16/12/16: The Root of the 2007-2010 Crises is Back, with a Vengeance

There are several fundamental problem in the global economy, legacies of the past 20 years - from the mid 1990s on - that continue to drive the trend toward secular stagnations (see explainer here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2015/07/7615-secular-stagnation-double-threat.html).

One key structural problem is that of excessive reliance on credit (or debt) to drive growth. We have seen the devastating effects of the rapidly rising unsustainable levels of the real economic debt (debt that combines government obligations, non-financial corporate debt and household debt) in the case of 2008 crises.

And we were supposed to have learned the lesson. Supposed to have, because the entire conversation about structural reforms in banking and capital markets worldwide was framed in the context of deleveraging (reduction of debt levels). This has been the leitmotif of structural policies reforms in Europe, the U.S., in Australia and in China, and elsewhere, including at the level of the EU and the IMF. Supposed to have, because we did not that lesson. Instead of deleveraging, we got re-leveraging of economies - companies, households and governments.

Problem Case Study: U.S. Corporates

Take the U.S. corporate bonds market (that excludes direct loans through private lenders and intermediated loans through banks) - an USD8 trillion-sized elephant. Based on the latest research of the U.S. Treasury Department, non-banking institutions - plain vanilla investment funds, pension funds, mom-and-pop insurance companies, etc are now holding a full 1/4 of U.S. corporates bonds. According to the U.S. Treasury, these expanding holdings of / risk exposures to corporate debt are now "a top threat to stability" of the U.S. financial system. And the warning comes at the time when U.S. corporate debt is at an all-time high as a share of GDP, based on the figures from the Office of Financial Research.

And it gets worse. Since 2007, corporate debt pile in the U.S. rose some 75 percent to USD8.4 trillion, based on data from the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association - which is more than USD8 trillion estimated by the Treasury. These are long-term debt instruments. Short term debt obligations - money market instruments - add another USD 2.9 trillion and factoring in the rise of the value of the dollar since the Fed meeting this week, closer to USD3 trillion. So the total U.S. corporate debt pile currently stands at around USD 11.3 trillion to USD 11.4 trillion.

Take two:

1. Debt, after the epic deleveraging of the 2008 crisis, is now at an all-time high; and
2. Debt held by systemic retail investment institutions (insurance companies, pensions funds, retail investment funds) is at all time high.

And the risks in this market are rising. Since the election of Donald Trump, global debt markets lost some USD2.3 trillion worth of value. This reaction was driven by the expectation that his economic policies, especially his promise of a large scale infrastructure investment stimulus, will trigger inflationary pressures in the U.S. economy that is already running at full growth capacity (see here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/12/151216-us-economic-policies-in-era-of.html). Further monetary policy tightening in the U.S. - as signalled by the Fed this week (see here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/12/151216-long-term-fed-path-may-force-ecb.html) will take these valuations down even further.

Some estimates (see https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-16/republican-tax-reform-seen-shrinking-u-s-corporate-bond-market) suggest that the Republican party corporate tax reforms (that might remove interest rate tax deductibility for companies) can trigger a 30 percent drop in investment grade bonds valuations in the U.S. - bonds amounting to just under USD 4.9 trillion. The impact would be even more pronounced on other bonds values. Even making the estimate less dramatic and expecting a 25 percent drop across the entire debt market would wipe out some USD 2.85 trillion off the balancesheets of the bonds-holding investors.

As yields rise, and bond prices drop, the aforementioned systemic retail investment institutions will be nursing massive losses on their investment books. If the rush to sell their bond holdings, they will crash the entire market, triggering potentially a worse financial meltdown than the one witnessed in 2008. If they sit on their holdings, they will be pressed to raise capital and their redemptions will be stressed. It's either a rock or a hard place.


Problem Extrapolation: the World

The glut of U.S. corporate debt, however, is just the tip of an iceberg.

As noted in this IMF paper, published on December 15th, corporate leverage (debt) has been on a steady march upward in the emerging markets (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16243.pdf).

And in its Fiscal Monitor for October 2016, the Fund notes that "At 225 percent of world GDP, the global debt of the nonfinancial sector—comprising the general government, households, and nonfinancial firms—is currently at an all-time high. Two-thirds, amounting to about $100 trillion, consists of liabilities of the private sector which, as documented in an extensive literature, can carry great risks when they reach excessive levels." (see http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fm/2016/02/pdf/fm1602.pdf)

Yes, global real economic debt now stands at around USD152 trillion or 225 percent of world GDP.

Excluding China and the U.S. global debt levels as percentage of GDP are close to 2009 all time peak. Much of the post-Crisis re-leveraging took place on Government's balancehseets, as illustrated below, but the most ominous side of the debt growth equation is that private sector world-wide did not sustain any deleveraging between 2008 and 2015. In fact, Advanced Economies Government debt take up fully replaced private sector debt growth rates contraction. Worse happened in the Emerging Markets:

So all the fabled deleveraging in the economies in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis has been banks-balancesheets deleveraging - Western banks dumping liabilities to be picked up by someone else (vulture funds, investors, other banks, the aforementioned systemic retail investment institutions, etc).

And as IMF analysis shows, only 12 advanced economies have posted declines in total non-financial private debt (real economic debt) as a share of GDP over 2008-2015 period.  Alas, in the majority of these, gains in private deleveraging have been more than fully offset by deterioration in government debt:

Crucially, especially for those still believing the austerity-by-cuts narrative presented in popular media, fiscal uplift in debt levels in the Advanced Economies did not take place due to banks-rescues alone. Primary fiscal deficits did most of the debt lifting:

In simple terms, across the advanced economies, there was no spending austerity. There was tax austerity. And on the effectiveness of the latter compared to the former you can read this note: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/12/10122016-austerity-three-wrongs-meet.html. Spoiler alert: tax-based austerity is a worse disaster than spending-based austerity.

In summary, thus, years of monetarist activism spurring a massive rise in corporate debt, coupled with the utter inability of the states to cut back on public spending and the depth of the Global Financial Crisis and the Great Recession have combined to propel global debt levels past the pre-crisis peak to a new historical high.

The core root of the 2007-2010 crises is back. With a vengeance.

25/5/16: IMF's Epic Flip Flopping on Greece

IMF published the full Transcript of a Conference Call on Greece from Wednesday, May 25, 2016 (see: http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2016/tr052516.htm). And it is simply bizarre.

Let me quote here from the transcript (quotes in black italics) against quotes from the Eurogroup statement last night (available here: Eurogroup statement link) marked with blue text in italics. Emphasis in bold is mine

“On debt, I certainly think that we have made progress, Europe is making progress. Debt relief is firmly on the agenda now. Our European partners and all the other stakeholders all now recognize that Greece debt is unsustainable, is highly unsustainable, they accept that debt relief is needed.”

Do they? Let’s take a look at the Eurogroup official statement:

Is debt relief firmly on the agenda and does Eurogroup 'accept that debt relief is needed'? "The Eurogroup agrees to assess debt sustainability" Note: the Eurogroup did not agree to deliver debt relief, but simply to assess it. Which might put debt relief on the agenda, but it is hardly a meaningful commitment, as similar promises were made before, not only for Greece, but also for other peripheral states.

Does Eurogroup "recognize that Greece debt is unsustainable, is highly unsustainable"? No. There is no mentioning of words 'unsustainable' or 'highly unsustainable' in the Eurogroup document. None. Nada. Instead, here is what the Eurogroup says about the extent of Greek debt sustainability: "The Eurogroup recognises that over the exceptionally long time horizon of assessing debt sustainability there can be no forecasts, only assumptions, given the sizable degree of uncertainty over macroeconomic developments." Does this sound to you like the Eurogroup recognized 'highly unsustainable' nature of Greek debt? Not to me...

Furthermore, relating to debt relief measures, the Eurogroup notes: “For the medium term, the Eurogroup expects to implement a possible second set of measures following the successful implementation of the ESM programme. These measures will be implemented if an update of the debt sustainability analysis produced by the institutions at the end of the programme shows they are needed to meet the agreed GFN benchmark, subject to a positive assessment from the institutions and the Eurogroup on programme implementation.” Again, there is no admission by the Eurogroup of unsustainable nature of Greek debt, and in fact there is a statement that only 'if' debt is deemed to be unsustainable at the medium-term future, then debt relief measures can be contemplated as possible. This neither amounts to (1) statement that does not agree with the IMF assertion that the Eurogroup realizes unsustainable nature of Greek debt burden; and (2) statement that does not agree with the IMF assertion that the Eurogroup put debt relief 'firmly on the table'.

More per IMF: Eurogroup “…accept the methodology that should be used to calibrate the necessary debt relief. They accept the objectives in terms of the gross financing need in the near term and in the long run. They even accept the time periods, a very long time period, over which this debt has to be met through 2060. And I think they are also beginning to accept more realism in the assumption.”

Again, do they? Let’s go back to the Eurogroup statement: “The Eurogroup recognises that over the exceptionally long time horizon of assessing debt sustainability there can be no forecasts, only assumptions, given the sizable degree of uncertainty over macroeconomic developments.” Have the Eurogroup accepted IMF’s assumptions? No. It simply said that things might change and if they do, well, then we’ll get back to you.

Things get worse from there on.

IMF: “We have not changed our view on how the outlook for debt is looking. We have not gone back. We want to assure you that we will not want big primary surpluses.” This statement, of course, refers to the IMF stating (see here) that Greek primary surpluses of 3.5% assumed under the DSA for Bailout 3.0 were unrealistic. And yet, quoting the Eurogroup document: the new agreement “provides further reassurances that Greece will meet the primary surplus targets of the ESM programme (3.5% of GDP in the medium-term), without prejudice to the obligations of Greece under the SGP and the Fiscal Compact.”  So, IMF says it did not surrender on 3.5% primary surplus for Greece being unrealistic, yet Eurogroup says 3.5% target is here to stay. Who’s spinning what?

IMF: “...I cannot see us facing this on a primary surplus that is above 1.5 [ percent of GDP]. I know it's just not credible in our view. And you will see that there is nothing in the European statement anymore that says 3.5 should be used for the DSA. So there, too, Europe is moving.” As I just quoted from the eurogroup statement clearly saying 3.5% surplus is staying.

IMF is again tangled up in long tales of courage played against short strides to surrender. PR balancing, face-savings, twisting, turning, obscuring… you name it, the IMF got it going here.

23/5/16: Greek Debt Sustainability and IMF's Pipe Dreams

IMF outlined its position on Greek debt sustainability, once again stressing the fact - known to everyone with an ounce of brain left untouched by Eurohopium injections from Brussels and Frankfurt : Greek debt is currently unsustainable.

Here are some details of the IMF’s latest encounter with reality:

Firstly, per IMF: Greek “debt was deemed sustainable, but not with high probability, when the first program was adopted in May 2010. Public debt was projected to surge from 115 percent of GDP to a peak of 150 percent of GDP, primarily because the expected internal devaluation implied declining nominal GDP while fiscal deficits were expected to add to the debt burden, but also because of the decision to forgo a private sector debt restructuring (PSI).”

Several things to note here. The extent of internal devaluation required for Greece is a function of several aspects of Euro area policies, most notably, lack of functional independent currency that can absorb - via normal devaluation - some of the shocks; lack of will on behalf of the EU to restructure official debt owed by Greece to EFSF/ESM pair of European institutions and to the ECB; and effective capture of virtually all Greek ‘assistance’ funds within the banking sector and external financing sector, with zero trickle down from these sectors funding to the real economy. In other words, there were plenty of sources for Greek debt non-sustainability arising from EU construct and policies.

Secondly, “the much deeper-than-expected recession necessitated significant debt relief in 2011-12 to maintain the prospect of restoring sustainability. Private creditors accepted large haircuts;… European partners provided very large NPV relief by extending maturities and reducing and deferring interest payments; and Fund maturities were lengthened…”

Which, of course is rather ironic. Lack of functional mechanisms for the recovery in the Greek case included, in addition to those internal to the Greek economic institutions, also the three factors outlined above. In other words, de facto, 2011-2012 restructuring of debt was, at least in part, compensatory measures for exogenous drivers of the Greek crisis. The EU paid for its own poor institutional set up.

However, as IMF notes, “European partners also pledged to provide additional debt relief—if needed—to meet specific debt-to-GDP targets (of 124 percent by 2020 and well under 110 percent by 2022). Critically for the DSA, the Greek government at the time insisted — supported by its European partners — on preserving the very ambitious targets for growth, the fiscal surplus, and privatization, arguing that there was broad political support for the underlying policies.”

Oh dear, per IMF, therefore (and of course the Fund is correct here), the idiocy of shooting Greece in both feet was of not only European making, but also of Greek making. No kidding: Greek own Governments have insisted (and continue to insist) on internecine, unrealistic and outright stupid targets that even the IMF is feeling nauseous about.

“Serious implementation problems caused a sharp deterioration in sustainability, raising fresh doubts about the realism of policy assumptions, especially from mid–2014. The authorities’ hoped-for broad political support for the program did not materialize…  causing long delays in concluding reviews, with only 5 of 16 originally scheduled reviews eventually completed. The problems mounted from mid-2014, with across-the-board reversals after the change of government in early-2015. Staff’s revised DSA—published in June 2015—suggested that the agreed debt targets for 2020-2022 would be missed by over 30 percent of GDP.”

This is clinical. Pre-conditions for August 2015 Bailout 3.0 were set by a combination of external (EU-driven) and internal (domestic politics-driven) factors that effectively confirmed the absolute absurdity of the whole programme. Yes, the IMF is trying to walk away now from sitting at the very same table where all of this transpired. And yes, the IMF deserves to be placed onto the second tier of blame here. Blame is due nonetheless, as the Fund could have attempted to seriously force the EU hand on changing the programme on a number of occasions, but it continued to support the Greek programme, broadly, even while issuing caveats.

But give a cheer to the Tsipras’ Government utter senility: “Critically, …the new government insisted—like its predecessor—that it could garner political support for the necessary underlying reforms.”


And now onto new stuff.

Per IMF’s today’s note: “developments since last summer suggest that a realignment of critical policy and DSA assumptions can no longer be deferred if the DSA is to remain credible. While there certainly has been progress in some areas under the new program that was put in place in August 2015 with support by the ESM, and growth and primary balance out-turns last year were better than expected, the government has not been able to mobilize political support for the overall pace of reforms that would be required to retain the June 2015 DSA’s still ambitious assumptions of a dramatic, rapid, and sustained improvement in productivity and fiscal performance. In all key policy areas—fiscal, financial sector stability, labor, product and service markets—the authorities’ current policy plans fall well short of what would be required to achieve their ambitious fiscal and growth targets.”

Pardon me here, but I seriously doubt the primary problem is with the Greek Government inability to mobilize political support. Actually, the real problem is that the entire framework is so full of imaginary numbers, that any Government in any state of political leadership will have zero chance at delivering on these projections. Yes, the Greeks are blessed with a Government that would’t be able to replace a battery in a calculator, but now, even with fresh batteries no calculator would be able to solve the required growth equations.

So, we have the IMF conclusion: “Consequently, staff believes that a realignment of assumptions with the evident political and social constraints on the pace and scope of adjustment is needed”. In more common parlance, the IMF has to revise its model assumptions as follows:

Primary surplus (aka - austerity):  The IMF recognizes that current tax rates are already too high in Greece (that’s right, the IMF actually finds Greek tax targets to be self-defeating), while expenditure cuts have been ad hoc, as opposed to structural. Thus, with “…tax compliance rates falling precipitously and discretionary spending already severely compressed, staff believes that the additional adjustment needed to allow Greece to run sustained primary surpluses over the long run can only be achieved if based on measures to broaden the tax base and lowering outlays on wages and pensions, which by now account for as much as 75 percent primary spending… This suggests that it is unrealistic to assume that Greece can undertake the additional adjustment of 4½ percent of GDP needed to base the DSA on a primary surplus of 3½ percent of GDP.”

This is bad. And it is direct. But IMF wants to make an even stronger point to get through the thick skulls of Greek authorities and their EU masters: “Even if Greece through a heroic effort could temporarily reach a surplus close to 3½ percent of GDP, few countries have managed to reach and sustain such high levels of primary balances for a decade or more, and it is highly unlikely that Greece can do so considering its still weak policy
making institutions and projections suggesting that unemployment will remain at double digits for several decades.” ‘Heroic’ efforts - even in theory - are not enough anymore, says the IMF. I would suggest they were never enough. But, hey, let’s not split hairs.

So to make things more ‘realistic’, the IMF estimates that primary surplus long run target should be 1.5 percent of GDP - full half of the previously required. Still, even this lower target is highly uncertain (per IMF) as it will require extraordinary discipline from the current and future Greek governments. Personally, I doubt Greece will be able to run even that surplus target for longer than 5 years before sliding into its ‘normal’ pattern of spending money it doesn’t have.

Growth (aka illusionary holy grail of debt/GDP ratios):  “Staff believes that the continued absence of political support for a strong and broad
acceleration of structural reforms suggests that it is no longer tenable to base the DSA on the assumption that Greece can quickly move from having one of the lowest to having the highest productivity growth rates in the eurozone.”

Reasons for doom? 

1. “…the bank recapitalization completed in 2015 was not accompanied by an upfront governance overhaul to overcome longstanding problems, including susceptibility to political interference in bank management. …in the absence of more forceful actions by regulators, and in view of the exceptionally large level of NPLs [non-performing loans] and high share of Deferred Tax Assets in bank capital, banks will be burdened by very weak balance sheets for years to come, suggesting that they will be unable to provide credit to the economy on a scale needed to support very ambitious growth targets.” There are several problems with this assessment. One: credit creation is unimaginable in the Greek economy today even if the banks were fully reformed because there is no domestic demand and because absent currency devaluation there is also no external demand. Two: despite a massive (95%+ of all bailout funds) injection into the banking sector, Greek NPLs remain unresolved. In a way, the EU simply wasted all the money without achieving anything real in the Greek case.
2. lack of structural reforms in the collective dismissals and industrial action frameworks “and the still extremely gradual pace at which Greece envisages to tackle its pervasive restrictions in product and service markets are also not consistent with the very ambitious growth assumptions”.

So, on the net, “against this background, staff has lowered its long-term growth assumption to 1¼ percent… Here as well the revised assumption remains ambitious in as much as it assumes steadfastness in implementing reforms that exceeds the experience to date, such that Greece would converge to the average productivity growth in the euro-zone over the long-term.”


So how bad are the matters, really, when it comes to Greek debt sustainability?

Per IMF: “Under staff’s baseline assumptions, there is a substantial gap between projected
outcomes and the sustainability objectives … The revised projections suggest that debt will be around 174 percent of GDP by 2020, and 167 percent by 2022. …Debt is projected to decline gradually to just under 160 percent by 2030 as the output gap closes, but trends upwards thereafter, reaching around 250 percent of GDP by 2060, as the cost of debt, which rises over time as market financing replaces highly subsidized official sector financing, more than offsets the debt-reducing effects of growth and the primary balance surplus”.

A handy chart to compare current assessment against June 2015 bombshell that almost exploded the Bailout 3.0

As a result of the above revised estimates/assumptions: a “substantial reprofiling of the terms of European loans to Greece is thus required to bring GFN down by around 20 percent of GDP by 2040 and an additional 20 percent by 2060,…based on a combination of three measures..:

• Maturity extensions: An extension of maturities for EFSF, ESM and GLF loans of, up to 14 years for EFSF loans, 10 years for ESM loans, and 30 years for GLF loans could reduce the GFN and debt ratios by about 7 and 25 percent of GDP by 2060 respectively. However, this measure alone would be insufficient to restore sustainability.
• …Extending the deferrals on debt service further could help reduce GFN further by 17 percent of GDP by 2040 and 24 percent by 2060, and …could lower debt by 84 percent of GDP by 2060 (This would imply an extension of grace periods on existing debt ranging from 6 years on ESM loans to 17 and 20 years for EFSF and GLF loans, respectively, as well as an extension of the current deferral on interest payments on EFSF loans by a further 17 years together with interest deferrals on ESM and GLF loans by up to 24 years). However, even in this case, GFN would exceed 20 percent by 2050, and debt would be on a rising path.
• To ensure that debt can remain on a downward path, official interest rates would need to be fixed at low levels for an extended period, not exceeding 1½ percent until 2040. …Adding this measure to the two noted above helps to reduce debt by 53 percent of GDP by 2040 and 151 percent by 2060, and GFN by 22 percent by 2040 and 39 percent by 2060, which satisfies the sustainability objectives noted earlier”.

So, in the nutshell, to achieve - theoretical - sustainability even under rather optimistic assumptions and with unprecedented (to-date) efforts at structural reforms, Greece requires a write-off of some 50% of GDP in net present value terms through 2040. Still, hedging its bets for the next 5 years, the IMF notes: “Even under the proposed debt restructuring scenarios, debt dynamics remain highly sensitive to shocks.”

In other words, per IMF, with proposed debt relief, Greece is probabilistically still screwed.

Which, of course, begs a question: why would the IMF not call for simple two-step approach to Greek debt resolution:

• Step 1: fix interest on loans at zero percent through 2040 or 2050 (placing bonds with the ECB and mandating the ECB monetizes interest on these bonds payable by EFSF/ESM et al). Annual cost would be issuance of ca EUR 2 billion in currency per annum - nothing that would add to the inflationary pressures in the euro area at any point in time;
• Step 2: require annual assessment of Greek compliance with reforms programme in exchange for (Step 1).

Ah, yes, I forgot, we have an ‘independent’ ECB… right, then… back to imaginative fiscal acrobatics.

One has to feel for the Greeks: screwed by Europe, screwed by their own governments and politically ‘corrected’ by the IMF. Now, wait, of course, all the upset must be directed toward getting rid of the latter. Because the former two cannot be anything else, but friends…

15/5/16: Don't Rush the Cheers for Eurozone Growth, Yet

Remember record-busting 0.6% preliminary flash estimate of the first estimate GDP growth figure for Euro area released back in April? Well, it sort of was true, sort of...

Eurostat now puts 1Q 2016 growth at 0.5% q/q in its updated estimate released today - 0.1% lower than the April estimate. This figure is tied jointly for highest q/q growth figure since 1Q 2011 when it hit 0.8%.

Sounds good? Brilliant - the euro area outperformed both the U.S. and the UK. But when one looks at annual rates of growth... things are not as shiny.

In annual terms, growth rate actually fell in 1Q 2016, from 1.6% in 2Q 215 through 4Q 2015 to 1.5% in 1Q 2016. You won't be jumping with joy on that. And as the euro area lead growth indicator, Eurocoin suggests, rates of growth have been declining over the last three months through April 2016, dropping from cyclical high of 0.48 in January 2016 to a 13-months low of 0.28 in April 2016:

There is a strong smell of smoke from the Eurostat figures. Demand side of the economy is apparently booming. Despite the fact that retail sales are tanking:

Meanwhile, external trade is also underperforming (on foot of euro appreciation from November 2015 lows against both the US dollar and British pound):

Euro bottomed out at around 1.057 to the dollar at the end of November, and steadily gained against the USD every month since, with current valuation around 1.13-1.14 range. This hardly supports European exports to the U.S. Controlling for volatility, similar trend is against British Pound. About the only thing going the euro way today is yen and it is immaterial to the Euro area’s economy.

So euro zone economic growth appears to be loosing momentum since the start of 2Q 2016. And there are both short term drivers for this and long term ones.

Short term drivers, as outlined above suggest that current risks environment appears to be titled to the downside:

• Eurozone Composite Output Index by Markit posted 53.0 in April against March 53.1. Statistically-speaking, the rate of growth effectively remained static. 
• German Composite PMI was at 53.6, which is an 11-months low, French Composite index reading was 50.2 (barely above the 50.0 line, but still at 3mo high), while Italian Composite PMI in April came in at 53.1, also 2 months high. 
• Importantly, the euro zone PMI indices have been moving out of step with the Global PMI readings. In April, while eurozone PMI declined marginally compered to the end of 1Q 2016, Global PMI reading marginally picked up, rising from 51.5 in March to 51.6 in April. 
• The ongoing stagnation in France continued, while solid expansions were noted in Germany, Italy, Spain and Ireland.
• Developed markets saw all-industry output rise at the fastest pace in three months during April. However, the rate of increase still one of the weakest registered during the past three years. Growth remained only modest in both the US and the UK (UK growth slowed to its weakest pace since March 2013). This puts pressure on demand for eurozone exports and, in turn, pressures profit margins and investment.
• Given 1Q growth estimate at 0.5% (q/q growth) from the Eurostat, current level of Eurocoin suggest quarterly growth slowdown to around 0.4%. 
• Ifo’s Economic climate indicator for the Euro area has now been on a clear declining trend since mid-2015 and is now at its lowest levels since 1Q 2015 and second lowest reading in two-and-a-half years.
• In Germany, consensus estimates put gross domestic product growth at 0.3 percent in the current quarter and 0.4 percent in 3Q and 4Q, with full year growth of around 1.5 percent.

My view: we might see 2Q growth coming in at 0.3-0.4 percent, if April trends continue into the rest of 2Q. Overall, I expect 2016 growth to be around 1.4-1.5 percent which is just about to the downside on current consensus estimate of 1.5 percent.


Long term drivers for structural euro zone growth weakness: Even with positive 1Q 2016 print on growth side, it is fairly clear that euro zone lacks serious growth catalysts.

Everyone is talking about Brexit referendum and the renewal of the Greek crisis as key threats. Put frankly - this is a smokescreen. When it comes to longer term euro zone growth prospects both are irrelevant. Growth within the euro area has nothing to do with the UK. And Greece has been effectively removed from the markets and economic agents' considerations - the country is no longer commanding any serious media attention (with markets fatigued by the never-ending 'crises'). With ESM / EFSF /ECB now seemingly the sole bearers of Greek debt (with IMF likely to take back seat in the Bailout 3.0 as per http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/05/11516-71-steps-guide-to-greek-crisis.html) Greek funding issues and any risk of a default are unlikely to trigger Grexit. Put more directly, even if Greece were to exit the Euro, no one will bat an eyelid over such an event.

Meanwhile, the real long term problems for the euro area are:

• Capex remains subdued across the entire euro area, including Germany, Italy, France. 
• Fiscal policy is currently largely neutral and it is hard to see how the euro area can find any significant capacity to increase fiscal spending. 
• ECB stimulus is working in the financial markets, but not on the ground - there is still too much debt and too little prospect for a return on capital. Quality borrowers are not rushing to take on loans for capex. And the banks are not too eager to lend to borrowers with legacy leverage problems. 
• Eurozone banking is still a mess: capital and loans restructuring is sporadic, rather than systematic, negative rates taking a bite out of margins, but even if this headwind is taken out, markets volatility is not helping. 

And there are even bigger structural headwinds:

1. Lack of agility in the structurally over-regulated and sclerotic economy: technological innovation is weak, adoption of technological innovation is weak, labour force quality is deteriorating, so productivity growth has collapsed. Entrepreneurship is weak. Employment is sluggish and of deteriorating quality. That’s supply side.
2. Demand side is improving due to a short term boost from the post-Great Recession cyclical recovery. But, legacy issues of debt across corporate and household sectors and public finances are still present.
3. On financial side: banks-intermediated funding model for capex is a drag on growth and there is zero momentum on equity and direct debt issuance sides. Even with ECB going into another round of TLTROs, issuance of new bonds has spiked primarily because of larger corporates issuance, not because of market deepening.
4. On policies front, there is total and comprehensive paralysis. EU is malfunctioning, torn apart by crises of European making. National governments have lost capacity to legislate because of delegation of so much decision making to Brussels in the past. Political discontent is rising everywhere. We now have growing proportions of core European countries’ populations - the Big 4s - wanting to reexamine the entire EU.

Europe has been Japanified. And there is little that it can do to avoid this stagnation trap. There is no hope that  fiscal policy can do what monetary policy has failed to deliver - the great hope of Keynesianistas. And with that, both the monetary and the fiscal sides of European growth equation are out. What's left? Endless low interest rates (with a risk of policy error, should Germans rebel against Draghi's uncountable puts) and endless painful quasi-deflating (through low demand) of debt. Aka, pain.

15/4/16: Slovakia v France: Risk Divergence

I love it when the good guys lead: "Slovakia leaps ahead of France, reveals country risk survey

Full article available here: http://www.euromoney.com/Article/3545875/Slovakia-leaps-ahead-of-France-reveals-country-risk-survey.html?copyrightInfo=true

My full comment on the matter:

"From macroeconomic perspective the two economies appear to be heading in the opposite direction.

While France is experiencing weakening growth momentum with forecast real GDP growth rates for 2016-2017 at around 1.55 percent on average and declining (1H 2015 compared to current, a forecast swing of around 0.05 percentage points), Slovakian economy is gaining speed, with current forecast growth rate at around 3.57 percent for 2016-2017, representing an upgrade of around 0.3 percentage points.

Much of this is accounted for by differences in investment (rising in Slovakia, as a share of GDP, while relatively stagnant in France), as well as growth in exports of goods and services (with Slovakia expected to outperform France in terms of growth in exports in both 2016 and 2017 - a reversal on 2015 outrun).

In fiscal policy terms, both countries are expected to post modest reduction in total burden of Government in the economy, reflected in the declining ratio of Government revenues to GDP over 2016-2017. However, in France, this forecast is less certain due to political cycle and ongoing lack of progress on both structural reforms and fiscal targets. In contrast, Slovakia already runs relatively lean, strongly value-for-money focused public spending policies. As the result, even under relatively rosy projections, France will continue to post greater Government deficits than Slovakia through 2017. Crucially, even with negative Government yields on French debt, France is currently running deeper primary deficits than Slovakia, which suggests that the French fiscal space is much thinner than headline difference between the two countries suggest.

The above dynamics also point to continued divergence between the two countries' paths in terms of external balances. Slovakia's current account surplus in 2016-2017 is likely to average at around 0.15 percent of GDP. In contrast, France's current account deficit is expected to be around 0.37 percent of GDP.

In simple terms, diverging macroeconomic and political risks paths do warrant risk repricing in the case of both Slovakia (to the downside of risks) and France (to the upside in terms of risks assessment) into 2016, and possibly into 2017."

The risk trends are indeed showing counter-movement:

14/3/2016: Foreign Investors, Sovereign Risks & Regulatory Clowns

Over 2012-2013, sovereign and corporate bonds markets started showing sigs of QE-related fatigue within the system, most commonly associated with periodically volatile trading spreads, term premia and risk spreads. In 2013, following the onset of the Fed-related “taper tantrum” many emerging markets spreads on their sovereign bonds widen dramatically, especially in response to rapid devaluations of their domestic currencies.

“This prompted market analysts to identify five of the worst hit economies as the “fragile five,” attributing their vulnerability to economic fundamentals, particularly to current account deficits.” Which is fine - current account is a reasonably important signal of the overall external balance in the economy, but… the but bit is that current account alone means little. Take for example Russia: back in 2013, the economy enjoyed record current account surpluses - so was a picture of rude health by the analysts criteria. Yet, within the economy there was already an apparent and fully recognised on-going structural slowdown.

Bickering over indicators validity aside, however, it would be nice to know which indicators and which risk models do investors flow when they decide to buy or sell emerging market bonds?

Traditionally, we think about two types of factors: “push” and “pull” factors, determining whether the emerging economy experiences capital inflows or outflows.

- “The push factors often relate to economic or financial developments in the global economy as a whole or in the advanced economies, notably the United States.”
- “The pull factors often relate to country-specific economic fundamentals in emerging markets”

Both push and pull factors seem to be important.

In analyzing returns on sovereign CDS contracts, the BIS paper looks at CDS returns “for 18 emerging markets and 10 advanced countries over 11 years of monthly data from January 2004 to December 2014.”

Findings in a nutshell:

• “Statistical tests for breaks in the movements of CDS returns suggest a break at the time of the eruption of the global subprime crisis in October 2008. This leads us to consider two subperiods separately, an “old normal” before the outbreak of the crisis and a “new normal” afterwards.”
• “In both the old normal and new normal, we seek to explain the variation of these [principal factors] loadings [onto risk premia] in terms of such fundamentals as debt-to-GDP ratios, fiscal balances, current account balances, sovereign credit ratings, trade openness, GDP growth and depth of the domestic bond market.”
• “In the old normal, the first risk factor alone explains about half of the variation in CDS returns…” 
• “This factor becomes more dominant in the new normal, in which it explains over three-fifths of the variation in returns.”
• “When it comes to how the different countries load on this factor, we find that that the commonly cited economic fundamentals have little influence on the country-specific loadings on the factor. Instead the single most important explanatory variable for the differences in loadings is a dummy variable that identifies whether or not a country is an emerging market.”

To summarise the BIS findings: “In the end, we find that CDS returns in the new normal move over time largely to reflect the movements of a single global risk factor, with the variation across sovereigns for the most part reflecting the designation of “emerging market”. There seems to be no “fragile five”; there are only emerging markets. While the emerging markets designation may serve to summarize many relevant features of sovereign borrowers, it is a designation that lacks the kind of granularity that we would have expected for a fundamental on which investors’ risk assessments are based. The importance of the emerging markets designation in the new normal suggests that index tracking behaviour by investors has become a powerful force in global bond markets.”

And the cherry on top of the proverbial pie? Why, here it goes: “Haldane (2014) has argued that in the world of international finance, the global subprime crisis and the regulations that followed made asset managers more important than banks. Miyajima and Shim (2014) show that even actively managed emerging market bond funds follow their benchmarks portfolios  quite closely. For the most part, when global investors invest in emerging markets, instead of picking and choosing based on country-specific fundamentals, they appear to simply replicate their benchmark portfolios, the constituents of which hardly change over time.”

Wait, what? All regulators are running around the world chasing the bad bankers (for their pre-2008 shenanigans), all the while the new threat has already migrated to asset management. The regulators and enforcers are busy bee-buzzing around courts and regulatory hearings chasing the elusive ‘signalling value’ of enforcing old rules onto the heads of the bankers. With little real outcome to show, I must add. … But the future culprits are not to be found amongst those who care to watch the fate of bankers unfolding in front of them.

In short, having exposed the farce of bond / CDS markets pricing risks based on a vague and vacuous designation of a country, the BIS paper inadvertently also exposed the massive futility of the financial regulators chasing their own tails trying to get past crises culprits to prevent new crises from happening, even though the future culprits don;t give a toss about the past culprits.

Dogs, tails, everything wagging everyone, and vice versa…


Full paper here: Amstad, Marlene and Remolona, Eli M. and Shek, Jimmy, “How Do Global Investors Differentiate between Sovereign Risks? The New Normal versus the Old” (January 2016). BIS Working Paper No. 541: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2722580

9/2/16: Currency Devaluation and Small Countries: Some Warning Shots for Ireland

In recent years, and especially since the start of the ECB QE programmes, euro depreciation vis-a-vis other key currencies, namely the USD, has been a major boost to Ireland, supporting (allegedly) exports growth and improving valuations of our exports. However, exports-led recovery has been rather problematic from the point of view of what has been happening on the ground, in the real economy. In part, this effect is down to the source of exports growth - the MNCs. But in part, it seems, the effect is also down to the very nature of our economy ex-MNCs.

Recent research from the IMF (see: Acevedo Mejia, Sebastian and Cebotari, Aliona and Greenidge, Kevin and Keim, Geoffrey N., External Devaluations: Are Small States Different? (November 2015). IMF Working Paper No. 15/240: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2727185) investigated “whether the macroeconomic effects of external devaluations have systematically different effects in small states, which are typically more open and less diversified than larger peers.”

Notice that this is about ‘external’ devaluations (via the exchange rate channel) as opposed to ‘internal’ devaluations (via real wages and costs channel). Also note, the data set for the study does not cover euro area or Ireland.

The study found “that the effects of devaluation on growth and external balances are not significantly different between small and large states, with both groups equally likely to experience expansionary [in case of devaluation] or contractionary [in case of appreciation] outcomes.” So far, so good.

But there is a kicker: “However, the transmission channels are different: devaluations in small states are more likely to affect demand through expenditure compression, rather than expenditure-switching channels. In particular, consumption tends to fall more sharply in small states due to adverse income effects, thereby reducing import demand.”

Which, per IMF team means that the governments of small open economies experiencing devaluation of their exchange rate (Ireland today) should do several things to minimise the adverse costs spillover from devaluation to households/consumers. These are:

1. “Tight incomes policies after the devaluation ― such as tight monetary and government wage policies―are crucial for containing inflation and preventing the cost-push inflation from taking hold more permanently. …While tight wage policies are certainly important in the public sector as the largest employer in many small states, economy-wide consensus on the need for wage restraint is also desirable.” Let’s see: tight wages policies, including in public sector. Not in GE16 you won’t! So one responsive policy is out.
2. “To avoid expenditure compression exacerbating poverty in the most vulnerable households, small countries should be particularly alert to these adverse effects and be ready to address them through appropriately targeted and efficient social safety nets.” Which means that you don’t quite slash and burn welfare system in times of devaluations. What’s the call on that for Ireland over the last few years? Not that great, in fairness.
3. “With the pick-up in investment providing the strongest boost to growth in expansionary devaluations, structural reforms to remove bottlenecks and stimulate post-devaluation investment are important.” Investment? Why, sure we’d like to have some, but instead we are having continued boom in assets flipping by vultures and tax-shenanigans by MNCs paraded in our national accounts as ‘investment’. 
4. “A favorable external environment is important in supporting growth following devaluations.” Good news, everyone - we’ve found one (so far) thing that Ireland does enjoy, courtesy of our links to the U.S. economy and courtesy of us having a huge base of MNCs ‘exporting’ to the U.S. and elsewhere around the world. Never mind this is all about tax optimisation. Exports are booming. 
5. “The devaluation and supporting policies should be credible enough to stem market perceptions of any further devaluation or policy adjustments.” Why is it important to create strong market perception that further devaluations won’t take place? Because “…expectations of further devaluations or an increase in the sovereign risk premium would push domestic interest rates higher, imposing large costs in terms of investment, output contraction and financial instability.” Of course, we - as in Ireland - have zero control over both quantum of devaluation and its credibility, because devaluation is being driven by the ECB. But do note that, barring ‘sufficient’ devaluation, there will be costs in the form of higher cost of capital and government and real economic debt.It is worth noting that these costs will be spread not only onto Ireland, but across the entire euro area. Should we get ready for that eventuality? Or should we just continue to ignore the expected path of future interest rates, as we have been doing so far? 

I would ask your friendly GE16 candidates for their thoughts on the above… for the laughs…

4/2/16: Tear Gas v Lagarde’s Tears: Greece

Here’s Greece on pensions reforms:

Source: https://www.rt.com/news/331265-greece-tear-gas-protet/#.VrN56JItCdA.twitter

Here’s IMF on same:

Note: to watch the video comment by Mme Lagarde on Greek situation, please click on this link: http://www.imf.org/external/mmedia/view.aspx?vid=4739363229001 (answer on Greece starts at 22’:22”). Otherwise, here’s official IMF transcript of it:

“I have always said that the Greek program has to walk on two legs: one is significant reforms and one is debt relief. If the pension [system] cannot be as significantly and substantially reformed as needed, we could need more debt relief on the other side. Equally, no [amount of debt relief] will make the pension system sustainable. For the financing of the pension system, the budget has to pay 10 percent of GDP. This is not sustainable. The average in Europe is 2.5 percent. It all needs to add up, but at the same time the pension system needs to be sustainable in the medium and long term. This requires taking short-term measures that will make it sustainable in the long term.

“I really don't like it when we are portrayed as the “draconian, rigorous terrible IMF.” We do not want draconian fiscal measures to apply to Greece, which have already made a lot of sacrifices. We have said that fiscal consolidation should not be excessive, so that the economy could work and eventually expand. But it needs to add up. And the pension system needs to be reformed, the tax collection needs to be improved so that revenue comes in and evasion is stopped. And the debt relief by the other Europeans must accompany that process.  We will be very attentive to  the sustainability of the reforms, to the fact that it needs to add up, and to walk on two legs. That will be our compass for Greece. But we want that country to succeed at the end of the day, but it has to succeed in real life, not on paper.”

Yep. Lots of good words and then there are those ungrateful Greeks who are just refusing to understand:

1. How can Mme Lagarde insist that there’s a second leg (debt relief) where the EU already said, repeatedly, there is none? and
2. How there can be sustainability to the Greek pensions reforms if there are actually people living on them day-to-day who may be unable to take a cut to their pay? Who's going to feed them? Care for them? On what money? Where has IMF published tests of proposed reforms with respect to their impact on pensioners?

Strangely, Mme Lagarde seems to be not that interested in answering either one of these concerns.

27/1/16: Russian Capital Outflows 2015: Abating, but Still High

In two recent posts, I covered Russian External Debt dynamics and drawdowns on Russian Sovereign Wealth Funds. Last, but not least, I am yet to cover capital inflows/outflows for 2015. So, as promised, here is a post covering these.

Based on data that includes preliminary reporting for 4Q 2015, full year 2015 net capital outflows from Russia amounted to USD56.9 billion, composed of USD33.4 billion outflows in the Banking Sector and USD23.5 billion outflows in ‘Other Sectors’. In the banking sector there were simultaneous disposals of some USD28.2 billion of assets and reduction of USD61.6 in liabilities (repayment of maturing debts and deposits).

Thus, 2015 marked the second lowest year in the last 5 in terms of net capital outflows. In comparison, 2014 net capital outflows stood at a whooping USD153 billion and 2013 saw outflows of USD61.6 billion. Net banks’ position improved from outflows of USD86.0 billion in 2014 to outflows of USD33.4 billion in 2015. Other Sectors outflows also improved in 2015. In 2015, this category of outflows amounted to USD23.5 billion, against USD67 billion in 2014. 2015 marked the slowest outflows year in this sector in 8 years.

Chart to illustrate dynamics:

On a quarterly basis, net capital outflows from Russia in 4Q 2015 are estimated at USD9.2 billion, down from USD76.2 billion in 4Q 2014. Capital outflows were lower in every quarter of 2015 compared to corresponding quarter of 2014 and in 3Q 2015 there was a net capital inflow of USD3.4 billion - the first net inflow in any quarter since 2Q 2010.

So on balance, Russian capital outflows remain strong, but are abating rapidly. Most of the outflows is accounted for by the deleveraging of the Banks followed by shallower deleveraging of the ‘Other Sectors’.

26/1/16: Russian External Debt: Deleveraging Goes On

In previous post, I covered the drawdowns on Russian SWFs over 2015. As promised, here is the capital outflows / debt redemptions part of the equation.

The latest data for changes in the composition of External Debt of the Russian Federation that we have dates back to the end of 2Q 2015. We also have projections of maturities of debt forward, allowing us to estimate - based on schedule - debt redemptions through 4Q 2015. Chart below illustrates the trend.

As shown in the chart above, based on estimated schedule of repayments, by the end of 2015, Russia total external debt has declined by some USD177.1 billion or 24 percent. Some of this was converted into equity and domestic debt, and some (3Q-4Q maturities) would have been rolled over. Still, that is a sizeable chunk of external debt gone - a very rapid rate of economy’s deleveraging.

Compositionally, a bulk of this came from the ‘Other Sectors’, but in percentage terms, the largest decline has been in the General Government category, where the decline y/y was 36 percent.

Looking at forward schedule of maturities, the following chart highlights the overall trend decline in debt redemptions coming forward in 2016 and into 2Q 2017.

Again, the largest burden of debt redemptions falls onto ‘Other Sectors’ - excluding Government, Central Bank and Banks.

The total quantum of debt due to mature in 2016 is USD76.58 billion, of which Government debt maturing amounts to just 1.7 billion, banks debts maturing account for USD19.27 billion and the balance is due to mature for ‘Other Sectors’.

These are aggregates, so they include debt owed to parent entities, debt owed to direct investors, debt convertible into equity, debt written by banks affiliated with corporates, etc. In other words, a large chunk of this debt is not really under any pressure of repayment. General estimates put such debt at around 20-25 percent of the total debt due in the Banking and Other sectors. If we take a partial adjustment for this, netting out ‘Other Sectors’ external debt held by Investment enterprises and in form of Trade Credit and Financial Leases, etc, then total debt maturing in 2016 per schedule falls to, roughly, USD 59.5 billion - well shy of the aggregate total officially reported as USD 76.58 billion.


So in a summary: Russian deleveraging continued strongly in 2015 and will be ongoing still in 2016. 2016 levels of debt redemptions across all sectors of the economy are shallower than in 2015. Although this rate of deleveraging does present significant challenges to the economy from the point of view of funds available for investment and to support operations, overall deleveraging process is, in effect, itself an investment into future capacity of companies and banks to raise funding. The main impediment to the re-starting of this process, however, is the geopolitical environment of sanctions against Russian banks that de facto closed access to external funding for the vast majority of sanctioned and non-sanctioned enterprises and banks.


Next, I will be covering Russian capital outflows, so stay tuned of that.

25/1/16: Russian Sovereign Funds: Down, but Not Out, Yet…

In the context of 2016 Budget, Russian sovereign reserves dynamics are clearly an important consideration. For example, in his recent statement, former Russian Finance Minister, Kudrin, has suggested that if Budget deficit reaches above 5% of GDP in 2016, the entire cushion of liquid foreign reserves held by the Government will be exhausted by the end of the year, leaving Russia exposed to big cuts in the budget for 2017. This is similar to the positions of Russia's Economy Minister Alexei Ulyukayev and the current Finance Minister Anton Siluanov.

The expectations are based on three considerations:
1) 2015 dynamics of Russian sovereign wealth funds;
2) Funds outflows expected under the external debt repayment schedules; and
3) A potentially massive call on Russian reserves from the VEB capital requirements.

I covered the last point earlier here. So let’s take a look at the first point.

Russia’s main and more liquid Reserve Fund shrank substantially last year as it carried out its explicit mandate to provide support for fiscal balance. Set up in 2008, the fund holds only liquid foreign assets and 2015 became the first year since the Great Recession and the Global Financial Crisis (2009-2010 in Russia’s case) when it experienced net withdrawals. The value of the fund fell from roughly USD90 billion to ca USD50 billion by the end of December 2015.

However, the key to these holdings is their Ruble equivalent, as Russian budgetary expenditures are in domestic currency. By this metric, the Fund has been doing somewhat better. By end of December 2015, the Reserve Fund held assets valued at RUB3.6 trillion, amounting to almost 5 percent of Russian GDP or roughly 1.7 times Budget 2016 requirement for deficit coverage. Budget 2016 is based on expectation that the Reserve Fund will supply some RUB2.1 trillion to cover the deficit.

The sticking point is that Budget 2016 - in its current reincarnation - is based on oil price of USD50pb. The Ministry of Finance is currently preparing amended Budget based on USD30-35pb price of Brent, but we are yet to see the resulting deficits projections. What we do know is that the Government has requested up to 10 percent cuts across public expenditure for 2016. Absent such cuts, and if oil prices remain around USD30pb mark, the deficit is likely to balloon to the levels where 2016 deficit will end up fully depleting the Reserve Fund.

Added safety cushion, of course, will be provided by devaluation of the Ruble. This worked pretty well in 2015, but the problem going into 2016 is that required further devaluations will likely bring Ruble into USDRUB 90+ range, inducing severe redistribution of losses onto the shoulders of consumers and cutting hard into companies investment in new equipment and technologies.

Bofit provided a handy chart showing the dynamics of Fund resources and a breakdown of these dynamics by key factors

Aside from the Reserve Fund, Russia also has the National Welfare Fund which was set up to underwrite public pensions. The Fund has been used to provide capital and funding to Russian banks shut out of the international borrowing in form of bonds purchases and deposits with the banks, as well as to some Russian companies, in form of debt purchases. These deposits and loans, however, are not liquid and, therefore, not available for fiscal supports. About only hope for some liquidity extraction from these allocations is via Russian corporates using cash flows from exports to repay the Fund - something that is unlikely to create significant buffers for the Budget.

At the end of 2015, the National Welfare Fund held assets valued at USD72 billion, of which USD48 billion (or RUB3.5 trillion) was held in relatively liquid foreign-currency assets and the balance held in assets written against domestic systemically important banks and companies. Even assuming - optimistically - that 10 percent of the residual assets can be cashed in over 2016, the liquidity available from the Fund runs to around USD50 billion.

Thus, total liquidity cushion held by two Russian SWFs currently amounts to USD100 billion without adjusting for liquidity risks and costs, and if we are to take nominal adjustments for these two factors, liquidity cushion probably falls to USD75-80 billion total.

It is worth noting, however, that Russia has other international reserves at its disposal. Per official data, as of the ned of December 2015, total International Reserves stood at USD368.4 billion, down USD17.06 billion on December 2014 and down USD222.17 billion on all time peak. In accessible reserves, Russia has International funds (excluding SDRs and IMF reserves) of USD363.07 billion.

I will be covering funds outflows schedule for 2016 in a separate post, so stay tuned.

14/1/16: Debt in Sub-Saharan Africa & Country-Specific Risks

The age of QE in the West, as well as the Great Recession and the Global Financial Crisis have both undoubtedly left some serious scars on the Emerging Markets. One example is the rising (once again) debt in the countries that prior to 2007 have benefited from major debt restructuring initiatives. Here is the new World Bank paper assessing the extent of debt accumulation in Sub-Saharan Africa post-2007.

"Sub-Saharan African countries as a group showed a considerable reduction in public and external indebtedness in the early 2000s as a result of debt relief programs, higher economic growth, and improved fiscal management for some countries. More recently, however, vulnerabilities in some countries are on the rise, including a few with very rapid debt accumulation."

Across Sub-Saharan African countries, "borrowing to support fiscal deficits since 2009, including through domestic markets and Eurobond issuance, has driven a net increase in public debt for all countries except oil exporters benefitting from buoyant commodity prices and fragile states receiving post-2008 Highly Indebted Poor Country relief. Current account deficits and foreign direct investment inflows drove the external debt dynamics, with balance of payments problems associated with very rapid external debt accumulation in some cases. Pockets of increasing vulnerabilities of debt financing profiles and sensitivity of debt burden indicators to macro-fiscal shocks require close monitoring."

And looking forward, things are not exactly promising: "Specific risks that policy makers in Sub-Saharan Africa need to pay attention to going forward include the recent fall in commodity prices, especially oil, the slowdown in China and the sluggish recovery in Europe, dependence on non-debt-creating flows, and accounting for contingent liabilities."

Full paper: Battaile, Bill and Hernandez, Fernando Leonardo and Norambuena, Vivian, Debt Sustainability in Sub-Saharan Africa: Unraveling Country-Specific Risks (December 21, 2015). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 7523 is available via SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2706885

23/12/15: Vnesheconombank: where things stay ugly

As reported by BOFIT, Russia’s 4th largest and state-owned Vnesheconombank  (VEB Group which technically is not a bank, but a development bank and an owner of a number of banks, so as such VEB is not subject to CBR supervision) requires estimated funding supports at EUR15–20 billion “to cover at least the next few years”.  Per Bloomberg, VEB has been seeking USD23 billion “to support long-term growth and pay off the upcoming loan” (data as of November 23). VEB total assets in Russia amount to ca EUR45 billion, which, per BOFIT, “would make VEB Russia’s fourth largest bank with holdings that correspond to about 4 % of the banking sector’s total assets”. Overall, VEB holds 2.8 trillion Rubles in loans assets and around 1 trillion Rubles in other assets.

To-date, VEB received EUR8 billion in deposits from the National Welfare Fund and about EUR500 million in other monies (most of which came from the Central Bank’s 2014 profits).

Per both, Bloomberg and BOFIT: VEB has been a major lender behind Sochi Winter Olympics 2014. New lending increased total loans held by the bank by some 25% in Ruble terms in 2013 before doubling loans in 2014. VEB started aggressive loans expansion in 2007 since when its assets base grew almost 10-fold. Over 2015, bank-held loans posted some serious deterioration in quality forcing bank to set aside significant reserves to cover potential losses. Per Reuters report, “S&P estimates some 500 billion roubles of VEB's loans were directed by the government and are therefore regarded as relatively risky. While the huge investments made in Sochi have generated public discussion in Russia, far less attention has been given to no less massive investments VEB made in Ukraine. "That's still on their books and they keep rolling those loans over. Of course it's only a question of time before they accept losses on those assets," said S&P's Vartapetov. In an interview in December 2013, VEB Chairman Vladimir Dmitriev said the bank had via Russian investors ploughed $8 billion into Ukrainian steel plants, mainly in the Donbass region, since ravaged in a separatist conflict. He said the investment had supported 40,000 Ukrainian workers, but did not say how the Russian economy had benefited.” Overall, Russian banks’ continued presence and even growth in Ukraine - while puzzling to some external observers - can be explained by the significant role these banks play in the Ukrainian economy.

In 2014, VEB posted full year loss of USD4.5 billion / RUB250 billion and in 1H 2015 losses totalled USD1.5 billion. VEB’s Ukrainian subsidiary was one of the big drivers for these. Based on the figures, VEB posted the largest loss of any Russian company in 2014.  The top three largest loss making companies in 2014 were: Vnesheconombank, followed by the steelmaking giant Mechel (loss of 167 billion rubles) and the monopoly Russian Railways (losses of 99 billion rubles).

In addition, VEB holds some USD19.3 billion of debt maturing through 2025 (see chart from Bloomberg) with EUR9 billion of this in eurobonds:

VEB is subject to both EU and US sanctions which effectively shut VEB access to funding markets and the bank will require between EUR2.5 and 3 billion for debt servicing in 2016 alone. This week, VEB secured a five-year loan of 10 billion yuan or EUR1.4 billion from China Development Bank.

Recently, Finance Minister Anton Siluanov stated that VEB requires as much as USD20 billion in funding (ca 1.7% of Russian GDP), and that VEB is expected to sell some of its assets to fund part of the gap.


Per Bloomberg, “the finance ministry’s proposals include exchanging the lender’s Eurobonds for Russian government securities, Vedomosti reported Nov. 24. Other options on the table include a local government bond offering for 1.5 trillion rubles to recapitalize the bank, and transferring bad assets from VEB’s balance sheet to the state, according to newspaper Kommersant.”

28/10/15: Russian Economy Update: Consumption and Debt

Updating Russian stats: September consumption and deleveraging: bigger clouds, brighter silver lining. 

In basic terms, as reported by BOFIT, per Rosstat, Russian seasonally-adjusted retail sales (by volume) fell more than 10% y/y in September, with non-food sales driving the figure deeper into the red. On the ‘upside’, services sales to households fell less than overall retail sales. This accelerates the rate of decline in household consumption expenditure - over 1H 2015, expenditure fell just under 9% y/y. Small silver lining to this cloud is that household debt continued to decline as Russian households withdrew from the credit markets and focused on increased savings (most likely precautionary savings).

Russian households are not the only ones that are saving. Overall external debt of the Russian Federation fell, again, in 3Q 2015, with preliminary data from the Central Bank of Russia figures putting total foreign debt at USD522bn as of end-September, down just over USD30bn compared to 2Q 2015. Per official estimates, ca 50 percent of the overall reduction q/q in external debt came from repayment of credit due, while the other 50 percent was down to devaluation of the ruble (ca 20 percent of Russian external debt was issued in Rubles).

Overall, 3Q 2015 saw some USD40 billion of external debt maturing, which means that over 1/4 of that debt was rolled over by the non-bank corporations. Per CBR estimates, ca 40% of the external debt owed by the Russian non-bank corporations relates to intragroup loans - basically debt owed across subsidiaries of the same percent entity. And over recent quarters, this type of debt has been increasing as the proportion of total debt, most likely reflecting two sub-trends:
1) increasing refinancing of inter-group loans using intra-group funds; and
2) increasing conversion of intra-group investments/equity into intragroup debt (and/or some conversion of FDI equity into intra-group debt).

Over the next 12 months (from the start of 4Q 2015), Russian foreign debt maturity profile covers USD87 billion in maturing obligations against country currency reserves of USD370 billion-odd. As noted by BOFIT, “A common rule-of-thumb suggests that a country’s reserves need to be sufficient to cover at least 100% of its short-term foreign debt to avoid liquidity problems.” Russia’s current cover is closer to 430%. And that is absent further ruble devaluations.

A chart via BOFIT:

10/10/15: IMF’s Macro Data and That “Iceland v Ireland” Question, again

Recently, I posted some data from the IMF Fiscal Monitor for October 2015 comparing fiscal performance of Iceland and Ireland and showing the extent tp which Iceland outperforms Ireland in terms of fiscal deficits and Government debt metrics. You can see the full post here.

Now, consider economic performance, especially of interest given recently strong performance by Ireland in terms of GDP, GNP and even Domestic Demand growth rates.

So let’s take a look at IMF's latest economic data and revisit that "Iceland v Ireland" question.

Let;s first take a look at the real GDP per capita, setting peak pre-crisis levels of 2007 (for both countries) as 100 index reading and tracing evolution of the real GDP per capita. Both countries are expected to regain their pre-crisis GDP per capita levels in 2015, with Iceland reaching 0.17% above the pre-crisis peak and Ireland reaching 0.29% above the same measure.

We are not going to dwell on the gargantuan (20%+) GDP/GNP spread or the fact that Irish Domestic Consumption per capita is nowhere near pre-crisis peak (see here). In pure real GDP per capita terms, Iceland is doing as well or as badly as Ireland so far.

The same applies to GDP per capita expressed in current prices and adjusted for differences in exchange rates and price levels (the Purchasing Power Parity adjustment). Iceland is at 112.9 index reading in 2015 forecast, Ireland at 113.1 index reading. For 2016, Iceland is forecast to be around 117.5, Ireland at 117.8. Neck-in-neck.

However, when it comes to the labour market performance, the close proximity between two countries vanishes.

Unemployment rate in Iceland rose from 2.3% in 2007 to a peak of 7.525% in 2010 and is expected to be at 4.3% in 2015, falling to forecast rate of 4.1% by 2016-2017 before rising to 4.4% in 2020. Ireland is faring much worse. Our unemployment rate was double Iceland’s in 2007 - at 4.67% and this peaked in 2012 at 14.67%. Since 2012, the rate fell, with 2015 outlook set at 9.58% - more than double Iceland’s rate, falling gradually to 6.9% in 2020 - more than 50 percent higher than Iceland’s.

Employment rate also tells the story of Iceland’s outperformance. And worse - dynamically, this outperformance is set to continue deteriorating for Ireland. In 2007, Iceland’s total employment ratio to total population was 57.5% against Ireland’s 49% - a gap of 8.5 percentage points. This year, per IMF projections Iceland’s employment ratio will be around 55.8% against Ireland’s 42.2% - a gap of 13.6 percentage points. In 2016 (the furthers forecast by the IMF), Iceland’s employment rate is projected to be 56.5% against Ireland’s 42.7% - a gap of 13.8 percentage points.

Since the beginning of the crisis, Irish policymakers extolled the virtue of our open economy and exports as the drivers for economic recovery. Aptly, we commonly regard ourselves to be a powerhouse of exporting activities. Which means that we should be leading Iceland in terms of our external balances performance. Reality is a bit more mixed. Iceland’s current account deficit stood at a whooping 22.8% of GDP in 2008 on foot of strong ‘imports’ of capital into the banking system. Ireland’s was more benign at 5.73% of GDP. However, since the peak of the crisis, both countries achieved massive improvements in their current account balances, with 2014 ending with Iceland posting a current account surplus of 3.41% of GDP and Ireland posting a current account surplus of 3.62% of GDP. However, in 2015, IMF forecast for current account balance shows Iceland pulling ahead of Ireland, with current account surplus of 4.61% of GDP against Ireland’s 3.2% of GDP. This gap - in favour of Iceland - is expected to persist (per IMF) through 2020.

Table below summarises the sheer magnitude of positive adjustments to pre-crisis and crisis worst points of performance on all metrics above, through 2015 for both countries:

In summary: 

• In absolute terms, both Ireland and Iceland have made big adjustments on low points of performance pre-crisis and at the peak of the crisis through 2015. 
• Iceland clearly outperforms Ireland in labour market terms. 
• Ignoring the caveats on composition of Irish GDP, Ireland and Iceland perform basically in similar terms in terms of economic activity recovery. 
• In terms of external balances, Iceland currently leads Ireland, after having lagged Ireland through 2012. 
• Iceland solidly outperforms Ireland in fiscal metrics of Government debt and deficit dynamics.

The evidence above is sufficient to reject the claims that Ireland outperforms Iceland in recovery.