper on the impact of independent directors appointments on equity prices published in September-October 2012 issue of the Emerging Markets Finance & Trade (vol 48, number 5, pages 25-47) throws some light on the role of regulatory and governance restrictions relating to Corporate Governance.

Traditionally, and especially in the present economic climate of mistrust of the enterprise and markets, imposition of the regulatory requirements for independent directors appointments to the boards of the companies is seen as a good thing. The argument in favour of mandatory requirement of this sort goes along the lines that forcing a company to comply with the 'best practice' in corporate governance leads to an improvement in company performance. Presence of independent directors on the boards, especially where mandated, is seen as one of the most important aspects of board-level governance, bestowing the benefits of monitoring of the management decisions and performance, as well as signalling to investors (and even potentially customers and counterparties to the firm's operations) the quality of the firm (at least as far as its governance structures are concerned).

If the above thesis is correct, on average, firms operating in the regulatory environment of mandatory requirements for appointment of independent non-executive directors should outperform (from investor perspective) firms operating in the environment where such appointments are not required.

Ming-Chang Wang and Yung-Chuan Lee - in their paper titled "The Signaling Effect of Independent Director Appointments" - use data for Korean plcs during the period of time when some of the firms were covered by the explicit requirement for appointment of directors and some operated in the environment where such appointments were made on the basis of voluntary choice of the firm board.

The authors hypothecise that "analytical model proposes that the market expects voluntary appointments to bring more positive value than mandatory appointments since voluntary appointments signal the integrity of the firm". And indeed, the authors find that voluntary and not mandatory appointments "are associated with higher abnormal returns from appointment announcements, particularly for firms with severe agency problems..."

Empirical results from the study show that:

1. "... there are significantly positive market reactions to the announcements of the appointment of independent directors" in terms of abnormal returns in days 0, 1 and 2 after the announcement (+0.095-0.125%) and in cumulated abnormal returns "in the windows after and between the event day" at 0.236% and 0.254%, respectively.
2. "... mandatory appointment policy has not provided investors with any significant monitoring value, and we can therefore also state that the regulation has not been effective for the market".
3. "In contrast to the mandatory appointments, the significantly positive abnormal returns of the voluntary appointments for days 0, 1, 2, and 3 reveal the possibility of the existence of a combination effect of both signaling and monitoring value after the event day, based upon firms' voluntarily appointing independent directors to signal their integrity."

From the point of view of the policy systems, the results above suggest that instead of imposing mandatory requirements, we would be better off cultivating voluntary culture of board independence and appointment of directors with truly independent track records. Afterall, when you think of the potential for cronyism determining or co-determining appointments choices in the mandatory requirement setting, you can see that mandatory appointments can do more damage than good to both the firms and the markets.

23/4/2013: Updating the cost of banking crisis data

Nice update from the ECB on the cumulated cost of the banking crisis in Europe, now available through 2012. The net effect, summing up all assumed sovereign liabilities relating to the crisis, including contingent liabilities, and subtracting asset values associated with these liabilities are shown (by country) in the chart below:

Note the special place of Ireland in the above.

For the euro area as a whole, net liabilities relating to the crisis back in 2007 stood at EUR 0.00 (EUR36.72 billion for EU27). By the end of 2012 these have risen to EUR 740.15 billion (EUR 734.23 billion for EU27).

Net revenue losses for Government arising from the banking sector rescues, per ECB are:

23/4/2014: Irish Government Net Debt

Not that I am looking for it, but the data just jumps out to shout "All this malarky about Ireland's Government debt sustainability being ahead of all in the 'periphery' is just bollocks". And indeed it is.

Recall that the last bastion of 'our debt is just fine' brigade used to be the rarely cited metric of Net Debt (debt less cash reserves and disposable assets available to the State). Recall that our 'assets' - largely a pile of shares in AIB and Ptsb et al - is officially valued at long-term economic value (not current value, which would be way, way lower than LTEV). And now, behold Ireland's relative position in terms of net debt to GDP ratio, courtesy of the IMF WEO projections for 2013 published this month:

So: third worst in the euro area and worse than that for Italy. And, incidentally, it is expected to be third worst in 2014 as well.

Good thing Benda & Loonan are not running around saying 'Ireland is not Italy', yet...

23/4/2013: Ignore Europe's Debt Crisis at Your Own Peril

In recent days it became quite 'normal' to bash 'austerity' and talk about debt overhang as the contrived issue with no grounding in reality. Aside from the arguments of those worked up about Reinhrat & Rogoff (2010) paper (ignoring all other research showing qualitatively, and even quantitatively similar results to theirs), there is a pesky little problem:

• Debt has physical manifestation (albeit an imperfect one) in the form of banks (lenders) balancesheets. 

As the result of this pesky problem, we can indeed gauge (again, an imperfect translation, but better than none) the effect of repairing these balancesheets on the supply of credit, thus on investment, and thus on real economic activity.

Here are 2012 IMF estimates of the effects of the euro area banks deleveraging on the real economy:

'Weak policies' in the above are what we currently pursuing - with monetary and fiscal policies mismatch. And the negative effect of the declines runs past 2017 in the case of the heavily-indebted peripheral states. Cumulated decline estimated, relative to baseline GDP forecasts, is almost 12% over 5 years. Which over 20 years (average duration of the debt crises episodes) runs closer to 0.7% of GDP loss per annum due to banks deleveraging, aka due to banks managing debt levels on their own balancesheets.

The above chart is based on banking sector lending alone, excluding effects from deleveraging by other investors and financial intermediaries, and excluding effects of non-EU banks deleveraging or effects of the non-EU banks exits from the euro area. With these in place, the adverse effects can probably reach beyond 1% mark.

22/4/2013: Government Latest Hair-brained Idea

Earlier today, RTE has reported that:
"The [Irish] Government has launched a plan to facilitate the creation of 20,000 jobs in the manufacturing sector by 2016." Frankly speaking, I can't be bothered to read much more into the idea. In times of aplenty it is bonkers to allow the state to pick winners in the economics game and then let civil servants lavish 'investment' supports onto them. In times when debt/GDP ratio is up at 120% of GDP marker and private debt is bending the nation into the ground, the very same idea is simply a prescription for massive waste we can't afford. 

But here's what, according to RTE report is even worse: 

1. "Under the plan fledgling manufacturing companies will get to apply for support from a specific start-up fund." Wait... start-up funds invest in start-ups which, by their definition can't be in existence long enough to become 'fledgling' - unless they are 'fledging from the start-up phase' which is equivalent to being dead-on-arrival. So question for Irish boffins: you will be investing in freshly-dead firms or fledgling ancient 'one-day-were-start-ups'?
2. "There will also be a support fund for capital investment by manufacturing companies and additional financial support for R&D investment in engineering firms." Aside from capital investment (presumably, having nationalised most of the banking system, our markets-supportive Government now has appetite to take on equity in manufacturing firms too) idea which suffers from the same problem of 'winners-picking', leading to risk-mispricing (which in current fiscal conditions can be labeled 'waste' outright), there is a problem of R&D supports. Targeted tax and sponsorship allocations to R&D supports are not a good policy for stimulating high value-added R&D. Here's one study that found as much. 
3. "The plan also contains proposals to maintain or reduce company costs for energy, waste, regulation and tax." Wait, how is that going to be achieved, if, per our semi-state behemoths and the Government, there is no ripping-off of consumers/users going on in Irish energy, waste and tax environments? Either things are being priced to rip-off customers today (thus allowing for some price reductions), or there is no room for price reductions, or - as most likely - the Irish Government is planning to increase rip-off of other customers (e.g. households) to subsidise select manufacturing ones.
4. If Irish Government pumps said subsidies into select manufacturers, how does this square with the equal markets treatment laws within the EU? And how will the Irish Government deal with the pesky problem that you can engage in industrial favouritism while making any serious claims about having a real markets-oriented economy here?

I can go on about this latest idea. It is promised that it will 'create' 20,000 jobs by 2016 - a claim that is, as always is the case with the Irish Government pronouncements, is neither verifiable, nor based on any serious analysis. But, needless to say, there will be loads of PR opportunities involving flowers, ribbons, Ministers and RTE cameras in months to come. Meanwhile, when your taxes go up comes December 2013 once again, don't ask why, think Government 'jobs creation' plans... Think big... Think someone else is getting subsidies so you don't have to...

22/4/2013: Who funds growth in Europe?..

There are charts and then there are Charts. One example of the latter is via IMF CR1371

The above shows a number of really interesting differences between the euro area and the US, as well as within euro area:

• Look at the share of overall funding accruing to the traditional (deposits) banks in the US (tiny) and the euro area (massive) - debt is the preferred form of funding for Europe
• Look at the share of equity in the US funding and in euro area, ex-Luxembourg - equity is not a preferred way for funding growth in Europe.
• Why the above matter? Simply put, debt - especially banks debt - is not challenging existent ownership of the firm raising funding. Which means that patriarchal structures of family-owned firms, with their inefficient and paternalistic hiring and promotions and management systems can be sustained more easily in the case of debt-funded firms than in the case of equity funded ones.
• Look at the role played in the US by the credit supplied by 'other financial institutions' - non-banks. Again, these would be more 'activist'-styled funding streams exerting more pressure on management and ownership structures.

What about Ireland? Look at the composition of funding sources in the country:

1. Strong reliance on corporate bonds markets is probably reflective of three factors: (a) concentrated loans issued during the building boom and related to construction, development & investment in land remain the legacy of the boom and rely on collateralized bonds issuance, (b) banks funding via collateralization, (c) concentrated nature of Irish listed plcs, (d) massive M&A spree undertaken by Irish plcs and larger private companies on foot of cheap leverage available in the 2000-2007 period, etc. The volume of bonds might be large, but their quality is most likely lower due to the above points.
2. Strong - actually second strongest in the sample after Cyprus - reliance on bank lending to fund economy.
3. Weak, extremely thin equity cushion. 

Now, keep in mind: equity is the best, most stable and most suitable for absorbing crisis impact form of funding.

21/4/2014: Exports-led recovery? Not that promising so far...

Regular readers of this blog know that since the beginning of the crisis, I have been sceptical about the Government-pushed proposition that exports led recovery can be sufficient to lift Ireland out of the current crises-induced stagnation.

Over the recent years I have put forward a number of arguments as to why this proposition is faulty, including:

1. A weakening link between our GDP, GNP and national income,
2. A worrisome demographic trend that is structurally leading to lower labour markets participation, alongside the renewed emigration,
3. Structural weaknesses in the economy left ravaged by some 15 years if not more of bubbles-driven growth,
4. Taxation and state policy structures that favor old modes of economic development and which are incompatible with high value-added entrepreneurship, employment creation and growth, 
5. Substitution away from more real economy-linked goods exports in favor of the superficially inflated exports of services in the ICT and international financial services sectors, etc

But the dynamics of our exports are also not encouraging. 

Here's a summary of some trends in Irish exports since 1930s, all expressed in relation to nominal value of merchandise trade (omitting effects of inflation). Based on 5-year cumulative trade volumes (summing up annual trade volumes over 5 year periods):

• Irish exports grew 147.8% in 1980-1984 and 86.7% in 1985-1989 - during the 1980s recession. This did not lift Irish economy out of the crisis, then.
• Irish exports grew 56.3% in 1990-1994 period and 56.4% in 1995-1999 period. Thus, slower  rate of growth in exports during the 1990s than in the 1980s accompanied growth in the 1990s. This hardly presents a strong case for an 'exports-led recovery'.
• Irish exports expanded cumulatively 148.0% in 2000-2004, before shrinking by 0.4% in 2005-2009 period and is expected to grow at 4.6% cumulatively in 2010-2014 (using 2010-2012 data available to project trend to 2014). 

The last point above presents a problem for the Government thesis on exports-led recovery: the rates of growth in merchandise exports currently expected to prevail over 2010-2014 period are nowhere near either the 1980s crisis-period rates of growth or 1990s Celtic Tiger period rates of growth.

Ok, but what about trade surplus? Recall, trade surplus feeds directly into current account which, some believe almost religious, is the only thing that matters in determining the economy's ability to recover from debt-linked crises. Again, here are the facts:

• During the 1980-1984 Ireland run trade deficit that on a cumulative basis amounted to EUR5,969mln. This gave way to a cumulated surplus of EUR8,938mln in 1985-1989 period. So attaining a relatively strong trade surplus did not lift Irish economy from the crisis of the 1980s.
• In Celtic Tiger era, during 1990-1994 period, cumulated surpluses rose at a robust rate of 155.7% on previous 5 year period, and this increase was followed by a further improvement of 113.9% in 1995-1999 period. 
• During Celtic Garfield stage, in 2000-2004 period Irish trade surplus increased by a cumulative 245.4%. However, in 2005-2009 period trade surplus shrunk 10.9% cumulatively on previous 5 years. Based on data through 2012, projected cumulated growth in trade surplus (recall, this is merchandise trade only) grew by 43.6%.

Again, trade surplus growth is strong, currently, but it is nowhere near being as strong as in the 1990s. Worse, current rate of growth in trade surplus is well below the rate of growth attained in the 1980s.

Charts to illustrate:

Oh, and do note in the above chart the inverse relationship between the ratio of merchandise exports to imports (that kept rising during the Celtic Tiger and Garfield periods as per trend) and the downward trend in exports growth. 

21/4/2014: Sunday Independent article

My article on Euro area austerity policies failure in Sunday Independent - it's not in levels of cuts, but in the lack of real change from the status quo.

19/4/2013: More from the IMF on Irish banks...

Getting back to the IMF GFSR report released earlier this week. Some nice charts worth a quick comment or two:

Two things worth noting in the above:

1. Increase in covered bonds for Irish banks, absent, pretty much, any serious issuance between 2007 and 2012 and maturing of some bonds. This may be linked to the deteriorating quality of assets against which the bonds were secured, requiring 'top-ups' with new assets. In effect, this means that to maintain existent level of funding a bank will require more assets to be put aside.
2. Massive, relative to GDP, exposure to MROs + LTROs for the Irish banks. Let's keep in mind that some Irish banks were precluded from participating in the second LTRO due to lack of suitable collateral. Even with that, Irish banking sector exposure to LTROs relative to GDP is the largest of all countries in the sample.

The next two charts plot relationship between banks' lending to households and corporates and the growth forecasts for the economies:

By both charts above, Ireland appears to be basically just on the borderline between the core and the peripheral countries. Of course, this means preciously little, since Irish banks basically are issuing no new loans and thus whatever rates they report are heavily, very heavily biased in favour of higher quality borrowers. Here's how this bias works: the bank in Ireland issues a loan to company A for the amount X and duration W. The rate on this loan is r=f(A,X,W)  such that if A quality is higher then rate r  is lower, if X is larger, the rate is higher, and if W is longer, the rate is also higher. We control all other variables that might influence the rate quoted. If the case of the same company looking for the same loan outside Ireland, the bias above would imply a lower rate quoted, or a smaller loan granted or for shorter duration, or all or any permutations of the above. 

Here is an interesting point. In the first chart above, Irish house loans rates went up during the crisis, but corporate loans rates went dramatically down during the crisis. Now, houses-related loans within the Irish banking system are currently in default at close to 20% rate, while SMEs loans are in default close to 50% rate. High quality corporates are probably in the same rate of default today as in 2007. Which means that corporate loans book of Irish banks should be posting default rates (NPLs) of similar or larger proportions as house lending book. Yet the rates for two types of loans have moved in the opposite direction and very significantly.

On foot of the above, question for our Dear Leaders: Are Irish banks, for purely political reasons (recall Government's repeated exhortations about the need for the banks to 'do their bit for the economy', 'lend to our SMEs' etc), using house loans pricing to subsidise corporate loans issuance?

Just in case you start harping on about Irish corporates having better debt loads than households, IMF has the following handy charts:

And more: Irish corporates have exceptionally poor interest coverage ratios:

Keep in mind - the above applies only to listed firms, not to privately held ones...

19/4/2013: Mountains to climb, canyons to wade across

Nice visual from Pictet gang, sizing up two banking systems:

That was pre-'rescue' of Cypriot economy from itself by the 'benevolent' Troika Partners...

Recall, the package deal includes scaling back Cypriot banks to ca x3 GDP, or cutting the sector back to just about where it was in mid-2012 for Iceland, given the magnitude of GDP contraction from 2012 levels that this would require. It will be the case of roughly 'Look to your left, look to your right - either both of the bank clerks next to you are gone, or you are gone with one of them in tow'.

Updated:

And another visual from Pictet folks: