Thursday, October 14, 2010

Economics 14/10/10: Rip-off Ireland is roaring its ugly head

CPI for September is out... kinda out... it was sent out yesterday without an embargo, by mistake, and now it was re-released again.

So the headline figure is: +0.5% yoy gain in CPI and -1.0% yoy loss in HICP. Mixed bag, you'd say. By one measure (CPI) it looks like things are getting back to a (positive) normal, while by HICP reading we are still in the (crisis) normal.

But let's take a closer look at decomposition of price changes. Per CSO, the most notable changes in the year were:
  • increases in Education (+9.5%),
  • increases in Housing, Water, Electricity, Gas & Other Fuels (+8.5%) and Communications (+2.9%) [Note: monthly CPI ex mortgage interest decreased by 0.2% in the month and was down by 0.9% in the year], and
  • decreases in Clothing & Footwear (-7.4%), Furnishings, Household Equipment & Routine Household Maintenance (-3.7%) and Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco (-3.1%).
The annual rate of inflation for Services was 2.1% in the year to September, while Goods experienced continued deflation of -1.6%.

The most significant monthly price changes were:
  • decreases in Transport (-1.6%) - driven by airfares drop (not by the state-controlled bus and train fares, mind you) and
  • decreases in Miscellaneous Goods &Services (-0.4%) - primarily due to cuts in health insurance charges;
  • increase in Clothing & Footwear (+4.5%).
Per CSO: "The CPI excluding tobacco index for September decreased by 0.2% in the month and was up by 0.4% in the year. The CPI excluding energy products fell by 0.2% in the month and decreased by 0.2% in the year. "

So good news then is that:
  1. State services, such as Education (+9.5% ! in 12 months);
  2. Banks payback to consumers for propping them up (CPI is up +0.5% yoy and ex-mortgages CPI is down -0.9% over the same period. So far, we have had, courtesy of our banks rescue plans: in a year to September 2009 mortgages costs fell 48%, in a year to September 2010 they rose 25.1%. All despite the fact that Irish banks are no longer facing higher costs of funding - instead they are simply borrowing from ECB using our bonds, for which you, me and our kids will be liable);
  3. State-set charges on energy (+8% yoy);
  4. State set health costs (+0.5%);
  5. Largely state-set or influenced transport costs (+1.4%)
are all signaling that we are living in a public sector boom times, as the Government seemingly pushes forward with the agenda of beefing up semi-states revenues at our expense.

Clearly, we've turned another corner, folks, and it's the 'Ugly Boulevard' ahead of us, consumers.

Saturday, October 9, 2010

Economics 9/10/10: Path to reforms

This is an unedited version of my column in October 2010 Village magazine:

The events of the recent months have clearly shown that the current policies path leads to a continued status quo. This is the sole and unavoidable conclusion currently being reached by all independent analysts and commentators on either side of ideological divide. It is a non-partisan concern that informs the rising tide of discontent within the Fiana Fail and Green parties, recent changes within Fine Gael, positions of all other opposition parties, and indeed the entire electorate – as reflected in the opinion polls.

At this junction, there is no longer any need to enlist numerous factual manifestations of this reality – they are all around us, expressed by politicians and ordinary citizens. The tide of international opinion concerning the prospects for Ireland should the current policies persist has turned against us. The IMF (since April 2010), the EU Commission (since May 2010), markets makers and participants – all have put out challenging assessments of Irish Government official projections for the recovery. Irish banks – far from being repaired by Nama – just keep asking for more taxpayers bailouts with a frightening regularity of a drug addict returning to a methadone dispensary.

It is, therefore, time to challenge the existent policy consensus. It is the time to put forward proposals for reforms, to debate real alternatives and to provide those political parties and individual politicians willing to champion change with new ideas to energise the electorate.

Here is my own set of ideas – the offshoot of the ongoing ‘Manifesto Project’ I have decided to run on my blog.

To preclude any ‘kill the messenger’ objections, allow me to state that the following is just a set of policy reforms proposals that any party or politician are welcome to adopt in part or as a whole and put to the electorate.

Fine print aside, let me outline the backdrop to the policies – the backdrop of the specific crises we face as a nation. The Irish economy has been hit by a Perfect Storm that combines:
  • a deeply rooted crisis in public finances;
  • a structural collapse of the banking sector;
  • an unemployment crisis stemming from the collapse of employment and jobs creation;
  • a competitiveness crisis that is not limited to wages and labour costs, but the cost of living and doing business;
  • the crisis in the quality and efficiency of domestic services - dominated and restricted by the excessive market power of the incumbent state-owned and state-regulated oligopolies.

These crises have been exacerbated by the Government policies since 2008. These policies have saddled ordinary families and individuals (regardless of whether they work in public sector or private sector, employed or unemployed, young or old) with the full cost of stabilizing vested interests and elites. This manifested itself in rising tax burden, falling provision of public services, lack of reforms in banking and public sectors. The resulting devastation of private entrepreneurship and businesses, contracting investment and availability of operating capital, a catastrophic lack of confidence in economy are the corollaries. The accompanying spikes in unemployment and businesses failures, and a hike in precautionary savings are additional manifestations of these.

The current crisis has clearly shown that the corporatist state - where vested interests, including Political, Business, Social and Environmental collude with the state to set economic and social preferences and priorities - is morally, politically and economically bankrupt. I believe that Irish democracy cannot be surrendered to the vested interests, no matter how broadly-based or highly minded they might be.

There are only two ways forward from this status quo. The first is the path we are travelling – the path of a generations-long and painfully deep crisis of stagnation and declining standards of living. The second one is a path of structural reforms aimed at realigning the current political system to serve the interests of the ordinary citizens and residents of this land.

Such a reform is also a disruptive and a painful one. It can only be achieved by creation of an alternative to the existent policies and structures.

In my view, the agenda for reform should champion the rights of ordinary citizens – consumers and taxpayers – to counterbalance existent system that promotes the interests of the vested pressure groups and elites. It must, therefore, include changes to the state political and governance systems, to the principles governing provision of the public services, to the systems of our private markets and, lastly, to the rebuilding of our financial system. For the sake of brevity, I will focus on the first two objectives.

Changes to political and governance systems


The core changes to the political and governance systems must put transparency and accountability principles of governance to the front. This will require creation of automatic systems of disclosure and control that are not subject to tampering by individual office holders. It also requires ending Social Partnership, delegating all authority, and the responsibility, for developing, implementing and monitoring economic and social policies solely to the Legislative and Executive branches of the State.

In terms of transparency, default setting must be public disclosure and unrestricted free access to all data not subject to the secrecy of the state considerations. Sensitive data should be published with exclusion of sensitive information and identifiers, until the time when it can be published in full.

Accountability requires that performance and productivity metrics should be designed and refined through experience for all branches of public sector. All earnings in the public sector should be linked to individual productivity.

Local authorities must be reformed, reducing the overall number of local authorities to, say, 7, covering: West & North West, South, Greater Cork, Greater Dublin, Greater Limerick, Greater Galway and Border & Midlands.

Seanad should be given real powers of the upper chamber and be elected directly by the people of Ireland, with equal representation for each of the 7 geographic region outlined above. Dail should be reformed by reducing the number of TDs and to cover both local and national mandates. The former will preserve a number of seats allocated locally, while the latter will allocate some proportion of seats based on national polls.

Both chambers along with the Executive should accord no privilege to their members that will put them above the ordinary citizens of the state. This will require abolition of unvouched expenses, enforcement of the Benefit-in-Kind principle of taxation and removal of the un-provisioned pensions entitlements.

All state purchasing should be carried on-line, made public and transparent and subject to annual audits by independent external board.

State services reforms should include the separation of provider of services from the supplier of services. This means that the Irish state should aim to be a purchaser of services, e.g. health care and care for the disabled, for those who cannot afford them. But the State should not own service providers. Instead, public services can be supplied by mutual, private for-profit or non-profit providers. Transition to such an arrangement will require significant training and logistics support for current employees.

Higher education should be based on fees set by universities and overseen by the Department for Education. The State should set up (with participation of charities and other private agencies) a number of funds that will provide financial aid to students based on need (with an objective of creating an equal opportunity for all qualified students to undertake studies) as well as merit (with an objective of rewarding real achievement). A further system of state-guaranteed student loans should be set, subject to independent oversight and audit
.

The state should focus significant resources on the need to improve and strengthen provision of universal early, primary and secondary education in order to achieve maximum equality of opportunity for the children independent of the social and/or economic status of their parents.


Changes to fiscal systems


There is a need to rebalance the burden of taxation in the economy to deliver on three core objectives. First, the taxation system should be fair, transparent and protected from abuse. Second, it should involve participation from all agents in the economy. Third, it should not attempt to pick winners and leave in its wake the losers.

With these objectives in mind, I would suggest adoption of a flat rate income tax system with single personal standard deduction plus a child allowance, potentially linked to the level of unemployment benefits. All discretionary tax breaks should be removed, including any tax incentives for farming and any other economic activity. Non-residency limits should be set to reflect the needs of Irish citizens working abroad and commuting home – e.g. a limit of maximum 124 days annually to cover all weekends plus standard vacation. A move to a single rate income and corporate tax can also be used to deliver full equalization in taxation between workers, entrepreneurs and businesses.

Existent Byzantine system of indirect taxes and levies is to be simplified with a view that all such charges should be based on user fee principle and be fully ring-fenced to finance provision of services covered and mitigation of adverse externalities (e.g. environmental degradation etc) generated by these services.

There is a need for having strong, but life-time capped, welfare provisions. This will provide a sufficient insurance cover for all able-bodied working age adults in the country to a cumulative maximum of 7 years over the life-time. Provision of welfare supports to those unable to work due to health or family circumstances (e.g caring for a disabled relative etc) should be exempt from life-time limits.

The basic social insurance pension reform should ensure that the elderly are covered by s sufficient safety net, but the working-age individuals are encouraged to privately invest in their pensions.

Wages for politicians and senior public servants are to be tied to the National Disposable Income in order to create a direct link to the overall levels of welfare in the society (including that of the unemployed and socially vulnerable). There should be no bonuses or discretionary pay and all public sector pensions should be converted to a Defined Contribution system with generous matching from the employer.

Government spending should be benchmarked to a specific range of GDP (for example – 35-38%). A balanced budget should be maintained over every 3-year period. This allows for small emergency spending boosts in recessions, but prevents spending sprees before the elections and other abuses of the public funds.

All quangoes, except those with immediate independent oversight authority (e.g FR and Competition Authority) are to be abolished and their functions transferred to the respective departments. Responsibility for governance and management must rest with the Government.

There is a need for a fully transparent tax on land values (LVT) in order to finance public infrastructure investments and provision of local services, including environmental protection and improvements. I would suggest that the revenue from LVT should be split 50:50 between central & local authorities. Local authorities should be allowed to vary their rate of LVT within reasonable parameters. For example, if LVT is levied at 1% pa, the local authority can be allowed to charge between 0.25% and 0.5% as it deems suitable, while the central government will collect 0.5%.


After three years of ever-deepening crises in political, economic, and banking spheres, Ireland now faces a stark choice between two alternatives. We can, as a nation, elect to either follow the status quo path that leads to a stagnation. Alternatively, we can choose to challenge the existent policy consensus to champion the rights of ordinary citizens – consumers and taxpayers.

Economics 9/10/10: Facing the Budget

This is an unedited version of my column in Business & Finance magazine for October 2010.

James Carville famously remarked that: "I used to think if there was reincarnation, I want to come back as a president or the pope or a .400 baseball hitter. But now I want to come back as the bond market. You can intimidate everybody."

Three years into financial, fiscal and growth crises, Ireland’s continued lack of progress in resolving our long term fiscal deficits has finally caught up with our policymakers. Since mid August, the bond markets have been breathing the fear of fundamentals.

Make no mistake, all the talk about ‘ridiculously high’ bond yields on Irish sovereign debt, foreign analysts errors and conspiracy theories according to which a number of home grown academics have colluded with international media to play down Irish success story are nothing more than saber rattling. Damaging to our internal process of shaping the correct policies and disastrous to our external reputation, these claims have no foundation in the reality.

The facts that inform, at least in part, market assessment of our sovereign bond risks, are simple. After three years of struggling with deficits, Ireland is once again facing an Exchequer shortfall in excess of 11% of our GDP this year. Even ex-banks recapitalization measures, we are the worst performing country in the Eurozone in terms of fiscal balances two years in a row. With banks support measures counted in, we will post the worst peace-time fiscal deficit in the history of Europe.

More than that, looking forward, we are facing a daunting task of brining our deficits down to 5.3-5.9 percent of GDP by 2015. Repeated promises by our Finance officials and politicians to cut deficit to 2.9% by 2014 are now firmly relegated to the realm of fiction.

Combining Department of Finance, IMF and my own forecasts (which fall closer to those of IMF), the expected deficit path for Irish Exchequer through 2011-2015 is shown in the table below.


In difference with our official forecasts, IMF predicts Ireland’s 2014 deficit to reach 5.3% of our GDP based on May 2010 estimates for economic growth and absent accounting for the latest banks recapitalization costs. Adjusting this path to reflect stickier unemployment and lower growth (both across GDP and GNP) as consistent with IMF revisions of global economic growth forecasts since May 2010 yields the expected exchequer deficit of 5.99% of GDP for 2014.

Equally important is a steeper debt curve that is factored in the above projections courtesy of higher cost of financing, cumulated banks and NAMA losses and lower growth. By my estimates, total state liabilities, inclusive of Nama and banks recapitalization measures, will reach 127% by 2013. The risk to these numbers is to the upside.

These estimates have some serious implications to the pricing of Irish debt in the markets.

In August IMF published research (WP/10/184) titled "Fiscal Deficits, Public Debt, and Sovereign Bond Yields" which provides analysis "of the impact of fiscal deficits and public debt on long-term interest rates during 1980–2008, taking into account a wide range of country-specific factors” for 31 economies.

The paper finds that “higher deficits and public debt lead to a significant increase in long-term interest rates, with the precise magnitude dependent on initial fiscal, institutional and other structural conditions, as well as spillovers from global financial markets. Taking into account these factors suggests that large fiscal deficits and public debts are likely to put substantial upward pressures on sovereign bond yields in many advanced economies over the medium term. …An increase in the fiscal deficit of 1 percent of GDP was seen to raise real yields by about 30–34 basis points."

By the above numbers, Irish bonds currently should be yielding over 7.5% in real terms, not 6.5% we've seen so far. This puts into perspective the statements about 'ridiculously high' yields being observed today.

If we add to this relationship the effect of change in our public debt position plus a risk premium over Germany (+180bps), the expected historically-justified real yield on our 10 year bonds will rise to around 9.3%.

Looking at a historic range of values, our ex-banks deficits warrant the yields in the range of 8-20%. Alternatively, for our bond yields to be justified at 6.5% we need to cut our deficit back to around 5.2% mark and hold our debt to GDP ratio steady.

The IMF findings are hardly alone. Another August 2010 study, this time from German CESIfo, titled "Long-run Determinants of Sovereign Yields" produces similar results, while using distinct econometric methodology and data from that deployed in the IMF paper. "For the period 1973-2008 [the study] consider the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, UK, Canada, Japan, and U.S."

Current Account deficits, Debt to GDP ratios, and fiscal deficits all have predictable effect on the long-term interest rates and thus bond yields. Crucially, the Current Account channel of risk transmission to bond yields is based on the view that “the deterioration of current account balances may signal a widening gap between savings and investment, pushing long-term interest rates upwards."

Ireland shows relatively weak sensitivity in interest rates to debt, moderate to current account balances but severely strong (3rd strongest, in fact) to deficits. By combined measures of three responses, we are now firmly in the PIIGS club, with our bond yields based on fundamentals justified at the levels well above Portugal.

And the matter doesn’t rest at the macroeconomic fundamentals. The latest bout of bond yields pressure, culminating in a number of large scale interventions in the market by the ECB is based on significant concerns about the quality of the collateral backing our covered bonds – theoretically the safest of all bond instruments. The bonds downgrade by the Moody’s – an action which in itself represents an extremely rare event in the advanced economies – also puts direct pressure on the likes of the Irish Central Bank and our banks’ repos with the ECB. Illustrative here is the case of the Anglo repos and other derivatives – some €14 billion of which have already gone into Nama and €11.5bn of which rests with the Central Bank under an Anglo MLRA repo agreement secured against the non-Nama loans.

Which, of course, brings us to the logical question of what has to be done to correct our current position.

The forthcoming Budget 2011 is the last line of defence the Government can attempt to hold. Failing to deliver significant (well in excess of €3 billion for 2011) reduction in the deficit, while providing a crystal-clear picture of all deficit measures and targets through 2013-2014 will likely see our long term bond yields rising to the levels above 7%, where Ireland’s application to the European Stabilization Fund (aka IMF/ECB rescue) will be inevitable.

Overall, the Government must cut current ex-banks deficit by around 5.5% of GDP before 2015. Using my projection for GDP growth, this amounts to over €10 billion in cuts.

Yes – cuts. My projections for deficits above are based on rather optimistic assumptions concerning Exchequer revenues (rising €8.2 billion between 2010 and 2015 or 23.8% on 2010 figure). Majority of these increases will happen due to tax burden increases, as capital spending and other automatic stabilizers will be weaker in years ahead due to contraction of capital investment. This implies that the Exchequer will have no room for further significant tax increases in years ahead. In addition, my projections factor in the need for a token reduction in cumulated debt, which spikes dramatically around 2014.

Of course, the above estimates do not account for the adverse effects of higher taxes and lower Government spending on our growth and unemployment. Virtually all of the tax increases to-date (both direct and indirect) fell on the shoulders of households. At this point in time, I see no room for further increases in the tax burden. Data from private savings and deposits shows clearly that Irish households are suffering a precipitous decrease in terms of their net financial buffers, resulting in an adverse knock-on effect on future spending and investment.

While no serious analysis of the labour force and growth sensitivity to tax rates and public spending in Ireland is available, both theory and practice elsewhere suggest that these will be non-trivial. Here, not only the level of cuts, but also their sources matter. So far, three quarters of the adjustment in public spending to-date has been carried on the shoulders of capital spending. Yet, capital expenditure is perhaps the only part of Government spending that is not subject to large economic losses to imports. Furthermore, unlike current spending, capital spending has a growth dimensions that is spread over time.

All in, Minister Lenihan needs to refocus our spending cuts away from capital programmes – where the cuts have already been dramatic, leaving very little new room for manoeuvre – and firmly on the side of current expenditure. Per chart below, the latest Exchequer figures strongly show that this has not been the case so far in the crisis. Furthermore, cuts to current expenditure are severely hampered by the Croke Park deal. In effect, by leaving out of the balancing equation current spending on wages and earnings in the public sector, the Croke Park deal is one single largest obstacle on Ireland’s path to solvency.

[see updated chart here]

Looking across the current spending landscape, it is completely inevitable that cuts will have to focus on reducing the numbers employed and the levels of pay in the public sector. Under current conditions in the labour markets, the Exchequer simply cannot avoid dramatically slashing back its wages bills. Thus, the 2011-2014 framework should aim to reduce public sector employment by at least 70-90,000, yielding savings of some €4.5-5.5 billion once statutory redundancy costs are netted out. Another must will involve reforming welfare system, once again reducing the overall costs. Savings here can amount to 12% of the current expenditure target of €10.6bn – much smaller reduction than that in the wages bill, but a very significant number when it comes to vitally important benefits for the most vulnerable members of our society.

Next in line are health and education. The Government can enact an ambitious reform of our health services, shedding completely the responsibility for managing services provision and aiming to act solely as a payer for these services for those who cannot afford private insurance. Such a reform can see savings of ca €2-2.5 billion netted out of the system on both current and capital sides. Education reforms – especially introduction of third level fees – can provide another €1 billion.

The Government should not only slash current spending, but also develop and implement strategic long-term reforms of management in the public sector. Currently Ireland lags behind the average levels of international best practice in deploying advanced management (including ICT) systems in public sector. Reforming the managerial processes in public sector, per international evidence, can yield longer-term savings of ca 5% of the total net current spending of the state, or €2 billion.

Overall, comes December, Minister Lenihan needs to present a convincing and extremely ambitious programme for reforming public spending in Ireland. At this point in time, international bond markets, as well as domestic economy will need to see a serious change in the path to fiscal solvency chosen to-date before our bond yields, as well as our businesses and households propensity to invest in Ireland improve.

Wednesday, October 6, 2010

Economics 7/10/10: Irish Government Spending habit

Our leadership - from the Minister for Finance to the heads of the Central Bank and various quangoes, to the affiliated leading business figures are keen on pointing the finger for Ireland's troubles at the banks. While the banks are certainly responsible for much of the problems we face, there are other troubles, of an equally pressing nature, that besiege our economy courtesy of the direct decisions taken by the Government.

Exchequer problems ex-banks are a good starting point for taking a closer look at our grave condition.

Irish Exchequer is expected (by the DofF) to bring in some €32 billion in Tax Revenues this year. The Government is expected to spend some €19 billion or 59.4% of the total tax take on its Wages and Pensions bill.

Imagine a household that is paying almost 60 percent of wages earned by those of its members working to purchase household services. Alternatively, imagine a household with a single earner where a person working earns, say €50,000pa and has a spouse who is engaged in full time household work. The implicit cost of such household work (labour alone) to this family, using our Government's metrics, would be €30,000 net of tax.

What would any household do in these circumstances? Of course - send the spouse into workforce and hire substitute services (childcare, cleaning, cooking etc)... What does the Irish state do? It signs a multi-annual agreement with the unions that ensures that the taxpayers will see no reprieve on wages and pensions bills they pay for Public Sector.

Now, let's put things into perspective. 2003 Exchequer Tax Revenues were at the same (nominal) level as the expected revenues this year - €32 billion. Exchequer Pay and Pensions bill was €13 billion or 40.6% of the total tax take.

So between 2003 and today, Irish Exchequer has managed to increase its exposure to public sector pay and pensions costs by a massive 46.2%. In the mean time, due to increased private sector competition (despite such competition being retarded by our regulatory regimes) and continuously improving demographics (younger population and a rising share of population with access to superior foreign public services, such as health - aka the immigrants), the overall public sector responsibilities in terms of services provision have actually declined.

Back to household analogy here - we've got a houseworker in the family who is now armed with newer technology, reducing time and effort input into work, as the cost of such houseworker to the family is rising by almost 50%.

Recap the top-line figures: pay and pensions bills of our sovereign are up 46%. Ex-exports, our domestic economy income is down 34.4% (see here). A country where 1.4 million private sector workers are forced to living beyond our means to pay the wages and pensions for some 470,000 public sector employees?

Mad stuff, but then again, Irish Public Sector is more like a WAG in its expectations of pay and performance, than a Cinderella.

Economics 6/10/10: Mortgages arrears and paying FR staff

The latest, highly irritating, half-talk about the real issues comes courtesy of our FR. Per Matthew Elderfiled, Ireland's mortgage arrears figures stand at 36,000 borrowers or 4.3% of the borrowers. Now, the number clearly does not include:

  • Those who have renegotiated their mortgage terms (acknowledged by Mr Elderfield), forced to do so by... err... inability to pay; and
  • Those who are in the receipt of state aid to pay their mortgage interest, due to their... err... inability to cover their mortgage; and
  • Those who are missing some of the payments, without triggering actual arrears (say paying 5 months out of every six, thus sliding in and out of arrears)
Here's a question Mr Elderfield should be answering: Why wouldn't his office demand from the banks full disclosure of the above information? "

It's a hugely difficult subject," Mr Elderfield told the Dail Committee today. Really? What's all the highly paid FR staff for, then? To write speeches for the Regulator and arrange events calendar?

Another question for Mr Elderfield. Q1 2010 estimate by NIRSA showed that 32,321 mortgages were in arrears 90 days or over. Figures from the Central Bank show that 36,438 mortgages were in arrears for more than 90 days at the end of June 2010. What's the value of Mr Elederfiled's latest statement if it offers no new information?

And just when you get the idea that Mr Elderfield should have been answering more questions than he did, here's the last one: What is his office doing to prevent banks from savaging more vulnerable (to increases in the cost of mortgage finance) ARM mortgage holders?

Economics 6/10/10: Irish spreads in the need of a new catalyst

Updated below

A quick post on foot of last morning call (here) on ECB propping up Irish Government bonds

Yesterday, absent visible ECB interference in the markets, Ireland’s 10-year yield rose 6 bps relative to benchmark German bund. The gap now stands at above 408 bps, still below a record 454 bps posted on September 29.

The Portuguese-German spread rose by 1/3 of Irish-German spread - up 2 bps to 385 bps, while the Spanish-German spread stayed put at 180. Greece-Germany spread is at 777, but it is largely academic, as the country does not borrow from the open markets anymore.

The spreads are moving up on Moody’s latest threat to Ireland's sovereign ratings. Moody's downgraded Ireland to Aa2 in July. The agency now says that it will complete a new review of country position within three months. Accoridng to Moody's: “Ireland is on a trajectory toward lower debt affordability over the next three to five years.” Which of course means the probability of Ireland having to restructure its debts is rising, primarily on the back of deteriorating economic conditions.

S&P’s cut Ireland’s credit rating one step to AA- on August 24, while Fitch has a AA- rating.

So in the nutshell, the 'honeymoon' post-Lenihan's announcement last Thursday seems to be over - we are back into the markets-determined volatility and there's a desperate need for a catalyst to shift yields either way.

Update:
Oh, and of course, since hitting the 'Publish Post' button, this is just in: Fitch downgraded Irish credit rating to A+ from AA- and put it on a negative outlook. Causes: bigger-than-expected cost of cleaning up the country's banks and uncertainty over economic recovery.

Irish-German spreads moved up to 421.4 bps

Tuesday, October 5, 2010

Economics 5/10/10: Irish bonds - ECB propping Leni up, for now

Irish bonds have been performing quite strongly in the last few days, following last Thursday desperate news on banks recapitalizations. What gives, one might ask? Was the certainty of Ireland posting a historical record-breaking 32% budget deficit this year better than the uncertainty of previous estimates? Or was it something else.

Given the opacity of the sovereign bond markets - especially for countries like Ireland (note the farce here - Government own securities exist in a world of much more restricted newsflows than ordinary equities, and yet everyone today expects Governments to lead in a charge for greater transparency and regulation) - one finds it difficult to explain what has been happening here.

Two possible contributing factors emerged in recent days to at leats partially account for strong performance:
  1. ECB buying Irish bonds; and
  2. Short positions being rolled up in profit taking
Now, we have some confirmation to (1). FT Deutschland reports today that last week ECB has dramatically increased purchases of Greek, Spanish and Irish bonds, having bough ca €1.384 billion worth of stuff in one week, and bringing its total holdings to €63.5bn. The weekly ramp up was some ten-fold on €134 million of same bonds purchased in the last week of September. ECB now holds some 14% of the entire sovereign debt market in Greek, Spanish and Irish bonds. This implies that market valuations in these bonds are entirely bogus.

FT Alphaville has a few charts on both Irish & Portuguese markets (here).

Which brings us to the shorts closures. Holding an open and backdated short position in the paper artificially propped up by the ECB is like taking a proverbial p**ss into the gale force wind storm. Given that most shorts against Irish debt were written around mid- to late-August, this was clearly the time to book some profits. Which, of course, further pushed up demand for these bonds and thus prices. Yields compressed down.

But the question next is: where does the freed up cash flow now? Most likely, the markets will pause to see whether the ECB latest purchasing is going to continue. If so, expect another rise in prices and a waiting game, as markets participants would rationally expect the ECB to start unwinding new purchases in a couple of weeks time. Once that move is seen on the horizon, new shorts will be taken, once again.

Monday, October 4, 2010

Economics 4/10/10: Exchequer deficit

Lastly, it's time to put the sums together.

Despite the heroic efforts of the Government and the Public Sector Unions, Exchequer deficit continues to trace out the exactly same path as 2008. And this is ex-banks:
As I pointed out in the previous post, we are 'saving' €1,562 million January 2010-September 2010 of which €1,406 million came from the capital budget cuts (the so-called investment (dis-)stimulus that Brian & Brian have promised to deliver in Budget 2009, then Budget 2010 and in all of their 'growth strategies' since the beginning of the crisis). Only miserly €156 million of savings came out of the public sector current spending, less than 1/10 of the total cuts.

More worrying is the fact that much of the capital cuts came in at the beginning of the year, and since July, these cuts are getting smaller and smaller as a share of overall capital budget allocation. Meanwhile, current spending cuts are becoming virtually invisible with time as well.

In June this year, capital budget was down 36% yoy. Today this decline stands at 32.1%. In January, we posted an impressive 11.9% cut, yoy, in current spending. This has steadily declined to 1.6% by August 2010 and finally to 0.5% in September 2010. Let's take a look at the latter number: current spending by the Government €30,088 mln through September, which is 1/2 of 1 percent lower than it was in the first 9 months of the disastrous 2009! Does anyone still wonder why the capital markets don't buy the story that Irish Government is capable of controlling its spending habits?

Let's cut to the chase. Despite all the rosy, warmly glowing reports about "yet another month of improved fiscal performance" it looks like we are turning yet another corner - the corner of rapidly evaporating savings. Next intersection: Disaster Avenue?

Economics 4/10/10: Exchequer Expenditure for September

Exchequer expenditure in details.

Starting from the top, the same picture as in August remains true - capital spending cuts drive overall performance on expenditure side, while current spending cuts are extremely shallow:
Notice also that both cuts are getting shallower as the year progresses. In months ahead, delayed payments to contractors will have to be settled, implying that it is likely that current spending is going to break the contraction cycle by the year end, while capital side savings are going to get shallower. It is, therefore, highly unlikely that overall year on year performance in terms of Exchequer spending will post a decline greater than 2% of overall spending in the end.

Detailed expenditure by department, year on year:
So where's the money being spent?
And how does it compare to the DofF targets?
Again, let's exclude capital spending and focus on current spending:

So for all the hoopla about draconian cuts and great courage of our public sector (remember, the Croke Park agreement claimed that €3 billion has been cut out of public sector wages alone), we have saved (January-September 2010) a miserly €1,562 million. Oh, about 5 weeks worth of our state borrowing so far or 3 weeks of our borrowing year to date. But even that number conceals the truth. Year on year, just €156mln - miserly number indeed - was cut out of current expenditure. That's right, folks, for the state that borrowed €16 billion this year so far, we managed to save less than 1/2 a week worth of what we issued in fresh bonds since January 1.

Put this into Croke Numbers perspective, at the rate things go, it will take 19.2 years for us to reach the magic 3 billion in savings number cited by the Bearded Ones.

Economics 4/10/10: Tax receipts & burden

Second installment of analysis of tax receipts. Starting from the top:
As I noted in the first post - there's no evidence of any recovery when it comes to total tax receipts. There is, of course, a significant lag to any recovery translating into tax revenue, especially across the income tax receipts. But the same is not true for capital taxes (investment recovery usually predates employment recovery), VAT (consumption pick up shows up also earlier in the recovery cycle) and a host of other smaller tax heads (excise etc).

Year on year dynamics are also quite depressing:
Not a single core tax head is in positive growth territory, although excise is getting closer to hitting an upside.
In smaller categories, customs duties are posting positive growth - helped by car sales and imports by MNCs. Stamps show the extent of sell-off of shares in August on the back of renewed weaknesses in financials, plus some accountancy moves.

Now to the worrisome picture: tax burden distribution.
Back in the dark ages of the 1980s, PAYE taxpayers carried some 70% of the tax burden. Guess what, we are back to that territory now - all consumption and income tax heads are now accounting for roughly 79% of the total tax take. The Government policy of making taxpayers pay for everything - from banks to Croke Park agreement - is really starting to show.

Illustrated differently:

Lastly, receipts performance against DofF target.
Customs and Corpo are showing significant improvement. Income tax and Vat are poor cousins. Overall, total tax take is getting closer to target, but still runs below the DofF projections. Again, Q4 will be the crucial quarter here.

Economics 4/10/10: Exchequer receipts

High level view of Exchequer receipts paints a continuation to the depressing picture. If there is any stabilization in the economy, this stabilization is yet to be seen on the tax receipts side of things.
Income tax above is tracing neatly below the returns for the last year. Good news, September 2009 slight slowdown was avoided so far. But the real direction of tax receipts on income side is in going to be revealed in the current Q4. Same is true for VAT:
September 2010 VAT receipts are even more disappointing given all the noises about the pick up in retail sales. Going back to school, while yielding a small uptick in volume of sales, clearly was erased in terms of value of sales as deflation in core retail sectors continues.

Corporation tax is struggling to stay above 2008 - a clear sign that economy is still sick:
Core months here are however ahead of us.

Excise and Stamps taxes are almost bang on with 2009, which isn't much of an achievement.

Capital taxes clearly showing no improvement in investment in this economy:

Customs duties moving upside - in part clearly on the back of exporters robust performance so far, plus car imports mini-boom (well, relative to previous years)
Total tax receipts are therefore running well below their levels in 2009:
I never was a fan of the "receipts to target" metrics, primarily because real numbers/levels speak to me much more than imaginary numbers DofF produces our of its excel spreadsheet forecasts. However, to keep up with the fashionable 'economists' from our banks and brokerages - stay tuned for that analysis to follow.

Sunday, October 3, 2010

Economics 3/10/10: Construction sector - destruction continues

Nothing exemplifies the collapse of the Celtic Tiger than the fate of our indigenous 'flagship' sectors: Banking and Construction. The two fates, linked at the hip, got some very different treatment in the media this week. Banks received all the attention, yet Construction suffered a total neglect. Yet, last week CSO published Q2 2010 data for Construction sector.

Undoing any damage to the Construction sector's reputation as the 'leading newsflow' sector of Ireland Inc, let's update the data. Here are the charts, most of which, as often is the case, speak for themselves.

First volume and value in all sectors ex-Civil Engineering:
Next: Civil Engineering:
Interestingly, if you recall, since Budget 2009, this Government has consistently claimed that Ireland is getting a significant stimulus in the form of public investment - which, of course, in Government's parlance always means 'building stuff'. In fact, even after the imposition of the latest cuts in the Budget 2010, Civil Engineering spend (ok, investment) declined at the rates greater than the Government has planned for.

Residential and Non-Residential:
To see the real extent of our crisis in the Construction and Building sector, compare ourselves to the European counterparts:
And what about our previous claims that we don't belong to PIIGS?
What's amazing, of course is that despite this massive contraction, our housing and property markets continue to free-fall while employment in the sector continues to contract.